JGP v JGQ [2026] SGECT 1

“An employee is wrongfully dismissed if, without cause, he is dismissed without full notice or without money in lieu of notice. The notice period is either: that set out in the contract; or the appropriate implied notice; or is determined in accordance with the statutory minimum period calculated in accordance with the employee’s length of service. An employer may legitimately terminate an employee’s employment without notice or money in lieu of notice if the employee has committed gross misconduct or some other serious breach of his contract of employment such as dishonesty, disobedience, or serious incompetence. … If an employer, without legitimate reason, summarily terminates an employee’s contract, the employee is entitled to compensation for his notice period. This is quantified by calculating the net amounts (salary and benefits) he should have received during the balance of his notice period” (Blackstone’s Employment Law Practice 2023 (Lydia Banerjee and Gavin Mansfield eds) (Oxford University Press, 2023) at [25.01], [25.03]).

Though this is a statement of English law, it accurately reflects the position in Singapore as well. This much is clear from several of our own Court of Appeal’s decisions, the correctness of which few would question (see, eg, Port of Singapore Authority v Wallace John Bryson [1979-1980] SLR(R) 670; Chiam Heng Hsien v Jurong Town Corp [1986-1986] SLR(R) 92; Alexander Proudfoot Productivity Services Co S’pore Pte Ltd v Sim Hua Ngee Alvin and another appeal [1992] 3 SLR(R) 933; Latham Scott v Credit Suisse First Boston [2000] 2 SLR(R) 30). Indeed, it seems almost banal to state what “wrongful dismissal” simpliciter is about. Absent discrete complications—such as those arising, for example, from the application of the principle in Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch D 339 (“Boston Deep Sea Fishing”) (cf, Phosagro Asia Pte Ltd v Piattchanine, Iouri [2016] 5 SLR 1052 (“Phosagro Asia”)); the legacy of Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 (“Addis”) in restricting recoverable damages (cf, Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 357); or whether the implied term of mutual trust and confidence exists in Singapore (cf, Dong Wei v Shell Eastern Trading (Pte) Ltd and another [2022] 1 SLR 1318 (“Dong Wei”))—the law in this area is generally regarded as straightforward or, at least, settled.

It is, therefore, somewhat unfortunate that—when the Employment (Amendment) Act 2018 (No 55 of 2018) was passed, and the jurisdiction to decide employee-claims under s 14(2) of the Employment Act 1968 (“EA”) (as well as its sister provision, s 84(2) of the EA concerning pregnant employees) was transferred from the Minister to the Employment Claims Tribunals (“ECT”)—Parliament chose to call the disputes arising from such claims “wrongful dismissal disputes” (see s 2(1) of and the Third Schedule to the Employment Claims Act 2016 (“ECA”)). This label—now, because of the 2018 Act, attached to two very substantively different claims—has been the source of some conceptual confusion. This confusion has, in turn, produced not only a lack of clarity as to the principles and propositions of law that the ECT is bound to apply when deciding such claims, but also those which the courts are to apply in respect of the “wrongful dismissal” claims they hear (see, eg, Longitude 101 Pte Ltd v Navinea Kanapathy Pillai and another matter [2025] SLR(StC) 403 (“Longitude 101”); Cisilia Oktavia Lim v Reins International (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2024] SGMC 68 (“Cisilia Oktavia Lim”)). As a result, the law governing “wrongful dismissals” has become a little more layered, difficult, and unclear than it perhaps needed to be.

The circumstances of six related cases (including the present) that were before me were relatively apt demonstrations of at least some of this difficulty and lack of clarity. As such, I take the opportunity here to parse through as many of those layers as possible, in an attempt to make as much sense of the law as I am able within the constraints inherent in this institutional setting. That is, one where parties are required to act in-person and, as a corollary, tribunals do not benefit from the assistance of opposing arguments from counsel, especially on matters of law. Nevertheless, despite any shortcomings this may produce in my understanding, I still think it crucial that an exposition on the law and its surrounding difficulties be written. In my view, the law needs clarification, especially given the high volume of “wrongful dismissal” claims dealt with by the ECT and the corresponding risk of inconsistency a lack of clarity can create. Even if, ultimately, my understanding of the law is not placed before an appellate court for rejection, criticism, correction, or adoption, I trust that the detailed treatment of the law I offer here will still be of some utility to fellow employment tribunals of coordinate jurisdiction, as they too work through the same difficulties in their own cases.

Preface

In December 2023, the respondent commenced an internal review of staff medical-benefit claims after concerns had arisen about possible misuse of outpatient medical entitlements. The review had been prompted by a high volume of claims submitted for sums incurred at a clinic which I shall refer to as “Clinic X”, where some employees appeared to have sought reimbursement for retail items that were not claimable under the respondent’s “Medical and Dental Benefits” policy (the “Medical Claims Policy” or “MCP”).

A substantial number of employees were investigated in the course of this review, which revealed that many had made claims for reimbursement which were not permissible under the MCP. The respondent performed a grouping exercise to tier these employees according, chiefly, to quantitative criteria. Those who fell within the highest quantitative tiers were issued a notice to attend a disciplinary inquiry (“DI”) before a Disciplinary Committee (“DC”). There were some employees who did not fall within the highest quantitative tiers, but who had also been notified to attend a DI. In respect of those cases, there were other qualitative reasons which the respondent assessed warranted a DC hearing from the employee and examining their conduct.

In the result, around 40 employees were dismissed, each having been assessed by the various DCs to have intentionally, wilfully, and/or dishonestly committed serious breaches of the respondent’s MCP by making the impermissible claims that they had. Of those, eight filed claims in the ECT, mainly contending that they had been “wrongfully dismissed”. One employee withdrew her case early in the process; another’s (“Ms X”) proceeded to trial before a different tribunal; and, after that tribunal issued its decision in that case, the remaining six were fixed for trial before me. None of the six matters were joined under r 12 of the Employment Claims Rules 2017 (“EC Rules”), and they each proceeded as individual cases.

Ultimately, however, on essentially the same analytical basis, I decided all six cases against the respondent and awarded each of the claimants before me substantial compensation (relative to the ECT’s monetary jurisdiction). The respondent has since filed applications seeking leave to appeal my decision in all six cases, and—notwithstanding the absence of a joinder (on why the cases had not been joined and the effect this had on the disputes, see [A.41] et seq below)—it would serve neither clarity nor economy to produce six largely repetitive sets of grounds. I therefore avoid such repetition by noting simply that although there were subtle differences between the six cases, none of those differences led to any differences in either analysis or conclusion. I therefore only produce full written grounds of decision in respect of the instant claimant’s (“Ms C”) case (ie, this set of grounds) and append them in full to the briefer oral judgments I gave in respect of the other five cases.

Whilst this approach suffers from the disadvantage of those five cases not benefitting from a full written statement of the parties’ cases and my analysis thereof, that is preferable, in my view, to having largely unnecessary and duplicative grounds. As I stated, my analysis in respect of each of the six cases was essentially the same because I did not think there were material differences between the cases which ought to cause me to vary my approach in any of the cases. Accordingly, my detailed reasoning set out here in respect of Ms C’s case can be taken as essentially that which I would have given in each of the other five cases.

Annexes

I append to these grounds of decision three annexes. The first records the consolidated procedural history across the related claims, including the two matters that did not proceed before me and the sequencing of the remaining six—so that the reader may see, in one place, the path that each case took through the ECT. The second addresses the other tribunal’s earlier decision delivered in Ms X’s matter, describes why the six cases before me had not been joined, and explains the consequences of that for how the evidence and submissions were handled, including the cognisance I took of the related cases in deciding each individual one. The third offers a structured analysis of the law on dismissals in Singapore. Although this exposition is general and, accordingly, largely obiter (cf [4] above), there are aspects of that analysis which bore on the subject of five questions of law which were engaged by the circumstances of Ms C’s as well as the other five cases.

A general background

In late December 2023, a group-wide review was initiated by the respondent’s parent company’s (“RP”) Group Human Resources (“Group HR”) into reimbursement claims charged to Clinic X under employees’ medical-benefit budgets. Group HR led and centrally coordinated the exercise across RPC and its relevant subsidiaries—this included the respondent. The review examined whether purchases reflected on Clinic X invoices had been claimed in a manner not permitted by the prevailing medical claims policies applicable to each employing entity; for the respondent, this was its MCP published on its intranet in 2022 and 2023. The relevant window of review was January 2022 to September 2023.

The first step was information-gathering. On or about 26 December 2023, Group HR issued to employees identified for review (including those employed by the respondent) a standardised Notice of Investigation with an accompanying questionnaire. The notice explained that Group HR was examining Clinic X-linked reimbursement claims against the applicable medical claims policy; it set a deadline for submission, required employees to upload itemised receipts (or complete a claims appendix where receipts were unavailable), cautioned that disciplinary action might follow, and reminded employees to keep the process confidential. The questionnaire then sought particulars of each Clinic X claim (including what was purchased and why, whether it was medically warranted or prescribed, and whether it was for self or dependant); asked the employee to confirm if the claims were permitted under the policy; and, if not, whether the employee agreed to repay the respondent in full.

