[2026] SGDC 46

Introduction

The claimants and the defendants are in the business of providing dental and medical related services. The underlying dispute between the parties concerns a consultancy agreement dated 16 February 2025 and the provision of services by the claimants to entities related to the defendants.

The five appeals (the “RAs”) and the two summonses before me are filed by the defendants. They are centred on an unless order given by the learned Deputy Registrar (the “Unless Order”). The Unless Order in turn stems from directions of the court for the defendants to file and serve further and better particulars (the “F&BP”); and to provide copies of the documents referred to in the defendants’ list of documents (the “DLOD”). Following the failure of the defendants to comply with the Unless Order, it was enforced, and judgment was entered against the defendants. As for the summonses, one was filed for the extension of time to file one of the RAs; whilst the other was to set aside the judgment that was entered pursuant to the Unless Order.

The defendants contend that they were not provided with an opportunity to be heard by the court, nor to adduce any evidence, prior to the issuance of the Unless Order and its enforcement. The claimants on the other hand contend that the defendants’ conduct in failing to comply with the Unless Order was intentional and contumelious.

For the reasons below, I am allowing the summonses and the two of the RAs.

Issues to be determined

The issues to be decided by me are as follows:

Analysis and findings

Filing of multiple RAs is prolix and unnecessary

I will first deal with the nature of the five RAs and the two summonses. Whilst the defendants’ dissatisfaction is with the imposition of the Unless Order and its enforcement; they deemed it fit to file a series of five RAs. It is therefore necessary to first examine the nature of each of the five sequentially filed RAs in turn.

The first is Registrar’s Appeal No 20 of 2025 (“RA 20”). It is filed by way of a notice of appeal dated 30 April 2025 against the directions issued by the learned Deputy Registrar (the “DR”) on 21 April 2025. These directions contained the decision given by the DR on 17 April 2025. In turn, the decision given by the DR on 17 April 2025 is in substance the Unless Order itself.

Fourth is the appeal in Registrar’s Appeal No 23 of 2025 (“RA 23”) filed by way of a Notice of Appeal dated 5 May 2025 against the decision of the DR given on 17 April 2025. As alluded to above, this decision is in substance the Unless Order. Lastly, Registrar’s Appeal No 24 of 2025 (“RA 24”) filed by way of a Notice of Appeal dated 5 May 2025 is the appeal against JUD 703, the judgment that was entered in the enforcement of the Unless Order.

As seen, to say that these RAs were convoluted and circular in nature is understating it. The concern of the defendants is with the imposition of the Unless order and its Enforcement. It is therefore unfortunate that the defendants found it necessary to file five RAs when one would suffice to exercise their right of appeal. RA 23 was also filed out of time. Therefore, fixed before me as well for consideration is the summons for extension of time. This would be District Court Summons No 1558 of 2025 (“SUM 1558”). For good measure, the defendants also filed a summons to set aside JUD 703. This would be District Court Summons No 2258 of 2025 (“SUM 2258”).

In view of the array of RAs filed, I will first discuss how the RAs as filed by the defendants are interconnected with one another. As alluded to above, although there are five distinct appeals against the various decisions of the DR, the underlying intent of the RAs is to challenge the imposition of the Unless Order and its enforcement. The starting place is therefore the Unless Order itself. The Unless Order was contained in the directions of the DR given on 17 April 2025. The directions stated as follows:

It is seen that the Unless Order, which was given on 17 April 2025 required the defendants to file and serve the F&BP ordered by the court at a summons hearing, District Court Summons No 1906 of 2024 (“SUM 1906”); and to provide copies of the documents in the DLOD, by 25 April 2025. It further provided that the entirety of the defence would be struck out on 28 April 2025 should the defendants fail to file and serve the FNBP and provide the claimants with copies of the documents by 25 April 2025. In such an event, the claimants were at liberty to enter judgment on the basis of their statement of claim.

As noted above, the Unless Order is the subject matter of the defendants’ appeal under RA 23. The Unless Order was then communicated to the defendants by way of registrar’s directions dated 21 April 2025, which also included a notification of the further case conference on 7 May 2025 pending compliance by the defendants of the Unless Order. These directions themselves became the subject matter of appeal under RA 20 filed by the defendants. In other words, not content with appealing against the Unless Order itself, the defendants found it fit to also appeal against the court’s directions communicating the Unless Order to the parties and fixing the date for a further case conference. As for RA 24, it is the appeal against the judgment, JUD 703, that was entered in the enforcement of the Unless Order.

