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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Oct 2021

General Division of the High Court

Sinopec International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Bank of Communications Co Ltd

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[2021] SGHC 245Case no. Suit No 832 of 2020 (Summonses Nos 4431 of 2020 and 1899 of 2021)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] In this case, the plaintiff, a Singapore company, which is a beneficiary under several letters of credit, has brought proceedings against the defendant bank, which issued those letters of credit. The plaintiff was not paid even though it had apparently presented compliant documents. The defendant refused to make payment because it claims that there was fraud in the documents presented, in that certain bills of lading were no longer documents of title, but worthless pieces of paper. The applications before me do not concern the merits of the claim and defence. They are limited to the questions as to whether the court has jurisdiction over the defendant because it contends that it has not been properly served with the writ, and also whether, if there was proper service, the court should exercise its jurisdiction because it is claimed by the defendant that there is a more appropriate forum than Singapore, and also because there are foreign court proceedings and foreign criminal investigations, which the defendant says will have a bearing on the determination of the issues in this action.

  2. The parties

  3. [2] The plaintiff, Sinopec International (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Sinopec SG”), is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of trading oil, refined petroleum and petrochemical products. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sinopec Japan Co Ltd, which is in turn 99% owned by China Petrochemical International Co Ltd (“Sinopec Intl”). Sinopec Intl is a wholly owned subsidiary of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (“Sinopec Corp”). Sinopec Corp is the parent organisation of various subsidiaries within the “Sinopec Group” which similarly engage in the international trade of petrochemical products. These subsidiaries include Sinopec Chemical Commercial Holding Company Ltd, Jiangsu Company (“Sinopec Jiangsu”), China Jinshan Associated Trading Corporation (“China Jinshan”) and Shanghai Jinshan Associated Trading Corporation (“Shanghai Jinshan”).

  4. [3] The defendant is the Bank of Communications Co Ltd (“BComm”), an international bank, with its head office in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). It was BComm’s branch in Tokyo, Japan (“BComm Tokyo”), which issued the letters of credit that are the subject of this action. BComm also has a branch in Singapore (“BComm SG”).

  5. Background facts

  6. The LCs

  7. [4] Sinopec SG is the beneficiary of four letters of credit issued by BComm Tokyo (“the LCs”). Shanghai International Holding Co Ltd (“SIH”) had applied for the LCs to meet its payment obligations under four contracts entered into on or around 11 July 2019 for the purchase of Paraxylene (“the Cargo”) from Sinopec SG (“the Sale Contracts”). SIH apparently intended to on-sell the Cargo to Hong Kong Zhong Tuo Industry Ltd (“HKZT”) under four sales contracts (“the Downstream Contracts”).

  8. [5] The LCs incorporated The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 600 (“UCP 600”). The terms of the LCs were first communicated by BComm’s Hong Kong branch (as the first advising bank) to Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”)’s Hong Kong branch (“Westpac HK”), and then by Westpac HK (as the second advising bank) to Sinopec SG. The LCs contained, in particular, the following terms:

  9. (a) it was available at any bank by negotiation;

  10. (b) BComm was to honour the LCs by paying on drafts drawn upon it at 90 days after sight; and

  11. (c) “shipment and documents effected prior to [the LCs’] issuance date is acceptable” (“the Additional Condition”).

  12. The Presentation

  13. [6] To obtain payment under the LCs, which were available at any bank by negotiation, Sinopec SG could approach any bank of its choice to purchase its documents and a draft drawn by Sinopec SG on BComm under the LCs. If that bank agreed to negotiate the LCs, Sinopec SG would then be entitled to a discounted amount of the sum secured by the LCs, with the discount representing the interest and fees incurred by that bank in making payment under the LCs ahead of their due date (see Art. 2 of the UCP 600; Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India and another [2016] 3 SLR 1308 (“Grains”) at [8]; Ali Malek and David Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits (Tottel Publishing, 4th Ed, 2009) (“Jack”) at 2.19).

  14. [8] By presenting the documents at Westpac HK, Sinopec SG wanted Westpac to negotiate the LCs. However, it would appear that Westpac withheld its decision on whether to do so, at least until after BComm had determined that the presented documents were compliant. As it turned out, Westpac did not negotiate the LCs, presumably because BComm Tokyo subsequently rejected the documents as being non-compliant (see [12] below). In these circumstances, Westpac HK only acted as a “collecting bank” in transmitting and presenting the documents to BComm Tokyo on Sinopec SG’s behalf and as Sinopec SG’s agent (see Jack at para 7.2).

  15. [9] Notwithstanding that the documents were transmitted by Westpac HK to BComm Tokyo, and it was at BComm Tokyo where the documents were examined and found to be discrepant, the place where the documents were presented under the LCs would still be Westpac HK, ie, Hong Kong. This is so, for two reasons:

  16. (a) Art. 6(d)(ii) of the UCP 600 provides that the place for presentation of documents under a letter of credit is the bank at which the credit is available. In this case, since the LCs were available at any bank by negotiation, Sinopec SG would have been authorised by the terms of the credit to present documents at any bank of its choice (see Grains at [50]), in addition to the issuing bank (see Art. 6(d)(ii) of the UCP 600). The place of presentation would therefore be any bank where Sinopec SG chose to present its documents, in this case, Westpac HK.

  17. (b) The liability of the issuing bank under Art. 7(a) of the UCP 600 is engaged as long as the beneficiary makes a valid and complying presentation to a bank at which the credit is available, irrespective of whether that bank has agreed to honour or negotiate a complying presentation (Grains at [54]-[55(a)]). It is also the presentation at that bank that is the point of reference for determining the time at which the presentation of documents under the credit was made (Grains at [51]). In this case, if the documents presented were compliant, it would have been the Presentation at Westpac HK (and not any subsequent receipt of documents by BComm Tokyo) that would have rendered BComm liable under the LCs. It is therefore immaterial that Westpac did not negotiate the LCs and that did not make Westpac HK any less the place of presentation of documents under the LCs.

  18. [10] Returning to the documents presented by Sinopec SG, they included, inter alia, four bills of lading (“the BLs”):

  19. (a) BL no SJ01PXOMAN03 dated 28 April 2019 for 4790.519 MT of Paraxylene shipped on board the Southern Jaguar (“BL 1”).

  20. (b) BL no SJS190429KVT dated 29 April 2019 for 4761.279 MT of Paraxylene shipped on board the Korea Victory (“BL 2”).

  21. (c) BL nos. 1 and 2, each dated 27 May 2019 and for 5250 MT of Paraxylene shipped on board the Fairchem Forte (“BLs 3 and 4”).

