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Grounds publishedDecided 19 Apr 2024
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General Division of the High Court

Public Prosecutor v Ravivarma Govindan

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[2024] SGHC 99Case no. Criminal Case No 23 of 2023

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  1. [1] The accused person, Ravivarma Govindan (“the Accused”), claimed trial to two charges of importation of a Class A controlled drug under s 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), which is punishable under either ss 33(1) or 33B(1) of the MDA. Having considered the parties’ submissions and the evidence, I convicted the Accused on both charges. At the sentencing stage, in light of the issuance of a certificate of substantive assistance by the Public Prosecutor (“the Prosecution”) and my finding that the Accused’s involvement was limited to that of a courier under s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA, I exercised my discretion under s 33B(1)(a) and imposed a global sentence of life imprisonment and 20 strokes of the cane. The Accused has appealed against my decision on both conviction and sentence. I now set out the full reasons for my decision.

  2. Background

  3. Charges

  4. [2] The first charge against the Accused concerned the importation into Singapore of three blocks of vegetable matter containing not less than 1,551.0g of cannabis.

  5. [3] The second charge concerned the importation into Singapore of one bundle containing not less than 82.38g of methamphetamine.

  6. Undisputed facts

  7. [4] The undisputed facts were set out in a statement of agreed facts that was tendered, duly signed by the Prosecution and the Defence, pursuant to s 267(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”).

  8. [5] The Accused is a Malaysian citizen. In the early hours of the morning of 6 February 2020, at around 6.25am, the Accused drove from Johor Bahru to Tuas Checkpoint in a rented Myvi motorcar bearing registration number WB5890W (“the Car”). The Car was stopped by an Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (“ICA”) officer, who escorted the Car, driven by the Accused, to A1 White House at Tuas Checkpoint.

  9. [6] At A1 White House, the Accused was asked in Malay if he had anything to declare. He replied that he did not. The Accused was warned that he would be liable for anything found in the Car, which he acknowledged.

  10. [7] Officers from the ICA proceeded to conduct a search on the Car. During the search of the Car’s right passenger seat, a blue bundle was detected underneath a wooden board in the seat. The ICA officers then ceased the search and placed the Accused under arrest. As the Accused was being arrested, he repeatedly asked “why” in Malay, to which he was instructed to wait for the arrival of officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”).

  11. [8] At about 6.55am, a team of CNB officers arrived at A1 White House. The CNB officers continued a search of the seat, during which they recovered and seized as case exhibits: (a) three big blue bundles (marked as “A1”, “A2”, and “A3” ); and (b) one small bundle (marked as “A4” ). For convenience, I refer to the bundles collectively as “the Bundles”.

  12. [9] It was discovered that A1, A2 and A3 each contained one block of vegetable matter (respectively marked as “A1A”, A2A”, A3A” ), while A4 contained a crystalline or powdery substance (marked as “A4A” ). Subsequently, the contents of the Bundles were sent for analysis by the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”), who returned the following results:

  13. (a) A1A was found to contain not less than 960.4g of cannabis mixture;

  14. (b) A2A was found to contain not less than 945.5g of cannabis mixture;

  15. (c) A3A was found to contain not less than 909.1g of cannabis mixture; and

  16. (d) A4A was found to contain not less than 82.38g of methamphetamine.

  17. In sum, the Bundles contained not less than 1,551.0g of cannabis and not less than 82.38g of methamphetamine, both of which are Class A controlled drugs under the First Schedule of the MDA.

  18. [10] During the Accused’s arrest, the CNB also seized various personal properties of the Accused, including his mobile phone (marked as “B1-HP1”, and henceforth referred to as the “Handphone”). The Accused’s Handphone was subsequently sent for forensic examination.

  19. [11] After the Accused’s arrest, the CNB commenced follow-up operations with a view to apprehending others who may have been involved. This involved the monitoring of calls to and from the Accused’s Handphone following his arrest. These calls were answered by the Accused in the presence of CNB officers and recorded on a CNB voice recorder. I will refer to the contents of some of these monitored calls (“the Follow-Up Calls”) at appropriate junctures below.

  20. [12] As a result of these follow-up operations, the CNB successfully induced one Netiaanthan Manimaran (“Netiaanthan”), also a Malaysian citizen and the Accused’s childhood friend, to come to Singapore on the same day as the Accused’s arrest. Upon his attempted entry into Singapore at Tuas Checkpoint at around 2.51pm, Netiaanthan was arrested. At the time of his arrest, Netiaanthan had been riding a motorcycle bearing registration number JLN6104. Netiaanthan’s alleged involvement in the offences forming the subject of the two charges here was a major plank of the Accused’s defence to the charges against him. I will therefore elaborate on his role in the present case below.

  21. (a) a contemporaneous statement recorded on 6 February 2020 at 7.23am (the “First Contemporaneous Statement”);

  22. (b) a contemporaneous statement recorded on 6 February 2020 at 9.35am (the “Second Contemporaneous Statement”);

  23. (c) a cautioned statement recorded on 7 February 2020 at about 3.50am under s 23 of the CPC (the “First Cautioned Statement”);

  24. (d) a long statement recorded on 9 February 2020 at about 9.34am under s 22 of the CPC (the “First Long Statement”);

  25. (e) a long statement recorded on 10 February 2020 at about 2.58pm under s 22 of the CPC (the “Second Long Statement”);

  26. (f) a long statement recorded on 11 February 2020 at about 10.17am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Third Long Statement”);

  27. (g) a long statement recorded on 11 February 2020 at about 2.45pm under s 22 of the CPC (the “Fourth Long Statement”);

  28. (h) a long statement recorded on 12 February 2020 at about 9.52am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Fifth Long Statement”);

  29. (i) a long statement recorded on 12 February 2020 at about 2.56pm under s 22 of the CPC (the “Sixth Long Statement”);

  30. (j) a long statement recorded on 12 February 2020 at about 4.00pm under s 22 of the CPC (the “Seventh Long Statement”);

  31. (k) a long statement recorded on 7 August 2020 at about 10.10am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Eighth Long Statement”);

  32. (l) a long statement recorded on 2 September 2020 at about 2.08pm under s 22 of the CPC (the “Ninth Long Statement”);

  33. (m) a long statement recorded on 8 September 2020 at about 10.13am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Tenth Long Statement”);

  34. (n) a long statement recorded on 16 September 2020 at about 10.06am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Eleventh Long Statement”);

  35. (o) a long statement recorded on 25 September 2020 at about 10.35am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Twelfth Long Statement”);

  36. (p) a long statement recorded on 29 September 2020 at about 10.11am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Thirteenth Long Statement”);

  37. (q) a long statement recorded on 7 October 2020 at about 10.06am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Fourteenth Long Statement”);

  38. (r) a long statement recorded on 8 October 2020 at about 10.00am under s 22 of the CPC (the “Fifteenth Long Statement”); and

  39. (s) a cautioned statement recorded on 13 October 2020 at about 10.00am under s 23 of the CPC (the “Second Cautioned Statement”).

  40. [14] It was undisputed that there was no oppression, nor was there any threat, inducement or promise made before or during the recording of the Accused's statements, all of which were given voluntarily.

