Public Prosecutor v Yeo Chee Hong [2026] SGDC 210

Introduction

Private sector corruption offences undermine an even playing field in niche industries and markets, while subverting the competitive advantage of legitimate industry stakeholders. The perpetration of these offences in the private sector does not detract from the fact that the underlying criminal conduct bears negative ramifications that are inevitably felt by segments of the public, thereby stirring public disquiet. The insidious nature of such corrupt transactions accentuates the difficulty in detection.

The present case involved private sector actors in the supply of security equipment to a property management company.

The accused, a 53- year old male Chinese Singaporean, claimed trial to a charge under section 6(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241, 1993 Revised Edition) (“PCA”) for an offence of corruptly giving gratification of an amount totalling $5000. On the first day of the trial, before the hearing commenced, the accused pleaded guilty to the following charge:

DAC-905544-2023

You are charged that you, are charged that you, sometime after 12 May 2021, in Singapore, did corruptly give gratification of totalling S$5,000 to an agent, to wit, one Kwok Kum Seng, Wilfred, a Building Manager of Harvest @ Woodlands, MCST 3959 (“Harvest”), as a reward for doing an act in relation to his principal’s affairs, to wit, for advancing the business interests of Glexus Security Products Distribution Pte Ltd with Harvest, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 6(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241, 1993 Revised Edition) (“PCA”).

The accused further consented to two charges under section 6(c) read with section 29(a) of the PCA to be taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. These charges concerned the act of abetting the offences of knowingly giving a false quotation to Wilfred, with the intention to mislead Harvest with the use of such a false document (“TIC charges”).

DAC-905545-2023

You are charged that you, sometime between April and May 2021, in Singapore, did abet by instigating one Yeo Chee Beng, a Project Manager of Axus Technology Pte Ltd (Axus), to knowingly give to an agent, to wit, one Kwok Kum Seng, Wilfred, a Building Manager of Harvest @ Woodlands, MCST 3959 (“Harvest”), a quotation from Axus dated 23 April 2021, for a total sum of S$62,381 for the replacement and upgrading of CCTV systems on Harvest’s premises, in respect of which Harvest was interested and the said quotation contained statements which are defective in a material particular, namely, the quotation was not a genuine offer to perform works for Harvest, and which the document to your knowledge was intended to mislead Harvest, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 6(c) read with Section 29(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241, 1993 Revised Edition) (“PCA”).

DAC-905546-2023

You are charged that you, sometime between April and May 2021, in Singapore, did abet by instigating one Gan Kim Lock, the Director of Techies Technology Pte Ltd (Techies), to knowingly give to an agent, to wit, one Kwok Kum Seng, Wilfred, a Building Manager of Harvest @ Woodlands, MCST 3959 (“Harvest”), a quotation from Techies, dated 26 April 2021, for a total sum of S$68,900 for the replacement and upgrading of CCTV systems on Harvest’s premises, in respect of which Harvest was interested and the said quotation contained statements which are defective in a material particular, namely, the quotation was not a genuine offer to perform works for Harvest, and which the document to your knowledge was intended to mislead Harvest, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 6(c) read with Section 29(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241, 1993 Revised Edition) (“PCA”).

I imposed a sentence of five weeks’ imprisonment and set out my reasons.

Punishment prescribed by law

An offence involving the corrupt giving of gratification to any agent as a reward for doing or having done any act in relation to the principal’s business or showing favour to any person in relation to the principal’s business under section 6(b) of the PCA may be punished with a maximum fine of $100,000, or with an imprisonment term which may extend to five years, or with both.

Section 2 of the PCA defines an agent as any person employed by or acting for another, while a principal includes an employer. It is not disputed that Wilfred was an agent of Harvest at the material time.

Antecedents

The accused had no antecedents.

The facts

The accused admitted to the Statement of Facts unreservedly.

The accused was a director of Glexus Holdings Pte Ltd (“Glexus Holdings”). Glexus Holdings was the holding company of Glexus Security Products Distribution Pte Ltd (“Glexus Security”). Glexus Security was involved in the business of selling and installing CCTV surveillance and alarm systems. The accused oversaw the sales and procured customers and business deals for Glexus Security.

