High Court · Decided 22 January 2020
Sun Electric Pte Ltd and another v Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 18 · Case no. Suit No 200 of 2016 (Summons Nos 4280 of 2019 and 5557 of 2019)
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] This was an application by Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd (“Menrva”) and Mr Chan Lap Fung Bernard (“Mr Chan”) (collectively, “the applicants”) who sought, among other things, a Mareva injunction against Sun Electric Power Pte Ltd (“SEPPL”), Sun Electric Pte Ltd (“SEPL”), Sun Electric (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“SESPL”), Sun Electric Energy Assets Pte Ltd (“SEEAPL”), Sun Electric Digital Stream Ltd (“SEDSL”) and Mr Matthew Peloso (“Mr Peloso”) (collectively, “the respondents”), as well as various ancillary disclosure orders against the same parties. The applicants had found out about the impending sale of a majority stake in SEEAPL to an as-yet unidentified foreign investor and believed this to be a potential act of dissipation.
- [2]
[2] This matter was heard over four separate hearings. At the final hearing on 22 October 2019, I granted the applicants the disclosure orders (“the Disclosure Orders”). I now give my grounds of decision. The grounds primarily concern disclosure orders that are granted ancillary to a Mareva injunction. I also set out my reasons for dismissing the respondents’ application for leave to appeal and a stay of execution of the Disclosure Orders.
Facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] SEPL, SEPPL, SEEAPL, SEDSL and SESPL are part of the Sun Electric Group (“the SE Group”). These companies engage in, inter alia, business development, marketing for rooftop solar systems and supplies of clean electrical power. SEPPL was incorporated on 17 September 2013. Both SEPL and SEEAPL were incorporated in 2014. In 2015, SESPL was founded as SEPL’s subsidiary. The last corporate entity, SEDSL, is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”). SEDSL was the only entity unrepresented in the present proceedings.
- [4]
[4] Mr Peloso is the founder of the SE Group. At the time of the dispute, he was the sole director of SEPL, SESPL, SEPPL, and SEEAPL.
The underlying claim
- [5]
[5] Both SEPL and SEPPL were the plaintiffs in Suit No 200 of 2016. This suit involved a claim against the applicants for breach of a consultancy agreement (“the consultancy agreement”) and breach of various duties of care. Menrva, one of the two defendants in Suit 200 of 2016, counterclaimed against SEPL for fees owed under the consultancy agreement. Vinodh Coomaraswamy J’s decision is reported in Sun Electric Pte Ltd and another v Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd and another [2018] SGHC 264 (“the liability judgment”).
- [6]
[6] The facts giving rise to the underlying claims and counterclaim in Suit 200 of 2016 have been set out extensively at [1]–[26] of the liability judgment. I will not repeat them here. It suffices to note that the Energy Market Authority of Singapore (“EMA”) had established the Enhanced Forward Sales Contract Scheme (“the Scheme”) to facilitate participation in Singapore’s electric futures market. SEPL was accepted as a participant in the Scheme. SEPL later engaged Menrva as a consultant pursuant to the consultancy agreement.
- [7]
[7] Under the consultancy agreement, Menrva was obliged to provide Mr Chan’s services to SEPL (liability judgment at [1]). Two of the legal issues were (a) whether Menrva had breached the consultancy agreement and (b) whether SEPL was contractually liable to pay Menrva certain fees under the same agreement (liability judgment at [27]). Coomaraswamy J held largely in favour of the defendants to the claim, who are also the applicants in the present case. He held for Menrva in the counterclaim, leaving damages to be assessed (at [153] and [154]).
- [9]
[9] Although the respondents have not sought leave to appeal against my decision to grant the applicants the Mareva injunction on 24 September 2019, I set out the matters that transpired during all four hearings. These also encompass my reasons for granting the Mareva injunction.
Judicial Management proceedings
- [10]
[10] It must be highlighted that one of the respondents, SEPPL, the second plaintiff in the suit, had become the subject of judicial management proceedings (“JM proceedings”) (see Originating Summon 1060 of 2019). This was made known to the applicants on 21 August 2019 through the disclosure of Mr Peloso’s affidavit in support of the JM proceedings. Mr Peloso applied for SEPPL to be placed under judicial management on two grounds. First, that SEPPL was unable to pay its debts. Second, that the interests of SEPPL’s shareholders would be better served through the winding down of its operations.
