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Grounds publishedDecided 8 May 2024

General Division of the High Court

Center for Competency-Based Learning and Development Pte Ltd v SkillsFuture Singapore Agency

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[2024] SGHC 121Case no. Suit No 718 of 2021

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  1. [1] This action arises out of a contract which the plaintiff entered into with the defendant – a statutory body tasked to implement the SkillsFuture initiative in Singapore – in or around May 2007, on what appeared to be the defendant’s standard-form terms. The plaintiff is a training organisation which provided, inter alia, cleaning-related training courses to numerous trainees over the course of the years. Consequently, the plaintiff made claims on the defendant’s SkillsConnect portal for disbursement of monetary support in respect of these training courses pursuant to the contract. Between April and July 2020 and in December 2020, 14 of the trainees that attended the plaintiff’s courses were called up by the defendant as part of an audit of the plaintiff’s processes. The 14 trainees’ purported testimonies formed the crux of the factual dispute between the parties, being the evidential basis upon which the defendant formed the opinion that the plaintiff had been guilty of “gross moral turpitude” and accordingly elected to terminate the contract on 25 March 2021. The defendant, naturally, claimed that it had the sole and absolute discretion to form such opinion; the plaintiff asserted in response that the discretion was not unfettered. Be that as it may, the evidential complexity before the court was augmented by the parties’ decisions not to call any of the 14 trainees as witnesses for the trial. This was despite the concerns raised by the plaintiff as to the quality of the defendant’s investigative process and the alleged memory impairment of the 14 trainees in question, who, according to the plaintiff, were elderly cleaners sent by their employers for skills upgrading. Far be it to burble in the tulgey wood of conjecture, the court must therefore decide the case based on the material before it.

  2. [2] The contractual arrangement between the parties also presented certain onerous clauses, not least upon the defendant’s election to terminate the contract. On the defendant’s part, it contended that such harsh terms were necessary to enable the defendant to discharge its statutory duty and safeguard the public funds constituting the Skills Development Fund. Be that as it may, it is trite that a contract entered into by the parties records the terms of the bargain they have struck and the contractual allocation of risks between them. In giving effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the contract, the courts seek to uphold the bargain of the parties and will undertake an objective interpretative exercise of the text of the contract and its surrounding context rather than refer to the parties’ actual or subjective intentions.

  3. Facts

  4. The parties

  5. [3] The plaintiff and defendant in counterclaim (“CBLD”) is a Singapore-incorporated company in the business of providing business and management consultancy services, corporate training services and motivational courses. CBLD’s sole shareholder is Ms Chan Lai Peng Elizabeth (“Ms Chan”), who is also a director of CBLD. To conduct its training sessions, CBLD engaged resident trainers, who are employees of CBLD, and associate trainers, who are independent contractors.

  6. Background to the SkillsConnect portal and the Contract

  7. [5] SkillsConnect was the online portal through which SkillsConnect account holders (such as CBLD) could transact with SSG during the relevant period, to obtain funding from SSG. The SkillsConnect portal was closed on 30 October 2021 and replaced by a new portal introduced by SSG, which was known as the Training Partners Gateway (“TPGateway”) portal.

  8. [6] In or Around May 2007, CBLD applied for a SkillsConnect account (the “SkillsConnect Account”) which was activated for the use of the SkillsConnect portal. At the same time, CBLD and SSG entered into a standard form contract, which is defined at cl 1.2 of the SkillsConnect General Terms and Conditions to comprise of the following documents (collectively, the “Contract”):

  9. [7] Clause 1.3 of the SkillsConnect General T&C reserves SSG’s power to “amend the Contract from time to time”, and provides that CBLD would be “bound by the latest version of the Contract found on SkillsConnect or on the web pages of the SSG web site (http://www.ssg-wsg.gov.sg/)”.

  10. (a) First, the training organisation submits an application for a training grant (“Training Grant Application”) on the SkillsConnect portal for approval. Upon SSG’s approval of the Training Grant Application (thereafter, the “Training Grant”), a Training Grant application number (“Training Grant Application Number”) is generated;

  11. (b) Subsequently, the training is to be conducted by the training organisation within 120 days. After the training has been duly conducted, the next step consists of the training organisation submitting an ad hoc claim in respect of each trainee pursuant to the earlier approved Training Grant (the “Ad hoc Claim”). Submitting an Ad hoc Claim requires the training organisation to make certain supporting declarations on the portal, including:

  12. (i) a declaration as to the number of training hours for which each trainee indicated in the Ad hoc Claim had attended the course;

  13. (ii) a declaration as to whether the training was conducted during the relevant trainee’s working hours;

  14. (iii) a declaration as to the start date and the end date of the course;

  15. (iv) a declaration as to course duration, comprising the number of classroom training hours and assessment hours; and

  16. (v) a declaration that the information stated in the Ad hoc Claim and its accompanying information (ie, the submitted attendance sheets) are true and correct.

  17. At time of submission, the training organisation is also required to provide SSG with a softcopy of the attendance sheet signed by the trainers and trainees of the course. According to SSG, the attendance sheet is “intended to serve as a contemporaneous record that the trainee(s) have attended the training course”.

  18. (c) At the final step, the grant will only be disbursed after the Ad hoc Claim has been approved by SSG. Upon SSG’s approval, an ad hoc reference number is generated (“Ad hoc Reference Number”), which also contains the Training Grant Application number. An example of an Ad hoc Reference Number is “TG-2020-096219/AC00001”.

  19. Events leading up to the termination of the Contract

  20. [9] On 16 October 2020, CBLD received a notice of intent to terminate the Contract (the “Notice of Intent”) from SSG’s Mr Pang Tong Wee (“Mr Pang”) on behalf of SSG’s Chief Executive. Mr Pang was the Chief Investigator and Director of SSG’s Fraud and Enforcement Division at all material times, which had carried out an investigation into CBLD’s submitted claims. In the Notice of Intent, SSG claimed that a group of trainees whose details were appended in its letter had not in fact fulfilled the 75% minimum attendance requirement for the respective Ad hoc Claims submitted by CBLD. The following breaches committed by CBLD were particularised:

  21. (a) In breach of cl 7.3 of the SkillsConnect General T&C, CBLD had “failed to ensure that all information it has provided about its claim submissions is true, accurate and complete. Among other things, training hours submitted for claims far exceeded what trainees had actually attended …”.

  22. (b) In breach of cl 7.5 of the SkillsConnect General T&C, CBLD had “failed to put in place adequate control measures to prevent the occurrences of the offences by the trainers”.

  23. (c) In breach of cll 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) of the SkillsConnect Funding T&C, “[c]laims have been submitted to SSG by CBLD even though the conduct of the funded courses was incomplete and even though the trainees did not attain a minimum of seventy-five percent (75%) attendance for the Funded Course”.

  24. [10] SSG also sought a refund of $793,083.79 from CBLD for the affected claims mentioned at sub-paragraphs (a)–(c) above, and provided details of the said affected claims in an annexture to the Notice of Intent. Furthermore, in view of the above breaches, the Notice of Intent stated that CBLD “has failed an audit conducted by the SSG” and that the latter “intends to terminate the contract with CBLD pursuant to clause 12.1(c) of the SkillsConnect General Terms and Conditions”. CBLD was thereafter given 14 days from the date of the Notice of Intent (ie, by 5pm on 29 October 2020) to show cause to SSG in writing as to why SSG should not, inter alia, terminate the Contract.