  41. The parties’ cases

  42. The Prosecution’s case

  43. [15] The Prosecution relied on the presumptions under ss 21 and 18(2) of the MDA to establish its case against the Accused. As the Bundles containing cannabis and methamphetamine were found in the Car which the Accused had control of, he was presumed to have the drugs in his possession under s 21 of the MDA and was also presumed to have known of the nature of the drugs contained in the Bundles under s 18(2) of the MDA. The onus therefore lay on the Accused to rebut these presumptions. The Prosecution submitted that the Accused failed to rebut either presumption.

  44. The Prosecution’s case on possession

  45. [16] As regards the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA, the Prosecution made a few key points.

  46. [17] First, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s claim of a similar past incident in December 2019 (“the December 2019 Incident”), where Netiaanthan had allegedly duped him into carrying contraband hidden in a car driven by him into Singapore, as well as the Accused’s own professed outrage at Netiaanthan over this incident, should not be believed. The Prosecution pointed to internal inconsistency in the Accused’s account, the lack of corroborating evidence, and the delay before the Accused had raised this supposed incident in the course of investigations.

  47. [18] Second, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused had been a willing renter and driver of the Car containing the drugs into Singapore. This was in contrast to the Accused’s claims that he had only rented the Car following a late request for assistance by Netiaanthan, and that he had only driven the Car into Singapore as it was his only mode of transport after Netiaanthan had taken his motorcycle. In this connection, the Prosecution also disputed the Accused’s claim that he had undertaken checks on the Car prior to setting off. To this end, the Prosecution pointed to inconsistency with contemporaneous evidence, as well as the internal inconsistency and improbability of the Accused’s account of events.

  48. [19] Third, the Prosecution submitted that the contents of the Follow-Up Calls after the Accused’s arrest were highly incriminating as they disclosed that the Accused was aware that the Bundles had been hidden in the Car. Indeed, the conversations between the Accused and other persons indicated that the Accused not only knew of the Bundles, but also knew that they contained drugs, and that these drugs were cannabis and methamphetamine specifically.

  49. [20] Fourth, the Prosecution contended that the Accused had been an evasive witness at trial and that his evidence therefore lacked credibility. This was the conclusion to be drawn from numerous internal inconsistencies in the Accused’s account, as well as his denials of knowledge on various matters in the face of clearly contradictory evidence. Such evidence included conversations in text messages that the Accused had been party to, the statements he had given to the CNB after his arrest, and the Follow-Up Calls.

  50. [21] Fifth, the Prosecution urged the court to consider the Accused’s account of events against that which Netiaanthan had given to the CNB after his own arrest. The Prosecution submitted that the court should prefer Netiaanthan’s account (which incriminated the Accused) over the Accused’s bare assertions that Netiaanthan had lied.

  51. [22] Finally, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s claim to having no knowledge of the Bundles having been in the Car was a clear afterthought. In this regard, the Prosecution relied on the Accused’s omission to substantiate this belief in statements to the CNB and argued that the Accused’s explanation that the omission was the result of inaccurate or incorrect recording was clearly self-serving and should be rejected.

  52. The Prosecution’s case on knowledge

  53. [23] In relation to the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA, the Prosecution relied on much of the same points as above to argue that it could be properly inferred from the totality of the evidence that the Accused not only knew about the presence of the Bundles in the Car, but that he had known of the specific nature of their contents.

  54. [24] In this regard, particular emphasis was placed on the Follow-Up Calls, in which the callers had used euphemistic terms for drugs. It was suggested that the Accused had failed to give an adequate explanation on why the callers would use such terms other than that he knew what they meant, and more specifically, that they had been referring to the drugs found in the Car. At the highest, the Accused could be said to have been indifferent to what the Bundles contained, but this was insufficient to rebut the presumption of knowledge.

  55. The Defence’s case

  56. The Defence’s version of events

  57. [25] The pith of the Defence’s case was to point the finger at Netiaanthan while simultaneously disclaiming all knowledge of incriminating matters. Given that they form the substratum of the Defence’s case, I first set out the Accused’s version of the facts, which can be broadly summarised as follows.

  58. [26] On 5 February 2020 (ie, a day before his arrest), the Accused had received a late request from Netiaanthan to help rent a car for Netiaanthan. Although the Accused had already rented a car for Netiaanthan, Netiaanthan told him that this first car was unsuitable because it could not be used to keep cigarettes. The Accused was scared and reluctant to rent the Car for Netiaanthan as he suspected that the cigarettes that Netiaanthan intended to hide in the car were illegal unpaid duty cigarettes. The Accused initially rebuffed Netiaanthan’s request, but after Netiaanthan assured him that this would be “the last time”, the Accused caved and agreed to help him. To this end, the Accused made arrangements for the rental of a car. The Accused, however, did not collect the car himself. Instead, he arranged for Netiaanthan and their common friend Daniel (whom the Accused and Netiaanthan also referred to as “Cina”) to collect the car. There was no dispute that this second car referred to by the Accused was the Car.

  59. [27] On 6 February 2020 (ie, the day of the Accused’s arrest), the Accused had been awoken early by Netiaanthan, who told the Accused that he (ie, Netiaanthan) needed to use the Accused’s motorcycle and that the Accused could use the Car to go to his workplace in Singapore. Before the Accused could really question Netiaanthan and register his protest, Netiaanthan rode away on the Accused’s motorcycle. This left the Accused with little choice but to use the Car to travel to Singapore to go to work; he could not afford to miss work as he had previously taken medical leave.

  60. [28] As the Accused prepared to set off, Netiaanthan returned on the Accused’s motorcycle. Netiaanthan told the Accused that there were cigarettes in the Car. He instructed the Accused to drive to the Accused’s workplace in Singapore, and that he (Netiaanthan) would come by the Accused’s workplace to collect the Car while leaving the Accused’s motorcycle in place of the Car. Despite the Accused’s protest that he did not want to drive the Car into Singapore, Netiaanthan said “see you in Singapore” and rode away on the Accused’s motorcycle again.

  61. [29] Having little choice but to use the Car to get to Singapore, the Accused undertook checks on various parts of the Car. These checks turned up fruitless as the Accused could not find anything hidden in the Car. Although the Accused felt tension as he did not know where the cigarettes had been hidden, he felt comfortable and safe to use the Car to enter Singapore as he had not been able to find them during his own checks. The Accused then set off for Singapore in the Car.

  62. [30] As alluded to above (at [17]), the Accused also made reference to the December 2019 Incident at various junctures, including: (a) before trial, in his Seventh Long Statement to the CNB; and (b) at trial, in the course of examination-in-chief and under cross-examination. I set out the relevant facts on this alleged incident, and address it below, at an appropriate juncture.

  63. The Defence’s case on lack of possession

  64. [31] The Defence accepted that s 21 of the MDA had been engaged by virtue of the Bundles containing the drugs having been found in the Car. However, the Defence submitted that the presumption had been rebutted as the Accused had not known that the Bundles were in the Car before he had driven into Singapore on the day of his arrest. Four main points were raised in support of this submission.

  65. [32] First, the Defence pointed to the fact that the Accused had consistently denied knowledge about the Bundles hidden in the Car from the moment of his arrest. In this connection, the Accused gave evidence that he had checked the Car and found nothing before deciding to use it and drive into Singapore, which supported his belief that there was nothing illegal in the Car.

