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Grounds publishedDecided 11 Jul 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Foreland Singapore Pte Ltd and another v IG Asia Pte Ltd

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[2024] SGHC 179Case no. Suit No 369 of 2022

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  1. [1] This is the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant, for damages arising from the latter’s allegedly wrongful reversal of the former’s closing nickel trades made on 8 March 2022 (the “Foreland Closing Trades” or “FCTs”). In essence, the plaintiffs had issued instructions to the defendant to execute the FCTs. The defendant executed those instructions. The plaintiffs then issued further instructions to withdraw moneys in their associated accounts, including profits from the FCTs. The defendant did not do so on the basis that the London Market Exchange (“LME”) had, in an extraordinary turn of events, suspended nickel trading and cancelled all nickel trades conducted on 8 March 2022 (the “Suspension and Reversal”). Instead, the defendant reversed the FCTs. The crux of the present case is whether the defendant was entitled to: (a) refuse to pay Foreland upon the execution of the FCTs; and (b) reverse the FCTs.

  2. [3] I now explain the detailed reasons for my decision in this judgment.

  3. The parties

  4. [4] I begin with the parties in this action. The first plaintiff, Foreland Singapore Pte Ltd (“FSG”), is a company incorporated in Singapore. It carries on business as an investment, trading and holding company, as well as the provision of management consultancy services. The second plaintiff, Foreland Holdings Co Ltd (“FJP”), is a corporation incorporated in Japan and carries on business as an investment, trading and holding company. For convenience, I will refer to FSG and FJP, collectively, as “Foreland” in the singular.

  5. [5] The defendant, IG Asia Pte Ltd (“IGA”), is a company incorporated in Singapore. IGA is a member of the IG Group of companies (“IG Group”). IGA carries on the business of dealing in and providing financial and brokerage services, security dealings, as well as commodity contracts brokerage activities as a market maker, including foreign exchange trading, contracts for difference (“CFDs”) trading, and indices trading. In this regard, it provides a platform (the “IG Platform”) for its clients to trade in over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives contracts.

  6. [6] In October 2018 and February 2021, respectively, FSG and FJP opened Corporate Margin Trading Accounts (the “Accounts”) with IGA. FSG also successfully applied to be classified as an expert investor in December 2018. It is not disputed that, in the course of the operation of the Accounts, Foreland carried out trades and transactions of various commodities, including nickel, which the defendant executed on an OTC basis, that is, directly between FSG and IGA, as well as directly between FJP and IGA.

  7. [7] It is also common ground that the relationship between Foreland as clients and IGA is governed by, among other documents, the MTCA, which is a standard form document. The parties’ relationship is also governed by the written statements in the SOEP.

  8. Overview of CFD trading

  9. [8] At this juncture, it is useful to explain some basic concepts regarding CFD trading to assist the reader in understanding the reasoning in this judgment. For the avoidance of doubt, none of these constitute findings of fact or law.

  10. [9] CFDs are, broadly speaking, financial products that allow investors to speculate on the price movements of various financial markets, such as stocks, commodities, indices, and currencies, without the investor having to actually own the underlying asset. When purchasing a certain quantity of CFDs (ie, “opening a position”), an investor can either “go long” (ie, bet that the price of the underlying asset will increase), or “go short” (ie, bet that the price of the underlying asset will decrease).

  11. [11] The results of trading CFDs can be broadly summarised as follows. If the investor predicted the price movement correctly, he could choose to “close” (ie, terminate) the position at that point in time. The result of such a “closing transaction” or “closing trade” is that he would reap a profit, with the magnitude of the profit being dependent on the degree of the price movement (ie, the difference between the price of the underlying asset at the time when the investor opened the position (“opening price” or “opening level”) as compared to the price of the same when he closed the position (“closing price” or “closing level”)). On the other hand, if the investor predicted the price movement wrongly, he might suffer serious losses, sometimes losing the entire investment sum (or more) – this is a feature of trading on margin. Where the price moves in the wrong direction, or when the market faces disruptions, the broker might raise the margin rate, which would effectively compel the investor to deposit more money with the broker, or risk getting his position closed forcibly (potentially at an unfavourable time).

  12. The undisputed facts

  13. [12] With the above background in mind, I now turn to the substantive dispute. The parties’ dispute centres on 41 out of a total of 51 nickel CFD transactions that Foreland opened. This comprised 19 nickel transactions opened by FSG, and 22 nickel transactions opened by FJP (collectively, the “Transactions”). Foreland opened the Transactions between 18 February 2022 and 3 March 2022.

  14. [13] Following an extraordinary surge in nickel prices on the LME in early March 2022, Foreland issued instructions via the IG Platform on 8 March 2022 to close all their open nickel positions – these closing trades are what I have referred to above as the “FCTs”. IGA executed these instructions. Foreland’s open nickel positions were therefore closed. The resulting profits were reflected in the Account Statements that were automatically generated for Foreland, dated 8 March 2022 and 9 March 2022.

  15. [14] On 8 March 2022 at around 8.15am (GMT) and later at around 12.00pm (GMT), the LME issued written notices for the suspension of all nickel trading on the LME Market (the “Suspension”), and the cancellation of all trades “executed on or after 00:00 UK time on 8 March 2022” (the “Reversal”).

  16. [15] On 8 March 2022 and 9 March 2022, Foreland instructed IGA to effect the withdrawal of $6,636,840.10 and $11,874,152.84 from the FSG Account and the FJP Account, respectively, into their designated bank accounts. However, IGA did not act on Foreland’s instructions. Instead, IGA purported to rely on the Suspension and later reversed the FCTs by:

  17. [16] Foreland later made various requests to withdraw as much money as possible from the Accounts on a without prejudice basis. However, instead of acting on Foreland’s instructions, IGA eventually only released parts of the sums which were reflected in the Account Statements as being available. The key question in the present case is whether IGA’s actions at each stage of the entire episode were justified.

  18. The parties’ general cases

  19. [17] Foreland’s general case is that IGA was not justified in reversing the FCTs. According to Foreland, pursuant to Terms 4 and 9 of the MTCA, Foreland had issued instructions to execute the FCTs, which IGA admittedly accepted, executed, and confirmed in writing by way of the Account Statements. Upon these instructions, IGA was obliged, pursuant to Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA, to pay the moneys to Foreland.

  20. [18] IGA’s general case is that the Suspension and Reversal constituted an emergency or an exceptional market condition that amounts to a “Force Majeure Event” under Term 23(1) of the MTCA. This therefore entitled it to exercise the right under Term 23(2) of the MTCA to suspend or modify the application of all or any of the Terms of the MTCA, especially Terms 7(13), 7(14), and Term 4(7) read with Term 4(8)(k). This was on the basis that the Force Majeure Event made it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with these Terms. Alternatively, even if the Suspension and Reversal were not a Force Majeure Event, IGA was entitled to reverse the FCTs by virtue of Term 10(4) of the MTCA, since it had acted in good faith and fairness. Further, IGA was not precluded from reversing the FCTs by virtue of, among other things, the method by which it had done so, as well as the Account Statements. Finally, IGA acted properly and in good faith in relation to Foreland’s withdrawal requests and the closures of the RFTs.

