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Grounds publishedDecided 14 Jul 2025
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General Division of the High Court

A drink driver's appeal failed; the sentence for causing a death was upheld

Ng En You Jeremiah (alias Huang Enyou) v Public Prosecutor

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[2025] SGHC 135Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9212 of 2023/01

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A drink driver's appeal failed; the sentence for causing a death was upheld

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  1. Introduction

  2. [3] The appellant appealed and took issue with the imposition of the sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge and the sentencing framework relied on by the DJ in reaching that decision. He also contended that the DJ erred in finding that it would be contrary to the public interest for the PG Guidelines to apply.

  3. [4] In view of the amendments to the RTA passed by Parliament in 2019, this appeal presented an opportunity for us to consider and determine the applicable sentencing frameworks to be adopted for the offences disclosed in the two charges. For the offence disclosed in the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge, the change in the statutory architecture meant that this was the first time we considered the appropriate sentencing framework for that offence. As for the offence disclosed in the Drink Driving Charge, the increase in the maximum sentence after the amendments to the RTA called for the revision of the existing sentencing framework in Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 755 (“Stansilas”). Alongside these, we considered the application of the PG Guidelines – which came into effect on 1 October 2023 – to offences such as these.

  4. [5] We appointed Ms Chua Xyn Yee (“Ms Chua”) as young independent counsel (“YIC”) to assist us with the questions raised in this appeal. We directed her to consider and make submissions on the following questions:

  5. (a) What is an appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of reckless/dangerous driving under s 64(1) of the RTA and punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with s 64(2)(c) of the RTA? Ms Chua was asked to specifically consider the sentencing approaches in Wu Zhi Yong v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 587 (“Wu Zhi Yong”) and Public Prosecutor v Sy Yong Da [2021] SGDC 179 (“Sy Yong Da”).

  6. (b) How might the sentencing framework in Stansilas be modified in light of the 2019 amendments to the RTA which increased the prescribed punishment for an offence under s 67(1)(b) of the RTA?

  7. (c) Do the PG Guidelines provide for an appropriate framework to determine the extent to which a sentence might be reduced on account of an offender’s plea of guilt? After the Court of Appeal had issued its grounds of decision in Iskandar bin Jinan v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2024] 2 SLR 673 (“Iskandar”) – in which the PG Guidelines were considered in depth – we invited Ms Chua (and the parties) to address us on whether the PG Guidelines applied in determining the appropriate sentence for the offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty and if so, how.

  8. Background

  9. Facts

  10. [7] In the court below, the appellant pleaded guilty to the Drink Driving Charge and the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge, and consented to having three other charges taken into consideration for sentencing:

  11. [8] The appellant admitted to the following facts as set out in the Statement of Facts prepared by the Prosecution dated 24 May 2023.

  12. Events preceding the accident

  13. [9] On 23 December 2021, between 7pm to 10pm, the appellant consumed four cans of beer at his office, located at Tampines Street 93. He was having dinner and drinks at the office with his brother, Mr Joshua Ng En Yi (“Mr Joshua Ng”) and two other friends. Thereafter, at about 11pm, the appellant left his office and drove a red Mercedes car with Mr Joshua Ng in the front passenger seat. The appellant had intended to drive back to his residence at 48 Jalan Lateh which is approximately 10km away from his office.

  14. [10] At about 11.10pm, the appellant was travelling along Tampines Avenue 1 which had a speed limit of 60km/h. He was initially travelling at a speed of between 157km/h and 169km/h. As he approached the junction of Tampines Avenue 1 and Tampines Avenue 10, where the accident subsequently occurred, he first reduced his speed to between 146km/h and 156km/h, and then to between 122km/h and 130km/h.

  15. [11] Before the accident, several vehicles had formed up along Tampines Avenue 10 (in the direction of Pasir Ris Drive 12) at the junction of Tampines Avenue 1 because the traffic light in their direction had turned red. The vehicles, and their occupants, were as follows:

  16. (a) In the rightmost lane, closest to the road divider and closest to the intersection was a car driven by one Mr Ng Liang Hwi (“Mr Ng”).

  17. (b) Behind Mr Ng’s car in the rightmost lane was a car driven by one Mr Kenn Wong Mun Soon (the “deceased”). The deceased was a private-hire driver for GoJek at the material time. One Mr Sim Hong Wee (“Mr Sim”) and one Mr Ng Zi Yuan Darren (“Mr Darren Ng”) were passengers in this car, sitting in the rear of the car at the left and right side respectively.

  18. (c) In the middle lane, closest to the intersection and roughly abreast to Mr Ng’s car was a car driven by one Ms Chow Yan Ping Kimberly (“Ms Chow”).

  19. (d) In the middle lane behind Ms Chow’s car sat a car driven by one Mr Troung Manh Quang (“Mr Truong”). Mr Troung’s wife and their two children (aged six and nine) were passengers in this car.

  20. (e) In the middle lane behind Mr Troung’s car was a car being driven by one Muhammad Fariz Bin Sa’adon (“Mr Fariz”).

  21. (f) In the leftmost lane, abreast to Mr Truong’s car was a taxi being driven by one Mr Kamsani bin Tarseelim (“Mr Kamsani”).

  22. [12] At around the same time, a motorcycle being ridden by one Mr Mahmud Azmani Fikri Mahmod Fuao (“Mr Fikri”) along Tampines Avenue 10 in the direction of Pasir Ris Drive 12 approached the same junction. The traffic light was still red in his direction and the other vehicles as described above stood waiting. Mr Fikri rode his motorcycle between the rightmost lane and the middle lane as he moved forwards towards the intersection.

  23. [13] A visual representation of all of the vehicles along Tampines Avenue 10 (in the direction of Pasir Ris Drive 12) at the junction of Tampines Avenue 1, immediately before the accident occurred, is as follows:

  24. Accident

  25. [14] The appellant, travelling on Tampines Avenue 1, approached the above-mentioned junction. As he was about to turn left onto Tampines Avenue 10 (in the direction of Bartley Road East) (ie, in the direction opposite of the vehicles described above) via a dedicated turning lane, he lost control of the car. At this point, the car was travelling at a speed of between 92km/h and 108km/h. Consequently, the appellant failed to properly execute the left turn and instead proceeded straight ahead. The car smashed through the centre divider along Tampines Avenue 10 and collided directly into the right side of the deceased’s car.

  26. [15] The impact of the collision pushed the deceased’s car to the left and backwards. Consequently, the deceased’s car collided into the right side of Mr Truong’s car and into the front of Mr Fariz’s car. As Mr Fikri’s motorcycle was passing between the deceased’s car and Mr Truong’s car at this time, Mr Fikri was crushed between the two cars. The impact of the collision between the deceased’s car and Mr Truong’s car also pushed Mr Truong’s car to the left, causing it to collide into the right side of Mr Kamsani’s taxi.