- [11]
[11] Based on Mr Peloso’s affidavit, SEPPL’s issued share capital was S$45,605,994. As of the date of Mr Peloso’s affidavit, SEPPL’s cash on hand amounted to a meagre $93,599.64. In his affidavit, Mr Peloso claimed that SEPPL’s major creditors were SESPL and SEPL, various customers of SEPPL, Wong Partnership LLP, and an entity known as Kashish. Kashish was listed as SEPPL’s largest creditor with an outstanding debt of S$927,594.61. The role of Kashish in the present proceedings was significant and I will explain the relevance of this in greater detail below. As of the date of the final hearing on 22 October 2019, judicial managers had not yet been appointed. The applicants had stressed that judicial management applications (“JM applications”) were not always successful and that in the meantime, SEPPL should be restrained from dissipating its assets.
The 12 September hearing
- [13]
[13] At the inter partes hearing on 12 September 2019, the applicants sought, inter alia, the following orders:
(c) various ancillary disclosure orders.
- [14]
[14] On the basis of the evidence before me, I was inclined to grant both the Mareva injunction and Disclosure Orders at the first hearing on 12 September 2019. However, for reasons which will be made clear, both the Mareva injunction and the Disclosure Orders were not granted that day but only at the subsequent hearings held on 24 September 2019 and 22 October 2019.
- [15]
[15] To obtain Mareva relief against a party to the suit, a plaintiff must establish a good arguable case on the merits and a real risk that the defendant will dissipate its assets to frustrate the enforcement of an anticipated judgment of the court (Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar and another v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 558 (“Bouvier”) at [36]). The issue of there being a “good arguable case” did not arise because the plaintiff in the counterclaim, Menrva, had successfully established its counterclaim against SEPL, with judgment having been entered.
- [17]
[17] Applying the test in Teo Siew Har, I was of the view that the assets of the third parties were, on a good arguable standard, the assets of the defendant in the counterclaim, SEPL. It is not necessary for me to elaborate further as the respondents did not seek leave to appeal against this point (see [9] above).
- [18]
[18] The parties’ main point of contention at the four hearings was the existence of a “real risk” of asset dissipation.
The RCMA Injunction
- [20]
[20] As part of the same Scheme established by the EMA, SEPPL had entered into an agreement with RCMA. Pursuant to this, RCMA agreed to perform certain obligations undertaken by SEPPL. SEPPL was to receive 70% of the payouts made by the EMA and RCMA the remaining 30%. Collectively, these were known as the “FSC Payments”.
- [21]
[21] A dispute arose between RCMA and SEPPL. RCMA commenced Suit 191 of 2018 to recover its share of the FSC Payments under the agreement. Subsequently, on 26 February 2018, RCMA obtained the RCMA injunction on the following terms:
- [22]
[22] The applicants contended that there had been a blatant disregard of the RCMA injunction. This was evident from various transfers out of SEPPL’s OCBC Account (“the OCBC Account”) made in direct contravention of the terms of the RCMA Injunction. This in turn evidenced a “real risk” of dissipation of assets.
- [23]
[23] It is undisputed that there was initially a certain sum of money in the OCBC Account. The OCBC Account was a joint account specifically opened to receive money under the FSC Scheme. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between RCMA and SEPPL, both parties were joint signatories to the OCBC Account.
- [24]
[24] After the RCMA Injunction was imposed by the court, there were at least three transfers or withdrawals from the OCBC Account for various purposes. I highlight two of the more significant ones, which demonstrated a “real risk” of dissipation. The first was made on 24 September 2018, where a sum of S$1,500,000 was withdrawn from the OCBC Account. Mr Peloso attempted to explain this withdrawal in the following manner:
- [26]
[26] Thereafter, sometime between 27 November 2018 to 17 December 2018, money was again taken out of the OCBC Account, in apparent contravention of the RCMA Injunction. This time, the entire sum of money in the OCBC Account was transferred to a DBS Account held by SEPPL (“the DBS account”). The sum amounted to approximately S$6 million. This sum of money was subsequently garnished by an UAE entity, known as “Kashish”, in highly suspicious circumstances.
