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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Nov 2019
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Court of Appeal

Oro Negro Drilling Pte Ltd and others v Integradora de Servicios Petroleros Oro Negro SAPI de CV and others and another appeal (Jesus Angel Guerra Mendez, non-party)

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[2019] SGCA 74Case no. Civil Appeal No 194 of 2018

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] The pursuit of foreign proceedings can, in limited circumstances, be restrained by different types of injunctive relief. However, not all injunctions which have the effect of restraining the pursuit of or participation in foreign proceedings can be classified as anti-suit injunctions. The difference in classification is not just a matter of form but a distinction which carries crucial significance. A proper classification of the precise nature of the injunction bears on the correct appreciation of the issues before the court which in turn impacts on the correct application of the governing legal principles. The converse is equally true.

  2. [2] In the court below, the converse in fact occurred. The High Court Judge (“the Judge”), was persuaded by the respondents to examine the ex parte interim injunctions on the basis that they were in substance anti-suit injunctions to restrain the commencement and continuation of insolvency proceedings (“the concurso proceedings”) purportedly commenced on behalf of the appellants, all Singapore incorporated companies, before the insolvency court in Mexico. However, in truth, the ex parte interim injunctions were not obtained to restrain the concurso proceedings per se but to enforce a negative covenant in the appellants’ constitutions. Each of the appellants’ constitutions expressly provided that its directors were not to carry into effect any petition to initiate concurso proceedings unless this was approved by an independent director. It was common ground that no such approval was procured. In fact, the independent director was not even notified of the resolution prior to the commencement of the concurso proceedings. Under these circumstances, the injunctions sought by the appellants were to restrain the respondents from purporting to represent them in the concurso proceedings in light of the breach of this negative covenant. As such, comity considerations which typically take centre stage in deciding whether to grant an anti-suit injunction were strictly not engaged.

  3. [3] Once the precise nature of the relief was properly identified, it became self-evident that the crucial issue was whether the appellants had a good arguable case against the respondents as regards the breach of the negative covenant. In that respect, the importance of Singapore law to determine the capacity of and issues relating to the internal governance of the appellants, as Singapore incorporated companies, to commence the concurso proceedings would have been apparent for the purposes of determining whether service outside jurisdiction should have been granted and in particular, whether Singapore was clearly the most appropriate forum to hear the dispute. As the Judge did not attach sufficient weight to the importance of Singapore law in determining the key issue in the action and Singapore as the appellants’ place of incorporation, the Judge had misdirected herself. She found that the appellants’ reliance on their being Singapore incorporated companies and the application of Singapore law for the purposes of Originating Summons No 126 of 2018 (“OS 126”) were “contrived”, “an afterthought” and “tactical” when in fact, it was as a matter of law and right.

  4. Facts

  5. [5] The appellants were a group of Singapore-incorporated companies which comprised of:

  6. [6] Oro Negro was the holding company and sole shareholder of all the other appellants. It was in turn solely owned by the first respondent, Integradora de Servicios Petroleros Oro Negro, SAPI de CV (“Integradora”). Oro Negro had no business activities of its own and had no employees. It paid its taxes in Mexico and its sole purpose was to serve as a holding company for the second to sixth appellants, and to receive funds from those companies. Each of the other appellants owned an offshore jack-up drilling rig named after their respective owners (“the Rigs”). For this reason, we shall refer to these other appellants collectively as “the Rig Owners”. The Rigs were deployed in Mexican waters.

  7. [7] Integradora was a Mexican-incorporated company that was in the business of providing integrated and diversified oilfield services. All of Integradora’s operations were located in Mexico, and its sole client was the Mexican state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos Mexicanos (“Pemex”). Integradora provided its services to Pemex through Perforadora Oro Negro S de RL de CV (“Perforadora”), a Mexican-incorporated entity which was 99.25% owned by Integradora.

  8. [8] Perforadora was the bareboat charterer of the Rigs. It in turn sub-chartered the Rigs (“the Pemex Charters”) to Pemex’s subsidiaries. Pursuant to a Mexican law-governed trust agreement which was also subject to the Mexican court’s exclusive jurisdiction (“the Mexican Trust”), income from the Pemex Charters were paid to Perforadora through trust accounts with a Mexican subsidiary of Deutsche Bank (“DB Mexico”). After receiving its income from the Pemex Charters, Perforadora would deduct its operating expenses and overheads before distributing the balance to the Rig Owners. The Rig Owners would then deduct their respective charter fees before transferring the balance to Oro Negro.

  9. [9] The second and third respondents, Mr Alonso Del Val Echeverria (“Mr Alonso”) and Mr Gonzalo Gil White (“Mr Gonzalo”) (collectively, “the former directors”) were directors of the appellants at the material time. They were eventually removed from office in September 2017, though we note for the moment that they have challenged the validity of their removal under Mexican law. We shall elaborate on this and the circumstances surrounding their removal subsequently. At the time they were directors of the appellants, Mr Gonzalo was a director of Integradora while Mr Alonso was authorised to execute important documents on Integradora’s behalf.

  10. [10] For convenience, we shall henceforth refer to Integradora, Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo, the three respondents herein, collectively as “IAG”.

  11. [11] The non-party in this appeal was Mr Jesus Angel Guerra Mendez (“Mr Mendez”), a lawyer in Guerra Gonzalez y Asociados SC (“Guerra”), a Mexican law firm. He (and IAG) claimed that the appellants had appointed him and other lawyers in his firm as their attorneys pursuant to powers of attorney (“POAs”) granted by the appellants on or around 31 August 2017. It suffices for the moment to note that the appellants challenged his appointment and authority to act on their behalf. Mr Mendez became a non-party to this appeal as he had filed an application to vary the Interim Injunctions that the Judge had initially granted (see below at [38]).