  66. [33] Second, the Defence submitted that there was some contemporaneous evidence to support the Accused’s account of how he had come about using the Car, and that such account was not inherently incredible.

  67. [34] Third, the Defence contended that there was no objective evidence that contradicted the Accused’s account. This claim was supported by the undisputed fact that the Accused’s DNA was not found on the Bundles and the Seat, and that the Accused apparently received, or stood to receive, no remuneration for bringing the Bundles into Singapore. In response to the Prosecution’s reliance on the Follow-Up Calls, the Defence submitted that the references made by the callers to drugs did not suggest that the Accused had prior knowledge of the Bundles and their contents, but were instead procured by what the Accused had said to them in the latter’s attempt to assist the CNB with its follow-up operations.

  68. [35] Finally, the Defence submitted that the Accused had a legitimate purpose to enter Singapore on the date of his arrest, as he was only intending to go to his workplace. Presumably, this was in contradistinction to any nefarious intent to import drugs.

  69. The Defence’s case on lack of knowledge

  70. [36] The Defence submitted that the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA had been rebutted because the Accused had thought that the Bundles contained cigarettes (rather than cannabis and methamphetamine).

  71. [37] In this regard, the Defence pointed to the following factors to support its contention that the Accused had believed that the Bundles contained cigarettes:

  72. (a) First, the Accused had consistently maintained and testified at trial that he had held such a belief.

  73. (b) Second, the basis of the Accused’s belief was the events that had transpired in the morning of his arrest. In particular, the Accused claimed that Netiaanthan had told him that the Car contained cigarettes.

  74. (c) Third, the Accused testified that he had known that bringing drugs into Singapore was an offence.

  75. The applicable law

  76. [38] The charges of drug importation faced by the Accused were under s 7 of the MDA:

  77. [39] The elements of the offence of importation under s 7 of the MDA are that: (a) the accused was in possession of the drugs; (b) the accused had knowledge of the nature of the drugs; and (c) the drugs were intentionally brought into Singapore without prior authorisation (see Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 254 (“Adili”) at [27]).

  78. [40] The third element of importation was not in dispute. It was unarguable that the Accused had brought or caused the Bundles containing the drugs to be brought into Singapore (see s 2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed); Public Prosecutor v Adnan bin Kadir [2013] 3 SLR 1052 at [5] and [22]). It was also agreed between the parties that neither the Accused nor Netiaanthan were authorised to possess cannabis and/or methamphetamine for any purpose. Thus, the differences between the parties were confined to the first and second elements.

  79. [41] To establish the first element of possession, the Prosecution had to prove that: (a) the Accused was in physical possession, custody or control of the Bundles that were found to contain cannabis and methamphetamine; and (b) the Accused knew that the Bundles were in fact in his possession, custody or control (see Adili at [34]).

  80. [42] The second element of knowledge required the Prosecution to prove that the Accused was aware of the specific nature of the drugs contained in the Bundles. More specifically, it had to be proven that the Accused knew that the Bundles contained cannabis and methamphetamine; it would not have sufficed that the Accused knew that the Bundles contained some illicit substance or even a controlled drug generally (see Ramesh a/l Perumal v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 1003 at [65]–[67]).

  81. [43] As mentioned above, the Prosecution invoked the presumptions under ss 21 and 18(2) of the MDA. Section 21 of the MDA provides:

  82. [44] This presumption goes towards the first element of possession. In the present case, the effect of s 21 of the MDA was to place the burden of proof on the Accused to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not know that the Bundles (and the drugs contained therein) were in the Car (see Gopu Jaya Raman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 1 SLR 499 (“Gopu Jaya Raman”) at [21] and [97]; Beh Chew Boo v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1375 (“Beh Chew Boo”) at [55]).

  83. [45] If the Accused succeeded in rebutting the presumption under s 21 of the MDA, the Prosecution would have failed to prove that he was in possession of the cannabis and methamphetamine. The case against the Accused would then have failed in limine and there would have been no need or occasion to consider the second element (see Gopu Jaya Raman at [22]).

  84. [46] If, on the other hand, the Accused failed to rebut the presumption under s 21 of the MDA, the second presumption invoked by the Prosecution would come into play. In this regard, s 18(2) of the MDA provides:

  85. [47] The presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA goes towards the second element of knowledge of the specific nature of the drug. Like the s 21 presumption above, its effect was to place the burden of proof on the Accused to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not know the nature of the controlled drug referred to in the charges against him. Given that the Accused was charged for importation of cannabis and methamphetamine, he was presumed to know that the Bundles contained these two drugs unless he succeeded in proving otherwise (see Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 1156 at [23]–[24]; Obeng Comfort v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 633 (“Obeng Comfort”) at [37]).

  86. [48] As a matter of common sense and practical application, an accused person who seeks to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA should be able to say what he thought or believed he was carrying. It would not suffice for the accused to simply state that he did not know or think he was carrying drugs, as this would render the s 18(2) presumption all bark and no bite. In a similar vein, the accused would not rebut the s 18(2) presumption simply because he did not know the scientific or chemical name of the drug, or the effects that the drug could bring about. In short, the s 18(2) presumption operates to vest the accused with knowledge of the nature of the drugs he was found in possession of, and to satisfactorily rebut this, he must give an account of what he thought it was (see Obeng Comfort at [39]).

  87. [49] I also bore in mind the following guidance laid down by the Court of Appeal in Obeng Comfort on the nature of the inquiry into whether the s 18(2) presumption had been rebutted (at [40]):

  88. [50] Finally, in considering whether the Accused rebutted the presumptions in play, I was mindful of two cautionary points. First, given the inherent difficulty in proving a negative, the burden on the Accused must not be so onerous that it became virtually impossible to discharge (Gopu Jaya Raman at [24]). Second, although the Prosecution had statutory presumptions operating in its favour, the evidence had to be evaluated neutrally in determining whether each presumption had been rebutted, without any predilection for either conclusion (Gopu Jaya Raman at [25]).

  89. Issues to be determined

  90. [51] Given the Prosecution’s reliance on the ss 21 and 18(2) presumptions, the two substantive issues in this case were whether the Accused had succeeded in rebutting either of these presumptions.

  91. [52] In addition to these substantive issues, there were two other discrete points that arose from the Defence’s case: (a) first, the Accused’s objections to certain evidence; and (b) second, the December 2019 Incident that was raised by the Accused. I propose to first address these two points as preliminary issues, before coming to the two substantive issues above.

  92. My decision

  93. [53] Having considered the parties’ submissions and the evidence carefully, I concluded that the Accused failed to rebut either the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA or the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA. I arrived at this conclusion, despite taking a generous approach to the Accused on the preliminary issues, as there were crucial pieces of incriminating evidence that the Defence failed to provide any satisfactory answer to.

  94. Preliminary issues

  95. The Defence’s objections to certain evidence

  96. [54] The first preliminary issue arose out of the two objections to certain evidence made by the Defence in its closing submissions.

  97. [55] First, the Defence contended that the evidence of a CNB officer, one Sergeant Hemamalani d/o Rajesegaran (“Sgt Hema”), on her alleged questioning of the Accused shortly after his arrest, should be excluded on the basis that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value pursuant to the court’s common law exclusionary discretion under the principles set out in Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”). In the alternative, the Defence submitted that, even if the court was not minded to exclude Sgt Hema’s evidence, no weight should be placed on it.

