Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore [2017] SGCA 18

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This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore [2016] 4 SLR 192 (“the Judgment”), dismissing an application for judicial review. The appellant sought a quashing order against the decision of a review committee, constituted under s 85(6) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the LPA”), to dismiss in part a complaint made by the appellant against two lawyers. The complaint was, in essence, that the lawyers had made grossly excessive claims for party and party costs against the appellant’s wife. The appellant claimed that the review committee had made errors of law in dismissing the complaint and sought judicial review on that basis.

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The appeal raises the novel issue of whether, and to what extent, lawyers owe ethical duties in advancing claims on behalf of their clients for party and party costs. The issue is thrown into sharp relief by the facts of the case, where the party and party costs claimed by the lawyers in question were substantially reduced on taxation and, indeed, partly as a result of the lawyers’ own admission that they had erroneously included certain duplicated costs in their bills of costs. It is an inquiry that necessitates an inevitable and important comparison to the ethical obligations owed by lawyers in charging fees for solicitor and client costs. The question that confronts the court in the present case is as follows: when, if ever, can a finding of professional misconduct properly be drawn solely from the fact that there has been a significant reduction on taxation of party and party costs? It is, needless to say, an important question given the frequency with which lawyers’ claims for party and party costs are reduced – sometimes very significantly so – on taxation.

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Although the subsequent decision of the second disciplinary committee on the charges against Dr Lim and the related proceedings thereafter are not directly material for the present appeal, we note for completeness that the disciplinary tribunal convicted Dr Lim on all 94 charges on 21 June 2012. Dr Lim’s appeal against her conviction was dismissed by the High Court on 28 June 2013. The High Court’s decision is reported in Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2013] 3 SLR 900 (“Susan Lim (2013)”). There were subsequent (and related) proceedings relating to the issue of costs (see Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2015] SGHC 129, which decision was affirmed by this court in Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2016] 2 SLR 933).

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On 19 April 2013, the SMC’s lawyers, WongPartnership LLP (“WP”), filed three bills of costs for taxation. These were Bills of Costs Nos 65, 66 and 72 of 2013 (respectively “BC 65/2013”, “BC 66/2013” and “BC 72/2013”; and collectively “Bills of Costs”). The costs claimed were in respect of OS 1131/2010, OS 1252/2010 and CA 80/2011. A total sum of $1,007,009.37 (excluding GST and disbursements) was sought.

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At the taxation hearing, an assistant registrar taxed down the costs sought by the SMC to a total of $340,000 for all the Bills of Costs. Dissatisfied with the result, the SMC applied for a review of taxation. At the taxation review hearing on 12 August 2013 before the Judge, WP indicated that it was reducing the total sum claimed in the Bills of Costs to $720,000 (excluding GST and disbursements). This represented a reduction of $287,009.37 from the amount originally claimed. WP’s explanation for the reduction was that it “gave a discount of 20% on the time used because of overlap between lawyers. Then [WP] excluded re-getting up for new lawyers who joined the team”.

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The Judge increased the amount allowed for BC 65/2013 by $30,000. The SMC was therefore permitted to recover a total of $370,000 in costs.

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On 23 January 2014, the Appellant sent a letter of complaint (“the Complaint”) to the Chairman of the Complaints Panel of the Respondent. The complaint was directed against two lawyers from WP, namely, Mr Yeo Khirn Hai Alvin SC (“Mr Yeo”) and Ms Ho Pei Shien Melanie (“Ms Ho”). In essence, the complaint was that Mr Yeo and Ms Ho were “charging bills of costs against [Dr Lim] which were clearly exorbitant and which … would amount to grossly improper conduct and/or conduct unbecoming as members of an honourable profession”. The Appellant claimed that the difference between the amount sought in the Bills of Costs and the amount that was finally awarded at the taxation review indicated that there was “gross overcharging”.

