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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Sep 2022

General Division of the High Court

Sabrina Sim Xin Huey v Public Prosecutor

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[2022] SGHC 240Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9106 of 202213 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. [2] The appellant, Sabrina Sim Xin Huey, pleaded guilty to one charge under s 41C(1)(a)(iii), read with s 41C(2), and punishable under s 41C(3)(a)(i) of the ABA (“the Charge”). A second charge, also preferred under the same provisions, was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. Broadly, the charges pertained to the appellant’s failure to take reasonable steps to ensure that two dogs under her care were not confined in a manner that subjected them to unnecessary pain and suffering.

  2. Background facts

  3. [4] The appellant was a dog trainer. Sometime in January 2020, the complainant engaged the appellant to train her two dogs (“the Dogs”). The Dogs resided with the appellant during this engagement.

  4. [5] On 25 August 2020, the appellant drove the Dogs from her residence to Veragoo Close to conduct a training session. This concluded at approximately 1.45pm. Thereafter, the appellant placed the Dogs in the boot of her car and drove home.

  5. [6] The appellant arrived home at approximately 2.30pm. She parked her vehicle in an unsheltered spot in an open-air carpark. Distracted by a social media post, the appellant exited her vehicle without the Dogs in tow.

  6. [7] She realised that she had left the Dogs in the boot of her car approximately one and a half hours later. By the time she attended to the Dogs, they were unresponsive, which prompted the appellant to bring the Dogs to a veterinary clinic in the vicinity.

  7. [8] The Dogs were, however, dead by the time they arrived at the clinic. A post-mortem conducted on one of the Dogs three hours later established that the “cause of death was heat stress”.

  8. The DJ’s decision

  9. [9] The detailed grounds of the DJ’s decision can be found at Public Prosecutor v Sabrina Sim Xin Huey [2022] SGDC 151. In summary, the DJ considered that s 43B of the ABA, which grants the court the discretion to impose disqualification on offenders in certain circumstances, was enacted to further the ends of deterrence.

  10. [11] The DJ pegged the appropriate length of disqualification at six months. This balanced the fact that the appellant’s negligence resulted in the death of the Dogs with the fact that she had not intended the harm which materialised.

  11. The parties’ submissions

  12. The appellant’s submissions

  13. The Prosecution’s submissions

  14. My decision

  15. [18] I deal first with the appellant’s contention that a court ought only to impose disqualification orders under s 43B(1) of the ABA “in the most serious cases of animal abuse” and where an offender intentionally inflicts harm on an animal. I do not accept that the court’s discretion under s 43B(1) of the ABA is so restricted.

  16. [19] For ease of reference, I set out s 43B(1) of the ABA:

  17. [20] To begin, the plain wording of s 43B(1) of the ABA does not support the appellant’s interpretation of the provision. The first step of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the possible interpretations of the statutory provision, having regard to both the provision in question as well as the context of the text within the written law as a whole (Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37]).

  18. [22] Whilst the appellant contends that the parliamentary debates on the Bill support her interpretation of the ambit of s 43B(1) of the ABA, I find to the contrary. The appellant points to an extract of the debate on the Bill in which then Member of Parliament for Ang Mo Kio Group Representation Constituency, Mr Yeo Guat Kwang (“Mr Yeo”), observed that “[t]he Bill also proposes to empower the [c]ourt to disallow offenders, where warranted, from owning or being in charge of any animal while working or being employed in any animal-related business, or from engaging in or carrying on an animal-related business, for a set period of up to a one year” and “such a penalty need only be meted out in specific cases in line with the intent and severity of the abuse, and would be able to serve as a social deterrent to offenders” (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (4 November 2014) vol 92).

  19. [25] However, with respect, this argument is premised on a misunderstanding of negligence. While negligence does not require an offender to have knowledge or awareness of the risk of the consequence in question ensuing but merely that as a matter of objective assessment, there are grounds that could have led a reasonable person in the position of the actor to foresee the consequence in question flowing from the action (Muhammad Khalis bin Ramlee v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 449 at [34]), this does not mean that a negligent offender is incapable of controlling or comprehending his acts or omissions. Further, even if an offender did not appreciate the risk of his acts or omissions at the time of the offence, specific deterrence is forward-looking. It seeks to instil in a particular offender the fear of re-offending through the potential threat of re-experiencing the same sanction previously imposed (Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR(R) 814 at [21]).

  20. Conclusion