The co-accused was one Kwok Kum Seng, Wilfred (“Wilfred). Wifred was employed by Melana International Pte Ltd (“Melana”), a property management company. Harvest @ Woodlands, Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 3959 (“Harvest”) was a commercial property. At the material time, Harvest engaged Melana. Wilfred became the building manager of Harvest and reported directly to the managing council of Harvest.

The accused and Wilfred were friends for several years when Wilfred was employed by another property management company in a similar capacity.

As the building manager of Harvest, Wilfred was responsible for liaising with contractors when building works were to be carried out. Generally, Wilfred was required to obtain at least three independent quotations to Harvest’s managing council, which members would decide on the contractor based on the quotation they accepted. Wilfred could source for the contractors and to recommend the quotation to the managing council. The managing council would award the contracts for building works based on the price quotations from the contractors and Wilfred’s recommendations. Harvest would depart from the general tender process in situations where urgent works were to be performed or works were specifically carried out by its existing contractors.

Sometime between March and April 2021, Wilfred approached the accused to ascertain whether Glexus Security was interested to carry out the works involving the replacement and upgrading of CCTV systems on Harvest’s premises.

The accused and Wilfred discussed and agreed that Wilfred would assist Glexus Security to obtain the award for the works in return for some ‘loans’ to Wilfred by the accused. The accused knew that the “loans” were in fact commission or “Kopi money” for helping Glexus Security to obtain the award for the works. He knew that Wilfred would not repay these “loans”.

Thereafter, Wilfred disclosed the exact specifications of the Works, as well as Harvest’s pre-determined budget of $50,000 for the Works to the accused. This was done in pursuance of their agreement. In reality, Wilfred was not permitted to disclose Harvest’s budget to any contractors.

The accused utilised the information disclosed by Wilfred and prepared a quotation to Harvest to perform the Works for $53,500 (including Goods and Service Tax). The quotation by Glexus Security was based on the upper limit of Harvest’s budget.

On 13 April 2021, the accused sent the said quotation to Wilfred via WhatsApp. Wilfred asked the accused to provide two additional quotations to Harvest, as well as the work email addresses of: (i) himself and (ii) the two additional contractors. Wilfred intended to use the three email addresses to send “official” requests for quotes, to give the impression that they were all above board.

The accused agreed and sent his work email address to Wilfred on 14 April 2021, and approached the following individuals to prepare the supporting quotations: (a) Yeo Chee Beng (“Chee Beng”), the accused’s brother and the Project Manager of Axus Technology Pte Ltd (“Axus”); and (b) Gan Kim Lock (“Kim Lock”), the Director of Techies Technology Pte Ltd (“Techies”).

The accused told Chee Beng and Kim Lock about Glexus Security’s intended tender sum, and left them to provide supporting quotations as he knew that they would understand that they were supposed to submit higher tender sums. He also admitted that these were deliberately “priced so high” so that Harvest’s managing council would reject them, and to ensure that the Works would be awarded to Glexus Security.

Following these instructions, Chee Beng and Kim Lock prepared quotations for the Works, and forwarded their quotations to the accused. The respective tender sums stated in Axus’s and Techies’s supporting quotations were $62,381 and $68,900 respectively.

On 25 April 2021, the accused sent Glexus Security’s quotation for $53,500 to Wilfred’s work email address (Mcst3959@gmail.com). He also sent Chee Beng’s and Kim Lock’s work email addresses to Wilfred on the same day.

On 26 April 2021, the accused sent Axus’s and Techies’s supporting quotations to Wilfred via WhatsApp. Chee Beng and Kim Lock were then instructed to send their respective quotations to Wilfred’s work email address, which they did.1 This was done to create the impression that both were genuine quotations that were properly sourced by Wilfred.

After receiving the three quotations (i.e. Glexus Security, Axus and Techies), Wilfred submitted them to Harvest’s managing council for selection, with Glexus Security’s quote being the lowest. Investigations also revealed that Wilfred recommended Glexus Security’s quotation (out of the three quotations) to the council.

Harvest’s managing council awarded the Works to Glexus Security. Harvest paid out the full tender sum of $53,500 to Glexus Security over two cheques dated 12 May and 17 June 2021.