  27. [16] An officer from the Traffic Police arrived at the accident scene soon after. The appellant failed the breathalyzer test administered by the officer. He was arrested and escorted back to the Traffic Police Headquarters, where a Breath Evidential Analyser test was administered on him. The test produced a reading of 42μg of alcohol per 100ml of breath.

  28. Victims’ injuries and property damage sustained

  29. [17] The deceased was brought to Changi General Hospital (“CGH”) after the accident. When he arrived, he was unresponsive and his cardiac electrical rhythm was in asystole. Eventually, cardiopulmonary resuscitation efforts were terminated, and the deceased was pronounced dead soon after. The deceased had sustained the following injuries: (a) right supraorbital deep laceration of about 4cm; (b) left anterior neck laceration; (c) right lateral chest wall laceration; (d) epigastric abrasion; (e) right knee superficial laceration; and (f) right shin abrasions and wounds. The deceased’s cause of death was a traumatic rupture of the descending thoracic aorta, which was consistent with being sustained from a road traffic accident.

  30. [18] Mr Sim, who was a passenger in the deceased’s car, was conveyed to CGH after the accident. He sustained (a) 3cm x 1.5cm laceration over the left mandible, (b) small subcentimetre lacerations medial to the left mandibular wound, (c) superficial abrasions over his right knee and (d) left medial aspect of the ankle. He was hospitalised for two days and given 11 days of hospitalisation leave.

  31. [19] Mr Darren Ng, the other passenger in the deceased’s car, was also conveyed to CGH. He sustained the following injuries: (a) retrograde amnesia; (b) mild head injury; (c) neck strain; (d) right facial laceration with bruising; (e) right shin abrasion; (f) bilateral shoulder contusion or sprain; (g) right lateral canthus laceration; (h) left apical occult pneumothorax; and (i) superficial abrasions over the right shin. He was hospitalised for two days and given nine days of hospitalisation leave.

  32. [20] Likewise, Mr Fikri, the motorcyclist, was conveyed to CGH. He sustained the following injuries: (a) lacerations over the chin, anterior neck, right shoulder, and left anterolateral chest; (b) traumatic brain injury; (c) avulsion fracture of left occipital epicondyle; (d) C1-C2 injury; (e) anterior neck foreign bodies; (f) right femur distal shaft open fracture and right tibia and fibula midshaft open fractures; and (g) left ankle (open) and foot (calcaneal) fractures and comminuted left distal tibial fracture. Given the complexity of his injuries, Mr Fikri was likely to still experience stiffness in his right knee and left ankle as well as decreased endurance in performing strenuous lower limb activities. Mr Fikri was hospitalised for 66 days, and given 95 days of hospitalisation leave and 125 days of medical leave.

  33. [21] Mr Truong was conveyed to CGH. He sustained contusions and was given three days of medical leave.

  34. [22] After the accident, Mr Kamsani experienced pain in his right hand. He sought medical treatment the next day and received five days of medical leave.

  35. [23] The following damages were noted on the appellant’s car: (a) front windscreen cracked; (b) front bumper and front right portion of car were cracked and crumpled; (c) all four tires were punctured; and (d) two right wheel rims were twisted.

  36. [24] The following damages were noted on the deceased’s car: (a) bonnet, top of the car and rear bumper were crumpled; (b) front bumper and front right light ripped off; (c) front and rear windscreens, and two right windows were smashed; (d) right side of car was scratched and crumpled; (e) both right tires were punctured (twisted front right wheel rim); and (f) left side of the car was crumpled (left rear door was ripped off by the Singapore Civil Defence Force).

  37. [25] The following damages were noted on Mr Fikri’s motorcycle: (a) front fork, rear rim and axle were broken; (b) front centre portion and right rear panel of the motorcycle were ripped off; (c) front left portion of the motorcycle was crumpled; (d) right mirror was twisted; and (e) right exhaust pipe was torn off.

  38. [26] The following damages were noted on Mr Truong’s car: (a) right side of the car was crumpled; (b) front right window was smashed; (c) right side-view mirror and front-left light were ripped off; and (d) rear-left door was dented.

  39. [27] The following damages were noted on Mr Kamsani’s taxi: (a) right side-view mirror was twisted; (b) front-right side of the car was crumpled; and (c) rear-right door was dented.

  40. [28] As for Mr Fariz’s car, the right portion of the front bumper and the front-right side of the car were dented.

  41. Parties’ submissions below

  42. [30] Before the DJ, the Prosecution sought the following sentences: (a) in respect of the Drink Driving Charge, at least six months’ imprisonment and at least ten years’ disqualification; and (b) in respect of the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge, between eight and ten years’ imprisonment and at least 12 years’ disqualification.

  43. [31] In respect of the Drink Driving Charge, the Prosecution applied the sentencing framework in Stansilas, and doubled the sentencing ranges given that the maximum penalties for drink driving had been doubled after the legislative amendments to the RTA. The Prosecution contended that the appropriate starting point was between eight and 12 months’ imprisonment, which was to be reduced to at least six months’ imprisonment on account of the appellant’s early plea of guilt.

  44. [32] As for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge, the Prosecution submitted that a considerable uplift should be applied to the mandatory minimum three years’ imprisonment term because: (a) the degree of potential harm was high; (b) the appellant was highly culpable; and (c) the charges taken into consideration reflected the extent of the harm and property damage caused by the appellant’s dangerous driving. The Prosecution argued against the application of the sentencing framework in Sy Yong Da as that framework did not specifically account for an offender’s alcohol level.

  45. [34] The appellant raised various mitigating factors, including the fact that he had made full restitution to the deceased and the other victims. The appellant also contended that his culpability was on the lowest end of moderate culpability as (a) his alcohol level was only 42μg per 100ml of breath, which was only marginally above the legal limit and (b) it was not that he drove dangerously in a flagrant and brazen manner but that as he was negotiating the turn, his bulky safety boots slipped off the brake pedals and onto the accelerator, causing an abrupt acceleration leading him to lose control of the car.

  46. [35] In respect of the Drink Driving Charge, the appellant applied the sentencing framework in Stansilas, concluding that the harm fell within the “very serious” category and that his culpability fell within the lowest end of the “medium” category, such that an imprisonment sentence of no more than two months would be just and appropriate.

  47. [36] As for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge, the appellant turned to the sentencing framework in Sy Yong Da and submitted that he fell at the highest end of the “low” culpability category.