  98. [56] Second, the Defence submitted that the court should place no weight on the statements given by Netiaanthan to the CNB following his arrest, save to the extent that they corroborated the Accused’s belief that, if he had been carrying anything illegal, such contraband was cigarettes rather than drugs. The Defence also submitted that no weight should be placed on the statement of facts that Netiaanthan pleaded guilty to when he was subsequently charged and convicted of one charge of attempted possession of cannabis under s 8(a) read with s 12 of the MDA.

  99. (1) The objection against Sgt Hema’s evidence

  100. [57] The evidence of Sgt Hema that the Defence took issue with was her account, given in examination-in-chief, that the Accused had given answers to her questions following his arrest which suggested that he had knowledge of a scheme amongst his associates to traffic drugs into Singapore:

  101. [58] The difficulty was that these details were contained in neither Sgt Hema’s conditioned statement nor the conditioned statement of Sgt Hema’s superior, Deputy Superintendent Sea Hoon Cheng , who Sgt Hema testified to having informed of the details. This was conceded by Sgt Hema when both conditioned statements were put before her in cross-examination.

  102. [59] The Defence argued that, if the Accused did tell the above details to Sgt Hema, her failure to record them in writing constituted a breach of the procedural requirements for the taking of long statements under s 22 of the CPC. It submitted that this procedural non-compliance rendered Sgt Hema’s evidence highly prejudicial to the Accused, and that the court should respond to this by either excluding it under its Kadar discretion or by placing no weight on it.

  103. [60] I was content to resolve this objection in favour of the Defence and, in coming to my decision, I placed no weight on Sgt Hema’s evidence on this point. I did not think it necessary to discuss the Defence’s submissions at length because it did not seem to me that Sgt Hema’s evidence was particularly critical to the Prosecution’s case.

  104. (2) Netiaanthan’s statements and the statement of facts for his conviction

  105. [61] The Defence submitted that no weight ought to be accorded to the statements given by Netiaanthan after his arrest and the statement of facts that he had pleaded guilty to in separate proceedings. The Defence gave three reasons for this. First, the Accused did not have the opportunity to test the veracity of Netiaanthan’s statements as the latter had declined to testify at the Accused’s trial. Second, the contents of Netiaanthan’s statements were likely to be self-serving as they were given at a time when he had a strong incentive to conceal or even contrive facts to minimise his involvement. Third, it was suggested that Netiaanthan’s statements were inconsistent with contemporaneous evidence.

  106. [62] For the predominant reason that the Defence was deprived of the opportunity to test Netiaanthan under cross-examination, I accepted the Defence’s submission and placed no weight on Netiaanthan’s evidence (see Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [57]).

  107. [63] However, in deciding that no weight should be placed on Netiaanthan’s evidence, I also rejected the Defence’s submission that limited weight should be placed on certain portions of Netiaanthan’s evidence to the extent that they corroborated the Accused’s supposed belief that he had only been transporting cigarettes. The Defence could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate in this manner. As a matter of fairness, the Prosecution also faced the corresponding disadvantage of an inability to test the parts of Netiaanthan’s evidence that were favourable to the Accused. A just result to both parties, in my view, was for Netiaanthan’s evidence to be treated as tainted in its entirety.

  108. The December 2019 Incident

  109. [64] The second preliminary issue relates to the December 2019 Incident that was raised by the Accused. I have found it appropriate to address this as a preliminary issue because it appeared to me that the Defence had essentially abandoned reliance on the December 2019 Incident by the close of the trial. However, before I elaborate on this, it is necessary for context that I first set out the Accused’s account of this incident.

  110. [65] The December 2019 Incident, as described by the Accused in his Seventh Long Statement to the CNB, can be summarised as follows. Sometime in December 2019, Netiaanthan asked the Accused to drive a car that the Accused had rented for Netiaanthan into Singapore. This was because Netiaanthan claimed to require use of the Accused’s motorcycle. The Accused agreed, and when he arrived in Singapore at his workplace, he saw someone in a helmet on his (the Accused’s) motorcycle, waiting outside the gate of his workplace. The Accused was surprised that his motorcycle was there, and he did not recognise the helmeted individual. This stranger then approached the car that the Accused was driving, knocked on the window, and informed the Accused that his (the Accused’s) helmet and jacket were in the car boot. The Accused then got out of the car to check and confirmed (to his surprise) that his items were in the car boot. After the Accused retrieved his items and closed the boot, the stranger had gotten into the car and drove off immediately.

  111. [66] When the Accused returned home, he questioned Netiaanthan on what had transpired at his workplace. Netiaanthan apologised to the Accused but told him nothing except that there had been cigarettes in the car. The Accused claimed that he was angered by this, and scolded Netiaanthan for putting him at risk. Netiaanthan apologised once more and attempted to placate the Accused by giving him some money. The Accused claimed that he rejected this money, and let the matter lie notwithstanding his professed anger and irritation at the time.

  112. [67] It appeared that the Accused raised the December 2019 Incident intending to rely on its similarity to the present charges against him, so as to support his claimed belief that there was either nothing illegal in the Car or, at the most, that cigarettes had been hidden in the Car. I caveat that this was my impression because (as mentioned above) the Defence seemed to drop reliance on the December 2019 Incident in its ultimate case. I drew this conclusion for the following two reasons.

  113. [68] First, the Defence mentioned the December 2019 Incident only once in its closing submissions. This sole reference was made not in the course of making any argument that the court should draw any inference from it, but in the course of the Defence’s restatement of the events that transpired prior and subsequent to the Accused’s arrest. Specifically, the Defence referred to the December 2019 Incident as something that the Accused had told the CNB officers about shortly after his arrest.

  114. [69] Second, and more importantly, when it came to the Defence’s oral reply submissions, apart from reiterating that the Accused had mentioned the December 2019 Incident in his Seventh Long Statement, counsel for the Defence himself sought to downplay the December 2019 Incident as a “neutral point” that was “of little weight”.

  115. [70] The Accused’s travel movement records from the ICA were placed in evidence before the court. These records indicated details such as the date and time of entry and departure, as well as the mode of transport at entry and departure. Based on these records, assuming that the December 2019 Incident did occur, the date it occurred would probably have been 18 December 2019, as this was the only date which met all of the following conditions: (a) the Accused had entered Singapore by car; (b) the Accused had left Singapore by motorcycle; and (c) there was no corresponding entry and departure by Netiaanthan in the car in which the Accused had entered into Singapore. The last of these conditions – ie, condition (c) – is critical because the Accused’s account of the December 2019 Incident was that the car had been collected from his workplace by a stranger rather than Netiaanthan. Further lending strength to the inference that 18 December 2019 was the relevant date was the fact that Netiaanthan entered Singapore the next day (19 December 2019) in the car that the Accused had entered Singapore with on the previous day. This necessarily meant that the car had been driven back to Malaysia by someone (such as the stranger claimed by the Accused) before finding its way to Netiaanthan.

  116. [71] However, even with these travel movement records, there was simply not enough evidence before me to make any finding as to whether the December 2019 Incident had occurred and whether the Accused’s account of its details was accurate. At the highest, these records could only corroborate the possibility of the December 2019 Incident having occurred. They had nothing to say about the truth or probability of the Accused’s account.

