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Grounds publishedDecided 4 Sep 2024

General Division of the High Court

Alliance Divine Impex Pte Ltd v Arulappan Tony (DBS Bank Ltd, non-party)

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[2024] SGHC 227Case no. Originating Application No 679 of 2023 (Summons No 1940 of 2024)17 paragraphs

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  1. [2] After considering the applicant’s submissions, I allowed the application. I provide the reasons for my decision in these grounds particularly to elaborate on the applicable considerations for a court’s exercise of its discretion under s 175(1) of the EA, as well as the relationship between s 175 and O 11 r 11 of the ROC 2021.

  2. Background facts

  3. [3] The applicant, Alliance Divine Impex Pte Ltd, is in, among others, the business of sale of meat products to various other businesses in Singapore. The respondent, Mr Arulappan Tony, was employed by the applicant from February 2019 to May 2022 as a senior sales and marketing manager (“Sales Manager”). The respondent’s responsibilities as a Sales Manager included inputting various records into the applicant’s business ledger in connection with the sale of food products. The respondent left the applicant’s employ in May 2022.

  4. [4] In January 2023, the director of Alliance Frozen Food Pte Ltd (“AFF”), one Elangovan, informed the applicant’s sole director that the respondent had allegedly conspired with an employee of AFF. Pursuant to a business audit undertaken by AFF, it appeared that the respondent had, without authorisation, sold and delivered food products from the applicant to AFF. AFF had made payments towards the invoices drawn in connection with these sales. However, the applicant and AFF were at all material times competitors and in the same business of selling food products. There should therefore have been no business dealings between the applicant and AFF.

  5. [5] After further investigations, the applicant discovered that there was a shortfall of food products in its inventory. This amounted to about 30 to 40 pallets of missing food products worth approximately $300,000 to $400,000. Further, the applicant verified that the invoices which AFF had purportedly paid were not set out in the applicant’s business ledger or any such business records, and that the invoices issued to AFF had contained payment details stipulating for payment to be made to the respondent’s bank account with DBS and not the applicant’s account therewith. In addition, the total amount payable pursuant to the allegedly unauthorised invoices issued in the name of the applicant to AFF was considerably less than the value of the missing food products. The applicant therefore believes that the respondent had entered into various unauthorised transactions, not only with AFF, but also with other business entities.

  6. The applicable law

  7. My decision: SUM 1940 was granted

  8. The bank statements sought in SUM 1940 fell within the definition of “bankers’ books” under s 170 of the EA

  9. [13] As stated in s 170 of the EA, “bankers’ books” includes “ledgers, day books, cash books, account books and all other books used in the ordinary business of the bank”. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Wee Soon Kim Anthony v UBS AG [2003] 2 SLR(R) 91 (“Anthony Wee”) held (at [36]) that any form of permanent record maintained by a bank in relation to the transactions of a customer, including correspondence between a bank and a customer which records a transaction, thereby forming an integral part of the customer’s account, would fall within the scope of “other books” in the definition of “bankers’ books” under s 170 of the EA. More recently, the High Court in La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd v Zhang Lan and others [2022] 5 SLR 602 (“La Dolce Vita”), citing Anthony Wee (see La Dolce Vita at [24]–[26]), further emphasised that for information to be considered an entry in a banker’s book, such entry must amount to a transactional record of the bank concerning a customer, although it need not concern specific transactions where it records transactional facts (see La Dolce Vita at [37]–[41]).

  10. [14] With the above definition in mind, I was satisfied that the requested bank documents fell within the definition of “bankers’ books” under s 170 of the EA. This is because they consist of the complete and unredacted bank statements of the bank account held by the respondent with DBS. Such bank statements would therefore constitute a permanent record maintained by DBS and certainly amount to transactional records concerning the account of a customer (ie, the respondent) within the meaning of Anthony Wee at [36] and La Dolce Vita at [37] and [39].

  11. An order under s 175 of the EA to inspect and take copies of the bank documents sought in SUM 1940 should be made

  12. [19] These three factors for consideration dovetail with the historical origins of s 175(1) of the EA, viz, s 6(1) of the Indian Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 (Act No 18 of 1891 of the Imperial Legislative Council of India). Section 6(1) is substantially similar to s 175(1) of the EA, save for the additional of several words. For completeness, s 6(1) provides as follows, with the words in emphasis missing from s 175(1):

  13. The touchstone of the inquiry is therefore the reasonableness of the basis on which inspection of bankers’ books is sought, stemming from the default rule that “[a] banker is bound not to disclose the state of a customer’s accounts except upon a reasonable and proper occasion [Hardy v Veasey, LR 3 Ex 107]” [emphasis added] (see Sarkar’s Law of Evidence at p 3285).