  48. Decision below

  49. Sentence for the Drink Driving Charge

  50. [38] In determining the sentence for the Drink Driving Charge, the DJ considered the sentencing framework for first-time drink drivers in Rafael Voltaire Alzate v Public Prosecutor [2022] 3 SLR 993 (“Rafael”) as providing neutral starting points based on the offenders’ alcohol level (GD at [87]–[88]):

  51. Band

  52. Level of alcohol (μg per 100ml of breath)

  53. Range of fines

  54. Range of disqualification

  55. 1

  56. 36–54

  57. $2,000 to $4,000

  58. [24] to 30 months

  59. 2

  60. 55–69

  61. $4,000 to $6,000

  62. [30] to 36 months

  63. 3

  64. 70–89

  65. $6,000 to $8,000

  66. [36] to 48 months

  67. 4

  68. ≥90

  69. $8,000 to $10,000

  70. [48] to 60 months (or longer)

  71. [39] As the appellant had caused death, serious harm to several persons as well as property damage while driving a motorcar under the influence of alcohol, the starting point was a custodial sentence (GD at [90]). Further, given that the maximum penalties for drink driving had effectively been doubled since the sentencing framework in Stansilas was established, the DJ held that the necessary upward calibration should be made, to take into account the full range of punishment prescribed by Parliament (GD at [91]).

  72. [40] In the DJ’s view, the harm caused by the appellant’s drink driving was very serious. Not only had he caused the death of an innocent driver (which was the gravest harm possible), he also caused serious injuries to multiple other road users (GD at [93]). The appellant’s culpability rested at the threshold between moderate and high. Although his level of alcohol at 42μg was within Band 1 of the sentencing framework in Rafael, the appellant had been travelling at a very high speed all along Tampines Avenue 1 and had made an extremely dangerous manoeuvre by making a left turn at high speed while the roads along Tampines Avenue 1 and Tampines Avenue 10 were still relatively busy (GD at [94]).

  73. [41] As such, based on an upward calibration of the sentencing framework in Stansilas, the DJ held that the appropriate starting point would be between eight and 12 months’ imprisonment. A sentencing discount should then be applied on account of the appellant’s early plea of guilt. The DJ concluded that a sentence of six months’ imprisonment and ten years’ disqualification for the Drink Driving Charge was appropriate (GD at [95]). The DJ also noted that it would be contrary to the public interest for the PG Guidelines – particularly the maximum discount of 30% for a Stage 1 case – to apply given the very serious nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case (GD at [96]).

  74. Sentence for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge

  75. [42] In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in respect of a serious offender for a dangerous driving charge, the DJ declined to follow the sentencing framework in Sy Yong Da, finding that the framework did not account for how an offender’s blood alcohol level factored into the equation (GD at [97]). Instead, the DJ was guided by the observations as well as the sentencing framework in Wu Zhi Yong for cases under s 64(1) of the RTA and punishable under s 64(2C)(a) read with s 64(2C)(c) of the RTA involving serious offenders for cases with no personal injury or potential harm (GD at [98]).

  76. [43] The DJ considered the following offence-specific factors:

  77. (a) Serious potential harm (GD at [102]–[103]): At the material time, the traffic flow was heavy, the road surface was dry, and the weather was clear. Besides the victims that were injured, there were other road users present at the location, including the passengers in the damaged cars and those in the cluster of other vehicles in the immediate vicinity of the accident location. It was only fortuitous that no one else was hurt. In addition, the appellant had intended to travel a substantial distance of 10km to reach his residence at Jalan Lateh.

  78. (b) Serious property damage (GD at [104]).

  79. (c) Increased culpability (GD at [105]–[106]): The appellant was travelling at very high speeds which exceeded the prescribed speed limit, and he had made an extremely dangerous manoeuvre by making a left turn at a high speed. Driving at such an absurdly high speed while intoxicated not only made an accident a more likely event, it also exponentially increased the severity of any accident that occurred. The appellant’s culpability would be at the threshold between moderate and high range.

  80. (d) Presence of the charges that were taken into consideration (GD at [107]): This reflected how the appellant’s dangerous driving caused extremely severe injuries to the motorcyclist, Mr Fikri, and injuries of varying degrees of severity to four other road users.

  81. In view of the multiple offence-specific aggravating factors set out above, the indicative starting point of eight years’ imprisonment – which was at the higher end of the prescribed sentencing band – was appropriate (GD at [108]).

  82. [44] The DJ then considered the following offender-specific factors:

  83. (a) The appellant pleaded guilty to the proceeded charges against him and was extremely remorseful for his actions. He checked on the victims and rendered assistance as much as he could until the ambulance arrived and provided his full cooperation to the authorities. He also made restitution to the various victims (GD at [111]).

  84. (b) The appellant had a compounded speeding offence in 2016, which was a relevant antecedent for sentencing (GD at [112]).

  85. [45] The DJ thus calibrated the starting point of eight years’ imprisonment downwards, reducing the sentence to seven years’ imprisonment. The DJ held that it would be contrary to the public interest for the PG Guidelines – particularly the maximum discount of 30% for a Stage 1 case – to apply here as well given the very serious nature of the offence and the circumstances of this charge (GD at [113]). She found that the minimum prescribed disqualification period of 12 years was appropriate (GD at [114]).

  86. Parties’ cases on appeal and YIC’s submissions

  87. Appellant’s submissions

  88. [46] The appellant appealed only against the imprisonment sentence imposed in respect of the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge. He submitted that the DJ erred in fact and in law by:

  89. (a) finding that the case of Sy Yong Da was not applicable to the present case because it does not specifically account for an offender’s blood alcohol level or a “serious offender”, despite similarly involving reckless or dangerous driving causing death under s 64(2) of the RTA;

  90. (b) relying on the sentencing framework in Wu Zhi Yong which is confined to offences punishable under s 64(2C) of the RTA, ie, reckless or dangerous driving simpliciter, and thereafter finding that the appellant’s case fell within the highest band of Wu Zhi Yong;

  91. (c) failing to accord sufficient weight to the voluntary substantial restitution made by the appellant or to the appellant’s early plea of guilt, and relatedly, failing to accord any weight to the appellant’s undertaking to fulfil the outstanding claims by various victims and the costs of repair of railings to the Land Transport Authority; and

  92. (d) finding that it would be contrary to the public interest for the PG Guidelines, particularly the maximum discount of 30% for a Stage 1 case, to apply.

  93. [47] Consequently, the appellant contended that the global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive and disproportionate. Rather, a sentence of between five and six years’ imprisonment for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge would have been just in these circumstances.

  94. [48] On the PG Guidelines, the appellant submitted that the facts of the present case were not so egregious as to warrant the invocation of the public interest exception, which should be reserved for exceptional cases. The maximum reduction of 30% should be applied as there were no serious aggravating factors or other compelling reasons to apply a lower sentencing reduction than the maximum 30%.