  22. BComm Tokyo’s refusal to honour

  23. [12] On 25 and 26 July 2019, BComm’s Hong Kong branch informed Sinopec SG (via Westpac HK) that the Presentation was rejected because of “[bill of lading] suspected fraud”, which it further elaborated on in the following terms: the shipped-on-board date on the BLs was too far from the issuance date of the LCs; and the respective vessels carrying the Cargo had arrived at the respective discharge ports on various dates in May and June 2019 (“the Notices of Rejection”). In these proceedings, it is common ground that the Cargo on board the Southern Jaguar and Korea Victory had been discharged to HZHS in May 2019, while the Cargo on board the Fairchem Forte had been discharged to HKZT in June 2019 (“the Discharge”). The Discharge had taken place against letters of indemnity (“the LOIs”) issued by Sinopec SG (for the shipment on board the Southern Jaguar and Fairchem Forte) and Shanghai Jinshan (for the shipment on board the Korea Victory).

  24. [13] From 26 to 29 July 2019, Sinopec SG responded by disagreeing with the Notices of Rejection, and cited the Additional Condition. However, BComm Tokyo was unmoved. On 2 August 2019, BComm’s Hong Kong branch replied by stating that BComm could not accept forged documents, and that it learnt from its investigations that the actual goods to which the BLs related (ie, the Cargo) had already been discharged.

  25. [14] In affidavits filed for the present proceedings, BComm provided a fuller account of the circumstances that led to BComm Tokyo’s issuance of the Notices of Rejection. BComm says that, on 23 July 2019, at a meeting of both sides’ representatives, it had been informed by SIH that: (a) there had been media reports emerging on 12 July 2019 that the Zhong Tuo Group was in financial difficulties due to trading losses, and so SIH became concerned that HKZT would be unable to pay for the Cargo under the Downstream Contracts; and (b) SIH had been unable to locate the Cargo even though it had not issued any instructions for the release of the Cargo, and so it suspected fraud relating to the Sale Contracts. SIH therefore filed a police report on or around 20 July 2019 with the Shanghai Public Security Bureau (“Shanghai PSB”) (“the SIH Report”).

  26. [15] Thereafter, BComm Tokyo took steps to investigate the allegations made by SIH. It reviewed the documents presented by Sinopec SG for payment (in particular, the BLs) and noted that the respective vessels carrying the Cargo had arrived at the respective ports of discharge prior to the date of the Sale Contracts, and did not subsequently revisit those ports of discharge. From these investigations, BComm Tokyo concluded that the Cargo had already been discharged, and was of the view that the BLs were being re-used by Sinopec SG to collect payment under the LCs. This confirmed what it had been told of by SIH, and therefore BComm Tokyo determined that it was entitled to refuse payment under the LCs.

  27. Subsequent developments

  28. The PRC Criminal Investigations

  29. [16] According to BComm, pursuant to the SIH Report, the Shanghai PSB commenced criminal investigations into the alleged fraud relating to the LCs and the Sale Contracts (“the PRC Criminal Investigations”). The PRC Criminal Investigations also concern three other letters of credit in respect of other contracts for the sale and purchase of Paraxylene between Sinopec SG and SIH (in addition to the Sale Contracts), two of which were issued by the Bank of China’s Tokyo branch (“BOC Tokyo”). According to BComm, findings from these investigations may result in criminal proceedings before criminal courts in the PRC (“the PRC Criminal Proceedings”).

  30. Letter of demand

  31. [17] On 28 August 2019, Sinopec SG issued a letter of demand (via its Japanese solicitors) to BComm’s Tokyo branch, demanding that BComm honour its payment obligations under the LCs, and threatening legal proceedings if payment was not forthcoming.

  32. The Suit

  33. [18] On 2 September 2020, Sinopec SG commenced Suit No 832 of 2020 (“the Suit”) against BComm. The writ of summons was served at the office of BComm SG on 4 September 2020 (“the Writ”). BComm entered an appearance on 14 September 2020.

  34. [19] On 12 October 2020, BComm filed Summons No 4431 of 2020 (“SUM 4431”) for, inter alia, (a) a declaration that the Singapore courts have no jurisdiction over BComm (“the Declaration Application”); (b) a stay of the Suit on ground of forum non conveniens (“the Stay Application”); and (c) in the alternative, a case management stay of the Suit until the conclusion of the PRC Criminal Proceedings (“the CMS Application”).

  35. The Rehabilitation Proceedings by SIH

  36. [20] On 19 September 2019, SIH obtained approval from the Tokyo District Court to commence proceedings to rehabilitate its business by proposing an agreement or arrangement with its creditors, in a process that appears somewhat similar to a scheme of arrangement under Singapore law. This proposed agreement or arrangement is subject to the approval of SIH’s creditors, whose proofs of claim are accepted by SIH (“the Rehabilitation Proceedings”). While not explicitly stated, it appears quite clear from the affidavits that the Rehabilitation Proceedings are a form of insolvency proceedings under Japanese Law, and that SIH is now insolvent.

  37. The PRC Civil Proceedings

  38. [21] On 1 December 2020, BComm submitted a civil complaint to the Shanghai Financial Courts (“the Shanghai Court”) against Sinopec SG and China Jinshan (“the PRC Civil Proceedings”). Oddly, both BComm and BComm Tokyo are named as separate plaintiffs in those proceedings (“the PRC Plaintiffs”), even though they are the same legal entity, ie, BComm (see [50] below). SIH is also named by the PRC Plaintiffs as a third party to the PRC Civil Proceedings, but it does not appear that the PRC Plaintiffs are pursuing any causes of action or seeking any relief against it. It is common ground that the commencement date of the PRC Civil Proceedings is the date on which it was docketed by the PRC Courts, ie, 1 December 2020.

  39. [23] By 7 January 2021, court papers for the PRC Civil Proceedings were served on China Jinshan and SIH. To date, Sinopec SG has not agreed to accept service of the PRC Civil Proceedings. Nonetheless, BComm takes the position that Sinopec SG would have become aware of those proceedings when the court papers were served on China Jinshan. Sinopec SG maintains that it had only been made aware of the PRC Civil Proceedings through BComm’s Singapore solicitors through an email on 8 April 2021.

  40. [25] According to a summons issued by the Shanghai Court to BComm on 16 March 2021, the trial of the PRC Civil Proceedings is fixed on 21 December 2021. Given that it has not been served with the court papers, Sinopec SG takes the position that the trial of the PRC Civil Proceedings clearly cannot proceed on 21 December 2021. It is supported by the opinion of its PRC law expert, who says that the trial date is merely tentative, and will be postponed until effective service of court papers has been achieved. On the other hand, BComm’s PRC law expert says that such a characterisation of the trial date is incorrect, as it would only have been fixed by the Shanghai Court after taking into account the time required for effective service of court papers on Sinopec SG. Counsel for Sinopec SG informed me at the hearing that his client had still not been served with any papers relating to the PRC Civil Proceedings.

  41. [26] Although the PRC Civil Proceedings were commenced on 1 December 2020, the earliest time at which the PRC Civil Proceedings were made known to the Singapore courts was on 16 April 2021 when Sinopec SG’s solicitors wrote a letter to the Supreme Court requesting for an urgent pre-trial conference after BComm had requested Sinopec SG to consent to an amendment of SUM 4431 to take into account the PRC Civil Proceedings in relation to the CMS Application. Sinopec SG did not consent and, on 23 April 2021, BComm filed Summons No 1899 of 2021 (“SUM 1899”) for leave to amend its prayers for the CMS Application (“the Amendment Application”).

