General Division of the High Court · Decided 3 October 2024
Only the substantively amended charge earned the bigger cut for a guilty plea
Public Prosecutor v S Iswaran
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC 251 · Case no. Criminal Case No 50 of 2024
✱ The decision, in one line
Not legal advice
Only the substantively amended charge earned the bigger cut for a guilty plea
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [162], [163]
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] Trust and confidence in public institutions are the bedrock of effective governance, which can all too easily be undermined by the appearance that an individual public servant has fallen below the standards of integrity and accountability. This could in turn have a detrimental impact on the discharge of the Government’s functions. The foregoing sets the background to the present case and provides an opportunity to examine two important issues and provide clarity in that regard.
- [2]
[2] First, what is the appropriate sentencing approach where a public servant commits the offence of obtaining a valuable thing from a person concerned in proceedings or business transacted by that public servant or having a connection with that public servant’s official functions? The gravamen of an offence under s 165 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) or Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) is the injury to the trust in and integrity of public institutions which results where public servants accept or obtain pecuniary benefits from a person or any associate in circumstances where the interests of the person or associate call into question that public servant’s integrity and loyalty. These interests may, for example, be interests relating to the outcomes of legal proceedings or interests in business transactions with public institutions.
- [3]
[3] Second, what is the appropriate reduction in sentence, applying the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“SAP PG Guidelines”), where an accused pleads guilty to multiple charges following the amendment of a subset of his charges after the completion of the criminal case disclosure procedures but before the commencement of the trial?
Introduction
- [4]
[4] The accused, Mr S Iswaran, was formerly a Minister of the Government of Singapore. From 2015 to 2022, as a public servant in that capacity, he obtained for himself various valuable things without consideration from Mr Ong Beng Seng (“OBS”) and Mr Lum Kok Seng (“LKS”). He did so despite knowing that they were concerned in business transacted which had a connection with his official functions.
- [5]
[5] The accused pleaded guilty to one charge under s 165 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), three charges under s 165 of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) and one charge under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed). For convenience, I shall refer to the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) and the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) interchangeably as the “Penal Code” save where it is necessary to specify the applicable version thereof. The accused also admitted to 30 other charges under s 165 of the Penal Code and gave his consent for these charges to be taken into consideration for sentencing. In this judgment, I determine the appropriate individual sentences and aggregate sentence to be imposed on the accused.
The charges
- [6]
[6] I begin by providing an overview of the 35 charges, comprising five proceeded charges and 30 charges taken into consideration. These may be broadly categorised as follows:
(a) The 1st to 26th charges, under s 165 of the Penal Code, pertained to the accused having obtained for himself various valuable things without consideration from OBS, knowing that OBS was concerned in business transacted which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister and Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee. The approximate total value of the valuable things obtained from OBS was S$384,340.98. Of these charges, the 6th and 26th charges were proceeded with while the remaining charges were taken into consideration.
(b) The 27th charge, under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, pertained to the accused having made payment for a business class flight ticket from Doha to Singapore previously obtained from OBS (and forming part of the subject of the 26th charge), knowing that this act was likely to obstruct the course of justice. The 27th charge was proceeded with.
(c) The 28th to 35th charges, under s 165 of the Penal Code, pertained to the accused having obtained for himself various valuable things without consideration from LKS, knowing that LKS was concerned in business transacted which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister for Transport. The approximate total value of the valuable things obtained from LKS was S$18,956.94. Of these charges, the 29th and 33rd charges were proceeded with while the remaining charges were taken into consideration.
- [7]
[7] Further details concerning the charges may be found in the Annexes to this judgment. Annex 1 reproduces the 35 charges in full while Annex 2 sets out a schedule of offences.
Undisputed facts
- [8]
[8] The accused admitted to the Statement of Facts without qualification. The salient facts stated in the Statement of Facts are highlighted at [9]–[46] below.
The accused’s positions and portfolios as a public servant
- [9]
[9] The accused was at all material times a public servant under s 21 of the Penal Code in his capacity as a Minister of the Government.
- [10]
[10] The accused was a Member of Parliament (“MP”) from 1997 to 2024. He held the following positions or portfolios in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (the “MTI”) from 2006 to 2024:
From 1 October 2015 to 30 April 2018, as the Minister (Industry) in the MTI, the accused was responsible for various departments and statutory boards including the Singapore Tourism Board (the “STB”).
- [11]
[11] The accused also held the following positions in other ministries from 2009 to 2024:
From 15 May 2021 to 17 January 2024, as the Minister for Transport, the accused was responsible for the Land Transport Authority of Singapore (the “LTA”).
- [12]
[12] In addition, an inter-agency committee known as the F1 Steering Committee was established by the Government in 2007 to oversee the Singapore Formula 1 Grand Prix (the “Singapore F1”) as a national project. The F1 Steering Committee was tasked with resolving high-level policy and implementation issues and synergising efforts between government agencies and the Singapore F1 race promoter, Singapore GP Pte Ltd (“SGP”). From 2007 to 2018 and 2021 to 2023, the accused was Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee and the Minister responsible for overseeing the Singapore F1 as a national project. From 2018 to 2021, during the periods when he was not its Chairman, the accused was the advisor to the F1 Steering Committee.
- [13]
[13] The accused resigned from office on 17 January 2024.
Facts relevant to the 6th, 26th and 27th charges
Background facts
- [14]
[14] SGP was incorporated in 2007 under the laws of Singapore. At all material times, OBS was SGP’s majority shareholder, being the beneficial owner of over 90% of the shares in SGP:
(a) 90% of SGP’s shares were owned by Reef Enterprises Pte Ltd. This was a wholly owned subsidiary of Reef Holdings Pte Ltd which, in turn, was wholly owned by OBS.
(b) 10% of SGP’s shares were owned by Komoco Holdings Pte Ltd of which OBS was the majority shareholder.
- [15]
[15] SGP was responsible for organising and promoting the annual Singapore F1 race from 2008 to 2023, save for 2020 and 2021 when it was not held due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- [16]
[16] From 2012 to 2022, the STB and SGP entered into the following three contracts for the promotion, hosting and staging of the annual Singapore F1 race (collectively, the “Singapore F1 Contracts”):
(a) the 2012 Restatement of the Facilitation Agreement of 22 September 2012, entered into on 22 September 2012 (the “2012 Facilitation Agreement”);
(b) the Facilitation Agreement for the Singapore Grand Prix 2018 to 2021, entered into on 15 September 2017; and
(c) the Facilitation Agreement for the Singapore Grand Prix 2022 to 2028, entered into on 27 January 2022 (the “2022 Facilitation Agreement”).