  21. [19] In response to IGA’s general case, Foreland argues that the Suspension and Reversal did not confer on IGA the right to reverse the FCTs. This is for the following reasons. First, since the parties had dealt with each other on an OTC basis, IGA assumed full responsibility for and bore all risks from the FCTs. IGA therefore cannot visit the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal on Foreland. Second, even if IGA could visit the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal on Foreland, and even if that event amounted to a Force Majeure Event under the MTCA, IGA could not rely on the MTCA to reverse the FCTs. Third, and in any event, the terms of the MTCA that conferred upon IGA the right to reverse the FCTs are unreasonable pursuant to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (2020 Rev Ed) (“UCTA”). Moreover, IGA was precluded from reversing the FCTs by virtue of the method IGA had used to effect them as well as the Account Statements. Alternatively, IGA was not entitled to reverse the FCTs by virtue of having acted in good faith and fairness. Finally, IGA did not act properly or in good faith in relation to Foreland’s withdrawal requests and the closures of the RFTs.

  22. The relevant issues

  23. [20] Shortly after the trial had ended, I invited the parties to tender their respective proposed list of issues. With these issues in mind, I then issued a suggested list of four main issues for the parties’ consideration, so that their closing submissions could be broadly aligned.

  24. [21] While this has resulted in the parties’ closing submissions being somewhat aligned, this was not entirely so. In this regard, a well-structured set of submissions with a coherent internal flow and logic that addressed the key issues raised would have been helpful. Indeed, a possible indicator of a good set of submissions is a coherent table of contents with logically nested multi-level headings from which a reasonable reader can, without reading anything else, discern the general case being put forward (see also the High Court decision of V V Technology Pte Ltd v Twitter, Inc [2023] 5 SLR 513 at [5]). In this regard, and with respect, I found it slightly difficult to follow one set of closing submissions, which had 18 first-level headings for content that covered about 70 pages. While each party is well-entitled to advance its closing submissions in whatever manner it deems fit, it was not helpful for submissions to be structured with no apparent connection between arguments. Be that as it may, I gave my fullest consideration to both Foreland’s and IGA’s closing submissions under the circumstances.

  25. [22] Having regard to the parties’ submissions, I will address the following issues in this judgment:

  26. [23] It is obvious that I will need to deal with sub-issues within these six main issues. To avoid confusion at this juncture, I will only outline those sub-issues at the appropriate points of this judgment. However, I will not address every issue that the parties have brought forward, especially if I do not think that the particular issue is germane to the dispute at hand.

  27. Whether IGA could visit the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal on Foreland despite the parties having dealt with each other on an OTC basis

  28. The parties’ arguments

  29. [24] As a threshold point, Foreland argues that the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal cannot be visited on it because IGA had dealt with it as principal and market maker on an OTC basis, with IGA acting as the sole execution venue for the execution of transactions instructed by Foreland. By way of explanation, OTC trades refer to trades that are negotiated and agreed upon between market participants away from the supervision and central clearing of an exchange, in contrast to exchange trading which takes place through public “open outcry” in a centralised location. Foreland relies heavily on the opinion of Mr Tsvetan Nikolaev Beloreshki (“Mr Beloreshki”), who acted as its expert.

  30. [25] In response, IGA makes the following points:

  31. My decision: the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal can be visited on Foreland despite Foreland dealing with IGA as principal and market maker on an OTC basis

  32. [26] In my judgment, the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal can be visited on Foreland despite Foreland dealing with IGA on an OTC basis. I arrive at this conclusion for the following reasons.

  33. The prices for nickel CFDs are derived from the LME nickel prices

  34. [27] First, the prices for the nickel CFDs are clearly dependent on nickel prices on the LME. After all, the prices for the nickel CFDs offered on the IG Platform are derived from the three-month forward nickel prices on the LME, albeit with a dealing spread added. This fact is stated clearly in several client-facing documents, including the MTCA:

  35. [29] Another term that Foreland relies on is Term 4(3), which it raised for the first time in its Reply Submissions. Foreland argues that Term 4(3), by contemplating the possibility of IGA quoting figures even when the Underlying Market is closed or non-existent, proves that the prices of the nickel CFDs are not dependent on LME nickel prices. I do not accept Foreland’s submission. It is clear from the wording of Term 4(3) that the closure or non-existence of the Underlying Market are contemplated as exceptional events. Absent such exceptional circumstances, the prices that IGA offers are derived from the underlying market. In short, the exception proves the rule.

  36. [30] In addition to the foregoing, Foreland’s witnesses testified at trial that they were unaware that the nickel CFDs, which Foreland traded with IGA, were connected with the LME. For example, Mr Nobuaki Aoshima (“Mr Nobuaki”), who is a director at FJP, said that he did not know how the nickel CFD prices were derived. He even claimed that “IG has created these prices”, and how these prices were derived was “not in any of [Foreland’s] concerns”. Similarly, Mr Hasegawa Yozo (“Mr Hasegawa”), who is the director and the sole shareholder of FSG, also claimed that he did not know that the nickel CFD prices were derived from the LME.

  37. [31] Leaving aside the clear terms in the MTCA and other documents, it is commercially unrealistic to believe that Foreland would have traded with a platform which provided no visibility as to how they derived their prices. This is not believable because it would mean that Mr Nobuaki and Mr Hasegawa, who are both highly experienced traders, would choose to trade on a platform which provided no basis upon which they could make their investment decisions. Moreover, Mr Hasegawa eventually agreed during cross-examination that he understood IGA to have referenced LME nickel prices for the nickel CFDs. In any event, even if Foreland did not actually know that the nickel CFD prices were derived from the LME, it ought reasonably to have known the same, by virtue of the various Terms in the MTCA and the documents I referred to above. There is therefore limited legal relevance even if Foreland’s witnesses did not know that the nickel CFDs were connected with the LME.

  38. [32] Accordingly, the fact that Foreland dealt with IGA on an OTC basis does not mean that Foreland is insulated from events in relation to the LME, such as the Suspension and Reversal. Such an argument ignores the commercial reality of how prices for the nickel CFDs are derived from the LME nickel prices.

  39. IGA’s trading model is contingent on being able to hedge the nickel CFDs on the LME

  40. [33] Second, IGA’s trading model is contingent upon being able to hedge the exposure from client trades on the underlying market (hedging referring generally to a strategy of offsetting investment risk from loss or failure by taking a countervailing action, with a perfect hedge being one that eliminates the possibility of future gain or loss). To begin with, this trading model is clearly communicated to clients on its website. IGA needs to engage in such hedging because it does not conduct proprietary trading in CFDs. Indeed, IGA is only able to offer the nickel CFD as a product to its clients because it could hedge its market risk on the LME through its risk management process.