In my view, the filing of the multiple RAs is prolix and unnecessary. The defendants’ dissatisfaction is with the ordering of the Unless Order, and its enforcement. That should be the subject matter of their appeal. There is no reason to file appeals against procedural directions peripheral to the Unless Order. Peripheral matters would fall in line with the determination of the central issue at hand.

The legal principles governing unless orders

With that, I turn now to the central issue before me. Caselaw has held that unless orders are a useful tool to ensure the efficient administration of justice. The Court of Appeal held in Mitora Pte Ltd v Agritrade International (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 1179 (“Mitora”) at [42] as follows:

Turning to the question of the consequences of a breach of such unless orders, the Court of Appeal held at [35]-[36]:

Therefore, the breach of an unless order will automatically bring upon the defaulting party its adverse consequences. The burden will then lie on the defaulting party to persuade the court that the breach had not been intentional and contumelious so as to avoid the adverse consequences. There is also a notable reminder by the Court of Appeal, in referencing the passage in In re Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1196, that obedience to orders of the court is the foundation on which its authority is founded.

The usual consequence of the breach of an unless order is a striking-out order. The Court of Appeal emphasised that litigants who commit process breaches will continue to be penalised and are liable to the sanction of having their claim or defence struck out. The Court of Appeal stated as follows at [47]-[48]:

As seen, the Court of Appeal reiterated that striking out an action (or a defence) is appropriate in cases involving an inexcusable breach of a significant procedural obligation. In this regard, the court is entitled to look at all circumstances in its assessment of whether the striking-out application should be granted.

It should however be noted that the Court of Appeal also cautioned that the immediate purpose of an unless order is not to punish misconduct but to secure a fair trial in accordance with due process of law. Unless orders should not be given as a matter of course but as a last resort when the defaulter’s conduct is inexcusable. They are also to be drafted with due care and consideration. The Court of Appeal held as follows at [45]-[46]:

Hence, the draconian sanction of striking out a litigant’s claim or defence in its entirety should not be the default consequence of an unless order, as it would effectively deprive the litigant of its substantive rights on account of a procedural fault. The question to be asked is whether there is a reasonable prospect of a fair trial given all that has gone on in relation the matters surrounding the breach of the unless order. At the end of the day, the test is whether a fair trial is still possible.

In another Court of Appeal decision, Syed Mohamed Abdul Muthaliff v Arian Bhisham Chotrani [1999] 1 SLR(R) 361, it was held that the court should exercise its discretion whether to grant an extension of time for compliance with an unless order in light of all the circumstances. The facts of each case should be scrutinised, and previous cases were mere guidelines, not conditions precedent. As in Mitora, it was held that it should be determined whether the failure to adhere to the unless order was intentional and contumelious.

The defendants did not cross the line of intentional and contumelious disregard for the court’s findings and directions

With the above legal principles in mind, I return to the present case.

The genesis of the Unless Order can be traced to the hearing of SUM 1906 on 18 November 2024. The defendants were ordered to file and serve FNBP of the Defence on the claimants within 14 days ie, by 2 December 2024. The deadline passed without the defendants filing and serving the FNBP of the defence ordered pursuant to SUM 1906. The Unless Order also relates to the court’s directions given to the parties to file and exchange their list of documents (“LODs”) by way of a Registrar’s Directions dated 28 November 2024 (“28 Nov RegDir”). The court directed as follows:

As the defendants did not comply with the directions given on 17 February 2025, the claimants’ solicitors requested by way of letter to court dated 25 February 2025 for the court to issue further directions. The following directions were issued on 27 February 2025:

(a) the defendants are to pay costs of $600 to the claimants;

(b) the defendants are to file and serve the FNBP ordered pursuant to SUM 1906 by 12 March 2025;

(c) the defendants are to provide copies of the documents contained in the DLOD by 12 March 2025;

(d) if the defendants fail to file and serve the FNBP ordered pursuant to SUM 1906 and provide copies of the documents contained in the DLOD by 12 March 2025, they are to explain their omission to do so; and

(e) if there is further non-compliance, cost consequences or further directions will be issued without the defendants’ input and the claimants may be given liberty to seek the necessary unless order and/or seek permission to file an application for such orders.

The defendants failed to comply with the directions. On 25 March 2025 the defendants’ solicitors wrote to court requesting for an extension of time until 2 April 2025 to comply with the directions. The defendants stated that their representative had to take multiple overseas trips on an urgent basis. On 27 March 2025 a short final extension was accordingly given till 2 April 2025 for the defendants to comply with the above directions given on 27 February 2025.

