Shariffah Zaiton Binte Syed Agil Alsagoff [2026] SGDC 127

Costs

DC/SUM 336/2026 was an application by the defendant to set aside a regular judgment entered in default of appearance vis-à-vis DC/OC 2302/2025. I allowed the application and ordered that costs be in the cause. The claimant has appealed solely against the cost order. Despite the limited scope of appeal, I will briefly discuss the merits of the case as they were relevant to my decision vis-à-vis the cost order. Simply put, I was of the view that the setting aside ought to have been consented to by the claimant upon such consent having been sought by the defendant on several occasions prior to the hearing of this matter – thereby averting unnecessary expense of costs and court resources. Despite this view I did not order costs against the claimant, instead electing to make a cost order which would favour she who eventually succeeds based on the merits of her case.

Costs

During submissions on costs, counsel for the plaintiff relied on the following dicta from the Court of Appeal in Mercurine at ([105] in seeking costs to be awarded to his client:

Costs

In addition, he contended that any alternative cost award would unfairly penalise his client for having complied with procedure. After all, it was said, the setting aside application was necessitated by the defendant’s failings which gave rise to the default judgment being entered.

Costs

Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, sought costs to be awarded to his client. The basis for this submission was that the claimant was accorded multiple opportunities to consent to the setting aside. Had the claimant exercised good judgment and so consented, extensive arguments which escalated costs could have been averted.

Costs

I commence by observing that the Court of Appeal in Mercurine was not setting rigid rules vis-à-vis costs for setting aside regular or irregular default judgments. This is clear firstly, from the fact that the Court of Appeal was prescribing what happens “typically” for such cost orders. Secondly, the Court of Appeal explicitly considered circumstances where defendants ought not to bear costs of failed setting aside applications (Mercurine at [106]):

Costs

In ordering costs to be in the cause, I was guided by the Ideals stated in the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). In particular, the need to achieve “expeditious proceedings”, “cost-effective work”, and “efficient use of court resources”. These were stated in the ROC 2021 as follows:

Costs

In my view, achievement of the aforementioned Ideals requires parties to objectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases in deciding whether to pursue or defend any applications. This is to avert unnecessary expense of resources by parties, and the Courts. I am fortified in my view by the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with costs. In particular O. 21, r 2 which explicitly requires Courts to consider “efforts made by the parties at amicable resolution” and “the conduct of the parties” in the course of making cost orders. Order 21, r 2 of the ROC 2021 reads:

Costs

Indeed, the importance of avoiding unnecessary wastage of resources is further evidenced by O 21, r 4 of the ROC 2021 providing for adverse cost orders against successful parties in circumstances where such parties either act unnecessarily or fail to consider amicable resolutions. The provision reads:

Costs

In my view this was a case which warranted departure from the typical scenarios vis-à-vis costs envisioned by the Court of Appeal in Mercurine. Whilst the claimant regularly entered default judgment against the defendant, the obvious merits of the setting aside application rendered refusal of multiple offers for amicable resolution by the claimant incompatible with the Ideals of the ROC 2021 cited above. I took such conduct into consideration, in accordance with O 21. r 2 of the ROC 2021, in making the cost order.

Costs

For the reasons above, I ordered costs to be in the cause.