On 12 May 2021, Wilfred instructed the accused to “Prepare 10 for me later” over WhatsApp. Wilfred also informed the accused that he would get Glexus Security’s quotation (see paragraph [12] above) approved on the same day. The accused understood that Wilfred was requesting for a commission of $10,000 for his role in helping Glexus Security secure the Works, but felt that the requested amount was “too high”. He thus ignored Wilfred’s request. Despite this, Wilfred continued to ask the accused to lend him smaller sums of money.

After 12 May 2021, Wilfred received a total of $5,000 in cash, as commissions from the accused, over a few occasions. He had not repaid this sum of money to the accused. The accused had extended these sums to Wilfred corruptly, as a reward for advancing the business interests of Glexus Security with Harvest, namely, to ensure that the Works would be awarded to Glexus,

The accused admitted to deleting his text messages with Wilfred, prior to 26 October 2021, that were on his mobile phone. He explained that these messages concerned the payment of the commissions to Wilfred, and he did not want to risk the discovery of their corrupt arrangement.

The parties’ submissions

The prosecution’s submissions

The prosecution sought a custodial sentence in the region of seven to eight weeks’ imprisonment.

The prosecution highlighted that the accused was part of a corrupt arrangement in which he had given Wilfred a cash reward to render unfair assistance to Glexus Security, of which he had beneficial ownership and obtained a building contract of considerable value. According to the prosecution, the accused played an instrumental role in undermining the tender process of Harvest and executing the corrupt arrangement.

The prosecution did not object to a sentencing discount of up to 10% to apply to the accused person’s plea of guilt at Stage 3 of the proceedings, pursuant to the sentencing guidelines on reduction in sentences for guilty pleas issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel (“the SAP sentencing guidelines”).

The defence submissions and mitigation plea

The defence sought a fine. In justification of a fine in the region of $25,000 to $30,000 as an appropriate sentence, the defence argued that the amount of gratification involved was not significant. According to the defence, the accused “did not initiate the bribes”. Neither did he seek to profit. The defence submitted that there was no real detriment to Harvest as Harvest did not suffer real monetary loss as the work was carried out at the lowest price. The defence further contended that the offence was a one-off transaction.

The defence asserted that the accused’s psychiatric condition of major depressive and anxiety disorder contributed to the commission of the offence and his mental health issues significantly impaired his ability to resist pressure and assess the implications of his actions. According to the defence, the accused was experiencing a relapse of depressive and anxiety symptoms at the material time of the offence and there was a contributory link between his psychiatric condition and the offending behaviour. The defence further highlighted the risk of relapse and deterioration in the accused’s psychiatric condition that would be brought on by incarceration if a custodial sentence were imposed, given his stress intolerance and vulnerability to confinement.

It was the defence contention that the accused’s psychiatric condition rendered him easily manipulated and pressured. He was pressured by Wilfred into giving the latter loans. The accused was placed under tremendous stress due to Wilfred’s persistent and numerous text messages and succumbed to the latter’s requests.

The defence highlighted that the accused pleaded guilty and cooperative in investigations.

Issues to be determined

Whether the custodial threshold was crossed

The issue at the fore is whether the circumstances presented were sufficient to cross the threshold for a custodial sentence. I found this to be answered in the affirmative.

Deterrence is the predominant sentencing consideration in private sector corruption offences. The public interest element is invoked in the private sector where businesses are required to be conducted in a fair and transparent manner so as not to prejudice the public’s legitimate expectations of bona fides, commercial even-handedness, economic welfare and efficient operation of the market: Goh Ngak Eng v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 SLR 1385 (“Goh Ngak Eng”) at [54] . It was further observed by the court in Goh Ngak Eng at [31] that “the need for deterrence has resulted in a recent upward trend in custodial sentences for serious private sector corruption offences”. It is an economic imperative to “deter the creation of a corrupt business culture at the highest level of commerce”.

Equally relevant are the following factors that would attract the sentencing principle of general deterrence, as identified in PP v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR (R) 814 (“ Law Aik Meng ”) at [24] - [25]: (a) offences affecting public safety, public security, public health or public services, (b) offences leading to public disquiet, (c) group/syndicate offences and (d) difficulty of detection.