  42. BComm’s allegations of fraud and Sinopec SG’s claims of “credit facilitation”

  43. [27] In affidavits filed for the present proceedings, BComm elaborated on the allegations of fraud which it relied on in refusing to make payment under the LCs. These allegations rest largely on what it had been informed of by officers of the Shanghai PSB at a meeting on 24 September 2019 (“the 24 Sep Meeting”). BComm’s account of that meeting is that the officers said that the Cargo (to which the BLs and the Sale Contracts relate) had been the subject of previous contracts of sale between Sinopec SG and entities within the Zhong Tuo Group (“the Alleged Prior Contracts”). The Cargo had also been discharged to the respective Zhong Tuo Group entities in May and June 2019 pursuant to Sinopec SG’s performance of its obligations as seller under the Alleged Prior Contracts.

  44. [28] However, by July 2019, it became clear that the Zhong Tuo Group had fallen into financial difficulty, and that Sinopec SG would not be able to recover any payment for the Cargo from the Zhong Tuo Group. Accordingly, Sinopec SG decided to alter the documentation for the Alleged Prior Contracts into a sequence of deals involving Sinopec SG, SIH and HKZT, where Sinopec SG and SIH entered into the Sale Contracts, while SIH entered into the Downstream Contracts with HKZT.

  45. [29] The alleged fraud therefore stemmed from how the Sale Contracts had been contrived by Sinopec SG as a means of obtaining payment (by way of letters of credit) for the Cargo that Sinopec SG had already sold and released to the Zhong Tuo Group entities under the Alleged Prior Contracts, and which it no longer had title to. According to BComm, Sinopec SG was seeking to sell the Cargo and obtain payment for it twice - first from the Zhong Tuo Group entities, and when it failed to do so, from BComm (as an issuer of the LCs on the application of SIH). Apparently, the officers of the Shanghai PSB had also stated at the 24 Sep Meeting that they had advised Sinopec SG not to take legal action against BComm to claim compensation under the LCs.

  46. [30] Sinopec SG disputes BComm’s allegations of fraud. It provides a very different characterisation of the Sale Contracts. It explains that it had first purchased the Cargo from suppliers (“the Supply Contracts”) on behalf of Shanghai Jinshan. In doing so, Sinopec SG was only acting as a “credit facilitator” on behalf of Shanghai Jinshan, given that Shanghai Jinshan did not have banking facilities that allowed it to apply for letters of credit, which were the prescribed mode of payment under the Supply Contracts.

  47. [31] There were four of these Supply Contracts: one was dated 25 March 2019 (for the shipment on board the Southern Jaguar originating from Oman), another was dated 19 April 2019 (for the shipment on board the Korea Victory originating from South Korea), and the remaining two were dated 21 May 2019 (for each of the two shipments on board the Fairchem Forte originating from Georgia, USA). The Cargo was in turn to be sold to Sinopec Jiangsu pursuant to “Export Contracts” entered into between Sinopec SG and Sinopec Jiangsu. While the Export Contracts have been formalised in writing, they were never signed due to an administrative oversight. In its affidavits, Sinopec SG exhibited four of these Export Contracts, which it appears (given the country of origin of the Paraxylene specified in each of these contracts) correspond to each of the Supply Contracts. According to the dates on these Export Contracts, it appears that, save for one of them, they were all formalised shortly after the corresponding Supply Contract was entered into.

  48. [32] According to Sinopec SG, the LOIs (against which the Discharge took place) had been issued “on the instructions of Sinopec Jiangsu … [as] the buyer of [the Cargo] under the Export Contracts”. These LOIs were dated 30 April 2019 (in respect of the shipment on board the Korea Victory), 14 May 2019 (in respect of the shipment on board the Southern Jaguar), and 27 May 2019 (in respect of the shipments on board the Fairchem Forte). While not stated in explicit terms, this can only mean that the Discharge had taken place on the instructions of Sinopec Jiangsu at around the relevant times when the respective LOIs were issued.

  49. [33] Some two months after the Export Contracts had been entered into, Sinopec Jiangsu informed Sinopec SG that the Export Contracts were to be “novated” to the end receivers of the Cargo, HKZT and HZHS, ie, the Zhong Tuo Group entities (see [12] above). According to the dates of the email correspondence apparently recording these instructions from Sinopec Jiangsu, the novation would have taken place on or around 27 June 2019. I should add that it is not possible to pinpoint the precise date on which the novation took place and the terms on which it occurred because Sinopec SG has thus far not disclosed all the documents in relation to the novation.

  50. [34] A “novation” refers to the process by which the contract between the original contracting parties is discharged through mutual consent and substituted with a new contract between the same parties to the original contract or between different parties (Fairview Developments Pte Ltd v Ong & Ong Pte Ltd and another appeal [2014] 2 SLR 318 at [46]). As such, the expected result of the novation in this case would have been the replacement of Sinopec Jiangsu by the respective Zhong Tuo Group entities as a party to each of the novated Export Contracts. However, it appears that never happened because SIH entered the picture to act as a credit facilitator for the Zhong Tuo Group entities, which had to make payment for the Cargo, but which did not have access to banking facilities that allowed them to apply for letters of credit to do so. Under this arrangement, SIH was to apply for letters of credit (ie, the LCs) in favour of Sinopec SG to enable the Zhong Tuo Group entities to make payment for the Cargo and thereby take on the credit risk of the Zhong Tuo Group entities.

  51. [35] According to Sinopec SG, the Sale Contracts were executed for this very purpose. Sinopec SG also states that it had only been aware that SIH was acting as a credit facilitator and expected that SIH would directly or indirectly receive payment from the Zhong Tuo Group for performing this role, and then use such funds to reimburse BComm Tokyo, which issued the LCs. It will therefore appear that, at the time when the Sale Contracts were entered into, Sinopec SG was not aware of any precise arrangements relating to the Cargo between SIH and the Zhong Tuo Group, such as the Downstream Contracts.

  52. [36] Therefore, the effect of the novation was the interposition of a set of back-to-back contracts: the Sale Contracts between Sinopec SG and SIH, and some other contractual arrangement between SIH and the Zhong Tuo Group, the precise details of which Sinopec SG was not aware of but under which it expected SIH to obtain reimbursement for acting as a credit facilitator. Hence, Sinopec SG’s position is that it has never been a party to any contract relating to the Cargo with the Zhong Tuo Group. Prior to the novation, the only such contract to which it had been a party were the Export Contracts with Sinopec Jiangsu. Following the novation, Sinopec SG was a party to the Sale Contracts with SIH.