The Singapore F1 Contracts set out the STB’s and SGP’s rights and obligations in relation to the Singapore F1. Among other things, they required SGP to set aside a certain number of complimentary tickets to the Singapore F1 race to be distributed free of charge.
Facts relating to the 6th charge
- [17]
[17] Sometime in or before September 2017, the Deputy Chairman of SGP, Colin Syn (“Colin”), asked the accused how many tickets he would require for the Singapore F1 2017 race. Colin did so pursuant to an earlier standing instruction from OBS to him to allocate complimentary tickets to the Singapore F1 race to the accused. The accused informed Colin that he would require ten “Green Room” tickets to the Singapore F1 2017 race.
- [18]
[18] The Green Room was a hospitality suite which offered guests a premium experience to enjoy the Singapore F1 race. Each Green Room ticket included access to a fully air-conditioned suite with attached outdoor seating as well as complimentary food and alcoholic beverages.
- [19]
[19] Colin obtained approval for the ten Green Room tickets, which came from SGP’s contractual allocation of complimentary tickets to the Singapore F1 race (see [16] above). The allocation of these complimentary tickets was controlled by OBS.
- [20]
[20] Sometime in September 2017, the ten Green Room tickets were delivered to the accused. The value of each Green Room ticket was S$4,226.50 and the total value of the ten Green Room tickets was S$42,265. The accused distributed these tickets to his family, friends and others to attend the Singapore F1 2017 race.
- [21]
[21] The accused did not pay for the ten Green Room tickets. He also did not declare to the Government that he had obtained them from OBS.
- [22]
[22] Further, the accused knew at the time that OBS was concerned in the performance of the 2012 Facilitation Agreement, which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister and Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee.
Facts relating to the 26th charge
- [24]
[24] On 10 December 2022, the accused travelled from Singapore to Doha, Qatar on OBS’s private jet (the “Singapore-Doha Flight”). The approximate value of the Singapore-Doha Flight was US$7,700 or S$10,410.40.
- [25]
[25] Upon reaching Doha, the accused checked into Four Seasons Hotel Doha, where he stayed for one night (the “Doha Hotel Stay”). The value of the Doha Hotel Stay was S$4,737.63. This was paid for by SGP on OBS’s instructions.
- [26]
[26] On 11 December 2022, the accused travelled from Doha to Singapore on a business class flight (the “Doha-Singapore Flight”). The value of the Doha-Singapore Flight was S$5,700. This was likewise paid for by SGP on OBS’s instructions.
- [27]
[27] The accused did not pay for the Singapore-Doha Flight or Doha Hotel Stay. He likewise did not pay for the Doha-Singapore Flight before or during the Doha Trip. However, the accused subsequently made payment to SGP on or around 25 May 2023 for the value of the Doha-Singapore Flight, which payment formed the subject of the 27th charge (see [33] below). The accused also did not declare to the Government that he had obtained the Singapore-Doha Flight, Doha Hotel Stay or Doha-Singapore Flight from OBS.
- [28]
[28] Further, the accused knew at the time that OBS was concerned in the performance of the 2022 Facilitation Agreement, which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister and Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee.
Facts relating to the 27th charge
- [29]
[29] On or around 17 May 2023, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (the “CPIB”) was investigating a separate matter relating to OBS’s associates when it came across the flight manifest of the Singapore-Doha Flight. On 18 May 2023, OBS was informed by his associates that CPIB had seized the flight manifest of the Singapore-Doha Flight and questioned them about the Doha Trip.
- [30]
[30] Sometime between 18 and 23 May 2023, OBS spoke to the accused over the phone. OBS informed the accused that the CPIB had seized the flight manifest of the Singapore-Doha Flight in the course of its investigations into a separate matter. The accused acknowledged this.
- [31]
[31] The following day, OBS spoke again to the accused over the phone. The accused asked OBS to have SGP bill him for the expenses related to the Doha Trip, including the Doha-Singapore Flight. OBS agreed to this and asked a director of SGP, Mok Chee Liang (“Mok”), to arrange for payment by the accused.
- [32]
[32] On 24 May 2023, Mok emailed the accused’s personal assistant, Ivy Chan, with an invoice for the Doha-Singapore Flight.
- [33]
[33] On or around 25 May 2023, the accused made payment for the Doha-Singapore Flight by issuing a cheque to SGP for S$5,700. This was an act with a tendency to obstruct the course of justice because it made it less likely that the accused would be investigated by the CPIB in relation to the Doha Trip. Further, the accused knew at the time that this act was likely to obstruct the course of justice.
Facts relevant to the 29th and 33rd charges
Background facts
- [34]
[34] Lum Chang Building Contractors Pte Ltd (“LCBC”) was incorporated in 1970 under the laws of Singapore. As of 2021 and 2022, LCBC was wholly owned by Lum Chang Asia Pacific Pte Ltd which, in turn, was wholly owned by Lum Chang Holdings Limited. LKS was a director of LCBC and the managing director of Lum Chang Holdings Limited.
- [35]
[35] In 2016, the LTA and LCBC entered into the T315 contract for “Addition and Alteration Works to Existing Tanah Merah Station and Existing Viaducts” (the “T315 Contract”). The T315 Contract had a value of S$325m.
Facts relating to the 29th charge
- [36]
[36] Sometime in late 2021, the accused asked LKS to help him source for whisky and red wine. On 14 November 2021, the accused sent a screenshot of a bottle of Gordon & MacPhail Caol Ila whisky to LKS via WhatsApp message, asking LKS to check with his regular supplier what he thought about it. LKS replied that he “will check with [his] supplier and revert”.
- [37]
[37] On 7 January 2022, LKS informed the accused that he had purchased two bottles of the Gordon & MacPhail Caol Ila whisky and would send these to the accused along with a batch of red wine. The accused acknowledged this and thanked LKS.
- [38]
[38] Sometime in January 2022, LKS arranged for the following to be delivered to the accused’s residence (collectively, the “14 Whisky and Wine Bottles”):
(a) two bottles of Gordon & MacPhail Caol Ila whisky with an approximate value of S$542.23;
(b) three bottles of L’Evangile 2014 wine with a value of S$394.20;
(c) three bottles of Pauillac De Latour 2015 wine with a value of S$186.31;
(d) three bottles of Albert Bichot Domaine du Clos Frantin Grands Echezeaux Grand Cru 2015 wine with a value of S$1,177.21; and
(e) three bottles of Pichon Lalande 2010 wine with a value of S$955.80.