  95. [49] Assuming that the framework in Wu Zhi Yong applied, the appellant’s counsel argued in oral submissions that the offence should fall within Band 2 of the framework. He emphasised (a) the relatively low alcohol level of the appellant; (b) the fact that the appellant remained at the scene of the accident, unlike the offenders in Wu Zhi Yong and Sy Yong Da; and (c) the significant early voluntary restitution made by the appellant. As such, the appropriate sentence should be between seven to eight years’ imprisonment, subject to a further reduction of 30% on the application of the PG Guidelines. Even if the starting sentence was nine years as the Prosecution submitted, a 30% reduction on the application of the PG Guidelines would yield a sentence of just under six and a half years’ imprisonment. There was a difference in this compared to the sentence of seven years’ imprisonment imposed by the DJ.

  96. Prosecution’s submissions

  97. (a) The framework in Sy Yong Da should not have been applied as it was best suited for offences where a broad range of outcomes could arise under the specific axes of harm or culpability. For offences under s 64(2)(a) of the RTA, where death was caused, the nature of the harm ceased to be a relevant differentiating factor and one of the two axes had become irrelevant. Further, the framework in Sy Yong Da did not specifically account for how an offender’s alcohol level would move the offender upwards or downwards within the three culpability bands.

  98. (b) Rather, the modified sentencing bands approach adopted in Wu Zhi Yong should apply to offences of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender, after the necessary adjustments have been made to account for the different prescribed sentencing ranges. Charges taken into consideration (“TIC Charges”) ought not to be considered at the first step of the analysis, when identifying the applicable sentencing band, but should only be considered at the second step as an offender-specific factor.

  99. (d) The modified sentencing bands approach in Stansilas remains well-suited for offences under s 67(1)(b) of the RTA and should continue to apply, so long as the sentencing ranges were re-calibrated to give effect to the higher penalties available under the amended RTA. The determination of whether an offender’s culpability was high should be made with reference to the framework set out in Rafael. The appropriate disqualification periods for each of the sentencing bands should also be delineated, with an upper limit of ten years’ disqualification for the most serious cases involving drink driving punishable under s 67(2) of the RTA.

  100. (e) The PG Guidelines should ordinarily be applied by the courts when determining the reduction in sentence that ought to be granted when an accused person pleads guilty. The public interest exception should be construed narrowly and should not have applied; there were simply insufficient grounds to warrant its invocation in this particular case. In relation to the offences in the present case, the PG Guidelines should have applied in an unattenuated fashion.

  101. [51] Turning to the case at hand, the Prosecution argued that the starting position for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge ought to be nine years’ imprisonment (accounting for the charges taken into consideration as an offender-specific aggravating factor at the second step of the framework) on the basis that the appellant claimed trial. As the appellant had instead indicated his intention to plead guilty at an early stage and shortly after the first mention of the case, this case fell to be considered as a Stage 1 case under the PG Guidelines, and the appellant should thus have been given around a 30% reduction in sentence. This would have translated into a sentence of roughly six years’ and four months’ imprisonment. In comparison, the sentence imposed of seven years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

  102. YIC’s Submissions

  103. Sentencing framework for reckless or dangerous driving causing death by serious offender

  104. [52] Ms Chua submitted that an appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of reckless or dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with s 64(2)(c) of the RTA can be adapted from the two-step framework in Wu Zhi Yong (see [66]–[70] below). She proposed the following sentencing bands under Step 1 of the framework:

  105. Band

  106. Description

  107. Punishment

  108. Disqualification period

  109. 1

  110. Lower level of seriousness, with no offence-specific aggravating factors or only present to a limited extent, and offender’s alcohol level is likely to be at Band 1 or 2 of the framework in Rafael

  111. [3] to 5 years’ imprisonment

  112. [12] to 13 years

  113. 2

  114. Higher level of seriousness, with usually two or more offence-specific aggravating factors, and offender’s level of culpability and alcohol level will typically both be on the higher side (alcohol level in Band 3 or 4 of the framework in Rafael)

  115. [5] to 8 years’ imprisonment

  116. [13] to 14 years

  117. 3

  118. Most serious cases, with multiple aggravating factors suggesting higher levels of culpability and alcohol

  119. [8] to 10 years’ imprisonment

  120. [14] to 15 years

  121. [53] Ms Chua submitted that an additional offence-specific aggravating factor of “other serious actual harm” should be expressly considered at Step 1. Further, she clarified that the range of disqualification periods proposed in each band was tentative, and the alternative would be to not provide the range of periods but to simply note the mandatory 12-year disqualification period.

  122. [54] Ms Chua contended that the framework in Sy Yong Da was not an appropriate sentencing framework for an offence punishable under s 64(2)(a) of the RTA. Since there was only a single eventuality of harm, leading the DJ to only deal with the degree of culpability, it may be unnecessarily misleading or confusing to lump all offence-specific aggravating factors under the heading of “culpability”. Further, the Sy Yong Da framework did not seem to adequately account for aggravating factors of “serious potential harm”, “serious property damage” and “other serious actual harm”.

  123. Sentencing framework for drink driving causing personal injury and/or property damage

  124. [55] Ms Chua submitted that in light of the doubling of the prescribed punishment for a first-time offender for a drink driving offence under s 67(1)(b) of the RTA as a result of the amendments introduced in 2019, the framework in Stansilas might be modified by doubling the imprisonment terms for each harm-culpability category. Further, when considering an offender’s alcohol level to assess his or her culpability in accordance with the framework in Stansilas, reference may be taken from the alcohol level bands set out in Rafael. Additionally, regard should be had to precedent cases to decide the appropriate disqualification period to be imposed.

  125. The applicability of the PG Guidelines

  126. [56] Ms Chua submitted that the PG Guidelines should have applied in determining the appropriate sentences for the offences to which the appellant had pleaded guilty and the public interest exception need not be invoked to exclude its application. With respect to an offence of reckless or dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender, the maximum sentence reduction should be 20% at Stage 1 and 15% at Stage 2 (as opposed to 30% at Stage 1 and 20% at Stage 2 as set out in the PG Guidelines). This was to avoid the problem of sentences clustering at or near the mandatory minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment. With respect to an offence of drink driving causing personal injury and/or property damage, the PG Guidelines could apply without any further calibration.

  127. Issues to be determined

  128. [57] As prefaced, the following issues arose for our determination:

  129. (a) What is the appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender while under the influence of alcohol under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with ss 64(2)(c) and 64(2D)(b) of the RTA?

  130. (b) What is the appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of drink driving resulting in personal injury and/or property damage under s 67(1)(b) punishable under s 67(1) read with s 67(2)(a) of the RTA?