  53. [37] Sinopec SG says that SIH (by virtue of its role as a “credit facilitator”) would have known, at the time of entering into the Sale Contracts, that the Cargo had already been discharged in May and June 2019. In particular, it says cl 11 of the Sale Contracts, which specified the delivery dates as “ANY [APRIL 2019] ARRIVAL”, would have made that clear. Otherwise, SIH would not have requested that the LCs contain the Additional Condition. Sinopec SG also says that, in light of SIH’s request for the Additional Condition, and the fact that BComm Tokyo had been provided with copies of the Sale Contracts by SIH when it applied for the LCs, and so would have had sight of cl 11, BComm would also have known, or ought to have known, that the Cargo had already been discharged at the time when it agreed to issue the LCs.

  54. [38] Responding to that contention, BComm says that SIH had been in the dark as to the whereabouts of the Cargo from the time when it applied for the LCs with BComm Tokyo. BComm also denies that it knew or ought to have known that the Cargo had been discharged, presumably from the time when the LCs were issued, since BComm’s knowledge would have been limited to whatever the applicant for the LCs (SIH) provided BComm Tokyo with. Also, BComm says that cl 11 of the Sale Contracts cannot impute SIH with the knowledge that the Cargo had already been discharged to HKZT or HZHS. Further, BComm also says that the inclusion of the Additional Condition as a term of the LCs only shows that BComm Tokyo could accept bills of lading issued prior to the issuance date of the LCs, but it cannot impute BComm with the knowledge that the Cargo had already been discharged prior to the issuance of the LCs.

  55. [39] BComm also refers to a letter provided by SIH to BComm Tokyo dated 26 May 2021 (“the SIH 26 May Letter”), in which SIH claimed that it did not know, at the time of entering into the Sale Contracts, that: (a) Sinopec SG and HKZT had previously entered into separate sale contracts relating to the Cargo; and (b) the Cargo under the Sale Contracts had been discharged in May and June 2019. Sinopec SG disputes the authenticity of the SIH 26 May Letter, but also claims its contents showed that SIH knew that it was acting as a credit facilitator.

  56. [40] From the parties’ respective cases, it appears to me that BComm and Sinopec SG are in contention over two main issues. First, what were the Sale Contracts for? BComm says that the contracts involved the physical sale and purchase of the Cargo, and that SIH was not acting as a “credit facilitator” as Sinopec SG claims. On the other hand, Sinopec SG maintains that the Sale Contracts had been interposed in the chain transaction for the Cargo (beginning with the purchase of the Cargo under the Supply Contracts, the subsequent sale to Sinopec Jiangsu, and then the eventual novation involving SIH and the Zhong Tuo Group entities) to facilitate payment by the Zhong Tuo Group, and so the Sale Contracts per se were not meant to involve any actual dealings in goods.

  57. [41] Second, were Sinopec SG and the respective Zhong Tuo Group entities in any contractual relationship relating to the Cargo at the time of the Discharge? Sinopec SG says they were not - the Zhong Tuo Group entities and itself only become parties to the separate back-to-back contracts with SIH in July 2019, after the Discharge had already taken place in May and June 2019. BComm alleges that Sinopec SG and the respective Zhong Tuo Group entities were in such a contractual relationship, and in particular, they had already entered into the Alleged Prior Contracts by then.

  58. SUM 4431 and SUM 1899

  59. [42] BComm makes four applications in SUM 4431 and SUM 1899: (a) the Declaration Application; (b) the Stay Application; (c) the Amendment Application; and (d) the CMS Application.

  60. [43] For the Declaration Application, BComm argues that there has been no proper service of originating process as the Writ had only been served on BComm SG. BComm argues that, for the purposes of the dispute over the LCs, BComm Tokyo, as the branch which issued the LCs, should be regarded as a distinct legal entity, and since there has been no proper service on BComm Tokyo, the Singapore courts have no jurisdiction over BComm. In reply, Sinopec SG argues that service of the Writ on BComm SG constitutes effective service on BComm, and is sufficient to found jurisdiction over it, even though it had been BComm Tokyo which issued the LCs.

  61. [44] For the Stay Application, BComm argues that the various connecting factors - identified by reference to the governing law of the LCs, the witnesses and documentary evidence which it says is necessary to establish its fraud defence to Sinopec SG’s claim in the Suit and the PRC Civil Proceedings overlapping with the Suit - all point toward jurisdictions other than Singapore, specifically, the PRC, Hong Kong and/or Japan (collectively, the “Alternative Fora”), as the more appropriate forum, and so the Suit should be stayed on grounds of forum non conveniens.

  62. [45] On the other hand, Sinopec SG argues that little if no weight should be placed on these purported connections. First, the witnesses which BComm has identified as necessary for its defence do not appear relevant, and there is no evidence as to where they are located, and whether they are unwilling to testify in Singapore. Second, it identifies the governing law of the LCs as Singapore law. But it says, even if it is Hong Kong law, as argued by BComm, that would not be a significant factor in favour of Hong Kong as the more appropriate forum, since both Singapore and Hong Kong law are similar in respect of the fraud defence to a claim under letters of credit. Third, it argues that no weight should be given to the PRC Civil Proceedings in the forum non conveniens analysis as they were commenced for strategic reasons by BComm, well after the Suit was started in Singapore. In the alternative, a stay should nevertheless be refused even if a more appropriate forum than Singapore can be identified because Sinopec SG will be deprived of a legitimate juridical advantage if the dispute were tried in the PRC, given the fact that the Shanghai Court will only apply PRC law, and the scope of the fraud defence under PRC law is broader as compared to Singapore law. It also points to substantial prejudice arising from delay and procedural differences if the dispute were tried in the PRC as reasons for refusing a stay.

  63. [46] For the Amendment Application, BComm argues that its prayer for the CMS Application should be amended to take into account the PRC Civil Proceedings as it will allow the real controversy between parties to be determined. Sinopec SG opposes the Amendment Application on grounds that the PRC Civil Proceedings had been commenced for strategic reasons, and also because of how late in time the application was made.

  64. [47] In the event that I am minded to grant the Amendment Application, BComm argues that the CMS Application should be allowed so that it can adduce all relevant evidence it requires for its fraud defence on the basis of findings from the PRC Criminal Proceedings and the PRC Civil Proceedings; and the Singapore courts can also have the benefit of those findings to avoid traversing the very same grounds. Sinopec SG argues that the CMS Application should not be granted because the PRC Criminal Proceedings do not appear relevant to the issues in dispute in the Suit, and also because doing so would render the Singapore proceedings otiose and result in a substantial delay in the resolution of the dispute.

  65. Issues to be determined

  66. [48] There are four main issues to be determined:

  67. (a) whether there has been effective service on BComm to found the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts over it;

  68. (b) whether the Suit should be stayed on grounds of forum non conveniens;

  69. (c) whether the Amendment Application should be allowed; and

  70. (d) whether the CMS Application (either in its original form, or in the form of the amended prayers) should be allowed.