Selection for the next stage flowed from a grouping exercise conducted after the questionnaires and supporting materials were returned. Employees were first placed into four broad categories (A–D). Placement turned principally on quantitative metrics—essentially, the number and aggregate value of Clinic X-linked claims over the review period. In broad terms, Group A was the lowest-activity band: in 2022, an employee had to have lodged between 1 and 12 claims with a total not exceeding $2,400, and in 2023, between 1 and 9 claims with a total not exceeding $1,800. Group B captured moderate activity: for 2022, either 13–24 claims or a total between $2,401 and $4,800; for 2023, either 10–18 claims or a total between $1,801 and $3,600. Group C reflected heavier activity: for 2022, either 25–48 claims or a total between $4,801 and $9,600; for 2023, either 19–36 claims or a total between $3,601 and $7,200. Group D comprised very heavy activity: for 2022, more than 48 claims or a total exceeding $9,600; for 2023, more than 36 claims or a total exceeding $7,200. For classification, where an employee straddled more than one band, the higher tier applied.

Following the initial banding into Groups A–D (on quantitative metrics alone), the next step was interviews. As a rule, all employees in Groups C and D were called to attend so that they could explain their Clinic X purchases and their understanding of the MCP. Employees in Groups A and B were offered an interview and were scheduled unless they elected to waive their right to attend an interview pursuant to their applicable Disciplinary Procedures (be it that of the Group or the relevant subsidiary). Otherwise, employees were also called where their questionnaire answers left material points unclear or where regulatory status made an interview appropriate (for example, if they were regulated representatives). Interviews were conducted by HR on a confidential basis with contemporaneous notes, and employees were given an opportunity to review and confirm the interview record.

By end-January 2024, the interview phase and document review were substantially complete, and the investigation was formally closed on or around 31 January 2024. On 6 February 2024, the Investigation Team submitted its report and recommendations to the Group’s Head of HR as well as the respondent’s Global Head of HR (“Ms A”). At that stage, a second-round sort was applied to Groups A–C by reference to two features: first, the employee’s monthly average value of Clinic X claims over the review window (ie, the total value of all Clinic X claims divided by the months of active service); and second, whether the employee—having accepted that the claims were impermissible—agreed to repay.

(a) Thus, for Group A, employees who agreed to repay were coded A1 if they had only a single sub-$78.50 claim in the whole review period, A2 if the monthly average value of their claims was below $78.50, and A3 if it was at or above $78.50. Those who did not agree to repay were coded A4.

(b) For Group B, employees who agreed to repay were coded B1 if the monthly average value of their claims was below $157 and B2 if it was at or above $157. Those who did not agree to repay were coded B3.

(c) For Group C, employees who agreed to repay were coded C1 if the monthly average value of their claims was below $314 and C2 if it was at or above $314. Those who did not agree to repay were C3.

The three benchmarks ($78.50 / $157 / $314) were derived from the then-applicable no-itemisation limits ($100 per claim up to September 2022 and $200 thereafter) and were used to approximate, respectively, half, one, and two such claims per month over the review period. To explain, the window comprised 21 months (January 2022 to September 2023), being 9 months at $100 and 12 months at $200; hence, one notional claim per month is (9 × $100) + (12 × $200) ÷ 21 ≈ $157, with the half- and double-rate figures approximated at $78.50 and $314. These notional monthly benchmarks essentially allowed the Investigation Team to distinguish, within Groups A–C, between occasional activity and regular or sustained activity, irrespective of the precise transaction pattern.

A new qualitatively-defined Group E was also constituted. This group comprised: (a) employees who, but for their failure to accept that their claims were impermissible under the MCP, would otherwise have fallen within A2, A4, B1, B2 or C1; (b) employees who had shown an inability to understand or comprehend the MCP even after explanation; and (c) employees who had been uncooperative during the investigation. By way of illustration, an employee who had lodged, say, 14 claims in 2022 totalling about $2,300 (which would have placed her in Group B1 on the numbers) but who, despite explanation, insisted that her Clinic X purchases were claimable and declined to repay would have been placed in Group E.

With the further sub-divided bands (A–D) and the constitution of Group E in place, the Investigation Team recommended that the disciplinary process continue along two tracks. First, employees in Groups A1–A4, B1–B3 and C1 were to receive direct disciplinary outcomes under the Group or subsidiary’s Disciplinary Framework. Second, employees in Groups C2, C3, D and E were to be referred to a DI before a three-member DC. Approval for this recommendation was obtained shortly thereafter. From late February 2024, HR began operationalising the plan: DCs were assembled, DI dates were coordinated, and notices were issued in batches setting out the charges to be examined and the materials on which the Group or its subsidiaries proposed to rely.

Shortly thereafter—around mid-March 2024—concerns were raised at Group level (including by the RPC Group CEO and the Group’s Head of HR), with the respondent’s Global Head of HR participating in that discussion, about the sheer number of DCs being convened to conduct DIs, the strain on resources, and the impact on staff morale. Group HR asked that the Investigation Team re-look at, in particular, the Group C2 cohort. On 21 March 2024, the team recommended that C2 employees (save for those who had already attended or completed a DI) should not proceed to DIs and instead be dealt with by direct disciplinary action under the applicable Disciplinary Framework. Approvals were then given at the employing-entity level on or about 27 March 2024, with Ms A giving her approval for the respondent. Accordingly, C2 DIs that had not yet taken place were cancelled (if scheduled) or not convened, and outcomes were issued directly—typically a letter of warning, often accompanied by a percentage reduction of the employee’s 2023 performance bonus—while any C2 DIs already conducted were left to run their course.

Following the recalibration affecting only Group C2, the remaining DIs proceeded unaffected for the Group C3, D and E cohorts (and for any C2 matters where a DI had already been conducted). Through late March and April 2024, three-member DCs heard those cases, considered the consolidated materials (the questionnaires, receipts or claims appendices, interview records, etc) alongside the employees’ explanations given during the DIs. Written reasons were then issued by the DCs, addressing, broadly speaking: (a) whether the relevant employee had breached the applicable medical claims policy; (b) if so, whether those breaches had been committed intentionally, wilfully, and/or dishonestly; and (c) the recommended sanction.

The DCs’ recommended sanction had to be approved under the relevant entity’s Disciplinary Framework. As far as the respondent was concerned, such recommendations had to be submitted to and approved by the respondent’s Global Head of HR (Ms A) as well as the respondent’s Global Head of Regulatory Compliance. Once approvals were given, the disciplinary outcome was communicated by a letter under Ms A’s hand, which set out the gist of the grounds. In general, the DI track culminated, in most cases, in DC recommendations for dismissal. There was a minority which resulted in non-termination outcomes where either dishonesty was not found by the DC or—despite such an adverse finding—the DC considered the employee’s mitigating circumstances sufficiently weighty to warrant a lesser sanction.

Each of the six claimants whose cases were before me fell within Group D and had been referred to DCs. Their respective DCs concluded that they had committed serious breaches of the MCP, and that those breaches had been committed intentionally, wilfully and/or dishonestly. In each case, the DCs recommended dismissal; those recommendations were approved, and the dismissals were effected. However, it is important to note that, though, in all six cases, the letters of dismissal communicated the DCs’ conclusions—namely, that the employees were found to have committed serious breaches of the MCP intentionally, wilfully, and/or dishonestly—those letters also stated that the six claimants’ employments were being terminated with full contractual notice. Timing wise, all six claimants were given notice of their dismissal in mid-April 2024 with notice running until mid-July 2024. The letters of dismissal also called the employees’ attention to their entitlement to file an appeal against the decision, whereupon Ms A would determine whether to convene an Appeal Committee, her decision being final.

Each of the six claimants sought an appeal. However, in each of their cases, no Appeal Committee was convened. On Ms A’s evidence, the Disciplinary Framework contemplated that, where a DI had already been conducted and a DC had reached its decision, an appeal would be entertained only if: (a) new material evidence had arisen after the DI; or (b) there were material procedural gaps undermining the reliability of the DC’s decision. As neither basis was shown in any of the six matters, she decided that no Appeal Committees would be convened. Her decision was made and communicated to each of the claimants in the first half of May 2024 and, save for one, the claimants were notified in the later part of May that their employments would be brought to an end with immediate effect, with the remaining notice being commuted to salary in lieu thereof.

After each claimant’s employment came to an end, he or she lodged a mediation request with the Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management (“TADM”) under Part 2 of the ECA. The mediations—all of which were union-assisted—did not result in settlement. TADM accordingly issued each claimant two Claim Referral Certificates recording unresolved disputes. Thereafter, each claimant commenced two claims in the ECT against the respondent. The first and principal claim in each case was for “wrongful dismissal” under s 14(2) of the EA, and the second was a contractual claim seeking payment of his or her 2023 performance bonus.

The facts of Ms C’s case

Ms C commenced employment with the respondent on 16 September 2021 under a written contract dated 20 August 2021 which provided, among other things, for three months’ notice of termination. She was eligible for medical benefits under the MCP and for variable remuneration assessed annually. On or about 26 December 2023, Ms C received the Notice of Investigation and standard questionnaire. She completed and returned the materials within the week, appending the available Clinic X receipts and a claims appendix. Over the review window, her Clinic X usage arose only in 2023: between March and September that year she submitted 62 reimbursement claims totalling $9,989.64. In 2022, she did not make any reimbursement claims for purchases made at Clinic X. In her responses, she indicated that her Clinic X purchases in 2023 consisted largely of vitamins, supplements and skincare items, that she had not consulted a doctor at Clinic X, and that the claims had been submitted under “Self”.