- [27]
[27] In January 2019, a mere one month after the sum was transferred from the OCBC Account to the DBS Account, Kashish commenced proceedings in Singapore against SEPPL for the sum of $6,995,755.78 in Suit 74 of 2019. The losses were allegedly incurred by SEPPL through trading under various contracts for differences (“CFDs”) that SEPPL had entered into with Kashish from 2016 to 2018.
- [28]
[28] As it turned out, after the commencement of the proceedings, SEPPL decided not to enter an appearance in Suit 74 of 2019. This was apparently done on the advice of its solicitors. Consequently, Kashish obtained default judgment for the sum of S$6,995,755.78.
- [29]
[29] The evidence showed that Kashish had found out about this sum of money through Mr Peloso himself. This was by way of a letter sent by SEPPL through Mr Peloso on 3 December 2018. This letter was sent about one month before Kashish commenced proceedings against SEPPL.
- [30]
[30] The letter reads as follows:
- [32]
[32] Yet, as it later emerged, all of the money in the OCBC Account found its way into the hands of Kashish.
- [34]
[34] I found the manner in which Kashish obtained SEPPL’s DBS Account details highly troubling. According to Mr Peloso, he himself had informed Kashish of the DBS Bank Account number. On 9 January 2019, Mr Peloso met with Mr Arpan Saha (“Mr Saha”), Kashish’s Account Manager. During this meeting, Mr Peloso claimed that Mr Saha had asked him for “proof of funds” that SEPPL could satisfy the default judgment. In response, Mr Peloso disclosed the DBS Account number and the fact that the account held approximately $6 million in funds. It was not made clear to me why it was necessary for Mr Peloso to inform Mr Saha of the DBS Account number.
- [35]
[35] It was undisputed that the money that was removed from the OCBC Account to the DBS Account was not ultimately replaced by SEPPL. In other words, there was a net depletion of approximately S$6 million from the OCBC Account. This had been done despite Mr Peloso having stated in his letter to Kashish that “the money in the account cannot be moved due to the [RCMA Injunction]”.
- [36]
[36] Mr Peloso’s explanation for the above events did not withstand scrutiny. He claimed that Kashish was a legitimate commercial entity. He cited the fact that Kashish’s website listed it as a “wholly-owned subsidiary of a publicly listed company on the Bombay Stock Exchange” (a company known as “Kushal Ltd”). The relatively large losses suffered, totalling approximately S$6.9 million, was explained as having been incurred under several separate CFDs. The losses were also said to have been sustained over a period of 11 separate quarters.
- [37]
[37] Despite Mr Peloso’s explanation, there was no evidence on how or why SEPPL entered into a commercial relationship with Kashish, an UAE entity. Details of the CFDs were not provided. I was not given an explanation as to why SEPPL continued entering into new CFDs with Kashish despite continuously suffering from such large losses over several quarters. In my judgment, the lack of evidence was wholly unsatisfactory. Given the above circumstances, I was satisfied that there was a real risk of dissipation of assets.
Transfer of patents
- [38]
[38] About six months after the liability judgment was released, SEPL transferred eight of its 11 patents (or pending patent applications) to SEDSL, a BVI entity. These patents were collectively sold by SEPL for S$80,000 and exclusively licensed back to entities in the SE Group. The respondents failed to produce the terms of these licenses. No explanation was furnished regarding why the patents were sold at this price. In this connection, it is worth noting that a much larger sum of $1.2m had been spent registering the patents (see below at [43]). I thus inferred that there was a real risk of dissipation.
S$16.8 million loss
- [39]
[39] The final point concerned the SE Group’s losses of about S$16.8 million.
- [40]
[40] Mr Peloso claimed that SE Group entities earned approximately S$16.8 million in revenue from their share of FSC Payments under the Scheme. It was unchallenged that the payments were received in SEPPL’s OCBC Account. The applicants submitted that there was no explanation as to how this large sum of money was used.