  12. Background to the dispute

  13. The financing of the Rigs

  14. [12] The Rigs’ purchase and operation was financed, inter alia, by bonds worth approximately US$940m (“the Bonds”) issued by Oro Negro to various bondholders pursuant to an agreement dated 24 January 2014 (“the Bond Agreement”) between Oro Negro and Nordic Trustee ASA (“NT”), a Norwegian company that acted as the bond trustee on the bondholders’ behalf. The Bond Agreement was governed by Norwegian Law. Although it was subsequently amended and re-stated, none of the amendments were material for the purposes of these appeals. We only need to highlight the following clauses of the Bond Agreement.

  15. [13] First, cl 13.5(a) of the Bond Agreement required Oro Negro to procure the amendment of the appellants’ constitutions to provide: (a) NT with a right to appoint an independent director to each of the appellants’ board of directors; and (b) the independent director with a veto over any attempt by the appellants to place themselves in any insolvency-related proceedings. It also provided that the appellants were not to amend their constitutions in a manner contrary to these two requirements.

  16. [14] Second, and significantly, cl 13.5(g) of the Bond Agreement also provided, inter alia, that Oro Negro was not to change its place of incorporation.

  17. [15] Finally, cl 15.1(g) (“the EOD Clause”) gave NT the right to declare the Bonds to be in default if the appellants, Integradora, or Perforadora took any steps to liquidate themselves or place themselves in insolvency-related proceedings.

  18. [16] As part of the financing arrangement, fixed charges over the appellants’ shares were also granted in favour of NT through deeds between Integradora and NT and Oro Negro and NT (“the Share Charges”). The Share Charges were governed by Singapore law and were subject to the Singapore court’s exclusive jurisdiction. For present purposes, it would suffice to highlight that cl 4.7 of the Share Charges provided that: (a) the chargors shall comply with cl 13.5(a) of the Bond Agreement (see above at [13]) as though it were set out expressly in the Share Charges; and (b) that they would procure the independent director’s appointment upon receiving a written notice from NT to that effect.

  19. The amendments to the appellants’ constitutions

  20. [17] A raft of amendments to the appellants’ constitutions were passed in April 2016. However, only one amendment was material for these appeals.

  21. [18] Pursuant to cl 13.5(a) of the Bond Agreement and cl 4.7 of the Share Charges (see above at [13] and [16]), the appellants’ constitutions were amended to include provisions for the appointment of an independent director and provisions which granted the independent director a veto in respect of certain decisions. Most importantly for present purposes is the addition of the following provision to all of the appellants’ constitutions:

  22. Although these provisions were numbered differently in the appellants’ constitutions, we shall adopt the numbering used in Oro Negro’s constitution and simply refer to all the provisions as “Art 115A” for convenience.

  23. [19] Mr Noel Blair Hunter Cochrane Jr was duly appointed as the appellants’ independent director (“the Independent Director”) in September 2016, on NT’s directions.

  24. Perforadora entered rough seas with the Pemex Charters

  25. [20] In 2015 and 2016, Pemex insisted on temporary amendments to the duration and hire rate of the Pemex Charters, which in turn caused a fall in the Rig Owners’ revenue. In 2017, Pemex insisted on a number of further, and permanent, amendments to the Pemex Charters (“the Proposed Pemex Amendments”) and threatened to terminate the Pemex Charters if Perforadora did not agree to them. Additionally, Pemex also refused to allow Perforadora to invoice them for services already rendered. The specifics of the Proposed Pemex Amendments are immaterial for present purposes, save that IAG expected them to cause an approximately 70% fall in Perforadora’s revenue. They further contended that this would have in turn caused Oro Negro to eventually default on its repayment obligations to the bondholders as well as caused the Rig Owners to become insolvent.

  26. [21] On 11 August 2017, an ad hoc group of bondholders of Oro Negro (“the ad hoc group”) expressed support for the Proposed Pemex Amendments and made proposals for amendments to the bond documents to facilitate the implementation of the same. IAG contended that the ad hoc group’s proposal was commercially unrealistic. They also suggested that the ad hoc group was trying to engineer a situation where Oro Negro would end up defaulting on its obligations under the Bond Agreement because a leading member of the ad hoc group was closely related to Integradora’s main competitor, a company called Seamex, which had also leased rigs to Pemex.

  27. POAs purportedly granted to Guerra by Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo

  28. [22] Pemex subsequently refused to implement the Proposed Pemex Amendments, even though it had proposed them. This led Integradora to believe that Pemex was going to unilaterally terminate the Pemex Charters. On or around 31 August 2017, Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo granted POAs to lawyers from Guerra, including Mr Mendez, on the appellants’ behalf (“the Guerra POAs”). The Guerra POAs purportedly granted the Guerra lawyers wide-ranging powers, including general powers of attorney for “litigations and collections” which included, but was not limited to, the filing and dismissal of “all kinds of proceedings”. It was undisputed that the Guerra POAs were executed without the Independent Director’s knowledge and approval.

  29. The events of default and their aftermath

  30. Perforadora filed a petition to place itself into concurso proceedings

  31. [23] On 11 September 2017, Perforadora voluntarily filed a concurso petition in the Mexican court (“the Perforadora Concurso Petition”). A concurso was essentially a court-sanctioned debt restructuring process for insolvent companies, governed by a Mexican statute called the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (“the LCM”). Broadly speaking, such proceedings consisted of the following stages:

  32. (a) First, the application stage, which would commence upon the filing and admission of a concurso petition, where the court will appoint an “examiner” who will verify whether the company was in fact insolvent. If it was, then the court will declare the insolvent company to be in concurso, and the court’s judgment to this effect will be published to notify creditors of the beginning of the concurso proceedings.

  33. (b) At the second stage, the court would appoint a “conciliador” whose role is to serve as a mediator between the petitioner and its creditors and to propose a plan for the insolvent company’s reorganisation. The conciliador would also be conferred with limited management powers over the insolvent company though he or she may also apply to the court to take over as the full manager of the insolvent company’s business.