  14. [21] A similar inquiry is undertaken in respect of the English Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 (c 11) (UK) (“BBEA 1879”), which E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C V M Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2011) (“Ellinger’s Banking Law”) describes (at pp 187–188) in the following terms:

  15. [emphasis added]

  16. [22] For completeness, s 7 of the UK’s BBEA 1879 is also in pari materia with s 175(1) of the EA and s 6(1) of its Indian equivalent, providing that:

  17. The emphasised portion is absent from s 175(1) but found instead in s 175(2) of the EA (with some minor differences which are not material).

  18. [23] Thus, the three factors I have outlined at [18] above would serve to focus the analytical inquiry into the reasonableness and propriety of the application to inspect otherwise confidential documents between a bank and its customer, in a structured format. It would strike the proper balance between the confidentiality of the banker-customer relationship on the one hand, and the reasonable juridical interests of the applicant for relief on the other, which is the focus of the analyses undertaken in respect of equivalent Indian and English legislation, as at [20]–[22] above.

  19. [24] On the relevancy of the documents sought in the present case, I note that the Court of Appeal in Anthony Wee (at [24]) took the view that any bank documents not relevant to the matters in issue in the underlying action should not be made available for inspection, but found on the facts there (at [23]–[26]) that the issue of relevancy had already been determined in prior interlocutory proceedings for discovery (see also the High Court decision of Technigroup Far East Pte Ltd and another v Jaswinderpal Singh s/o Bachint Singh and others [2018] 3 SLR 1391 at [57]). On the affidavit evidence before me, it was clear that the bank documents sought in SUM 1940 were relevant and material to the applicant’s intended causes of action against the respondent. In particular, I was satisfied that the applicant had reasonable cause to seek the production of the bank statements to assist its prospective case against the respondent for conversion or unjust enrichment, by investigating the respondent’s putative unauthorised transactions with AFF and other counterparties (see at [5] above).

  20. [25] Further, I was also satisfied that the applicant had tried other means, including pre-action discovery which the court granted but the respondent never complied with (see at [6] and [17] above), to obtain the said documents, thereby necessitating the taking out of SUM 1940 for inspection and taking of copies of the same against DBS.

  21. [26] Finally, I was satisfied that the applicant had brought the present application in good faith and not for a collateral purpose. This was evidenced by, inter alia, the restricted time period for the documents sought, which correspond to when the respondent was in the applicant’s employ (see at [3] and [6(a)] above), and the methodology by which the applicant said that it intended to use the sought documents to frame or prove its prospective case against the respondent – including, inter alia, ascertaining whether the respondent had benefitted from the sale of the applicant’s food products in unauthorised transactions and the quantum of the benefit that he obtained.

  22. The interplay between the court’s exercise of its discretion under s 175(1) of the EA vis-à-vis O 11 r 11(1) of the ROC 2021

  23. [27] For completeness, the applicant also submitted that O 11 r 11(1) of the ROC 2021 constituted an alternative ground to compel DBS to disclose the documents sought. O 11 r 11(1) provides as follows:

  24. [emphasis added]

  25. [31] In any case, I doubted whether the applicant’s intended cause of actions actually asserted any proprietary claim so as to bring them within the reasoning in Bankers Trust. As alluded to at [28] above, there is a general consensus among the authorities that the Bankers Trust jurisdiction can only be invoked where the claimant asserts a proprietary claim to assets (see Paget’s Law of Banking (John Odgers KC & Ian Wilson KC gen eds) (LexisNexis, 16th Ed, 2023) at para 33.10). Mere personal claims that sound in damages, even if they may involve wrongful interference with proprietary rights, do not suffice. For instance, in the English High Court Chancery Division decision of Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and others (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911, Hoffmann J (as he then was) said (at 918) that “the first principle of the Bankers Trust case is that the plaintiff must demonstrate a real prospect that the information may lead to the location or preservation of assets to which he is making a proprietary claim” [emphasis added]. A similar observation on this limitation of the court’s Bankers Trust jurisdiction can also be found in Paul McGrath QC, Commercial Fraud in Civil Practice (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2014) (at paras 15.156 and 15.158):

  26. [32] The applicant’s intended claims against the respondent were for conversion and unjust enrichment. It seemed to me, based on the causes of actions as described in the supporting affidavit, that these were personal claims for compensation. This remained so even if there is some claimed interference with property rights in the claim for conversion, as the claim is still fundamentally an assertion that the respondent owes the applicant money and not that the moneys in the respondent’s account with DBS belong to the applicant.

  27. Conclusion

  28. [37] For all of the reasons stated above, I allowed SUM 1940 pursuant to s 175(1) of the EA.