  117. [72] Given that the burden lay on the Accused to prove the December 2019 Incident on the balance of probabilities, the insufficiency in evidence had to be resolved against the Accused as a failure to discharge his burden of proof (see ss 105 and 108 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed)). Further, as noted above, the Prosecution did argue that the Accused’s account of the December 2019 Incident should be rejected, although their arguments were mostly founded on internal consistency and logic rather than evidence. The Accused’s apparent resiliation from the December 2019 Incident at the close of his case meant that these points went unanswered.

  118. [73] However, I was willing to give the Accused the benefit of the doubt that the December 2019 Incident had panned out as he claimed, given the inherent difficulty he faced in proving it due to Netiaanthan’s absence at trial. But as I will explain at appropriate points below, I did not agree with the Defence that it could be waved away as a “neutral point”, as it seemed to me that the December 2019 Incident tended to hurt, rather than to support, the Defence’s case.

  119. Substantive issues

  120. [74] Having addressed the preliminary issues, I come to the substantive issues that arise from the two MDA presumptions that were invoked in this case.

  121. Whether the Accused had rebutted the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA

  122. [75] To recapitulate, for the Accused to succeed in rebutting the s 21 presumption, he had to prove on the balance of probabilities that he had no knowledge that the Bundles were in the Car. In my judgment, he fell considerably short of discharging this burden for the following reasons.

  123. (1) The Accused was contradicted by his own statements

  124. [76] First, I accepted the Prosecution’s submission that the Accused’s claim of having no knowledge of the existence of the Bundles in the Car seemed to be an afterthought that was belatedly raised at trial. This claim was inconsistent with what the Accused had told the CNB in all his statements, as he had admitted to knowing that there had been some form of contraband hidden in the Car. To substantiate this finding, I set out in the following paragraphs a chronological account of the Accused’s statements which demonstrates that he had consistently maintained having knowledge of some contraband in the Car.

  125. [77] In his First Cautioned Statement, taken less than 24 hours after his arrest, the Accused stated – after the usual caution had been administered – in his defence to the charges that he knew that there had been cigarettes in the Car, but he did not know of the quantity. Given that the element of knowing possession does not require the Accused to have appreciated the nature of what he was carrying, whether he believed that it was cigarettes (as he claimed) or actually knew that it was drugs – viz, cannabis and methamphetamine – was irrelevant to the issue of rebutting the presumption of possession. The Accused’s knowledge that he was in possession of some contraband would suffice to establish the element of knowing possession.

  126. [78] Subsequently, in his Fifth Long Statement, the Accused recounted the circumstances of his arrest at Tuas Checkpoint. This statement was replete with a litany of the same admission (ie, that he knew that there had been some contraband hidden in the Car).

  127. [79] As the Accused recounted his account of events from his alighting from the Car up until the initial search by two ICA officers, he had this to say on his reply when asked by the officers on whether he had anything to declare before they commenced searching the Car:

  128. In this extract, the Accused did not only admit to having known that there was some contraband hidden in the Car, he also explained his thought process behind his decision to deliberately hide this knowledge from the officers.

  129. [80] Still on his Fifth Long Statement, the Accused went on to explain his perspective when the Bundles were recovered from the Car by the CNB officers. He once again made clear that he knew that something had been hidden in the Car, and that his surprise was not directed to the existence of contraband in the Car, but to what the contraband turned out to be (ie, drugs).

  130. [81] Skipping forward in time, I come to the Accused’s Second Cautioned Statement, recorded on 13 October 2020 at about 11.03am, more than half a year after his arrest. This was the last statement that the Accused gave to the CNB. Given the lapse of time since his arrest, it was reasonable to expect that the Accused would by this time have firmed up his defence to the allegations against him. Nevertheless, the Accused once again did not disclaim knowledge of the existence of contraband in the Car. On the contrary, he maintained the account given in his First Cautioned Statement that he had known that there were cigarettes hidden in the Car.

  131. [82] It is thus clear from the above that, in his statements to the CNB, the Accused had consistently taken a position that was fundamentally inconsistent with his case at trial that he did not know that there was anything incriminating in the Car.

  132. [83] I found that the Accused offered no cogent explanation or reconciliation of the inconsistency between his position as articulated in his statements and his position at trial, on the issue of his knowledge as to the existence of hidden contraband in the Car. Given this, I disbelieved his account at trial as to his lack of knowledge of contraband being in the Car. In this regard, I highlight the remarkable consistency and clarity with which he had maintained knowledge of the existence of contraband from his First Cautioned Statement through to his Second Cautioned Statement. His subsequent attempt to disclaim such knowledge at trial was clearly an afterthought.

  133. [84] The law does allow an accused person to run alternative cases, even if they may be inconsistent (see Public Prosecutor v Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi [2015] SGCA 33 at [37], citing Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan and another appeal [2012] 3 SLR 527 (“Mas Swan”) at [68]). The Defence emphasised this at the close of its oral reply submissions.

  134. [85] This legal proposition is correct. But Mas Swan does not govern patent and irreconcilable inconsistencies between an accused person’s alternative cases and the drawing of the entirely logical inference from this that one is not believable. To my mind, when viewed in the context in which the statement was made, the point that the Court of Appeal made in Mas Swan was a relatively limited one.

  135. [86] Mas Swan involved two accused persons, Mas Swan and Roshamima, who were jointly charged with importing diamorphine into Singapore after three hidden bundles of diamorphine were discovered in the vehicle in which they were attempting to enter Singapore from Malaysia. At trial, Mas Swan contended that he knew that the three bundles were in the car but believed that they contained ecstasy pills because Roshamima had told him so. On the other hand, Roshamima denied any such conversation having taken place and disclaimed any knowledge of the existence of the three bundles in the car. At first instance, the trial judge accepted Mas Swan’s evidence and acquitted him of the charge of importation. In contrast, Roshamima was convicted as the trial judge disbelieved her defence that she did not know of the existence of the three bundles in the car. The learned judge also considered that Roshamima had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA.

  136. [87] On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in law by failing to consider the possibility that Roshamima might also have believed that the three bundles actually contained ecstasy pills. This was the context in which the court stated the principle that “a trial judge should not shut his mind to any alternative defence that is reasonably available on the evidence even though it may be inconsistent with the accused’s primary defence” (Mas Swan at [68]). It is clear, therefore, that the Court of Appeal said absolutely nothing that impinges on how the court should go about treating the inconsistencies in an accused person’s alternative accounts. Its point was that just because the accused person has opted to go with an ‘all or nothing’ defence – there, denying knowledge of the existence of the three bundles altogether – and has pleaded no other alternative, the court should not fail to consider the possibility of an alternative defence – there, lack of knowledge of the specific nature of the contents of the bundle – if it rejects the ‘all or nothing’ defence that the accused has solely relied on. To cast the ratio of Mas Swan as a broad proposition that an accused person is entitled to run inconsistent defences may not therefore be entirely accurate, even if the proposition is sound, since in Mas Swan, the issue really arose from the fact that the accused, Roshamima, had herself not run an alternative case. Looked at in this light, the Court of Appeal’s concern in Mas Swan did not arise in the present case, since the Accused had himself put forward alternative cases against possession and knowledge rather than putting all his eggs in the basket of refuting possession.

