Public Prosecutor v DCC [2026] SGHC 10

Introduction

The complainant (“C”), at present aged 18, is the cousin of the accused (“DCC”), at present aged 22.

DCC faces three charges alleged to have arisen between 2016 to 2018, when C was between eight and ten years of age:

DCC denies that any of the alleged instances of rape or sexual assault occurred.

Undisputed facts

From the time C was two months’ old, she was cared for by her grandmother every weekday in the home of her aunt, the mother of DCC. Her parents would attend each evening to have dinner and to bring C home. When C’s brothers were born, this babysitting arrangement came to include her brothers and her parents employed a helper to assist.

I explain the relevant relationships between C’s and DCC’s families with the following family tree diagram:

CMR and CFR are C’s mother and father. C is their eldest child. CYR and CYT are C’s younger brothers. AMR and AFR are DCC’s mother and father. AMR is CFR’s elder sister, and AGM is their mother. DCC and ABR, DCC’s elder brother who is two years older than him, are a pair of brothers who were adopted at a young age by AMR and AFR. Thus, though DCC and ABR are biologically related to each other, they are not biologically related to the other persons mentioned above. At trial, CMR and CFR were called as Prosecution witnesses, while AGM, AMR and ABR were called as Defence witnesses.

Two of the domestic helpers employed by C’s parents are relevant to this case. The first domestic helper referred to (“FDH”) was employed from 28 December 2012 to 16 January 2017, while the second domestic helper (“SDH”) was employed from 13 January 2017 to 17 May 2018.

Around 2009, AGM’s and AMR’s family moved homes to a four-storey terrace house (the “Residence”). The first floor of the Residence comprises a living room and a dining area, while both the second and third floors of the Residence comprise two bedrooms each. In particular, one of the bedrooms on the third floor has an en suite toilet (the “master bedroom”) and, outside of the master bedroom, there is an L-shaped table with two chairs (the “L-shaped table”). The fourth floor is an attic.

The Prosecution’s version of events

The incidents

All the incidents are alleged to have taken place in the master bedroom. C testified that the first incident of rape and sexual assault happened sometime in 2013, when she was in pre-school and both her and DCC were about six and ten years old respectively.

At trial, C narrated what would typically occur in an incident of sexual assault by DCC, which happened about once a week. These incidents would occur in the master bedroom of the Residence. This room was used by AMR and ABR, who slept on the same bed. On the occasions where C was in the Residence, she would ordinarily be doing homework at a foldable table in the master bedroom below a cupboard. DCC would come into the master bedroom, carry C (by wrapping his arms around C, from the front) to the left side of the bed, which was ABR’s side of the bed, and place her down on the bed such that her head was facing upwards. DCC would then close and lock the door and draw the curtains.

Thereafter, DCC would situate himself between C’s legs and over C, and then proceed to take off C’s shirt and pants. He would also take off his own shirt, pants and underwear. DCC would then start to touch C’s chest. On some occasions, he would digitally penetrate C while, on other occasions, he would proceed straight to penile penetration. Most of these acts of penetration were of C’s vagina, though there were instances of C’s anus being penetrated as well. While DCC was performing the sexual acts, he would be covered by a blanket drawn up to C’s neck as C had expressed discomfort with seeing the sexual acts. This meant that C could not see what was happening, though she would look under the blanket sometimes. She thought the incidents lasted for about 30 minutes to one hour although, when they first started occurring while she was younger, she could not tell the time. She subsequently clarified that she could not recall how long the sessions lasted when she was older.

DCC told C that these acts were good for her. C felt uncomfortable but assumed that, because the acts were good for her, she should not question them and thus did not do so. DCC also told C not to tell anyone.

An incident of sexual assault would typically come to an end in three ways: (i) when DCC finished on his own accord; (ii) when it was dinnertime and AMR called for dinner; or (iii) when a helper knocked on the door. There was a monitor in the room which displayed the feed of a closed-circuit television camera (“CCTV”) overlooking the staircase to the second floor and the aforementioned L-shaped table situated outside the master bedroom. This allowed DCC and C to see whether someone was approaching the master bedroom. If someone knocked on the door, DCC would put on his clothes, ask C to put on her clothes or enter the toilet to put on her clothes, and thereafter unlock the door and allow the individual to enter the room. At the end of these incidents, DCC would tell C to put her clothes back on.

