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Grounds publishedDecided 12 May 2026

District Court

Achievers LLC v Legal Aid Bureau

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[2026] SGDC 162Case no. District Court Bill of Costs No 4 of 20265 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. Background facts

  3. [5] Subsequently, I heard BCS 4 on 15 April 2026.

  4. My decision

  5. [6] Regulation 15(2) of the LAAR was relevant. This reads:

  6. Costs in the Syariah Court

  7. The relevant provision in the present case was s 120(3) of the LPA as the Respondent had consented for the Bill of Costs to be assessed by its letter dated 27 January 2026 to the Applicant.

  8. [13] Crucially, the words “court” and “Registrar” in s 120 are positively defined in s 116(1) of the LPA, and do not include the Syariah Court or its registrar:

  9. Of relevance is also s 116(2)(a) of the LPA, which states that Part 9 applies “to all remuneration and costs received by a Singapore law practice or a solicitor practising in a Singapore law practice …”. Moreover, nothing in the AMLA suggests that the Syariah Court has been conferred the jurisdiction to assess a solicitor’s bill of costs. Nor, in light of the express provisions of the LPA, would it be possible to imply that the Syariah Court has any inherent jurisdiction or power to do so.

  10. The proper interpretation of reg 15(2)

  11. [16] In Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 at [47], the Constitutional Tribunal approved of the following passage by Dawson J in Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 concerning s 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 of Victoria (that provision corresponds to s 9A of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Interpretation Act”) which sets out the principle of purposive interpretation):

  12. [17] The words in bold italics above refer to the principle of rectifying construction. This principle is founded on the basis of rectifying “obvious drafting errors” and “plain cases of drafting mistakes” on the part of the legislature: Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1223 at [63]. Under this approach, the court may add or substitute words to give effect to the legislative intention: Nam Hong Construction & Engineering Pte Ltd v Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 604 (“Nam Hong”) at [54]. The test for when the adoption of a rectifying construction is permitted was summarised by the Court of Appeal in Nam Hong at [55] (I have substituted references to “Parliament” with “the lawmaker” since reg 15(2) of the LAAR is subsidiary legislation made by the executive):

  13. (a) first, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the legislation read as a whole what the mischief was that the lawmaker sought to remedy with the legislation;

  14. (b) second, it was apparent that the draftsman and the lawmaker had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, the eventuality that was required to be dealt with so that the purpose of the legislation could be achieved; and

  15. (c) third, it was possible to state with certainty what the additional or substituted words would be that the draftsman would have inserted and that the lawmaker would have approved had their attention been drawn to the omission.

  16. As explained recently by a three-member coram of the General Division of the High Court in Kenneth Lum Hsien Loong v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 89, the three requirements in Nam Hong should be applied in situations where “certain words should be added or substituted to correct a clear oversight”. This is to “ensure that the court remains faithful to [the legislative] intent and does not rewrite the statute in any manner the court deems fit” (at [36]).

  17. Conclusion