- [41]
[41] Based on SEPPL’s unaudited management accounts, its total cash and current assets, as at 31 July 2019, amounted to S$287,295.29, of which only S$93,599.64 was in the form of cash in bank accounts. According to Mr Peloso, SEPPL’s creditors included the following entities:
(a) Kashish, for the sum of $927,594.61;
(b) SESPL, for the sum of S$635,647.62;
(c) SEPL, for the sum of S$15,800.00;
(d) 40 customers of SEPPL, who had placed security deposits with SEPPL, for the total sum of $287,138.24 (the identities of the customers allegedly constituted commercially sensitive and confidential information and were therefore not disclosed); and
(e) WongPartnership LLP, for the sum of S$139,145.14.
- [42]
[42] I have expressed my disquiet as regards the Kashish matter. Apart from Kashish, I noted that SEPPL’s major creditors were primarily related entities who were also parties to the present proceedings.
- [44]
[44] I was satisfied that the manner in which part of the $16.8 million had been spent gave rise to a real risk of dissipation.
- [45]
[45] There were several reasons for this.
- [47]
[47] Second, it was clear that a large amount of the expenses listed by Mr Peloso in his affidavit for SEPPL was incurred by other entities in the SE Group. However, there was a noticeable omission by Mr Peloso to mention any reason why the sums that were received by SEPPL in the OCBC Account ended up being used by other entities in the SE Group.
Proposal for payment into court
- [49]
[49] As stated above, I was prepared to grant the Mareva injunction and the Disclosure Orders based on the evidence before me. However, the respondents’ counsel, Ms Koh Swee Yen (“Ms Koh”), informed me of a potential deal with a foreign investor to acquire a controlling majority stake in SEEAPL. A non-binding sheet had been signed and “definitive agreements” were to be signed by mid-September 2019. Final completion was supposed to take place by the end of September 2019.
- [50]
[50] I should state that the applicants had claimed that the impending sale of shares in SEEAPL was also evidence of a real risk of dissipation. In this respect, the applicants relied on, inter alia, the respondent’s failure to disclose the identity of the foreign investor or any other details of the proposed sale.
- [51]
[51] One option that I proposed was for some part of the sum received from the sale (the quantum of which had yet to be decided) to be paid into court. At this stage, it was not entirely clear how much money the SE Group would receive from the sale. The proposal would obviate the need for the Mareva injunction and the Disclosure Orders. In the circumstances, I adjourned the matter to 16 September 2019. This was to allow Ms Koh to take her clients’ instructions and consider the workability of the proposal.
The 16 September hearing
- [52]
[52] During the hearing, Ms Koh informed me that Mr Peloso had conferred with the other stakeholders in the SE Group. The SE Group was willing to set aside “cash consideration” of up to $1,605,452.53 from the sale of the majority stake in SEEAPL by way of payment into court.
The 24 September hearing
- [56]
[56] On 24 September 2019, the terms of the Mareva injunction were finalised. During the hearing, counsel for the respondents, Mr Daniel Liu (“Mr Liu”), informed me that the foreign investor had become concerned about contingent liabilities arising from the Mareva injunction. Mr Liu told me that the initial amount of cash consideration proposed by the foreign investor had not taken into account these contingent liabilities.
- [57]
[57] In response, I informed parties that I would make the Disclosure Orders if the proposed acquisition did not go ahead and the Enjoined Sum was not paid into court.
The 22 October hearing
- [58]
[58] On 22 October 2019, I granted the Disclosure Orders which formed the subject of the respondents’ application for leave to appeal.
- [59]
[59] As it turned out, the proposed deal for the acquisition of SEEAPL’s majority stake did not go through. Apparently, RCMA had found out the foreign investor’s identity and alerted it to the Mareva injunction. However, Mr Liu acknowledged that it was “still possible that the deal may go through” in the future.
- [61]
[61] The full set of Disclosure Orders were as follows:
My decision on the Disclosure Orders
- [63]
[63] On 22 October 2019, the respondents sought leave to appeal against my decision to grant the Disclosure Orders ancillary to the Mareva injunction. The respondents also sought a stay of execution.