C also described an alternative scenario in which she would be doing homework in AFR’s bedroom, which was located on the third floor opposite the master bedroom, as opposed to the master bedroom itself. On those occasions, DCC would drag C by the hand from AFR’s bedroom to the master bedroom, and pull C onto the bed. The sequence of events in relation to the sexual penetration and touching as narrated at [11] would then continue.

The First Family Meeting

Sometime between 2016 and 2017, C told FDH, prior to a shower, that DCC had touched her. C did not specify whether DCC had used his penis or his hand to touch her, because she did not know the difference at the time. In response, FDH told C to tell AMR and C did so. C could not remember specifying to AMR where DCC had touched her. This complaint prompted what came to be referred to as the “First Family Meeting”, which was attended by C, DCC, CMR, CFR, AMR and AGM in the kitchen of the Residence.

C was unable to recall what transpired at this meeting or its exact date. But it must have taken place before FDH left on 16 January 2017. CMR testified that this First Family Meeting took place sometime in late 2016. None of the Defence’s witnesses were able to recall when this meeting took place.

CMR recounted as follows. According to her, she received a call from AMR requesting that she and CFR arrive at the Residence quickly. CMR and CFR went to the Residence and, upon arriving, saw FDH consoling C, who was crying. This occurred on the first floor of the Residence, adjacent to the staircase. CMR asked AMR what happened, to which AMR replied by stating “C said [DCC] touch [sic] her”. CMR then asked C what happened, and C responded by saying “here, here, here” while crying and gesticulating in an up and down motion from waist to mid-thigh.

CFR recalled that two family meetings occurred as a result of C’s complaints, though he could not recall which family meeting occurred first. Nonetheless, CFR remembered that, during the family meeting on the first floor (which is where CMR placed the First Family Meeting, as stated above at [17]), C was crying and gestured at herself from her belly button downwards past the groin to her thigh. According to CFR, AMR accused C of lying. CFR had asked AMR to show him CCTV footage from the third floor, but AMR replied that the CCTV was not functional.

After the First Family Meeting

It is not disputed that the outcome of the First Family Meeting was that C was told not to go to the third floor of the Residence (where the master bedroom was situated), and that C was to remain on the first floor of the Residence to study and play. She also remembered that AGM had instructed her to tell everyone that she was lying, but she did not do so.

Thereafter, C continued to go to the Residence after school. Initially, she did her homework in the dining area around the first floor of the Residence. However, after some time, she became uncomfortable with the mosquito bites she was sustaining at the first floor and decided to return to work in the master bedroom on the third floor instead. Thereafter, DCC continued with his sexual acts, telling C, in her words, that “I better not tell anyone this time”. The frequency of the incidents increased to two or three times a week and were committed on the same side of the bed in the master bedroom.

Charge A1

The Prosecution’s Opening Statement situated the incident underlying charge A1 as occurring between the First Family Meeting and a subsequent family meeting (referred to as the “Second Family Meeting”). By then, C was slightly older and therefore, instead of carrying C, DCC would ask C to go onto the bed or drag C by her hand to the bed. The same sequence of events (as narrated above at [11]) would occur.

C sited the incident in charge A3 as occurring before 9 November 2017, which was when she had her first period, with the incident in charge A2 taking place after her second period. For ease of flow, I introduce the facts pertinent to the charges chronologically in this section.

Charge A3

Charge A3 concerns a distinct occasion in which DCC placed his hand in a zip-lock bag with a football design, and then used two of his fingers to penetrate C’s vagina with his fingers wrapped in the zip-lock bag. After penetrating her, DCC took his fingers out of C’s vagina, brought the zip-lock bag with his hand in it up to C’s face, and told her that was what she smelt like. C recalled feeling confused, and did not know why she needed to know how she smelt. Subsequently, he threw away the zip-lock bag and continued with the sexual assault in a similar manner as in the previous incidents, namely by touching her chest and then penetrating her vagina with his penis. For ease of reference, this incident is referred to in this judgment as the “Zip-lock Bag Incident”.