  131. (c) Do the PG Guidelines provide for an appropriate framework to determine the extent to which a sentence for the above two offences might be reduced on account of an offender’s plea of guilt?

  132. [58] Ultimately, we had to consider if the sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for the Dangerous Driving Causing Death Charge was appropriate, in application of the relevant legal principles.

  133. Appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender while under the influence of alcohol under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with ss 64(2)(c) and 64(2D)(b) of the RTA

  134. [59] We begin by setting out the relevant sub-sections of s 64 of the RTA as in force at the time of the appellant’s offences:

  135. [60] The above is the result of amendments to the RTA which came into effect on 1 November 2019 following the passage of s 13 of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 19 of 2019) (the “Amendment Act”). The Amendment Act introduced a whole suite of amendments to the RTA, enhancing and fortifying the existing legislative infrastructure regulating road traffic in Singapore with the stated aim of making our roads safer (Sue Chang v Public Prosecutor [2023] 3 SLR 440 (“Sue Chang”) at [31]).

  136. [61] Two aspects of the amendments to s 64 of the RTA bear emphasis. First, the amendments “envisaged a new scheme of penalties for reckless or dangerous driving in a tiered structure calibrated according to the degree of hurt caused … Specific ranges of punishments are prescribed for each category of harm; the more serious the harm caused, the harsher the penalties naturally are” [emphasis added] (Wu Zhi Yong at [15]). By tiering the punishment provisions to correspond with the type of harm suffered, Parliament has given clear expression to the need to give explicit consideration to the (different) outcomes that result from instances of dangerous driving, which is a stark departure from the structure of the pre-2019 RTA, where there was a single range of punishment with no differentiation based on the type and/or degree of harm caused (see Sue Chang at [39]). Second, the penalties for reckless or dangerous driving under s 64 of the RTA were “further enhanced where drink driving occurred in conjunction with reckless or dangerous driving, through the introduction of the ‘serious offender’ provisions” – see sub-s (c) of each of ss 64(2)–64(2C) read with s 64(8) of the RTA, which defines a serious offender as one who has also been convicted of certain other offences including drink driving under s 67 of the RTA (Wu Zhi Yong at [16]).

  137. [62] As the court held in Chen Song v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2025] 3 SLR 509 (“Chen Song”) (at [47]), albeit in the context of careless driving offences under s 65 of the RTA, the formulation of a sentencing framework ought to be guided by the architecture of the relevant provisions of the RTA and the legislative intention behind it. With the above context in mind, we turn to the two competing sentencing frameworks that the parties proposed and that Ms Chua analysed, namely those in Wu Zhi Yong and Sy Yong Da.

  138. Framework in Wu Zhi Yong

  139. [64] In that case, Sundaresh Menon CJ declined to apply the “sentencing matrix” approach and adopted the “sentencing bands” approach instead (at [23] and [29]).

  140. (a) Under the “sentencing matrix” approach, the court first determines the severity of the offence on the basis of the principal factual elements of the case that are closely related to (i) the culpability of the offender in carrying out the offence and (ii) the harm resulting from the offender’s actions. This exercise expresses itself in a matrix comprising the axes of culpability and harm, and each cell within that matrix features a different indicative starting point and range of sentences. Thereafter, the sentencing court will have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors other than the principal factual elements to determine the precise sentence (at [22]).

  141. [65] Menon CJ found that a “sentencing matrix” based on harm and culpability was not appropriate in light of the architecture of s 64 of the RTA, since the Amendment Act delineated the range of sentences applicable in relation to each type of harm (eg, death, grievous hurt, hurt or none of the aforementioned) (at [27]). A “sentencing matrix” framework would typically be appropriate where a broad range of outcomes can arise under the specific axes of harm or culpability. This allows any case to be situated at an appropriate point within the matrix by calibrating across both axes (at [28]). However, under s 64 of the RTA, the factor of “harm” is, in large part, already reflected in the different penalty-prescribing provisions and in the choice between the different provisions, such that it is no longer significant enough to justify it as a principal sentencing element in a matrix for a specific provision (at [28]). In fact, Menon CJ also observed that where death is caused, the nature of the harm ceases to be a relevant differentiating factor for the purposes of sentencing offenders falling within the ambit of the dangerous driving causing death provision (at [27]). We return to this last observation later which we consider to be highly pertinent in the present appeal.

  142. [66] Instead, a modified “sentencing bands” approach would be more suitable (at [29]). At the first step, the court should identify the band applicable to the offence and the indicative starting point with reference to that band, having regard to the offence-specific factors present. These would encompass factors relating to the manner and mode by which the offence was committed, as well as the harm caused by the offender. At the second step, the court would have regard to the offender-specific factors, being the aggravating and mitigating factors that are personal to the offender (at [30]).

  143. [67] In relation to the “serious offender” provision and how that should factor into the sentencing framework, Menon CJ held that it would be contrary to Parliament’s intention to approach the additional penalty provision under s 64(2C)(c) of the RTA (which applies to “serious offenders”) by stacking a further penalty over and above that to be imposed under s 64(2C)(a) in a two-step process. Rather, the additional penalty provision serves to enhance the overall range of punishment prescribed under s 64(2C) (at [31]–[33]). Calibrating the punishment to be imposed under s 64 of the RTA as a whole allows for a holistic assessment of all the factors that go toward the offender’s culpability (including the conduct of drink driving), and in this way, the sentencing court would utilise the full sentencing range (at [34]).

  144. [68] Menon CJ provided a non-exhaustive list of offence-specific aggravating factors to be considered at the first step of the sentencing framework (at [36]):

  145. (a) Serious potential harm: Apart from actual harm, regard should also be had to the potential harm that can result from the act of dangerous or reckless driving. The level of potential harm would be assessed against facts which would include the condition of the road, the volume of traffic or number of pedestrians actually on or which might reasonably be expected to be on the road at the relevant time, the speed and manner of driving, visibility at the relevant time, the type of vehicle, and any particular vulnerabilities (eg, a truck or car colliding into a motorcycle or pedestrian). Where an assessment of these facts reveals that the potential harm occasioned to road users would have been serious, this would be an aggravating factor.

  146. (b) Serious property damage: As a general rule, the amount of any loss or damage may serve as a proxy indicator of harm.

  147. (c) High alcohol level found in the accused person’s blood or breath: A high level of alcohol that substantially exceeds the prescribed limit would be an aggravating factor. This determination of whether an offender’s alcohol level is high can be made with reference to the sentencing framework for an offence under s 67 of the RTA, set out in Rafael, which is calibrated in accordance with the alcohol levels found in an offender’s blood or breath. The level of alcohol found in an offender’s blood or breath would be a key factor in determining the sentencing band in which a case is situated, as the fact of drink driving has been legislatively highlighted as a significant factor in sentencing (at [37]).