  25. [11] On 16 October 2020, CBLD’s Ms Chan wrote to Mr Lim Yih Dar (“Mr Yih Dar”) (also known as Mr Gabriel Lim), a manager at SSG’s Fraud and Enforcement Division, seeking further information “on what checks were conducted by SSG and what evidences were collected to determine that those classes listed did not meet 75% attendance” (the “16/10/2020 E-mail”). On 22 October 2020, Ms Chan again wrote to Mr Yih Dar to request an extension of 14 days in relation to the given deadline of 29 October 2020, citing the “time needed for [CBLD] to complete a thorough investigation, compile the relevant documents and prepare the report”.

  26. [12] In response to Ms Chan’s request in the 16/10/2020 E-mail, Mr Yih Dar replied on 23 October 2020 stating that SSG had “amongst other things, conducted verification checks with a significant number of trainees before we came to our conclusion. However, we seek your understanding that we are unable to share beyond what has already been shared (please see attached) as the information you have requested is very specific and confidential”. Mr Yih Dar further stated:

  27. [13] At the same time, Mr Yih Dar also conveyed SSG’s approval of the request for an extension of time and notified CBLD that it may, by 5pm on 13 November 2020, show cause to SSG in writing as to why SSG should not, inter alia, terminate the Contract.

  28. CBLD’s show cause

  29. [14] On 13 November 2020, CBLD completed its internal investigations and provided an investigation report to SSG (the “CBLD Investigation Report”). CBLD Investigation Report raised certain concerns on SSG’s manner of investigations (see below at [77]–[78]). Among other steps that CBLD took to show cause, it had interviewed a total of 184 trainees from Aras Development Pte Ltd (“ARAS”) and Lifelong Cleaning Pte Ltd (“Lifelong”), and obtained the trainees’ written declarations on their participation in the training courses (the “CBLD Declarations”). For convenience, I shall refer to this as the “Mass Declaration Exercise”.

  30. [15] The CBLD Investigation Report concluded that there was no breach of the Contract and that SSG’s audit “may have been conducted in a manner that did not result in accurate information and results.”

  31. Termination of the Contract

  32. [16] On 25 March 2021, CBLD received a notice for immediate termination of the Contract (the “Termination Letter”) pursuant to cl 12.1(d) of the SkillsConnect General T&C, and that SSG had “formed the opinion that CBLD is guilty of gross moral turpitude”. The Termination Letter further stated:

  33. Procedural history

  34. [17] CBLD commenced action against SSG vide HC/S 718/2021 (“Suit 718”) on 26 August 2021.

  35. Application to admit the 14 Trainee Statements and four trainees’ statutory declarations

  36. [18] At the hearing on 8 May 2023, I granted SSG’s application for the interview statements of 14 trainees (collectively, the “14 Trainee Statements”) to be admitted pursuant to s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”), which provides:

  37. [19] The 14 Trainee Statements were the statements of 14 trainees from ARAS and Lifelong (collectively, the “14 Trainees”) who had purportedly attended CBLD’s training courses and in respect of whom Ad hoc Claims had been submitted by CBLD. The 14 Trainee Statements were recorded pursuant to SSG’s conduct of in-person interviews with the 14 Trainees between 14 and 23 December 2020, and presumably in exercise of SSG’s powers of inquiry under s 57(2)(c) of the SSG Act. The 14 Trainees had attended courses conducted by four of CBLD’s trainers – namely, Mr Tan Kim Hwee Robin (“Robin”), Mr Lim Li Jian (“LLJ”), Mr Toh Kit Hong Kevin (“Kevin”) and Mr Wilkins Chew (“Wilkins”). For convenience, I shall refer to these four trainers as the “Impugned Trainers”.

  38. [20] The rationale behind the hearsay exception in s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the EA is that a statement made in the ordinary course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation is a record of historical fact made from a disinterested standpoint and may therefore be presumed to be true: Bumi Geo Engineering Pte Ltd v Civil Tech Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1322 at [104], citing M C Sarkar et al, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence vol I (LexisNexis, 17th Ed Reprint, 2011) at p 970. I was satisfied that the 14 Trainee Statements came within the ambit of s 32(1)(b)(iv) of the EA and admitted these documents for the purpose of proving that these statements were received, with the probative value of the statements to be decided per s 32(5) of the EA.

  39. [21] At the same time, CBLD also applied for the statutory declarations made by four out of the 14 Trainees, pursuant to the Oaths and Declarations Act (Cap 211, 2001 Rev Ed) (“Oaths and Declarations Act”), to be admitted. On 8 May 2023, I granted this application and admitted the four statutory declarations pursuant to ss 32C(1)(a) and 32C(2) of the EA, which state as follows:

  40. The stood-down claims

  41. [22] At Annex A of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 3) dated 21 September 2023 (“SOC”), CBLD provided a breakdown of its claim sum under the Contract, where the claim entries have been categorised with the following descriptions:

  42. (a) Category 1A: “Training grants approved for CBLD’s environmental services programs under SkillsConnect System but remain unpaid”.

  43. (b) Category 1B: “Training grants approved for environmental services programs under TPGateway system but remain unpaid”.

  44. (c) Category 1C: “Training grants approved for HR programs under SkillsConnect system but remain unpaid”.

  45. (d) Category 1D: “Training grants approved for HR programs under TPGateway system but remain unpaid”.

  46. (e) Category 2: “SkillsFuture Credit Claims by Self-Sponsored Individuals. Approved for ready payout/release for disbursement by SSG but remain unpaid”.

  47. The parties adopted the above categorisation employed at Annex A of the SOC. For convenience, I shall also adopt the same.

  48. [23] SSG pleaded that the entries under Categories 1B, 1D and 2 did not pertain to claims submitted under the Contract. On the first day of trial, counsel for CBLD rightly conceded that this was so and orally made an application for permission to amend their statement of claim in respect of the entries under Categories 1B, 1D and 2.

  49. The parties’ cases

  50. CBLD’s case

  51. [25] Suit 781 is CBLD’s claim for a total sum of $1,439,157.72 submitted as Ad hoc Claims to SSG pursuant to cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C in relation to completed training courses conducted by CBLD during the period of April 2020 to March 2021. The precise construction of cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C is disputed by the parties. Since the entries under Categories 1B, 1D and 2 were stood down, CBLD’s claim sum for this tranche is therefore the sum of $591,121.90 (the “Claim Sum”), being the aggregate sum claimed in relation to the entries under Categories 1A and 1C. In this regard, CBLD contends that cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C requires SSG to award monetary support by way of a grant to CBLD, in consideration of CBLD providing its services by conducting training course(s) (which are Funded Courses as defined in the Contract) to trainees.