  34. (c) At the last and final stage, the insolvent company would be declared “bankrupt” if: (i) the insolvent company sought such a declaration; (ii) there was no agreement between the creditors and the insolvent company for the restructuring of its debts; or (iii) the conciliador sought such a declaration. If the insolvent company were declared bankrupt, a liquidator will be appointed to realise the insolvent company’s assets for its creditors’ benefit, and various other consequences will also follow.

  35. Guerra filed concurso petitions on the appellants’ behalf

  36. [24] On 20 September 2017, Integradora (as the sole shareholder of Oro Negro) passed a shareholder’s resolution which purported to, inter alia:

  37. (a) approve the engagement of Guerra as Oro Negro’s lawyers for the purposes of filing a concurso petition on Oro Negro’s behalf; and

  38. (b) grant powers of attorney to various lawyers from Guerra to, inter alia, “seek or desist any kind of proceedings” on Oro Negro’s behalf.

  39. [25] In turn, Oro Negro (as the Rig Owners’ sole shareholder), also passed various shareholder’s resolutions to the same effect. For convenience, we shall refer to all of these shareholder’s resolutions as “the September 2017 resolutions”. Mr Alonso signed all of the September 2017 resolutions on Integradora and Oro Negro’s behalf.

  40. [26] The Perforadora Concurso Petition only came to NT’s attention on 19 September 2017. NT then declared an “Event of Default” pursuant to cl 15.1(g)(i) (see above at [15]) of the Bond Agreement on 25 September 2017. Thereafter, in exercise of its rights under the Bond Agreement and the Share Charges, NT:

  41. (a) Replaced all the appellants’ existing directors, including Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo, save for the Independent Director, with Mr Roger Arnold Hancock (“Mr Hancock”) and Mr Roger Alan Bartlett (“Mr Bartlett”) (collectively, “the new directors”) on 25 September 2017. This was carried out pursuant to: (i) pre-executed resignation letters signed by the former directors; and (ii) resolutions authorising the appointment of persons nominated by NT as the appellants’ new directors.

  42. (b) Perfected its security over the Oro Negro shares held by Intregradora and transferred these shares to its nominee, OND Pte Ltd (“OND”) on 4 October 2017. OND thus replaced Integradora as the controller of Oro Negro.

  43. [27] On 29 September 2017, Guerra filed a concurso petition on the appellants’ behalf in the Mexican court (“the Oro Negro Concurso Petition”). It was undisputed that it did this without the Independent Director’s knowledge or approval. Concurrently, Guerra also filed a concurso petition on Integradora’s behalf (“the Integradora Concurso Petition”). In a deposition made in related insolvency proceedings in the United States (which have since been stayed) (GD at [43]), Mr Alonso confirmed that he had reviewed the Oro Negro and Integradora Concurso Petitions before they were filed.

  44. [28] The appellants only learnt of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition on 6 October 2017. On 9 October 2017, the new directors passed board resolutions purporting to rescind any POAs that had been granted on their behalf to any persons. IAG were informed of these resolutions on 23 October 2017. For completeness, we note that Pemex terminated the Pemex Charters on 3 October 2017.

  45. Proceedings in the Mexican courts

  46. [29] On 17 October 2017, Cervantes Sainz, SC (“CS”), a Mexican law firm that was instructed by the new directors, filed a “brief” to notify the Mexican court that there had been a change to the appellants’ corporate structures. This was followed by a motion that CS filed on or around 18 October 2017 (“the withdrawal motion”), seeking orders that:

  47. (a) CS were the appellants’ authorised legal representatives;

  48. (b) Guerra were not the appellants’ authorised legal representatives and that their powers to appear on behalf of the appellants had, in any case, been revoked; and

  49. (c) the Oro Negro Concurso Petition be withdrawn.

  50. [30] On 25 October 2017, Guerra filed, purportedly on behalf of Integradora and the appellants, an “inefficiency and punitive damages claim” against NT, OND, and the new directors (“the inefficiency motion”), seeking the following orders:

  51. (a) a declaration that the Event of Default declaration by NT, its removal of Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo as the appellants’ directors and the appointment of the new directors in their place, the transfer of Oro Negro’s shares to OND, and the 9 October 2017 resolutions purporting to revoke the Guerra POAs were illegal, ineffective, and have no effect pursuant to Art 87 of the LCM; and

  52. (b) punitive damages amounting to approximately US$916m, being the unpaid principal on the Bonds.

  53. [32] On 2 May 2018, the Mexican court held that: (a) the Guerra POAs were not proven to have been validly revoked and would be treated as having been validly granted until proven otherwise; (b) the withdrawal of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition would not be allowed as Guerra were presumed to have filed the petition with valid authority and in good faith; and (c) the Oro Negro Concurso Petition was dismissed as it was submitted without the Independent Director’s approval and was therefore in breach of the appellants’ constitutions (“the 2 May 2018 decision”).

  54. [33] Guerra filed a motion for the court to reconsider the 2 May 2018 decision, but that motion was dismissed on 18 June 2018. It subsequently filed an amparo (constitutional) appeal against the court’s decision not to reconsider the 2 May 2018 decision (“the dismissal amparo”). On 19 September 2018, the Amparo Court overruled the 2 May 2018 decision and directed the Concurso Court to reconsider the admission of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition as well as the question of whether compliance with Art 115A should be excused on the basis that the Independent Director was in a position of conflict.

  55. [34] For completeness, we noted that the Rig Owners had commenced actions against Perforadora in the United States courts seeking the return of the rigs following the alleged termination of the Pemex Charters, while Mr Alonso had commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings in the United States on behalf of Perforadora and Integradora. These proceedings had been stayed pending the disposal of the proceedings in Mexico (GD at [44]–[45], though they were immaterial for the purposes of these appeals.