  137. [88] Indeed, my caution against reading Mas Swan too broadly, or out of context, is buttressed by the fact that the Court of Appeal has, in subsequent decisions, itself recognised “[the] need to qualify the seeming breadth of the holding in Mas Swan” (see Mohammad Azli bin Mohammad Salleh v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 1374 (“Azli”) at [94]). In Azli, the Court of Appeal clarified that “there must be some limits to [Mas Swan’s] application” due to the particular factual context of Mas Swan (at [95]). Specifically, Sundaresh Menon CJ emphasised that the need to consider alternative defences was necessarily “constrained by reference to the available evidence” (at [96]). It is an implicit assumption in this statement, and really a matter of common sense, that the viability of any case – primary or alternative – that an accused person runs will be constrained by the available evidence.

  138. [89] I found that lessons could be drawn from the Court of Appeal’s treatment of Mas Swan in Azli. Menon CJ opined in Azli that some of the criticism levelled by the Court of Appeal in Mas Swan at the trial judge there had not been entirely warranted because, having not run a case on knowledge, no evidence or submission was ever advanced by Roshamima (the co-accused person in Mas Swan) before the trial judge to rebut the presumption under s 18(2) of the MDA (Azli at [95]). Thus, it was difficult to see how the trial judge could, as the Court of Appeal suggested he should, have considered Roshamima’s knowledge of what was in the bundles (Azli at [96]). In my view, a similar point could be made about the Accused’s case on rebutting the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA. In the context of his statements at least – although the same could be said about the totality of the evidence – there was little to nothing on which he (or the court) could latch upon to support the argument that he had not known about the existence of contraband at all in the Car.

  139. [90] It follows from the above that Mas Swan and the principle therein does not immunise an accused person from adverse consequences if, as in the present case, he conducts his defence by taking a position that is founded on certain premises, and even leads evidence in support, before doing an about turn and resiling from this position or its underlying premises. Although I have attempted to explain this point in some detail, I do not think that this can be controversial.

  140. (2) The Defence’s factual case was internally inconsistent

  141. [91] Second, I found that the Defence’s factual case was internally inconsistent. Not only did it not support a lack of knowledge on the Accused’s part that there was contraband in the Car, it was in fact premised on him having such knowledge. Given this fundamental inconsistency, I found the Accused’s account to lack credibility, and this supported my overall finding that his case on lack of possession was an afterthought.

  142. [92] I have set out the Defence’s version of events as to how he had come to drive the Car into Singapore on the date of his arrest at [26]–[29] above. For present purposes, it suffices to highlight three points that form part of the Defence’s own account of events. First, Netiaanthan had sought the Accused’s assistance to rent the Car because he (Netiaanthan) wanted to hide cigarettes in the Car. Although the Accused claimed to have been initially reluctant, he did not dispute that he ultimately acceded to this request. In other words, he agreed to assist Netiaanthan in smuggling cigarettes into Singapore. Second, on the date of his arrest, before the Accused had set off for Singapore in the Car, Netiaanthan had positively informed him that there were cigarettes hidden in the Car. Third, because Netiaanthan had informed the Accused of this, he (the Accused) supposedly decided to undertake his own checks and sweep of the Car prior to his departure, which he claimed turned up empty for any contraband hidden in the Car. Apart from being stated in the Defence’s closing submissions, the Accused confirmed all three of these points under cross-examination.

  143. [93] In my judgment, as a matter of simple logic, it was plainly impossible for the Accused to put forward a factual account containing the three points above and simultaneously maintain that he had no knowledge that there was contraband hidden in the Car. Rather, the Accused’s account clearly implicated him having such knowledge, not least because (a) he acquired knowledge of the existence of contraband in the Car when Netiaanthan told him so; and (b) it was precisely because he had such knowledge that he supposedly decided to conduct checks on the Car. It defies logic that the Accused would conduct a check on the Car if he did not know – or at the very least, have reason to suspect – that there was contraband hidden therein.

  144. [94] With respect, it appeared to me that the Defence’s case was built on a defective foundation, which was a conflation between: (a) a lack of knowledge that contraband had been hidden in the Car; and (b) a lack of knowledge of where contraband had been hidden in the Car. The crucial distinction, in the present context, was that only the former would suffice to enable the Accused to rebut the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA. Taken at its highest, the Defence’s case could only be consistent with a lack of knowledge about the exact location in the Car where the contraband had been hidden. The Accused could not sensibly claim that he did not know that there was contraband hidden in the Car at all.

  145. [95] In my view, this clearly manifested itself in the context of the Accused’s claim that, after he had checked the Car and found nothing, he was “having the tension as [he] did not know where [Netiaanthan] kept the cigarettes”. If the Accused genuinely believed that there had been nothing hidden in the Car whatsoever, it would not make sense for him to feel any tension or concern. The existence of tension and concern was instead consistent with him having knowledge that there was something hidden in the Car, albeit that he could not locate it. Indeed, the Prosecution picked up on this glaring inconsistency and put it to the Accused in its cross-examination.

  146. [96] The Defence did not address this inconsistency in its re-examination of the Accused. However, by the time of its closing submissions, it had evidently become alive to the significance of this point, as it sought to reconcile the Accused’s feeling of tension with his claimed belief that there was nothing hidden in the Car in the following explanation:

  147. [97] I was not persuaded that it could have been possible for the Accused to feel tension while having a genuine belief that there was nothing hidden in the Car. This was unsurprising because, as I have explained above, the two rested on fundamentally incompatible bases. If the Accused genuinely did not know that there was anything hidden in the Car, he would not have felt tension because he would have had nothing to be concerned about. In my view, the part of the extract above that I have placed in emphasis inevitably gave the game away: the Accused felt tension because he knew that there was contraband hidden in the Car – since Netiaanthan had told him so – but he did not know where exactly in the Car the contraband had been hidden. The Defence all but conceded to this in its statement that the Accused was “trying to manage his emotions stemming from what he actually saw versus what he was told but did not see”. Put simply, the fact that the Accused could not see the hidden contraband (because he could not find it), did not mean that what he had been told (that there was contraband hidden in the Car) was untrue.

  148. [98] In my judgment, the likely explanation for this logical inconsistency was that the Accused’s claim that he had no knowledge of the existence of any contraband in the Car was an afterthought. This dovetails with my analysis above where I have demonstrated the remarkable consistency with which the Accused had asserted knowledge that the Car contained cigarettes. The Accused had initially focused on putting up a case to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 21 of the MDA. At this juncture, I point out that, in his statements, the Accused did not merely state a belief that the Bundles contained cigarettes. Instead, in all the extracts from his statements that I have referred to above, he went further to assert actual knowledge that the Bundles (or at least the Car) contained cigarettes. There is a clear conceptual difference between claiming to believe something and claiming to know it as a fact. While this may be a difference in degree and not kind, it heightens the disparity between his initial position and his subsequent case at trial where he claimed to have no knowledge of the Bundles at all.

  149. [99] In short, the Defence’s case made a lot more sense when one viewed it in the context of the Accused having known that there was contraband hidden in the Car, and it made a lot less sense if one tried to rationalise it with him having no knowledge of anything being hidden in the Car. Given this, the natural inference to draw was that the former – which was also given at a time more proximate to his arrest – was the correct account and the latter was an afterthought.