  52. [26] In addition, CBLD alleges that the Contract was wrongfully terminated and claims for damages to be assessed. In this regard, CBLD’s pleaded case is as follows:

  53. (a) first, CBLD was not guilty of gross moral turpitude and that SSG did not have any basis to form the opinion that CBLD was guilty of gross moral turpitude;

  54. (b) second, CBLD did not breach any of the terms or the representations and warranties relied upon by SSG;

  55. (c) third, and in any event, cl 3.3 of the Funding – Specific T&C and cll 12.1(a), 12.1(d), 12.2, 12.5, 13.4, 14.1(c) and 15.1 of the SkillsConnect General T&C (collectively, the “Impugned Clauses”) are not operative and unenforceable, by reason of being unfair, unreasonable and/or unconscionable;

  56. (d) fourth, and in the alternative, the Impugned Clauses are subject to an implied term that SSG cannot exercise its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and/or irrationally. In this case, CBLD asserts that despite the “very small sample size” and “insufficient, un-conclusive and imprecise nature” of SSG’s investigation process, SSG disregarded CBLD’s Investigation Report, and thereby “wrongfully and/or unreasonably and/or arbitrarily and/or capriciously and/or irrationally” formed the opinion that CBLD was guilty of gross moral turpitude.

  57. [27] In response to SSG’s position that the Claim Sum is not owing, CBLD asserts that SSG is estopped or precluded from taking that position. SSG represented and/or promised by conduct that it would pay approved claims such as the Claim Sum to CBLD. In reliance on this, and despite not having being paid such approved claims, CBLD continued conducting courses for trainees in 2020 until shortly after the Termination Letter was issued, and in the process incurred substantial expenses.

  58. [28] Further and/or in the alternative to the above, CBLD claims remuneration on a quantum meruit basis for provision of the training courses.

  59. [29] In the light of the foregoing, CBLD claims:

  60. (a) the Claim Sum (ie, $591,121.90) and damages to be assessed for wrongful termination of the Contract; or

  61. (b) in the alternative, damages to be assessed for breach of cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C, or remuneration on a quantum meruit basis.

  62. [30] Lastly, in relation to SSG’s counterclaim which is advanced on the basis of cl 13.4 of the SkillsConnect General T&C (the “Clawback Clause”), CBLD repeats, as its primary case, that the Contract was unlawfully terminated; furthermore, that the Clawback Clause is unfair, unreasonable and/or unconscionable and therefore, not operative and unenforceable; and/or the Clawback Clause is subject to an implied term that SSG cannot exercise its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and/or irrationally; and/or SSG is estopped from taking the position that the counterclaim sum is payable by CBLD. For completeness, I note that whilst there is some indication on the face of CBLD’s pleadings suggesting that the Clawback Clause may amount to a penalty, CBLD has wholly abandoned this point in its closing submissions. I therefore do not propose to consider whether the penalty doctrine applies to the Clawback Clause.

  63. SSG’s case

  64. [31] Preliminarily, SSG contends that CBLD is not entitled to claim against SSG in this action as CBLD is contractually bound by the general exemption clause in cl 15.1 of the SkillsConnect General T&C.

  65. [32] As to whether SSG is under any obligation pursuant to the Contract to disburse monetary support for completed training courses, SSG strenuously denies any obligation of the sort. SSG contends that cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C imposes no obligation on SSG to award monetary support by way of a grant to any party simply by reason of that party’s eligibility to make a claim for a grant. Rather, that clause provides SSG with the sole discretion to exercise its power to accept or reject any claim for monetary support by way of a grant. In connection with its denial of the Claim Sum, I note that while SSG also pleaded reliance on cl 12.2 of the SkillsConnect General T&C, it appeared to have abandoned reliance on this clause by the time of closing submissions. I therefore shall make no finding concerning cl 12.2 of the SkillsConnect General T&C.

  66. [33] In any event, SSG takes issue with certain irregular, erroneous and/or irrelevant information in respect of certain claim entries (collectively, the “Defective Claim Entries”). According to SSG, these claims therefore do not satisfy cll 4 and 5 of the Funding – Specific T&C. In total, the Inaccurate Claims Entries amount to $22,082.30.

  67. [34] In respect of the other claim entries (ie, in respect of which an Ad hoc Reference Number has been properly furnished), SSG relies on the Clawback Clause, which provides that “[u]pon the termination of the Contract or the termination or revocation of any right or benefit granted under the Contract by reason of any matter set out in Section 12.1(a) to (g), [CBLD] shall pay to SSG the full amount of any funding or subsidy received from SSG under the Contract or in connection with the right or benefit so terminated or revoked” [emphasis added]. SSG therefore denies that the sums in the claim entries are owing and payable to CBLD. In any event, SSG disputes that it is obligated to pay the Claim Sum as the Contract has been validly terminated.

  68. [35] As to CBLD’s claim for unlawful termination, SSG denies that the termination of the Contract was wrongful. In this regard, SSG’s pleaded case relies on cl 12.1(d) of the SkillsConnect General T&C to terminate the Contract, on the basis that “in the opinion of SSG [CBLD was] guilty of gross moral turpitude”. SSG formed the opinion that CBLD “has deceived or attempted to deceive [SSG], which is a Singapore public sector agency”. Further, SSG pleaded that an alternative ground for termination is cl 12.1(a) of the SkillsConnect General T&C, on the following basis:

  69. (a) CBLD’s breach of the representations and warranties provided under cl 14.1(c) of the SkillsConnect General T&C; and

  70. (b) CBLD’s breaches of cl 7.3 of the SkillsConnect General T&C; cll 4.5 and 4.6(a)–4.6(c) of the Terms and Conditions for Funded Courses, and para 3(iv) of the Guidelines to Terms & Conditions – Funded Courses.

  71. [36] In essence, these breaches relate to CBLD’s failure to (i) ensure that the information provided to SSG in its Ad hoc Claim submissions are true, accurate and complete, and (ii) to maintain a formal system to track the attendance of its trainees.

  72. [37] As to CBLD’s alternative claim for remuneration on a quantum meruit basis, SSG disputes this by reason of the fact that the Contract was not one for services. Furthermore, SSG had not requested CBLD to perform any services or to conduct any training courses.

  73. [38] SSG’s counterclaim for the sum of $793,083.79 (the “Counterclaim Sum”) is advanced pursuant to the valid termination of the Contract and the Clawback Clause. The Counterclaim Sum relates to the funding received by CBLD under the Contract in relation to training sessions conducted by the Impugned Trainers (ie, Robin, LLJ, Kevin and Wilkins) for the employees of ARAS and Lifeline. This is a fraction of the total amount of funding and/or subsidies disbursed by SSG to CBLD under the Contract, which SSG says amounted to some $7,759,215.25 from 2010 to 2020.

  74. Issues to be determined

  75. [40] The issues which arise for my determination in the present tranche are:

  76. (a) As a preliminary issue, whether CBLD is precluded from bringing Suit 781 by virtue of cl 15.1 of the SkillsConnect General T&C;

  77. (b) Whether the Contract was validly terminated by SSG, in particular:

  78. (i) Whether CBLD submitted false, inaccurate or incomplete information for the purpose of making Ad hoc Claim submissions;

  79. (ii) Whether CBLD maintained a formal system to track the attendance of the trainees who attended their courses;

  80. (iii) Whether CBLD maintained a formal feedback system;

  81. (iv) Whether, in the opinion of SSG, CBLD was guilty of “gross moral turpitude”;

  82. (v) Whether SSG is precluded from relying on the ground of termination in cl 12.1(a) of the SkillsConnect General T&C;

  83. (vi) Whether cll 12.1(a) and/or 12.1(d) are subject to an implied term that SSG cannot exercise its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and/or irrationally; or are otherwise unfair, unreasonable and/or unconscionable;

  84. (c) Whether the Claim Sum is owing and payable to CBLD; in particular:

  85. (i) What is the proper construction of cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C? In particular, does cl 3 require SSG to disburse monetary support by way of a grant to CBLD for eligible claims, or does it confer on SSG the sole discretion to exercise its power to accept or reject any claim for monetary support by way of a grant?