Law on Disclosure Obligations
Preliminary remarks
- [65]
[65] I begin by reminding myself of the four important points made by Justice Mummery in the ground breaking decision of TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra and another [1992] 1 WLR 231 at 241:
- [66]
[66] In my view, in granting Mareva relief (including ancillary disclosure orders) regard must be had to how wily a defendant has been in devising schemes to dissipate, dispose or put its assets out of reach to evade judgment. To meet the objectives of Mareva relief and confront the challenges posed by devious schemes, the Mareva relief must remain flexible and be capable of being tailored accordingly.
- [67]
[67] The CA in Petromar Energy Resources Pte Ltd v Glencore International AG [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1152 (“Petromar”) set out the purpose of disclosure orders. In brief, disclosure orders are merely ancillary to a Mareva injunction for the plaintiff to determine the location of a defendant’s assets and take appropriate steps to preserve them pending the trial (at [21]). The CA elaborated on disclosure orders in Bouvier at [101]:
- [68]
[68] A recent decision by Andrew Ang SJ in Sea Trucks Offshore Ltd and others v Roomans, Jacobus Johannes and others [2019] 3 SLR 836 (“Sea Trucks”) was instructive. The plaintiffs had obtained a Mareva injunction against two defendants. The injunction prohibited the two defendants from dealing with their assets up to a certain value. The two defendants filed affidavits but only partially disclosed their assets. Thereafter, the defendants applied to vary their disclosure obligations on the basis that the disclosed sums were sufficient for the purpose of the Mareva injunction. In dismissing the application to vary the disclosure obligations, Ang SJ set out several important principles in relation to ancillary disclosure obligations:
(a) A plaintiff is given no interest, security or priority in assets that are the subject of a Mareva injunction. Thus, the only way to allow the plaintiff to effectively police the Mareva injunction is by giving the plaintiff sufficient information about the location and details of the defendant’s assets (at [45]).
(b) As a general rule, a defendant will be required to make disclosure of all its assets even though the assets restrained are limited to those of a certain value (at [52]).
(d) It is often the case that a Mareva injunction contains exceptions that allow the defendant to apply some of the restrained sums of money towards ordinary expenses and legal fees. Thus, where the defendant only discloses assets that are equal in value or slightly above that restrained by the Mareva injunction, this could reduce the injunction’s efficacy (at [49]).
(e) As a wide disclosure obligation is typically required to give a Mareva injunction teeth, such widely-phrased disclosure obligations are the norm rather than the exception, and have been described as being the “standard terms” on which a disclosure obligation is made (at [52]).
- [69]
[69] Ang SJ stated that it is only where disclosure orders go further than requiring the defendant to disclose all its assets that the court has found such obligations to be overly onerous (at [53]), such as in Wallace Kevin James v Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd [1998] 1 SLR (R) 61 (“Wallace”) and Petromar.
- [70]
[70] In Petromar, Glencore had obtained an ex parte interim Mareva injunction against Petromar, together with ancillary disclosure orders. The CA determined that there was an abuse of the ancillary orders for disclosure, as it appeared that Glencore was not merely seeking to ascertain the amount of money in Petromar’s bank account, but also to determine the movement of money to and from the bank account to assist it in its claims against Petromar and another entity, Metro (at [21]). Two further observations may be made about Petromar. The first is that the disclosure orders had been granted by the Judge below at an early stage in the proceedings, indeed on the date the action was commenced. The second is that the disclosure orders were granted on an ex parte basis. In this regard, the court declared that there was no reason why such extensive orders could not have been granted at an inter partes hearing instead (at [19]).
- [74]
[74] The above cases concerned disclosure orders that were granted pre-judgment. I now turn to examine decisions involving post-judgment Mareva injunctions and disclosure orders, given that the present case involved the grant of a post-judgment Mareva injunction and ancillary disclosure orders.
- [75]
[75] Judith Prakash J (as she then was) held in Hitachi Leasing (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Vincent Ambrose and another [2001] 1 SLR(R) 762 (“Hitachi Leasing”) that the two conditions for the issue of a post-judgment Mareva injunction are as follows. First, a real risk of the debtor dissipating or disposing of assets with the intention of depriving the creditor of any satisfaction of its debt. Second, that the injunction must act as an aid to execution (at [19]). Hitachi Leasing did not, however, concern disclosure orders. Hitachi Leasing was cited with approval by the CA in The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR (also known as Jugoimport-SDPR) v Westacre Investments Inc and other appeals [2016] 5 SLR 372 at [120].