  71. Issue 1: Whether there was proper service to found the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts?

  72. [49] At common law, all branches of a bank are regarded as emanations of that one bank, and so the head office of a bank and its various branches are regarded as a single legal entity (Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (Michael Bridge gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th Ed, 2017) (“Benjamin”) at para 23-026; E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C V M Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2011) at p 711). There are, however, exceptions to this general rule and a bank and its branches located overseas have been treated as separate entities in some situations (see, eg, Johanna Vroegop, “The status of bank branches” (1990) 5 JBL 445 at 446; Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233 at 1241).

  73. [50] In this case, there is no dispute that both BComm SG and BComm Tokyo are part of the same legal entity, BComm. As such, the defendant in the Suit is simply BComm, even though it had been BComm Tokyo which issued the LCs. BComm is a foreign company registered under s 368(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Companies Act”). Section 376(a) of the Companies Act provides that service on a registered foreign company will be effective if it is addressed to the foreign company and left at or sent by post to its registered office in Singapore. As such, service on BComm SG, which is the registered office of BComm in Singapore, will constitute effective service on BComm. According to the Memorandum of Service, the Writ (which had been addressed to BComm) had been left at the office of BComm SG. By virtue of that, there has been effective service on BComm, and the jurisdiction of the court over BComm for the purposes of the Suit has been properly established pursuant to s 16(1)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“the SCJA”), notwithstanding that it had been BComm’s Tokyo branch that issued the LCs.

  74. [51] At the hearing before me and in written submissions, counsel for BComm argued that the Writ must be served on BComm’s Tokyo branch for the Singapore courts to be seised of jurisdiction. He argues that, for the purposes of the contract under the LCs between BComm and Sinopec SG, BComm’s Tokyo branch is to be regarded as a distinct legal entity that is separate from BComm’s other branches. That is because the contract under the LCs incorporates Art. 3 of the UCP 600, which provides that “[b]ranches of a bank in different countries are considered to be separate banks”.

  75. [53] In my judgment, BComm and BComm Tokyo are to be regarded as a single legal entity for the purposes of service of process under our procedural rules. Art. 3 of the UCP 600, which parties have contracted to apply to the contract under the LCs, does not have the effect of altering the rules as to service of process so that originating process in respect of any dispute arising from a letter of credit must be specifically served on the bank branch that issued the credit. The purpose of Art. 3 is to allow branches of the same bank to be treated as separate banks so that they can each perform the respective functions required of the different banks involved in a letter of credit transaction as set out in Art. 2 of the UCP 600, notwithstanding that these branches will be regarded at general law as parts of a single legal entity (see James Byrne et al, UCP600: An Analytical Commentary (Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, 2001) (“Byrne”) at pp 240-241; Benjamin ([49] above) at para 23-026). As the following extract from Byrne suggests, how bank branches are to be treated for the purposes of service of process in a particular jurisdiction is a question outside of the UCP 600 (at p 243):

  76. [54] While the court in Taurus Petroleum found that a bank branch which issued a letter of credit constitutes a separate entity, I find that case distinguishable as it involved a different context from the present case. In Taurus Petroleum, the court was concerned with identifying the situs of the debt under the said letter of credit. To do so, the court had to consider where that debt was recoverable. It will appear that the court only applied Art. 3 and found the London branch of Credit Agricole to be a “separate bank” from its French headquarters because it had been of the view that the debt due under that letter of credit was only recoverable at the London branch, where the applicant for the letter of credit had maintained its accounts with Credit Agricole (see Taurus Petroleum at [31]). The court therefore applied Art. 3 and regarded bank branches as separate entities only for the limited purpose of identifying the situs of a debt due under a letter of credit. I do not read Taurus Petroleum as laying down a statement of general principle that bank branches involved in a letter of credit of transaction were to be regarded as separate entities for all purposes by virtue of Art. 3.

  77. [55] Since BComm and BComm Tokyo are one and the same legal entity, I find that the effective service of the Writ on BComm, by service on BComm SG, suffices to establish the court’s jurisdiction over BComm as the defendant in the Suit. I therefore dismiss the Declaration Application.

  78. [56] In coming to this conclusion, I note that the same result was reached by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in LG Electronics Hong Kong Ltd v Bank of Taiwan [2001] HKEC 2098, which involved somewhat similar facts. In that case, the plaintiff was a beneficiary under a letter of credit issued by the Panchiao, Taiwan, branch of the Bank of Taiwan (“BOT”). After the plaintiff’s presentation of documents was rejected, it commenced proceedings against BOT in Hong Kong to recover payment. The writ of summons simply identified BOT as the defendant, and provided the address of its place of business in Hong Kong at which service may be effected (at [3] and [21]). The court accepted that there had been effective service of originating process on BOT by virtue of service on BOT’s place of business in Hong Kong (at [14] and [17]). BOT had argued that the defendant in the writ was BOT’s Hong Kong branch, which was in turn a separate legal entity from BOT’s Panchiao branch. As such, BOT contended that the court had no jurisdiction because BOT’s Panchiao branch, which issued the credit, had not been named in the writ. Like BComm in this case, BOT also relied on Art. 2 of The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 500 (“UCP 500”), which provided, in similar terms to Art. 3 of the UCP 600, that branches of a bank in different countries are considered separate banks.

  79. [57] The court rejected BOT’s arguments - in particular, the argument that Art. 2 of the UCP 500 had the effect of rendering BOT’s Panchiao branch a separate legal entity (at [19] and [23]). It held that the defendant identified in the writ was simply BOT, and not BOT’s Hong Kong branch (at [21]). Bank branches were only to be treated as separate entities in their dealings with each other and other banks in a letter of credit transaction, but not for other purposes. Hence, there was no need to identify BOT’s Panchiao branch as a defendant in the writ, because BOT Panchiao and BOT were simply one and the same entity (at [22]). Since BOT was a registered foreign company under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) (“the Ordinance”) (at [3]), service of process on BOT’s place of business in Hong Kong constituted effective service on BOT pursuant to provisions in the Ordinance that were similar in terms to s 376(a) of the Companies Act (at [21] and [23]). Accordingly, the court’s jurisdiction over BOT was properly founded.

  80. Issue 2: Whether the Suit should be stayed on grounds of forum non conveniens

  81. [58] The Court of Appeal in Rickshaw Investments Ltd and another v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 (“Rickshaw”) at [12] endorsed the test articulated by the UK House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”) as governing an application for a stay of proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens.

  82. [59] The Spiliada test comprises two stages. The first stage of the test considers whether there is some other available forum which is more appropriate for the case to be tried, and if the court concludes that there is a more appropriate forum, a stay will ordinarily be granted (“Stage One”), unless the court finds at the second stage of the test that there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nonetheless not be granted (“Stage Two”) (Rickshaw at [14]; Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others v Credit Suisse Trust Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 638 (“Ivanishvili”) at [81]).

  83. [60] At Stage One, the legal burden is on the applicant for the stay to show that there is another forum which is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate” than Singapore (Ivanishvili at [82]). At this stage, the court considers the connecting factors that link the dispute with the competing jurisdictions, which include (Ivanishvili at [82]; Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd and another and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 265 (“Rappo”) at [71]):

  84. (a) the personal connections of the parties and the witnesses;

  85. (b) the connections to relevant events and transactions;

  86. (c) the applicable law to the dispute;

  87. (d) the existence of proceedings elsewhere (lis alibi pendens); and

  88. (e) the “shape of the litigation”, viz, the manner in which the claim and the defence have been pleaded.

