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Grounds publishedDecided 20 Sep 2022

General Division of the High Court

Syed Ibrahim Shaik Mohideen v Wavoo Abdusalam Shahul Hameed and others

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[2022] SGHC 228Case no. Originating Summons No 779 of 2021 (Summons No 2371 of 2022)18 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [1] This is the first and second defendants’ application for leave to cross-examine the plaintiff on his affidavits filed in HC/OS 779/2021 (“OS 779”). For convenience, I shall term the first and second defendants as “the applicants”, unless the context requires otherwise. OS 779 is the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action against the first and second defendants in the name of the third defendant, pursuant to s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”). The underlying basis behind the present application was that, so the applicants alleged, there were material disputes of fact arising from the plaintiff’s evidence in OS 779 which warrant the court taking a closer look at that evidence.

  2. The factual background

  3. [3] The third defendant is Suvai Foods Pte Ltd, a company incorporated in Singapore on 2 March 2012 (“the Company”). The Company is engaged in the business of manufacturing food products, in particular fresh Indian food products. The plaintiff was a co-founder of the Company and was appointed a director of the Company from its incorporation until he was removed pursuant to a members’ resolution at the Annual General Meeting on 23 August 2021. Since 12 April 2021, the plaintiff has been a majority shareholder of the Company. He holds 9,600 of the 20,000 ordinary shares in the Company, or approximately 48%.

  4. [4] The first defendant is also a co-founder of the Company and remains a director. He is a minority shareholder of the Company with about 44% of the issued shares since 12 April 2021. The second defendant has been a director of the Company since 1 August 2019. She is also a minority shareholder with about 8% of the issued shares.

  5. [5] The plaintiff commenced OS 779 for leave to commence a statutory derivative action on behalf of the Company against the first and second defendants pursuant to s 216A of the Companies Act. The plaintiff’s application was premised on the first and second defendants’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in their capacities as directors. As against the first defendant, the plaintiff alleged the following breaches:

  6. [6] As against the second defendant, the plaintiff alleged that, since her appointment as a director of the Company, she had conspired with the first defendant to act against the Company’s interests by engaging in [5(d)]–[5(g)] above.

  7. [7] On 12 May 2022, the applicants informed the plaintiff of their intention to cross-examine him and requested for his consent or comments. Despite attempts by the applicants to follow up with the plaintiff on 24 May 2022 and 2 June 2022, the plaintiff did not reply until 8 June 2022. The plaintiff’s eventual reply was that he would oppose the applicants’ application to cross-examine him. The applicants therefore proceeded to file the present application.

  8. The applicants’ grounds for the present application

  9. [8] The essence of the applicants’ grounds for the present application was that there were material disputes of facts arising from the plaintiff’s evidence in OS 779. The applicants submitted that their evidence warranted the court taking a closer look at the plaintiff’s evidence. Referencing the requirements for an application for leave under s 216A of the Companies Act, the applicants said that there were material disputes of facts arising from the plaintiff’s evidence in terms of the so-called notice, good faith, and interest requirements (see the High Court decision of Tan Chun Chuen Malcolm v Beach Hotel Pte Ltd and another [2022] SGHC 187 at [4]–[5]).

  10. [9] More specifically, the applicants pointed to several “factual gaps” in the plaintiff’s narrative of the relevant events. According to them, these factual gaps had either been contradicted by the applicants’ affidavits or raised issues of fact that are relevant and necessary to the disputed issues in OS 779. Where these factual gaps gave rise to issues of fact, they can be divided into events before the filing of OS 779, and events after the filing of OS 779. The applicants said that the resolution of these factual gaps would greatly assist the court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s case in OS 779 as these gaps related to his account of material events.

  11. The applicable principles to determine when to order cross-examination in an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action

  12. The court’s discretion to order cross-examination in an originating summons

  13. Overview of the court’s general discretion

  14. [13] Similarly, O 28 r 4(3) of the ROC provides as follows:

  15. [14] The combined effect of O 38 r 2(2) and O 28 r 4(3) is that, unlike the case of proceedings commenced by writ where the default position would be that a deponent of an affidavit of evidence-in-chief is to be cross-examined at trial (see O 38 r 2(1)), a party who wishes to cross-examine a deponent in proceedings commenced by originating summons or summons would have to make an application to court for cross-examination.

