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[2026] SGDC 44

[2026] SGDC 44

District Court of Singapore4 Feb 2026

Published judgment text with court metadata, source links, and stable paragraph anchors.

Open official sourcePDFReport an issue

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District Judge Lim Wee Ming:

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Introduction

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The accused claimed trial to a charge of speeding at 141 km/h, 71 km/h above the speed limit. I found the accused guilty and sentenced him to a fine of $1,000 and disqualified him from driving for 9 months.

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The accused has appealed against the disqualification order. There is no appeal against the conviction nor the fine.

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Charge

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The accused claimed trial to the following charge:

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You, … are charged that you, on 7 September 2024, at about 4.12 pm, along East Coast Parkway (towards Airport LPV120F), Singapore, did drive a motor vehicle with plate number SNF3617D at a speed of 141 kmph, and this speed was in excess of the imposed speed limit of 70 kmph of the road, and you have thereby committed an offence under Section 63(4) punishable under Section 131(2)(a) read with Section 42(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961.

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Facts

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On 7 September 2024 at 4:12pm, a Mercedes SL350 with registration number SNF3617D (“the Vehicle”) that was travelling along the East Coast Parkway towards the airport, was captured by a speed camera travelling at 141 kmph, 71 kmph above the speed limit.

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Ownership of the Vehicle was traced to the accused. The accused’s position was that the driver of the Vehicle may not have been him and that:

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(a) The Vehicle had been sent to the workshop around the material time, and it may have been someone from the workshop who had driven the Vehicle at the material time.

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(b) The Vehicle was occasionally driven by his ex-girlfriend, Daphne Wee Zhen Yu (“Daphne Wee”), who may have driven the Vehicle at the material time.

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At the trial, the prosecution adduced evidence from Shawn Yap Huai Bin (“Shawn Yap”), the workshop repair owner, who gave evidence that the Vehicle had been returned and was no longer with the workshop at the material time. There was also documentary evidence that supported Shawn Yap’s account as follows:

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(a) There was an exchange of messages between the accused and Shawn Yap on 3 September 2024, where the accused asked “Hey Shaun [sic] will the car be ready for pickup today? …”, to which Shawn replied “… Car can take liao” . This exchange of messages showed that the Vehicle was ready for collection on 3 September 2024.

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(b) There was a further message from the accused to Shawn Yap the next day on 4 September 2024, where the accused asked “hey shaun [sic] is there a fuse or relay that needs to be reset for the power boot function? The trunk release no longer triggers the power boot to lift itself”. This message shows that as of 4 September 2024, the Vehicle had already been collected from the workshop, and the accused was in possession of the Vehicle.

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(c) An invoice from the workshop dated 3 September 2024, showing that the repairs had been completed as of that date.

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In relation to the allegation that the Vehicle may have been driven by Daphne Wee instead of the accused, Daphne Wee’s evidence was that on the afternoon of the speeding offence, she was at home waiting for the accused to pick her up. The key points of her evidence were as follows:

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(a) She had sent a message to the accused at 4:10pm asking “I can come out if u r reaching”.

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(b) The accused replied “ecp”. This was at 4:10pm as well.

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(c) When the accused arrived at her house, he told her that the police were after him. Subsequently, the accused told her that it was a serious case, he may lose his licence, and he was intending to sell his car.

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At the close of the prosecution’s case, I found that the prosecution had made out a case against the accused on the charge which the accused was being tried. I called upon the accused to give evidence in his defence.

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The accused elected not to give evidence. In his oral closing submissions, the accused accepted that the evidence shows that the Vehicle travelled at high speed. However, he submitted that the prosecution’s case rested on Daphne Wee, and that the WhatsApp Messages exchanged with her did not show that the accused was driving at that time. In relation to his “ecp” reply to Daphne Wee’s message asking, “I can come out if u r reaching”, the accused submitted that his “ecp” reply did not say that he was driving or speeding at that time.

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Conviction

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After hearing the oral closing submissions from the prosecution and the accused, I found the accused guilty and convicted him of the offence. As the accused has not appealed against his conviction, I will just set out briefly, my grounds for convicting the accused as follows:

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(a) The evidence from Shawn Yap together with the relevant exchange of WhatsApp messages between Shawn Yap and the accused and the invoice from the workshop, show that the Vehicle was no longer in the possession of the workshop at the time the speeding offence was committed.

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(b) In the light of Daphne Wee’s evidence, in particular the exchange of WhatsApp messages at 4:10pm where Daphne Wee asked “I can come out if u r reaching”, and the accused replied “ecp”, two minutes before the Vehicle was caught speeding on the camera, and the absence of any evidence from the accused that explains this, I was satisfied that the accused was driving the Vehicle when it was speeding at 141 kmph along the East Coast Parkway. The accused’s submission in relation to his “ecp” reply, that the message did not say that he was driving or speeding at that time, was clutching at straws, particularly as the accused did not give any evidence to explain what he meant when he responded “ecp”, just two minutes before the speeding offence occurred.

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In the premises, I found that the prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I found the accused guilty and convicted him of the charge.

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Prosecution’s sentencing submissions

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In its address on sentence, the prosecution sought a fine of $1,000 and a disqualification period of 9 months.

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The prosecution’s position is that a deterrent sentence is called for and highlighted the following key points:

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(a) The accused had driven at 141kmph, more than double the prescribed speed limit.

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(b) The accused showed no sign of remorse and elected to claim trial.

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(c) Despite claiming trial, the accused elected not to give evidence.

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(d) Significant resources were expended in preparation for the trial and there are no relevant mitigating factors.

