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Grounds publishedDecided 5 Nov 2020

Court of Appeal

Siva Kumar s/o Avadiar v Quek Leng Chuang and others

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[2020] SGCA 110Case no. Civil Appeal No 59 of 202021 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. Background facts

  3. The parties

  4. [5] The 3rd respondent, Environmental Solutions (Asia) Pte Ltd (“the Company”) was founded by the appellant, Mr Siva Kumar, the 1st respondent, Mr Quek Leng Chuang and Mr James Traazil. The Company was incorporated on 8 May 1999. Shortly after the first meeting in or around July 1999 where the business plans were discussed , Mr James Traazil passed away. As a result, the appellant and the 1st respondent started the business of the Company on their own.

  5. [6] The appellant presently holds 992,500 shares (49.625%) in the Company. The appellant was a director of the Company from 22 November 1999 to 27 May 2019. The 1st respondent holds 992,500 shares (49.625%) in the Company and is presently its sole director. The 2nd respondent, Mr Traazil Leon, who is the son of the late Mr James Traazil, holds the balance 15,000 shares (0.75%) in the Company, and became a shareholder of the Company on 18 January 2019, after the said shares were transferred to him from the estate of Mr James Traazil.

  6. Breakdown in relations

  7. [7] Sometime in January 2018, the relationship between the appellant and the 1st respondent began to deteriorate over various business disagreements.

  8. [8] On 29 January 2019, the appellant was served a notice of an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) to be held on 18 February 2019 to remove him as director of the Company and to appoint the 2nd respondent as director in the appellant’s stead. As a result, the appellant commenced HC/S 168/2019 (“Suit 168”) on 7 February 2019 against the respondents for minority oppression, amongst others. In Suit 168, the appellant sought the following reliefs:

  9. (a) a declaration to remain as a director of the Company for as long as he was a shareholder of the Company;

  10. (b) an injunction to restrain the 1st respondent, the 2nd respondent and the Company from removing him as a director of the Company, affecting his right to equal representation on the board of directors, or interfering with his rights and performance of his duties as a director;

  11. (d) damages to be assessed.

  12. [9] On 7 February 2019, the appellant also filed HC/SUM 621/2019 (“SUM 621”) to restrain the 1st respondent, 2nd respondent and the Company from proceeding with the EGM on 18 February 2019. On 26 April 2019, the appellant was served with a notice of an EGM to be held on 11 May 2019 for the proposed appointment of one Tay Eng Hean to be appointed as a director of the Company. On 7 May 2019, the appellant filed HC/SUM 2360/2019 (“SUM 2360”) to restrain the 1st respondent, 2nd respondent and the Company from proceeding with the proposed EGM on 11 May 2019.

  13. [10] On 9 May 2019, the appellant obtained various court orders including an interim injunction restraining any EGMs of the Company to appoint a new director of the Company, pending the resolution of SUM 2360 and SUM 621 which were both adjourned to be heard on 24 May 2019.

  14. (a) On 15 August 2019, they jointly appointed Nexia TS Pte Ltd (“Nexia”) as the Valuer and agreed to the terms of engagement of Nexia and its scope of work.

  15. (b) They provided the documents as requested by Nexia.

  16. (c) Thereafter, the parties made three sets of submissions to Nexia on 6 September 2019, 29 October 2019 and 25 November 2019 respectively in respect of the valuation. Both parties therefore had ample opportunities to address Nexia on the application of the lack of marketability discount before Nexia’s final valuation report (“Final Report”) was issued.

  17. (d) Upon Nexia’s review of each set of submissions, Nexia provided the parties with two draft reports before issuing the Final Report.

  18. (i) On 10 October 2019, Nexia issued its first draft valuation report, valuing the appellant’s shares at US$703,000. The appellant took issue with Nexia’s application of a 25% discount for lack of marketability to the valuation of the appellant’s shares.

  19. (ii) On 11 November 2019, Nexia issued the second draft report, valuing the appellant’s share of US$487,000 with the application of a 25% discount for lack of marketability to the valuation of the appellant’s shares.

  20. (iii) On 4 December 2019, Nexia issued the Final Report valuing the appellant’s shares at US$395,000 on the premise that the 25% discount for lack of marketability was applicable. This was derived from a gross valuation of approximately US$526,000. It is apparent that Nexia was consistently of the view that the discount for lack of marketability would apply in all of its valuation reports.

  21. [13] We note that there were some differences in the valuation of the appellant’s shares by Nexia in its three reports. The first and second draft valuation reports differed because the first draft valuation report adopted the Guideline Public Company Method, while the second draft valuation report adopted the Discounted Cash Flow Method. Nexia took the view in the second draft valuation report that the Discounted Cash Flow Method was the most appropriate because (a) the shares of the Company were valued on a going concern premise; (b) there was sufficient reliable historical and projected financial data made available for the evaluation of share value based on the Discounted Cash Flow Method; and (c) in line with the going concern premise, it was unlikely that market participants would consider the net asset value. The Final Report also adopted the Discounted Cash Flow Method, but differed from the second draft valuation report because of differences in the Indicative Enterprise Values and the Indicative Equity Values. In any case, nothing material turns on the differences in Nexia’s valuation reports and the changes in Nexia’s valuations in its three reports were not the focus of the parties’ dispute.

  22. Decision below in OS 83

  23. Parties’ arguments on appeal

  24. [22] We turn now to briefly summarise the parties’ arguments on appeal.