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The two paragraphs extracted above are central to this appeal. Put shortly, in so far as the Appellant’s allegation that the amounts claimed in the Bills of Costs were excessive was concerned, the RC stated that a reduction upon taxation of the costs claimed – even if such reduction was significant – would not amount to misconduct in the absence of improper or fraudulent claims. In so far as the allegation that the effective hourly rate was excessive was concerned, the RC accepted that the amounts claimed in the Bills of Costs reflected the work of all the lawyers involved and found that the hourly rate was therefore not excessive. The RC accordingly dismissed Limb 1 of the Complaint in relation to both Mr Yeo and Ms Ho.

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In so far as Limb 2 of the Complaint was concerned, the Respondent stated at para 11 of the Decision Letter that, in the RC’s view, there would be some substance to Limb 2 if the amounts claimed in the Bills of Costs exceeded what the SMC had actually paid or was liable to pay to WP. The RC had therefore sought to obtain from WP “clarification” on the terms of engagement between the SMC and WP and the amounts billed. WP’s reply was that Mr Yeo was “not involved in drawing up the Bills of Costs or the taxation proceedings”, that the SMC’s engagement of WP was on WP’s standard fee arrangement based on actual time spent by the lawyers on the files, and that the SMC had approved of and paid each of WP’s bills in full. The SMC separately confirmed in writing to the RC that the total amount billed to the SMC was higher than the amount claimed in the Bills of Costs, and that it had paid WP’s bills in full. Ultimately, however, the RC decided not to have regard to “significant parts of [WP’s] response” because of WP’s position that they were covered by privilege.

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At paras 14(b)(i) and (ii) of the Decision Letter, the Respondent went on to state the RC’s finding that Mr Yeo was not involved in the preparation of the Bills of Costs and the related proceedings and its conclusion that there was therefore no misconduct on his part. However, in relation to Ms Ho, the RC decided that Limb 2 of the Complaint was not frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, and accordingly decided to refer this part of the Complaint against Ms Ho to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel.

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OS 593/2014 was heard by the Judge (ie, the same judge who heard the taxation review for the Bills of Costs). Apart from the Appellant and Respondent, the Attorney-General was also represented at the hearing.

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In so far as Ground 1 of the Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the RC’s decision was concerned, the Judge found that the correct position in law is that a significant reduction in costs on taxation, taken alone, will not ordinarily mean that there is gross over-claiming amounting to misconduct. However, this does not mean that a significant reduction will never, in and of itself, be sufficient to constitute misconduct (see the Judgment at [101]). The Judge provided an example of a bill of costs for $200,000, filed in relation to a claim for the repayment of a $500,000 loan where the defendant had capitulated after the submission of a 10-page statement of claim, and where the costs sought had then been taxed down to $10,000. The facts of such a case in themselves might be sufficient to suggest that there was gross over-claiming such as to constitute misconduct on the part of the plaintiff’s lawyer (see the Judgment at [104]). The Judge also found that, on a proper reading of the RC’s language in the Decision Letter, the RC had adopted the correct legal approach and therefore had not erred (see the Judgment at [110]).

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In so far as Ground 2 was concerned, the Judge held that it would not be a breach of O 59 r 19 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”) to claim in a bill of costs the total number of hours spent by all the lawyers who worked on the matter, even though there were more than two such lawyers. Absent a certificate from the court, the court would only award costs for the work that would reasonably have been done by a notional two-man team, assuming they did all the work (although that work could in fact have been done by more than two solicitors) (see the Judgment at [125]). Thus, the RC had not erred in law in stating that the effective hourly rates of Mr Yeo and Ms Ho were not excessive given that “the amounts in the Bills of Costs reflect[ed] the work of all the solicitors involved”. That, in the Judge’s view, was simply a shorthand description of what was permitted under O 59 r 19 of the Rules of Court (“O 59 r 19”). The RC was not stating (contrary to the Appellant’s characterisation of what was said in the Decision Letter) that it was permissible for all work to be included regardless of duplication (see the Judgment at [132] and [133]).

