Petroships Investment Pte Ltd v Wealthplus Pte Ltd and others and another matter [2016] SGCA 17

Introduction

Case law is the lifeblood of the common law system in general and the Singapore legal system in particular. This is not surprising as case law is, in fact, a foundational building block in the genius of the common law and equity as we know it. Case law is often also an integral part of the process of statutory interpretation. It is, however, important to note that case law is not important for its own sake. It must be relevant. On rare occasions, it is not. One such occasion would be when a legal rule or principle is being formulated for the very first time – and/or for which there is no (or at least no directly relevant) case law authority. At this juncture, the court must have recourse to general (or, more accurately, first) principles (which would entail an analysis which is guided, inter alia, by context, reason as well as common sense). As we shall see in a moment, this is precisely one such occasion. The judgment against which the present appeal has been brought (see Petroships Investment Pte Ltd v Wealthplus Pte Ltd and others [2015] SGHC 145 (“the GD”)) focused on whether or not the pre-requisites pursuant to s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“s 216A”) had been satisfied (in particular, whether the claim had been brought in good faith). However, in our view, the threshold issue was whether or not s 216A was even applicable in the first place – particularly given the fact that the company concerned was already in liquidation. In this last-mentioned regard, there was a dearth of directly relevant case law. Recourse had to be had to general principles. In this regard, it was clear, in our view, that s 216A was not applicable where the company concerned had gone into liquidation. Hence, it was unnecessary for us to inquire (as the court below did) into the application of s 216A since, ex hypothesi, this provision was not applicable in the first place. We now set out the detailed grounds for our decision.

Facts

Project to exploit land use rights in China

The appellant was Petroships Investments Pte Ltd (“Petroships”), which was a minority shareholder in Wealthplus Pte Ltd (“Wealthplus”). Wealthplus was the first respondent. Its shareholders (and their shareholdings) were:

(a) Megacity Investment Pte Ltd (“Megacity”), the third respondent: 49%;

(b) Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte) Ltd (“KBBCE”): 41%; and

(c) Petroships: 10%.

The ultimate parent company of Megacity and KBBCE was Koh Brothers Group Limited (“Koh Bros Group”), which was the second respondent. Listed in 1994, Koh Bros Group describes itself as a well-established construction, property development and specialist engineering solutions provider. It offers construction services with various subsidiaries, joint ventures and associated companies in Asia, including China.

Early in 1998, Koh Bros Group founder, Koh Tiat Meng, invited Alan Chan, who controlled Petroships, to invest in a project to exploit certain land use rights in China. These rights, to develop five plots of land in Shantou, China, were initially held by KBBCE. Alan Chan agreed. Wealthplus was created as the investment vehicle for the project and held the land use rights through certain subsidiaries. Initially, Megacity and Petroships were the only two shareholders of Wealthplus. In 2011, Megacity transferred a portion of its 90% shareholding to KBBCE such that the former held 49% and the latter held 41% shareholding.

From July 1998 to September 2009, Wealthplus had three directors on its board. Petroships nominated Alan Chan. Megacity nominated Koh Teak Huat (Koh Tiat Meng’s brother) and Koh Keng Siang (Koh Tiat Meng’s son). Besides being Wealthplus directors, Koh Teak Huat and Koh Keng Siang were also directors in other companies within the Koh Bros Group.

Sale of land use rights

The project to exploit the land use rights in China did not come to pass. In August 2007, Wealthplus caused the rights to be sold with Petroships’ consent. Wealthplus’ subsidiaries collectively received $19.4m in sale proceeds. From 2008, Petroships started agitating for its share of the profits of the investment, the recovery of its capital and the repayment of its $1.1m loan to Wealthplus. Disagreements arose between Alan Chan on one side, and Koh Teak Huat and Koh Keng Siang on the other. This led Alan Chan to resign from his Wealthplus directorship in September 2009.

Series of suits

The disagreements spawned a series of successive suits that Petroships commenced against Megacity, Wealthplus and Koh Bros Group in different combinations. All were struck out. They are summarised as follows:

(a) On 27 March 2009, Petroships sued Megacity (Suit No 280 of 2009). It alleged that Megacity had failed to pay Petroships its share of the profits arising from the investment (amounting to $117,728), and that Megacity had failed to repay Petroships’ $1.1m loan. On 21 August 2009, the case was struck out on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.

(b) On 12 January 2010, Petroships sued Megacity and Wealthplus (Suit No 23 of 2010). It alleged that Wealthplus had failed to repay Petroships’ $1.1m loan, that Megacity had failed to procure Wealthplus’ repayment of the loan, that Petroships, as a minority shareholder, had been oppressed by Wealthplus’ delay in repaying the loan, and that Megacity and Wealthplus had acted in an unfairly discriminatory way towards Petroships. Petroships sought an order for Megacity to procure Wealthplus to repay the $1.1m loan and, alternatively, an order for Wealthplus to be wound up and to be ordered to repay the loan. On 9 September 2010, the case was struck out for breach of a peremptory order – Petroships had failed to meet timelines for the filing of documents.

(c) On 12 October 2010, Petroships sued Megacity and Wealthplus again (Suit No 783 of 2010). The claim was identical to that in the preceding suit. On 11 May 2011, it was struck out for being scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and/or otherwise an abuse of the court process.