  56. The Singapore proceedings

  57. [35] On 26 January 2018, the appellants filed OS 126 in the Singapore High Court, seeking declarations that:

  58. (a) the shareholder resolutions that Integradora passed which purported to authorise members of Guerra to seek a concurso petition on the appellants’ behalf was ultra vires and/or incapable of enabling the appellants to seek any concurso or any other insolvency matter without the Independent Director’s approval;

  59. (b) IAG had no authority to cause and shall not cause the appellants to commence, continue and/or maintain any concurso petition or any other legal action purportedly on the appellants’ behalf whether in Mexico or elsewhere; and

  60. (c) IAG had no authority to act for any of the appellants and/or shall not act for any of the appellants and/or deal with the appellants’ assets including, but not limited to, the Rigs.

  61. [36] In OS 126, the appellants also sought permanent injunctions to:

  62. (a) restrain IAG and their servants and/or agents from relying and/or continuing to rely on the September 2017 resolutions to cause the appellants to commence, continue, and/or maintain any concurso petition or insolvency action and/or any other legal action purportedly on the appellants’ behalf, whether in Mexico or elsewhere; and

  63. (b) restrain IAG and their servants and/or agents from commencing, continuing and/or maintaining any concurso petition or insolvency action and/or any other legal action purportedly on the appellants’ behalf, whether in Mexico or elsewhere.

  64. [37] Simultaneously, the appellants also filed HC/Summons No 482 of 2018, where they sought and obtained ex parte (GD at [1]):

  65. (a) the Interim Injunctions against IAG which mirrored the injunctions prayed for in OS 126 (see above at [36]); and

  66. (b) the court’s leave to serve OS 126 on IAG in Mexico (as well as the necessary extension of time for service).

  67. (a) a declaration that Guerra and its lawyers were not bound by the Interim Injunctions;

  68. (c) alternatively, a variation of the Interim Injunctions to clarify that they did not prohibit any third party from complying with what that third party “reasonably believe[d] to be its obligations, contractual, statutory, professionally or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of Mexico, or under the proper law of the [Guerra POAs]”.

  69. The decision below

  70. [41] The Judge also found that the appellants had acted in bad faith as they were attempting to use the Singapore court’s process to “muzzle” IAG in the Mexican proceedings by obtaining an anti-suit injunction against them (GD at [119], [121] and [133]).

  71. [42] In her view, IAG had not acted in breach of Art 115A as: (a) Integradora was not restricted from passing resolutions authorising the commencement of concurso proceedings on the appellants’ behalf; and (b) Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo were directors, and not members of the appellants and were therefore not contractually bound to observe their constitutions (GD at [112], [147]).

  72. [43] In addition, the Judge found that the Interim Injunctions should be set aside on the basis of comity since there were ongoing Mexican proceedings, as well as proceedings in the United States that had been stayed pending the disposal of the Mexican proceedings (GD at [139]).

  73. [44] Finally, the Judge found that the appellants had failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts (GD at [117]–[118], [120]–[123], [138]).

  74. The parties’ cases

  75. The appellants’ case

  76. [45] The appellants submitted that the Judge’s decision was based on the erroneous conclusion that Singapore was not the appropriate forum to determine the dispute in OS 126. They contended that Singapore was clearly the more appropriate forum to determine the issues raised therein because the governing law of their claims was Singapore law, and that the appellants were incorporated in Singapore precisely “to take advantage of Singapore law, corporate structure and governance”. They also disagreed with her finding that they had failed to make full and frank disclosure.

  77. The respondents’ case

  78. [49] They also contended that the Interim Injunctions interfered with the administration of justice in Mexico by shutting IAG out of the concurso proceedings, which would result in the appellants succeeding by default. Additionally, they submitted that the balance of convenience lay in favour of discharging the Interim Injunctions as IAG would be prejudiced by losing an opportunity to regain control of the appellants. In contrast, the appellants would suffer no prejudice as could be seen from the fact that they did not rush to Singapore immediately after learning about the Oro Negro Concurso Petition and were content to participate in the Mexican proceedings for a period of time.

  79. Mr Mendez’s case

  80. [50] Mr Mendez submitted that he was not bound by the Interim Injunctions since he was neither the servant nor agent of IAG. He contended that this question should be determined by Mexican law, and that under Mexican law he was not considered to be IAG’s servant or agent. Nevertheless, Mr Mendez also submitted that the Interim Injunctions should be varied as they may otherwise have the effect of preventing him from carrying out his professional duties under Mexican law. In his view, the proposed variations were akin to those frequently made in respect of third parties in the context of Mareva injunctions.

  81. [51] Mr Mendez also submitted that he should not be added as a defendant in OS 126 since his participation was not required for its fair and proper disposal as he had no involvement whatsoever in respect of the appellants’ claims against IAG. Finally, Mr Mendez contended that he had not voluntarily submitted to the Singapore court’s jurisdiction since the variation application was merely defensive and did not amount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction.

  82. The issues to be determined

  83. [52] Against this backdrop, the following substantive issues arose for determination in these appeals:

  84. (b) Whether the Judge erred in discharging the Interim Injunctions.

  85. (c) Whether Mr Mendez should have been added as a third defendant in OS 126.

  86. (d) Whether this court should have allowed Mr Mendez’s variation application.

  87. Issue 1: Whether the Judge erred in setting aside the Overseas Service Order

  88. (a) First, the plaintiff must have a good arguable case that its claim falls within one of the “jurisdictional gateways” under O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Ed) (the “ROC”). For convenience, we shall henceforth refer to this requirement as the “good arguable case requirement”.

  89. (b) Second, there must be a sufficient degree of merit to the plaintiff’s claim, and in doing so it must show that there is a serious question to be tried. This requirement was unnecessary though, if the plaintiff was relying on a jurisdictional gateway that already required the court to examine the merits of its claim under the good arguable case requirement (Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd and another v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd and others [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1156 at [18]–[20]).

  90. (c) Third, Singapore must clearly be the more appropriate forum for the trial or determination of the action (the “appropriate forum requirement”).