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In so far as Ground 3 was concerned, the Judge found that the RC should not have relied on WP’s purported clarification that Mr Yeo was not involved in drawing up the Bills of Costs or the taxation proceedings, as WP’s assertion was unsupported by any documentation or objective evidence (see the Judgment at [145]). However, given the RC’s finding that there was in essence no substance in the Limb 2 complaint against Mr Yeo (ie, claiming against Dr Lim for costs exceeding the amount that the SMC paid), there was no reason to refer the Limb 2 complaint against Mr Yeo back to the RC (see the Judgment at [173]).

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In so far as Ground 1 is concerned, the Appellant alleges that the Judge erred in concluding that, on a proper reading of the Decision Letter, the RC had not applied the principle that the significant taxing down of a bill of costs could never amount to misconduct unless there was “some other impropriety”. According to the Appellant, the RC had applied such a principle, and such a principle was an incorrect statement of the law.

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The Appellant further claims that in the Judge’s consideration of Ground 2, the Judge had failed to address the issue of whether the RC had “erred and/or misdirected itself in law by altogether failing to consider” whether WP’s inclusion of “duplicated costs” of $287,009.37 – which led to WP’s decision to reduce its claim for costs at the taxation review by that amount (see above at [12]) – was in breach of O 59 r 19. Finally, in relation to Ground 3, the Appellant submits that if the RC had erred as stated in either or both Ground 1 and Ground 2, it follows that Ground 3 (ie, that the RC had erred in relying on WP’s clarification) is an additional reason for this court to quash the RC’s decision to dismiss the complaint against Mr Yeo.

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It will be apparent that the Appellant’s argument on Ground 3 will therefore turn on whether this court finds that the RC had erred in the manner alleged in the first two grounds. In other words, if this court does not find that the RC had erred in law in deciding that there was no over-claiming or wrongful inclusion of “Duplicated Costs” (for the reasons stated in the first two grounds), the question of whether Mr Yeo was involved in drawing up the Bills of Costs or in the taxation proceedings would be irrelevant.

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It appears that the RC had indeed formulated a legal test at para 9 of the Decision Letter that, ex hypothesi, is of general as well as normative import. It had then applied that test at para 14 of the Decision Letter (specifically para 14(a)(iii) of the same), referring specifically to the Bills of Costs that were in issue before it. At this juncture, we pause to observe that the legal test was not one that was devoid of any content or substance; rather, it purports to set out the necessary conditions for a finding of misconduct in the context of claiming party and party costs. Before we elaborate on this and, indeed, on the legal test which the RC had formulated, it is of the first importance to note that the Decision Letter in general and the legal test formulated by the RC in particular must be read in the context of the proceedings as a whole – and it is to this particular point that we first turn our attention.

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As both counsel for the Respondent, Mr Christopher Anand Daniel, and counsel for the Attorney-General’s Chambers, Mr Khoo Boo Jin (“Mr Khoo”), pertinently observed, this was not a case of alleged overcharging involving a lawyer and his client. In other words, we are not dealing with a case involving solicitor and client costs. We are concerned, instead, with a case involving party and party costs. In the former case, it is axiomatic that overcharging on the part of the lawyer in respect of his own client can – in and of itself – amount to professional misconduct. Indeed, the Appellant, in his Complaint to the Respondent, cited the views of the Singapore High Court in Susan Lim (2013). However, that decision is not entirely on point inasmuch as it related to a doctor’s ethical obligation to charge a fair and reasonable fee to his patient for services rendered, although a comparison was drawn to lawyers’ obligations in charging fees to their clients. It would be apposite to set out the court’s observations in that case (at [43]−[46], [52] and [56]) in full, in order to explain not only the context of that decision but also the court’s process of reasoning and analysis:

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As will be evident, the situation in the present appeal is quite different as it is not, unlike the situation involving a lawyer or doctor (as the case may be) and his own client, one that involves a relationship of trust and confidence between the same. At this juncture, we think that it is of the first importance to underscore this underlying thread or theme – that in a case involving party and party costs, the relationship of trust and confidence between solicitor and client is not involved. Indeed, as Mr Khoo was at pains to emphasise during the course of oral submissions to this court, if there has been any professional misconduct on the facts of this appeal, that would be misconduct involving the breach of a solicitor’s duty to the court rather than to his client. This is, in our view, an important distinction because this particular context will inform the nature of the legal test that the RC formulated in the Decision Letter.

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Put simply, the fact that this particular case involves party and party costs entails – leaving aside, for the moment, the overarching duty owed by a solicitor to the court – that the claim for costs in this particular situation occurs in what is essentially an adversarial context. It is often, if not invariably, the case that a party’s claim for party and party costs will be reduced by the court on taxation, for the reason (if nothing else) that taxation is an adversarial process and the quantum of costs to be allowed will typically be disputed by the opposing party. The corollary of the adversarial nature of the taxation of party and party costs is that an excessive claim for such costs would not (in and of itself) generally constitute professional misconduct by the lawyer concerned.

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One might, of course, encounter the extremely rare situation where the making of such a claim might (in and of itself) properly be regarded as professional misconduct − for example, where the initial claim for party and party costs is for an astronomical figure which has been taxed down by the taxing master or court to an amount that is a tiny fraction of the aforesaid figure. We observe that the Judge provided a similar example at [104] of the Judgment. However, a moment’s reflection will reveal how extraordinarily rare such a situation is likely to be. Indeed, it seems to us that this is likely to be more theoretical than real simply because no reasonable lawyer would countenance making such a completely disproportionate and unjustifiable claim on behalf of his client (even in a party and party costs context) in the first place. It is far more likely that a lawyer’s excessive claim for party and party costs will be coupled with some other questionable conduct on the part of the lawyer, and that when, taken together, his behaviour constitutes a breach of the duty to the court and, hence, constitutes professional misconduct.

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However, we understand the Appellant’s argument in the present appeal to be that the RC had committed an error of law because it had posited a legal principle to the effect that over-claiming could never – in and of itself – constitute professional misconduct and that, in order to constitute such misconduct, it had always to be accompanied by some other form of improper conduct. We have explained that in a situation relating to party and party costs, that proposition is indeed likely to hold true for the vast majority of cases – save for the extremely rare situation in which the disproportionality would itself suggest that there was (without more) professional misconduct on the part of the lawyer concerned.

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Hence, we find that the statement of legal principle set out by the Judge at [101] of the Judgment is thoroughly accurate. That statement can be summarised as follows: While a lawyer’s gross over-claim of party and party costs might (in an extremely rare) instance constitute professional misconduct by that lawyer in and of itself, professional misconduct will generally be found in a situation where such overcharging is coupled with some other form of misconduct on the part of that lawyer. Everything turns, in the final analysis, on the precise facts and circumstances of the case concerned.

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Returning to the crucial paragraphs in the Decision Letter, it will be recalled that we have already observed that para 9 of that letter embodies a legal test, which test was applied at para 14(a)(iii) of the same. In so far as para 9 is concerned, the RC observed that “a reduction by the taxing master (Registrar or Judge of the Supreme Court) of the costs claimed even if significant, would not amount to misconduct in the absence of improper or fraudulent claims” [emphasis added in italics and bold italics]. It is important to also bear in mind the context in which this observation (or, rather, general statement of principle) was made, which we have already noted to be that of party and party costs, where the duty owed is not to the client as such, but, rather, to the court.