  86. (ii) Assuming the Contract was validly terminated, what is the effect of the termination on SSG’s obligations under cl 3 of the Funding – Specific T&C in respect of the Claim Sum?

  87. (iii) Whether SSG is estopped from relying on the Clawback Clause in respect of denying the Claim Sum;

  88. (iv) Whether the Defective Claim Entries are recoverable;

  89. (d) Whether CBLD’s claim for quantum meruit is made out;

  90. (e) Assuming the Contract was validly terminated, whether SSG is entitled to the Counterclaim Sum pursuant to the Clawback Clause, in particular:

  91. (i) Whether the Clawback Clause is subject to an implied term that it cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously and/or irrationally;

  92. (ii) Whether the Clawback Clause is unfair, unreasonable and/or unconscionable; and

  93. (f) Whether SSG is entitled to indemnity costs.

  94. The concept, standard and burden of proof

  95. [41] I shall start with addressing the question of the burden of proof. It cannot be disputed that in so far as CBLD’s claim is premised on the wrongful termination of the Contract, the burden lies on CBLD to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that “[a]ll claims submitted to [SSG] by [CBLD] are in relation to trainees who have attended these training courses and who have attained a minimum of seventy-five percent (75%) attendance for these said training courses”. It goes without saying that the claimant bears the legal burden of establishing his case (see s 103 of the EA which encapsulates the same principle at common law): Loo Chay Sit v Estate of Loo Chay Loo, deceased [2010] 1 SLR 286 (“Loo Chay Sit”) at [14]. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Loo Chay Sit provided instructive guidance concerning the three possibilities as to the concept of proof under ss 3(3)–(5) of the EA. Whilst the legal principles are trite, in the light of the specific factual matrix in this case and the nature of the evidence adduced by the parties (see below at [47]–[86]), I find it helpful to reproduce the relevant passages from Loo Chay Sit at [18]–[22]:

  96. [42] The Court of Appeal emphasized that “whether or not a particular fact is “proved” or “disproved” or “not proved” will depend, in the final analysis, on, the particular factual matrix concerned, and, in this connection, the evidence adduced by the parties” [emphasis in original] (Loo Chay Sit at [23]).

  97. [43] In addition to the aforementioned principles, I am also mindful that pursuant to SSG’s counterclaim, SSG has, in its written submissions, made certain allegations of forgery, fraudulent conduct and dishonesty on the part of CBLD. The parties also agree that “gross moral turpitude” requires dishonesty.

  98. [44] Where fraud is alleged in civil proceedings, the standard of proof remains that of a balance of probabilities; but owing to the severity and potentially serious implications attaching to a fraud, more evidence is required to establish that allegation than would be the situation in an ordinary civil case: Tang Yoke Kheng (trading as Niklex Supply Co) v Lek Benedict and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 263 (“Tang Yoke Kheng”) at [14]; Chua Kwee Chen and others (as Westlake Eating House) and another v Koh Choon Chin [2006] 3 SLR(R) 469 at [39]. In Tang Yoke Kheng, the Court of Appeal explained (at [14]):

  99. [45] This principle in Tang Yoke Kheng was followed in Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie Handoyo”), in the context of allegations of forgery or fabrication of a guarantee in a civil claim. The Court of Appeal in Alwie Handoyo at [160] further affirmed the observations of Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman (Consolidated Appeals) [2003] 1 AC 153 at [55], where he explained:

  100. Analysis of the evidence before the court

  101. [46] The people best placed to testify as to the truth of the statements in the 14 Trainee Statements would have been the 14 Trainees themselves. However, they were not called as witnesses.

  102. SSG’s evidence

  103. [47] I shall begin by setting out SSG’s evidence at trial, before turning to CBLD’s evidence.

  104. [48] According to the evidence of SSG’s Mr Pang, the Fraud and Enforcement Division began investigations into CBLD’s compliance with the Contract in around April 2020. Between April and July 2020, SSG made several telephone calls (the “Telephone Interviews”) to 21 trainees who had attended training courses conducted by CBLD. Questions relating to the course attendance, course duration and course venues were posed to these 21 trainees. The Telephone Interviews revealed certain discrepancies between on one hand, the information submitted by CBLD to SSG pursuant to which Ad hoc Claims had been made and approved, and on the other hand, what the trainees recollected of the actual training sessions conducted by CBLD. SSG identified these discrepancies through comparing the attendance sheets submitted by CBLD when making an Ad hoc Claim against the recounts allegedly provided by the 21 trainees during the Telephone Interviews.

  105. [49] However, the contents of the Telephone Interviews were not disclosed at trial. The court could only refer to a summary of the alleged discrepancies revealed from the Telephone Interviews as set out in Mr Yih Dar’s affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) (which gave a generalised account), as well as the brief particulars of each Telephone Interview in so far as the subsequent 14 Trainee Statements may have recorded the same.

  106. [50] According to Mr Pang, the discrepancies revealed from the Telephone Interviews could not be merely dismissed as administrative or minor inaccuracies. SSG took a serious view of the discrepancies revealed from the Telephone Interviews “because they suggested that [CBLD] had made Adhoc Claims in breach of the SkillsConnect Contract, including the eligibility requirements set out in the Funding T&C”.

  107. [51] The CBLD Investigation Report was submitted to SSG on 13 November 2020, pursuant to the show cause process. Thereafter, between 14 and 23 December 2020, SSG furthered its investigations by conducting in-person interviews with and taking the statements of 14 out of the 21 trainees from the Telephone Interviews (ie, the 14 Trainees). Out of the 14 Trainee Statements, SSG’s Mr Pang confirmed at trial that four statements (namely, the statements from Trainee 6, Trainee 8, Trainee 12 and Trainee 14) were in fact consistent with CBLD’s submissions for Ad hoc Claims, and were not statements that led to SSG forming the opinion that CBLD was guilty of gross moral turpitude.

  108. [52] I therefore confine the analysis below to the remaining ten trainees’ interview statements. SSG asserted that these statements disclosed the following discrepancies, and supported its findings that CBLD had provided false information in its Ad hoc Claims and deceived SSG:

  109. (a) large discrepancies between the number of hours attended by the trainees and the number of hours recorded on the attendance sheets submitted by CBLD, and no reasons were stated on the attendance sheets regarding the trainees’ absence from training;

  110. (b) the training sessions were not conducted at the training venue(s) stated on the attendance sheets;

  111. (c) the trainees were trained alone or with significantly fewer other trainees than as indicated in the attendance sheets, whereas the attendance sheets indicated that the trainees were trained in large groups;

  112. (d) in respect of three trainees (namely, Trainee 4, Trainee 9 and Trainee 10), their purported signatures on the attendance sheets were not theirs; and

  113. (e) in respect of one trainee (namely, Trainee 9), she had never attended any training or signed any of the attendance sheets, and she had felt pressured to sign the declaration that she attended the training courses conducted by CBLD.