  150. [100] In closing this point, I make a brief reference to the December 2019 Incident. As I alluded to above (at [73]), although this incident was raised by the Accused, it seemed to me to hurt his defence rather than assist it. The present point was one such example. If one were to consider the Accused’s version of events in the context of the December 2019 Incident, it would mean that the Accused had been duped by Netiaanthan into smuggling cigarettes into Singapore on a previous occasion. He would therefore have been aware of Netiaanthan’s modus operandi, and this made any claim to not having knowledge that the Car contained hidden contraband all the more unbelievable, especially because, on this occasion, Netiaanthan had actually told him of the existence of the contraband in the Car.

  151. (3) The Accused’s account was contradicted by his text messages

  152. [101] Third, the Accused’s claim to having no knowledge that there had been contraband hidden in the Car was contradicted by text messages that he had been party to.

  153. [102] It would be recalled that, on the Accused’s account of events, Netiaanthan’s request for his assistance to rent the Car had been sprung onto him at the eleventh hour (see [26] above). Specifically, the Accused claimed that Netiaanthan had made the late request the night before his arrest, that is, Wednesday, 5 February 2020. This was stated by the Accused in his Fourth Long Statement, maintained during cross-examination, and the factual account put forward by the Defence in its closing submissions.

  154. [103] However, as the Prosecution pointed out in its closing submissions, this was contradicted by messages that were exchanged between the Accused and Daniel (a common friend with Netiaanthan) the day before – 4 February 2020 – where the two clearly discussed the renting of a car. Indeed, contrary to the Accused’s claim that he had been initially unwilling to rent the Car for Netiaanthan, these messages showed the Accused actively chasing Netiaanthan (through Daniel) to confirm what type of car to rent.

  155. [104] Further, and more importantly, the Accused’s claim that he did not know that there was anything hidden in the Car was undermined by how he told Daniel in these messages that they should “try putting the bomb” into the car, and if it was not possible to do so, they could “change the car”. This clearly inferred the existence of a prior arrangement between the Accused, Daniel and Netiaanthan to rent a car for the purpose of packing something into it. Although the Accused categorically denied this at first in cross-examination, he later recanted this denial and admitted that these messages involved a discussion to hide contraband – specifically, cigarettes – in the rented car, which turned out to be the Car that he had driven into Singapore.

  156. [105] The Accused’s change of position here generally undermined his credibility as a witness. But, for the more specific purpose of the s 21 presumption, the crucial point was that these messages materially contradicted the Accused’s account of an eleventh-hour request from Netiaanthan for assistance in renting the Car. These messages also contradicted the Accused’s claim that he had been unaware that anything had been hidden in the Car, as they revealed an element of planning to hide contraband in a rental car almost immediately before the Accused’s arrest.

  157. (4) The Follow-up Calls indicated that the Accused knew of the Bundles in the Car

  158. [106] Fourth, it could be inferred from the Follow-up Calls that the callers who the Accused conversed with clearly assumed that he had knowledge of the existence of the Bundles in the Car. It bears emphasis that these callers were not strangers to the Accused, but on his own evidence, his friends.

  159. [107] For example, in a Follow-up Call between the Accused and one “Sanggap2” at 9.52am, Sanggap2 instructed the Accused to inform him when the Accused reported for work, and that he (Sanggap2) “will send someone to take everything”. Since Sanggap2 did not explain what "everything" meant in the rest of the call, Sanggap2 must have assumed that the Accused knew what he was talking about. It was not suggested that Sanggap2 had dialled the wrong number or that the Accused had otherwise received a message that was meant for someone else, since the Accused himself confirmed that Sanggap2 was a common friend of him and Nethiaanthan.

  160. [108] The Accused had no explanation for why Sanggap2 had made such an assumption. After the audio of this Follow-up Call was played to him, the Accused stated in his Eleventh Long Statement that he “could not explain why Sanggap[2] had not sounded surprised when [the Accused] replied him ok after [Sanggap2] told [him] that he will send someone to collect the things”.

  161. [109] It was clear from a subsequent Follow-up Call between the Accused and Sanggap2 at 12.45pm that the “everything” which Sanggap2 had referred to in the earlier call were the Bundles that had been hidden in the Car. In this subsequent call, after Sanggap2 had inquired of him how the Car had been searched at customs, the Accused responded that the Car had been “checked fully”, but that “[he] was not caught” as while the officers had “tapped behind the seat”, “they said that there was nothing inside” as “[i]t’s sealed with cable tie”. The Accused was clearly referencing the Bundles that had been hidden behind the seat in a manner that involved the use of cable ties. In response, Sanggap2 merely confirmed: “Ah yes. It was sealed by cable tied. If it is not sealed with cable tied, then you see how”. The fact that Sanggap2 exhibited no surprise whatsoever that the Accused knew exactly where and how the Bundles had been hidden in the Car clearly suggested that he (Sanggap2) assumed that the Accused had known of this.

  162. [110] In a similar vein was the Accused’s Follow-up Call with Netiaanthan at 1.52pm. In this call, the Accused told Netiaanthan that he (the Accused) had removed the Bundles from the Car and kept them in his company. Similar to Sanggap2, Netiaanthan did not express the slightest surprise at the fact that the Accused had been able to do so. This clearly suggested that Netiaanthan believed that the Accused knew of the Bundles in the Car. Indeed, Netiaanthan also believed that the Accused knew where exactly the Bundles had been hidden in the Car.

  163. (5) The authorities relied on by the Defence

  164. [111] The Defence cited two decisions of the Court of Appeal, Gopu Jaya Raman and Beh Chew Boo, in which the accused persons were found to have successfully rebutted the presumption under s 21 of the MDA. I found both decisions to be readily distinguishable and of no assistance to the Defence.

  165. [112] In Gopu Jaya Raman, the appellant successfully rebutted the presumption of possession because he was able to satisfy a majority of the Court of Appeal that, on a balance of probabilities, the three bundles of drugs found on his motorcycle had been planted there without his knowledge (at [91]). It is clear that the present case was completely different. Since the Accused admitted that Netiaanthan had told him about the contraband hidden in the Car prior to entering Singapore, he was clearly not in the same position as the appellant in Gopu Jaya Raman. Furthermore, the majority in Gopu Jaya Raman found that while the appellant’s associates clearly had a plan to transport drugs into Singapore, it was not satisfied on the evidence that the appellant had been part of this plan (at [92]-[93]). In contrast, as I have found above, the messages between the Accused and Daniel on 4 February 2020 clearly suggested that the Accused, Daniel and Netiaanthan had a common design to pack something into the Car before it was driven into Singapore.