  89. [61] However, to successfully obtain a stay, it is not enough for the applicant to merely show that Singapore is not the natural forum (JIO Minerals FZC and others v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 (“JIO Minerals”) at [53]), eg, by relying on a host of connecting factors pointing away from Singapore but which are dispersed amongst several jurisdictions and hence incapable of pointing towards any particular jurisdiction as the more appropriate forum (see Siemens AG v Holdrich Investment Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1007 (“Siemens AG”) at [4]). This is because Singapore can only be forum non conveniens if the connecting factors pointing away from Singapore identify a distinctly more appropriate forum than Singapore, and not merely if those connections outweigh those which point to Singapore (Siemens AG at [4]).

  90. [62] When engaging in the inquiry under Stage One, the court can and should attribute differing weight to each connecting factor depending on the particular nature of the dispute (Rickshaw ([58] above) at [23]), and more weight can be ascribed to those connecting factors corresponding to incidences that are likely to be material to the fair determination of the dispute (Rappo at [71]; Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Jhaveri Darsan Jitendra [2019] 2 SLR 372 (“Salgaocar”) at [54]). Since the search is for connections that have the most relevant and substantial associations with the dispute, it is the quality of the connecting factors (rather than the mere quantity of factors) that is crucial in this analysis (Rappo at [70]). In this vein, the court will also weigh the connecting factors with reference to the likely issues, and connections which have little or no bearing on the adjudication of the issues in dispute between the parties will generally carry little weight (JIO Minerals at [41]; Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v Soon Peng Yam and others [1994] 3 SLR(R) 768 at [21]; Yeoh Poh San and another v Won Siok Wan [2002] SGHC 196 at [18]).

  91. [63] At Stage Two, in considering whether a stay should be refused, the main consideration is whether substantial justice can be obtained in the foreign prima facie natural forum, and the plaintiff must establish with cogent evidence that it will be denied substantial justice if the case is not heard in the forum (JIO Minerals at [43]). The fact that the plaintiff would be deprived of a legitimate juridical or personal advantage if it were not allowed to proceed in Singapore will not by itself amount to a denial of substantial justice (Rappo at [109]). The court will also proceed cautiously before pronouncing that a litigant will experience a deprivation of substantial justice if it is left to seek recourse in an available and appropriate foreign forum, especially if the foreign forum operates a well-established and well-recognised system of justice (Rappo at [110]).

  92. Stage One

  93. [64] BComm identifies four broad connecting factors which it says point towards the Alternative Fora (in particular, the PRC) as the more appropriate forum: the governing law of the contract between BComm and Sinopec SG under the LCs, the personal connections of the witnesses (raising issues of witness availability and compellability), the location where documentary evidence is available, and the risk of overlapping proceedings (arising by virtue of the PRC Civil Proceedings). I will consider these factors in turn.

  94. Governing law

  95. [65] The governing law of the dispute is a connecting factor that points to the courts of the jurisdiction from which that system of law originates as the more appropriate forum because there will clearly be savings in time and resources if a court applies the laws of its own jurisdiction to the substantive dispute (Rickshaw ([58] above) at [42]).

  96. [66] The LCs do not contain a provision for governing law. It is common ground between the parties that the governing law of the LCs is not PRC law. BComm contends the governing law of the LCs must be Hong Kong law, while Sinopec SG contends that the governing law of the LCs is Singapore law, or in the alternative, Hong Kong law.

  97. (1) Determining the governing law of letters of credit

  98. [67] In the absence of an express choice of governing law in the LCs, the system of law with which the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary under the letter of credit is most closely connected is the law of the place where the documents necessary to procure payment to the beneficiary are to be presented and checked, and where payment to the beneficiary is to be made against those documents (Sinotani Pacific Pte Ltd v Agricultural Bank of China [1999] 2 SLR(R) 970 (“Sinotani”) at [19] and [23]; Marconi Communications v PT Pan Indonesia Bank [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 72 (“Marconi”) at [43] and [63]).

  99. [68] In Sinotani, the letter of credit was a straight credit issued by a Chinese bank (“ABC”) but it provided that documents may be presented at the Singapore branch of a Canadian bank (“RBC”) for the purposes of drawing on the credit. It was argued that the contract between ABC and the beneficiary was governed by Singapore law as the place of presentation of documents and place of payment was Singapore. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument. First, documents were presented in Singapore only for the purpose of forwarding to ABC’s branch in Dalian, the PRC, as RBC neither had the authority to pay the beneficiary nor bind ABC by virtue of its acceptance of presented documents in Singapore, and so any presentation and acceptance of documents only took place in the PRC (at [26]). Second, the letter of credit had also provided for payment to be made from ABC’s branch in Dalian (at [27]). The court therefore found that it was PRC law with which the contract under the letter of credit had the closest and most real connection.

  100. [69] Marconi concerned a letter of credit issued by an Indonesian bank (“Hastin Bank”) that was advised to the beneficiary by an English bank (“SCB London”) (at [10]). Another Indonesian bank (“Panin Bank”) acted as a confirming bank (at [11]). While the credit did not expressly state so, the English Court of Appeal found that it was a credit available by negotiation, and that Hastin Bank, Panin Bank and the beneficiary had all contemplated that the credit was to be operated in favour of the beneficiary through SCB London as the negotiating bank (at [21]). As things transpired, SCB London did not act as a negotiating bank, but merely a collecting bank in checking and forwarding the documents presented by the beneficiary to Panin Bank (at [12] and [54]). Both Hastin Bank and Panin Bank rejected the documents as a non-compliant presentation (at [13]). Hastin Bank subsequently became insolvent, and the beneficiary commenced proceedings against Panin Bank in the English courts. An issue arose as to the governing law of the contract between the beneficiary and Panin Bank (as confirming bank) under the letter of credit.

  101. [70] The English Court of Appeal found that it was English law with which the contract between Panin Bank and the beneficiary had the closest connection because, since the credit was available by negotiation at SCB London, the contemplated place for presentation of documents and payment was England (at [64]-[66]). The English Court of Appeal also endorsed the reasoning of the trial judge that it did not matter that SCB London did not actually act as a negotiating bank because it was the availability of SCB London as a negotiating bank that gave rise to the closeness of connection with England (at [54]). In this vein, the court added that the proper approach in identifying the governing law of the contract under the letter of credit is to look at how the contract was intended by its terms to operate at the time it was made, rather than to look at what in fact occurred (at [55]).