  41. (1) IG Group’s hedging model shows a clear connection between the FCTs and the LME

  42. [34] In this regard, IGA’s evidence is that hedging is done through IG Markets Limited (“IGM”), which is the IG Group of companies’ central risk management vehicle. According to Mr Adam James Blemings (“Mr Blemings”), who is the Head of Trading of the IG Group, IG Group’s CFD business is contingent on the hedging of client trades on the underlying market through IGM. Thus, for any given CFD product, when a client trade is placed with an IG Group entity, that trade is automatically mirrored with IGM by way of that IG Group entity entering into a back-to-back transaction with IGM that is identical to the client’s trade in position, transaction type, and price. The market risk of all the client trades with the IG Group are thus aggregated with IGM through these mirrored trades. When the market risk exceeds an internally prescribed limit, IGM places hedging transactions to hedge the total exposure faced by the IG Group arising from the client trades. IGM places these hedging transactions either automatically or manually, depending on the product.

  43. [35] These hedging arrangements are necessary because of the IG Group’s business model. The starting point is that the IG Group does not engage in proprietary trading of CFDs. Therefore, it does not profit from its clients’ trades per se (its profits come from the dealing spread, see [27(c)] above). Instead, its clients’ positions mostly offset each other (ie, its clients take opposite positions, or “bets”, on the price movements of nickel). Inherent in this business model, however, is the possibility that a large majority of clients trade in one direction. In such a situation, IG Group needs to protect its exposure to risk by hedging in the underlying market. Without such hedging, IG Group would be exposed to an unacceptable amount of risk, which would undermine its ability to offer its trading services to its clients. This explains why the IG Group’s CFD business is contingent upon the hedging of client trades on the underlying market.

  44. [36] In relation to nickel CFDs, the underlying market on which the IG Group manually places hedging transactions for its client’s nickel trades is the LME. This is because the prices for the nickel CFDs are based on the three-month forward price of nickel offered on the LME. The IG Group does not hedge nickel trades on any other exchange because pricing on other exchanges is not necessarily sufficiently correlated to the pricing of the nickel CFDs for the exposure to be appropriately covered. IGM places the hedging transactions with Goldman Sachs & Co LLC (“GS”), which acts as IGM’s hedging broker. IGM’s clearing broker, Macquarie Bank Limited (“Macquarie”), matches the hedging transactions and clears them via the LME. Drawing from Mr Slovenski’s evidence, I summarise the trade flow from Foreland through to Macquarie in the table below:

  45. Counterparty

  46. Platform

  47. Contract Term

  48. Notes

  49. Foreland

  50. Via IGA Platform

  51. OTC Contract

  52. IGA

  53. OTC Contract

  54. IGA has no market risk exposure due to hedging arrangement with IGM.

  55. IGA

  56. Automatic after trade on IGA Platform

  57. OTC Contract

  58. IGM

  59. OTC Contract

  60. IGM absorbs market risk from IGA and manages market risk between OTC Contract and LME.

  61. IGM

  62. Inter Office Market

  63. Contingent Agreement to Trade (LME)

  64. Goldman Sachs

  65. Goldman transacts with IGM contingent on the transactions being accepted by Macquarie. From an LME perspective this is a “Contingent Agreement to Trade”.

  66. Goldman Sachs

  67. LME Clear

  68. Macquarie

  69. LME (upon Acceptance is considered “Executed”)

  70. LME Clear

  71. LME

  72. [37] In view of the above, it was not possible for Foreland to be insulated from the LME. While IGA was principal and market marker, this does not mean that the nickel CFDs were not offered to Foreland on a hedged basis or that their pricing could exist independently of market events. Indeed, this is quite clear from the documents that Foreland had access to. IGA’s website titled “Does IGA aim to profit from client losses” states that IGA’s business model is “based on providing individuals with the opportunity to trade the world’s financial markets” and that IGA protects “[its] exposure to risk by hedging in the underlying market”. The SOEP also states that “[w]hilst [IGA] acts as principal in respect of your orders, [IGA] assess the execution venues available … and upon which [IGA] place significant reliance to obtain on a consistent basis the best possible result for the execution of your orders”. Further, the SOEP also states that IGA looks at the “price feed and hedging venues”, which is the underlying market, in determining its execution arrangements.

  73. [38] At this juncture, I find it convenient to address Foreland’s argument that its lack of control over, as well as knowledge and visibility of, IG Group’s trading and risk management models, means that Foreland must be insulated from events in relation to the LME. I disagree with this argument. Put simply, what matters is the parties’ allocation of risk between themselves, and not the extent of Foreland’s knowledge about IGA’s trading and risk management model. With regard to the former, the extracts reproduced above make it clear that the prices IGA charged for its nickel CFDs were offered on a hedged basis, were linked to the LME, and that Foreland knew or should have known this. Second, and as I explained above (at [35]), the IG Group’s business model hinges on it being able to manage its exposure arising from client trades, through hedging on the underlying market. Thus, IGA does not take on the underlying market risks of its client’s trades. Instead, these trades are done on prices linked to and reflective of the underlying market, and the risks arising therefrom are managed through hedges on the underlying market.

  74. [39] Thus, specifically in relation to the Suspension and Reversal, the matching of IGM’s hedges by Macquarie was never completed because the Suspension made matching and clearing impossible. As a result, all client nickel trades carried out on 8 March 2022 with IG Group entities, which included the FCTs, became unhedged. Accordingly, the fact that Foreland dealt with IGA on an OTC basis does not mean that Foreland was insulated from all events in relation to the LME, such as the Suspension and Reversal. Instead, the risk of the Suspension and Reversal remained with IGA’s clients, such as Foreland.

  75. (2) Foreland’s attempt to dispute the connection between the FCTs and the Suspension and Reversal is not convincing

  76. [40] Leaving aside the IG Group’s hedging business model as described above, Foreland argues that there is no causal connection between the reversal of the FCTs and the Suspension and Reversal because: (a) IGA had fully hedged its exposure with IGM, and did not become unhedged; (b) the unhedging of IGA’s exposure was due to Macquarie not matching or clearing the hedges, which was due to reasons other than the Suspension and Reversal; and (c) IGM had consciously decided to hedge its exposure only on the LME, therefore bringing upon itself the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal. I do not agree with these reasons that Foreland has advanced to support its argument that there is no causal connection between the reversal of the FCTs and the Suspension and Reversal.

  77. [41] First, Foreland’s argument that IGA was entitled to reject IGM’s reversal of the automatic back-to-back hedging transactions (between IGA and IGM) ignores the realities of IGA’s trading model. Although it is true that IGA’s mirror trades transfer IGA’s exposure to IGM, the transfer of that exposure is for the purpose of IGM hedging that exposure, aggregated with the risk arising from other IG Group entities, on the LME. Thus, IGM’s hedges and the mirror trades are clearly part of a single process. Foreland is therefore incorrect to argue that IGM decided to “unhedge” IGA. Instead, the IG Group had taken the decision to reverse all client nickel trades on 8 March 2022 for all the relevant IG Group entities, and this was made necessary by the Suspension and Reversal.