  91. Sub-issue 1(A) – The good arguable case requirement

  92. The appellants had a good arguable case against Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo for breach of the appellants’ constitutions

  93. (1) The former directors were bound to comply with Art 115A

  94. [56] Although the appellants accepted that the former directors were not parties to the appellants’ constitutions, they submitted that this court should nonetheless find the existence of a collateral contract between them and the former directors that incorporates the appellants’ constitutions. This was because individuals who have accepted appointment as directors should be taken to have agreed to serve the company on the terms contained in the constitution. They relied on the English High Court’s decision in In re Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union (Isaacs’ Case) [1892] 2 Ch 158 (“Isaacs’ Case”); the Malaysian High Court’s decision in Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra & others v Perdana Petroleum Bhd (formerly known as Petra Perdana Bhd) [2013] 8 MLJ 280 (“Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim”); and this court’s decision in Chee Kheong Mah Chaly and others v Liquidators of Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2003] 2 SLR(R) 571 (“Chaly Chee”).

  95. [57] IAG, on the other hand, submitted that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo were not parties to any agreement which imposed a contractual obligation on them to observe the appellants’ constitutions. They relied on the principle that a company’s constitution was merely a contract between a company and its shareholders, and its shareholders inter se. Although they recognised that a company’s constitutional provisions could be incorporated into an agreement between a non-member director and a company, they submitted that a director’s consent to being appointed per se was insufficient for such purposes.

  96. [58] In our view, the central question on this issue was whether the former directors’ acceptance of their appointments as the appellants’ directors was sufficient to cause them to be bound by the appellants’ constitutional provisions.

  97. [59] Both parties agreed that Singapore law was the applicable law for the resolution of this issue. In any case, it was well-established that issues relating to the duties owed by an officer to a company was to be determined by the law of the company’s place of incorporation, or the lex incorporationis (Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157 (“Base Metal”) per Tuckey LJ at [56], per Arden LJ at [69]; Focus Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1086 (“Focus Energy”) at [31]–[33]; Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 1st Ed, 2014) at para 10.22).

  98. [60] We were satisfied that the appellants had a good arguable case that the former directors were bound to observe the appellants’ constitutions. In our view, the former directors’ consent to being appointed as the appellants’ directors on the facts of this case, gave rise to an agreement that they would serve the appellants based on the terms of their constitutions.

  99. [61] As Lord Esher MR observed in Swabey v Port Darwin Gold Mining Co (1889) 1 Megone 385 (“Swabey”) at 387, “[t]he articles [of a company] do not themselves form a contract, but from them you get the terms upon which the directors are serving”. That case involved a dispute between a director and his company over the director’s fees. The plaintiff director had been appointed as a director of the defendant company at a time when the company’s articles contained a provision which provided that its directors were to be paid a particular annual sum. After the plaintiff’s appointment, however, a special resolution was passed to amend that provision in such a way as to reduce its directors’ fees. The special resolution also purported to apply this amendment retroactively from a date prior to the plaintiff’s appointment. The plaintiff resigned his directorship and sued for three months’ worth of his outstanding fees based on the pre-amendment rate.

  100. [62] The claim was dismissed at first instance but was allowed on appeal. The English Court of Appeal’s leading judgment was delivered by Lord Halsbury LC, who held that although the articles per se did not constitute a contract between the company and the plaintiff director, a person who accepts an appointment as a director with notice of the company’s articles would be taken to have entered into a contract with the company to serve on the terms of its articles (at 386). Lord Halsbury LC further held that a director in this position would also be taken to have agreed that it is possible for the company to alter the director’s terms of service, in which case the director would have the option to continue serving based on the new terms or resigning. Those terms, however, could only be altered prospectively, and the director in that case was therefore entitled to his fees based on the old rate up to the point the articles were altered. Lord Esher MR concurred with this analysis and delivered a short concurring judgment in which he made the observation cited above at [61].

  101. [63] We noted that Swabey concerned a situation where the director was seeking to enforce his rights under the articles against the company, whereas here, it was the appellants that were seeking to enforce the articles against the former directors. In our view, the contractual effect of the company’s articles vis-à-vis its directors should work both ways.

  102. [64] In Isaacs’ Case, the company’s articles provided that its first director would be deemed to have agreed to subscribe to qualification shares from the company and that the shares would be allotted to him if he failed to acquire them within a month of his appointment. Sir Henry Isaacs was eventually appointed as its first director. He had signed a copy of the company’s constitution at the time of his appointment and also attended various board meetings but never acquired the requisite qualification shares. When the company was wound up, Sir Henry applied for his name to be struck off its list of contributories. His application was refused and the court held that Sir Henry was liable to be placed on the list of contributories as he was bound by the company’s articles to acquire the qualification shares. Citing Lord Esher MR’s judgment in Swabey, Stirling J observed that (at 164):

  103. [65] Stirling J’s decision was upheld on appeal and was subsequently cited with approval in In re T N Farrer Ltd [1937] 1 Ch 352 (at 358) and Molineaux v The London, Birmingham and Manchester Insurance Company, Limited [1902] 2 KB 589 (at 596).

  104. [67] For completeness, we should add that this court in Chaly Chee at [18] and [24] also observed, albeit in obiter dicta, that incorporation of the company’s articles into D&T’s contract of appointment might still have been possible even if their appointment contract had contained more express terms than what was stated in D&T’s letter of acceptance.

  105. [69] We agreed with these principles and found that on the evidence before us, there was a good arguable case that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo had agreed to serve as the appellants’ directors on the footing of the appellants’ constitutions.