- [39]
[39] The accused did not pay for the 14 Whisky and Wine Bottles. He also did not declare to the Government that he had obtained them from LKS.
- [40]
[40] Further, the accused knew at the time that LKS was concerned in the performance of the T315 Contract, which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister for Transport.
Facts relating to the 33rd charge
- [41]
[41] On 7 May 2022, LKS and his family received an invitation to the accused’s 60th birthday celebration on 18 June 2022. Sometime before 13 June 2022, LKS suggested to the accused that he would buy a foldable bicycle for the accused’s birthday.
- [42]
[42] Sometime in June 2022, the accused obtained a Brompton T-Line bicycle with a value of S$7,907.50 from LKS.
- [43]
[43] The accused did not pay for the Brompton T-Line bicycle. He also did not declare to the Government that he had obtained it from LKS.
- [44]
[44] Further, the accused knew at the time that LKS was concerned in the performance of the T315 Contract, which had a connection with the accused’s official functions as Minister for Transport.
Seizure of properties from the accused
- [45]
[45] In the course of its investigations, the CPIB seized the following items amongst others from the accused:
(a) four bottles of Gordon & MacPhail Caol Ila whisky with an approximate value of S$1,084.46 (forming the subject of the 28th charge, which was taken into consideration);
(b) three bottles of Albert Bichot Domaine du Clos Frantin Grands Echezeaux Grand Cru 2015 wine with a value of S$1,177.21 (forming part of the subject of the proceeded 29th charge);
(c) three bottles of Pichon Lalande 2010 wine with a value of S$955.80 (forming part of the subject of the proceeded 29th charge);
(d) a TaylorMade golf driver with an approximate value of S$749 (forming the subject of the 30th charge, which was taken into consideration);
(e) nine Honma Beres BE-08 golf clubs with a value of S$4,420 (forming the subject of the 32nd charge, which was taken into consideration);
(f) a Brompton T-Line bicycle with a value of S$7,907.50 (forming the subject of the proceeded 33rd charge);
(g) two bottles of M&H Elements Sherry Cask whisky with a value of S$198 (forming the subject of the 34th charge, which was taken into consideration); and
(h) a Scotty Cameron Phantom golf putter with an approximate value of S$600, a golf chipper with the words “Wilson Harmonized Chipper” with an approximate value of S$100 and a golf chipper with the words “ChipR” and “Ping” with an approximate value of S$100 (forming the subject of the 35th charge, which was taken into consideration).
- [46]
[46] The accused agreed for these items to be forfeited to the State.
Disgorgement by the accused of his benefits
- [47]
[47] On 23 September 2024, the accused also fully disgorged to the Accountant-General his financial gain from his offences under s 165 of the Penal Code, including those underlying the charges taken into consideration, in the amount of S$380,305.95. This excluded the value of the items seized by the CPIB (see [45] above) as well as the value of the Doha-Singapore Flight for which the accused had already made payment to SGP (see [33] above).
- [48]
[48] The accused had earlier voluntarily returned all monies that he had received by way of salary as a Minister and allowances as an MP from the commencement of the CPIB’s investigations in July 2023. In a letter to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (“PM Lee”) dated 17 January 2024, the accused claimed that he was doing so because he “cannot in all good conscience benefit” from the monies when he was unable, on account of the CPIB’s investigations, to discharge his duties. He further stated that “[t]his is the right thing to do for Singapore and is in keeping with the Government’s high standards of integrity”.
Procedural history
- [49]
[49] The accused initially claimed trial to the charges against him. It is important to mention at this juncture that the 25th and 26th charges were initially, and throughout most of the proceedings, framed under s 6(a) read with s 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “PCA”). In their original form, the 25th and 26th charges alleged that the accused had corruptly obtained gratification from OBS as an inducement for advancing OBS’s business interests in matters relating to the 2022 Facilitation Agreement and, additionally in the case of the 26th charge, a proposal for a contract with the STB to establish the ABBA Voyage virtual concert in Singapore.
- [50]
[50] The Prosecution intended to try the charges involving LKS (ie, the 28th to 35th charges) separately from and before the charges involving OBS (ie, the 1st to 27th charges). The accused applied in HC/CM 16/2024 for a joinder of all 35 charges under ss 133 and 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”). I heard and allowed this application: see S Iswaran v Public Prosecutor [2024] 4 SLR 965.
- [52]
[52] Following the conclusion of the criminal case disclosure procedures, the Prosecution agreed, acceding to representations sent by the Defence, to amend the 25th and 26th charges from charges under s 6(a) read with s 7 of the PCA to charges under s 165 of the Penal Code. After these charges were duly amended, the accused pleaded guilty to the 6th, 26th, 27th, 29th and 33rd charges. He also admitted to the remaining charges and gave his consent for them to be taken into consideration for sentencing.
The parties’ positions on sentence
- [53]
[53] The parties take the following sentencing positions:
The Prosecution’s position
- [54]
[54] In relation to the charges under s 165 of the Penal Code (ie, the 6th, 26th, 29th and 33rd charges), the Prosecution submits that the custodial threshold has clearly been crossed having regard to the following considerations:
(a) The accused was a Minister at the material time. This was the highest level of executive office in the Government. His offences had a significant impact on the Government’s hard-earned reputation for integrity and honesty, especially in view of his considerable seniority and standing as a Minister (of 12 years prior to his resignation).
(b) The accused was not a mere passive acceptor of the gifts but played a more active role in obtaining them, leveraging on his position as a public servant in doing so.
(c) The business transactions in which OBS and LKS were concerned were directly connected to the accused’s official functions.
(d) These business transactions were of significant interest and value.
(e) The accused gained personally from the offences in obtaining all the gifts for himself, even if he then went on to distribute some of these to others.
(f) The 30 other charges under s 165 of the Penal Code which were taken into consideration showed that the accused’s offending was part of a pattern of behaviour.
- [55]
[55] In relation to the 6th and 26th charges, the Prosecution submits that the accused undermined the independence of his position as Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee and compromised his position as the most senior Government representative negotiating with SGP on F1-related matters. However, the Prosecution also concedes, citing a press statement by the MTI dated 18 January 2024, that there is presently no evidence to suggest that the Singapore F1 Contracts were structured to the disadvantage of the Government. The Prosecution seeks a slightly lower sentence for the 26th charge as compared to the 6th charge having regard to the lower value of the valuable things obtained.