On the respondent’s metrics (see [13] above), those figures placed her in Group D and, in consequence, she was required to attend an HR interview on 10 January 2024, at which she broadly reiterated her questionnaire answers and explained that she had understood, from what colleagues and the clinic staff had said, that non-itemised claims below the stated threshold could be submitted. She indicated that she was prepared to repay the sums if the claims were not in order. Consistent with the treatment of Group D cases (see [18] above), the respondent then issued Ms C a Notice of DI on 13 March 2024, and the DI was convened before a three-member DC on 20 March 2024. The committee was chaired by one Mr T (Managing Director, Risk Management), with a Mr S (Managing Director, Group Finance) and a Ms Y (Managing Director, Group HR) as members.

Ms C attended and was invited to explain her claims. Before the DC, she accepted that she had not been examined by a doctor at Clinic X and that her purchases had consisted largely of vitamins, supplements, skincare products, and occasional household or personal-care items, including one electric toothbrush. She explained that she had first learned of Clinic X from a colleague who had represented that many employees frequented the clinic and had successfully made claims for similar purchases. On her account, the clinic staff had also advised her to keep each receipt below $200, as amounts under that threshold did not need to be itemised for reimbursement; she said she had understood this to mean that such claims were permissible. Ms C stated that she had therefore believed her claims were consistent with prevailing practice and that she had not intended to deceive the respondent. She further said that she had agreed to repay the full amount once informed that her claims were not in order, and that she deeply regretted the lapse.

The DC considered the evidence before it, including Ms C’s questionnaire and interview responses, and her oral explanations at the inquiry. It found that Ms C had made repeated claims for items plainly non-medical in nature and that these could not reasonably have been regarded as claimable under the MCP. The DC observed that the pattern of her purchases—62 transactions over a seven-month period, many on consecutive days, and typically just below $200—demonstrated a sustained and deliberate disregard for the policy’s requirements. It therefore concluded that there was a serious breach of policy and, further, that Ms C had committed that breach intentionally and dishonestly.

That said, the DC also took into account Ms C’s relatively junior position, her previously clean employment record, her full repayment of the sums claimed, and what it described as her “simple-minded” reliance on the representations of colleagues and the clinic staff. While maintaining its findings of intentional misconduct and serious breach, the DC regarded these matters as mitigating when calibrating sanction. Balancing them against the gravity and pattern of the conduct, the DC concluded that, though her conduct would ordinarily have warranted dismissal, her personal circumstances justified some leniency. It therefore recommended that Ms C be issued a letter of warning together with a 100% reduction of her performance bonus for 2023.

When the DC’s report was submitted for approval on 17 April 2024, pursuant to the respondent’s Disciplinary Framework (the “DF”), Ms A (the respondent’s Global Head of HR) expressed concern that the finding of dishonesty was not consistent with such a lenient sanction and requested that the DC reconsider its recommendation. The DC reconvened within the day, reassessed the matter, and—by a two-to-one majority—determined that the mitigating factors were insufficient to justify deviation from the standard consequence for misconduct of this gravity. It therefore revised its recommendation to “termination”. Ms A accepted and approved that revised recommendation later that same day. The next day, 18 April, the respondent issued Ms C a notice of termination, giving her three months’ notice—which was the period provided for in her employment contract—that her last day would be 17 July. Before the expiry of such notice, the respondent decided to bring forward the effective termination date and pay salary in lieu of the unserved notice period. By letter dated 24 May 2024, Ms C was informed that her employment would be terminated with immediate effect, with all sums due to her paid accordingly.

Although Ms C was formally terminated with notice (part of which was later commuted to salary in lieu), the letter of termination issued to her on 18 April 2024 made clear that the decision to end her employment was founded on the findings of the DC. The letter expressly recorded that she was found to have committed intentional misconduct involving dishonesty and a serious breach of the MCP. The letter also set out the evidential basis for those conclusions:

On 29 April 2024, after this letter was issued (but before notice given therein had been commuted to salary in lieu thereof), Ms C sought an internal appeal against the DC’s decision, this being an avenue of recourse available to her under the respondent’s DF. In her appeal email, she wrote, in substance: (a) that she had been told by clinic staff—and separately by a colleague—that claims below $200 need not be itemised and could be submitted, and that she had not previously appreciated the significance of this “$200 threshold”; and (b) that she had understood Clinic X to be a clinic used for the respondent’s medical claims and, seeing many of her colleagues there “doing the same”, she had not read the MCP. She also asked that leniency be shown, pointing to her performance, recent promotion, and remorse.

Clause 8.4 of the DF required the respondent’s Global Head of HR to determine whether an Appeal Committee ought even to be convened to consider the appeal and, whatever that decision, it was to be final (as stated at [22] above). On 14 May, Ms A recorded her decision that no Appeal Committee would be convened. In her written report on the matter, she noted that Ms C had already attended a full DI hearing, that no new material evidence had arisen after the DI concluded, and that there were no material procedural gaps rendering the DC’s decision unreliable. Ms C’s appeal therefore did not proceed further.

No further internal recourse was available to Ms C and, as such, on 24 May 2024, her employment came to an end (see [30] above). She thus initiated proceedings against the respondent, lodging the two present claims in the ECT on 12 November 2024. By her first claim for “wrongful dismissal” under s 14(2) of the EA, she sought compensation amounting to $25,998. By her second, she sought the payment of her performance bonus for 2023 in the sum of $13,000.

Concurrently, Ms C began her search for comparable employment. On her account, she had submitted résumés and contacted recruiters but had faced difficulty securing even first-round interviews, a difficulty she attributed to having been candid about the circumstances of her departure from the respondent. Ms C’s explanation for her candour was that she had felt it necessary to declare upfront that she had been dismissed because the institutions at which she was seeking employment would, in any event, have conducted background checks with the respondent and learnt of her dismissal. As an illustration of how the dismissal affected her ability to seek new employment, Ms C referred to a role that required Japanese-language ability. Ms C said she held a JLPT N4 certification and, on the recruiter’s initial view, had a strong chance because such candidates were uncommon. However, the recruiter later informed her that the prospective employer had taken her dismissal from the respondent into consideration in deciding not to proceed with an interview. This was in early October 2024 and, on Ms C’s account, she remained unemployed throughout the progression of her claims in the ECT, until as late as 29 August 2025.

The claimant’s case

Ms C’s case comprised four principal planks. First, as to the grounds proffered for dismissal, she denied dishonesty and maintained that her Clinic X claims were submitted under a genuine (if mistaken) belief. Second, as to the fact of dismissal, she contended that dismissal was not justified even if some misconduct was found. Third, as to the process leading to her dismissal, she alleged material lapses in “due inquiry” required by s 14(1) of the EA and in the contractual procedure required by the various clauses in the DF. Fourth, as to her 2023 performance bonus, she argued that the respondent’s non-award was not a good-faith exercise of discretion tethered to performance, but a punitive sequel to an already-infirm disciplinary outcome.

As to the grounds proffered for dismissal

The first plank of Ms C’s case was that the grounds recorded in the respondent’s notice of dismissal were not made out on the evidence and were, in material respects, overstated. The letter (issued on 18 April 2024) communicated the DC’s conclusions that she had committed “intentional misconduct involving dishonesty” and a “serious breach” of the MCP, and cited (among other matters) her awareness of a “$200 threshold”, split billing, and purchases (eg, chicken essence, an electric toothbrush) unsupported by any consultation at Clinic X. She denied that these facts, even if accepted, established dishonesty or wilfulness; rather, she said they showed a mistaken but genuine belief—formed from colleagues’ practices and Clinic X’s own representations about non-itemised claims below the prevailing threshold—that her claims were permissible. On that footing, she submitted the respondent could not discharge its burden of proof under s 27(2)(b) of the ECA to prove the specific reasons it chose to state (viz, dishonesty, wilfulness, intention), as opposed to misconduct simpliciter.

As to the fact of dismissal and the process leading thereto

The second and third planks of Ms C’s case were that she ought not to have been dismissed at all, and that the process culminating in dismissal fell short of both statute and the respondent’s own DF. In particular, she relied on s 14(1) of the EA (the requirement of “due inquiry”), and on specific DF provisions. Specifically, Ms C relied on:

(a) Clause 6.4, which required a DC, when calibrating sanction, to consider relevant precedent cases so as to ensure consistency of treatment across like cases. Ms C’s case was that the respondent failed to comply with this clause because neither the DC’s written reasons nor the approval materials showed any engagement with precedent or parity analysis drawn from the same Clinic X episode. She identified comparators whose DIs were cancelled or who, despite adverse findings, received warnings and bonus reductions rather than dismissal, and said there was no principled, transparent explanation for imposing a harsher outcome on her.

(b) Clause 7.1, which channelled a DC’s recommended sanction to the approvers (there were two: Ms A as the respondent’s Global Head of HR and the respondent’s Global Head of Regulatory Compliance) for approval and did not invite a merits review or substitution by approvers. Ms C’s case was that this clause had been breached because, after the DC initially recommended a warning with a 100% reduction of her 2023 bonus, Ms A queried that lenient outcome and asked the DC to reconsider, which led to the DC revising its recommendation to termination, which was then approved (see [30] above). She said this sequence showed the approval stage being used to drive a different substantive outcome, thereby displacing the DC’s sanction-setting role and offending cl 7.1 as well as the “due inquiry” requirement in s 14(1). In this connection, she also relied more generally on the DF’s fairness and natural justice requirements (including cll 3.4 and 5.12).