Charge A2

C testified that the incident which is the subject of charge A2 occurred on the day of the Second Family Meeting. C recalled that, on this occasion, DCC had penetrated her with his penis and touched her breasts and that he only ceased committing these acts when he had to go for Chinese tuition. After DCC left the room for Chinese tuition, C went to bathe and she decided to tell SDH. SDH was then accompanying C when she showered as C was afraid of ghosts at the time and did not want to be left alone. C told SDH that DCC had touched her. As with her first complaint to FDH, C did not specify to SDH how or where DCC had touched her.

The Second Family Meeting

SDH told C to tell AMR, and C proceeded to do so that evening. As with her previous complaint to AMR, C did not specify how or where DCC had touched her. This then led to the Second Family Meeting. This was convened in AGM’s room on the second floor, with C, CMR, CFR, DCC, AMR, AFR, and AGM in attendance.

C could not remember what was said during the meeting or if she or DCC spoke at all.

CMR placed this incident as occurring around January 2018, and was able to recall this as it coincided with the Primary One registration exercise for schools and that bus transport arrangements had to be made for CYR. C would have been 10 years’ old in January 2018, only turning 11 later in October.

According to CMR, the Second Family Meeting occurred after she received a call from AMR. CMR stated that C cried as she gesticulated and said “again mummy, again. He touched me, here, here”. C had gestured over her chest and her groin area. CMR also stated that, during this family meeting in AGM’s room, CFR had confronted DCC and DCC responded with a denial and a statement that “he wanted to jump down a building”.

CFR recounted that the Second Family Meeting took place in AGM’s bedroom. At the Second Family Meeting, C gestured in an up and down motion from her belly-button to the middle of her thighs while crying and saying, “this way”. CFR cautioned that he was not sure because his attention was focused on questioning AMR and DCC. Both AMR and AGM accused C of lying, and CFR confronted DCC about what he did to C. AMR then told CFR not to “stress [DCC] further”. CFR had also asked AMR for the CCTV footage and, again, AMR responded by stating that the CCTV was not functional. Under cross-examination, when it was suggested to him that DCC had threatened to commit suicide, CFR stated that he could not remember this. Although he did remember that AMR was worried that DCC would end his own life, he could not remember what prompted AMR to say that.

After the Second Family Meeting

It was not disputed that the outcome of the meeting was that C’s parents agreed that she and her brothers would go home after school instead of going to the Residence. After the Second Family Meeting, C would still go to the Residence to meet another uncle and his family on weekends and, on some of those occasions, DCC would be there as well. C would then pretend as though nothing had happened and tried to carry on normal conversations with DCC.

C’s 12th Birthday

For her 12th birthday in October 2019, CMR and CFR had invited AMR, AFR, ABR and DCC over without informing C. This was upsetting to C, who described her emotions as such:

According to C, she wanted to avoid AMR’s family and spend as little time as possible with them. Consequently, C hid in her room and cried. After some time, CMR was able to coax C out of her room to cut her birthday cake though she went back to her room thereafter.

CMR testified that, on C’s 12th birthday, C had “acted very, very, very strongly”. According to CMR, C hid in her room and only came out to cut her cake after CMR had told her to “come out for mama, just celebrate your birthday”. C then returned to her room and, after AMR’s family left, C “was crying badly”. CMR also stated that C had ignored all of the birthday presents given to her to such an extent that, till this day, CMR still does not know what became of the presents. However, despite recognising that C’s behaviour was abnormal, CMR did not ask C about what had upset her and did not know what led to C being upset at the time.

C’s realisation that she had been raped by DCC

C said she initially did not know that what DCC did to her was wrong. She only came to a realisation sometime between Primary Six and Secondary One, when she read a news article about a lady being raped. As the events detailed in the news article were similar to what she had experienced in her childhood, C conducted a Google search on what “rape” was. This realisation led to subsequent events that are referred to in this judgment as the “Laptop Incident”.