The present case fell within the first category set out in Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostofa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166 (“ Mostofa Romel”) at [26(a)], namely, “where the receiving party is paid to confer on the paying party a benefit that is within the receiving party’s power to confer, without regard to whether the paying party ought properly to have received that benefit. This is typically done at the payer’s behest.” The court held at [27] that “whether the custodial threshold is crossed will depend on the facts”. Pertinently, the court noted at [20] that there was no presumption in favour of non-custodial sentences where private sector offences involved an amount of gratification below $30,000 and in the absence of real detriment to the principal’s interests. Similarly, the court in Heng Tze Yong v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 976 (“Heng Tze Yong”) observed at [24] that there was no rule that cases involving bribes less than $30,000 should only attract a fine.

Application of the sentencing framework in Goh Ngak Eng

(i) Harm-Culpability analysis

While the amount of $5000 was given over a few occasions, the prosecution elected not to proceed on an amalgamated charge that would attract an enhanced punishment. The prosecution confirmed that it was not invoking the statutory provisions relating to amalgamation. The reasons that the prosecution had taken account of in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion in proceeding on an individual charge, as opposed to an amalgamated one are not relevant considerations in sentencing: see Public Prosecutor v Gaiyathiri d/o Murugayan [2022] 2 SLR 1103 at [57]. However, the court is entitled to take account of the extent of offending as a relevant sentencing consideration, notwithstanding the prosecution’s discretion to proceed on an individual, as opposed to an amalgamated, charge. This was established in Public Prosecutor v Bong Sim Swan Suzanna [2020] 2 SLR 1001 (“ Suzanna Bong ”), where the Court of Appeal affirmed the principles set out in Chua Siew Peng v Public Prosecutor & anor [2017] 4 SLR 1247 at [81]-[85], stated at [65]-[66] that while a sentencing court generally could not take into account uncharged offences, it was entitled to and in fact should consider the aggravating circumstances in which the offence was committed, even where those circumstances could technically constitute separate offences. The Court of Appeal observed that conduct that was so closely intertwined to constitute a sufficient nexus to the commission of the offence could be considered at the sentencing stage, regardless of whether that fact could also constitute a separate offence for which the offender was not charged. Where the fact is relevant and proved, it ought to be considered by the sentencing court. In this regard, I found the fact relating to multiple occasions of corrupt giving had sufficient nexus to the commission of the offence and should be considered in sentencing.

Pertinently, the defence had mischaracterised the offence in the proceeded charge as a single act of corrupt giving, when the gratification of $5000 was given on multiple occasions. The defence erroneously premised its sentencing position on a single corrupt transaction. Throughout its submissions that the defence had categorically referred the offence in the proceeded charge as a one-off transaction and described the offence as “one giving on the proceeded charge”. In a similar vein, it is apparent that Dr Yeo’s opinion related only to an isolated occasion, as opposed to multiple occasions. This in turn raised the question as to whether the accused’s depressive condition contributed to his offending on the other occasions.

I next considered the role of the accused vis-à-vis that of the co-accused person, Wilfred.

Consistency in sentencing is relevant. The principle of parity applies when two of more offenders who were party to the same offence were sentenced, the sentences passed should be similar, unless there was a relevant difference in their responsibility or in their personal circumstances: Public Prosecutor v Ramlee [1998] 3 SLR(R) 95 and affirmed by the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Ng Sae Kiat and other appeals [2015] 5 SLR 167. In Chong Han Rui v Public Prosecutor [2016] SGHC 25 at [1], the High Court reiterated that the application of the parity principle to the sentences meted out to co-offenders who were party to a common criminal enterprise should not be unduly disparate from each other, namely, those of similar culpability should receive similar sentences, while those of greater culpability should generally be more severely punished. It was further emphasised by the court at [52]:

“…however that the parity principle is not to be applied in a rigid and inflexible manner. Rather, it is an important aid to the sentencing court to ensure that sentencing of co-offenders is done in a manner that is broadly consistent and fair. But ultimately, what is consistent and fair depends on the facts of the case at hand…”

[emphasis added]

While the accused was a party to the same transaction as Wilfred, I was mindful that the principle of parity of sentencing ought not to be applied blindly, without regard to the degree of culpability of each individual offender in committing the offending acts.