- [56]
[56] In relation to the 29th and 33rd charges, the Prosecution acknowledges that the accused did not intervene in any decisions relating to the T315 Contract in favour of LCBC. Nonetheless, the Prosecution submits that such conduct could, if allowed to continue, have resulted in damage to the public interest. It emphasises the significant value of the T315 Contract. Taking reference from its sentencing position for the 6th and 26th charges, the Prosecution seeks a lower sentence for the 29th and 33rd charges having regard to the lower value of the valuable things and the more attenuated business relationship between the accused and LCBC.
- [57]
[57] With respect to the 27th charge under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, the Prosecution highlights that the investigations obstructed were serious in nature. The Prosecution further submits that it is not appreciably less aggravating that the accused did not intend to obstruct the course of justice but merely knew that his act was likely to have this outcome. This is because the offence could potentially have led the CPIB to decide, erroneously, not to commence investigations against him. The Prosecution, in arriving at its proposed sentencing position, considers that the accused’s actions were more in the vein of obscuring the true facts than destroying evidence.
(a) The 27th charge (under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code) concerned a different legal interest from the other charges (under s 165 of the Penal Code). The former represented an offence against the administration of justice through interference with criminal investigations while the latter represented a violation of the interest in a public service that advances the Government’s interests effectively and maintains the public’s trust.
(b) The 6th and 26th charges on the one hand and the 29th and 33rd charges on the other arose from two unrelated factual contexts, involving different givers, different governmental business and valuable things of different kinds.
(c) As between the 6th and 26th charges, ordering the sentence for the 6th charge to run consecutively would give “fuller expression to the timeframe and nature” of the accused’s offences under s 165 of the Penal Code. This is because the offence underlying the 6th charge occurred earlier and involved the highest-value gifts amongst the proceeded charges. The Singapore F1 tickets forming the subject of the 6th charge also formed the subject of seven other charges which were taken into consideration, and these tickets constituted the largest proportion of the total value of the gifts received by the accused.
The Prosecution also submits that the ensuing aggregate sentence of seven months’ imprisonment is commensurate with the totality of the accused’s offending.
- [59]
[59] The Prosecution submits that limited mitigating weight should be given to the accused’s disgorgement of his financial gain because it was made late in the day and cannot undo the damage done to the public interest. As for the accused’s plea of guilt, applying the SAP PG Guidelines, the Prosecution submits that the accused is entitled to a discount of no more than 30% for the 26th charge, which was amended, and a discount of no more than 10% for the remaining charges. Thus, in totality, the Prosecution submits that a global sentence of six to seven months’ imprisonment is appropriate.
The Defence’s position
- [60]
[60] In relation to the charges under s 165 of the Penal Code (ie, the 6th, 26th, 29th and 33rd charges), the Defence submits that the offences occasioned no or minimal harm and that the accused’s level of culpability was low. In respect of the level of harm, the Defence submits that no loss was caused to any third parties. In particular, OBS and LKS did not suffer any loss because they had given the valuable things to the accused on their own accord. In respect of the level of culpability, the Defence submits that the offences did not involve any planning, premeditation or sophistication. The valuable things were also obtained by the accused from OBS and LKS against the backdrop of existing friendships. Further, the accused committed the offences without any ill intent or motive. He was simply ignorant of the unlawfulness of his conduct. There was also no abuse by the accused of his position.
- [61]
[61] In relation to the 27th charge under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, the Defence highlights that the accused did not intend to obstruct the course of justice and that the offence was not premeditated or persistent.
- [62]
[62] Turning to the offender-specific factors, the Defence submits that there are no aggravating factors warranting an uplift to the sentences to be imposed. On the contrary, significant mitigating weight should be placed on: (a) the accused’s plea of guilty; (b) the accused’s public service and contributions to Singapore; and (c) the accused’s voluntary disgorgement of his benefits. Specifically, in respect of his plea of guilty, the Defence submits that the accused is entitled under the SAP PG Guidelines to a sentencing discount of up to 30% for all the charges and should be awarded this maximum discount. The accused had initially elected to claim trial only because the 25th and 26th charges, which were originally framed under s 6(a) read with s 7 of the PCA and were baseless, had coloured the overall case against him. However, following the Prosecution’s amendment of the 25th and 26th charges, the accused had pleaded guilty at the earliest available opportunity.
My decision on sentence
- [64]
[64] I now explain my decision on sentence and give my reasons, which will encompass the following areas:
(a) the appropriate indicative sentences for each of the offences under s 165 of the Penal Code, having regard to the offence-specific factors;
(b) the appropriate indicative sentence for the offence under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, having regard to the offence-specific factors;
(c) the appropriate adjustments to be made to all the individual indicative sentences on account of the offender-specific factors; and
(d) the appropriate aggregate sentence.
Indicative sentences for the offences under s 165 of the Penal Code
The object and purpose of s 165 of the Penal Code
- [65]
[65] Section 165 falls within Chapter 9 of the Penal Code, which provides for “Offences by or relating to public servants”. It is noteworthy that Chapter 9 also contains s 161 which, broadly speaking, prohibits a public servant from taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. For ease of reference, I set out both ss 161 and 165 of the Penal Code in full:
- [66]
[66] The prescribed punishment under s 161, being a fine or imprisonment of up to three years or both, exceeds the prescribed punishment under s 165 in its severity. This appears to correlate with the heightened gravity of an offence under s 161. Section 161 requires proof that the gratification in question constituted a motive or reward for: (a) doing or forbearing to do any official act; (b) showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in the exercise of the offender’s official functions; or (c) rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person with the Government, any Member of Parliament or the Cabinet, or with any public servant.
- [67]
[67] Section 165, on the other hand, targets the following situation:
(a) a public servant (“A”) accepts, obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain;
(b) for A or for any other person;
(c) any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which A knows to be inadequate;
(d) from a person of the following description:
(i) any person whom A knows to have been, to be or to be likely to be concerned in any proceedings or business transacted or about to be transacted by A or having any connection with the official functions of A or of any public servant to whom he (A) is subordinate (ie, A’s superior); or
(ii) any person whom A knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned.
- [68]
[68] Unlike s 161, there is no requirement under s 165 of the Penal Code that the received benefits constituted a motive or reward bearing some connection with the public servant’s official acts, the exercise of his official functions or the rendering of a service or disservice to any person. For the purposes of [67(d)] above, the requisite mens rea is that of knowledge. It suffices that the public servant knew that the giver of the valuable thing was, is or is likely to be concerned in any proceedings or business transacted or about to be transacted by him or having any connection with his official functions or those of his superior. In the alternative, this knowledge may consist of a knowledge that the giver of the valuable thing is interested in or related to the person so concerned.