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The prosecution relied on a table illustrating that the usual sentence for the offence that the accused had been convicted of, was a fine up to $1,000 and a disqualification period of up to one year. Based on the table, the prosecution submitted that the mean disqualification period was 6 months and that as this would be for plead guilty cases, there should be an uplift in the present case to 9 months, as the accused had claimed trial.

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Mitigation plea

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In mitigation, the accused accepted the seriousness of speeding but submitted that the absence of a guilty plea does not equate absence of remorse. He submitted that the trial was to test genuine issues in the evidence and that his decision not to testify should not be treated as an aggravating factor. He further submitted that disqualification would affect him professionally as he works in an accounting and professional corporate services firm and needed to drive daily for client-facing professional duties.

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The court’s decision on sentence

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In view of the accused having driven at more than twice the speed limit and the accused claiming trial, I sentenced the accused to a fine of $1,000 in default 3 days’ imprisonment and a disqualification period of 9 months.

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I agree with the prosecution that a deterrent sentence is called for, and a disqualification period of 9 months is justified in this case for the following reasons:

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(a) The accused had driven at 71 kmph above the speed limit of 70 kmph, more than twice the speed limit.

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(b) The evidence of the traffic police officer, SGT Nigel Tan Jun Lin, who saw the Vehicle speeding and captured the speeding on his speed camera, was that the Vehicle had passed another vehicle while speeding. Accordingly, at the time that the accused was driving at 71kmph above the speed limit, his Vehicle was not the only vehicle on the road. There was another vehicle on the road which the accused overtook. There was clearly a risk that any impact with that other vehicle would have been disastrous, in view of the grossly excessive speed at which the accused was driving.

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(c) Daphne Wee’s evidence was that when the accused arrived at her home, the first thing he said was “The police are after me” . The accused was clearly aware that he had committed a serious speeding offence, yet he chose to contest the charge and suggest that someone else may have driven the Vehicle, instead of pleading guilty. Although the accused was entitled to claim trial and elect not to give evidence in his defence, his failure to accept responsibility for his conduct and actions when the evidence against him was clear and indisputable, shows the accused’s appalling lack of remorse.

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(d) The evidence of Daphne Wee that the accused said that “the police was not supposed to be on duty, saw him speeding”, was not disputed by the accused. The accused did not expect his speed to be tracked at that time of the day, and he committed the offence because he thought he would not be caught. This was not a case of a momentarily lapse of an offender driving just slightly above the speed limit. The fact that the accused was driving at 71 kmph above the speed limit shows that this was a deliberate and conscious decision on his part. He was reckless to the potential death or serious injury that could have been caused to other road users in consequence of the extremely high speed that he was driving. The fact that there was no such accident was purely fortuitous, taking into consideration the speed of 141 kmph at which the accused was driving and the fact that he overtook another vehicle at that speed.

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I would further point out that the effect of the disqualification on the accused’s profession and its impact on his ability to drive to see clients is not a mitigating factor. In M Raveendran v Public Prosecutor [2022] 3 SLR 1183, Menon CJ held:

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(a) “… taking account of extrinsic factors could result in a fundamental assault on the criminal justice system. If the court were to place weight on factors such as the financial consequences of a particular sentence, and reduce an offender’s sentence on that basis, it would result in the more favourable treatment of certain individuals. …” (at [43]), and

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(b) “It is a matter of fundamental importance that the criminal justice system be designed to work for all people in all circumstances. … If this fundamental principle of equality were to be displaced in favour of some offenders, it would undermine and dilute the deterrent effect of the entire system of criminal justice. …” (at [45] and [46]).

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The sentence of disqualification is meant to have a deterrent effect and part of that deterrence involves the impact on the offender who may experience the inconvenience and effect on his profession, as a result of being barred from driving. Other than the specific deterrence against the accused, there is also a message of general deterrence, as those who interact with the accused and come to know of the 9 months’ disqualification, are also made aware that the law treats such speeding offences seriously and this is not a minor transgression where the offender may be let off with a fine that may be less than a fraction of one percent of the price paid for the vehicle or a short disqualification that has little impact on the offender.

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Furthermore, in a press release last year from the Ministry of Home Affairs on “Enhanced Penalties for Speeding Offences”, it was pointed out that “The number of speeding violations reached a 10-year high in 2024. There were close to 192,000 speeding violations in 2024, an increase of 64.8% compared to 2023. There was also a 43.8% increase in speeding-related fatal accidents, from 32 cases in 2023 to 46 cases in 2024.” The 2024 figures, translate to an average of more than 500 speeding cases a day and close to four speeding-related fatal accidents a month. Effectively, this means that almost every week, a life is lost because of speeding.

Costs

The press release relates to enhanced penalties for speeding offences that only take effect this year. The enhanced penalties do not apply to the present case where the offence was committed in 2024. Nevertheless, the concern arising from the substantial increase in speeding offences and related fatal accidents is a relevant consideration in sentencing such offences. The almost weekly deaths arising from speeding, justifies the concern of death or serious injury, particularly in this case, where the accused drove at 71 kmph above the speed limit. A sentence that will both deter the accused from repeating the offence and deter other drivers from committing such offences is necessary. As the maximum fine of $1,000 for this offence is just a tiny fraction of the cost of a car, it is the disqualification and possible imprisonment term of up to three months, that poses the more significant deterrence against committing such offences.

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Conclusion

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In conclusion, I sentenced the accused to a fine of $1,000 in default 3 days’ imprisonment and disqualification from driving all classes of vehicles for a period of 9 months. The accused has paid the fine and is only appealing against the disqualification order.

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DPP Mavis Ng Meiqi, Attorney General’s Chambers, for the prosecution

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Accused in person

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