  166. [113] In Beh Chew Boo, drugs had been found hidden in the storage compartment of the seat of the motorcycle on which the appellant had ridden into Singapore. The appellant’s defence was that the drugs had been hidden in the storage compartment without his knowledge. This appeared to be corroborated by the fact that the motorcycle did not belong to the appellant, but rather to his friend, Lew. Further, only the DNA of Lew, and not the Appellant, was found on the drug exhibits. The Court of Appeal considered that the appellant had put forward an account that was not “inherently incredible”, such that the evidential burden shifted to the Prosecution to rebut the appellant’s account (at [71] and [80]). In these unique circumstances, the Prosecution’s failure to call Lew as a witness meant that it failed to discharge its evidential burden in the face of the appellant’s “plausible defence” (at [80]). The Court of Appeal thus held that the appellant succeeded in rebutting the s 21 presumption and acquitted him. On comparison, it was clear that the Accused’s case was really nothing like Beh Chew Boo. The same points of difference (at [112] above) vis-à-vis Gopu Jaya Raman applied with equal force to the Accused’s misplaced reliance on Beh Chew Boo. Ultimately, the Accused could not run away from the reality that he had run a case of a lack of knowledge of contraband being in the Car in the face of his own account that he had been told precisely the opposite by Netiaanthan.

  167. [114] More generally, the underlying difficulty with the Defence’s reliance on these authorities was that it seemed to take the approach of attempting to force-fit the facts of the Accused’s case into statements made by the Court of Appeal in these cases where the presumption had been successfully rebutted. The Defence took certain statements made by the Court of Appeal, which were findings of fact or assessments of the evidence in the particular cases before it, as laying down some prescriptive formula or test as to whether an accused person succeeds in rebutting the s 21 presumption:

  168. It is noteworthy that the part of the above extract which I have placed in emphasis is essentially a patchwork of statements and phrases found in Gopu Jaya Raman and Beh Chew Boo.

  169. [115] I doubted that this was the correct approach to take. Whether an accused person succeeds in rebutting the presumption of possession (or knowledge) turns on the specific facts and evidence in each case. It is not something that is amenable to any sort of prescriptive formulae. After crocheting together the statements from Gopu Jaya Raman and Beh Chew Boo to create the “rule” which I have reproduced above, the Defence’s analysis essentially proceeded as a box-ticking exercise based on matching facts in the present case to these statements. However, these statements cannot be divorced from the specific factual and evidential context in which they were made. To take one example, the Court of Appeal’s statement in Beh Chew Boo that the appellant’s account was “not inherently incredible” was not intended to lay down any legal principle that a “not inherently incredible” account would lead to a rebuttal of the presumption. Rather, the finding that the appellant’s account in that case was “not inherently incredible” was significant against its factual backdrop, because it meant that, on the state of the evidence before the court, it was incumbent on the Prosecution to call Lew as a witness to respond to the appellant’s account.

  170. [116] In the present case, even if the Defence were correct that all of these features from Gopu Jaya Raman and Beh Chew Boo were existent, that did not mean that the Accused had ipso facto rebutted the presumption of possession as the appellants in these two decisions did, if, in spite of the presence of these features, the Accused nevertheless failed to put up any answer to the damning aspects of the Prosecution’s case and the evidence which I have highlighted above. The question of whether an accused person has rebutted the MDA’s presumptions is not a quantitative exercise in identifying as many common features with precedent cases of acquittal. It requires a qualitative assessment that is tailored to the specific facts and available evidence in the instant case.

  171. (6) Conclusion: The Accused failed to rebut the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA

  172. [117] For the reasons above, I was satisfied that the Accused failed to rebut the presumption of possession under s 21 of the MDA. It was clear that the Accused knew that there had been contraband hidden in the Car. The existence of this knowledge alone disabled him from being able to prove that he had not been in knowing possession of the Bundles that were discovered in the Car. What he believed the nature of this contraband to be, and whether he knew where exactly the contraband had been hidden in the Car, were strictly irrelevant matters when considering whether he had rebutted the s 21 presumption.

  173. Whether the Accused had rebutted the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA

  174. [118] I turn to the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA. Although the Defence suggested in its oral reply submissions that its strongest point lay in rebutting the s 18(2) presumption, the Defence’s case was rather threadbare. Its closing submissions were ultimately reduceable to the single point that the court should accept the Accused’s asserted belief that the Bundles contained cigarettes simply because he had been consistent in asserting this belief following his arrest.

  175. [119] In contrast to the sparsity of the Defence’s case on knowledge, I found the weight of the evidence to point in the opposite direction. In these circumstances, I had little difficulty in finding that the Defence had failed to rebut the s 18(2) presumption.

  176. (1) The Follow-up Calls and text messages indicated that the Accused knew the nature of the drugs

  177. [120] First, it could be inferred from the Follow-up Calls and the Accused’s text messages that the Accused knew the nature of the drugs in the Bundles.

  178. [121] I develop this point with reference to two examples from the Follow-up Calls and text messages: (a) Netiaanthan’s reference to “three books and 1 ice” in the 1.52pm Follow-up Call, and “books” in the text messages; and (b) Netiaanthan’s and Sanggap2’s references to “work” in the Follow-up Calls and the text messages.

  179. (A) Netiaanthan’s references to “three Books and 1 Ice” and “Books”

  180. [122] I start with the Follow-up Call between Netiaanthan and the Accused at 1.52pm. In this conversation, after the Accused told Netiaanthan that he (the Accused) had removed the Bundles from the Car, Netiaanthan replied that “there will be three books and 1 ice”, and asked the Accused to confirm this: “Is it right? Ah?”.

  181. [123] It was clear beyond peradventure that “three books and 1 ice” was an explicit reference to the Bundles and their contents. Although the Accused claimed in cross-examination that he did not know if “three books and 1 ice” was a reference by Netiaanthan to the Bundles, I had no hesitation in rejecting this as feigned ignorance by the Accused to dissociate himself from a highly incriminating, and therefore inconvenient, statement that Netiaanthan had made to him. In the first place, this claim of ignorance was a change in position from the Accused’s Eleventh Long Statement where, after hearing the audio of this Follow-up Call, the Accused had confirmed that he “knew that Nithianathan was talking about the four things that were found in the car”. Moreover, looking at the conversation itself, Netiaanthan had said that “there will be three books and 1 ice” only, and immediately, after the Accused had told him that “I saw what was inside after removing them”. Thus, it was plain that by “three books and 1 ice”, Netiaanthan was referring to the Bundles. Further, as a matter of common sense, it could hardly have been a coincidence that “three books” and “1 ice” just so happened to correspond, respectively, to the three bundles of cannabis – A1, A2 and A3 – and one bundle of methamphetamine – A4 – that had been discovered in the Car.

  182. [124] Given the importance of the terminology used, I pause at this juncture to clarify what Netiaanthan had actually said. Netiaanthan’s reference to “books” and “ice” were English translations of Tamil words that he used, viz, “booku” and “pani” respectively. This was confirmed in the examination-in-chief of the interpreter who had been present during the recording of the Accused’s statements, Mdm Vijaya Thavamary Abraham, after the audio of this Follow-up Call had been played back to her. The same was also confirmed by Sgt Hema. In response to clarificatory questions I posed to Sgt Hema, she confirmed that Netiaanthan had used the Tamil words “booku” and “panni”. Importantly, Sgt Hema also gave evidence that these terms were known to the CNB as drug slang for cannabis and ice (ie, methamphetamine). Whilst the Defence did raise an objection to Sgt Hema’s evidence (see [57]–[60] above), that was in respect of a different point altogether (ie, what the Accused had told her when she questioned him after his arrest). I thus saw no reason to doubt the veracity of this aspect of Sgt Hema’s evidence. It is well-settled that a trial judge is not bound to reject a witness’s evidence in its entirety but can reject some aspects and accept others.

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