- [69]
[69] It has been said that the offences under ss 161–165 of the Penal Code deal specifically with bribery and other forms of corrupt practices involving public servants and compared to the offences in the PCA, are more targeted in scope toward tackling the various forms of bribery of, and the taking of bribes by, public servants.
- [70]
[70] The Penal Code was enacted in 1871, drawing heavily from the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act 45 of 1860) (the “Indian Penal Code 1860”). The origins of ss 161 and 165 of the Penal Code can be traced back to the draft Indian Penal Code (the “Draft Indian Penal Code 1837”), which was prepared by the Indian Law Commission (the “ILC”) chaired by Thomas Babington Macaulay and submitted to the Governor-General of India in Council in 1837. This draft was eventually amended and passed into law on 6 October 1860. The Indian Penal Code 1860 remained in force in India until it was superseded by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (Act 45 of 2023), which came into force on 1 July 2024. Section 161 of the Penal Code may be traced back to cl 138 of the Draft Indian Penal Code 1837. Meanwhile, s 165 of the Penal Code appears to find its origins in cl 141 of the Draft Indian Penal Code 1837, which read as follows:
- [71]
[71] As the Prosecution highlights, cl 141 of the Draft Indian Penal Code 1837 was never passed into law. Instead, the provision adopted in the Indian Penal Code 1860 was substantially the same as s 165 of the Penal Code. The reasons for the changes are unknown, because there is no surviving copy of a report by the ILC chaired by Sir Barnes Peacock in 1856, documenting the reasons for the changes made to the Draft Indian Penal Code 1837 (see Ho Man Yuk v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 567 at [78(e)]). It is therefore unclear why s 165 of the Penal Code does not contain language “excluding trivialities, such as refreshments in the course of hospitality”.
- [72]
[72] I make three observations in light of the historical context:
(a) First, s 165 of the Penal Code applies to all public servants, which term is defined very broadly under s 21(1) of the Penal Code to include a large class of persons employed to perform public duties and is not limited to judges.
(b) Second, s 165 of the Penal Code does not contain any explanation as to the meaning of a “valuable thing”. This is unlike s 161 of the Penal Code, the explanations to which clarify that “gratification” is “not restricted to pecuniary gratifications, or to gratifications estimable in money”, and that “legal remuneration” is “not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand but [includes] all remuneration which he is permitted by law to accept”. What is clear is that the use of “valuable thing” in s 165, as opposed to “gratification”, is deliberate. In my view, the plain and ordinary meaning of “valuable thing” in the legislative context must mean a thing “having considerable monetary worth” (see the Collins Dictionary). The issue of whether an item satisfies this description is, to my mind, an objective factual inquiry.
(c) Third, s 165 of the Penal Code encompasses a wide variety of factual scenarios. Without providing an exhaustive list, some variables include the position occupied by the offender, the nature of the connection between the proceeding or business (in which the giver is interested) with the offender’s official functions, the value of the item obtained or accepted, the manner in which the offender abused his public office to obtain the benefit and whether the valuable item was accepted or obtained directly or from an associate of the giver.
- [73]
[73] I am also cognisant that the object of s 165 of the Penal Code differs from that of s 6(a) of the PCA. To constitute an offence under s 165 of the Penal Code, unlike an offence under s 6(a) of the PCA, it is not necessary that the offender provided any quid pro quo for the valuable thing. For instance, it is not necessary to establish that the valuable thing constituted an inducement or reward to the offender for acting, forbearing to act, showing favour or forbearing from showing disfavour in relation to his principal’s affairs. As a further example, to constitute an offence under s 165 of the Penal Code, it is also not necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the offender had acted with a corrupt intent in obtaining or accepting the valuable thing.
- [74]
[74] It should be noted that the punishment prescribed in s 7 for offences committed under ss 5 or 6 of the PCA relating to a contract or proposal for a contract with the Government, a government department or a public body, or a subcontract to execute work comprised in such a contract, is a fine of up to S$100,000 or imprisonment of up to seven years or both. The prescribed range of punishment under s 7 of the PCA is more extensive compared to that under s 165 of the Penal Code.
General deterrence is the predominant sentencing consideration
- [75]
[75] Having regard to the language of s 165 of the Penal Code, it appears to me that the gravamen of the offence is the damage to the trust in and integrity of public institutions stemming from the perception that the patronage of public servants may be cultivated by offers of valuable items from interested persons, such as those with an interest in the outcomes of legal proceedings or a business interest in a transaction with a public institution. Persons who hold public office are conferred status and power by virtue of such office for the purpose of serving the public interest, and the obtaining of gifts from persons who have a connection with a public servant’s official duties is an abuse of such power. Section 165 thus establishes a prohibition against the acceptance or obtaining of such pecuniary benefits by public servants with knowledge of the giver’s interest in certain proceedings or business connected to the public servant’s official capacity.
- [76]
[76] Given the object of s 165 of the Penal Code of safeguarding the integrity of public institutions and the public interest, general deterrence assumes centre stage in sentencing. The lack of prevalence of an offence may well be regarded as a sign of the health of the Government’s processes and protocols but it cannot detract from the necessity for the courts to signal their disapprobation of serious offences that threaten the public interest. I therefore disagree with the Defence’s submission that general deterrence has “limited application” in the present case simply because offences under s 165 of the Penal Code are not prevalent, as evidenced by the fact that “there has hitherto been no reported decision” involving such offences. In Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng [2007] 2 SLR(R) 814 (“Law Aik Meng”), the High Court clarified (at [24]) that:
- [77]
[77] The court then gave, as examples of such situations, where the offence is committed against or relating to public institutions (at [24(a)]) or is difficult to detect and/or apprehend (at [25(d)]). The court also added (at [25(c)]) that, where an offence has the wider-felt impact of triggering unease and offending the sensibilities of the general public, a deterrent sentence will be necessary and appropriate to quell public disquiet and the unease engendered by such crimes. Thus, although general deterrence may certainly be relevant where the offence in question is prevalent (see Law Aik Meng at [25(a)]), this is only one of the many situations in which the need for general deterrence may be engaged.
- [78]
[78] In oral arguments before me, the Defence submitted that public confidence in the Government’s impartiality and integrity was not undermined because the public had learnt about the offences for the first time when the accused was charged. The Defence further argued that a powerful signal had already been sent by the preferring of charges against the accused.