The co-accused, Wilfred, pleaded guilty to four charges under section 6(a) of the PCA and consented to nine charges under section 6(a) and section 6(c) of the PCA to be taken into consideration. Wilfred received a total amount of $40,000 in corrupt gratification in respect of all the charges under section 6(a) of the PCA. The four proceeded charges under section 6(a) of the PCA involved an amount of $37,000. The table prepared by the prosecution is reproduced below:

Charge Number

(Proceeded)

Offence

Brief Facts

Sentence

DAC-905522 2023

Section Prevention Corruption 6(a) of Act (Cap 241, Rev Ed 1993)

On 27 April 2021, Wilfred received $10,000 from one Yee Kok Tong (“Yee”), as a reward for advancing the business interests of Yeo Heng Electrical Works (“Yeo Heng”) with Harvest.

months’ imprisonment

(Consecutive)

DAC-905523 2023

On 27 April 2021, Wilfred received $10,000 from Yee, as a reward for advancing the business interests of Yeo Heng with Harvest.

months’ imprisonment

DAC-905524 2023

Sometime in July 2021, Wilfred received $12,000 from Yee, as a reward for advancing the business interests of Yeo Heng with Harvest.

months’ imprisonment

DAC-905526 2023

Sometime after 12 May 2021, Wilfred received $5,000 from the accused, as a reward for advancing the business interests of Glexus Holdings Pte Ltd with Harvest.

months’ imprisonment

(Consecutive)

Global sentence

months’ imprisonment Penalty of $40,500, in default 6 weeks’ imprisonment

According to the prosecution, Wilfred was sentenced to an imprisonment of two months for the charge involving the accused. The prosecution submitted that the claim-trial sentence for this charge should have been three month’s imprisonment. Wilfred was untraced.

The prosecution confirmed that no prosecutorial action was taken against the co-offenders in the TIC offences, namely, the accused person’s brother, Yeo Chee Beng and Gan Kim Lock.

It was not in dispute that the accused’s level of culpability was lower than Wilfred’s. I recognised that the accused did not initiate the payments to Wilfred. However, I was not persuaded by defence argument that the accused’s role was minimal. On the contrary, the accused played a pivotal role in facilitating the corrupt arrangement. He was instrumental in undermining the tender process exercise involving Harvest and Glexus Security. The accused was complicit in skewing the bidding exercise in his company’s favour. In my view, it is wholly artificial to view the accused’s role in isolation. Given that the corrupt arrangement was buoyed by the procurement of the falsified quotations, the offences in the proceeded and TIC charges were intrinsically linked. The level of his culpability in the entire scheme must be assessed holistically.

The corrupt arrangement bore the element of a considered intention to perpetrate the offence. The text messages between the accused and Wilfred evinced the nature and extent of their collaboration in the corrupt arrangement. The degree of planning and premeditation was demonstrably high. This in turn justified a harsher sentence than one which resulted from a “spur of the moment”.

Having considered these offence-specific factors at the first stage of the framework, I agreed with the parties that the case fell within the slight harm/low culpability category. However, I rejected the defence argument that a fine was the norm for offences falling within the slight harm/low culpability category.

Notably, the High Court in Goh Ngak Eng contemplated the imposition of imprisonment for the slight harm/low culpability category at [98]:

We agree with the Prosecution that the indicative sentencing range for a case of slight harm/low culpability should include a custodial term of up to six months. In our judgment, offending conduct coming within the slight harm/low culpability category can nevertheless attract a custodial sentence, if particular offence-specific factors are engaged on the facts of the case.

While the sentence should not exceed the indicative starting point of three months’ imprisonment in Wifred’s case, the accused’s conduct must be met with some measure of opprobrium. Accordingly, I determined the indicative starting sentence to be seven weeks’ imprisonment.

(ii) Accused’s psychiatric condition

The defence further submitted that an imprisonment term would be disproportionately harsh as incarceration would heighten the accused’s psychological vulnerability and frailty. According to Dr Yeo, the accused was psychologically vulnerable to confinement and prolonged high-stress environment. It was his opinion that incarceration would pose a significant risk of relapse and psychiatric deterioration to the accused. Dr Yeo added that the accused’s condition would be better managed with medical treatment and supervision in the community setting.