  78. [42] Further, Foreland is also incorrect to argue that IGA never pleaded or explained how it became unhedged, and that IGA never mentioned the “reversal” of the mirror trades between IGA and IGM. On the contrary, IGA’s repeated references to its trading model explain clearly how it had become unhedged. As for the “reversal” of the mirror trades, IGA explained that it had not stated as such because the mirror trades are not trades in the traditional sense and are thus not “reversed” in the usual manner. Rather, they are automatic records of the IG Group’s client trades with IGM. As a result, their “reversal” is effected when FCTs and other client trades are reversed, such that mirror trades to those reversals are booked with IGM.

  79. [43] Second, Foreland argues that Macquarie’s decision not to match and clear the hedging trades placed by IGM was the proximate cause of IGM being unhedged. The problem with this argument is that, as IGA rightly points out, the Suspension and Reversal is the most obvious cause of Macquarie’s failure to match the hedging trades. Therefore, Foreland has submitted that Macquarie’s decision not to match or clear the hedges was due to reasons other than the Suspension and Reversal. However, I find that this submission is not supported by any evidence. Foreland relies on two planks to support this submission. One, although Macquarie received instructions from GS to match and clear IGM’s hedging trades on the LME before the Suspension, Macquarie did not match IGM’s hedging trades before the Suspension. Two, Mr Beloreshki advanced a theory that Macquarie’s non-matching was due to liquidity issues in the market. Drawing on these two points, Foreland submits that Macquarie had decided of its own accord not to match IGM’s hedging trades independently before it even knew of the Suspension. However, Mr Beloreshki’s theory that IGM’s hedges were not cleared because of a lack of liquidity in the market was nowhere to be found in his report. Leaving that aside, Mr Beloreshki has not provided any clear evidence to substantiate this theory. Indeed, he did not correlate this theory to anything specific in Oliver Wyman, Independent Review of Events in the Nickel Market in March 2022 (Final report: January 2023) or other data. He has thus failed to show that even if the Suspension and Reversal had not come into effect, Macquarie would not have been able to match IGM’s trades due to the lack of liquidity. In so far as Foreland relies on the fact that Macquarie received instructions to match IGM’s trades before the Suspension but did not act on them, this does not show that Macquarie did not match the trades for reasons other than the Suspension and Reversal.

  80. [44] Third, Foreland’s argument, that IGM brought the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal upon itself because it decided only to hedge its exposure on the LME, overlooks several points. One, it ignores the truly extraordinary nature of the Suspension and Reversal. In fact, this was only the second time in the LME’s history that nickel trading had been suspended. It is therefore not right to judge IGM’s actions with the benefit of hindsight after such an extraordinary event had happened. Two, Foreland’s argument also ignores the fact that the LME is the only market on which the IG Group could realistically hedge the nickel CFD without turning it into an entirely different product. In this regard, Mr Slovenski provided cogent reasons why hedging in other markets would not work: for instance, liquidity in some markets is contingent on counterparty availability, and other markets had high barriers to entry including currency risk. In contrast, Mr Beloreshki made a bare assertion that IGM could have chosen to hedge its risks in a variety of alternative markets but without explaining why. Also, Mr Blemings explained that while the IG Group had explored other markets such as the Shanghai Futures Exchange, it would not have been practical to hedge the nickel CFD, which derived its pricing from the LME, through other markets with different prices.

  81. [45] Fourth, Foreland raised in its Reply Submissions, for the first time, the argument that Term 3(2)(b) of the MTCA shows that the hedging transactions IGA entered into in respect of any trades between IGA and Foreland are only for the purposes of managing IGA’s own risk in relation to those trades. Based on that, it argues that any unilateral hedging transactions undertaken by IGA can only affect IGA’s own risk, and not the risk which Foreland undertook under its trades with IGA. However, this is a misreading of Term 3(2)(b), which appears in a section entitled “Conflicts of Interest” and which reads:

  82. Plainly, Term 3(2)(b), read in its proper context, refers to an example of a “material interests and conflict of interests” that may arise between IGA and a potential client (see Term 3(2)). This has nothing to do with the parties’ overall allocation of risk in the transactions concerned.

  83. [46] Accordingly, the fact that Foreland dealt with IGA on an OTC basis does not mean that Foreland is insulated from events in relation to the LME, such as the Suspension and Reversal. Such an argument ignores the commercial reality of how the IG Group hedges client nickel trades on the LME. In sum, even if IGA had hedged directly on the LME without IGM’s involvement, the analysis would still be the same.

  84. Mr Beloreshki’s expert opinion on the implications of IGA acting as principal and market maker on an OTC basis is not reliable

  85. (1) Mr Beloreshki’s opinion

  86. [47] Third, in so far as Foreland relies heavily on Mr Beloreshki’s expert opinion to advance its argument on the present point, I do not think that his opinion, on the implications of IGA acting as principal and market maker on an OTC basis, is reliable. In this regard, Foreland summarised Mr Beloreshki’s opinion to be as follows:

  87. (2) Mr Beloreshki does not possess the relevant expertise

  88. [48] To begin with, and with the greatest of respect to Mr Beloreshki, I do not think that he possesses the relevant expertise to opine on the issues put to him for this action. Although Mr Beloreshki claims to have had “vast marketplace experience as a trader”, this is not supported by his actual experience. Instead, Mr Beloreshki only spent two years with Banque Paribas (“BNP”) from 1997 to 1999 and has been a consultant since 1999. While at BNP, Mr Beloreshki only acquired an entry-level broker licence, which did not allow him to deal with futures and commodities. He also did not trade on the LME or any other commodity exchange. All in all, Mr Beloreshki said that he is a “financial economist”. While Mr Beloreshki may be an excellent financial economist, such expertise is not the right kind required for this case.

  89. [49] Indeed, as IGA rightly points out, Mr Beloreshki’s expert opinion showed some unfamiliarity with the relevant issues in the present case.

  90. [50] First, Mr Beloreshki’s explanation of IGM’s hedging process was deficient. I raise the following examples:

  91. [51] Above all, Mr Beloreshki’s explanation of IGM’s hedging process appears to have lifted an entire paragraph, without attribution and almost word-for-word, from the Detailed Grounds of Defence of the LME and LME Clear Limited in Claim Nos CO/1995/2022 and CO/2007/2022 in the High Court of Justice King’s Bench Division Administrative Court (the “LME Defence”). While it may be understandable for a layperson to explain concepts by reference to other material, it is quite peculiar for an expert to do this by lifting an entire paragraph from another source and without any attribution. I illustrate this by first setting out para 33(e) of Mr Beloreshki’s report before reproducing para 30 of the LME Defence:

  92. For completeness, footnote 27 to para 33(e) of Mr Beloreshki’s report is not an attribution to any underlying source material. It simply reads “[i]n general, the process of trade execution on the LME takes place as quickly as it would be technologically practicable”.

  93. [52] Second, Mr Beloreshki wrongly claimed that IGM was not subject to the LME Rules. This is incorrect because the LME Rulebook requires contracts such as those between IGM and GSI, to provide that they are subject to the LME Rulebook. This is explicitly provided for in Regulation 2.6.4 of the Trading Rules, Part 3 of the LME Rulebook, which states:

  94. Accordingly, IGM’s hedges would have been governed by the LME Rules, contrary to Mr Beloreshki’s assertion to the contrary.