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Bearing that context in mind, in our view, what the RC was stating as a statement of principle was as follows: Given the adversarial nature of the proceedings (which is an inherent characteristic of the taxation of party and party costs), an excessive claim for costs (the quantum of which is reduced by the court) would not, in and of itself, generally constitute professional misconduct by the lawyer concerned, absent proof that the lawyer has put forward either an improper claim or a fraudulent claim. It will be immediately seen that professional misconduct involving an excessive claim for party and party costs, the quantum of which has been reduced by the court, may accordingly be established in either one of two situations – (1) where such a claim is improper, or (2) where such a claim is fraudulent. The situation in (2) is an obvious one whilst that in (1) is more general and would, in our view, cover a myriad of situations, including one where the very quantum of the claim itself is so astronomical as to be so disproportionate and unjustifiable that the making of that claim would itself constitute professional misconduct, given that no reasonable lawyer would even countenance making such a claim on behalf of his client (even in the context of party and party costs) in the first place. The more likely situation would be where an excessive claim for party and party costs is coupled with some other conduct on the part of the lawyer which, taken together, constitutes a breach of the duty to the court and hence constitutes professional misconduct.

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Indeed, this conclusion is reinforced when we turn to consider para 14(a)(iii). It will be recalled that the RC’s views in that particular paragraph of the Letter was an application of the legal principle set out at para 9 to the particular facts of the case. In this regard, the RC held that “the fact that the Bills were eventually taxed down significantly does not in itself give rise to an inquiry of professional misconduct, in the absence of any other impropriety” [emphasis added in italics and bold italics]. We think it clear that the RC’s mention of “the Bills” is a reference to the Bills of Costs that WP had submitted for taxation. In our view, the RC had found that, on the facts of the present case, the significant reduction in the quantum of party and party costs by the court did not, in and of itself, indicate that the lawyers were guilty of professional misconduct. That such an application of the legal principle to the facts of the present case resulted in this particular factual finding is not surprising simply because, as we have already noted above at [47], the quantum claimed must be so disproportionate and unjustifiable as to itself constitute professional misconduct on the part of the lawyer concerned. In our view, the RC was perfectly entitled to arrive at the conclusion that the quantum claimed in the present case was not, in fact, so astronomical, and indeed we see nothing on the facts to suggest otherwise.

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The question that then remained was whether – as the RC (correctly, in our view) proceeded to ask – there was, nevertheless, some “other impropriety” that, when taken together with the excessive quantum of costs claimed, might constitute a breach of duty to the court and, hence, result in professional misconduct on the part of the lawyer concerned. It is evident from the Decision Letter that the RC did not find that fraudulent claims had been advanced by the lawyers in question. Again, it is clear that the RC had merely applied the very same legal principle that was set out above (at [47]). We have explained our view that that principle is a correct statement of the law. It is equally clear that the merits of the RC’s decisions are not, as we have emphasised above, within the purview of the present proceedings. Finally (and for the avoidance of doubt), we note that there has been no allegation of fraud by the Appellant and there is therefore no need to apply the part of the test, set out above, that requires a consideration of whether the claim was fraudulent.

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It is important to note that this particular issue is not the same in substance as Ground 2 which was canvassed in the court below. On appeal, it appears that the Appellant is not contesting the Judge’s decision that it was permissible for the work of solicitors other than the two named solicitors (ie, Mr Yeo and Ms Ho) to have been included in the Bills of Costs, and that in finding that the Bills could “reflect the work of all the solicitors involved”, the RC had therefore not pronounced an erroneous statement of law that failed to take into account the prohibition in O 59 r 19. Instead, the crux of the Appellant’s submission on appeal is that the RC had erred or misdirected itself in law in failing to take into account WP’s acknowledgment that it had included $287,009.37 of duplicated costs in its claim, which was a breach of O 59 r 19. The Appellant alleges that the RC had failed to take this into account even though he had assigned prominence to this particular matter in his Complaint by dedicating four paragraphs of the Complaint to it. The Judge’s decision that the RC had not erred in finding that the Bills of Costs could reflect the work done by all the solicitors involved simply did not, the Appellant argues, address the matter of WP’s admitted inclusion of those impermissible costs. The Appellant goes on to suggest that had the RC “taken into account the fact that the Bills of Costs had been improperly inflated by [$287,009.37] in breach of the 2-solicitor rule [ie, O 59 r 19]”, the RC “could not have concluded that the Complaint of gross overcharging was lacking in substance”.