In my view, these concerns were unfounded. Any medical needs would be adequately addressed by the healthcare system provided by the Singapore Prisons Services (“SPS”), which manages and treats inmates with a variety of medical conditions. SPS further confirmed that the accused would continue to receive management and treatment for his medical condition.

Even if the presence of a contributory link between the accused person’s mental condition and the commission of the offence were established, it would be of such limited mitigating value as to fail to bring the accused’s case below the custodial threshold. The threshold warranting a custodial sentence was invariably crossed in the present case.

(iii) Other offender specific factors

I accorded due credit to the accused’s plea of guilt.

While the accused is untraced, he could not be regarded as a first offender. Quite apart from the proceeded charge, the accused committed the offences involving the abetment of the giving of a falsified quotation in the two TIC charges. As the TIC charges were of a similar nature to the proceeded charge, these would have the effect of heightening the criminality of the accused person and warranted an enhancement of the sentence to be imposed: UI at [38]. In respect of the offence proceeded, it was not an isolated incident of corrupt giving on the part of the accused. Rather, the act of corrupt giving of the amount of $5000 spanned multiple occasions. This was confirmed by the prosecution and set out in the Statement of Facts , to which the accused had admitted unequivocally. While his multiple corrupt acts would have constituted separate and distinct offences, these were not subject of any additional charges brought against the accused. Neither did the prosecution proceed on an amalgamated charge. The accused had displayed a sustained pattern of offending conduct which is relevant in sentencing.

Analysis of comparables in reported precedents

In support of a custodial sentence, the prosecution cited the case of Public Prosecutor v Joe Chua Yip Min [2022] SGDC 260 (“Joe Chua”), where imprisonment terms in the region of four to eight weeks were imposed for corrupt gratification amounts ranging from $1345 to $9600. The offender, Joe Chua was employed as a salesperson by Teck Soon Lee Auto Supply Pte Ltd (“TSL”). TSL was involved in the business of supplying automotive parts. Its customers included other spare parts shops, workshops and stocklists. Prior to his employment with TSL, the offender was a salesperson with JAE Auto Pte Ltd (“JAE”). JAE conducted business involving the sale of automobile parts. During his employment with JAE, the offender solicited bribes from two directors of TSL in return for his act of procuring more vehicle parts from TSL on JAE’s behalf. The offender initiated the request for gratification from one Philip, a director of TSL, in the form of a loan of several hundred dollars. Both the offender and Philip knew that the monies were intended as a reward for the offender’s continued purchase of spare parts from TSL on JAE’s behalf. Philip paid the gratification monthly to the offender over the course of a year. The corrupt arrangement was not disclosed to JAE. The corrupt arrangement subsequently extended to the referral of JAE customers to TSL. Another director of TSL, one Patrick, took part in the conspiracy with Philip to corruptly give gratification to the offender as a reward for diverting JAE’s business to TSL. Patrick met the offender on several occasions and corruptly gave cash gratification as a reward for referring JAE’s customers to TSL over a period of about six months.

The offender, who was untraced, pleaded guilty to three amalgamated charges under section 6(a) of the PCA, and consented to two similar charges to be taken into consideration. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the charge involving a corrupt gratification of $6000. In respect of the charge involving $9600 in corruption gratification, a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was imposed. The offender was sentenced to three months imprisonment for corruptly accepting a gratification amounting to $1345. The two charges that were consented to be taken into consideration involved gratification of $6000 and $8000 respectively. On appeal, the High Court reduced the sentences as follows:

S/N

Proceeded Charges

Amount of corrupt gratification

Offending Period

Sentence imposed by District Court

Sentence imposed by High Court on appeal

1.

S 6(a) PCA

$6000

January – December 2015

Six months’ imprisonment

Six weeks’ imprisonment

2.

S 6(a) PCA

$9600

January – December 2017

Eight months’ imprisonment

Eight weeks’ imprisonment

3.

S 6(a) PCA

$1345

September 2020 – March 2021

Three months’ imprisonment

Four weeks’ imprisonment

According to the prosecution, the decision of the High Court in Joe Chua was useful as a reference in calibrating the sentence in the present case that involved a similar amount of corrupt gratification.