  95. [53] Third, Mr Beloreshki did not appear to have a clear understanding of what CFDs are. This is because he insisted that an “inventory” of CFDs can be carried to fill client orders. Indeed, when Mr Harish Kumar (“Mr Kumar”), who appeared for IGA, pointed out to Mr Beloreshki that there was no question of “inventory” with respect to CFDs, Mr Beloreshki insisted that “inventory” could refer to the trading positions that might be taken by a market maker. That, with respect, makes little sense.

  96. [54] Taken collectively, I do not think that Mr Beloreshki possesses the relevant expertise to opine on the issues put to him for this action. I therefore do not prefer his opinion to that of IGA’s expert, Mr Slovenski.

  97. (3) Foreland’s complaints against Mr Slovenski are unfounded

  98. [55] On Mr Slovenski, Foreland made detailed submissions that he was an “incompetent and biased expert witness”. These are very strong words to use on anyone, let alone an expert witness. Accordingly, I expected Foreland to produce clear evidence and good reasons to ground its serious allegations. Unfortunately, Foreland has failed to do so.

  99. [56] Before I explain why Foreland has failed to do so, I should say that Mr Slovenski was instructed by IGA to opine on just two of the seven issues that Mr Beloreshki had been asked to opine on, namely:

  100. While Mr Philip Ling (“Mr Ling”), who appeared as instructed counsel for Foreland, took the position that Mr Slovenski was looking to “avoid treading into five of the seven issues” by merely opining on two issues, any assertion that Mr Slovenski had “avoided” the remaining issues is incorrect because Mr Slovenski had only been instructed to look into those two issues. Also, Foreland had formulated the seven issues on its own initiative, and IGA decided only to respond to two of those. IGA was well within its rights to do so.

  101. [57] I turn now to consider Foreland’s complaints against Mr Slovenski. For the reasons that follow, I find them all to be unfounded.

  102. (A) Mr Slovenski was not mistaken as to the issue he had to address

  103. [58] First, Foreland complains that Mr Slovenski had misstated the issue at para 9(a) of Mr Beloreshki’s report that he had dealt with. Paragraph 9(a) is about “[t]he meaning, effect, and implication of the Defendant dealing with Plaintiffs as principal and market maker, on an OTC basis”. Instead of this, Foreland complains that Mr Slovenski repeatedly stated the issue to be “whether IGA was in fact acting and dealing with Foreland as principal and market maker”. However, the extracts that Foreland relies on from the Certified Transcript do not show that Mr Slovenski was so mistaken.

  104. [59] While I have reviewed all of the extracts that Foreland relies on, it is not necessary for me to discuss every one of them. It suffices to raise a few examples to show how Foreland’s argument, that Mr Slovenski had misstated the issue he had to address at para 9(a) of Mr Beloreshki’s report, is, quite unfortunately, premised on reading a number of Mr Slovenski’s responses out of their proper context. As a first example, Foreland raises these lines from Mr Slovenski’s responses in the Certified Transcript:

  105. [60] Admittedly, when read on its own, it does appear that Mr Slovenski had stated he had to give an opinion “around whether or not IGA was dealing with Foreland as a market maker and principal.” However, when I examine what Mr Slovenski said immediately after these quoted lines, it becomes clear that he was not confused as to the issue he had to opine on:

  106. [61] Furthermore, it is instructive to examine the question to which Mr Slovenski was responding, and the words immediately preceding the quoted portion of Mr Slovenski’s reply (see at [59] above):

  107. It is clear from these lines that Mr Slovenski was responding to the cross-examination question by Mr Ling on whether Mr Slovenski was correct to have assumed that IGA was able to reverse the FCTs based on various Terms in the MTCA. I accept Mr Slovenski’s point that it would be difficult for him to opine on “[t]he meaning, effect, and implication of the [d]efendant dealing with [p]laintiffs as principal and market maker, on an OTC basis”, if he did not assume that IGA was acting as market maker and a principal. This may also be why Mr Slovenski had said he was giving an opinion “around” whether IGA was dealing with Foreland as a market maker and principal, and not “on” whether IGA was so dealing. Thus, Mr Slovenski was far from misstating the issue that he had to opine on.

  108. [62] As another example, Foreland raises two isolated instances in the Certified Transcript as further proof of its allegation that Mr Slovenski ostensibly misunderstood the issue he was to opine on:

  109. …

  110. Well, I was asked to -- the first issue I was asked to address was around IGA operating as a -- I don’t remember the exact wording, but around being a principal and market maker, okay? So it was the first issue I was supposed to address.

  111. However, to be fair to Mr Slovenski, it is clear from the Certified Transcript that Mr Ling had not asked him directly to state the issue that he was supposed to opine on. Instead, in both instances, Mr Slovenski was replying to Mr Ling’s questions about whether he ought to have made the assumptions that he did. In that context, it would not be fair to expect Mr Slovenski to have set out the issue with exactitude. Also, Mr Slovenski was quite candid in saying that he did not remember the exact wording of the issue but that it was “around” IGA being a market maker and principal.

  112. [63] I therefore do not think it is right for Foreland to extrapolate from these isolated instances in his evidence the logical leap that Mr Slovenski was somehow an “incompetent and biased” expert witness.

  113. (B) Mr Slovenski was not biased just because he had made certain assumptions in his report

  114. [64] Second, Foreland argues that Mr Slovenski is biased because he had made certain assumptions which constitute the primary issues that the court needs to decide in this action. These assumptions are: (a) that “IGA was able to reverse the trades and reinstate [Foreland’s] … positions based on the various clauses in the [MTCA]”; and (b) that IGA’s allegation that it had become unhedged should have a bearing on the nickel trades placed by Foreland. Accordingly, Foreland claims that for Mr Slovenski to have proceeded on these assumptions “renders any conclusion which he purports to arrive at in reliance thereon not only circular, but in fact wholly meaningless” and that Mr Slovenski was “effectively arrogating to himself the duties and powers of the [c]ourt to determine these issues”.

  115. [65] I find Foreland’s argument to be untenable. It is common for assumptions to be made in a report, including an expert report. In the present case, Mr Slovenski made the assumptions to enable him to sensibly respond to the issues that were referred to him. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Indeed, Foreland itself assumes that the Suspension and Reversal amounted to a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA. Foreland may rightly object to the correctness of the assumptions themselves, but the fact that Mr Slovenski had used assumptions does not mean that he was biased.

  116. [66] Fundamentally, Foreland has confused an assumption with a conclusion. Mr Slovenski was not arrogating any of the court’s duties and powers to determine these issues because he was not making any conclusions on findings of fact that I am to reach (though, to be fair, Mr Slovenski (and anyone) is well-entitled to come to conclusions of their own without being accused of acting in place of the court). To take an example, if one were asked to describe his or her plan for the day on the assumption that it rained, that does not mean that that person is arrogating mother nature’s power to make it rain. That person is also not being biased in favour of rainy days when setting out his or her plan on this assumption. With respect, Foreland’s argument, that Mr Slovenski was biased because he had made certain assumptions, simply does not make any sense. It is puzzling that Foreland devoted a good part of its time for the cross-examination of Mr Slovenski to explore this issue.