She also said the process of requiring an employee to attend a DI before a DC had been applied arbitrarily across the broader cohort. First, she pointed to the respondent’s two-stage grouping exercise (see [15]–[20] above). While she accepted that she had been sorted into Group D on the respondent’s metrics, she argued the later re-examination of Group C2 (where DIs were cancelled/not convened) illustrated the malleability of the track to a DI and, therefore, the arbitrariness of routing decisions. On her case, materially similar conduct sometimes attracted only a warning and bonus cut without a DI, whereas she was sent to a DC and dismissed. If she had been routed differently (eg, as with the Group C2 cohort after the review), dismissal would not have arisen. She cited comparators whose DIs were cancelled and replaced by a warning with a partial bonus cut, and said the respondent gave no principled, transparent basis for treating her more harshly. This, she said, bore directly on “due inquiry” under s 14(1) and on the DF’s parity/precedent requirements.

Ms C also took issue with the internal appeal process. She contended that the appeal stage under cl 8.4 of the DF was administered in a way that compounded the earlier defects. Although she filed an internal appeal on 29 April 2024, Ms A decided not to convene an Appeal Committee, recording that a full DI had already been held and there was no new evidence or material procedural gap. Ms C’s argument was that this was circular: the very issues she raised were treated as outside the remit to warrant an appeal, which meant no neutral forum ever assessed them. She said this departed from the DF’s stated function for the appeal stage and also offended the “due inquiry” requirement in s 14(1) when set against the scale and variability of outcomes in the overall episode.

As to entitlement to performance bonus for work done in 2023

The fourth plank concerned her 2023 performance bonus. She accepted that her contract framed bonuses as discretionary and conditioned, inter alia, on notice and misconduct, but contended that discretion had to be exercised honestly, in good faith, for proper purposes and rationally—ie, tethered to performance and not used punitively as an add-on to a contested disciplinary outcome. On her case, the respondent announced “no declaration” of her 2023 bonus as a sequel to the dismissal decision, without engaging with performance or applying any transparent, even-handed approach across the cohort. She said that was arbitrary and punitive. She contrasted her outcome with others in the same episode who, despite adverse findings, retained some portion of their 2023 bonus under warning-type outcomes. In short, she argued the non-award was an unlawful exercise of discretion because it rode on the same flawed disciplinary process rather than on a bona fide appraisal of 2023 performance.

The respondent’s case

The respondent’s case mirrored the claimant’s four planks, but in the opposite direction. First, as to the grounds recorded in the dismissal notice, the respondent maintained that the DC’s findings of “intentional misconduct involving dishonesty” and a “serious breach” of the MCP were borne out on the evidence. Second, as to the fact of dismissal and the process culminating in it, the respondent contended that s 14(1) of the EA was not engaged and that the DF was, in any event, irrelevant to the ECT’s task under s 14(2). Instead, applying the Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal (Govt Gazette, Electronic Ed, 23 Jul 2024) (“TGWD”), the only question for me was whether the reason stated was false. Alternatively, if s 14(1) or the DF was thought to matter, the respondent said that “due inquiry” was in fact conducted and the DF complied with. Third, in the alternative, if it was found that Ms C had a claim under s 14(2), the respondent contended that any compensation should be minimal upon application of the Second Schedule to the Employment Claims Regulations 2017 (“EC Regulations”). Fourth, as to the 2023 performance bonus, the respondent denied any contractual entitlement and said its non-award was a lawful, rational exercise of discretion.

As to the grounds proffered for dismissal

The respondent’s primary position was that the dismissal reason stated in the 18 April 2024 letter—intentional misconduct involving dishonesty and a serious breach of the MCP committed wilfully or with conscious disregard—was not false. It stood by the DC’s conclusions and submitted that the contemporaneous materials, Ms C’s own answers, and the objective pattern of claiming together established both the breach and the required state of mind.

First, the respondent said the claims themselves could not be squared with the governing policy. The MCP budget was for “GP and specialist outpatient” spend, not general retail; Ms C’s purchases (vitamins and supplements, skincare products, chicken essence, an electric toothbrush) were not medically warranted or prescribed and so were non-claimable under a fair reading of the policy. The respondent emphasised that the Group ran a separate “Flex Dollar” scheme that (unlike the MCP) catered for wellness items—a design choice undercutting any suggestion that over-the-counter products fell within outpatient medical treatment. On the respondent’s case, no reasonable employee could have believed that stocking up on these items without any consultation amounted to outpatient treatment within the MCP.

Second, the respondent relied on the modus operandi as powerful circumstantial proof of intent. Over roughly six months (March–September 2023) Ms C lodged 62 claims totalling $9,989.64, with spends repeatedly clustering just below the non-itemisation threshold, on many occasions on consecutive days. The respondent pointed to instances of “split” invoices and to Ms C’s admissions at the DI—including that she kept purchases below $200 and that the clinic would suggest returning the next day to stay under the threshold—as showing that she deliberately shaped her transactions to exploit the system rather than because she innocently mistook the rules. This repeated pattern, the respondent said, is inconsistent with a bona fide misunderstanding and is strongly consistent with intentional or at least consciously reckless misuse.

Third, the respondent said Ms C’s own explanations confirmed the mental element. In the DI she accepted (in substance) that she never consulted a doctor at Clinic X; that she bought vitamins and skincare because she wanted to “stock up” or “try different brands”; and that she structured receipts around the threshold. The respondent argued that these statements—coupled with the scale and frequency of claiming—made out at least wilfulness or conscious/repeated disregard. Her reliance on colleagues’ practices or on what clinic staff said could not convert retail purchases into claimable outpatient treatment, particularly against the policy text and the separate Flex Dollar channel.

Fourth, the respondent accepted that, because it had stated specific grounds, s 27(2)(b) of the ECA put the burden on it to prove those grounds—and it maintained that the burden was discharged. The respondent’s submissions framed the issues as: (a) whether there was “misconduct”; and (b) whether the stated reason was false. The respondent’s case was “yes” to the former and “no” to the latter. Even if I preferred the formulation “serious breach with wilful or conscious disregard” to “dishonesty”, the respondent said the reason as stated in the letter remained accurate in substance and, under the TGWD lens, could not be impugned as false.

Finally, the respondent submitted that Ms C’s post hoc expressions of regret and her preparedness to repay did not assist her on liability: remorse is not a defence. What mattered was the contemporaneous conduct—repeated, sustained, and deliberately structured claiming that, on an objective view, fell outside the MCP and undermined the trust inherent in the employment relationship. On that footing, the respondent invited a finding that the DC’s conclusions on intentional misconduct (and, alternatively, wilful or conscious disregard) were properly reached and that the dismissal reason recorded in the 18 April letter was duly proven.

As to the fact of dismissal and the process leading thereto

Here, the respondent’s position was two-stranded. First, as a matter of remit, s 14(1) of the EA was not engaged because Ms C’s employment was terminated with notice (later partly commuted to salary in lieu). On the respondent’s case, both the text of s 14(1) and the TGWD confine the need for “due inquiry” to summary dismissals. Where notice is given or paid, the ECT’s task under s 14(2) is simply to test whether the stated reason for dismissal is false, and not to audit the employer’s internal processes.

Relatedly, the respondent submitted that the DF was not a justiciable yardstick for a s 14(2) claim. Disputes about adherence to the DF—which is contractual in nature—are not within the ECT’s statutory remit, which is bounded by the TGWD (to which the ECT must have regard under s 20(7) of the ECA). In this vein, it bears noting that the respondent had also resisted process-focused applications (including the bid to compel Ms A’s attendance: see Annex 1, [A.4]–[A.19] below), taking the position that such evidence was not legally relevant to the dispositive s 14(2) inquiry.

Second, and in any case (ie, if I considered s 14(1) or the DF to matter), the respondent said the requirements of “due inquiry” were satisfied and the DF was adhered to in substance and in procedure. Ms C was notified of the case against her, interviewed by HR, convened before a three-member DC, and afforded an opportunity to explain her purchases and the basis on which she believed claims were permissible. The DC considered the consolidated materials and her explanations, reached findings on breach and characterisation, and issued written reasons; any approval that followed was part of the DF’s escalation architecture and not a merits-based rehearing at large. In short, the respondent’s case was that the inquiry was real, the hearing was fair, and the conclusion reached was independently reasoned.

On approvals, the respondent emphasised that cl 7.1 of the DF requires DC-recommended sanctions to be approved by the respondent’s Global Head of HR and the Global Head of Regulatory Compliance. In Ms C’s case, after the DC’s initial sanction recommendation, Ms A (as Global Head of HR) queried parity and asked the DC to reconsider in light of “precedent cases”—by which the respondent meant other matters that had actually been heard by DCs and resulted in DC findings. The DC then reconvened, reconsidered, and revised its recommendation. The respondent presented this as cl 7.1 operating as a final, independent check for consistency across like cases, not an impermissible substitution of the DC’s role.

On the grouping exercise and Ms C’s case vis-à-vis comparators, the respondent rejected any suggestion of arbitrariness in the wider cohort handling. It argued that employees whose DIs were cancelled or never convened (eg, within the Group C2 recalibration: see [19] above) yielded no DC findings and therefore could not be “precedents” for cl 6.4 parity analysis. On the respondent’s case, it was entitled to decide which matters proceeded to DCs, and the absence of a DI in such cases meant there was nothing comparable to bind or calibrate Ms C’s outcome.