  148. (d) An offender’s reason or motivation for driving: This could be an aggravating (or conceivably, in some circumstances, even a mitigating) factor in respect of an offence of drink driving. The gravity of an offender’s conduct would be increased if he had, at that time, been driving a passenger for hire or reward.

  149. (e) Increased culpability: Factors increasing an accused person’s culpability for an offence of dangerous driving would include a particularly dangerous manner of driving. Examples include excessive speeding or deliberate dangerous driving, such as in “hell riding” cases.

  150. (f) The offender’s conduct following the offence or attempt to evade arrest: Conduct that is belligerent or violent upon arrest would constitute an aggravating factor. Likewise, the failure to stop in an attempt to evade arrest or to avoid apprehension should also weigh against an offender.

  151. [69] Having found that the punishment to be imposed under s 64(2C)(a) read with s 64(2C)(c) of the RTA was to be calibrated as a whole, the applicable sentencing range is a fine of between $2,000 and $15,000 and/or an imprisonment term not exceeding 24 months, as well as a disqualification period of no less than two years (at [38]). Menon CJ arrived at the following bands (at [39]–[44]):

  152. Band

  153. Description

  154. Punishment

  155. Disqualification period

  156. 1

  157. Lower level of seriousness, with no offence-specific aggravating factors present or where they are present only to a limited extent. The offender’s blood alcohol level is also likely to be at Bands 1 or 2 of Rafael.

  158. A fine of between $2,000 and $15,000 and/or up to 1 month’s imprisonment

  159. [2] to 3 years

  160. 2

  161. Higher level of seriousness and would usually contain two or more offence-specific aggravating factors. The level of culpability and the blood alcohol level will typically both be on the higher side, likely in Bands 3 and 4 of Rafael.

  162. [1] month’s to 1 year’s imprisonment

  163. [3] to 4 years

  164. 3

  165. Most serious cases of reckless or dangerous driving whilst under the influence of drink, with multiple aggravating factors suggesting higher levels of culpability and higher alcohol levels.

  166. [1] to 2 years’ imprisonment

  167. [4] to 5 years

  168. Within the appropriate band and corresponding sentencing range, the court then arrives at an indicative starting point (at [49]).

  169. [70] At the second step of the framework, the court calibrates the sentence from that starting point by having regard to the offender-specific factors. Offender-specific aggravating factors include offences taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing, relevant antecedents, and evidence showing a lack of remorse. Offender-specific mitigating factors include evidence of genuine remorse and an offender’s youth (at [48]).

  170. Framework in Sy Yong Da

  171. [71] Sy Yong Da is a District Court decision that concerned a case of dangerous driving causing death without the influence of alcohol punishable under s 64(2)(a) of the RTA. In that case, the offender was driving his motorcar in the early morning. He was speeding and had swerved abruptly from lane two to lane four of the road (ie, leftwards towards the streetside walkway for pedestrians, before losing control of the motorcar. The motorcar went off the road, mounted the left kerb and collided into a person who was walking along the sheltered pedestrian walkway. The offender then drove off immediately from the accident scene, leaving his victim there. He sent his motorcar to an automotive workshop for repairs. The victim eventually succumbed to her injuries (at [1]). The offender pleaded guilty to one charge of dangerous driving causing death under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with s 64(2D)(a) of the RTA and two other charges, with two further charges taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing (at [2]). The offender was sentenced to 68 months’ imprisonment and ten years’ disqualification for the offence of dangerous driving causing death (at [177]).

  172. [72] The court adopted the five-step approach as set out in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609 (“Logachev”) at [75]–[84] (Sy Yong Da at [109]–[110]; see also Public Prosecutor v Cullen Richard Alexander [2020] SGDC 88 at [104]–[157]), which is as follows:

  173. [73] As the only eventuality of the harm caused in fatal accidents is death, the court in Sy Yong Da was of the view that for the purpose of the sentencing framework under s 64(2)(a) of the RTA, only the degree of culpability of an accused is relevant in so far as the first step is concerned (at [114]). In assessing culpability, the court will consider the following factors: the manner of driving, the circumstances of driving, and the offender’s reasons for driving (Sy Yong Da at [122], following Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock [2017] 5 SLR 1141 at [37]–[40]). The court set out a “working or functional definition” in relation to each level of culpability and a corresponding indicative sentencing range (at [129] and [131]). The court highlighted that drink driving or driving under the influence of drugs will be dealt with additionally under the “serious offender” provision (at [129]).

  174. Appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender

  175. [74] In our judgment, a modified “sentencing bands” framework akin to that in Wu Zhi Yong is most suited for dangerous driving offences causing death.

  176. [75] The “sentencing bands” approach adopted in Wu Zhi Yong is preferrable over the “sentencing matrix” approach adopted in Sy Yong Da primarily because the nature of the harm ceases to be a relevant differentiating factor for the purposes of sentencing offenders facing a charge of dangerous driving causing death, as Menon CJ astutely observed in Wu Zhi Yong (at [27]) (see [65] above). This is consistent with the remarks in Chen Song (at [120]) where this court observed that the sentencing bands approach adopted in Wu Zhi Yong would also be appropriate for careless or dangerous driving offences resulting in death, given that there is only one possible type of harm that can be occasioned in such cases. Unlike grievous hurt (or hurt) which can manifest itself in different graduations, death is monotypic. There is no need to inquire into the precise extent of harm and thereafter reflect this extent in the sentencing range to consider because death is that precise, singular extent which constitutes an essential element of the offence. It should not be considered again as an offence-specific factor that would affect the calibration of sentence since the primary consideration of harm within this relevant offence is the death caused, and this is already reflected in a correspondingly higher sentencing range under the legislative framework of the RTA.

  177. [76] For this reason, a “sentencing matrix” approach based on the axes of harm and culpability, which the court in Sy Yong Da adopted, would not be appropriate. In our view, that approach is best suited for offences where a broad range of outcomes can arise under the specific axes of harm and culpability (Sue Chang at [61] and [64]), which is not observable here. Notably, the court in Sy Yong Da also appears to have recognised the inherent difficulty in adopting the “sentencing matrix” approach, having acknowledged that since the only eventuality of the harm caused in fatal accidents is death, only the degree of culpability of an accused is relevant (Sy Yong Da at [114]).

  178. [77] The other benefit of adopting a framework based on “sentencing bands” is the consistency in sentencing approaches for offences under ss 64 and 65 of the RTA. As the court in Chen Song noted in the context of considering the appropriate sentencing frameworks to be adopted for offences of careless driving causing grievous hurt and hurt simpliciter under ss 65(3)(a) and 65(4)(a) of the RTA respectively, “it would be desirable to maintain a consistent sentencing approach for all of the punishment provisions in ss 64 and 65 of the RTA, to ensure theoretical and practical coherence” (Chen Song at [120]).