  117. (C) Mr Slovenski’s clarification of his report was not improper

  118. [67] Third, Foreland argues that Mr Slovenski wrongly sought to change his expert opinion via a clarification in a list of errata that was adduced at the start of his oral evidence. Indeed, Foreland’s counsel were greatly agitated by this during the trial. The clarification in question is this:

  119. Paragraph 53

  120. I understand that there have been questions put to witnesses around exchanges providing liquidity and I believe that there is a misunderstanding of what is written in this paragraph. My paragraph 53 merely states that how the CFTC, CME and LME define market making include the element of compensation for accepting the risk of providing liquidity. It is not meant to imply that the exchanges themselves nor a regulatory body provide liquidity. The LME describes itself as providing “…a forum or “venue” within which buying and selling interests meet.” It does not provide liquidity.

  121. [emphasis in original]

  122. [68] In my view, Mr Slovenski was simply clarifying that LME was not a “liquidity provider”. Rather, there is liquidity on the exchange and such liquidity could be impacted by the Suspension. Mr Ling had every right to cross-examine Mr Slovenski on this point if he felt it to be critical. He did not do so during his initial cross-examination of Mr Slovenski. While I did not think that Mr Slovenski’s clarification was problematic, I allowed Mr Beloreshki to be recalled so that he could respond to Mr Slovenski’s clarification. However, Mr Beloreshki offered no meaningful response to Mr Slovenski’s clarification and had to be stopped from giving unrelated evidence.

  123. [69] In sum, I do not think that Mr Slovenski’s clarification of his report was in any way improper, given that: (a) it was a short clarification; (b) Foreland was afforded multiple opportunities to respond during the trial; and (c) Foreland could and did respond to this clarification in its closing submissions by reference to various documents already in the evidence. Accordingly, I do not see how Mr Slovenski’s clarification made him, as Foreland sought to put to him at trial, “an utterly incompetent, dishonest, biased and conniving witness”. Indeed, it is completely unnecessary to use such strong words against expert witnesses unless there is strong cause to do so. The Court of Appeal stated as much in similar circumstances in Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another and other appeals and other matters [2024] 2 SLR 1 at [42], where expert evidence was attacked with such phrases as “charade”, “blatant untruth”, “sleight of hand”, and “conveniently and brazenly”, the court described such terms as “distracting polemic” and “conclusionary epithets impugning the integrity of an expert witness” that ultimately proved to be “of little assistance to this court on the appeal”. As Robert French IJ so aptly put it there: “[t]his court is concerned to hear each party’s substantive arguments … not free character analyses of the opposing party’s witnesses or generalised denunciations of the opponent’s case”.

  124. (D) It is irrelevant whether Mr Slovenski is “more or less qualified” than Mr Kumar

  125. [70] While Foreland has not raised this in its Closing Submissions, it spent a considerable amount of time during Mr Slovenski’s cross-examination asking Mr Slovenski to state whether he was “more or less qualified” than Mr Kumar to address the expert issues in Mr Beloreshki’s report. When I intervened to ask about the relevance of these questions, it was explained to me that this had to do with Mr Slovenski’s credibility and that Foreland would take it up in submissions.

  126. [71] While Foreland eventually did not address this point in its Closing Submissions, I will observe that Foreland’s line of questioning on this issue was decidedly puzzling. Although I gave Foreland some latitude in asking questions as to whether Mr Slovenski was “more or less qualified” than Mr Kumar, I agree with IGA that the relative competencies of Mr Slovenski and Mr Kumar are irrelevant to the dispute, nor do they affect Mr Slovenski’s credibility, much less Mr Kumar’s ability to test Mr Beloreshki’s expert evidence during cross-examination. It is unclear to me why Foreland chose to devote yet another good part of its time for cross-examination of Mr Slovenski on this issue.

  127. (4) In any event, Mr Slovenski’s opinion is objectively preferable to Mr Beloreshki’s

  128. [72] In sum, Foreland never seriously challenged the substance of Mr Slovenski’s expert evidence at trial. Indeed, Foreland elected to limit its cross-examination of Mr Slovenski on the basis that its counsel was ill-qualified to “wade into the arena of expert opinion”. I am puzzled by this approach because Foreland ought to have challenged the veracity of an opposing expert witness’s opinion based on, for example, the reasoning or logic of the report. By Foreland’s logic, the court, which needs expert opinion because it is not an expert on the issues concerned, would not be in a position to evaluate the expert opinion tendered before it. This cannot be the case. Instead, as I have said above, Foreland chose to focus its relatively short cross-examination of Mr Slovenski on peripheral issues such as: (a) whether Mr Slovenski was biased in making the assumptions that he did in preparing his report; (b) whether Mr Slovenski improperly made the clarification to his report; and (c) whether Mr Slovenski was more or less qualified than Mr Kumar. The end result is that Mr Slovenski’s evidence on the two issues he was asked to opine on was never seriously challenged substantively. Since I do not regard Mr Beloreshki’s expert evidence to be objectively reliable compared to Mr Slovenski’s evidence, it follows that I prefer Mr Slovenski’s evidence to Mr Beloreshki’s.

  129. [73] I therefore accept Mr Slovenski’s expert evidence that:

  130. [74] The result of accepting Mr Slovenski’s evidence over that of Mr Beloreshki on these issues is that I accept the fact that, even though IGA traded with Foreland on an OTC basis, it still remains the case that IGA’s trading model is contingent upon being able to hedge the exposure from client trades on the underlying market. Further, I also reiterate my conclusion that Foreland’s attempt to dispute the connection between the FCTs and the Suspension and Reversal is not convincing for the following reasons: one, given the IG Group’s trading model, it was not realistic for IGA to reject IGM’s reversal of the automatic back-to-back hedging transactions; two, it was the Suspension and Reversal, rather than Macquarie’s failure to match and clear trades, that was the proximate cause of IGM becoming unhedged; three, IGM was justified in only hedging its exposure on the LME and hence cannot be said to have brought the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal upon itself due to its decision in this regard; and finally, the terms of the MTCA do not preclude IGA from passing the risks of the Suspension and Reversal onto its clients, inclusive of Foreland.

  131. [75] Accordingly, for all these reasons, I find that the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal can be visited on Foreland despite Foreland dealing with IGA on an OTC basis. Thus, I go on to consider if IGA is entitled by the Suspension and Reversal to reverse the FCTs on the basis of it being a Force Majeure Event.

  132. Whether IGA was entitled by the Suspension and Reversal to reverse the FCTs on the basis of it being a Force Majeure Event pursuant to Term 23(1) of the MTCA

  133. The parties’ arguments

  134. [76] Foreland advances a few points in response to what they characterise as the “broad issue” of whether IGA was entitled by the Suspension and Reversal to reverse the FCTs, on the basis that the Suspension and Reversal was a Force Majeure Event:

  135. [77] In response, IGA makes the following points:

  136. [78] I will address the parties’ submissions in the course of explaining my decision on this issue.