  114. [53] As to the CBLD Investigation Report, SSG explained its view that the report did not sufficiently explain the discrepancies which were disclosed from the Telephone Interviews. Among other concerns, there was a lack of contemporaneous evidence supporting the statements in the CBLD Investigation Report. SSG believed that ARAS or Lifeline would have kept the proof of their employees’ attendance at the training courses including, for example, “the cleaners-trainees’ work attendance log card showing they were absent from work on training days, … cleaning records and contemporaneous evidence of communication between … the trainee-cleaner’s supervisors, the trainees themselves, and/or the trainers from [CBLD]”. Additionally, SSG took the view that communications must have been undertaken to coordinate the trainees’ attendance for the training activities given the need to travel to training venues, yet no relevant messages via WhatsApp, SMS and/or e-mail were produced. CBLD’s trainers also failed to provide contemporaneous proof of their training sessions “such as photographs, correspondence and/or records of their whereabout on the training dates”.

  115. [54] Furthermore, SSG harboured concerns over the manner in which the Mass Declaration Exercise was conducted and how the CBLD Declarations had been obtained. From SSG’s conduct of the in-person interviews of the 14 Trainees between 14 and 23 December 2020, SSG claims to have been informed by the 14 Trainees that:

  116. (a) there was at least one instance where a trainee was asked to sign a written declaration about their participation in the training course(s) despite protesting that he/she did not attend the training;

  117. (b) there were instances where the boxes to indicate full attendance of the trainees were pre-ticked before the trainees were asked to sign on the declarations; and

  118. (c) the signing of CBLD Declarations was done in the presence of the trainee’s employer or supervisor (for instance, one “Elaine” from Lifeline was present), who, according to SSG, might have exerted pressure on the trainees to comply with the request to sign the CBLD Declarations.

  119. [55] Furthermore, it was not disputed that CBLD’s trainers were present during the signing of the CBLD Declarations. The CBLD Investigation Report at para 3.13 claimed that for “a number of trainees”, the trainers “had to refresh their memory by recapping what was taught and describing the activities that took place during the programmes”. CBLD’s Ms Chan and Mr Leonard Lim Ming Sheng (“Mr Leonard”), a director of CBLD at the material time and the son of Ms Chan, explained that this was arranged so that the trainees could see the trainers in-person and be reminded that they had attended the training sessions. Ms Chan further explained that, to the best of CBLD’s ability, CBLD tried to ensure that at least two witnesses, one from a different department in CBLD and one of the trainee’s site supervisors, were present at all times during interviews with the trainees and the signing of the CBLD Declarations. Nonetheless, SSG took the view that this called into question the objectivity of the CBLD Declarations. Pointing to the near perfect outcome of the CBLD Declarations (see below at [64]), SSG observes that no explanation was given by CBLD as to how the presence of the trainers and the two witnesses would not impact the objectivity of the CBLD Declarations.

  120. [56] For these reasons, SSG did not accept the findings set out in the CBLD Investigation Report.

  121. [57] Lastly, SSG also pointed to at least one incident on 16 December 2020 which called into question the probity of CBLD’s conduct in the investigation process. Mr Yih Dar gave evidence that as he was completing the interview of the last of three trainees from Lifeline (ie, Trainee 8’s interview) at around 9pm, he spotted a “young chap” standing outside the glass door of SSG’s office. The individual went off and was later seen again by Mr Lim’s colleague at around 10.30pm standing outside the building of SSG’s office. Upon questioning, the individual identified himself as an employee of Lifeline named “Ah Li” who was tasked to bring Trainee 8 to the nearby MRT station.

  122. [58] However, this “Ah Li” was later found out to be either LLJ or Wilkins. SSG reached out to Lifeline via e-mail on 16 December 2020 requesting the particulars of the purported employee who had accompanied Trainee 8. In response, the managing director of Lifeline, Mr John Tan, informed SSG that it had in fact been CBLD personnel who had escorted the Lifeline trainees to SSG’s offices for the interview. Mr John Tan explained:

  123. [59] SSG next followed up with CBLD’s Ms Chan on the details of the CBLD personnel who had accompanied the Lifeline trainees to SSG’s interviews on 16 December 2020. To this, Ms Chan replied via an e-mail on 19 January 2021 stating:

  124. [60] I observe that Ms Chan’s statement that “there is nothing for [CBLD] to hide” appeared to be somewhat at odds with the duplicitous conduct of the trainer who initially identified himself to be “Ah Li” from Lifeline. If the reason for such arrangement was an innocuous one, as Ms Chan asserted, there was no reason for the trainer to have been less than forthright as to his identity.

  125. [61] Be that as it may, SSG took a stern view of the matter in its consideration of CBLD’s show cause.

  126. CBLD’s evidence

  127. [62] I shall turn to CBLD’s evidence, which included: (i) the CBLD Investigation Report (and the CBLD Declarations therein); (ii) eight statutory declarations; and (iii) the evidence of CBLD’s personnel and trainers at trial. As to (ii), CBLD had, on 28 June 2021, in anticipation of legal proceedings, arranged for the statutory declarations of Trainee 10, Trainee 11, Trainee 12, Trainee 14, LLJ, Robin, Kevin and Wilkins to be affirmed pursuant to the Oaths and Declarations Act. As noted at [21] above, the statutory declarations of the four trainees were admitted pursuant to ss 32C(1)(a) and 32C(2) of the EA.

  128. [63] As to (i), CBLD claimed to have interviewed the 184 trainees in the following manner:

  129. [64] CBLD reported that, of the 184 trainees who completed CBLD Declarations, 183 trainees declared that they had attended their respective programmes. Several of the 183 trainees declared that they had attended the programme but could not remember the duration present. Only one trainee declared that he could not remember attending the programme. According to CBLD, these 184 trainees accounted for approximately 39.3% of the total number of training places, being 756 training places out of the total 1,922 training places identified by SSG.

  130. [65] The CBLD Investigation Report further noted that during the Mass Declaration Exercise, “CBLD observed that a number of trainees were unable to remember the training initially as the training may have occurred some time ago. The trainer had to refresh their memory by recapping what was taught and describing the activities that took place during the programs. Only after recognising the trainer and the program details, were they able to recall that they had attended the training”.

  131. [66] As to the eight statutory declarations and the evidence of CBLD’s personnel and trainers at trial, I discuss the evidence in the analysis below, where relevant.

  132. The CBLD Declarations

  133. [67] As a starting point, the results of the CBLD Declarations were not as “near perfect” as SSG sought to characterise them to be (see above at [55]). For instance, trainees were given the option to indicate that they could not remember the duration that they were present in the training course. 57 training places (out of the 756 training places surveyed) were attended by trainees who selected this option in their declaration forms. This suggested that the Mass Declaration Exercise was designed to be carried out impartially, as explained by CBLD’s Ms Chan:

  134. I would add that the “57 of them” stated by Ms Chan was referring to the 57 training places. Additionally, in respect of one of the training places (out of the 756 training places surveyed), a trainee selected the option which stated that he/she could not remember attending the programme.

  135. [68] Be that as it may, I accept that several of the 14 Trainee Statements raised justifiable concerns that struck to the very heart of the integrity of the CBLD Declarations.