  179. [78] More specifically, we regarded the particular modified sentencing bands approach in Wu Zhi Yong as appropriate as it accounts for the seriousness of the offence alongside the offender’s alcohol level. Indeed, the framework expressly references an offender’s alcohol level as one of the factors that presumptively places an offender within one of the three sentencing bands (see [69] above). It is crucial to ensure that due weight is accorded to the particular factor of the offender’s intoxication in the sentencing framework since the “serious offender” provision targets the specific, compounded mischief of dangerous driving while under the influence.

  180. [79] Therefore, as with Wu Zhi Yong, the sentencing framework to apply to an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender on account of drink driving comprises the same three broad sentencing bands at the first step, reflecting the varying degrees of seriousness of the offence and different levels of alcohol of the offender. This reflects the relevant offence-specific factors, such as those non-exhaustively set out by Menon CJ in Wu Zhi Yong (at [36]) (see [68] above). Thereafter, an assessment of the offender-specific factors is undertaken at the second step.

  181. [80] We make two further clarifications.

  182. (a) First, apart from the offence-specific factors set out by Menon CJ in Wu Zhi Yong (at [36]), we agree with Ms Chua that it would be necessary to also consider any serious harm other than the harm which is the subject of the charge. This is provided that such other harm is either actual harm directly the subject of a TIC Charge or harm which is intrinsically related to the charge such as the potential harm that could have been caused. With regard to the actual harm caused other than that of the charge, this would entail considering (i) the nature and location of the injuries (including the complexity, extent, number and treatment); (ii) the degree of permanence of the injuries; and (iii) the impact of the injuries (on quality of life) (see Chen Song at [124] and [127]).

  183. (b) Second, and relatedly, there is no reason to account for the TIC Charges in a strict and rigid manner. While the Prosecution argued that the TIC Charges should only feature at the second step (see [50(b)] above), in our judgment, a sentencing court may consider the TIC Charges (and their contents) as an aggravating factor at the first or second step of the sentencing process, ie, as either an offence-specific or offender-specific factor. TIC Charges come in a variety of forms and can include charges arising out of and directly related to the same incident, or other charges that are less associated. In the former instance, it is sensible for these charges to be regarded as an offence-specific factor at the first step while in the latter instance, those charges ought to be considered under the second step of the framework as an offender-specific factor. For example, where there were separate injuries caused that were the subject of separate TIC Charges, it may be more appropriate to consider the fact of these injuries within the first step of the framework in ascertaining the seriousness of the offence. However, due caution has to be exercised to ensure that there is no double counting such that the TIC Charges are considered at both steps of the framework.

  184. [81] Turning to the range of sentences for each individual band, we first note that, for the offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender punishable under s 64(2)(a) and s 64(2)(c) of the RTA, the full prescribed range of imprisonment is three to ten years. In dividing this range across the three bands, it is appropriate to allocate a slightly longer range and correspondingly more sentencing discretion to the middle band, ie, Band 2, to facilitate discriminating between the variety of offences with moderate to higher levels of seriousness. Conversely, Bands 1 and 3 which correspond to cases of the lowest and highest levels of seriousness respectively would not require such broad discretion since the appropriate sentences in those cases would generally approximate closer to the mandatory minimum or maximum sentences respectively. This division can be reflected as such:

  185. Band

  186. Range of imprisonment

  187. 1

  188. [3] to 5 years

  189. 2

  190. [5] to 8 years

  191. 3

  192. [8] to 10 years

  193. Summary of the sentencing framework for an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender

  194. [83] The sentencing framework for an offence of dangerous driving causing death by a serious offender while under the influence of alcohol under s 64(1) punishable under s 64(2)(a) read with ss 64(2)(c) and 64(2D)(b) of the RTA may be summarised as a two-step process. At the first step, the court should identify the band applicable to the offence and the indicative starting point within that band, having regard to the offence-specific factors present. These include consideration of the following factors: serious potential harm; other serious harm; serious property damage; offender’s alcohol level; offender’s reason or motivation for driving; other factors indicating increased culpability such as specific manner of driving; and offender’s conduct following the offence or attempt to evade arrest (see [68] and [80(a)] above).

  195. [84] The punishment to be imposed under s 64(2)(a) read with s 64(2)(c) of the RTA is to be calibrated as a whole with an applicable sentencing range of between three and ten years’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the sentencing bands and the respective ranges are as follows:

  196. Band

  197. Description

  198. Range of imprisonment term

  199. 1

  200. Lower level of seriousness, with no offence-specific aggravating factors present or where they are present only to a limited extent. The offender’s alcohol level is also likely to be at the lowest or second lowest bands in the framework set out in Rafael.

  201. [3] to 5 years

  202. 2

  203. Higher level of seriousness and would usually contain two or more offence-specific aggravating factors. In these cases, the level of culpability and the alcohol level will typically both be on the higher side. The offender’s alcohol level is in the highest or second highest band of the framework in Rafael.

  204. [5] to 8 years

  205. 3

  206. The most serious cases of reckless or dangerous driving whilst under the influence of drink. In these cases, there will be multiple aggravating factors suggesting higher levels of culpability and higher alcohol levels.

  207. [8] to 10 years

  208. [85] At the second step of the framework, the court calibrates the sentence from that starting point by having regard to the offender-specific factors. Offender-specific aggravating factors include offences taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing (assuming not already considered), relevant antecedents, and evidence showing a lack of remorse. Offender-specific mitigating factors include evidence of genuine remorse and an offender’s youth.

  209. Appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of drink driving that results in personal injury and/or property damage under s 67(1)(b) punishable under s 67(1) read with s 67(2)(a) of the RTA

  210. [87] We turn to address the appropriate sentencing framework for an offence of drink driving resulting in personal injury and/or property damage under the amended provisions of the RTA. While the appellant did not take issue with the sentence imposed (and therefore the sentencing approach taken) by the DJ in respect of the Drink Driving Charge, we take the opportunity to clarify and update the relevant sentencing framework.

  211. [88] We set out the relevant statutory provisions as in force at the time of the appellant’s offences:

  212. [89] As alluded to, the Amendment Act doubled the prescribed punishments for an offence of drink driving under s 67 of the RTA so that “offenders driving under influence [would] face stiffer penalties to signal the aggravated seriousness of their actions” (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 94, Sitting No 106 [8 July 2019] (Josephine Teo, Second Minister for Home Affairs)). Prior to the amendment, s 67(1) of the RTA provided that a first offender would be liable on conviction to a fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, while s 67(2) of the RTA also provided for a disqualification period of not less than 12 months. After the amendments in 2019, s 67(1) of the RTA provided that a first offender would be liable on conviction to a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both, while s 67(2) of the RTA provided for a minimum disqualification period of two years.