(d) On 25 November 2011, Petroships sued Koh Bros Group in Suit No 867 of 2011 (“Suit 867/2011”). It alleged that both parties had a contractual relationship. Petroships alleged that Koh Bros Group had wrongfully caused Wealthplus to enter into various transactions against its interest. Petroships also alleged that Koh Bros Group had failed to repay the $1.1m loan, failed to distribute to Petroships its share of the profits realised by Wealthplus, and was liable to account for Petroships’ share of Wealthplus’ profits.

Preceding the last-mentioned suit (ie, Suit 867/2011) was a letter dated 17 August 2011 to Koh Tiat Meng, in which Alan Chan (through his solicitors) questioned four transactions (“the four transactions”) that Wealthplus had entered into. Petroships claimed that these transactions did not seem to be in Wealthplus’ interests, viz:

(d) a sum of $559,631, being director’s fees paid in 2008 and 2009.

Wealthplus’ solicitors replied to the aforementioned letter and stated that Wealthplus was the more appropriate party to address these queries. Wealthplus told Alan Chan that its directors would be pleased to answer his queries at its coming annual general meeting, which took place on 22 November 2011. At the meeting, the explanations offered were as follows:

(a) the transfer of various sums to companies within the Koh Bros Group was part of the reimbursement cost for the acquisition of the land in China as per the joint venture agreement dated 8 June 1998;

(b) the write-off of S$135,005 comprised mainly the outstanding balances due from Wealthplus’ three former subsidiaries in China (which had been disposed of in the 2007 financial year) to their immediate holding company, which could not be recovered;

(c) the provision for impairment of $651,658 included:

(i) an outstanding balance of $537,253 due from the three former subsidiaries (which were disposed of in the 2007 financial year) to related companies in China, the recovery of which was doubtful; and

(ii) a prepayment of S$112,335 for an amount incurred by a director relating to the disposal of the land in China; and

(d) Wealthplus provided director’s remuneration to Koh Teak Huat, as he was the only director who actively managed Wealthplus’ business. He was paid director’s remuneration for contributions made in respect of the disposal of land in China. Koh Keng Siang and Alan Chan received no directors’ remuneration.

Dissatisfied with this response, Petroships commenced Suit 867/2011 three days after the 2011 AGM. On 26 March 2012, the suit was struck out for being frivolous and vexatious; the assistant registrar found that Petroships had failed to adduce any evidence of a contractual relationship with Koh Bros Group. On 10 May 2012, Petroships’ appeal to the High Court was dismissed.

The s 216A application

On 19 June 2012, Petroships served notice on Wealthplus’ directors as required under s 216A(3)(a) (hereafter, all statutory provisions refer to the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) unless otherwise stated). This informed the directors of the minority shareholder’s intention to apply for leave to bring a statutory derivation action in Wealthplus’ name against its directors if they failed to provide a full explanation of the four transactions within 14 days, or to commence necessary legal actions against the directors (for having caused Wealthplus to make the four transactions) and various companies in the Koh Bros Group (for recovery of the transferred monies).

Wealthplus’ directors failed to act on Petroships’ notice. On 14 August 2012, Petroships filed Originating Summons No 766 of 2012 (“OS 766”) to seek the court’s leave to commence a derivative action against the two groups of defendants. In one group were the Wealthplus directors, Koh Teak Huat and Koh Keng Siang. In the other group were Megacity, KBBCE, Koh Bros Group, and other related companies in the Group. The subject matter of the proposed derivative action comprised the four transactions (that Alan Chan queried on 17 August 2011 (see above at [9])) which were alleged to be among the transactions which did not appear to be in Wealthplus’ interests in Suit 867/2011.

Wealthplus in members’ voluntary liquidation

On 21 August 2012, a week after OS 766 was filed, Wealthplus was placed in members’ voluntary liquidation through a special resolution passed by the requisite majority of its shareholders. Petroships applied unsuccessfully for an injunction to restrain Wealthplus from acting on the resolution. Liquidators were appointed (“the liquidators”).

On 9 October 2012, Petroships drew to the liquidators’ attention the four transactions. It asked them if they accepted the directors’ explanations and whether they would be taking any action to vindicate Wealthplus’ rights. On 16 November 2012, the liquidators stated that they intended to take steps to investigate Petroships’ allegations provided, inter alia, that the shareholders consented. However, the shareholders could not arrive at any consensus. On 28 January 2013, the liquidators thus applied to the High Court for directions. But before the application could be heard, Megacity and KBBCE (who owned a combined 90% of Wealthplus) requisitioned an extraordinary general meeting to consider a resolution to remove the liquidators from office. The application was adjourned pending the meeting, which was scheduled in August 2013. Before the meeting, the liquidators accepted the inevitable and tendered their resignations. At the meeting on 21 August 2013, Wealthplus resolved to accept the liquidators’ resignations and appoint new liquidators.

Petroships asked the new liquidators (“the new liquidators”) about the four transactions. The new liquidators indicated that they did not intend to take over the previous liquidators’ application, which was accordingly withdrawn. The new liquidators adopted a neutral stance with regard to Petroships’ application in OS 766. In September 2013, Koh Bros Group and Megacity applied successfully to be added as respondents to oppose the application.

Decision of the court below

In OS 766, the High Court judge (“the Judge”) did not grant Petroships leave to commence derivative action. While Petroships had complied with the notice pre-requisite (see above at [12]), he held that the pre-requisites in s 216A(3)(b) and s 216A(3)(c) were not met.

He was not satisfied that Petroships was acting in good faith within the meaning of s 216A(3)(b) for the following reasons:

(a) Petroships had an illegitimate collateral purpose in seeking leave to bring the derivative action as its “real purpose” was to recover its $1.1m loan to Wealthplus and its share of the profits from its investment in Wealthplus (see the GD at [101]). This inference was irresistible from the nature of the actions previously commenced by Petroships.