- [76]
[76] Citing Gidrxslme Shipping Co Ltd v Tantomar-Transportes Marittimos Lda [1995] 1 WLR 299 (“Gidrxslme Shipping”), Belinda Ang J in Astro Nusantara International BV and others v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and others and another matter [2016] 2 SLR 737 noted at [89] that a post-arbitral award Mareva injunction could be made as an aid to execution on the basis that there was a real risk that the party against whom the award had been made may dispose of its assets to avoid execution.
- [78]
[78] Colman J took into account considerations such as the charterers claiming not to have any assets in England and the existence of outstanding and unsatisfied arbitral awards against them (at 311–312):
- [80]
[80] In Vitol SA v Capri Marine Limited and others [2010] EWHC 458 (Comm), Justice Tomlinson elaborated on the purpose of post-judgment disclosure orders at [37]:
(c) Different considerations apply between pre and post-judgment situations. In a post-judgment context, it is just and convenient that the judgment creditor should normally have all the information needed to levy execution of the judgment anywhere in the world (per Colman J in Gidrxslme Shipping at p 312EF).
- [81]
[81] Prakash J (as she then was) observed in R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG [2014] 3 SLR 166 that “[t]he language of s 4(10) of the [CLA] is very similar to that of s 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981” (at [44]). It has been recognised that s 4(10) of the CLA is the source of the statutory power to grant interlocutory relief, including Mareva injunctions (see [45]). Thus, the power to grant disclosure orders ancillary to a Mareva injunction, like the power to grant a Mareva injunction, originates from s 4(10) of the CLA.
Analysis
- [82]
[82] I set out the various orders of the Mareva injunction granted on 24 September 2019:
- [83]
[83] Apart from the above, the Mareva injunction contained the usual exceptions and terms.
- [84]
[84] As mentioned above at [61], there were five separate categories of Disclosure Orders:
(d) the Kashish Disclosure Orders; and
General
- [85]
[85] I first detail some of the broader reasons for granting the Disclosure Orders before turning to more specific considerations.
- [86]
[86] In my judgment, all the Disclosure Orders granted were necessary to police the Mareva injunction. I elaborate below at [91]–[108] on how the Disclosure Orders were necessary to police the Mareva injunction.
- [87]
[87] The next point is that the present case was unlike both Wallace and Petromar. The present case involved disclosure orders granted at a late stage in the proceedings, after liability had been established but before damages had been assessed. Both the disclosure orders in Wallace and Petromar had been granted at an early stage of proceedings. Further, there was no indication, as in Petromar, that the disclosure orders were sought for an extraneous purpose. In my judgment, the primary reason the respondents sought the accompanying disclosure orders was to police the Mareva injunction. Further, unlike Petromar, the disclosure orders here were granted only after four inter partes hearings. Parties here had every opportunity to be heard.
- [89]
[89] SEPPL’s assets were listed in Mr Peloso’s affidavit in support of its JM application (see above at [11]), but these consisted only of two patents and a sum of money. Moreover, there was no valuation attached to these two patents. Further, the respondents failed to point to the existence of any other liquid assets in Mr Peloso’s fourth affidavit. This case was unlike Sea Trucks, where the defendants had at least provided partial disclosure indicating the availability of a certain amount of assets. Here, it was not at all known whether there would be sufficient assets to satisfy the contingent liability.
Worldwide Disclosure Order
RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders
- [94]
[94] Given the width of the Mareva injunction, I found that the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders did not go beyond the assets restrained, and were therefore necessary for its policing. The width of the Mareva injunction becomes apparent upon examination of its precise terms.
- [97]
[97] In brief, the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders required the respondents to disclose the reasons SEPPL transferred a sum of about S$6 million from the joint OCBC Account to the DBS Account, as well as full details of SEPPL’s trading losses with Kashish, and how Kashish came to find out about the details of the sum of money in SEPPL’s DBS Account.
- [101]
[101] There were other reasons why I believed the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders to be justified.