  137. My decision: IGA was not entitled by the Suspension and Reversal to reverse the FCTs even though it is a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA

  138. [79] For the reasons that I will now explain, I conclude that IGA was not entitled by the Suspension and Reversal to reverse the FCTs despite the Suspension and Reversal qualifying as a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA. More specifically, I find that, while IGA was entitled by Term 23(2) of the MTCA to suspend or modify its payment obligations that would normally arise under Terms 7(13) and 7(14), IGA was not entitled by Term 23(2) to modify Term 4(7) so as to allow it to reverse the FCTs. The ultimate result is that, subject to any other further ground upon which IGA can justify its reversal of the FCTs, IGA had wrongfully reversed the FCTs and must compensate Foreland for any proven loss.

  139. [80] To summarise at this juncture, I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

  140. [81] The above means that unless IGA can show some other justification for reversing the FCTs, Foreland would succeed in its claim, subject to the assessment of damages. As I will explain below, IGA cannot rely on Term 10(4) of the MTCA to justify the reversal of the FCTs because IGA has pleaded that its reliance on Term 10(4) is predicated on the Suspension and Reversal not being a Force Majeure Event within the meaning of Term 23. Since I have found that the Suspension and Reversal is a Force Majeure Event, Term 23 applies to govern the parties’ affairs following the Suspension and Reversal. The problem for IGA is that Term 23(2) does not allow it to modify Term 4(7) so as to reverse the FCTs, and IGA cannot point to any other provision in the MTCA to justify the reversal. IGA has also not relied on the common law doctrine of frustration to plug any gap that the MTCA has not addressed in the event of a Force Majeure Event.

  141. [82] I now explain these various points in my reasoning behind my ultimate conclusion.

  142. The Suspension and Reversal amounted to a “Force Majeure Event” under Term 23(1) of the MTCA

  143. [83] To begin with, having found that the consequences of the Suspension and Reversal can be visited on Foreland, I now explain why the Suspension and Reversal amounted to a “Force Majeure Event” under Term 23(1) of the MTCA, which provides as follows:

  144. [84] In this regard, Foreland had pleaded that the Suspension and Reversal was not a Force Majeure Event because: (a) it does not and cannot bind IGA or IGM; (b) it does not and cannot affect the parties’ rights and obligations under the Account; and (c) it had no effect on the FCTs. While Foreland appears to have dropped these points in its Closing Submissions and even assumed that the Suspension and Reversal amounted to a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA, these three points can be easily dealt with. This is because they are premised on Foreland’s other arguments that it is not dealing on the underlying market and that the FCTs are insulated from the Suspension and Reversal. Since I have already disagreed with these arguments, it follows that I also disagree with Foreland’s pleaded points on why the Suspension and Reversal is not a Force Majeure Event.

  145. [85] I instead agree with IGA that the Suspension and Reversal is clearly a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA. In this regard, the Suspension and Reversal clearly comes within Term 23(1)(b) since it entailed the suspension and closure of the underlying market. The Suspension and Reversal also comes within Term 23(1)(c) since there was significant price volatility on 8 March 2022 leading to the Suspension and Reversal, with the Reversal then leading to the cancellation of all LME nickel trades on 8 March 2022. Thus, there was clearly an occurrence of “excessive movement” in the underlying market as spelt on in Term 23(1)(c).

  146. The Suspension and Reversal made it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA, therefore entitling it to suspend and/or modify those Terms

  147. (1) The proper interpretation of Term 23(2)(c) of the MTCA

  148. [86] However, it is not enough that the Suspension and Reversal is a Force Majeure Event under Term 23(1) of the MTCA. This is because Term 23(1) does not itself entitle IGA to reverse the FCTs. Therefore, IGA is relying on Term 23(2)(c) to suspend and/or modify Terms 7(13) and 7(14), as well as 4(7) of the MTCA. Term 23(2)(c) provides as follows:

  149. [87] In this regard, while Foreland cites the Court of Appeal decisions of Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd and another appeal [1999] 1 SLR(R) 945 at [44] and RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd and another appeal [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 (“RDC Concrete”) at [80], it is strictly not necessary in the present case for it to rely on the broader common law principle that a party seeking to rely on frustration must show, regardless of what the contract provides, that the frustrating event made it impossible or impracticable for it to perform its obligations. Instead, the present case turns squarely on the interpretation of Term 23 of the MTCA and the powers that it confers on IGA in the event of a Force Majeure Event. In this regard, the Court of Appeal has explained in Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Precise Development Pte Ltd and another application [2011] 2 SLR 106 at [49] (citing RDC Concrete at [54]) that:

  150. [88] The principles of contractual interpretation are well established under Singapore law. As the Court of Appeal stated in the seminal case of CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Ong Puay Koon and others and another appeal [2018] 1 SLR 170 (“CIFG”) (at [19]):

  151. [89] It is important that the interpretation must be one that the expressions used by the parties can reasonably bear, even if the court considers the parties’ intention. This is crucial in the present case. The plain words of Term 23(2)(c), which IGA relies on, provides that IGA may take the step to “suspend or modify the application of all or any of the Terms of this Agreement to the extent that the Force Majeure Event makes it impossible or impracticable for [IGA] to comply with the Term or Terms in question” [emphasis added]. In my judgment, this connotes three important points:

  152. (2) The Suspension and Reversal has made it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA

  153. [90] With this interpretation of Term 23(2)(c) in mind, I am satisfied that the Suspension and Reversal has made it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA, although the effect of the Suspension and Reversal must be limited to profits following it; the Suspension and Reversal cannot affect profits that had already arisen before that (ie, 8 March 2022, 00:00 GMT). To begin with, Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA provide as follows:

  154. Since Term 7(14) refers to Term 16(5), I set that out as well:

  155. [91] It is not disputed that the general effect of Terms 7(13), 7(14), and 16(5) is to impose on IGA an obligation to pay, upon the closing of a transaction, the difference between the opening level of the transaction and the closing level of the transaction, multiplied by the number of units in the relevant instrument (see [11] above for a brief explanation as to what this means). In short, applied to the present case, Terms 7(13) and 7(14) impose on IGA an obligation to pay Foreland the relevant sums upon the execution of the FCTs. IGA relies on Term 23(2)(c) to modify or suspend its payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14) because the FCTs could not be sustained.

  156. [92] Foreland argues that IGA has not shown how it was impossible or impracticable for it to comply with its payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14) in accordance with Foreland’s payment instructions. In this regard, Foreland argues that IGA needs to show that the Suspension and Reversal caused IGA’s compliance with its payment obligations to become impossible or impractical. Foreland then argues that IGA has failed to do this because IGA was at all times fully hedged and never became unhedged.