(b) The Judge, referring to the English High Court decision of Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2010] BCC 420, accepted that a shareholder acted in good faith so long as its “dominant purpose” was to benefit the company. On this test, the Judge held that Petroships’ collateral purpose was its dominant purpose in pursuing the derivative action, as it would not otherwise have brought the application (see the GD at [146]–[147]).

(c) Petroships’ delay in applying for leave to commence the derivative action could be taken as an indication that it lacked the requisite good faith. Each time it had a choice, Petroships pursued a remedy for alleged wrongs which it claimed to have suffered in preference to vindicating Wealthplus’ rights (see the GD at [115]–[116]).

(d) Alan Chan was dishonest in the course of the hearing and his lack of honesty was attributable to Petroships (see the GD at [117]).

(e) Petroships failed to name Alan Chan as a defendant in the proposed derivative action although Wealthplus had entered into most of the impugned transactions while he was a director (from July 1998 to September 2009). This meant that Wealthplus had a similarly arguable claim against Alan Chan for breach of directors’ duties as well. That Petroships did not propose to sue him was evidence of its collateral purpose, which had nothing to do with remedying the wrongs allegedly suffered by Wealthplus (see the GD at [129]–[138]).

As the s 216A pre-requisites are cumulative, the Judge recognised that it was unnecessary to go on to assess if Petroships’ proposed action was prima facie in Wealthplus’ interests within the meaning of s 216A(3)(c). However, he found that Petroships’ application failed under this limb as well.

The Judge stated that the question of whether a proposed derivative action was prima facie in the company’s interests involved not just an assessment of the legal merits of the action to determine if it was “legitimate and arguable” but also a holistic consideration of whether the action was in the “practical and commercial interests of the company” (see the GD at [152]–[153]). This was where the Judge considered the fact that Wealthplus was in liquidation. He was prepared to assume that the proposed derivative action was legitimate and arguable. However, he found that the action was not prima facie in the company’s interests as the remedy that Petroships sought – for its proposed action to be given independent consideration untainted by the majority shareholders’ self-interest – was available by a means which did not require Wealthplus to be brought into litigation against its will. Redress was available through the liquidators (see the GD at [154]).

The Judge observed that, in liquidation, control shifted from the self-interested majority to the liquidator, who was duty bound to exercise his powers “competently and impartially, without fear or favour” (see the GD at [157]). In liquidation, it was the liquidator and not the board of directors who was empowered under the Act (see s 305(1)(b) read with s 272(2)(a)) to unilaterally bring or defend legal proceedings in the name of the company, without having to seek shareholders’ approval at a general meeting (see the GD at [156]). Therefore, the underlying rationale for a derivative action “largely” disappeared when the company was in liquidation (see the GD at [157]).

The Judge dismissed Petroships’ argument that the derivative action had continued relevance despite the fact that Wealthplus had entered into liquidation. Petroships argued that in a members’ voluntary liquidation, the majority shareholders retained the power to remove the liquidator under s 294(3). This meant that Wealthplus’ new liquidators would not act against the wrongdoing majority for fear of being removed from their appointments. The Judge disagreed. Petroships had provided no grounds to support its conclusion. He also held that a derivative action was inappropriate even if Petroships could demonstrate that the liquidators had refused to act on the allegations out of self-interest. In such a situation, the Act and common law provided Petroships with alternative avenues to pursue its claims without having to commence a derivative action. First, it could apply to court for the liquidators to be replaced with its nominees under s 302. Second, it could apply to court for a reversal of the liquidators’ decision and seek a direction for the liquidators to commence action under s 315. Third, it could invite the court to exercise its common law power to order the liquidators to allow Petroships, as a contributory and therefore a party to the liquidation, to bring proceedings in the name of the company, provided that Petroships agreed to give the necessary indemnities (see the GD at [162]). We would also observe, parenthetically, that an action could also be brought against a liquidator for breach of duty under s 341 (see also Tan Cheng Han SC (gen ed), Walter Woon on Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, Revised, 2009) (“Walter Woon on Company Law”) at para 17.146).

The parties’ arguments on appeal

The appellant’s case

Before us, Petroships maintained that it was acting in good faith within the meaning of s 216A(3)(b). Petroships denied that it harboured a collateral purpose – its primary purpose was to recover debts due to Wealthplus, which then stood to recover a significant amount of assets for distribution in liquidation. Petroships submitted that even if its dominant purpose was to obtain a remedy for the alleged wrongs that it had suffered, this was entirely consistent with Wealthplus’ interests. Petroships was entitled to act in its self-interest. Petroships argued against the drawing of inferences from its first three actions (see above at [(8(a)–(8(c)]), as these actions were commenced by its previous counsel without authorisation. Petroships further submitted that Alan Chan was not involved in any of the impugned transactions. To prove its honest belief that it had a good cause of action, Petroships also sought to adduce new evidence by way of Summons No 293 of 2015 (“the summons”). The new evidence included documents that purportedly demonstrated the new liquidators’ lack of probity.

Petroships advanced two arguments to support its contention that the proposed derivative action was prima facie in Wealthplus’ interests within the meaning of s 216A(3)(c). First, it argued that the rationale for a derivative action had not been displaced by liquidation. Wealthplus was in a members’ voluntary liquidation, and therefore members retained the power to remove a liquidator by special resolution under s 294(3). Petroships argued that on the facts, the new liquidators were “beholden to [the] will” of the wrongdoing majority shareholders, which continued to exercise “effective control” over Wealthplus. The correspondence and documents that Petroships sought to adduce as new evidence were alleged proof of continued wrongdoer control.