Given that the offender in Joe Chan pleaded guilty to three charges under section 6(a) of the PCA, I was mindful of the operation of the totality principle, as well as the effect of the similar charges that were consented to be taken into consideration, in the adjustment of the individual sentences meted out. In the present case, the accused pleaded guilty to one charge under section 6(b) of the PCA. Accordingly, the totality principle would be of limited application. However, the TIC offences under section 6(c) of the PCA, being of a similar nature and closely linked to the proceeded offence, would have the effect of amplifying his level of culpability, warranting an enhancement in the sentence which the court would otherwise have imposed for the offence proceeded with - Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR( R ) 500 (“UI”) at [38]

The defence relied on the following cases of Heng Tze Yong v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 976 (“ Heng Tze Yong”) and Public Prosecutor v Quek Chun Hua, Dominic [2024] SGDC 147 (“Dominic Quek”) where sentences of fines were imposed for offences under section 6(b) of the PCA:

a. In Heng Tze Yong, the offender was a director of a company involved in the business of providing semiconductor engineering services. He was sentenced to five weeks’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to a single charge of corruptly giving gratification to agents contrary to section 6(b) of the PCA, and consented to a similar charge to be taken into consideration (“TIC charge”). The offender had given a bribe of $7000 to his co-offender, one Beng Ong, a facility manager of Micron, a company which was in the business of producing semiconductors. The co-offender had requested the bribe from the offender in exchange for assisting ANM to secure business from Micron and as a reward for the contracts that were already awarded to ANM for the supply of filters. Prior to this, Ben Ong had requested a bribe of $3000 from the offender, who complied with the request in order not to maintain the relationship with the offender and ensure continued business from Micron. Prior to the bribes procured by the co-offender, the offender’s company was awarded three contracts for the parts cleaning services. The co-offender was never involved in the award of those parts cleaning contracts of Micron. Subsequent to the payment of the bribes (including the TIC charge) by the offender, Ben Ong influenced the award of three contracts for the supply of filters by Micron to the offender’s company. However, Ben Ong was not involved in the award of the contracts for parts clearing services to ANM. These were separately awarded to ANM by Micron. The High Court allowed the appeal against sentence. The imprisonment term was set aside and substituted with a fine of $35,000.

b. Dominic Quek concerned an offender who pleaded guilty to an amalgamated charge under section 6(b) of the PCA and consented to a charge under section 204A of the Penal Code (Chapter 224, 2008 Rev Ed) to be taken into consideration. At the material time, he was the operations manager at his father’s company dealing in the business of supplying tyres and rims, called Tom’s Tyre Pte Ltd (“TT”). He became acquainted with one Leong Poh Keong (“Leong”), an executive with SATS Ltd (“SATS”) who oversaw the training, quality and projects at the SATS maintenance centre. These included tyre and fuel-related matters within SATS. As a member of the SATS tender evaluation committee, Leong was involved in the tender processes of setting the tender specifications and engagement with potential bidders. The offender became acquainted with Leong during his work visits to the SATS maintenance centre. Leong told the offender of his child with health problems in Vietnam and requested for loan. The offender agreed to the loan and gave Leong loans amounting to $9500 on three occasions. These loans formed the subject of the proceeded charge. The offender knew that Leong was inclined to recommend his father’s company during the awarding of the open tender exercise. Prior to the corrupt arrangement, TT was in a 2-year contract with SATS for the supply, delivery and fixing of new and existing tyres. There were multiple extensions of the same contract. In acceding to the loans to Leong, the offender did not want to jeopardize any future contractual extensions by SATS as these were evaluated by Leong. He was sentenced to a fine of $30,000. The prosecution withdrew the appeal against the sentence.

Both Heng Tze Yong and Dominic Quek featured a commonality of a subsisting and untainted contractual relationship between the givers’ companies and the agents’ principals that was independent of the corrupt arrangements. In Heng Tze Yong at [28], the court found a pre-existing business relationship between ANM and Micron that was independent of the corrupt transactions. The award of the contract to ANM for the provision of parts cleaning services was not influenced by Micron’s agent, Ben Ong. Similarly, in Dominic Quek at [19], the court applied the sentencing analysis in Heng Tze Yong and found as a prime consideration the ongoing untainted contractual relationship between SATS and TT that existed prior to the corrupt acts and that contractual relationship continued after the corrupt episode was uncovered. I agree with the prosecution that this consideration materially distinguished the present case. By contrast, the corrupt arrangement between the accused and Wilfred was singularly directed at assisting Glexus Security to obtain the award of the works.