- [79]
[79] I reject this submission for two main reasons. First, the Defence’s submission would be contrary to the principles in Law Aik Meng at [24] and [25]. General deterrence is not invariably displaced where any public disquiet arises only after an offender is prosecuted for his offences. As I have explained at [77] above, the public disquiet caused is one of the reasons why general deterrence is a relevant sentencing consideration. There is no necessity for such disquiet to have arisen before the offender was charged (and, consequentially, information about those charges publicised by the media). Indeed, it would be illogical to place less weight on general deterrence for this reason because there are a number of reasons why offences may remain out of the public eye prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings against an offender. For instance, this could have been due to his concealment of the offences or other reasons unattributable to him. Indeed, where the authority and status of an offender holding high public office may cause others to be slow to question his offending acts, the public disquiet that is generated when the offences come to light would clearly be significant. Second, I struggle to make sense of the contention that the mere fact that the accused has been prosecuted would have sent a sufficiently strong signal that the offences committed were unacceptable. The prosecution of an offender must necessarily be for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice, and the criminal justice process of justice begins with the initiation of criminal proceedings and culminates with the imposition of an appropriate sentence in the event of a conviction. In other words, if the initiation of criminal proceedings for an offence were to result in the imposition of an inadequate sentence, justice would not be appropriately served. Accordingly, general deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration for an offence under s 165 and the Defence’s submission that general deterrence is of limited application for such an offence cannot be correct.
The sentencing approach: default custodial terms with adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors
- [80]
[80] As observed by the parties, there appears to be no reported cases in Singapore involving an offence under s 165 of the Penal Code, from which guidance on sentencing can be derived. Limited guidance may be obtained from cases under the PCA, in light of the differences in the statutory context and punishment spectrum highlighted earlier (see [73]–[74] above). The default punitive position for a particular offence must be determined by reference to the punishment at the two ends of the spectrum of possible sentences as a first step. This may then be adjusted having regard to any aggravating or mitigating factors (Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] 4 SLR 661 (“Hue An Li”) at [59]; Public Prosecutor v BDB [2018] 1 SLR 127 at [59] and [61]).
- [81]
[81] To give an example of one such analytical approach, in Hue An Li, in providing guidance on the sentencing of offenders who have caused death by negligent driving under s 304A(b) of the Penal Code, the High Court held (at [61]) that the appropriate starting point should be a brief custodial term of up to four weeks’ imprisonment, being an approximate midpoint in a spectrum that ranged from a fine to two years’ imprisonment. The High Court clarified, however, that this did not mean that a sentence of imprisonment would be imposed in every case, because the court must examine all the circumstances of each individual case as well as any aggravating and/or mitigating factors to determine the gravity of the particular offender’s conduct before deciding what the appropriate sentence should be.
- [82]
[82] In certain contexts, it may be appropriate for a custodial term to constitute the general starting point even if the spectrum of possible punishment encompasses a fine as well as an imprisonment term. Indeed, in Chiew Kok Chai v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 SLR 713, the High Court held (at [52]) that a custodial sentence should be the norm for offences of making a false declaration in connection with a work pass application under s 22(1)(d) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A, 2009 Rev Ed) on account of the strong need for deterrence against such offences. In the court’s view, a fine for such offences would generally not be sufficient punishment unless substantial mitigating factors were present.
- [83]
[83] In Koh Yong Chiah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 3 SLR 447 (“Koh Yong Chiah”), in considering the offence of providing false information to a public servant under s 182 of the Penal Code, the High Court refrained (at [48]) from defining in the abstract a uniform set of factors that would allow the categorisation of an offender’s degree of culpability and, in turn, the appropriate punishment. The court instead provided broad guidance (at [49]) as to the type of cases that would generally attract a custodial sentence as a starting point, stating (at [50]) that the courts should, as a starting point, impose a custodial term if “appreciable harm” may be caused by the offence. Such harm could include personal injury, loss of liberty, financial loss or harm arising from the wastage of public investigative resources. The court recognised (at [50(e)]) that:
- [84]
[84] Until a corpus of relevant case law develops, it would be premature to set out a list of factors, as the court did in Koh Yong Chiah, to rationalise when the custodial threshold has been crossed, or to consider the appropriateness of setting out a sentencing framework for all offences under s 165 of the Penal Code. Given the strong deterrent stance required against offences that have the potential to destroy trust and confidence in public institutions, in my view, a custodial sentence should generally be the starting point where: (a) a public servant accepts a valuable item from a giver; and (b) the public servant knows that the giver has an interest in a business transaction which has a connection to the public servant’s official functions. Where appropriate, a fine in addition to a term of imprisonment should be imposed to disgorge any gains made by the offender.
- [85]
[85] Such a starting point would be subject to upward adjustments for aggravating factors and downward adjustments for mitigating factors. For clarity, there is no invariable rule that a custodial sentence must be imposed for all offences under s 165 of the Penal Code. A fine may be appropriate in the circumstances in light of the offence-specific and offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors.
The relevance of foreign precedents
- [86]
[86] For completeness, as directed by this court on 24 September 2024, the parties subsequently addressed this court in writing on the relevance of the case of Mohd Khir bin Toyo v Public Prosecutor [2015] 5 MLJ 429 (“Mohd Khir”) to sentencing generally, for offences under s 165 of the Penal Code, in light of the absence of local reported precedents.
- [87]
[87] In summary, in Mohd Khir, the offender was the Chief Minister of Selangor and, by virtue of that position, also the Chairman of the Selangor State Economic Development Corporation (“PKNS”). The offender had suggested to Dato Shamsuddin bin Haryoni (“Dato Shamsuddin”) that he was desirous of purchasing a piece of land, and Dato Shamsuddin formed the impression that the offender would in turn purchase the land from him. Dato Shamsuddin proceeded to acquire the land as he did not want to jeopardise his business interests in construction projects with the Selangor State Government transacted with PKNS. The offender later required Dato Shamsuddin to sell him the land at the price of RM3.5m, which Dato Shamsuddin testified that he did for fear of jeopardising his business interests with the State of Selangor. The offender knew that Dato Shamsuddin had purchased the land at RM6.5m and thus the consideration of RM3.5m was inadequate. The offender also knew of Dato Shamsuddin’s business interests in Selangor that were connected to the offender’s official duties as Chief Minister of Selangor. The offender claimed trial and was convicted of and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for an offence under the Malaysian equivalent of s 165 of the Penal Code, which sentence was upheld by the Malaysian Federal Court.
- [88]
[88] In its written submissions, the Defence brought to my attention the High Court’s pronouncements in Chan Chun Hong v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 465 (at [87]) that:
The Prosecution similarly agreed that “the sentences imposed by foreign courts do not typically inform sentencing in the Singapore context”.