  16. The general factors affecting the exercise of such discretion

  17. [17] While I have said that the discretion contemplated under O 38 r 2(2) and O 28 r 4(3) of the ROC is quite wide, it is also trite that every discretion must be exercised consistently and properly in accordance with the rationale that underlies that discretion. This must mean that there are some general factors that should guide the consistent and proper exercise of the discretion. Of course, these factors must necessarily be general in nature and not unduly affect the exercise of the discretion.

  18. The court’s discretion to order cross-examination in an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action

  19. Overview of the court’s discretion in this context

  20. The specific factors affecting the exercise of such discretion

  21. (1) The nature of an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action

  22. [24] The starting point is that an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action under s 216A of the Companies Act is not a trial of the alleged wrongdoing. Applications under s 216A are for leave. Given the nature of such an application, a lower standard of proof is applied to test the allegations made. All that is needed is a prima facie case at this stage. Thus, as noted in Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2017) (at p 481), the Court of Appeal in Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor [2013] 2 SLR 340 (“Ang Thiam Swee”) stated that to satisfy the requirement in s 216A(3)(c) of the Companies Act – which is the substantive requirement of the leave application – the applicant must (at [53]) “cross the threshold of convincing the court that the company’s claim would be legitimate and arguable”. The court also noted that (at [55]) it is “plain that at this interlocutory stage, the standard of proof required is low, and only the most obviously unmeritorious claims will be culled”. Similarly, in the High Court decision of Yeo Sing San v Sanmugam Murali and another [2016] SGHC 14 (at [23]), Aedit Abdullah JC (as he then was) held that “[t]he application for leave is only to provide a form of filtering, and it is clear that such filtering can only be at a broad level at this stage”.

  23. [25] The nature of an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action brings with it at least two consequences in relation to the need for cross-examination. First, there is no need at the application for leave stage to show that the intended action will or is likely to succeed (see Urs Meisterhans v GIP Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 552 at [25]) but what needs to be shown instead is that the claim is “legitimate and arguable” (see Ang Thiam Swee at [53]). Thus, as stated in Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (at p 483), the court is not required to make an extensive inquiry into the merits of the claim. Rather, it suffices for the court to rely on the affidavit evidence filed. Choo Han Teck JC (as he then was) put this very clearly in the High Court decision of Agus Irawan v Toh Teck Chye and others [2002] 1 SLR(R) 471 (“Agus Irawan”) (at [6]):

  24. [26] Second, given its nature and purpose, if an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action is successful, then there will be a full action taken out in the name of the company concerned based on the various facts raised in the affidavits filed for the leave application. This brings back the concern raised by Prakash JC in Tan Sock Hian about not giving parties a rehearsal ahead of the trial. Indeed, if the court hearing the application for leave takes too robust an examination of the evidence, such as by ordering cross-examination, then that effectively gives the parties the benefit of a rehearsal ahead of any trial that may eventually be brought in the name of the company concerned. This would not only be duplicative but may also lead to oppressive effects. Accordingly, similar to Prakash JC in Tan Sock Hian, I would regard that cross-examination should only be allowed in the exceptional case in what is akin to an interlocutory matter (see Tan Sock Hian at [14]).

  25. (2) The inevitable existence of disputes of facts

  26. [28] The second factor that affects the exercise of discretion is simply that it is inevitable that there will be disputes of facts, some material, in the competing affidavit evidence. This is inevitable because, if the parties are in agreement as to what happened in relation to the company concerned, there would be no application for leave to commence the statutory derivative action in the first place.

  27. (3) Exceedingly difficult for a court to order cross-examination

  28. (4) Necessity is not a relevant factor

  29. [35] Second, the applicants cited Agus Irawan in support of a “necessity” test. However, I read Agus Irawan, especially at [6], as holding that it will be a very rare instance where cross-examination is granted. I cannot see any way else to read Choo JC’s statement of the legal principle (at [6]): “[t]hat is what a prima facie legitimate or arguable case is all about. Leave to cross-examine in such situations ought to be sparingly granted.”

  30. Application of the principles to the present application

  31. [39] In summary, I was of the view that the applicants’ application for cross-examination in OS 779 should be dismissed. First, cross-examination at this point is not needed considering the nature of an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action. As Choo JC stated in Agus Irawan, the court need not and should not be drawn into an adjudication of the disputed facts at the leave application stage. Yet, this is what the present application, if granted, would amount to.

  32. [40] Second, if I granted the applicants’ request to cross-examine the plaintiff, I would effectively be allowing them a rehearsal ahead of any future trial brought in the name of the Company against the applicants. As Prakash JC alluded to in Tan Sock Hian, this would not only be duplicative but may also lead to oppressive effects.

  33. Conclusion