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It should be noted, as a preliminary matter, that the Appellant’s argument that the RC failed to consider WP’s reduction is, under the principles of judicial review, quite distinct from an argument that the RC erred in law in reaching its conclusion that the Bills of Costs were not excessive. The former involves an allegation of procedural impropriety, while the latter concerns the existence of illegality. They are conceptually distinct heads of review.

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Indeed, from a perusal of the Appellant’s Statement in support of his judicial review application, as well as his written submissions before the Judge, it is clear that the Appellant’s allegation about the RC’s failure to consider WP’s voluntary reduction merely formed a secondary aspect of his primary submission that the RC had erred in law in concluding that the Bills of Costs were not excessive because the hourly rates reflected the work of all the solicitors involved. It is therefore unsurprising that the Judge’s focus was on whether an error of law had been committed by the RC in coming to its conclusion as to whether the Bills could “reflect the work of all the solicitors involved”, and not on whether the RC had failed to consider WP’s admission that the amount claimed should be reduced by $287,009.37. Indeed, the Judge himself noted at [181] of the Judgment that the Appellant’s argument about WP’s reduction was not distinct from his overall complaint about gross over-claiming, and therefore discussed that argument only later (see [181]−[197] of the Judgment), and not within that part of the Judgment (see [118]−[134] of the Judgment) where he set out his findings on Ground 2 itself.

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However, the Appellant now characterises (in his written case before this court) Ground 2 as follows: “[t]he premise for Ground 2 is that the RC had made an error and/or misdirection in law in failing altogether to take into account the plainly relevant fact that the Bills of Costs contained a claim for impermissible Duplicated Costs” [emphasis added]. With respect, it is difficult to understand what the Appellant means. The conflation of a complaint founded on illegality with one founded on procedural impropriety is conceptually incoherent and, in our view, stems from a belated attempt to assign greater prominence to the issue concerning WP’s reduction of its claim. Put simply, the Appellant’s case in this particular respect has not only morphed but has also elevated what was then a subsidiary point at best into a main one at present.

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Be that as it may – and taking the Appellant’s case on appeal at its highest – there is nevertheless no good reason to think that the RC had not considered or taken into account the Appellant’s argument concerning WP’s acknowledgment, made during the taxation review, that its claim for costs should be reduced by $287,009.37. Let us elaborate.

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This is also a point made by Mr Khoo, who submits that a fair interpretation of the RC’s decision would be that the RC disagreed that there was any “other impropriety”, including any impropriety in respect of WP’s voluntary reduction. In our view, there is some strength to this particular argument. If the RC was satisfied that there was substance in the Appellant’s complaint that WP had breached O 59 r 19 by including getting-up costs for more than two solicitors within its Bills of Costs, or had otherwise improperly claimed for duplicated work, then it would not have concluded that there were no improper or fraudulent claims.

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The Appellant emphasises that he had dedicated four paragraphs in the Complaint to WP’s reduction of its Bills of Costs (a point which we have already noted above at [53]), and on this basis asserts the egregiousness of the RC’s failure to take the matter into account. This does not necessarily assist him. Given the prominence to which the Appellant had (as he asserts) given the matter, it would be reasonable to think that the RC had not in fact overlooked or disregarded it. Added to the fact that the RC had specifically directed itself to the inquiry of whether there was, on the evidence before it, any indication of improper claims, fraudulent claims or other impropriety, the more likely inference is that the RC had considered the issue of WP’s voluntary reduction and decided that there was no substance in the complaint.