  136. [69] The first was Trainee 9’s interview statement. When the CBLD Declaration signed by Trainee 9 was shown to her, she said that she had “[felt] pressured” into signing the CBLD Declaration despite asking “how I can sign if I have never attended training”. She said the CBLD Declaration had already been pre-ticked to indicate that she had attended the courses in full before she was asked to sign it. Her response also contradicted CBLD’s assertion that the role of the witness, in this case one “Elaine” from Lifeline, was to ensure that the interviewees had full autonomy in the completion of the CBLD Declaration (see above at [63]). For context, I set out Trainee 9’s relevant responses:

  137. For completeness, I note that Trainee 9 also stated at the end of her declaration that there were “other aunties telling [her] they faced the same thing as [she] did and have no choice but to just sign even though [they] never attend the training”. However, I decline to give any weight to this part of Trainee 9’s statement for the simple reason that it constitutes hearsay upon hearsay and is not reliable.

  138. [70] Second, there was Trainee 7’s interview statement. She stated that “the handwriting in S/n 01 and 02 doesn’t belong to [her]. [She] did not tick the boxes on [the CBLD Declaration] as well”. She also stated that “[she] was told to sign to prove that [she] attended training. But [she] wasn’t told that signing it means [she] agree[d] that [she had] attended the training to the full duration. The “ticks” were not made by [her]”.

  139. [71] Third, there was Trainee 13’s interview statement, which also appeared to contradict CBLD’s assertion of the procedural safeguards (namely, having a witness present) that had been put in place. Trainee 13 stated:

  140. [72] CBLD’s Ms Chan and Mr Leonard maintained that the presence of the trainers was necessary to give context to the trainees and help them remember the training sessions. They maintained that “clear instructions” were given to the trainers not to coerce or pressure the interviewees. However, Mr Leonard admitted that he had only been present for one of the sessions of the Mass Declaration Exercise. Ms Chan herself was not present at any of these sessions. Ms Chan candidly explained that the presence of CBLD’s trainers went beyond simply being present at the signing of the declarations; it extended to having interactions with the trainees:

  141. She maintained, however, that the purpose of these interactions was to help the trainees “refresh” their memories of the courses.

  142. [73] Mr Leonard also testified that prior to conducting the Mass Declaration Exercise, CBLD had “informed SSG that [CBLD is] going to do this and, therefore, … also implying that if [SSG] like[d] to be there, to be able to see all 184 candidates who [SSG] can speak to, I welcome that”. In other words, Mr Leonard claimed that the Mass Declaration Exercise was conducted under the expectation that SSG would conduct audits and spot checks in relation to the declarations. I would observe, however, that this “expectation” was not communicated to SSG as clearly as Mr Leonard claimed. In CBLD’s correspondence with SSG, the former merely stated that “[CBLD is] currently performing an internal investigation and will respond with a report which will contain, amongst other things … [a] declaration from the trainees involved on whether they have attended and completed the minimum amount of training hours”. At no point did CBLD expressly invite SSG to “audit” its Mass Declaration Exercise. Be that as it may and regardless of CBLD’s motives in having the Impugned Trainers present at the Mass Declaration Exercise, the possibility that the trainees had been influenced could not be ruled out, especially in the light of what was recorded in the interview statements of Trainee 9, Trainee 7 and Trainee 13.

  143. [74] I accept that CBLD was operating under certain constraints in conducting their investigations for the purposes of showing cause. For one, there was the time constraint. The Notice of Intent was served on CBLD on 16 October 2020 and CBLD was required to show cause by 13 November 2020 (after accounting for the extension granted by SSG). The second and more troubling matter was that it was apparent that insufficient particulars of the alleged breaches had been provided. This is disappointing because it would make it difficult for CBLD to know the case that it had to meet. In this case, the Notice of Intent asserted breaches of three provisions of the Contract and provided the general statements of breach. No specific grievances raised in the 14 Trainee Statements were cited. For instance, in respect of the alleged contraventions of cll 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) of the SkillsConnect – Funding T&C, the Notice of Intent merely stated that “[c]laims have been submitted to SSG by CBLD … even though the trainees did not attain a minimum of seventy-five (75%) attendance for the Funded Course”. According to SSG’s Mr Pang, CBLD ought to have known from the appended list of affected claims that the complaint related to the courses which had been conducted by the Impugned Trainers. Based on this, CBLD would have sufficient information to show cause. While CBLD indeed figured out that this involved the Impugned Trainers, it could not have known, at the time the Notice of Intent was sent, that the basis of SSG’s concerns was founded on the information provided by only the 14 Trainees. The identities of the 14 Trainees were not revealed. In fact, SSG never disclosed to CBLD the information which had been provided by the 14 Trainees over the Telephone Interviews, for the show cause process. CBLD was unable to identify most of the 14 Trainees, although several trainees “did sound out to [CBLD] that they [had been] interviewed by [SSG]” during the Mass Declaration Exercise. This meant that CBLD could only ask the 184 trainees whether they had attended CBLD’s training sessions in full. This perhaps also explains why CBLD’s show cause process was directed toward, inter alia, obtaining declarations and generalised statements of whether a trainee had attended the training course in full or not, instead of seeking to address the specific grievances raised in respect of the specific trainees’ Telephone Interview responses. Simply put, CBLD could not have known, and did not know, adequate particulars of the alleged breaches.

  144. [75] In the 16/10/2020 E-mail, Ms Chan requested SSG to “update [CBLD] on what checks were conducted by SSG and what evidences [sic] were collected to determine that those classes listed did not meet 75% attendance”. In a follow-up e-mail on 19 October 2020, Ms Chan stated that “[f]rom [CBLD’s] preliminary investigation, [it] found that SSG had not interviewed any of [its] staff, trainers nor the 2 clients in question and [CBLD does] not know how SSG concluded the allegation that trainees did not meet 75% attendance”. To Ms Chan’s request, however, Mr Yih Dar simply replied in an e-mail on 23 October 2020 that “[SSG has], amongst other things, conducted verification checks with a significant number of trainees before [SSG] came to [its] conclusion. However, [SSG] seek[s] your understanding that [SSG is] unable to share beyond what has already been shared … as the information you have requested is very specific and confidential” [emphasis added].

  145. [76] Nevertheless, I reiterate that the three trainees’ interview statements raised justifiable concerns as to the integrity of the Mass Declaration Exercise and the CBLD Declarations, which CBLD could not rebut. In any event, even if the integrity of the Mass Declaration Exercise and the CBLD Declarations could be overcome, it is uncertain what the trainees had understood and intended to declare by the words “the full duration” in the CBLD Declarations. In my judgment, I do not ascribe any weight to the CBLD Declarations because they are insufficiently reliable.

  146. The quality of SSG’s investigations

  147. [77] CBLD submits that the 14 Trainee Statements are not credible, owing to the manner in which these statements were recorded. Among other matters, CBLD points out that before SSG’s in-person interviews of the 14 Trainees took place, the CBLD Investigation Report had already expressly highlighted to SSG, under a section titled “SSG’S AUDIT MAY POTENTIALLY BEEN CONDUCTED IN AN UNSAFE OR INACCURATE MANNER”, the following pertinent considerations:

  148. (i) First, it was important to note the context that the trainees were mostly senior citizens with little to no formal education, poor language literacy and they do not have good memory. They had been sent by their respective employers for the cleaning-based courses conducted by CBLD. If asked whether the trainees remembered taking a course from a few months up to a year ago without providing further details, such as a photo of the trainer, description of what was taught and where the training took place, the trainees would not have been able to accurately recall the events.

  149. (ii) Second, the training sessions were entirely arranged by the trainees’ employers. The trainees were not required to fill in or submit any registration. All registration was conducted at their work sites during working hours.