- [102]
[102] Apart from the standard disclosure orders, the court has the power to make additional orders against a party that is the subject of a Mareva injunction to give discovery and answer interrogatories. The disclosure orders assist in, among other things, (a) determining the existence, nature and location of the respondents’ assets or of proceeds of fraud; and (b) clarifying questions of title concerning assets (Singapore Civil Procedure 2020 vol 1 (Chua Lee Ming gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th Ed, 2020) at para 29/1/69; see also Civil Procedure: Volume II (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at para 15-74). Although the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders were labelled as “disclosure” orders, they were also in effect interrogatories. In my judgment, both orders were necessary to achieve the above two objectives, given the evidential difficulty in determining the nature of the interest in the S$6 million that was garnished by Kashish.
- [103]
[103] In Lyu Yan, the plaintiff had opened a private wealth account with BNP Paribas and sought to transfer US$3m in RMB from her personal RMB account in China to one of her personal bank accounts in Singapore through the assistance of the defendants. As it turned out, the bulk of the plaintiff’s money disappeared (at [11]) and the plaintiff accordingly sought various orders pending trial. The plaintiff was granted a Worldwide Mareva injunction (at [14]). Crucially, the defendants were made to state on affidavit what had happened to the money initially transferred to their bank accounts (at [14(c)]). This question was presumably to assist in determining the location of the plaintiff’s assets to aid the policing of the Mareva injunction. In my judgment, the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders served a similar function. They were directed at determining the location of assets that potentially fell within the scope of the Mareva injunction.
- [105]
[105] Finally, it must be noted that both Orders were not onerous obligations. The Orders required only information readily available and entirely within Mr Peloso’s personal knowledge. After all, Mr Peloso had acknowledged that he had provided Kashish with the DBS Account number from which the sum of money was garnished. No prejudice would be occasioned if the respondents were required to comply with the RCMA and Kashish Disclosure Orders. Both orders must be seen in the light of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the transfer of money from the OCBC Account to the DBS Account, as well as the insufficient evidence concerning Kashish.
FSC Disclosure Order
Acquisition Disclosure Order
Non-compliance with the Practice Directions
- [109]
[109] The respondents submitted that the Disclosure Orders were wider than the orders set out in Form 7 of Appendix A of the PD. According to para 42(3) of the PD, Form 7 must be used unless the Court considers that there is “good reason” for adopting a different form. Based on the reasons set out above at [85]–[108], I was of the view that there were good reasons for the departure from the usual form.
Conclusion on the Disclosure Orders
- [111]
[111] For the above reasons, I granted the applicants the Disclosure Orders.
My decision on the application for leave to appeal
- [112]
[112] On 1 November 2019, the respondents filed Summons No 5537 of 2019 seeking leave to appeal against my decision on 22 October 2019. A hearing was fixed for 5 December 2019. On this date, counsel for the applicants, Ms Sia, informed me that the applicants had discovered that assets had been dissipated in breach of the Mareva injunction. Ms Sia sought to tender an affidavit detailing the same. I allowed the admission of the affidavit. I also permitted the respondents to file a reply affidavit and adjourned the hearing to 17 December 2019. Both parties filed written submissions on the question of leave to appeal.
- [113]
[113] On 17 December 2019, I refused the respondents’ application for leave to appeal.
- [114]
[114] The principles for granting leave to appeal are well established (see Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 (“Lee Kuan Yew”) at [16]). An applicant must establish one or more of the following grounds:
(a) a prima facie case of error;
(b) a question of general principle to be decided for the first time; or
(c) a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage.
- [115]
[115] The respondents made two broad submissions.
- [116]
[116] First, the respondents contended that my decision on 22 October 2019 disclosed a prima facie error as the Disclosure Orders went “over and above what [was] necessary for policing the mareva [sic] injunction”. This was for the following reasons. The respondents argued that the Disclosure Orders substantially departed from the standard form set out in Form 7 of the PD. As I have explained, each of the Disclosure Orders was co-extensive with the assets restrained under the Mareva injunction. In particular, Orders 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii) restrained the respondents from removing their assets on a worldwide basis. As an additional ground, disclosure orders granted ancillary to a post-judgment Mareva injunction served a secondary purpose of acting as aids to execution. Thus, the Disclosure Orders were also justified on this basis. As for the point on the departure from Form 7 of the PD, there was nothing which prevented me from departing from Form 7, so long as I was of the view that there were good reasons to do so.