Second, Petroships argued that the alternative remedies proposed by the Judge were “wholly impracticable and/or unnecessary”. Petroships submitted that the respondents bore the burden of demonstrating that the alternative remedies would afford a better remedy for Wealthplus. The respondents had only pointed to the theoretical existence of these alternative “remedies” without showing how they would afford a better remedy for Wealthplus.

The respondents’ case

Koh Bros Group and Megacity submitted that the fact that Wealthplus was in liquidation rendered Petroships’ case a non-starter. They cited common law authorities from England, Australia and Hong Kong to support the proposition that, at common law, a derivative action cannot be brought in the name of a company which was already in liquidation. The respondents submitted that the statutory remedy (pursuant to s 216A) was likewise unavailable in liquidation. In support of this argument, they cited English and Australian authorities, including the English High Court decision of Cinematic Finance Limited v Dominic Ryder and Others [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) (“Cinematic Finance Limited”) and the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd and another [2008] NSWCA 52 (“Chahwan”), which we shall return to below. On the back of these authorities, the respondents submitted that s 216A provides a remedy for minority shareholders when directors refuse to enforce a company’s rights. However, in liquidation, the power to run the company shifts from the board of directors to the liquidators, the latter of whom are governed by the Act.

In any event, the respondents submitted that Petroships was not acting in good faith within the meaning of s 216A(3)(b). They contended that the derivative action was aimed at circumventing the striking out orders in the various actions, and that Alan Chan was allegedly dishonest and was himself a director of Wealthplus until 22 September 2009. They also disagreed with Petroships’ various arguments on appeal, including the contention that the requirement of good faith was satisfied so long as the action appeared to be in Wealthplus’ interests, and that Petroships’ motive was irrelevant.

Koh Bros Group and Megacity also submitted that it was not in Wealthplus’ interests that derivative action be brought. The alleged transfers to various companies within the Koh Bros Group were in fact receivables belonging to Wealthplus. They alleged that Petroships had since tailored its claim from one based on the alleged transfers to one based on the liquidators’ alleged refusal to collect debts owed to Wealthplus. This was, inter alia, problematic as the proper forum of complaint would be the winding up regime under the Act and not s 216A. Koh Bros Group and Megacity further submitted that there were proper commercial reasons for writing off the bad debts and the provision of impairment, and that the director’s remuneration was justifiable as the land in China could not otherwise have been sold.

The appellant’s reply

Petroships made various counter-arguments in its reply. Of these arguments, the most important for the purpose of this appeal relates to its submission that s 216A remains available even when a company is in liquidation. Petroships submitted that the provisions and case law did not support the assertion that s 216A is unavailable in the context of all companies in liquidation. Such an assertion ignored the situation of a company which was in members’ voluntary liquidation, where, on the new evidence sought to be adduced, the wrongdoer majority continued to be in de facto control of the company and could prevent actions being brought against them.

Petroships also submitted that it was wrong to follow the approach in other jurisdictions in relation to the non-availability of the common law derivative action when a company was in liquidation. This was because the statutory derivative action had to be taken on its own terms – it was not a mere codification of the common law derivative action but a response to the shortcomings of the remedy at common law.

Petroships further distinguished the decisions cited by Megacity and Koh Bros Group on, inter alia, the basis that in those decisions, the factual situations were such that there was no further wrongdoer control. It suggested that the underlying principle to be drawn from the cases was that members had the right to take action on behalf of the company to vindicate its rights “if the present controllers of the company (be it the directors or the liquidators) refuse to enforce the company’s rights”. Petroships did note however, that the case of Chahwan arguably supported the contention that liquidation would remove the availability of statutory derivative action. But Petroships submitted that that decision was hardly of assistance as it was based on a significantly different provision in the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Australian Act”). Moreover, it was submitted that it was unclear whether future Australian decisions would adopt the approach in Chahwan.

Our decision

The singular – and crucial – issue before us was whether Petroships should be granted leave under s 216A to commence statutory derivative action in Wealthplus’ name against its directors. It was apparent that most of the ink spilled was aimed at addressing whether Petroships fulfilled the pre-requisites in s 216A, specifically, s 216A(3)(b)–(c). However, this, with respect, put the cart before the horse. As we observed at the beginning of our grounds, the threshold issue was whether s 216A was even applicable in the first place, as Wealthplus was already in liquidation. In the context of Singapore’s statutory derivative action as enshrined in s 216A, this was a question for which no answer was available in directly relevant case law. We thus proceeded to approach this novel question on first principles. Our approach started with the statutory text, before we explored the legislative history and case law. At the end of the analysis, we were satisfied that s 216A is unavailable once a company is in liquidation.

The statutory text

Section 216A states as follows:

Petroships submitted that nothing in s 216A suggested that the remedy was unavailable in liquidation. In fact, the express wording suggested that s 216A was applicable to both going concerns as well as companies in liquidation. It anchored its argument on s 216A(2), which stipulates that a complainant can apply for leave to, inter alia, bring an action in the name of and on behalf “of the company”. Since s 4 defines “company” as one incorporated pursuant to the Act or any corresponding previous written law, “company” would include both going concerns as well as companies in liquidation.