The defendants however failed to comply and on 8 April 2025 the following directions were given:

The claimants informed the court by way of a letter from their solicitors dated 9 April 2025 of their intentions to apply for an unless order on the basis that there had been a history of non-compliance on the part of the defendants. On 17 April 2025, directions were given by the DR asynchronously at a general process case conference. As alluded to above, the Unless Order was contained in these directions of the DR given on 17 April 2025. To recap, the Unless Order required the defendants to file and serve the F&BP and to provide copies of the documents in the DLOD by 25 April 2025, failing which the defence would be struck out on 28 April 2025. In such an event, the claimants were at liberty to enter judgment on the basis of their statement of claim.

The defendants failed to comply with the Unless Order. As a result, the defence was struck out on 28 April 2025. The claimants proceeded to enter JUD 703 as per the Unless Order.

On 30 April 2025, the defendants provided copies of the documents referred to in the DLOD by way of an email from their solicitors to the claimants’ solicitors, and filed and served the FNBP on the claimants.

In my view, in analysing the above events leading to the issuance of the Unless Order, it must be kept in mind the caution given by the Court of Appeal in Mitora that the immediate purpose of an unless order is not to punish misconduct but to secure a fair trial in accordance with due process of law. As discussed above, the question to be asked is whether there is a reasonable prospect of a fair trial given all that has gone on in relation the matters surrounding the breach of the Unless Order. At the end of the day, the test is whether a fair trial is still possible.

The burden remains of course with the defendants to show that the breach had not been intentional and contumelious so as to avoid the attendant adverse consequences. In this regard, the defendants pointed to them not being given an opportunity to address the court on whether the Unless Order should be made; to adduce evidence, whether by affidavit or otherwise in relation to the Unless Order; and to put evidence before the court prior to the making of the Unless Order. In other words, the defendants’ case is that they were not provided with an opportunity to be heard by the court, nor to adduce any evidence, prior to the issuance of the Unless Order and its enforcement. In this respect, I would only refer to the Court of Appeal’s admonishment that unless orders should not be given as a matter of course but as a last resort when the defaulter’s conduct is inexcusable.

As stated in Mitora, the draconian sanction of striking out a litigant’s claim or defence in its entirety should not be the default consequence of an unless order, as it would effectively deprive the litigant of its substantive rights on account of a procedural fault. Again, the question to be asked is whether a fair trial is still possible.

It is trite that it always remains open to the court to allow an extension of time for compliance with unless orders at any point of the proceedings in relation to the unless orders. As alluded to above, I note that on 30 April 2025, nine days after the Unless Order was issued, the defendants filed their F&BP and provided copies of the documents listed in the DLOD to the claimants. In my view, the failure of the defendants to adhere to the terms of the Unless Order did not cross the line of intentional and contumelious disregard for the court’s findings and directions. At the end of the day, there is a reasonable prospect of a fair trial given all that has gone on in relation the matters surrounding the breach of the Unless Order in the present case. In the premises, I grant the defendants an extension of time to comply with the terms of the Unless Order. For the avoidance of doubt, I set aside the enforcement of the Unless Order.

I turn now to SUM 1558, the summons for extension of time to file RA 23; and SUM 2258, the summons to set aside JUD 703. The factors to be taken into account in deciding whether to grant an extension of time to file or serve a notice of appeal are trite. They are: a) the length of delay; b) the reasons for delay; c) the chances of the appeal succeeding; and d) the degree of prejudice: Anwar Siraj & Anr v Ting Kang Chun John [2010] 1 SLR 1026. In my view, it follows from the analysis of the events above that all four factors clearly point to the granting of an extension of time.

As regards SUM 2258, it is uncontroverted that the threshold test in an application to set aside a default judgment (where the default judgment was regularly obtained), was for the defendant to “establish a prima facie defence in the sense of showing that there are triable or arguable issues”: Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 907 at [60]. It is trite that the test in regard to triable issues is similar to that in summary judgment applications. In my view, given the discussion that has gone on above, there is no reason not to allow the application.

I would add that whilst I am cognisant of the usual order of dealing first with the applications for the extension of time and the setting aside of judgment, before hearing the RAs, given the manner in which the five RAs were filed, the sequence in which I have proceeded with the matters before me would be the most expedient approach.

Conclusion

It the premises of the above, I allow RA 23 and RA 24. I dismiss RA 20, RA 21, and RA 22. They are superfluous and they do not comprise subject matter which is appealable.