  213. Framework in Stansilas

  214. [90] As stated, Stansilas set out a sentencing framework for an offence of drink driving where physical injury and/or property damage has been caused under the pre-amendment s 67(1)(b) of the RTA. In Stansilas, the offender was driving home after consuming beer. As he was heading towards a signalised cross junction, he noticed that the traffic light controlling his line of travel had turned amber. Instead of slowing down with a view to stopping, he accelerated, hoping to get through the junction. By the time he reached the junction, the traffic signal had turned red. As he entered the junction, his car brushed against a female pedestrian and collided into a motorcyclist who was travelling perpendicularly to the offender’s line of travel. The motorcyclist was flung off his motorcycle and hit the road, which caused him to lose consciousness momentarily. The offender was subsequently found to have 43μg of alcohol in every 100ml of breath. The pedestrian suffered a crush injury of the right foot and the motorcyclist experienced retrograde and anterograde amnesia. The offender pleaded guilty to the offence of drink driving under s 67(1)(b) of the RTA (as in force at that material time) and a second charge for driving in a manner which was dangerous to the public was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. The offender was sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment at the first instance, and his sentence was reduced to one week’s imprisonment on appeal.

  215. [91] There, Menon CJ held that in assessing the overall gravity of the offence, it is relevant to consider, first, the degree of harm caused; and second, the culpability of the offender. In relation to the latter, this will entail considering the extent to which the offender’s alcohol level exceeds the prescribed limit as well as the manner of the offender’s driving (at [74]). In relation to cases where physical injury and/or property damage has been caused, the two factors of harm and culpability can be calibrated as follows (at [75]):

  216. Harm

  217. Culpability

  218. Slight – slight or moderate property damage and/or slight physical injury characterised by no hospitalisation or medical leave

  219. Low – low alcohol level and no evidence of dangerous driving behaviour

  220. Moderate – serious property damage and/or moderate personal injury characterised by hospitalisation or medical leave but no fractures or permanent injuries

  221. Medium – moderate to high alcohol level or dangerous driving behaviour

  222. Serious – serious personal injury usually involving fractures, including injuries which are permanent in nature and/or which necessitate significant surgical procedures

  223. High – high alcohol level and dangerous driving behaviour

  224. Very serious – loss of limb, sight or hearing or life; or paralysis

  225. [92] Save in a case involving slight injury and low culpability, where physical injury and/or property damage has been caused, the prima facie position is that the custodial threshold has been crossed and unless this is displaced by reason of sufficiently strong mitigating factors, the court will then have to determine the length of the custodial sentence to impose on the offender (at [77]). In the exercise of its sentencing discretion, the court should assess the relevant interaction of harm and culpability having regard to what has been set out below (at [78]):

  226. Harm

  227. Culpability

  228. Slight

  229. Moderate

  230. Serious

  231. Very serious

  232. Low

  233. Fine

  234. Up to 1 month’s imprisonment

  235. Up to 1 month’s imprisonment

  236. Up to 2 months’ imprisonment

  237. Medium

  238. Up to 1 month’s imprisonment

  239. Up to 1 month’s imprisonment

  240. Up to 2 months’ imprisonment

  241. [2] to 4 months’ imprisonment

  242. High

  243. Up to 2 months’ imprisonment

  244. Up to 2 months’ imprisonment

  245. [2] to 4 months’ imprisonment

  246. [4] to 6 months’ imprisonment

  247. Appropriate sentencing framework for the offence of drink driving that results in personal injury and/or property damage

  248. [93] In our judgment, the framework in Stansilas should be recalibrated by doubling the imprisonment terms for each harm-culpability permutation in light of the Amendment Act, which doubled the punishments imposed under s 67 of the RTA. The framework in Stansilas should also be refined with reference to the alcohol level bands in the framework in Rafael (see [38] above).

  249. Doubling of imprisonment terms for each harm-culpability permutation

  250. [94] The recalibration of the framework to double the ranges of the imprisonment terms for each permutation in the harm-culpability matrix is uncontroversial; both Ms Chua and the Prosecution proposed the same in their submissions. In our view, increasing the ranges in this manner would certainly allow the court to utilise the full spectrum of the punishment prescribed by law, and, at the same time, consider the full extent of any aggravating and mitigating factors that may be present (see Niranjan s/o Muthupalani v Public Prosecutor [2024] 3 SLR 834 (“Niranjan”) at [60]).

  251. [95] The arithmetic doubling of the ranges is also consistent with the approach taken in other cases where legislative amendments have operated to modify the sentencing range for a particular offence, eg, Rafael and the revision of the sentencing framework in Edwin s/o Suse Nathen v Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 SLR 1139, or Niranjan and the revision of the sentencing framework in Low Song Chye v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 5 SLR 526. In those cases, the new sentencing range was arrived at by similarly extrapolating the pre-amendment positions in a proportionate and linear fashion.

  252. Offender’s alcohol level and the framework in Rafael

  253. [96] As set out at [91] above, the offender’s culpability is to be assessed against, inter alia, his or her alcohol level. This is because an offender’s alcohol level is an indicator of his or her inability or unfitness to drive due to his or her alcohol intake. Heavier punishment should therefore be imposed on drivers with higher alcohol levels (Stansilas at [37]).

  254. [97] In our judgment, consistent with the approach taken by Menon CJ in Wu Zhi Yong (at [36(c)]), the determination of whether an offender’s alcohol level is high can be made with reference to the sentencing framework for an offence under s 67 as set out in Rafael at [31], which is calibrated in accordance with the alcohol levels found in an offender’s blood or breath. As such, the three levels of culpability in the framework can be restated in the following manner:

  255. Culpability

  256. Description

  257. Low

  258. Alcohol level typically falling within Band 1 of Rafael and no evidence of dangerous driving behaviour

  259. Medium

  260. Alcohol level typically falling within Bands 2 and 3 of Rafael or dangerous driving behaviour

  261. High

  262. Alcohol level typically falling within Band 4 of Rafael and dangerous driving behaviour

  263. Disqualification period

  264. [98] While submissions were made on how disqualification periods should feature in the sentencing framework, we decline to lay down on this occasion more precise ranges of disqualification periods to fit within the respective bands in the revised sentencing framework. It is strictly not necessary to determine this in the present appeal, which does not call for a review of the disqualification period imposed for the Drink Driving Charge specifically, much less a framework for the disqualification period generally.

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