  106. [70] As this court observed in Chaly Chee (at [18]), it would be sensible for the court to infer that the parties intended to contract “on the footing of the articles” (or constitution) if there was no written or express terms of appointment. If relatively little would be required to incorporate a company’s constitution into a contract of appointment between a company and its auditor (see Chaly Chee at [22]), even less should be required where directors were concerned. This was especially so when the constitutions in question contained provisions relating to the appointment, duties, and powers of the company’s directors. In such circumstances, the only reasonable inference that the court could draw was that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo must have agreed with the appellants that their terms of service were to include the appellants’ constitutions. It did not matter that there was no evidence as to whether Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo were familiar with the appellants’ constitutional provisions at the time of their appointment. In our view, it would be extraordinary for directors to claim that they were not familiar with constitution of a company that they have agreed to serve. All directors were expected to conduct and manage the company’s affairs in accordance with the powers granted to them by the company’s constitution (In re John Fulton & Co Ltd [1931] Ch 35 at 55) and to “follow the appropriate procedures in the company’s constitution” (Clark v Cutland [2004] 1 WLR 783 per Arden LJ at [21]).

  107. [71] It also made no difference that Art 115A was inserted after the former directors were appointed since directors are taken to agree to abide by the company’s constitution as it stood from time to time. As Lord Halsbury LC held in Swabey, a director who served on the footing of the company’s articles has “as one of the stipulations of [his] contract, that it shall be possible for [the company] to alter the terms upon which he is to serve, in which case he would have the option of continuing to serve” (at 386). Thus, the fact that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo had continued serving as the appellants’ directors after Art 115A was inserted into the appellants’ constitutions meant that they must be taken to have agreed to serve on the terms of the amended constitutions. Both of them clearly knew about the insertion of Art 115A. Mr Alonso had signed all but one of the shareholder’s special resolutions on behalf of Integradora and Oro Negro respectively which amended the appellants’ constitutions to include Art 115A. Mr Gonzalo signed the Bond Agreement and original Share Charges on behalf of Integradora pursuant to which Art 115A was inserted into the appellants’ constitutions.

  108. (2) The former directors had breached their obligations under Art 115A

  109. [72] As was clear from a plain reading of Art 115A (see above at [18]), the appellants’ directors were prohibited from carrying into effect the filing of any petition to place the appellants in concurso unless two mandatory requirements were satisfied: (a) first, their shareholders had to approve of such a measure at a general meeting; and (b) the independent director had to separately approve of such a measure, if such an independent director had been appointed. It was clear to us that this provision was meant to safeguard the bondholders’ interests by making sure that the appellants would not cease operations and commence liquidation without the approval of an independent director nominated by the bond trustee. This was an important safeguard, given that Integradora was Oro Negro’s sole shareholder and that two of the appellants’ directors were office holders of Integradora.

  110. [73] We were satisfied that there was a good arguable case that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo had breached Art 115A by granting the wide-ranging POAs to Guerra without the Independent Director’s approval. At the outset, we noted that IAG did not dispute that the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition would be in breach of Art 115A, in the event we held that the former directors were bound by it. Instead, their main defence was that: (a) the former directors were not the parties that carried the Oro Negro Concurso Petition into effect; and (b) the former directors were in any case entitled to bypass Art 115A’s requirements as the Independent Director was in a position of conflict. We were not persuaded by either of these submissions.

  111. [74] First, there was a good arguable case that the former directors directly facilitated the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition without the Independent Director’s approval. Article 115A provided that the appellants’ directors shall not “carry into effect” the filing of any petition to place the appellants in concurso, unless its two requirements had been met (see above at [72]). The term “carry into effect” would, in our view, encompass situations where the acts of the directors had directly facilitated the commencement of any insolvency matter listed in Art 115A(a) to (c), which included a petition to place the appellants in concurso. In this case, the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition was achieved through the Guerra POAs granted by the former directors. In our view, the former directors could not have granted powers to Guerra which they themselves could not have validly exercised. In fact, this would be consistent with Art 116(B) which provided that “[d]irectors may from time to time … by power of attorney under the Seal appoint any company, firm or person or any fluctuating body of persons whether nominated directly or indirectly by the Directors to be the attorney or attorneys of the Company for such purposes and with such powers, authorities and discretions (not exceeding those vested in or exercisable by the Directors under these Articles)” [emphasis added]. To hold otherwise would mean that the former directors could essentially bypass the Art 115A safeguards by granting wide powers of attorney to non-directors. This was simply untenable.

  112. [76] We were also not persuaded by IAG’s submission that Mr Alonso and Mr Gonzalo were entitled to bypass Art 115A because the Independent Director would have voted in a capricious manner anyway on account of a conflict of interest. The fact remained that the Independent Director had to approve of any concurso petition filed on the appellants’ behalf. This was a mandatory requirement under Art 115A. We were not aware of any provision in the appellants’ constitution or any legal principle that entitled the former directors to bypass mandatory requirements in the companies’ constitutions even in such circumstances. We also noted that Mr Alonso did not state on affidavit that the former directors acted on this consideration when they granted the Guerra POAs. Instead, this point only emerged in their submissions. Finally, and in any case, IAG’s contention that the Independent Director would have acted in a capricious manner was speculative at best.

  113. The appellants had a good arguable case against Integradora for inducing breach of contract and unlawful means conspiracy, but not for breaching Art 115A

  114. [77] We turn now to Integradora. We agreed with the Judge and IAG that Art 115A was, strictly speaking, a provision that only prohibited the appellants’ directors from carrying into effect any petition to place the appellants in concurso without the Independent Director’s approval. As such, it did not apply to prohibit Integradora, as a shareholder of Oro Negro, from voting in favour of the September 2017 Resolutions authorising the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition.

  115. [78] However, we were of the view that the appellants had raised good arguable cases against Integradora for unlawful means conspiracy and for inducing the breach of Art 115A. Indeed, IAG did not contend that the appellants had no good arguable case against Integradora for these two causes of action. As we mentioned above at [55], their only contention in this regard was that Singapore was forum non conveniens. In any case, we were satisfied that the evidence before us disclosed a good arguable case against Integradora for unlawful means conspiracy against the appellants and for inducing a breach of the appellants’ constitutions. In this regard, it was relevant to note that all but one of the September 2017 resolutions to appoint Guerra to file concurso proceedings on the appellants’ behalf was signed by Mr Alonso on Integradora’s behalf just nine days before the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition (see above at [24]–[25]). It appeared, therefore, that Integradora’s plan at that point was for Guerra to proceed with the filing of the Oro Negro Concurso Petition on the appellants’ behalf without the Independent Director’s approval.