On the appeal stage, the respondent’s case was that cll 8.1–8.4 of the DF were followed. Where a full DI had been conducted, an appeal would ordinarily be entertained only if: (a) new material evidence arose after the DI; or (b) there were material procedural gaps rendering the DC’s decision unreliable. The Global Head of HR decides whether to convene an Appeal Committee, and that decision is final. In Ms C’s matter, Ms A did not convene an Appeal Committee because the appeal advanced disagreement with the DC’s findings and pleas in mitigation rather than “new” and “material” evidence or identified procedural gaps—a conclusion the respondent said was squarely within cl 8.2 and cl 8.4.

Stepping back, the respondent’s submission on process was therefore twofold: (a) as a jurisdictional matter, process complaints and DF-compliance are not, without more, routes to a finding of “dismissal without just cause or excuse” under s 14(2), given the TGWD-anchored inquiry into the truth of the stated reason; and (b) even if process is relevant, the handling of Ms C’s case—investigation, DI, DC findings, approvals under cl 7.1, and appeal screening under cl 8.2 and 8.4—satisfied both statutory “due inquiry” (to the extent it applied) and the DF’s terms in substance.

As to the remedies for “wrongful dismissal”

The respondent’s primary position was that no remedy arose because Ms C’s s 14(2) claim failed. In the alternative, if I were to find a dismissal “without just cause or excuse”, the respondent submitted that my task was confined to the compensatory framework prescribed by reg 17A and the Second Schedule to the EC Regulations. That is, I was to assess: “loss of income” and “harm” separately, the latter by applying the prescribed base amount and the listed aggravating and mitigating factors. The respondent emphasised that this framework is strictly compensatory and not punitive.

On “loss of income”, the respondent argued that the figure must be nil because Ms C did not lose notice pay: she was terminated with full contractual notice on 18 April 2024 and any unserved portion was commuted to salary in lieu on 24 May 2024. Accordingly, once the paid notice and salary in lieu were accounted for, there was no period of time where she ought to have earned an income but did not by reason of the dismissal “without just cause or excuse”.

On “harm”, the respondent invited me to start from the Second Schedule’s base amount of two months and then apply a 50% downward adjustment. It said there were no aggravating factors (eg, malice or humiliation), and there was at least one material mitigating factor: even on Ms C’s pleaded theory that the respondent failed to prove dishonesty, she had nonetheless made impermissible claims under the MCP, and that underlying misconduct (short of dishonesty, wilfulness, or intention) should mitigate the harm component. On that footing, the respondent asked that the base amount be reduced from two months to one month, which was to be computed using the gross rate of pay of Ms C’s monthly pay ($4,333).

As to entitlement to performance bonus for work done in 2023

The respondent’s position on Ms C’s separate “bonus” claim was straightforward. Primarily, it said the claim cannot stand as a matter of contract. The governing clause framed bonus as discretionary—“eligibility does not infer entitlement” and “bonus payments are made entirely at the discretion of the Company”—and that ends the matter unless Ms C could show an accrued entitlement. In this connection, the respondent rejected Ms C’s suggestion that bonuses had already “accrued” or were merely being “withheld”, saying there had been no declaration and no vesting event; the bonus claim was therefore not a case of enforcing an accrued payment but of inviting the tribunal to substitute its view for the respondent’s on whether to declare one at all. Indeed, the termination letter expressly stated that “[the respondent] will not be declaring and/or paying to [Ms C] any bonus/incentives for FY 2023”, and that this was a contemporaneous exercise of the contractual discretion made in light of the DI outcome.

Further to its contention that Ms C had no accrued entitlement to a bonus for 2023, the respondent also pointed to express pre-conditions that must be satisfied “at the time of payment of the bonus”, including that the employer has not given notice to terminate and that the employee “has not committed any act of misconduct”. On the respondent’s case, both conditions failed on the facts advanced by Ms C herself: the respondent had issued notice of termination and the disciplinary process had found misconduct.

In any event, the respondent also said the tribunal should not second-guess the exercise of discretion on a Wednesbury-type yardstick. Its decision not to declare any 2023 bonus was taken after the DI and by reference to a plainly relevant consideration—misconduct—and there was no suggestion of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or extraneous motives. That sufficed to defeat the claim even if one assumed (contrary to the respondent’s primary case) that some implied constraint of rationality applied.

My decision

The specific questions of law which arose in the six related cases

Before turning to each point, it is useful to say why these five questions arose at all. The parties’ stances pulled in different directions. The respondent anchored its case to the TGWD and framed the ECT’s task as truth-testing the stated ground of dismissal; the claimants, for their part, relied on the text and structure of s 14 of the EA—including “due inquiry”—and on the respondent’s own DF and comparators to contend for a wider, merits-led inquiry.

Those competing frames forced to the surface five threshold matters that had to be settled before facts could be sensibly weighed: whether a s 14(2) claim sits apart from, rather than subsumes, the common law action; whether “due inquiry” is engaged where notice (or pay in lieu) is given but the dismissal is nevertheless premised on misconduct; how far the contractual disciplinary framework affects (if at all) the statutory floor of “due inquiry”; what exactly an employer who states reasons must prove—and whether a failed aggravated ground can fairly give way to a lesser one—in order to discharge its burden; and, finally, whether and how the relative treatment of co-employees bears on proportionality and on the existence of “just cause or excuse”. These are the questions I answer below.

On the relationship between the common law and s 14(2) of the EA

At the risk of repetition (see Annex 3, [A.48] et seq below), I emphasise that two different wrongs travel under the modern label “wrongful dismissal”. The common law action sounds in contract and asks whether the employer brought the engagement to an end in accordance with the bargain (typically by giving or paying notice). Section 14(2) creates a statutory cause of action that asks a different question: whether the dismissal was “without just cause or excuse”. The two may intersect factually, but they are analytically distinct.

In the ECT, a claimant who invokes s 14(2) litigates only that statutory wrong. Contractual matters may be used as context—for example, a failure to follow an agreed procedure may bear on how confidently a tribunal can infer “cause”—but they are not independently actionable within the s 14(2) claim. That separation of questions preserves the ECT’s limited jurisdiction, avoids importing the common law’s notice-based lens into a merits-led inquiry, and keeps the remedial frames coherent (contract damages in one sphere, and the statutory framework—reinstatement or compensation—in the other).

On the requirement of “due inquiry” when notice is given or paid

Two strands lead to the same conclusion that a due inquiry is required where an employer elects to terminate with notice (or salary in lieu) but nevertheless anchors the decision “on the grounds of misconduct”.

First, on the text. Section 14(1) is framed in three linked elements: an employer “may after due inquiry dismiss without notice an employee on the grounds of misconduct”. Read with ordinary syntax, “after due inquiry” is the condition that attaches to the act of dismissing for misconduct; “without notice” states the consequence that the statute permits when that condition and ground are satisfied. Put another way, the procedural safeguard (“after due inquiry”) is tied to the ground (misconduct), not merely to the mode (summary dismissal).

To confine the inquiry requirement to naked summary cases would allow an employer to attach the grave label of “misconduct” while evading the very process Parliament coupled to that label by the simple expedient of paying notice. That reading would render the words “on the grounds of misconduct” partially otiose and create an incoherence across the EA: the same accusation would attract a statutory safeguard if the employer withholds notice, but none if it pays notice—even though the stigma and downstream effects for the worker are identical. A more coherent construction, and one that gives each phrase work to do, is this: whenever an employer relies on misconduct as the real basis for ending the employment, the due inquiry precondition is engaged; if the inquiry establishes misconduct, the EA permits dismissal without notice, but the employer may still choose to give notice. The choice to give notice does not dissolve the inquiry requirement that was triggered by the ground the employer chose to invoke.

Second, on purpose. The point of a “due inquiry” in the misconduct setting is not ceremony; it is to test, before a lasting stigma is affixed, whether the allegation is true, fairly put, and proportionately judged. Misconduct dismissals are qualitatively different from terminations for business re-organisation or neutral contract expiries: they speak to trust, character, and future employability. Requiring a fair internal inquiry—notice of the case, a real chance to answer it, and impartial consideration—ensures that an employer who seeks the benefit of calling a termination “for misconduct” also shoulders the responsibility of first confronting the employee with the charge and weighing it fairly.

It aligns incentives sensibly: if the employer wishes to keep matters at the level of contractual election (ending the bargain on notice with no accusation), it may do so without triggering the s 14(1) safeguard; but once it crosses the line into alleging misconduct, the safeguard travels with that choice. It also preserves coherence with the tribunal’s task under s 14(2): a careful inquiry strengthens confidence that “just cause or excuse” existed; a cursory or skipped inquiry weakens it. Most importantly, it prevents a perverse outcome in which employers can weaponise the language of “misconduct” to justify harsher internal consequences while sidestepping the minimal procedural discipline the EA expects when that label is invoked.

On the effect of contractual disciplinary frameworks on “due inquiry”

The statutory floor is modest and fact-sensitive. Employers may—and often should—adopt more exacting internal rules as a matter of governance, proportionality, and transparency. But those internal rules do not, by themselves, ratchet up the legal threshold of “due inquiry” in s 14(1). Treating them as if they did would perversely penalise the conscientious and reward the minimalist. Breaches of a contractual framework are not freestanding grounds of liability in a s 14(2) claim; they are part of the evidential picture. A careful, even-handed process strengthens confidence in the truth, gravity, and proportionality of the employer’s case; a cursory or lopsided one weakens it. That is the principled way in which contract and statute meet: procedure does not eclipse substance, but it often explains why a substantive conclusion is—or is not—justified.

