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Grounds publishedDecided 22 Dec 2025

District Court

[2025] SGDC 324

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[2025] SGDC 324Case no. District Court Bill of Costs No 12 of 2025 (District Court Summons No 1749/2025)8 paragraphs

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  1. District Court Bill of Costs No 12 of 2025 (District Court Summons No 1749/2025) District Judge Chiah Kok Khun

  2. Introduction

  3. [2] BCS 12 concerns work done by the applicant’s law firm for the underlying suit, District Court Suit No 2892 of 2020 (“DC 2892”) during the period of 23 February 2023 to 27 September 2023 (“Invoiced Period”). The applicant represented the respondent, a former client that operates a spa and wellness business, in DC 2892, and rendered the eight invoices in question to the respondent for the work done. DC 2892 is a claim by the respondent against an ex-employee for breaches of employment. BCS 12 was filed pursuant to the trial judge’s decision on 22 October 2024 to tax the invoices. The applicant appealed against the decision to tax the invoices, but it was upheld by the Honourable Justice Dedar Singh Gill (“Gill J”) on 26 March 2025.

  4. [3] On 25 August 2025, the DR taxed sections 1 and 2 of BCS 12 as follows:

  5. (a) Section 1 costs (professional fees) – reduced from $115,095.60 (subsequently revised to $108,225) to $46,000.

  6. (b) Section 2 costs (work done for assessment of costs) – no order. The DR found that the applicant should be disallowed section 2 costs, but allowed fees that need to be paid to extract the Registrar’s Certificate to be claimed by the applicant (ie, allocator fees and filing fees for the Registrar’s Certificate).

  7. Analysis and findings

  8. [5] I note at the outset that it is undisputable that taxation reviews are heard de novo and are unfettered by the discretion exercised by the registrar. I am therefore not constrained by the discretion exercised by the DR in determining the quantum of any item in the bill under review. I am entitled to exercise the powers and discretion vested in me by the rules and make a completely fresh decision, including substituting my own discretion for that of the registrar and awarding a different figure altogether in place of that awarded by the registrar. See Lau Liat Meng & Co v Lum Kai Keng [2002] SGHC at [10].

  9. [8] As for the considerations under Appendix 1, Order 59 of the Rules of Court 2014 (“ROC 2014”) referred to in Lin Jian Wei, they are as follows:

  10. The quantum of party-and-party costs awarded points to a reduction of section 1 costs

  11. (a) The drafting and finalisation of nine factual AEICs filed on behalf of the respondent, and reviewing the Defendant’s AEIC and Supplementary AEIC.

  12. (b) The appearances at three pre-trial conferences (“PTCs”) on 15 June 2023, 21 July 2023, and 18 August 2023.

  13. (c) Reviewing and attending the hearing of DC/SUM 2137/2023 and DC/SUM 2138/2023 (applications for amendment and an extension of time) (“Applications”) on 13 September 2023, where the respondent was awarded $3,000 (all in) for party-and-party costs.

  14. Section 1 costs should be reduced to $34,000

  15. [15] In considering this application, I note first that in the course of hearing the appeal against the decision to tax the invoices, Gill J had found the amounts claimed in the invoices to be plainly excessive. It is apposite to set out his Honour’s findings in this regard:

  16. [16] As seen, Gill J has made the finding that DC 2892 was not as complex as the applicant has made it out to be.

  17. [20] I turn next to a fee estimate found in the applicant’s letter of engagement dated 17 February 2023 sent to the respondent. The fee estimate was given by the applicant to the respondent in the course of its engagement for DC 2892. The fee estimate furnished to the respondent was for $70,000 and encompassed the AEIC stage, the trial preparation, the 6-day trial and the closing and reply submissions. Whilst I am fully cognisant that a fee estimate is only an estimate, it does provide a useful insight into the applicant’s view at the material time of the complexity of the underlying suit and the amount of work it reasonably expected to have to undertake to discharge the duties of its solicitors. It can be reasonably assumed that the applicant would not have given the fee estimate without having a full understanding and appreciation of the complexity of the underlying suit. I note too that the applicant did not at any time provide a revised fee estimate to the respondent.

  18. [21] The respondent’s position in regard to the $70,000 fee estimate is that it could be broken down into stages as follows:

  19. Conclusion