  116. The appropriate forum requirement

  117. [79] We now turn to the appropriate forum requirement. The Judge held that OS 126 had nothing or little to do with Singapore or Singapore law. Although counsel for IAG accepted at the hearing before us that the main issue in OS 126 was governed by Singapore law, he contended that Singapore was nevertheless forum non conveniens given the nature and extent of the insolvency proceedings in Mexico.

  118. [80] The applicable legal principles for determining whether Singapore was the more appropriate forum for the purposes of service out were well-established, and could be summarised as follows:

  119. (a) The question whether Singapore was the more appropriate forum for the action only arises for determination if the court was first satisfied that there was at least another available forum (Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 1st Ed, 2010) (“Fentiman”) at para 12.63). As this court observed in Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007 (“Siemens AG”) at [4], Singapore could only be forum non conveniens if there was a more appropriate forum other than Singapore. Here, the other available forum was Mexico.

  120. (b) The appellants (as the plaintiffs in OS 126) bore the burden of demonstrating that Singapore was, on balance, the more appropriate forum to decide on the issues raised in OS 126. In this regard, it was strictly irrelevant whether Singapore was the more appropriate forum “by a hair or by a mile” (Siemens AG at [8]).

  121. (c) The inquiry for determining whether Singapore was the more appropriate forum in the context of service out applications was the same as that undertaken at the first stage of the Spiliada test (Zoom Communications at [70]). Consequently, Singapore would be the more appropriate forum if it had the most real and substantial connection with the disputes raised (JIO Minerals FZC and others v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”) at [38]). The court would weigh the connecting factors that had the most relevant and substantial associations with the dispute rather than undertake a mechanical application of established connecting factors. It would also be primarily concerned with the quality of the connecting factors rather than the quantity of factors on each side of the scale (JIO Minerals at [41]; Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 at [70], Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra [2019] 2 SLR 372 (“Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar”) at [54]).

  122. (d) In the event that Singapore was not the more appropriate forum, it was an open question whether the second stage of the Spiliada test was applicable in the context of leave applications for service outside jurisdiction (ie, whether the Singapore court can nevertheless grant leave for service out if the plaintiff can show that substantial justice cannot be done in the otherwise appropriate foreign forum). There appeared to be authorities pointing both ways (see Lewis v King [2005] ILPr 16; Metall und Rohstoff GmbH v Donalson Lufkin & Kenrette [1990] 1 QB 391 at 488 which considered the second stage of the Spiliada enquiry; cf, Konamaneni and others v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd and others [2002] 1 WLR 1269 (“Konamaneni”) at [175]–[176]; Fentiman at 12.27–12.28 which suggest that the plaintiff has no cause to complain that it would be a denial of justice to refuse permission to serve out). However, given our determination that Singapore was clearly the more appropriate forum in this case, and since this point was not argued before us, it was not necessary for us to express any views on it.

  123. [81] Although the facts may have appeared complicated and complex, the main issue raised in OS 126 was whether, as a matter of Singapore law, the Oro Negro Concurso Petition was filed in breach of Art 115A. For choice of law purposes, this was an issue concerning the appellants’ corporate governance and internal management. Additionally, we also found it significant that the key dispute was legal in nature since the material facts were not disputed. Seen in this light, it became clear to us that Singapore was the more appropriate forum for the determination of OS 126 and that the Judge had erred in holding otherwise.

  124. Singapore was prima facie the more appropriate forum as OS 126 involved claims concerning the appellants’ corporate governance and internal management

  125. [82] The Judge did not attach sufficient weight to the fact that Singapore was the appellants’ place of incorporation and that the Bond Agreement expressly stipulated that it should remain as such. In our view, a company’s place of incorporation was, prima facie, the more appropriate forum in cases concerning its corporate governance or internal management, and that factor was to be given considerable weight in the analysis of the appropriate forum requirement.

  126. [83] As Lawrence Collins J held at [55] of Konamaneni:

  127. [84] Before us, there was no suggestion that the appellants were not properly incorporated in Singapore, or that their incorporation in Singapore was in pursuit of any illegal or improper purposes. As the appellants’ place of incorporation, Singapore was prima facie the more appropriate forum for determining disputes relating to their governance or internal management and the Judge had erred in failing to recognise this. Additionally, Integradora had expressly agreed that the appellants were to maintain their place of incorporation in Singapore pursuant to cl 13.5(g) of the Bond Agreement (see above at [14]). Consequently, and contrary to the Judge’s holdings (GD at [122] and [126]), the fact that Singapore was the appellants’ place of incorporation was not fortuitous and the appellants’ links to Singapore were not contrived. The appellants were therefore entitled to commence OS 126 in Singapore.

  128. The nature and extent of the Oro Negro Concurso Proceedings in Mexico

  129. [85] Further, we found that the Judge erred in placing substantial weight on the nature and extent of the Mexican proceedings. In our view, these proceedings were, strictly speaking, irrelevant for the purposes of determining the appropriate forum for the determination of OS 126. This was because they related to matters that were incidental to and arising from the concurso proceedings that were purportedly filed in breach of the appellants’ constitutions. If the concurso proceedings were indeed commenced in breach of the appellants’ constitutions, it followed that all the other consequential applications purportedly commenced on the appellants’ behalf in Mexico by Guerra would have been infected by that same breach. As such, the nature and extent of the Mexican proceedings did not change the outcome of our appropriate forum analysis.