We disagreed as s 216A suggests, on the contrary, that the application for leave to commence a derivative action is in the context of going concerns. Section 4 states that the definitions therein apply only in so far as the contrary intention does not appear. Section 216A(2) is subject to s 216A(3). Section 216A(3)(a), which is the notice pre-requisite, stipulates that no action may be brought unless the court is satisfied that the complainant has given 14 days’ notice to the directors of the company of its intention to apply for leave to commence the action if the directors do not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action or arbitration. In this regard, in the Singapore High Court decision of Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn v Airtrust (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2011] 3 SLR 980, Judith Prakash J observed as follows (at [14]):

Reference may also be made to Pearlie Koh, “Shareholder Litigation – Corporate Wrongs” in ch 10 of Hans Tjio, Pearlie Koh & Lee Pey Woan, Corporate Law (Academy Publishing, 2015), where the learned author observes as follows (at paras 10.050−10.051):

Evidently, the scenario envisaged in s 216A is one where there exists directors who are capable of taking action to vindicate the company’s rights, ie, that they remain in active management. Whilst a company is a going concern, it is normally for the board of directors to authorise legal proceedings as the power to manage is usually vested in the board: see Walter Woon on Company Law at para 9.6. However, when a company enters into liquidation, the board is effectively functus officio; the liquidator is now in the driver’s seat. For example, under s 294(2), which is applicable only to members’ voluntary winding up, all powers of the directors cease on the appointment of a liquidator, except in so far as the liquidator, or the company in general meeting with the liquidator’s consent, approves the continuance thereof. Hence, the directors have no power to react to any notice served pursuant to s 216A(3)(a), whether to prosecute, defend or discontinue an action on the company’s behalf. In this context, it would make little sense to require slavish adherence to the notice pre-requisite. Instead, corporate actions may be commenced by the liquidator when a company is in liquidation: see Walter Woon on Company Law at para 9.7. Section 272(2)(a) grants the power to “bring or defend any action or other legal proceeding in the name and on behalf of the company” to the liquidator, who is, according to s 272(3), subject to the control of the court in its exercise of various powers under s 272. Section 272(3) further states that any creditor or contributory may apply to the court with respect to any exercise or proposed exercise of the liquidator’s powers.

Section 216B further indicates that s 216A is meant to be applied to a company other than one under the control of a liquidator, as it envisages ratification of acts by the members of a company. Section 216B states as follows:

Legislative history

The legislative history of s 216A does not evince a contrary interpretation to that which has just been proffered. In 1993, the Singapore Parliament decided to introduce ss 216A and 216B into the Act. The provisions were based on equivalent provisions in Canada, which introduced the relevant federal legislation in 1975. This provided minority shareholders with a statutory avenue to commence an action in the name of the company, therefore providing them “with a way around the vague rule” in the English case of Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 (“Foss v Harbottle”): see Meng Seng Wee & Dan W Puchniak, “Derivative actions in Singapore: mundanely non-Asian, intriguingly non-American and at the forefront of the Commonwealth” in ch 8 of Dan W Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia, A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012) (“Wee & Puchniak”) at p 330. Foss v Harbottle had hitherto established that it is for the company, which has a separate legal personality, to sue for the wrongs that have been done to it; a shareholder can seek to vindicate the company’s rights only in very exceptional situations. This would be the case where, for example, a fraud has been visited on the minority by the wrongdoing majority, who cause harm to the company but use its controlling power to prevent the company from taking action.

The impetus for change came from Prof Walter Woon, who advised the parliamentary draftsman in 1990 of the desirability of reforming the law on the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle: see Wee & Puchniak at p 337. The Parliamentary debates and Select Committee report at the time, however, did not specifically discuss the question of whether s 216A was intended to be available to a company which had gone into liquidation (see generally Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 September 1992) vol 60 at cols 228–253, especially at col 231; Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (28 May 1993) vol 61 at cols 290–294, especially at col 293; the Explanatory Note to the Companies (Amendment) Bill (No 33/1992); and Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 33/92) (Parl 2 of 1993, 26 April 1993) (“the Select Committee Report”)). In fact, the thrust of the discussions appeared to take place in the context of going concerns. In its views on the main issues raised concerning the statutory derivative action, the Select Committee considered if there was a need to make statutory provision for a derivative action, given that there were already common law exceptions to allow minority shareholders to bring an action in the company’s name (see the Select Committee Report at [41]). Based on the representations received, it decided that the statutory remedy should not be made available to public-listed companies, as their proceedings and performance were already monitored by regulatory authorities and disgruntled shareholders of such companies had the avenue of selling their shares in the open market (ibid at [45]).

As already noted above (at [38]), s 216A was based on legislation in Canada, which was a trailblazer in the introduction (in the Commonwealth) of the statutory derivative action to circumvent the difficulties in the common law regime. Singapore and New Zealand, which made similar legislative changes in 1993, were relatively early jurisdictions to introduce statutory derivative actions. According to Wee & Puchniak at p 340, Singapore’s reform preceded similar provisions that were enacted elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Australia and United Kingdom, the jurisdictions which Singapore relied mainly on for its Companies Act, introduced statutory derivative actions only in 1999 and 2006, respectively. Hong Kong did so in 2005 (ibid at p 337).

The relevant section in the present Canada Business Corporations Act (RSC, 1985, c C-44) (“the Canadian Act”) reads as follows:

Like Singapore’s s 216A, the notice pre-requisite in s 239(2)(a) of the Canadian Act requires complainants to give notice to the directors of their intention to apply to court for leave to commence derivative action if the directors do not take the requested action.

