General Division of the High Court · Decided 27 March 2023
Maxx Engineering Works Pte Ltd v PQ Builders Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 71 · Case no. Originating Application No 621 of 2022 · 15 paragraphs
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Introduction
Background to the dispute
- [4]
[4] The parties entered into a contract (the “Sub-Contract). Clauses 54 and 55 of the Sub-Contract were salient:
Issue 1: Whether there was a legal obligation to refer to mediation
- [6]
[6] PQ submitted that the parties were not under a contractual obligation to refer the dispute to mediation before resorting to arbitration. Indeed, Clause 54 stated that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, prior reference of the dispute to mediation under this clause shall not be a condition precedent for its reference to arbitration …” [emphasis added].
- [7]
[7] Maxx accepted that Clause 54 did not oblige the parties to mediate before commencing arbitration. Maxx pointed out that notwithstanding, Clause 54 also stated that “… the parties shall refer the dispute for mediation at the Singapore Mediation Centre” [emphasis added]. In a similar vein, Clause 55 stated that “… the parties shall refer the dispute for arbitration…” [emphasis added]. Maxx hence submitted that “shall refer” should be interpreted such that the parties must attempt dispute resolution by referring the dispute to both mediation and arbitration, so long as arbitration of the dispute had not been concluded.
- [8]
[8] As PQ’s submissions were limited to mediation not being a condition precedent to referring the dispute to arbitration, PQ’s submissions did not meet Maxx’s submissions on this issue. I nevertheless considered PQ’s submissions where it related to the parties’ legal obligation to refer the dispute to mediation.
- [9]
[9] First, PQ highlighted that Clause 54 only stated that the parties “shall endeavor [sic]” to resolve disputes through negotiations. However, PQ failed to address the key portion of Clause 54 that Maxx relied on: “[i]f negotiations fail, the parties shall refer the dispute for mediation”. Moreover, the statement in Clause 54 that “prior reference of the dispute to mediation … shall not be a condition precedent for its reference to arbitration by either party” would not affect the parties’ obligation to refer the dispute to mediation. Maxx’s submission was not that parties must mediate before proceeding with arbitration but that the parties must refer the dispute to mediation even if parties had commenced arbitration (see [6] above).
- [10]
[10] PQ also did not dispute that the words “shall refer” in Clause 55, in respect of referring disputes to arbitration, imposed an obligation to refer the dispute to arbitration. Indeed, by commencing arbitration, PQ appeared to have accepted that its contractual obligation was to refer the dispute to arbitration under Clause 55. As a matter of consistency, and on the plain language of Clause 54, the phrase “shall refer” must have also imposed an obligation on the parties to refer the dispute to mediation.
- [11]
[11] Lastly, PQ argued that the parties were under a legal obligation only to consider referring the dispute to mediation, as opposed to being obligated to refer the dispute to mediation. In support of its argument, PQ cited the Court of Appeal decision of Cheung Teck Cheong Richard and others v LVND Investments Pte Ltd [2021] 2 SLR 890 (“Cheung Richard”).
- [12]
[12] In Cheung Richard, the Court of Appeal considered the content of a contractual clause, cl 20A.1:
The Court of Appeal held at [31] that cl 20A.1 imposed only an obligation to consider mediation and the obligation “did not rise to the level of an obligation to mediate”. Relying on this finding, PQ submitted that Clause 54 similarly did not impose an obligation on the parties to mediate.
- [13]
[13] However, in contrast to the wording of cl 20A.1 that the parties “shall consider … mediation”, the wording in Clause 54 was that the parties “shall refer the dispute … for mediation”. In other words, Clause 54 obliged the parties to “refer” the dispute to mediation and not merely consider such referral (as was the case in Cheung Richard). Accordingly, PQ’s analogisation of Clause 54 in the Sub-Contract to cl 20A.1 in Cheung Richard was unjustified.
- [14]
[14] Additionally, a further point of distinction was that, in Cheung Richard, cl 20A.1 was followed by a cl 20A.2 which stated: “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, [cl(l) 20A.1 and 20A.2] shall not amount to a legal obligation on the part of either [party] to attempt mediation as a means of resolving their dispute or difference”. Clause 20A.2 thus emphasised that cl 20A.1 was not intended to be a legal obligation. In comparison, there was no similar clause in the Sub-Contract that pointed to or suggested that Clause 54 was not intended to impose a legal obligation on the parties to refer their dispute to mediation.
- [15]
[15] I hence found that, by its plain wording, Clause 54 imposed a legal obligation on the parties to refer their dispute to mediation, if negotiations failed.
Issue 2: Whether it was just and equitable to order specific performance
Adequacy of damages
- [19]
[19] As a matter of doctrine, the substitutability of a good or service is a relevant factor in the consideration of whether damages are adequate. For example, the Court of Appeal in Tay Ah Poon v Chionh Hai Guan [1997] 1 SLR(R) 596 (“Tay Ah Poon”) noted at [13] (quoting Sharpe on Injunctions and Specific Performance (2nd Ed, 1995) at paras 8.10-8.20 with approval):
In addition, the Court of Appeal in Lee Chee Wei observed at [54] that “[w]hile a contract to transfer shares in a publicly listed company will generally not be specifically enforced, a contract to transfer shares in an unlisted company on the other hand can be specifically enforced” [emphasis omitted].
- [20]
[20] In the present case, the parties had bargained for an obligation to refer their disputes to mediation. In a similar vein to the Court of Appeal’s observations in Tay Ah Poon and Lee Chee Wei, I was of the view that damages for PQ’s breach of this obligation would have been an inadequate and unsuitable substitute for this obligation. Thus, this factor leaned in favour ordering specific performance of what the parties bargained for, ie. an obligation to refer the dispute to mediation.
Substantial hardship
Futility
Practicability
Other circumstances relating to the requirement of “just and equitable”
- [28]
[28] Second, as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 (“Toshin”) at [45], “[t]he choice made by contracting parties, especially when they are commercial entities, on how they want to resolve potential differences between them should be respected” [emphasis in original]. In the present case, the parties, in concluding the Sub-Contract containing Clause 54, agreed that they would resolve their disputes by mediation, should negotiations fail. Referencing Toshin as quoted above, I was of the view that the parties’ choice to refer their dispute to mediation should be respected.
- [29]
[29] Third, the trend towards the promotion of amicable dispute resolution. The observations of the Court of Appeal in Toshin in the context of a contractual agreement for parties to “negotiate in good faith” at [45] are apposite:
Conclusion