  102. (2) The governing law of the LCs

  103. [71] In this case, Field 41D of the LCs provided that they were “available with any bank by negotiation” [emphasis added]. Sinopec SG could therefore choose to present its documents and obtain payment at any bank of its choice, which would have been authorised by the terms of the LCs to give value for drafts drawn by Sinopec SG on BComm against compliant documents. In the event, Westpac HK acted as the advising bank and communicated the terms of the LCs to Sinopec SG. Sinopec SG also made the Presentation at Westpac HK, which then transmitted the documents on to BComm Tokyo (see [6] above).

  104. [72] Sinopec SG argues that the fact that the LCs were available with any bank by negotiation meant that Singapore law is the governing law of the LCs, because it could have gone to any bank in Singapore to negotiate the LCs. However, BComm argues that this ignores the fact that Sinopec SG had made the Presentation at Westpac HK, and consequently, its likely expectation was that it would be paid through Westpac HK had the Presentation been deemed compliant. As such, according to BComm, the place where Sinopec SG was to be paid, and the place where documents were to be presented, and checked before such payment was made, was Hong Kong.

  105. [73] In the case of a freely negotiable credit, since the beneficiary is free to present documents and obtain payment at any bank of its choice, the place of actual presentation of documents and payment is at the beneficiary’s choosing. However, that cannot mean that the place, and the corresponding system of law, with which the contract under the letter of credit has its closest connection will depend on where the beneficiary eventually decides to negotiate its documents. Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum and are made by reference to some system of law which defines the obligations assumed by the parties and prescribes remedies enforceable in a court of justice for failure to perform any of these obligations (Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] 1 AC 50 at 65). The contract between the issuing bank and a beneficiary under a letter of credit is formed and the issuing bank becomes irrevocably bound to honour the credit when the credit is communicated to the beneficiary (Sinotani ([67] above) at [24]; Jack ([6] above) at para 5.3). The place and the corresponding system of law that is most closely connected must therefore also be determined at that time, and not subsequently when the beneficiary presents documents pursuant to the terms of the credit. For example, in Marconi ([67] above), it did not matter that SCB London did not eventually negotiate the credit and merely acted as a collecting bank - given the designation of SCB London under the terms of the credit as the negotiating bank, it had been in the anticipation of the parties at the time when the contract was made that the beneficiary would present documents to, and be paid by, SCB London in England, and that sufficed to render English law most closely connected to the credit (at [55] and [66]).

  106. [74] In my judgment, in the case of a freely negotiable credit (like the LCs) where the beneficiary may present documents and obtain payment at any bank of its choice, the system of law with which the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary has its closest connection is that of the place where parties had contemplated that documents would be presented and payment made, at the time when the terms of the letter of credit were communicated to the beneficiary.

  107. [75] In this case, Sinopec SG is a Singapore-incorporated company and conducts business operations out of Singapore. The commercial purpose of a letter of credit is to provide the beneficiary with the right to receive payment against compliant documents in a particular country, usually that in which it carries on business (Marconi at [62]). Therefore, the ordinary expectation of parties at the time when the terms of the LCs were communicated to Sinopec SG was that Sinopec SG would have negotiated documents and sought to obtain payment in Singapore, the place at which it carries on business. It would have been in the contemplation of the parties at the material time that the place of presentation of documents and payment under the LCs was Singapore. I am therefore inclined to the view that Singapore law is the governing law of the contract between Sinopec SG and BComm under the LCs.

  108. [76] The fact that the terms of the LCs had been communicated by Westpac HK to Sinopec SG is not inconsistent with the view that I have expressed earlier. An advising bank which communicates the terms of a letter of credit to the beneficiary does not undertake any obligation to the beneficiary unless it adds its confirmation to the credit (see Art. 9(a) of the UCP 600). It does not appear that Westpac HK, which acted as the advising bank, had added its confirmation to the LCs, nor does it appear that Westpac HK had been invited by BComm to do so. In my view, the circumstances in which the LCs had been communicated therefore do not necessarily convey the impression that Hong Kong had been contemplated by parties as the place for presentation of the documents or for payment. In any event, for the purposes of the Stay Application, I do not have to come to a firm conclusion at this stage of the proceedings as to what the governing law of the LCs are. It suffices to state that I am not persuaded that Hong Kong had been in parties’ contemplation at the time the contract under the LCs was formed as the place where documents were to be presented, and where payment was to be made, and so Hong Kong law is unlikely to be the governing law.

  109. [77] Given my tentative view that the governing law of the contract between BComm and Sinopec SG is Singapore law, this connecting factor does not identify an alternate jurisdiction for the purposes of Stage One. However, even if the governing law were Hong Kong law and so identifies Hong Kong as an alternate jurisdiction, this does not change the overall result in so far as this connecting factor is concerned under Stage One. This is because both parties are in agreement that, whether it is Hong Kong law or Singapore law that is the governing law, there is no substantive difference in the legal principles that will apply to the dispute at hand. In any event, there is no evidence placed before me as to how Hong Kong law would differ from Singapore law in so far as the fraud defence to a claim under letters of credit is concerned. This is unsurprising given that both Singapore and Hong Kong are leading centres of business and commerce, and they also share a similar common law legal tradition.

  110. [79] Furthermore, as will be explained in more detail in the course of this judgment, given the nature of the defence which BComm says it intends to rely on in refusing to honour the LCs, it does not appear to me that the present case would raise any novel issues of law about the fraud defence to a claim under letters of credit. In situations like these, little weight is usually given to the governing law as a connecting factor, as the following extract from Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2006), approved by the Court of Appeal in CIMB at [61], explains:

  111. [80] Therefore, even if the governing law of the LCs were Hong Kong law and so constitute a connecting factor in favour of Hong Kong, I find that little to no weight may be accorded to that factor at Stage One.

  112. Personal connections of the witnesses

  113. [81] Connections relating to witnesses encompass two distinct factors: (a) the convenience in having the case decided in the forum where the witnesses are ordinarily resident (ie, the locations of the witnesses); and (b) the compellability of those witnesses (JIO Minerals ([61] above) at [63]). Where the main disputes in the action revolve around questions of fact, these factors take on greater significance because there would be savings of time and resources if the trial is held in the forum in which witnesses reside and where they are clearly compellable to testify (Rickshaw ([58] above) at [19]).

  114. [82] To appreciate the significance of this connecting factor, the court must consider what evidence would likely be needed in relation to the claims made in the action before the forum (Ivanishvili ([59] above) at [85]). The court will focus on the issues that are in dispute, and what evidence is needed in respect of those issues. In this regard, the focus is not on the evidence the plaintiff requires to establish its allegations, but on the potential prejudice to the defendant in running its defence if evidence from particular witnesses is unavailable (Ivanishvili at [86]).

  115. [83] A defendant who argues that the presence of witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction renders it the more appropriate forum should at least show that the evidence from those foreign witnesses is arguably relevant to its defence - it is not permitted to simply assert, without substantiation, that it requires foreign witnesses (JIO Minerals at [67]). However, it is also not required to demonstrate exactly how the testimony of those witnesses will be used and whether it is material to its defence because the court should not, at this interlocutory stage, predetermine the witnesses that the parties should call (JIO Minerals at [66]).