  150. (iii) Third, it was also important to note the context of how training was conducted for the trainees. The training sessions were mostly held in non-classroom settings including meeting rooms, storerooms and common corridors. The trainers intentionally tried to make the training feel informal to engage the trainees given their profile and learning needs. Thus, the trainers used simple words in different languages or dialects. The courses’ official titles, such as “Demonstrate Understanding of the Local Cleaning Industry Environment” or “Horizontal Surface Maintenance – Perform Cleaning of Carpets”, were rarely used.

  151. I shall refer to these considerations collectively as the “Contextual Considerations”.

  152. [78] In addition to the Contextual Considerations, the CBLD Investigation Report also highlighted the following matters:

  153. (a) The trainers had at times released trainees half an hour early, and up to a maximum of two hours early. The prescribed duration of the program in the lesson plan was meant for a class size of 18–24 trainees as per its accreditation. However, most of the classes conducted by CBLD averaged about 10 trainees, and hence less time was required for group activities and skills practice. This allowed the trainers to shorten the duration of the training slightly.

  154. (b) There were advanced and weaker learners in every class. The trainers recognised the need to give more time and attention to weaker learners with special needs. To do this, the trainers would sometimes release the advanced learners early so that they could spend more time with the weaker learners who remained behind. The advanced learners would be released early only if they were able to demonstrate their competency through the quizzes and practices facilitated by the trainer.

  155. (c) In relation to the instances when the trainers had released their trainees early, the trainers always remained on-site for the program’s full duration to recap the training material with the weaker learners, or to conduct make-up training for those trainees who had missed some parts of the programme.

  156. (d) The trainers would sometimes split up the trainees into smaller groups during the training sessions. During the practical training segments, the trainers would sometimes be with a small group of trainees at a different location that was away from the training room, for example, while conducting practical training on how to wash toilets. During this time, the trainees who were waiting in the training room for their turn to partake in the practical training might leave the room to attend to work without notifying the trainer, before eventually returning in time for their turn.

  157. (e) Trainees were sometimes called by their supervisor or service buyer to attend to work during the training sessions. At other times, the trainee felt restless or fatigued and needed short breaks. The trainers would conduct make-up training sessions for the said trainee, such that the trainees could all still meet the 75% attendance requirement.

  158. [79] In my view, the nature of the investigations conducted by SSG ought to have been an inquisitorial process rather than an adversarial one. SSG was relying on the Telephone Interviews and/or the 14 Trainee Statements, without giving recourse to CBLD to question or cross-examine the 14 Trainees on the specific content of the statements they had provided. As the statutory body tasked with disbursing funds under the SkillsFuture initiative and bearing the duty to identify any non-compliance with claims eligibility or fraudulent conduct by training providers, SSG’s interest was to get to the truth of the matter. SSG’s Mr Pang agreed under cross-examination that SSG’s investigative process was a quest for the truth, whichever way the truth came out. However, despite receiving certain indications in the CBLD Investigation Report that the matter was not as straightforward as it appeared and that there could have been plausible alternative explanations for the responses by the 14 Trainees in the Telephone Interviews, SSG’s officers did not explore these points in their subsequent interviews with the 14 Trainees. While the individual interviews were conducted by various SSG officers, it was confirmed that the questions for each interview had been prepared in advance.

  159. [80] Ms Tan Wan San (“Ms Tan WS”), a manager of SSG’s Fraud and Enforcement Division, recorded the interview statements of Trainee 1, Trainee 2 and Trainee 3. Mr Lee Ming Khiang Colin (“Mr Colin Lee”), a senior manager of the Fraud and Enforcement Division, recorded the interview statements of Trainee 10, Trainee 11, Trainee 12 and Trainee 14. As to the interview statements of the remaining seven trainees, these had been recorded and/or witnessed by Mr Yih Dar.

  160. [81] Mr Pang claimed that SSG had taken the CBLD Investigation Report into account when it had interviewed the trainees. However, this primarily extended to asking the trainees about the CBLD Declarations that they had made. Mr Pang testified that he was the director who had “[made] a recommendation” and submitted a detailed report “to [the] senior management” that CBLD was guilty of gross moral turpitude. He accepted that the CBLD Investigation Report had made known to SSG that there were certain potential explanations for the trainees’ responses, such as the possibility of make-up classes. Nonetheless, despite having knowledge of the matters raised in the CBLD Investigation Report, SSG did not look into these matters.

  161. [82] Neither Ms Tan WS nor Mr Colin Lee had been briefed on the contents of the CBLD Investigation Report, or the concerns raised therein, prior to conducting the interviews with the trainees. Ms Tan WS testified that she had only been briefed that “the interviewees may have attended training but the training sessions may not have been attended in full”. She was not briefed on, and also did not explore with the interviewees, the potential explanations that the trainees may have had for not being able to recall the training courses in full.

  162. [83] In the round, the trainees were not told or shown relevant course material to “refresh” their memories of the courses. Ms Tan WS and Mr Colin Lee themselves did not know about the courses which the interviewees supposedly attended. I find some force in CBLD’s concern that these trainees might be unable to recall the training simply from being shown the formal title of the courses, such as “Horizontal Surface Cleaning”. The trainees were also not asked about whether they had attended make-up classes; or the possibility that they could only recall the make-up classes but not the entirety of the training courses. The trainees were not asked about the possibility that they had mistaken CBLD’s training courses for a “company event” or mistaken CBLD’s trainers for their own supervisors, because CBLD’s trainers sometimes wore the same uniform as the trainees. For the trainees who responded that they could only remember training alone or in significantly smaller groups than was stated on the attendance sheets, these trainees were not asked about the possibility that they could only remember the practical segments of the training sessions during which the class had been broken up into smaller groups.

  163. [84] I also observe that SSG’s trainee interviews appeared to have been conducted rather mechanically. They did not take into consideration the profile of the interviewees whom CBLD described as mostly elderly, not entirely familiar with the English language and sometimes having poor memory retention. Ms Chan described that based on her interactions with the usual profile of these trainees, “one moment, they tell me this. This moment, they tell me that, … so they are so confused. They are totally so confused”. The CBLD Investigation Report recounted one incident where a trainee was “confused and nervous” and had purportedly mistaken SSG’s Telephone Interview for a scam call:

  164. [85] Additionally, the names of the training venues were asked in English without any clarification and this could have led to some misunderstanding by the interviewees, resulting in poor or incorrect recollection. For instance, Trainee 5 was asked if she recognised the venue, “East Group (80 Airport Boulevard S819642)”, as stated in the attendance sheet. She did not recognise the training venue and replied, “I do not know, I have never been there before”. Trainee 5’s interview statement was recorded by one “Sabina Tan Yushan” and witnessed by Mr Yih Dar. When cross-examined, Mr Yih Dar confirmed that Trainee 5 had not been told that, in layman terms, the address referred to the Singapore airport:

  165. He also accepted that it was “a possibility that [Trainee 5] may not have recognised the place, because it’s presented to her as ‘80 Airport Boulevard’”.