On that which the respondent needed to prove in order to discharge its burden

The respondent’s submission was that, having stated reasons, its task under s 27(2)(b) of the ECA was essentially to show that the stated ground was “not false”—and that once dishonesty (or an equivalent aggravated descriptor) was proved, nothing further was required. This answer is not wrong but it is incomplete in two ways.

First, the tribunal’s task is not exhausted by simply deciding whether or not the reasons advanced by the respondent in its notice of dismissal were “false”. Instead, the complete task needs to proceed in two steps. One, as to truth: are the material particulars of the stated reason proved on the balance of probabilities? Where the letter trades on aggravated descriptors—“dishonesty”, “wilfulness”, “intent”—the employer must prove the mental element that gives those labels their force; it is not enough to show a bare breach of policy. Two—and this is the part of the respondent’s submission which is missing—sufficiency: if proved, do those facts, viewed in their proper context, amount to “just cause or excuse” to dismiss, as opposed to warranting a lesser industrial penalty?

Admittedly, in the present cases, if the respondent’s stated grounds of dismissal were found to be true, they would self-evidently amount to just cause or excuse and satisfy the second step of the analysis. In such cases, the exercise does in practice collapse into a truth-testing exercise. However, for completeness, it would not be accurate to suggest that the tribunal’s task was limited to the respondent’s framing. Rather, the above two-stage analysis accords with the long-standing Malaysian approach to the same phrase “just cause or excuse”, under which the Industrial Court determines de novo both the truth of the charge and the adequacy of dismissal as a response (see the Federal Court’s articulation of the Industrial Court’s role in Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 753 and Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Seh Yen [1995] 3 MLJ 537).

Second, even if the respondent failed to prove that the grounds stated in its notices of dismissal were not false, that did not—in my view—automatically render the dismissals “without just cause or excuse” if a lesser wrong on the part of the claimants could still be established. However, there were guardrails to this substitution. Any “lesser” basis must: (a) sit within the gravamen of what was fairly put to the employee before dismissal (not a wholly new rationale devised after the fact); and (b) cohere with the notice of dismissal’s core account of why the relationship had to end. If those conditions are met, the tribunal may still ask whether the lesser wrong, in context, supplied “just cause or excuse”; if they are not, fairness precludes salvaging a dismissal on a different footing.

On the relative treatment of employees within an employment organisation

Parity is not a freestanding ground of liability and it does not answer the anterior question of fact: whether the claimants did what was alleged. But once some misconduct is established, consistency across materially similar cases goes directly to proportionality and, therefore, to whether the dismissal of this particular employee was “with just cause or excuse”. The touchstone is comparability: like cases ought, in general, to be treated alike unless there is a principled distinction (seniority and responsibility; degree and duration of participation; prior record; the employee’s candour, cooperation and remorse; business risk and trust-sensitivities in role; and any safety or regulatory implications). Malaysian courts have framed the Industrial Court’s merits task in precisely those terms of truth and proportionality; where disparity is asserted, it must be proved with concrete comparators and the court will ask whether the harsher penalty can be justified by real differences (see, eg, Harianto Effendy bin Zakaria & Ors v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [2014] 2 MELR 263).

There are, however, two boundaries. First, “consistency” is a cross-check, not a veto. A dismissal that is otherwise justified does not become unjustified merely because another employee elsewhere appears to have been treated more leniently; the question remains whether the present dismissal was a proportionate response to the proved misconduct in its full context. Second, the comparators must truly be comparable. The mere existence of a lenient decision in another broadly similar case does not, by itself, impeach a dismissal; what matters is whether there is a genuine inconsistency in the treatment of employees who are materially indistinguishable on the facts that matter to sanction. That is the sense in which parity assists—as a reasonableness and proportionality check, not as a rule of strict uniformity.

In practical terms, the party who relies on relative treatment must lay the evidential groundwork: who the proposed comparators are; what they did (and over what period); what their roles and records were; how they were dealt with; and why those features render them materially alike to the employee. Where that showing is not made out—for example, where asserted disparity of punishment is pleaded at a high level of generality, or the comparators turn out to be meaningfully different—the contention would likely fail. Conversely, where the employer’s own practice demonstrates that a particular norm for the same level of wrongdoing, that practice is powerful contextual evidence against dismissal being the principled response. Set against this framework, I treat relative treatment as part of the second stage of the analysis (proportionality), not as a device to dilute the first (truth). If the facts place a claimant within a cohort that the employer has, in practice, retained and corrected rather than dismissed, the onus then lies on the employer to articulate the principled difference that made dismissal necessary here. Absent such articulation grounded in the record, unexplained disparity will weigh against a conclusion that there was “just cause or excuse” to end the employment.

A brief summary of the applicable legal principles

A more complete statement of the law as I understand it is set out at Annex 3 read with [62]–[78] above. For present purposes, a brief summary of the key principles and propositions of law is sufficient:

(a) Notwithstanding the nomenclature, a claim under s 14(2) of the EA is a statutory wrong that is distinct from, and does not encompass, the common law action called “wrongful dismissal”.

(b) The ECT is of limited jurisdiction. Though it may hear specified contractual claims that often arise on dismissal (eg, claims for salary in lieu of notice), it cannot adjudicate breaches of employment contracts at large, including alleged breaches of an employer’s contractual disciplinary framework.

(c) The ECT’s task under s 14(2) is de novo. By this, I mean that the ECT is supposed to decide, afresh and on the evidence, whether the dismissal was “without just cause or excuse”. It does not merely review the employer’s decision or audit a domestic inquiry for error.

(d) The TGWD is to be taken into account as guidance in determining the claim. The guidelines are assistive; however, they do not control or narrow the statutory inquiry under s 14(2).

(e) Where an employer relies on misconduct as the basis for ending the employment, the due inquiry safeguard in s 14(1) is engaged even if notice (or salary in lieu) is given; the condition attaches to the ground (misconduct), not the mode (summary termination).

(f) “Due inquiry” is a modest, fact-sensitive standard of basic fairness: adequate and reasonably clear notice of the case, a real opportunity to answer it, and open-minded consideration of that answer before fixing on misconduct as the ground.

(g) Where the employment contract incorporates a disciplinary framework, that framework does not ratchet up the content of “due inquiry” and render the obligation to conduct that inquiry more onerous.

(h) Where “due inquiry” is required and fulfilled, the effect is evidential, not determinative: a fair internal process strengthens confidence in the reliability of the employer’s case but does not, by itself, prove “just cause or excuse”. Conversely, where it is required and not fulfilled, that omission does not of itself establish a claim under s 14(2); it is, however, a material weakness that may warrant adverse inferences, make it harder for the employer to discharge any burden under s 27(2)(b) of the ECA, and (though outside the ECT’s remit) may sound in limited contractual consequences in the civil courts (assuming the parties have a contractual disciplinary framework that was breached).

(i) Where an employee is dismissed on grounds of either misconduct or poor performance and those reasons are recorded in the notice of dismissal issued to the employee, s 27(2)(b) of the ECA is engaged and the employer bears the burden of proving that the reasons cited amount to “just cause or excuse” for the dismissal.

(j) The analysis of whether the reasons cited amount to “just cause or excuse” for the dismissal proceeds in two steps: (i) truth (including any mental element the employer itself invoked, such as dishonesty or wilfulness); and (ii) sufficiency (whether the proved facts, in context, amount to “just cause or excuse” rather than warranting a lesser penalty).

(k) Where the employer’s stated reason, as framed in the notice of dismissal, is not proved at that level but the evidence establishes a lesser wrong within the same gravamen, the tribunal may consider that lesser basis only within guardrails of fairness: it must have been fairly put to the employee before dismissal, cohere with the notice’s core account of why the relationship had to end, and be something the employee had a fair chance to meet, whether during the internal process or in the proceedings.

(l) Parity of treatment between employees plays no part at the anterior truth question, but once some misconduct is established it bears on proportionality: like cases should generally be treated alike unless principled distinctions (eg, seniority, degree and duration of participation, prior record, candour and cooperation, trust-sensitivities, safety or regulatory implications) justify a different outcome.

(m) Where a claim under s 14(2) is established, reinstatement may be ordered where practicable and where sufficient trust and confidence remain. Otherwise, compensation is bifurcated into “loss of income” (the earnings shortfall caused by either or both the fact and manner of the dismissal without just cause or excuse, net of any salary-in-lieu and mitigation, and subject to statutory cap of three months’ salary) and “harm” (a conventional base amount, adjusted by the listed factors), with double counting avoided.

With these principles in mind, I turn to the determinative factual issues.

The determinative factual issues

Against that frame, four questions determined the outcome and I take them in that order.

(a) First, process: was Ms C’s dismissal preceded by adequate “due inquiry” within s 14(1)?

(b) Second, merits: was the dismissal supported by “just cause or excuse”—in particular, whether the dishonesty/wilfulness asserted in the notice was proved on the balance of probabilities, and, if not, whether any lesser wrong fairly within the same gravamen could nevertheless justify dismissal.

(c) Third, remedy: if the claim succeeds, whether Ms C was entitled to compensation under both “loss of income” and “harm” and how those heads were to be assessed on these facts.

(d) Fourth, bonus: whether she was entitled to a 2023 performance bonus.

I address each in turn.

Was Ms C’s dismissal preceded by adequate “due inquiry”?