  130. [86] We also disagreed with IAG’s submission that the appellants’ argument before the Mexican court that: (a) Guerra had no authority to act on their behalf and (b) the Oro Negro Concurso Petition had been filed in breach of Art 115A necessarily indicated an acceptance by them that Mexico was the more appropriate forum for resolving the issues raised in OS 126. IAG accepted at the hearing before us that the appellants’ actions in the Mexican proceedings were entirely reactive in nature. In our view, it was reasonable for the new directors to have attempted to put a quick end to the Mexican proceedings after gaining control of the appellants. Although OS 126 was not commenced immediately after the appellants learnt about the Oro Negro Concurso Petition, we did not think that this delay was inordinate or of such length as to render Singapore forum non conveniens. Additionally, this delay did not result in any final determination of the substantive issues raised in OS 126 by the Mexican courts.

  131. Governing law of the issues in OS 126

  132. [87] Finally, the fact that that the main issue in OS 126 (ie, whether the Oro Negro Concurso Petition was filed in breach of Art 115A) was governed by Singapore law pointed in favour of Singapore as the more appropriate forum.

  133. [88] As mentioned above at [81] the main issue in OS 126 concerned the appellants’ corporate governance and internal management. It was well established that such issues were governed by the lex incorporationis (see, Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws vol 1 (Lord Collins of Mapesbury gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) (“Dicey, Morris & Collins”)at para 30–028; Base Metal per Tuckey LJ at [56] and Arden LJ at [67]–[69]; Konamaneni at [55]; Focus Energy (at [31]–[33] and [36])).

  134. [89] In Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar (at [56]–[57]), this court observed that the weight to be accorded to the governing law of a dispute would ultimately depend on the nature of the dispute (citing Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis Singapore, 2016) at para 75.093 and Dicey, Morris & Collins at para 12-034)). Here, the central issue of OS 126 concerned the internal governance and management of Singapore incorporated companies, an issue uniquely governed by Singapore law.

  135. Mexico was the place of alleged torts

  136. [90] The starting presumption in relation to tortious claims was that the place where the tort occurred was prima facie the natural forum for determining that tortious claim, though this was only one of the factors in the overall forum conveniens analysis (Rickshaw Investments Ltd and another v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [37]–[40]; JIO Minerals at [106]). In this case, it was clear that the unlawful means conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract claims which were alleged against IAG occurred in Mexico. Hence, Mexico would, prima facie, be the more appropriate forum for determining the appellants’ tortious claims against Integradora.

  137. [91] However, that presumption was displaced here because the underlying acts that allegedly attracted tortious liability arose from the breaches of the appellants’ constitutions. The alleged unlawful means that the appellants asserted was the breach of their constitutions, while the contracts that were allegedly breached were also their constitutions. The tortious claims were therefore parasitic on the non-tortious claims. In such circumstances, it would have been incongruous to have held that these two inextricably linked issues should be determined in two different fora.

  138. Other factors

  139. [92] For completeness, we also found the following factors irrelevant or neutral in our analysis of the appropriate forum requirement.

  140. (a) While IAG was correct that most of the witnesses were likely to be located in Mexico, we gave this factor relatively little weight since the determination of OS 126 was not likely to require witness testimonies. After all, it was common ground that the approval of the Independent Director was not procured.

  141. (b) The fact that the appellants had brought criminal complaints against the former directors was strictly irrelevant for the purposes of OS 126. The criminal proceedings involved questions on whether any Mexican penal laws had been violated, whereas OS 126 involved questions relating to the corporate governance of the appellants under Singapore law. While there might have been some overlap in the factual issues involved, we were not convinced that the extent of overlap was likely to be significant.

  142. (c) The appellants’ commencement of civil proceedings against DB Mexico and Perforadora in Mexico was also irrelevant because those proceedings neither concerned IAG’s capacity to represent the appellants nor their conduct in procuring the Guerra POAs. Instead, those civil proceedings related to the provision of information by DB Mexico as well as Perforadora, and were brought pursuant to the Mexican Trust which was expressly stated to be governed by Mexican law and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mexican courts.

  143. [93] In the circumstances, we did not find any persuasive reason to displace the starting point that Singapore was the more appropriate forum to determine the issues raised in OS 126.

  144. The unnecessary expert affidavits

  145. The full and frank disclosure requirement

  146. [95] Finally, we turn to address the question of full and frank disclosure. It was well-established that the duty to make full and frank disclosure in the context of interlocutory applications did not “require the plaintiff to disclose every relevant document, as it must on discovery” (The “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 at [88]). Instead, a plaintiff only bore the burden of disclosing facts that were material, ie, facts that the court should take into consideration in making an informed decision on the issues before it (The “Vasily Golovnin” at [86]–[87]). The question of whether full and frank disclosure had been made obviously depended on the issues raised in each case.

  147. [96] The Judge was of the view that the appellants had failed to disclose the following facts:

  148. (a) The potential applicability of Art 87 of the LCM, as well as a December 2017 ruling by the Mexican court that a provision in the Pemex charters that was similar to the EOD Clause in the Bond Agreement was invalid for contravening Art 87 (GD at [92], [116]–[118]), as it would have indicated that all of NT’s actions taken pursuant to the EOD Clause under the Bond Agreement would have been invalid, including the appellants’ commencement of OS 126 by the new directors (GD at [117]–[118]).

  149. (b) The fact that the Rig Owners had filed criminal complaints and lawsuits in Mexico in April 2018 against Mr Alonso and three lawyers from Guerra, as well as suits against DB Mexico and Perforadora between June to July 2018 (GD at [120]).

  150. (c) The fact that the appellants were incorporated in Singapore pursuant to the requirement of lenders who had underwritten the purchase of two of the rigs owned by the appellants, whose loans have since been paid off (GD at [122]).

  151. (d) The fact that the appellants’ bank accounts in Singapore were closed before OS 126 was filed, contrary to the appellants’ claim that they maintained bank accounts in Singapore (GD at [123]).

  152. [97] In our view, the Judge had erred in finding that this amounted to a lack of full and frank disclosure as none of these facts were material to the issues before the court:

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