Offence-specific factors
(1) Culpability factors
- [90]
[90] I agree with the Prosecution that the higher the office held by the offender as a public servant, the higher his level of culpability. Holders of high office ordinarily wield a greater degree of potential influence over significant business transactions or proceedings and have a larger resultant impact on the public interest. Further, such persons set the tone for public servants in conducting themselves in accordance with high standards of integrity, and must be expected to avoid any perception that they are susceptible to influence by pecuniary benefits. Persons who accept appointments to high office take on the heavy responsibilities of their office along with the associated power and status, and should generally be regarded as having acted with greater culpability in abusing their position to obtain valuable gifts.
- [91]
[91] An offender’s awareness that the giver was motivated by a desire to cultivate his goodwill and loyalty would also be a relevant factor in sentencing. The decision to obtain a valuable item in such circumstances, where the offender knows of a close connection between the giver’s interest and his official functions, is a marker of a more culpable state of mind. This consideration may be relevant where the giver has a significant interest, of which the offender is aware, in business undertaken by the offender by virtue of his official capacity. In other words, the larger the financial or personal interest of the giver known to the offender, the more culpable the offender is in receiving the benefit. This is because such knowledge of the giver’s significant motivation in cultivating and purchasing the offender’s patronage signifies a greater abuse by the offender of the trust reposed in the integrity of his office.
- [92]
[92] Other offence-specific factors include the degree of premeditation, sophistication and planning, the period of offending, as well as attempts to conceal the offence, to the extent that the relevant facts do not form the subject of a separate charge. For instance, where the concealment of an offence under s 165 of the Penal Code forms the subject of a separate charge under s 204A of the Penal Code, such concealment should not constitute an aggravating factor for the s 165 offence to avoid double counting.
(2) Harm factors
- [93]
[93] The value of the benefit obtained is relevant to sentencing, as the greater the pecuniary benefit obtained by the offender, the greater the tendency for injury to trust and confidence in public institutions. I should emphasise that the mere perception that the offender is under the influence of the giver is itself a type of harm because of the paramount importance of trust and confidence in public institutions. As the High Court put it in Koh Yong Chiah (at [68]):
- [94]
[94] Nonetheless, the court should eschew an over-emphasis on the value of the valuable item, for two main reasons. First, the accepting or obtaining of a valuable item is itself an element of the offence. To consider the mere fact that the item is valuable as an aggravating factor would therefore be double counting. Thus, the value of the item is relevant in sentencing only insofar as it is sufficiently significant as to indicate a higher level of damage to the public interest, thereby constituting an aggravating factor. Second, the value of the item is only one of the indicators for the level of harm caused by the offence. The harm caused will necessarily fall to be assessed having regard to the entire context, particularly the nature of the office and the functions that were at risk of being or have in fact been compromised. Generally, the greater the public interest in the concerned transactions or the official functions of the offender, the greater the harm that would ensue.
- [95]
[95] Any evidence that the offender’s discharge of his official duties was in fact influenced by his receipt of the valuable item would be relevant to the level of harm and constitute an aggravating factor. If the offender, in the exercise of his official capacity, does any act or forebears from doing any act as a favour to the giver consequent upon receiving the gift, harm would necessarily have resulted, even if there is no evidence that the giver had reaped any tangible financial benefit or business advantage. A fortiori, if the giver had been conferred any benefit or advantage by the offender in the exercise of his official functions, the level of harm would be greater.
Application to the facts
(1) The accused’s level of culpability
- [96]
[96] In relation to the 6th and 26th charges, the accused was a Minister and Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee at the material time. As rightly pointed by the Prosecution, as a Minister, the accused occupied the highest level of executive office. This placed him in a position to wield great influence over transactions of wide public interest. Further, as highlighted by the Prosecution, the accused as Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee oversaw the Singapore F1 and was the Government’s chief negotiator with SGP on business matters relating to the Singapore F1. The Singapore F1 had a significant bearing on the nation’s economic interests as a large-scale event that would draw in overseas spectators and generate income for the nation.
- [97]
[97] In relation to the 29th and the 33rd charges, the accused’s culpability was heightened by the critical role that he assumed as the Minister of Transport. As Minister for Transport, the accused was responsible for the LTA, which was involved in construction projects relating to the mass rapid transit (“MRT”) system. The MRT system was a project that would improve the infrastructure of the nation and affect the well-being of the entire nation.
- [98]
[98] Even if there was no evidence that the accused had exercised his influence over the connected business transactions, namely, the Singapore F1 Contracts and the T315 Contract, in favour of OBS or LKS, the accused’s culpability cannot be considered low given the accused’s experience and standing as a Minister. When the offences were committed, the accused had been a Minister for six to ten years. In his position, the accused’s culpability was higher for placing himself in a position of susceptibility to influence by pecuniary benefits conferred by persons with interests connected to his office.
- [99]
[99] Further, in committing the offence stated in the 6th charge, the accused had acted with deliberation insofar as he had made a specific request for the valuable items. When asked by Colin how many tickets to the Singapore F1 2017 race he required, the accused had answered that he would require ten Green Room tickets.
- [100]
[100] Similarly, in committing the offence stated in the 26th charge, the accused also acted with deliberation. The accused took urgent personal leave to facilitate his availability for the Doha Trip, thereby enabling him to enjoy an all-expenses paid trip with only four days’ prior notice.
- [101]
[101] In respect of the 6th and 26th charges, the accused abused his position by obtaining gifts from OBS despite knowing that OBS was concerned in business transacted having a particularly close connection with the accused’s official duties. This was a culpability-increasing factor. The accused was Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee, which was tasked with resolving high-level policy and implementation issues and synergising efforts between government agencies and SGP. OBS, meanwhile, was the beneficial owner of more than 90% of the shares in SGP. At the time of committing the offence in the 6th charge, the accused was also responsible, as the Minister (Industry) in the MTI, for the STB. At that time, the accused also knew that OBS was concerned in business transacted between SGP and the STB relating to the setting aside of a certain number of complimentary tickets to the Singapore F1 race to be distributed free of charge for the purpose of its promotion. When the offences stated in the 6th and 26th charges were committed, the accused was aware that OBS was concerned in business transactions that formed part of a long-running business relationship between the STB and SGP for the promotion, hosting and staging of the annual Singapore F1 race. This long-standing business relationship lasted from 2008 to 2023 (save for 2020 and 2021 when the Singapore F1 race was not held due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
- [102]
[102] The Prosecution characterises the accused as “more than a passive accepter of the gifts in question” on the basis that he had played an “active role” in obtaining the gifts. The Defence took issue with this characterisation in oral arguments before me. As I understand it, the Prosecution’s submission is that the accused had acted with deliberation and therefore displayed a higher level of culpability. I see no reason to disagree with this either as a matter of principle or on the facts. While the accused did not actively seek out the gifts, he cannot be described as a mere passive acceptor on the facts before me in relation to the 6th and 26th charges. Indeed, for the reasons I have just given (see [99]–[100] above), the accused’s level of culpability for the 6th and 26th charges was increased in view of the deliberateness discernible from his conduct.