  166. [86] However, despite these general misgivings which I have concerning the quality of SSG’s investigations process, I am unable to agree with CBLD’s submission that SSG’s findings from the 14 Trainee Statements were thereby proven to be “inaccurate and/or untrue” or that the 14 Trainee Statements were thereby “not credible”. To say so would be an over-generalisation. For instance, CBLD claimed that SSG had not shown the 14 Trainees the relevant course material or photographs of the trainers to “refresh” their memories. However, there is some force in saying that, on CBLD’s own case, the Mass Declaration Exercise was intended to and had “refreshed” the trainees’ memories (see above at [72]). As SSG pointed out, this was only one or two months prior to the recording of the 14 Trainee Statements in December 2020. Therefore, in my view, the precise weight to be given to the specific discrepancies raised by a specific trainee’s interview statement is a matter to be calibrated in the light of the evidence as a whole. This includes the potentially justifiable concerns raised by CBLD above.

  167. [87] Having set out my general considerations on the 14 Trainee Statements, I turn to the specific analysis of the material discrepancies raised.

  168. Specific findings on the discrepancies raised by the 14 Trainee Statements

  169. [88] Notwithstanding my general concerns set out above, I am satisfied that several of the 14 Trainee Statements raised the following discrepancies.

  170. Interview statements of Trainee 1, Trainee 2 and Trainee 3

  171. [89] I first deal with these three trainees’ interview statements. According to the attendance sheets, Trainee 1, Trainee 2 and Trainee 3 were stated to have attended the same training course spanning 19–21 February 2020, titled “Customer Management – Providing Quality Services” and conducted by Robin. The training location was stated to be “Amos International Group” at the address 156 Gul Circle. The total training duration of the course was stated to be 14 hours across the first two days of the course, with an assessment held separately on the last day of the course.

  172. [90] On the face of it, these three trainees’ interview statements appeared to reveal the following material discrepancies:

  173. (a) Trainee 1: During the Telephone Interview on 17 June 2020, Trainee 1 shared with SSG’s officer that she had only attended one training sponsored by Lifeline which was a two-hour training conducted at Trainee 1’s place of work “at CWT Integrated Pte Ltd in Pioneer”, that Trainee 1 had been the only trainee around and that the trainer had come to her place of work. Subsequently, during the in-person interview on 15 December 2020, Trainee 1 confirmed that (i) “the training was 1 to 2 hours” [emphasis added] for a course which was reflected on the attendance sheet as 14 hours long; (ii) she was the only person (other than the trainer) present at that training; and (iii) she had never been to the venue reflected on the attendance sheets.

  174. (b) Trainee 2: According to the attendance sheets, Trainee 2 was stated to have attended two courses; the one spanning 19–21 February 2020 (as detailed above at [89]), and the other spanning 25–26 February 2020 for a total training duration of seven hours. Yet, during the Telephone Interview on 17 June 2020, Trainee 2 informed SSG’s officer that she had only attended one training sponsored by her employer for at most an hour, that she could not recall the exact location where that training was conducted, and that there had been about five trainees including herself at that training. Subsequently, during Trainee 2’s in-person interview on 16 December 2020, she clarified that she had in fact attended two courses, each for about an hour, and that the two training sessions had been “held within the same month but on different days”. Trainee 2 also claimed that she had been the only trainee at the training sessions, and that she had not attended the training at the venue reflected on the attendance sheets. Instead, one training had been held at her worksite at “City Harvest” and the other training was conducted “at a void deck near City Harvest”.

  175. (c) Trainee 3: During the Telephone Interview on 17 June 2020, Trainee 3 shared with SSG’s officer that he had attended only two sessions of training, each lasting about 30 minutes and that he had been the only trainee on both occasions. He confirmed that this was his statement during the in-person interview on 16 December 2020. In contrast, there were three submitted attendance sheets for Trainee 3: the first was for the 19–21 February 2020 course (as detailed above at [89]), the second course was for 20 hours over three days and the third course was for 27 hours over four days. Trainee 3 also mentioned that he had never attended training at the stated venue on the attendance sheets but at his own worksite at “Tiong Seng Building”.

  176. [91] In summary, therefore, the material discrepancies appeared to be:

  177. (a) that each of the three trainees recalled attending the training for only “one or two hours”, or “about 30 minutes” for two training sessions, which was significantly less than the duration stated on the attendance sheets;

  178. (b) that each of the three trainees recalled being the “only trainee” present at the aforesaid training; and

  179. (c) that each of the three trainees recalled that they had not been trained at the venue stated on the attendance sheets.

  180. [92] I do not find Robin’s purported justifications for the discrepancies raised by Trainee 1, Trainee 2 and Trainee 3 to be convincing. There is the fact that each of the three above-mentioned trainees had separately told SSG that they had trained alone. In the first place, Robin admitted under cross-examination that he “could not remember any one of [the three trainees] at all because it’s a long process for [him] to do this”. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Robin’s evidence in his Supplemental AEIC dated 7 June 2023, Robin was therefore unable to give evidence specific to any trainee’s case at all. Yet, at trial, Robin maintained the possibility that each of these three trainees could only recall the individual make-up sessions that he could have conducted for them, and not the entirety of the training course. Under cross-examination, his response to the logical incredulity of being at three different make-up class locations at once was to assert that the make-up classes had been conducted at “different timing[s]”:

  181. [93] He also asserted that the make-up classes were held on “another day”, without providing further details:

  182. [94] When cross-examined, Robin also conceded that he had not put a remark on the attendance sheet whenever a trainee left a training session early:

  183. [95] Notwithstanding this, Robin failed to produce any contemporaneous records to show that a trainee had left a training session early:

  184. [96] Robin also admitted that he did not even inform CBLD of the instances when a trainee had left the training session early:

  185. [97] I do not find Robin’s purported justification for the discrepancies raised by Trainee 1, Trainee 2 and Trainee 3’s interview statements persuasive. I therefore reject this purported justification. In addition, I find that there are additional grounds to accept the discrepancies raised in Trainee 1’s and Trainee 3’s interview statements, which I set out below.

  186. (1) Trainee 1

  187. [98] Trainee 1 affirmed in her interview statement that she was conversant in Mandarin and that her highest academic qualification was Primary 6 education.

  188. [99] I pause to make one preliminary observation. From Trainee 1’s statement, I accept that her answers generally lent some force to CBLD’s claim that the trainees had poor memory retention and that it would be essential to note the context of how training was conducted for the trainees. For instance, when asked the basic question of “When did you start/end your employment with Lifeline Cleaning Pte Ltd?”, Trainee 1 replied:

  189. Trainee 1 was in fact employed by Lifeline at the material time. Yet, when asked about her current employment, I also note that Trainee 1 was able to provide the following generalised description:

  190. [100] Therefore, although Trainee 1 was able to recall some details with specificity (eg, the exact date of commencement of her employment), she was unable to provide a precise answer for other pieces of information, including “basic” or fundamental information such as the name of her current employer.

  191. [101] While I have some concerns with the quality of Trainee 1’s memory recollection in general, I am satisfied that, from the answers provided in her trainee statement which were specific to the training course, Trainee 1 was able to recall sufficient details of the course despite the passage of time and/or the manner in which SSG’s questions were posed. For instance, Trainee 1 was able to recall that the trainer of the course was “male, Chinese, probably in his 30s”. Trainee 1 was also able to recall that she had been sent for training:

  192. Similarly, Trainee 1 was also able to recall that the trainer had mentioned the name of the training provider but did not understand “as [the trainer] mentioned the company name in English”.

  193. [102] In this regard, I also find relevant that Trainee 1 was also able to elaborate with specificity on her answer that she had attended “only one or two hours” of training:

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