The genesis of Canada’s statutory derivative action was discussed by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in L&B Electric Ltd v Oickle (2005) NSSC 110 (“L&B Electric v Oickle”). In his judgment at [35], Moir J noted the severe criticisms that came to be levied on Foss v Harbottle in the mid-20th century and observed that the “problem was that the English courts developed and Canadian courts quickly embraced a galvanized, formalistic approach to what justified a departure [from the rule in Foss v Harbottle]”.

In response to the difficulties, the Ontario legislature created a Select Committee to review the province’s corporate legislation in 1965. The Lawrence Committee (named after its chairman Allan F Lawrence) issued the Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law in 1967 (“the Lawrence Report”), which led to a legislated derivative action in Ontario in 1970 (see L&B Electric v Oickle at [38]). The Ontario legislation influenced the recommendations of another committee led by Robert W V Dickerson (“the Dickerson Committee”), which published its Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law in Canada (“the Dickerson Report”) in 1971. The Dickerson Report came in two volumes: the first was a narrative whilst the second was a draft statute. The enactment of Canada’s Business Corporations Act in 1975 was based on the Dickerson Report (see L&B Electric v Oickle at [39]).

Moir J noted that the Lawrence Committee was “concerned about abuse of power by those having control through majority shareholdings” (see L&B Electric v Oickle at [37]). The Lawrence Report concluded that the statutory derivative action was “the most effective remedy to enforce the suggested statutory standard of conduct and care to be imposed upon directors in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities” (at p 62) [emphasis added]. A statutory derivative action would allow a minority shareholder to sue in representative form, claiming redress for a wrong done to the company, and should be incorporated into Ontario law and practice to serve as “an effective procedure whereby corporate wrongs can be put right”. The Lawrence Committee observed as follows (at p 63):

The recommendation that the shareholder should be required to demonstrate that it is prima facie in the “interests of the company or its shareholders that the action be brought” is an implied suggestion that the statutory derivation action was designed as a remedy for a minority shareholder in a going concern. This is because of the reference to the interests of the company and its members, but not those of its creditors. The interests of creditors would be the dominant consideration in a situation where, for example, an insolvent company is placed in a creditors’ voluntary liquidation.

The recommendations in the Lawrence Report were duly enacted as s 99 of Ontario’s Business Corporations Act 1970 (“the Ontario Act”). Section 99 states as follows:

The Dickerson Committee expressly stated that it had followed the model in s 99 of the Ontario Act in drafting subsection (2) of s 19.02 of its draft statute. This sub-section, which required the complainant to have made reasonable efforts to cause the directors to take action, reads as follows:

The Dickerson Committee explained the suggested sub-section in the preceding paragraph as follows (at para 482):

The Jenkins Committee that the Dickerson Report referred to was formed in the United Kingdom in 1959 to review and report on, inter alia, the Companies Act 1948 (c 38) (UK) (“the Companies Act 1948”). The Jenkins committee was concerned with the wrongful use of control that was vested in the majority. Its recommendation, which the Dickerson Committee took on board, states as follows (at para 206):

Evidently, the Jenkins Committee must have been concerned about wrongdoer control in companies that were going concerns. This is because it cannot be said that control remains “vested in the majority” when a company is in liquidation. Even in a members’ voluntary liquidation, s 304(2) of the Companies Act 1948 empowered the court to remove a liquidator and appoint another liquidator on cause being shown.

Before we leave this section, we note that s 19.03 of the draft statute of the Dickerson Committee does contain mention of liquidation. The section recommends that, in connection with an action brought (or intervened in) under s 19.02, the court may make any orders that it thinks fit, including directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action shall be paid directly to former and present security holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the corporation or its subsidiary (“the direct payment provision”). The Dickerson Report explained that s 19.03 was designed to give very broad discretion to the court to supervise generally the conduct of a derivative action (at para 483):

Whilst s 19.03 contemplates the situation of a company that has been liquidated, we are of the view that there is no necessary inconsistency with the pre-requisite in s 19.02 for the complainant to have made reasonable efforts to cause the directors to take action. In view of the wording in s 19.02, s 19.03 would pertain to a situation where the company enters liquidation after consent to bring a derivative action in the company’s name is given.

As mentioned above, the Dickerson Report formed the blueprint for the Canada Business Corporations Act, which was enacted in 1975. The present s 240 of this Act states as follows:

To the extent that the direct payment provision in s 19.03 of the Dickerson Committee’s draft statute might suggest that statutory derivative action is available to a company in liquidation, it is worth noting that the drafters of s 216A excluded the direct payment provision, which remains in the Canadian legislation at s 240(c). Our s 216A(5) (as originally enacted) states:

To conclude our review of legislative history, we found no indication that suggested that s 216A was intended to be available as a shareholder’s remedy in the context of a company that had been placed in liquidation.

Finally, we note that when Canada introduced the statutory derivative action, the drafters would likely have been aware of the common law precedent that held that that the right of a minority shareholder to maintain a representative action against the company and the majority shareholders ceased as soon as the company went into liquidation: Ferguson v Wallbridge [1935] 3 DLR 66. This was an appeal from the Court of Appeal for British Columbia to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If the common law position in relation to the availability of derivative action in liquidation was unsatisfactory to the drafters, one would have assumed that they would have made this explicit in the relevant legislation.

