Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Noor b in Abdullah [2016] SGHC 257

On 17 February 2015, in Committal Hearing No 154 of 2011, the accused was committed to stand trial in the High Court on 15 charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). At the trial before me on 18 October 2016, the prosecution proceeded on the first charge, which is punishable by death. That charge (“the Charge”) was as follows:

After the Charge was read to the accused, he pleaded guilty. However, s 227(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) states that, where the offence is punishable with death, the court shall not record the plea of guilty unless evidence is led by the prosecution to prove its case at trial. Accordingly, I called upon the prosecution to give evidence to prove the Charge.

The prosecution gave evidence by way of a statement of agreed facts (“SAF”) to be used as a formal admission under s 267 of the CPC. Counsel for the accused confirmed that the accused agreed to the contents of the SAF and its use under s 267 of the CPC. I set out below the provisions of s 267 of the CPC:

I was satisfied that the SAF may be used as evidence in the trial as the admissions therein were made by counsel for the accused on behalf of the latter. Accordingly, I admitted the SAF in evidence. The contents of the SAF are as follows:

Upon admission of the SAF in evidence, the prosecution rested its case. I found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case and called upon the accused to give his defence in accordance with s 230(1)(m) of the CPC. The accused elected to remain silent. Thereafter, I found that the evidence before me was sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt and convicted him of the Charge.

The prosecution tendered a certificate by the Public Prosecutor stating that the accused had substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau in disrupting drug trafficking activities within or outside Singapore. After hearing submissions by counsel, I agreed that the evidence showed that the accused’s involvement in the offence was restricted to transporting, sending or delivering the controlled drug which was the subject of the Charge. Accordingly, by operation of s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, this court had a discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment with caning instead of the death penalty.

After considering the accused’s antecedents and his counsel’s plea in mitigation, I found that this was an appropriate case to exercise the discretion to impose the lesser punishment. Accordingly, I sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with effect from the date of his arrest on 12 October 2011 and to the mandatory minimum of 15 strokes of the cane.