General Division of the High Court · Decided 8 May 2024
Peck Wee Boon Patrick and another v Lim Poh Goon and others
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 120 · Case no. Suit No 148 of 2022 · 13 paragraphs
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Introduction
Background
- [3]
[3] In the interests of brevity, I shall not reproduce the facts of the underlying dispute, which have been comprehensively set out in Peck Wee Boon.
- [4]
[4] On 15 February 2024, I issued my judgment in Peck Wee Boon. On the same day, the defendants’ counsel wrote in to inform the Court that they had served on the plaintiffs an OTS dated 21 March 2023 pursuant to O 22A of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”). The material terms of the OTS are as follows:
I note that the OTS had been served on 21 March 2023, before the initial deadline for the filing and exchange of the affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) of the Suit.
- [8]
[8] On 18 March 2024, the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal against my decision to dismiss their claims against the defendants.
The parties’ arguments
The applicable law
Issues to be determined
- [14]
[14] Since the plaintiffs did not accept the OTS, there are three issues to be determined:
(a) whether the Validity Requirement is fulfilled;
(b) whether the Favourability Requirement is fulfilled; and
(c) whether the OTS was a genuine and serious offer.
Whether the Validity Requirement is fulfilled
- [15]
[15] I shall first consider whether the Validity Requirement was satisfied, ie, the OTS was not withdrawn and had not expired before the disposal of the claims. It is undisputed that the defendants had not withdrawn the OTS.
The phrase “dispos[al] of the matter” in O 22A r 3(5) of the Rules of Court must be interpreted consistently with the similar phrase in O 22A r 9(3)(a) of the Rules of Court. This phrase refers to the final disposal of the claim on appeal where there is an appeal: NTUC Foodfare at [17]. In a case where costs are to be determined after trial and where an offer to settle does not specify a time for acceptance, the offer to settle may be accepted at any time before the issuance of the judgment of the first instance court. In the present case, the OTS does not specify a time for acceptance. Thus, the OTS may be accepted at any time by the plaintiffs before the issuance of my judgment on 15 February 2024. Therefore, I find that the Validity Requirement is satisfied.
- [18]
[18] I shall further discuss whether the OTS subsists in the period after the issuance of my judgment and before the appeal is heard. Although this issue is not relevant for my consideration, as I have already concluded that the OTS was valid when I dismissed the plaintiffs’ case, it will give some clarity to the scope of the validity of the OTS. In this regard, I note that the OTS requires the plaintiffs to “discontinue their claims against the 2nd and 4th Defendants in entirety by filing a Notice of Discontinuance, within seven (7) days of the Plaintiffs’ acceptance of [the OTS]”. This means that the Suit had to be discontinued if the plaintiffs chose to accept the OTS after I had issued my judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ Suit. In this scenario, the plaintiffs could not discontinue the Suit as I had dismissed it. The plaintiffs could only discontinue their appeal, which is not a term of the OTS. Hence, the OTS, which contains a term requiring the discontinuance of the action, could not be validly accepted by the plaintiffs after I had dismissed the Suit.
- [20]
[20] In Michael Vaz Lorrain, the Court of Appeal addressed its previous decision in NTUC Foodfare. In NTUC Foodfare, the offer to settle also contained a term that required the action to be discontinued, yet the Court of Appeal had concluded that the offer remained open for acceptance until the disposal of the appeal, ie, after the High Court had issued its judgment on the merits of the case and awarded damages accordingly: NTUC Foodfare at [17]. The Court of Appeal in Michael Vaz Lorrain at [27] observed that in NTUC Foodfare, it did not squarely address the preliminary issue – whether an offer to settle which contains a term that requires the action to be discontinued could be validly accepted after the issuance of the judgment of the first instance court. Additionally, the question of whether there could be compliance with the requirement of discontinuance after judgment was not an issue before the court: Michael Vaz Lorrain at [35].
Whether the Favourability Requirement is fulfilled
- [21]
[21] I shall now address whether the Favourability Requirement was satisfied, ie, whether the judgment obtained in Peck Wee Boon is not more favourable than the terms of the OTS. The OTS was a “drop-hands” offer, which is essentially a zero-dollar offer as the defendants would not be making any payment to the plaintiffs for the discontinuance of the Suit against the defendants. However, the judgment was a complete dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.
- [22]
[22] The decision in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 3563 v Wintree Investment Pte Ltd and others (Greatearth Corp Pte Ltd, third party) [2018] 5 SLR 412 (“MCST No 3563”) involved a similar situation. There, the offer to settle “involved essentially a zero-dollar offer or what is sometimes known as a “drop hands” offer”: MCST No 3563 at [36]. The respondent’s application for striking out was granted without any objection by the appellant, effectively amounting to a dismissal of the appellant’s claims. The question was whether, in light of these facts, the test of favourability was satisfied. Lee Seiu Kin J (as he then was) held at [38]:
- [23]
[23] By analogy, the complete dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims is not more favourable than the “drop-hands” offer in the OTS. Accordingly, I find that the Favourability Requirement has been satisfied.
Whether the OTS was a genuine and serious offer
- [24]
[24] Finally, I shall consider whether the OTS was a genuine and serious offer.
- [26]
[26] The purpose behind the default rule in O 22 r 9 of the Rules of Court is to encourage the parties in an action to resolve their dispute in an efficient manner. In this regard the Court of Appeal in Man B&W Diesel at [8] remarked:
This is why, if the defendant issues an offer to settle and secures an outcome more favourable than the offer, the defendant is entitled to indemnity costs as the acceptance of the offer by the plaintiff would have averted a costly trial.
- [28]
[28] In the present case, the OTS was a genuine and serious offer. The OTS was served more than a year after the plaintiffs had commenced the action against the defendants. Various interlocutory applications had already been taken up and directions for the filing of AEICs of the Suit had been issued. Indeed, the OTS came at a fairly advanced stage of the proceedings. The parties were able to and would have evaluated the strength of their respective cases. As I have found in Peck Wee Boon, it is obvious from the evidence and undisputed that the plaintiffs did not invest with the defendants, who were unknown to them at the material time, and the plaintiffs did not hand any money directly to the defendants. Clearly, the plaintiffs had overreached their claims and their chances of success against the defendants were dismal. Given my findings on the serious lack of merit in the plaintiffs’ claims, it also cannot be said that there was no legitimate basis for the OTS.
Conclusion