Case law on the statutory derivative action

There is no directly relevant case law on s 216A in Singapore. In other jurisdictions, there are authorities that state that leave to commence a statutory derivative action should not be granted when a company is in liquidation. For example, in the United Kingdom, which introduced the statutory derivative action in the Companies Act 2006 (c 46) (UK) (“the UK Act”), the English High Court in Cinematic Finance Limited held that derivative claims should not brought when a company is in liquidation. The case involved a majority shareholder who sought permission for derivative action. Roth J held that it was only in very exceptional circumstances that it could be appropriate to permit a shareholder in control of the company to bring a derivative claim (at [14]). He further held (at [22]):

In New Zealand, where the statutory derivative action is embodied in s 165 of its Companies Act (Act No 105 of 1993) (NZ) (“the New Zealand Companies Act”), the High Court held in Hedley v Albany Power Centre Ltd (in liq) [2005] 2 NZLR 196 (“Hedley v Albany Power Centre”) at [55] that “once a company is placed in liquidation, the Court no longer has – or at least ought not to exercise – its s 165 jurisdiction”. The court reasoned that as a matter of principle, allowing an application for derivative action would potentially undermine the liquidator’s principal duty of gathering in and distributing the company’s assets in an efficient manner. It also drew on s 284 of the New Zealand Companies Act, which provides for court supervision of liquidation. The court held that s 284 offered not just an adequate remedy but the most appropriate one when a company was in liquidation. In Lang Thai & Matt Berkahn, “Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia and New Zealand: What Can We Learn from Each Other?” (2012) 25 NZULR 370, the authors reviewed Hedley v Albany Power Centre (at 387) and noted that the decision was applied in a subsequent case in which the High Court interpreted the decision to mean that “there is no jurisdiction to utilise s 165 following liquidation” (see Buxton v Mainline Contracting Ltd (in liq) [2010] HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-1224, 22 October 2010 at [4]). The authors, however, take the view that this assertion was an “overstatement” on the face of s 165, and the better position is that “while not conclusive, liquidation is a factor that the Court will take into account in deciding whether to grant leave to commence a derivative action under the discretion given by s 165(1)”.

In Australia, our attention was drawn to Chahwan, which extensively considered the question of whether statutory derivation action was available to a company in liquidation in the context of Part 2F.1A (Proceedings on behalf of a company by members and others) of the Australian Act. Section 237 of the Australian Act states as follows:

Following its analysis of the statutory provisions and extrinsic materials, the New South Wales Court of Appeal unanimously concluded (at [125]) that Part 2F.1A of the Australian Act had no application to a company in liquidation, whether the company was in voluntary (shareholders or creditors) or court-ordered liquidation. In doing so, the court distinguished various decisions at first instances which had held that Part 2F.1A applied to a company in liquidation (at [121(i)]–[122]).

The Australian statutory derivative action provision is worded differently from s 216A in material respects. For example, s 237(2) requires the court to grant leave once the pre-requisites are met; there is no discretion. Section 237(3) also includes the rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the company’s best interests in certain situations, such as where it is established that the directors acted in good faith for a proper purpose. However, the differences in the procedural aspect merely reflect a different philosophy of the hurdles that a shareholder should cross before he can avail himself of the remedy. The rationale for the introduction of statutory derivative action remains unchanged. Notwithstanding the differences, we found certain aspects of the reasoning in Chahwan relevant to our own analysis of s 216A. These include the following:

(a) The court noted that there were indications in the statutory provisions that Part 2F.1A of the Australian Act was intended to deal with companies other than those in the control of a liquidator. Section 239 of the Australian Act provides that a person is not prevented from applying for leave even if the members of a company ratify or approve the conduct. Section 237(3)(c) of the Australian Act provides that if the directors who participated in the decision acted in good faith, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the company’s best interests to grant leave (at [121(b)]).

(b) The court also observed that prior to the creation of Part 2F.1A of the Australian Act, shareholders or creditors could only institute proceedings in the name of the company over the opposition of the directors if they came within an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. However, there was no such exception where a company was in liquidation (at [121(d)]).

(c) The court also agreed that as the cases dealing with Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions involved going concerns, the statutory provisions that were meant to replace that rule and its exceptions should also apply only to companies which were going concerns in the absence of contrary indication (at [121(e)]).

(d) No part of the mischief identified in the explanatory memorandum and the report of the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee dealt with a situation where the company was under liquidator control (at [121(f)]).

(e) The statutory provisions, in particular, s 1321 of the Australian Act which applied to a liquidator’s decision to refuse to exercise his power under s 477(2)(a) of the Australian Act to bring proceedings in the name of the company, provide appropriate remedies to a person otherwise qualified to make an application under s 237(1) of the Australian Act, notwithstanding that it is in the court’s discretion to grant the relief sought under s 1321 of the Australian Act (at [124(n)]).

In so far as s 216A is concerned, our review of the statutory provisions and the extrinsic materials have also suggested that s 216A is intended to apply to companies other than those in the control of a liquidator. The inapplicability of the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle to companies other than going concerns is also relevant to us as common law derivative action is (subject to the discussion below) part of Singapore law. Our Companies Act also provides statutory remedies in the liquidation regime that negate the need for a shareholder to seek leave under s 216A, as was identified by the Judge below (see above at [22] as well as Walter Woon on Company Law at paras 17.142−17.146).