- [118]
[118] Second, the respondents submitted that there was a question of general principle to be decided for the first time and a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage (ie, both limbs (b) and (c) of the test in Lee Kuan Yew). The question posed was this: in circumstances where non-parties to the underlying suit have been joined solely for the purposes of injunctive relief, what is the precise scope of ancillary disclosure orders that can and should be granted against such non-parties?
- [121]
[121] In respect of the latter orders, the applicants submitted that there was, in effect, no live question to deal with as these disclosure orders were not truly directed at the third parties to the suit. The applicants submitted that the additional orders under para 1(b) of the Disclosure Orders related to SEPPL, which was a party to the underlying suit.
- [122]
[122] In the main, I accepted this submission. This was an alternative reason to the reason stated at [119] for dismissing the application for leave to appeal.
- [124]
[124] Given the above, there was no question of general principle to be decided for the first time or question of general importance upon which further argument would be to the public advantage.
- [125]
[125] I also add that the evidence indicated that the respondents were dragging their feet in an attempt to avoid complying with the Disclosure Orders. The evidence in Mr Chan’s affidavit dated 5 December 2019 showed that Mr Peloso had no intention of complying with orders of court.
My decision on the application for stay of execution
- [127]
[127] It is trite that an appeal does not automatically operate as a stay of execution. The general position is that the court will not deprive a successful party of the fruits of its litigation until an appeal is determined, unless the unsuccessful party can show special circumstances to justify it (Strandore Invest A/S v Soh Kim Wat [2010] SGHC 174 at [7]).
- [129]
[129] Two cases are instructive on the question of whether a stay should be granted in cases involving disclosure orders that are ancillary to a Mareva injunction.
- [134]
[134] Further, the need to police the Mareva injunction assumed heightened importance in this case because of the troubling matters disclosed in Mr Chan’s affidavit tendered on 5 December 2019. In summary, the evidence showed that Mr Peloso had diluted his shareholdings in SEPL. It was thus necessary for the stay to be refused to prevent possible future breaches of the Mareva injunction.
- [135]
[135] Given that the respondents had thus far failed to comply with the Disclosure Orders, the applicants resorted to a more rudimentary method of “policing” the Mareva injunction. According to the applicants, they did this by carrying out business profile searches of the applicants from time to time. After carrying out a search on 2 December 2019, the applicants discovered that a new entity, known as UHP Holdings Pte Ltd (“UHP”) was now the holder of about 51% of the shares in SEPL. It should be noted that Mr Peloso was the shareholder of about 95.01% shares in SEPL as at 1 August 2019. Mr Chan stated on affidavit that SEPL had issued 113,274 ordinary shares to UHP at an undervalued price of S$0.185 when its usual share price was S$4.08 for a total sum of S$21,000. Mr Peloso did not refute this specific allegation in his reply affidavit.
- [136]
[136] The applicants also claimed that there was a link between UHP and Kashish. As stated above at [36], Mr Peloso alleged that Kashish was a wholly owned subsidiary of “Kushal Ltd”, an Indian public listed company. A news article produced by the applicants showed an apparent connection between Kushal Ltd and UHP, the company that had purchased Mr Peloso’s shares in SEPL. An extract of the article stated:
- [137]
[137] Mr Peloso’s reply affidavit, which sought to explain the above events, was long on claims and short on details. The explanation provided was also completely unsatisfactory. In Mr Peloso’s view, the sale of shares was simply not relevant to Summons No 5557 of 2019 (ie, the leave to appeal application). Mr Peloso also stated that the S$21,000 was only “upfront consideration” and that there were anticipated further investments to be made by, among others, UHP, up to the tune of US$100 million. However, no documentary evidence was provided in support of this rather exaggerated claim. On the relationship between UHP and Kashish (through the entity Kushal Ltd), Mr Peloso said that he had been informed by UHP that no such investment was made into Kushal Ltd. Again, there was no documentary evidence in support. For example, correspondence with a contact from UHP could have been provided. This was not done.
- [138]
[138] All of these remained of grave concern.
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