The first argument centres on the submission that the presumption of advancement had been weakened by the fact that Hari had two other brothers (we note, parenthetically, that the Testator did not make any provision for his daughters in his will). As has been observed in this court’s decision in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 at [68], the greater the number of children one has, the less likely it is that a transfer of property of substantial value to a single child without similar provision for the other children would be intended as a pure gift to that child. However, such a proposition is not one that is writ in stone and is certainly not one that is to applied in a literal and/or quantitative manner; indeed, the court concerned ought to consider the precise facts as well as context of the case before it. In the present case, Hari was the only one who was with the Testator throughout in Singapore. The eldest brother, Daya, who resided in Canada after having been sent there for medical studies, had lost touch with the family and had only reconnected intermittently with them (including the Testator) since 1983, although he appointed solicitors to hold a watching brief for him during the trial in the High Court (see the Judgment at [7]). Whilst Ranjit claims to have assisted the Testator with regard to the ancestral property in India, he was away in India for many years and only returned to Singapore approximately a dozen years after the Testator had paid for the Half Share of the Property that had been placed in Hari’s name. Further, although the will treated all three brothers equally, as the Judge noted, it had been signed two years before the registration of the Half Share and that one possible interpretation was that the Testator had simply decided to provide for Hari apart from the will; in the Judge’s view, Ranjit’s reliance on the will was therefore not as probative of the Testator’s intent as he had argued and, as just noted, could even point in the other direction (see the Judgment at [33]). At this juncture, it is also important to note that the oral testimony of the parties would have assisted the Judge in arriving at his decision as there was no clear documentary evidence that resolved this case one way or the other. In this regard, the Judge had determined that Hari’s residence and contact with the Testator in Singapore was more than just a literal happenstance. On the contrary, he was of the view (with which we agree) that Hari was in a “unique position as the Testator’s only son in Singapore” (see the Judgment at [33], as well as at [31]). As the Judge observed (at [86]):