Case law on common law derivative action

The position with respect to the common law derivative action also supports our reading that, as a matter of principle, statutory derivative action should not be available to a company in liquidation. At common law, a derivative claim cannot be brought by a minority shareholder of a company in liquidation: see Victor Joffe QC et al, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice and Procedure (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2011) (“Minority Shareholders”) at para 3.143. The learned authors, citing the English High Court decision of Fargro v Godfroy [1986] 1 WLR 1134, explain thus:

In a similar vein, it has been observed in Walter Woon on Company Law as follows (at paras 9.6 and 9.7):

It has also been pertinently observed in the same work thus (see ibid at para 17.122):

Finally, this work states as follows (see ibid at para 17.134):

As mentioned above, the United Kingdom enacted statutory derivative action in the UK Act, which replaced the common law derivative action. The authors of Minority Shareholders note the view that since the statutory derivative action in the UK Act “represents a new dispensation, it is possible that the courts in the United Kingdom will adopt a different position when faced with applications by members for permission to bring derivative claims under [the UK Act] when a company is in liquidation to that which existed at common law” (at para 3.144).

In Singapore, the case for the non-availability of the statutory derivative action in liquidation is arguably stronger as, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, the common law derivative action was not expressly abolished with the introduction of s 216A (see Wee & Puchniak at p 331; contra Malaysia and Hong Kong (see Walter Woon on Company Law at para 9.73)). This remains so after certain amendments to the Act took effect from July 2015. When s 216A was introduced in 1993, it applied only to Singapore private companies. This meant that the common law derivative action continued to exist at least for public-listed and foreign companies, which were excluded from the purview of s 216A. In July 2015, the Act was amended to, inter alia, extend s 216A to public-listed companies in Singapore (s 146(a) of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2014 (Act 36 of 2014) deleted the definition of “company” in s 216A(1), which was hitherto defined as a company other than one listed on the Singapore securities exchange). Following this amendment, the common law derivative action must necessarily remain for foreign companies. However, the question is whether a shareholder who can avail itself of s 216A can nevertheless choose to rely on the common law. This has been the subject of some discussion by academics, whose views are still relevant although they preceded the recent amendments.

Wee & Puchniak note that this is “an open question” that has not been conclusively determined by the Singapore courts. They state (at p 331):

On balance, the general consensus at least amongst the academic writers appears to be that the common law derivative action continues to exist alongside s 216A. In Walter Woon on Company Law, it is said that for unlisted companies, “it is doubtful whether common law derivative actions are precluded by s 216A. The earlier edition of this book was of the opinion that a member still has a choice about the procedure he wishes to adopt and the courts here have not commented on this point. However, it is difficult to see why an applicant should resort to the common law procedure when there are so many advantages of using the s 216A procedure” (at para 9.71) (and cf public-listed companies which were excluded from the scope of s 216A until 1 July 2015). And, in Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2007) (“Chew”), whilst the learned author acknowledged obiter dicta to the contrary in the British Columbia Supreme Court decision of Shield Development Co Ltd v Snyder and Western Mines Ltd [1976] 3 WWR 44 at 52, she observed thus (at p 323):

We also note that in one of the written representations to the Select Committee, one of the representors, Dr Low Kee Yang, did raise the following issue (see the Select Committee Report, Appendix II, Written Representations at p A 11 (but cf the view of the then Minister for Finance, Dr Richard Hu Tsu Tau in the Select Committee Report, Appendix III, Minutes of Evidence at p B 8 and the response by Dr Low and his further elaboration in response to a question by Mr Chng Hee Kok, ibid, as well as the view of Ms Susan de Silva, ibid at p B 21; however, this exchange occurred prior to the exclusion of the application of s 216A with respect to foreign as well as public-listed companies when it was introduced in 1993)):

Therefore, if the intention was to remove the common law derivative action when s 216A was introduced, one would have thought that the drafters would have expressly provided thus. There was no discussion of the removal even in the run-up to the latest amendments to s 216A, which remains inapplicable to a foreign company. However, the issue as to whether or not the common law derivative action co-exists with, or has (instead) been abrogated by, s 216A is one that can be conclusively determined when the issue next arises directly for decision before the Singapore courts.

What does appear clear, however, is that, as a matter of practicality, it does not seem efficient or effective for a party to initiate a common law derivative action when a statutory derivative action pursuant to s 216A is available. As Margaret Chew has perceptively observed (see Chew at p 324; cf Walter Woon on Company Law at para 9.73):

Whilst the issue may be moot as a matter of practicality, any continued right of a shareholder to utilise both remedies suggested to us that the same principle should apply to both forms of derivative action – that such an action (whether under common law or pursuant to s 216A) should not be available to a company in liquidation. To hold otherwise would result in an incongruous situation where in liquidation, one form of derivative action is available but not the other, even though both remedies are designed to address similar mischief.

We would conclude by pointing out that our decision in no way means that a corporate wrong will go without a remedy. Petroships submitted that the underlying principle in allowing a minority shareholder to take derivative action is whether there continues to be wrongdoer control. In this regard, Petroships suggested that the new liquidators, who were appointed through a members’ voluntary liquidation and could be removed by special resolution, were beholden to the majority and under its effective control (see above at [24]). However, this ignored the fact that in liquidation, even in members’ voluntary liquidation, the liquidator is subject to the oversight of the court. We disagreed that the remedies afforded by the liquidation regime are theoretical. As the Judge stated, “[t]he liquidator has a legal obligation to discharge his duties and to exercise his powers competently and impartially, without fear or favour” (see the GD at [157]). In Fustar Chemicals Ltd (Hong Kong) v Liquidator of Fustar Chemicals Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR 458, VK Rajah JA (who delivered the judgment of this court) stated (at [22]):

Conclusion

Given our decision that the application failed on the threshold issue (ie, that s 216A was not applicable in the context of the present case), it was unnecessary to deal with the substantive arguments on whether the pre-requisites in s 216A(3)(b)–(c) were met.