- [103]
[103] Conversely, with respect to the 29th and 33rd charges, I am of the view that there was no evidence that the accused had acted with premeditation or deliberation in accepting the gifts given by LKS.
(2) The harm caused
- [105]
[105] In a similar vein, the Defence submits in relation to the 6th charge that the Green Room tickets were not intended for sale but for distribution without charge to persons “desirable and necessary for the promotion and benefit” of the Singapore F1 race. The Defence emphasises that the accused did not sell his Green Room tickets for pecuniary gain but distributed them to family, friends and other people of diverse backgrounds, believing that this would achieve the Government’s objective of ensuring that the Singapore F1 would be an inclusive event that all segments of Singapore society could be a part of and take pride in.
- [106]
[106] The submission ignores the fact that the Green Room tickets would otherwise have been allocated by SGP for distribution free of charge, pursuant to its contractual obligations, as the promoters of the Singapore F1 race. In my view, the fact that the accused obtained special access to the Green Room tickets by virtue of his connection with OBS, who was concerned in business transacted by the accused in his official capacity, was of itself injurious to the integrity of the accused’s office. The resultant harm is not negated or diminished by the accused’s choice to share the benefit of the Green Room tickets with his associates. Further, the fact that the accused did not sell the tickets for pecuniary gain is only indicative of the absence of an aggravating factor but does not in and of itself constitute a mitigating factor.
- [107]
[107] The value of the items received was not insignificant, with the value being more significant for the 6th and 26th charges, in comparison with the 29th and 33rd charges. In my view, the value of the items received was culpability-increasing to an extent commensurate with their value.
(3) Indicative starting points
- [108]
[108] Having considered all of the relevant factors, I assess the harm and culpability of the accused as moderate for the 6th and 26th charges and low for the 29th and 33rd charges. Accordingly, I set out the indicative starting points as shown in the table:
Indicative sentence for the offence under s 204A of the Penal Code
- [109]
[109] I next turn to the 27th charge. The prescribed punishment for the doing of an act with a tendency to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice with knowledge or intention is a maximum imprisonment term of seven years or fine or both. The 27th charge, which was framed under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, pertained to the commission of such an act knowing it was likely to obstruct the course of justice.
(a) The nature of the predicate charge upon which the offender had sought to thwart the course of justice. The more serious it is, the more serious the act of perverting the course of justice will be.
(b) The effect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice.
(d) The degree of persistence, premeditation and sophistication in the commission of the offence.
- [111]
[111] Thus, in Parthiban, it was relevant that the predicate offence that the offender’s actions were aimed at subverting, being a capital charge of drug importation, was regarded (at [28]) as “the most serious conceivable” [emphasis in original]. This was the case not just with regard to the offender’s own capital charge, but in relation to the co-accused’s capital charge of abetting the offender’s drug importation. There was also extensive planning and premeditation. The offender had written a lengthy and detailed note containing instructions for the co-accused to falsely testify in a way so as to exonerate them both and arranged for a fellow prison inmate to pass the note to the co-accused to circumvent the difficulty the offender faced in meeting him. Further, while the offender’s actions were discovered prior to any judicial determination at the trial, this was only due to the co-accused’s voluntary disclosure. It was therefore entirely fortuitous that no harm had resulted. In the circumstances, the court concluded that the sentence of one year and nine months’ imprisonment appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offence.
- [112]
[112] The Defence highlights that Parthiban concerned an offence committed prior to the amendment to s 204A in January 2020 pursuant to the Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (Act 15 of 2019). Prior to 2020, s 204A only criminalised the intentional obstruction, prevention, perversion or defeating of justice, within the same range of punishment. The amended s 204A likewise criminalises such acts (see s 204A(b)) but additionally criminalises acts done with the knowledge that they are likely to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice (see s 204A(a)). On this basis, the Defence seeks to distinguish Parthiban. It emphasises that an offence under s 204A(a) should attract a lower sentence than one under s 204A(b) because a person who intentionally obstructs the course of justice must be more culpable than one with a lesser mens rea of mere knowledge that his act is likely to have that effect.
- [113]
[113] It is essential to note that the prescribed punishment for offences under s 204A was not increased by the amendment. The purpose of the amendment was to redefine the mental element for offences under s 204A of the Penal Code and not to prescribe different consequences for offenders who act with knowledge vis-à-vis those who act with intention. The Explanatory Statement to the Criminal Law Reform Bill 2019 (No 6 of 2019) described the purpose of the amendment as follows:
- [115]
[115] The Defence’s attempt to distinguish Parthiban is premised on the generalisation that knowledge tends to be a less culpable mental state than intent. Indeed, it is trite, as stated by the High Court in Muhammad Khalis bin Ramlee v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 449 (at [40]) that:
- [116]
[116] However, the court should eschew generalisations and assess each case on its own facts, taking into account all the relevant factors in assessing the culpability of an offender. In Seah Hock Thiam v Public Prosecutor [2013] SGHC 136, the offender asked his personal driver to “take care of it”, referring to parking offences committed by the offender’s friends, resulting in his driver taking responsibility for those offences. In so doing, the offender abetted his driver to pervert the course of justice, an offence under the pre-amendment s 204A read with s 109 of the Penal Code. In determining the offender’s appeal against sentence, the High Court did not appear to regard the predicate offences as being especially serious, and also considered that the offender’s culpability was not high even though he had acted intentionally. The High Court thus held that one week’s imprisonment was appropriate and adequate punishment.
- [117]
[117] In contrast, in the unreported State Courts cases cited by the Defence such as Public Prosecutor v Avtar Singh (SC-908199-2021) (“Avtar Singh”) and Public Prosecutor v Choo Soon Kooi v Public Prosecutor (SC-904795-2023) (“Choo Soon Kooi”), the offenders’ levels of culpability was higher in view of the nature of the consequences that they knew they were likely to avoid. In the result, the punishments imposed in Avtar Singh and Choo Soon Kooi were more severe even though the offenders were charged under the amended s 204A(a) of the Penal Code:
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