The court in Heng Tze Yong acknowledged at [24] that there was “no rule that cases involving bribes less than S$30,000 should only attract a fine.” It is noteworthy that Heng Tze Yong was decided before the case of Goh Ngak Eng.

Unreported precedents

In support of its submission for a fine, the defence further relied on the unreported cases of Public Prosecutor v Tea Lay Sin (“ Tea Lay Sin ” )and Public Prosecutor v Theva s/o Sundram (“ Theva”) . In Tea Lay Sin, the offender was sentenced to a fine of $13,000 for corruptly giving a gratification of $5000. The offender in Theva corruptly accepted gratification that amounted to over $20,000 on multiple occasions spanning several years in his position as a managing agent. He was sentenced to a fine of $20,000. According to the defence, the prosecution had sought a fine in both cases which involved more aggravating features. On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the unreported cases were less egregious than the present case, namely, there was an absence of premeditation and falsification of documents.

Given the paucity of reasons in these unreported decisions, there was little precedential value to engender a meaningful analysis and embark on a constructive comparison with the present case: see Toh Suat Leng Jennifer v Public Prosecutor [2022] 5 SLR 1075.

Whether the prosecution’s sentencing position was arbitrary

According to the Sentencing Advisory Panel (“SAP”) sentencing guidelines, the reduction in sentence to be considered at Stage 4 of the proceedings on or after the first day of the trial is up to a maximum of 5%.

In its original address on sentence, the prosecution indicated that the applicable sentencing discount was 5%, as the accused had pleaded guilty on the first day of the trial, bringing the case within Stage 4 of the SAP sentencing guidelines. Subsequently, the prosecution accepted that a maximum sentencing discount of 10% at Stage 3 could be applied, on account of the accused’s indication to plead guilty on the day before the commencement of the trial.

The defence maintained that the custodial threshold was not crossed and declined to submit in the alternative on the appropriate sentence of imprisonment. Rather, the defence contended that the prosecution had been arbitrary in its sentencing position. The defence took issue with how the prosecution had revised its sentencing position from 11 weeks’ imprisonment to one of between seven and eight weeks’ imprisonment on the first day of the trial.

I found the defence contention to be misplaced. On the contrary, the prosecution had shown concession in its sentencing position. In its original address on sentence, the prosecution indicated that the applicable sentencing discount was 5% according to the SAP sentencing guidelines, as the accused had pleaded guilty on the first day of the trial, bringing the case within Stage 4 of the proceedings. However, notwithstanding that the plea of guilt was technically taken on the first day of the trial, the prosecution informed the court that a maximum sentencing discount of 10% at Stage 3 of the proceedings could be applied, on account of the accused’s indication to plead guilty through his counsel on a day before the trial. An increase in the maximum sentencing discount that could be accorded to the accused ought to be viewed in his favour. I found the prosecution’s position to be fair and reasonable.

It is the prerogative of the prosecution to determine its sentencing position. The court would not regard as relevant the reasons underlying the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in arriving at a specific sentence.

Notably, the defence conceded that the accused was not prejudiced by the prosecution’s change in sentencing position. It is inconceivable how the accused would have been prejudiced when the prosecution had sought a lower custodial sentence. Further, the prosecution was prepared to accept that the accused person’s plea of guilt was taken at Stage 3 of the proceedings. The increase in the sentencing discount of up to 10% that could be accorded to the his plea of guilt could hardly be viewed as prejudicial to him. Indeed, any likelihood of prejudice would have raised a valid ground for concern if the prosecution had amended its sentencing position from a fine to imprisonment in the absence of additional evidence amounting to aggravating sentencing factors. However, such was not the present case.

Conclusion

These reasons fortified my view that custodial threshold had been crossed and five weeks’ imprisonment was a sentence commensurate with the overall criminality of the accused.

On a final note, I thank the parties for their comprehensive and helpful submissions in this matter.