  25. [28] The respondents further averred that the appellant’s argument against mutually agreed buy-outs recorded in contractual consent orders militated against public interest.

  26. Our decision

  27. Relevance of Liew Kit Fah

  28. [30] We start by observing that the present facts are far removed and entirely distinguishable from the facts in Liew Kit Fah.

  29. [36] However, we observe that this was premised on an erroneous interpretation of Liew Kit Fah. In fact, we held to the contrary in Liew Kit Fah that unlike the minority discount for lack of control, the discount for lack of marketability is “industry specific” and should be left to “the expertise of the independent valuer to decide whether to apply the lack of marketability discount for the respondents’ shares” (at [59]).

  30. [38] When parties agree to the joint appointment of an independent valuer, it would be within the parties’ contemplation that the valuer may arrive at a valuation which is different from the way each of them may subjectively value their respective shares. However, in agreeing to a valuation by a jointly appointed independent valuer, the parties must be bound by the resultant valuation. It is apposite to bear in mind that such a valuation can cut both ways as it could be favourable or unfavourable to either party.

  31. [39] Further, it is clear to us that Liew Kit Fah ([4] supra) could not possibly have had any impact or influence on the Valuer’s decision. The decision in Liew Kit Fah was only released on 27 November 2019. By then, Nexia had issued its first draft valuation report on 10 October 2019 which had applied a 25% lack of marketability discount to the valuation of the appellant’s shares. In any event, the Valuer’s decision to apply the discount for lack of marketability was entirely consistent with our observation in Liew Kit Fah at [59], as discussed above, that the application of such a discount is industry specific and should be left to the expertise of the independent valuer to decide.

  32. [40] For the above reasons, we reiterate that the majority and minority decisions in Liew Kit Fah did not assist the appellant’s submission.

  33. Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction or power to grant the Consent Order

  34. The distinction between “jurisdiction” and “power”

  35. [42] We start by making a preliminary observation that the terms “jurisdiction” and “power” have been commonly used interchangeably in various contexts. However, as we observed in Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 (“Re Nalpon”) at [29] and [32], a key distinction should be drawn between the two distinct and entirely different concepts. This court in Re Nalpon adopted the definitions proposed by Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) in Muhd Munir v Noor Hidah and other applications [1990] 2 SLR(R) 348 at [19] and made the following observations (at [29]–[31]):

  36. Furthermore, as described by this court in Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1996] 2 SLR(R) 80 at [39], jurisdiction is a precondition of the lawful exercise of a particular power.

  37. [43] In the present appeal, the true issue concerned the power exercised by the High Court (ie, the High Court’s capacity to give effect to its determination in granting the orders or reliefs sought by the successful party to the dispute), and not its jurisdiction (ie, the authority, however derived, to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it).

  38. [44] It cannot be denied that the High Court was clearly seised of jurisdiction pursuant to s 16(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“the SCJA”) to hear the dispute in Suit 168. The respondents were validly served with a writ of summons in Suit 168 in Singapore in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”).

  39. Dissenting judgment in Liew Kit Fah

  40. [51] In the House of Lords decision in Essex County Council v Essex Incorporated Congregational Church Union [1963] AC 808 (“Essex”), the parties attempted to confer jurisdiction upon the Lands Tribunal by agreement to determine a preliminary issue as to whether the provisions of Part IV of the Town and Country Planning Act 1959 (c 53) (“Town and Country Planning Act 1959”) enabled a purchase price notice to be served in respect of land part of which, being a church, was exempt from rates, had no rateable value and whether the purchase price notice as valid. The House of Lords held that the only statutory jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal under Town and Country Planning Act 1959 was to determine an objection properly made and therefore in deciding on the validity of the purchase price notice which was not the subject of such an objection, the Lands Tribunal had no jurisdiction to do so. It was thus in that context that Lord Reid observed at 820–821 that “it is a fundamental principle that no consent can confer on a court or tribunal with limited statutory jurisdiction any power to act beyond that jurisdiction”. Again, just like in Hinde, the jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal in Essex was similarly defined by statute ie, the Town and Country Planning Act 1959.

  41. The source of the court’s power to grant a consent order

  42. [56] The courts have generally accepted that they possess the inherent power to fulfil their functions as courts of law: Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 vol 1 (Chua Lee Meng gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th Ed, 2020) at para 92/4/1. In the leading case of Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Morris stated at 1301:

  43. Sir Jack Jacob, in his seminal article entitled “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) Current Legal Problems 23 (described in Wellmix Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man [2006] 2 SLR(R) 117 at [83] as being “widely recognised as the leading discourse on the inherent powers of the court in the Commonwealth”), defined (at 51) the inherent jurisdiction of the court as:

  44. [60] For the above reasons, we held the view that the court had the inherent power to grant consent orders providing for one party to purchase the shares of the other, even without a prior finding of minority oppression. In such a case, as explained by the majority decision in Liew Kit Fah, the court’s powers under s 216(2)(d) of the Companies Act are plainly not engaged in the first place. There would be no question of the court acting ultra vires in respect of s 216(2)(d) of the Companies Act in granting such consent orders.

  45. Other arguments

  46. [61] We now turn to summarily deal with the remaining arguments put forth by the appellant, which, in our judgment, were plainly untenable.

  47. Conclusion

  48. Steven Chong Chao Hick Tin Woo Bih Li

  49. Judge of Appeal Senior Judge Judge