  116. [84] The physical locations of witnesses are generally of less significance in present times given the ease of travel and the option of giving evidence from a foreign jurisdiction by video-link. Indeed, given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which will result in witnesses increasingly having to give evidence by video-link due to travel and other restrictions, their place of residence or physical locations will generally be less important (Bunge SA and another v Shrikant Bhasi and other appeals [2020] 2 SLR 1223 (“Bunge”) at [50]).

  117. [85] However, since a Singapore court cannot compel a foreign witness to testify physically in a Singapore court or via video-link (see O 38 r 18(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”)), the compellability of a foreign witness remains relevant, and it is a factor that points towards the jurisdiction in which that witness ordinarily resides as the more appropriate forum (JIO Minerals ([61] above) at [71]). The compellability of a witness to testify if the dispute was heard in the foreign jurisdiction in which he resides is a matter of foreign law and can be addressed by way of expert evidence (see JIO Minerals at [72]-[73]). Nevertheless, the absence of evidence of such foreign law should not be seen as reducing the weight associated to this connecting factor in an appropriate case because it remains the case that a foreign witness is more likely to testify if the dispute were heard in the foreign court where that witness is resident, than if it were heard in Singapore (see JIO Minerals at [74]).

  118. [86] Since the attendance of witnesses related to the parties can usually be secured even if they are not compellable to testify, the issue of compellability of witnesses should be focused on third-party witnesses over whom the parties to the dispute have no control and whom the parties may not be able to persuade to give evidence voluntarily in the absence of their compellability (Salgaocar ([62] above) at [73]; Ivanishvili ([59] above) at [84]).

  119. [87] There is, in general, no disagreement between the parties as to the legal principles set out above in relation to the personal connections of the witnesses. There is, however, one significant point of contention relating to the compellability of witnesses. That is whether the defendant seeking a stay of proceedings must first show that a witness is unwilling to testify in Singapore before the compellability of that witness can be a relevant consideration for the purposes of identifying a connecting factor for Stage One. Sinopec SG argues that there is such a requirement. It relies on Bunge ([84] above), where the Court of Appeal had stated: “the issue of compellability only arises if there is some indication that the relevant witness is unwilling to testify” (at [50]). BComm submits that there is no such requirement.

  120. [88] First, my review of the case law in Singapore prior to Bunge shows that compellability only becomes irrelevant when there is evidence that a witness, ordinarily residing in a foreign jurisdiction, is willing to come forward and testify in Singapore. In the absence of such evidence, a witness will not be taken to be willing to testify outside of his jurisdiction of residence, and so the compellability of a witness ordinarily points towards the jurisdiction in which he resides as the more appropriate forum.

  121. [89] In JIO Minerals ([61] above), the Court of Appeal found that the fact that particular witnesses were compellable only in Indonesia but not Singapore pointed to Indonesia as the natural forum. The court accepted that the compellability of the Indonesian witnesses was in issue and presented a relevant connecting factor even though it does not appear that there had been any suggestion that those witnesses were unwilling to testify in Singapore. It appeared to be sufficient that those witnesses were located outside of Singapore and in Indonesia, even if there had been no evidence that they were unwilling to come forward to testify in Singapore - in fact, the court had found that those witnesses were more likely to testify in Indonesia, even if they were not strictly compellable under Indonesian law (at [71]-[74]). Similarly, in Ivanishvili ([59] above), the Court of Appeal explained that, where there is a high likelihood of there being relevant witnesses who are non-compellable in Singapore, that would in principle be a factor pointing away from Singapore as the appropriate forum, even if such witnesses have not actually been identified (at [94]). If the relevant witnesses have not been identified, then a fortiori it could not have been possible for the defendant seeking a stay of proceedings to show that these witnesses are unwilling to testify in Singapore. Therefore, emphasis was placed by the court on the compellability of a witness to testify in Singapore, and not the unwillingness of a witness to testify in Singapore.

  122. [90] Therefore, the approach taken by our courts is that it will ordinarily proceed on the basis that compellability is in issue, unless shown otherwise by evidence of the willingness of a foreign witness to testify in Singapore. However, the approach advocated by Sinopec SG proceeds on the opposite premise – that compellability is not in issue, unless shown otherwise by evidence of the unwillingness of a foreign witness to testify in Singapore.

  123. [91] Second, I think that there may be practical difficulties if a defendant seeking a stay of proceedings is required to demonstrate, at an early stage of the proceedings, that the witnesses which it intends to call are unwilling to testify in Singapore. A defendant is not required to establish the materiality of any of its potential witnesses at this stage; it suffices that these witnesses are at least arguably relevant to its defence (see [83] above). As such, there is usually no certainty that any such witnesses will be called for the trial. I think it may be too much to expect of a defendant if it is required to obtain some confirmation from each and every such potential witness, who may be dispersed across different jurisdictions, stating that they are unwilling to come forward and testify in Singapore, at a time when its defence has not even been filed and all the disputed issues may not even be clear.

  124. [92] Third, the observations of the Court of Appeal in Bunge ([84] above) must be seen in the context of the particular facts in that case. In that case, the High Court had dismissed an application by the defendant for a stay of the Singapore proceedings in favour of India: see Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd and another v State Bank of India and others [2019] SGHC 292 (“Grains”) at [195]-[207]. On appeal, the defendant argued that the dispute had strong connections to India (which pointed to India as being the more appropriate forum) because, inter alia, some critical witnesses who were resident in India were not compellable as far as the Singapore proceedings were concerned (at [46]). These witnesses included one Ms Jadhav, who was an employee in the second plaintiff’s group of companies.

  125. [93] It was the defendant’s own case that Ms Jadhav would more likely testify if the claim were heard in India (at [50]). In my view, it was implicit in this argument that Ms Jadhav would, at the very least, have been willing to testify in Singapore, although less likely than if proceedings were in India. Where a witness is willing to testify in Singapore, then the issue of compellability becomes irrelevant (see [88]-[90] above). Hence, the Court of Appeal did not have to deal with any issue of compellability of Ms Jadhav given that it appeared that she was willing to testify for the Singapore proceedings. That explains the Court of Appeal’s comment (as set out at [87] above) about no issue of compellability arising because there was no evidence of the witness being unwilling to testify. Further, given that Ms Jadhav was in the employ of the second plaintiff’s group of companies and that her testimony was directly relevant to a key issue of fact (see Grains at [48]-[54] and [200]), it would be most unlikely that the second plaintiff would not procure her as a witness to the proceedings in Singapore, given that, otherwise, adverse inferences might be drawn. Notably, the Court of Appeal in Bunge also added that “considerations of witness … compellability must be specific to both the prevailing external situation and a party’s own case” (at [50]). In my view, this is a recognition that the relevance of the issue of witness compellability differs from one case to another. As such, I do not think that the Court of Appeal intended to lay down a universal requirement that a defendant must first show that particular witnesses are unwilling to testify before their compellability can be said to be an issue for the purposes of Stage One of the Spiliada test.

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