The legal floor is quite modest. As the High Court explained in Long Kim Wing v LTX-Credence Singapore Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC 151 (“Long Kim Wing”), “due inquiry” in s 14(1) is a fact-sensitive standard aimed at basic procedural fairness, not a court-like trial. What is required is, in substance: (a) adequate and reasonably clear notice of the allegations the employer proposes to rely on; (b) a real opportunity for the employee to answer those allegations and to place her explanation before the decision-maker; and (c) an open-minded consideration of that explanation before the employer fixes on misconduct as a dismissal ground. The statute does not prescribe set forms, adversarial trappings, or strict rules of evidence. What matters is that the employee knows the case to meet, is genuinely heard, and that the employer’s mind is applied in good faith to both accusation and answer before reaching its conclusion.

Measured against that yardstick, I was satisfied the notice requirement had been met. The sequence began with the December 2023 Notice of Investigation and questionnaire, which alerted the employee that Clinic X-linked claims were under review and required particulars of what had been purchased and why. It continued with the 13 March 2024 Notice of DI, which set out the disciplinary charges in clear terms—breach of the MCP and the characterisation of that breach—and indicated the materials to be considered at the hearing. In context, the two notices together conveyed, with sufficient particularity, both the conduct in issue and the lens through which it would be assessed. That advance clarity is what s 14(1) requires. It enabled the employee to understand, prepare for, and address the case she had to meet.

The second limb was likewise satisfied. There was an HR interview on 10 January 2024 at which the employee explained, in substance, how she came to make Clinic X purchases and why she believed claims under the threshold could be submitted. Thereafter, a three-member DC heard her on 20 March 2024. She reiterated that there had been no doctor consultation, described the items purchased, explained the colleague and clinic-counter context, and indicated her readiness to repay once told her claims were not in order. Nothing in the record suggests she had been prevented from advancing any line she wished to pursue. The hearing was certainly not like a trial, but it was not perfunctory either; it afforded a genuine chance to respond. That is what “opportunity” within s 14(1) contemplates—substance over form.

The third aspect—fair and open-minded consideration—is borne out by the committee’s treatment of the materials and the issuance of written reasons. The DC did not proceed in a conclusory manner. It considered the consolidated record (questionnaire, receipts/appendix, interview account) alongside the explanations given at the DI, and it articulated why it regarded the pattern of claims as incompatible with the MCP and as evidencing, in its view, an adverse mental element. One may disagree with the weight or inferences—I do, for reasons stated later—but for present purposes, only the fact and form of deliberation matter. They demonstrate that Ms C’s case was received and assessed before conclusions were drawn. That sufficed to meet the statutory minimum of consideration under s 14(1).

Impartiality in this setting means a decision taken with an open mind by those tasked to decide, rather than by someone disqualified by interest or predetermination. The committee’s composition—senior personnel from Risk Management (the chair), Group Finance, and Group HR—was disclosed and not challenged for conflict. There was no cogent basis to infer predetermination from the mere fact of seniority or organisational role. Nor does the later approvals architecture, addressed elsewhere, retroactively taint the fairness of the hearing that preceded it. On the record as a whole, I found that the inquiry was conducted, and the decision was reached, without disqualifying bias or closed-mindedness. That is all the statute requires.

The contemporaneous documentation also reinforces compliance with s 14(1). There were kept notes of interview, a convening notice that particularised the charges, and a written DC report with reasons. None of these alone are either necessary or sufficient for the general standard of “due inquiry” to be met. But, taken together, they were probative that the process actually occurred in the way I have described: notice was given, the employee spoke to the case, and the decision-makers turned their minds to what she said before reaching conclusions. That is the practical point of requiring an inquiry: to ensure that the ground of misconduct, if to be relied upon, has been tested through a fair process antecedent to dismissal.

I should also address one point that featured prominently in the parties’ submissions—the decision by Ms A not to convene an Appeal Committee to hear Ms C’s internal appeal. The DF permits an appeal stage, but its non-activation does not, without more, vitiate what came before. Section 14(1) is concerned with the adequacy of the employer’s inquiry prior to founding upon misconduct; it does not mandate a two-tier process or confer a right to appellate rehearing. An employer may choose to provide internal appeals as a matter of governance; that may be relevant context when assessing the overall justness of a dismissal under s 14(2). But the statutory minimum of “due inquiry” is satisfied if, prior to dismissal, the employee had fair notice, a genuine opportunity to be heard, and fair consideration of her case.

For completeness, I address Ms C’s reliance on the appeal stage contemplated in the respondent’s internal framework (ie, the DF). As explained in Annex 3 (see [A.57] et seq), the DF is not a justiciable yardstick in a claim under s 14(2) and cannot recalibrate the statutory content of “due inquiry” (see [71] above). The High Court’s articulation in Long Kim Wing fixes that content, and nothing in that standard suggests a right to any internal appeal; still less does it make the availability of an appeal a constituent element of “due inquiry”. Having found that the pre-appeal process crossed the statutory threshold, the subsequent decision not to convene an internal appeal does not advance Ms C’s procedural complaints.

Notwithstanding my conclusion that the respondent met the standard of “due inquiry”, two qualifications nevertheless tempered the weight I accord the committee’s conclusions. First, although the DC heard the employee and issued reasons, its analysis did not grapple with salient contextual uncertainties—the prevailing understanding of the outpatient policy within the organisation at the material time, the influence of clinic-counter practices and non-itemised invoices on staff behaviour, and the potential for miscommunication about the $200 threshold. Second, its mental-element inference leaned heavily on frequency and patterns without engaging those uncertainties. These were analytical limitations, not procedural defects: they did not vitiate “due inquiry”, which I found to be satisfied, but they did mean I approached the DC’s inferential conclusions with caution when deciding the distinct issue of dishonesty and, if misconduct is proved, whether that supplied “just cause or excuse” for dismissal.

Was Ms C’s dismissal supported by “just cause or excuse”?

The respondent framed the termination as “misconduct” aggravated by dishonesty. Because that reason was recorded in the notice of dismissal, s 27(2)(b) of the ECA placed the burden on the respondent to prove it. My analysis followed two steps. The first was truth: were the material particulars of the stated ground—including the state of mind the respondent chose to allege—proved on the balance of probabilities? The second was sufficiency: even if some wrongdoing is proved, did those proved facts, read in their proper setting and against the employer’s own practice, amount to “just cause or excuse” for ending the employment rather than calling for a lesser penalty. The exercise was de novo. The question was not whether the DC’s decision can be defended; it was whether the evidence before me established the ground the respondent advanced, or some lesser basis that fairly sits within it.

On the first step, the respondent relied chiefly on patterns: counter purchases without consultations, repetition across months, clustering just under the itemisation threshold, and an aggregate quantum it thought high. Those features warranted scrutiny, but they did not, by themselves, prove the state of mind the respondent alleged. Patterns often admit of more than one explanation. Here, they were just as consistent with a cohort misunderstanding shaped by non-itemised invoices and an internal “sub-$200” heuristic as with a deliberate plan to mislead. Where an inculpatory and an exculpatory account are both plausible, the employer must point to affirmative indicators that this employee knew the claims were impermissible and pressed on nonetheless. There was no such indicator in Ms C’s case—no training acknowledgment, no warning she accepted and ignored, no attempt at concealment, and no admission.

The “just-under-$200” clustering was treated by the respondent as a particularly indicative tell. It could have been, but—as with the other patterns relied on by the respondent—it was not automatically probative of deceit. If employees believed, however mistakenly, that non-itemised counter sales below the threshold were claimable, then staying under that threshold was what one would expect of compliant, not evasive, behaviour. For clustering to carry the weight the respondent assigned, there had to be something more: evidence that Ms C knew the threshold did not convert counter sales into benefits, yet used it as cover. The reasons did not identify that “something more”. They did not show that she split purchases to avoid itemisation, re-described items to mask their nature, or took steps to hide what she had done. Clustering, without those qualitative features, was a weak foundation for dishonesty.

The respondent’s approach also assumed clarity of policy at the material time. Its case was that the MCP was clear, accessible, and known. If that were so, the fact that a large number of financially literate staff nonetheless made the same kind of counter-purchase claims would be surprising. The respondent’s answer was to distinguish “dishonest” patterns from those less indicative of dishonesty. But that move sits uneasily with its own premise: if clarity truly prevailed, a single impermissible claim would tell strongly against honesty; repetition should not be necessary to prove knowledge. The need to rely on volume and frequency suggests the clarity assumption was overstated and that something more systemic—a practice aligned to non-itemised receipts and a $200 threshold—was shaping behaviour across the workforce.

The sums involved also matter. This was not a case of large, disguised benefits. The typical claim was modest; the overall quantum for most employees, including Ms C, was not high. Against the very real consequences for regulated financial-sector staff—loss of career, reputation, and future employability—it was difficult to accept that so many would knowingly risk everything for such returns. That did not render dishonesty impossible, but it lowered its probabilistic pull and requires stronger proof of knowledge and intent. The evidence did not provide that strength. There was no documentary sign that Ms C appreciated a prohibition and chose to breach it. Instead, the materials showed a pattern that matches the wider practice and a willingness to repay once told the claims were not in order. On that footing, the inference of dishonesty was not safely drawn.

Recklessness and wilful blindness were advanced in the alternative. Properly understood, those concepts require either recognition of a real risk and proceeding regardless (recklessness) or a conscious decision not to confirm what one strongly suspects (wilful blindness). The evidence did not reach those marks. There was no instance of Ms C being told unambiguously that counter purchases without consultation were non-claimable, nor of her reading a directive to that effect and ignoring it. Her consistent account was reliance on what colleagues and the clinic counter said, measured against a threshold used administratively across the organisation. That account may reflect a failure to check the formal policy carefully; it did not show that she perceived a real risk of non-claimability and pressed on anyway, still less that she shut her eyes to the truth.