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If the RC had directed itself to the right inquiry and concluded that there was no impropriety, it would be outside the purview of a supervising court to itself sift through the evidence and evaluate whether or not the RC was correct to arrive at that conclusion (see the Singapore High Court decision of Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] 1 SLR(R) 85 (“Shankar”) at [39]). As already noted above, the supervising court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction and it should not stray beyond its proper remit by venturing improperly into the merits: see above at [45] as well as Shankar at [39]. It is ultimately for the RC to make the essentially factual determination of whether there was substance in the allegation of misconduct, either because there was “overcharging” on the part of WP, or because WP’s claim for costs was in breach of O 59 r 19.

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Thirdly, little, if any, prejudice was (in any event) ultimately caused to Dr Lim by WP’s admitted inclusion of duplicated costs in its original Bills of Costs. The RC was entitled to take this into account in determining whether this aspect of the Complaint was “lacking in substance” pursuant to s 85(8) of the LPA, such that the Council should be directed to dismiss the matter and no Inquiry Committee need be constituted.

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A review of the circumstances in which the voluntary reduction was made quickly bears out this point. The taxation review was brought on WP’s own application. At the review, WP voluntarily informed the Judge and opposing counsel that it was reducing its claim by $287,009.37 because it had wrongly included the costs of duplicated work and of getting-up by new lawyers on the file. The reduction was, naturally, not challenged by Dr Lim’s counsel. From the perspective of harm to Dr Lim, given that the over-claim was ultimately brought to light, at a stage where the over-claim could be and was rectified, it is clear that minimal harm was caused. From the perspective of culpability or fault on the part of the solicitors, given that the taxation review was brought by WP itself, and that WP had voluntarily brought the over-claim to light in circumstances in which the Appellant makes no suggestion that the over-claim would have otherwise been discovered, we find that the culpability of the solicitors involved was also minimal. A clear and successful effort was made to rectify the over-claim.

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Bearing in mind the circumstances in which WP reduced its claim, it is entirely possible that the RC might have chosen not to articulate its decision on this aspect of the Complaint, or perhaps might have thought it altogether unnecessary to deal with the point (see also above at [60]), on the ground that the Appellant’s argument was simply so lacking in substance that it was not necessary to address it explicitly. We also note that the Appellant did not explain in his Complaint why a breach of O 59 r 19 ipso facto constitutes professional misconduct on the part of the lawyer advancing the costs claim. This was an unspoken assumption that the Appellant did not substantiate. In our view, it would have been important for the Appellant to demonstrate why a breach of the Rules of Court, taken alone, would furnish sufficient grounds for an allegation of professional misconduct, with all the attendant implications that disciplinary action potentially entails. We would go so far as to say – without deciding the point – that such a proposition seems inherently unlikely and unattractive. The Rules of Court regulate and prescribe the procedure and practices to be followed in our courts in all causes and matters (see Singapore Civil Procedure 2017 vol 1 (Foo Chee Hock gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) at para 1/0/2), and they are accordingly an indispensable component of Singapore procedural law, but it does not flow as a matter of logic or principle that a breach of these rules (without more) ought properly to entail disciplinary consequences. The onus clearly lay on the Appellant to satisfy the RC of this difficult point. From what he stated in his Complaint to the Respondent, it does not appear that he even made any attempt to do so. Nor did he seek to demonstrate that WP’s original inclusion of duplicated costs was done intentionally or did not otherwise flow from any misreading of O 59 r 19. Finally, we observe that Dr Lim herself did not raise any objection in this regard at the taxation review – nor, indeed, has she made any complaint against WP, Mr Yeo and/or Ms Ho since then.

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For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed. On the matter of costs, we direct all three parties to file written submissions on costs. Each of these submissions is not to exceed 10 pages, and they are to be exchanged simultaneously within 2 weeks of the date of delivery of this judgment.