  157. [93] While I agree with Foreland that the onus is on IGA to prove causation in this regard, I disagree with Foreland’s arguments that IGA has failed to do so. For the reasons I have discussed above, this is because the Suspension and Reversal affected IGA’s ability to provide the nickel CFD pricing to Foreland for the FCTs since those prices depended on the underlying LME market. Also, IGA’s ability to execute the FCTs on 8 March 2022 was predicated on the IG Group’s hedging model. Since the Suspension and Reversal retroactively annulled the substratum for the FCTs, it was no longer possible nor practicable for IGA to maintain the FCTs or the realised profits. It was therefore impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with its payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14). IGA was thus entitled to rely on Term 23(2)(c) to modify the application of Terms 7(13) and 7(14) such that, notwithstanding the FCTs, Terms 7(13) and 7(14) did not come into effect. Therefore, IGA was ultimately justified in not complying with its payment obligations under these terms. However, as I mentioned above, the Suspension and Reversal can only operate to extinguish profits arising after 8 March 2022, 00:00 GMT.

  158. [94] I turn to address Foreland’s alternative argument that the Suspension and Reversal did not make it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Terms 7(13) and 7(14) because, while the Suspension and Reversal may have made it more expensive for IGA to comply with its payment obligations under these terms, IGA could well afford to do so. In as much as Foreland made this argument, I disagree. This is because the question of “impossibility or impracticability” is not about IGA’s literal wherewithal (or “means” for those who may find “wherewithal” a difficult word) to pay but whether it agreed to bear the risk of the Suspension and Reversal. Thus, even if it was not literally impossible for IGA to have paid Foreland, the question of impossibility or impracticability in relation to IGA’s payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14) must be considered with regard to the commercial reality of how the nickel CFD product was structured, in that it depended on a functioning underlying market (ie, the LME) for pricing and for the hedges to go through. The Suspension and Reversal meant that there was no longer a functioning underlying market and thus no possibility of the nickel CFD trades (and any profits thereon) being maintained.

  159. [95] Moreover, it is clear from how the parties have allocated the risk of a Force Majeure Event that it was impossible or impracticable for IGA to have complied with its payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA. In this regard, Foreland argued that the risk concerned was a liquidity risk from the Reversal that caused a lack of counterparties to take the opposite sides of the trade, and that this was a risk to be borne by IGA alone. However, I prefer Mr Slovenski’s view that the risk of the Suspension and Reversal happening was not a liquidity risk but rather a “systemic” risk. This risk is not borne by IGA when it accepts its clients’ trades because clients are made aware that their trades do not stand in isolation but are based on prices linked to and reflective of the underlying market. Indeed, the bargain between IGA and its clients is that IGA provides an avenue for its clients to trade as if they were trading on the underlying market. In the circumstances, the risk of the occurrence of an exceptional underlying market event like the Suspension and Reversal remained with IGA’s clients, including Foreland. Indeed, this is aptly reflected by the Force Majeure Clause in Term 23(2). This term empowers IGA to take certain action if the Force Majeure Event makes it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with the terms of the MTCA. The presence of the Force Majeure Clause shows that the risk exposure of an exceptional underlying market event lies squarely with the client. Thus, I accept that the risk mitigated by IGM’s hedging is the risk of market movement, and not the systemic risk that materialised in the Suspension and Reversal.

  160. [96] Accordingly, I find that the Suspension and Reversal had made it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with its payment obligations under Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA. IGA is therefore justified in relying on Term 23(2)(c) to suspend or modify its payment obligations. Crucially, however, IGA relies on a modified Term 4(7) to justify its subsequent reversal of the FCTs. I therefore need to also consider if IGA is entitled to rely on Term 23(2)(c) to modify Term 4(7).

  161. However, the Suspension and Reversal did not make it impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Term 4(7) of the MTCA, and IGA was therefore not entitled to suspend and/or modify that Term

  162. (1) IGA’s sole reliance on a modified Term 4(7) to justify its reversal of the FCTs

  163. [97] As a preliminary point, it appears that IGA has relied only on a modified Term 4(7) of the MTCA to justify its reversal of the FCTs. I therefore first refer to how IGA has pleaded its entitlement to reverse the FCTs in its Defence (Amendment No 3) (the “Defence”). At para 23 of the Defence, IGA pleaded as follows:

  164. [98] It may appear from para 23.a.i of the Defence that IGA relies only on Terms 7(13) and 7(14) of the MTCA to justify that the FCTs “were reversed in accordance with the Reversal by the LME”. Indeed, given the use of the expression “[f]urther and/or in the alternative” at the beginning of para 23.a.ii, it might be thought that IGA’s reliance on Term 4(7) to reverse the FCTs is in addition to its reliance on Terms 7(13) and 7(14) to justify the same. However, given that IGA’s Closing Submissions state quite clearly that IGA’s case is premised on solely relying on Term 4(7) as “modified to allow IGA to also reverse a transaction”, I find that IGA is relying only on a modified Term 4(7) (instead of Terms 7(13) and 7(14)) to justify its reversal of the FCTs. In any event, consistent with this finding, IGA has not explained how modified Terms 7(13) and 7(14) would allow it to reverse the FCTs.

  165. (2) IGA is not entitled to modify Term 4(7) by relying on Term 23(2)(c)

  166. [99] I come then to Term 4(7) of the MTCA, which provides as follows:

  167. Since IGA relies on Term 4(8)(k), as Term 4(8) is referenced in Term 4(7), I set out Term 4(8)(k) as well:

  168. [100] IGA explains in its Closing Submissions that Term 23(2)(c) modified Term 4(7) read with Term 4(8)(k), and that the latter two terms, read together in their unmodified forms, permitted IGA to treat a transaction as void from the outset, close it, or allow it to remain open if a Force Majeure Event had existed at the time the client offered to open or close the transaction concerned. IGA argues that since the Suspension and Reversal had a retroactive effect, such that it affected transactions that had already been closed, none of these three options in Term 4(7) would have made any sense. Therefore, IGA says that “it was impossible/impracticable for IGA to follow the strict wording of Term 4(7) when taking steps to reflect [the Suspension and Reversal]”.

  169. [101] It is telling that IGA did not explain in its Closing Submissions why it would be impossible or impracticable for IGA to comply with Term 4(7), being the expression used in Term 23(2)(c) and with Term 4(7) being the “Term … in question”. It was only after I had asked the parties to address this issue in their Reply Submissions that IGA did so. In those submissions, IGA argues that “comply” also encompasses “the more general meaning of acting within the language of a provision”. IGA also argues that this broader construction conforms with the contextual background of the parties’ intention to achieve trades reflective of the underlying market. This therefore justifies a greater remedial flexibility on IGA’s part to, for instance, avail itself of a mechanism to consider a Force Majeure Event with retrospective effect and to accurately reflect the effects of the Suspension and Reversal.

  170. [102] In my judgment, IGA cannot rely on Term 23(2)(c) to modify Term 4(7) because Term 4(7) simply does not come within the type of term that can be suspended or modified under Term 23(2)(c). This is because, as Foreland points out, Term 4(7) is a permissive provision that conferred certain rights on IGA under the circumstances specified therein. There is thus nothing that IGA was obliged to comply with under Term 4(7), and which was rendered impossible or impracticable because of the Force Majeure Event, being the Suspension and Reversal.

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