Positive features of conduct also cut against adverse mental states. Ms C submitted claims through ordinary channels using the receipts she had. She did not alter documents, backdate forms, seek to bypass checks, or enlist others to support a false narrative. When the review flagged concerns, she accepted that there were no consultations and offered to repay. Those were not the actions of an employee pursuing concealment; they fit an employee who believed she was within bounds and, once corrected, attempted to make amends. None of this was conclusive, but in a case where state of mind was the fulcrum, such features weighed in the balance and made a deliberate intent to deceive less likely on the evidence actually before me.

The DC’s own characterisation of Ms C also sat awkwardly with a finding of dishonesty. It had recorded her as junior and “simple-minded”, following what she had been told by colleagues and the clinic. Its initial view was that a warning and a bonus reduction were appropriate. The escalation to dismissal followed Ms A’s request to reconsider, not the emergence of new inculpatory facts. Where a decision shifts from a non-dismissal sanction to a dishonesty-based termination, one would expect the reasons to identify the additional evidence or analysis now thought decisive. They did not. That sequence suggests uncertainty about the mental element rather than a clear conclusion that Ms C knew the rules and chose to evade them. Thus, on the evidence as a whole, I found that dishonesty, recklessness, and wilful blindness were not proved against Ms C.

That conclusion did not, however, end the inquiry. The evidence supported a lesser wrong: negligently making impermissible claims by relying on practice rather than the formal policy. The notices and the domestic process put the underlying conduct squarely in issue—counter purchases without consultation and the MCP’s scope—and Ms C had a fair chance to address those matters. On the guardrails I have set out (see [79(k)] above), the lesser wrong fairly sits within the same gravamen and may be considered. The question then is sufficiency: does that lesser wrong, read in context and calibrated against the employer’s own settled practice, amount to “just cause or excuse” to terminate employment?

In assessing sufficiency, three features are prominent. First, the systemic context: a widespread practice had taken root around non-itemised receipts and the $200 threshold. That does not excuse negligence, but it explains it. Second, Ms C’s role and record: she was junior, there was no suggestion of prior misconduct, and the committee itself saw mitigation strong enough to warrant non-dismissal before escalation. Third, proportionality across the cohort: other employees with comparable patterns were warned or had bonuses reduced rather than being dismissed. When like cases are treated alike (see [79(l)] above), the sanction for negligent reliance on practice rather than policy points towards a lesser penalty, not dismissal.

I appreciated that even Ms C’s lesser wrongdoing could have eroded the trust between her and the respondent and potentially justified dismissal. However, I did not think that this was particularly strong justification in the circumstances. The respondent’s evidence of the grouping exercise showed that persons with broadly comparable spend patterns in Groups C1 and C2 were not uniformly dismissed. The respondent’s own stance was that dishonesty triggered termination; absent dishonesty, warning and bonus consequences were within range. It would be difficult to justify singling out Ms C for dismissal on a lesser basis when others with similar conduct profiles received lesser sanctions. Parity is not a veto, but it is a cross-check on proportionality. In this case, it indicated that dismissal was a step too far for negligent reliance on practice rather than policy.

Drawing these threads together, I found that the respondent had not proved the mental element it chose to allege, and that while a lesser wrong was established—negligent submission of impermissible claims through reliance on practice rather than formal policy—that lesser wrong did not, in the circumstances and on the respondent’s own evidence of sanction triggers and cohort treatment, amount to “just cause or excuse” for dismissal. The claim under s 14(2) therefore succeeded. The appropriate consequence was compensation (as Ms C did not seek reinstatement), assessed under the heads and guardrails I have outlined elsewhere (see Annex 3, [A.153]–[A.160] below).

Was Ms C entitled to be compensated for both “loss of income” and “harm”?

The remedy follows the wrong: it is not punitive, and compensation under s 14(2) seeks to place Ms C so far as money can, in the pecuniary position she would have been in had she not been dismissed without just cause or excuse, while separately recognising the non-pecuniary harm of such a dismissal. The heads are distinct. “Loss of income” addresses the earnings shortfall proximately caused by the wrongful dismissal, net of salary-in-lieu and mitigation and subject to the cap. “Harm” was a conventional award, adjusted by listed factors but carefully separated from any items already captured as income loss.

On “loss of income”, the key question was the period of unemployment properly attributable to the fact and manner of dismissal without just cause or excuse. The starting point was the dismissal date (24 May 2024), and the end-point was when Ms C, acting reasonably, re-established earnings at a level comparable to her pre-dismissal role (or until the three-month statutory cap on compensation was reached: see para 2 of the Second Schedule to the EC Regulations).

On the evidence before me, Ms C remained unemployed for a sustained period—far more than the three months after the end of her contractual notice period—and adduced contemporaneous proof of difficulty securing new employment as a result of having been dismissed by the respondent. That reflected active and sustained efforts rather than any failure to mitigate, and it explained the continued absence of income as a consequence of the dismissal. There was no contention that she turned down suitable offers or otherwise acted unreasonably. I therefore awarded Ms C the full three-month period in which she claimed to have suffered lost income as a result of the dismissal: $4,333 × 3, or $12,999.

No deduction was made for the notice given and salary in lieu of notice already paid by the respondent because, as explained in Annex 3 (see [A.153] et seq below), compensation under s 14(2) does not replicate what Ms C would have earned had the contract simply run its course; it addresses the earnings shortfall proximately caused by the fact and manner of a dismissal without just cause or excuse. On that approach, the compensable window was the post-notice period during which the wrongful dismissal impaired her ability to secure comparable work. Salary in-lieu, by contrast, was consideration for bringing the contract to an end without service of notice and related to the notice period itself. Moreover, there was no temporal overlap. It thus followed that, even though Ms C received salary-in-lieu for the notice period, it did not answer or reduce the post-notice income shortfall I found.

I turn to “harm”. As set out fully in Annex 3, I took a conventional base of two months as the starting point (see para 5 of the Second Schedule to the EC Regulations). That base recognises the non-pecuniary injury inherent in being dismissed without just cause or excuse—the affront to dignity, the reputational sting of the recorded reason, and the disruption to one’s working life not captured by wage arithmetic—while promoting steadiness and comparability across cases. It also accorded with how the respondent itself framed the “base amount” in submissions: as the unadjusted anchor before case-specific factors were applied. On these facts, there was stigma in the reason recorded, though dishonesty was not proved; there were not, in my view, any “aggravating factors”. The internal process crossed the statutory floor and there was no public humiliation or gratuitous censure.

However, I found there to be a “mitigating factor” in the respondent’s favour. Although dishonesty, recklessness, and wilful blindness were not established, Ms C’s conduct contributed to the sequence of events that culminated in the dismissal and it was therefore proper to make a one-month reduction to reflect Ms C’s wrongdoing in negligently submitting impermissible claims by relying on practice rather than the formal policy. The “harm” award was therefore fixed at $4,333.

Was Ms C entitled to a performance bonus for work done in 2023?

The final question concerned Ms C’s 2023 performance bonus. On the evidence, I was not satisfied that Ms C had an accrued contractual entitlement to a 2023 performance bonus. The governing documents framed the bonus as discretionary, subject to individual and firm performance and applicable risk-and-conduct considerations. There was no proof that, for 2023, the respondent had committed by word or practice to pay a particular quantum (or any quantum) to Ms C.

I also did not find that the discretion was exercised in bad faith or for an improper purpose. It is true that I have found dishonesty not proved and dismissal unjustified. But the internal materials showed the DC, at first instance, proposing a warning with a 100% reduction of the 2023 bonus. That proposal—whatever one makes of its ultimate calibration—was at least recognisably tied to the respondent’s framework that treats conduct-related concerns in the relevant year as a risk factor in bonus setting. Given my finding that Ms C negligently submitted impermissible claims by relying on practice rather than policy, it cannot be said that conduct was an extraneous consideration for the 2023 exercise.

For completeness, I should also note that my finding that Ms C had been dismissed without just cause or excuse under s 14(2) did not, by itself, translate into a right to a performance bonus for the preceding year; the two inquiries address different questions. A prior-year bonus can, in principle, form part of the compensable loss of income if it was reasonably certain to be paid out but for the dismissal, would have been received within the compensable window, and its non-payment was causally linked to the dismissal. That route was not available for Ms C for three reasons. First, causation: on the respondent’s materials, the 2023 bonus would have been set at zero for conduct reasons even absent dismissal (see [29] above). Second, certainty: the scheme remained discretionary and no evidence showed a near-inevitable payout. Third, cap: the full three-month cap was already exhausted by Ms C’s proved losses. On any view, then, the 2023 bonus could not be added as part of her “loss of income” under s 14(2). The claim for a 2023 performance bonus was therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

Annex 1: Procedural history of all related matters

Annex 2: Cognisance taken of the related cases in each of the cases before me

The tribunal’s decision in Ms X’s case

The lack of a joinder and the six cases before me

Annex 3: An analysis of the law on dismissals in Singapore

Wrongful dismissal at common law

The meaning of “wrongful dismissal” in Singapore outside the common law

The nature of a “wrongful dismissal” claim before the ECT

The nature of a “wrongful dismissal” claim before the courts

Substantive protections against dismissal accorded by s 14(2) of the EA

Procedural protections accorded by the law in respect of dismissal

The power to order reinstatement

Compensation for a successful claim under s 14(2) of the EA