The Laptop Incident

C recalled that she first told her mother, CMR, that she was raped sometime before 29 September 2020 when CMR had incidentally come across C’s searches on rape arising from the above. While watching a video arising out of the search, the battery of the laptop ran out. Subsequently, when CMR charged and rebooted the laptop, she came across the open tab which displayed a search for the term “rape”. CMR asked C if she was the one who searched it and C confirmed that this was so. CMR followed up to ask if the search was related to C’s experiences with DCC. C then replied that it was. After the conversation, C was under the impression that CMR knew she had been raped but was not aware of how long the incidents lasted. That was, by C’s account, the extent of the conversation between her and CMR pursuant to the Laptop Incident, and she could not remember if CMR and CFR had taken any follow-up action. C was also unsure as to whether CFR was aware that she had told CMR she was raped.

Informing CGF about the incidents of rape/sexual assault

The first time C went into detail about the sexual incidents was in a conversation with her friend (“CGF”), on the night of 28 September 2020. CGF was C’s Secondary One and Secondary Two friend in their secondary school. They shared a close relationship and would tell each other about their personal problems.

Around the time of the disclosure, C no longer shared a room with her brothers. She found that, “left alone with [her] own thoughts”, she had flashbacks and nightmares and would either cry before sleeping or wake up crying. After hearing a comment made by a student in school that all smart people apparently have sex with their cousins, C told CGF about the statement, and CGF casually responded by asking C, “do you have sex with your cousin?”. This upset C, and she spent the day thinking about it. That night, C texted CGF via WhatsApp to inform her about the sexual incidents with DCC. In the course of these messages, C also informed CGF about her “horrific” 12th birthday where she hid in her room for an hour after DCC and his family visited.

Informing CMR and CFR

While C was confiding in CGF on WhatsApp, she was physically positioned next to CMR in CMR’s bedroom. In that context, C testified that she felt like she should have told CMR about what had occurred to her in greater detail, as she was under the impression that CMR did not comprehend the full extent of the incidents.

Sometime between 29 and 30 September 2020, C told CMR about what happened and the extent to which they occurred, namely that they involved rape and that they happened frequently during the period of 2013 to late 2017 or early 2018. When C told CMR, C testified that CMR was very shocked and was crying on her bed.

CMR and CFR testified that their first realisation of the true extent and nature of the sexual acts committed by DCC on C was on the night of 29 September. C came crying into the room where they were. CFR left the room, and C told CMR about the history of rape. CMR later informed CFR in a WhatsApp message as follows:

The police report

Sometime after C informed CMR as to the full extent of the incidents, CMR read the WhatsApp messages exchanged between C and CGF, as C would leave her phone at night in CMR’s bedroom. According to C, CMR was upset by the severity of the incidents as disclosed by C in the text messages. CMR informed CFR about the messages, and both of them encouraged C to lodge a police report when she was ready to do so.

Around the same time, CFR informed AMR about the incidents.

C was initially reluctant to report these incidents to the police, as she was worried this would ruin the relationship between her family and DCC’s family. She explained that AGM had, in the meantime, been upset with her. On 3 January 2021, CFR reassured C in a conversation that he was fine with C lodging the police report, and that she should stop worrying about his familial relations with AMR. Later that day, C went with CMR and CFR to lodge a police report.

The medical evidence

Subsequently, on 3 February 2021, C was examined at the KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (“KKH”) by one Dr Li Xinyi (“Dr Li”), who was an Associate Consultant at the Department of Urogynaecology at KKH at the time. Dr Li’s medical report dated 3 March 2021 (the “KKH Report”) concluded that C had no observable injuries and normal pelvic development, though there were old tears at the three and eight o’clock position on her hymen.

On 30 March 2021, C was interviewed at the Child Guidance Clinic at the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) by Dr Parvathy Pathy (“Dr Parvathy”), a Psychiatrist (Senior Consultant) at the time. Consequent to this examination, Dr Parvathy produced a medical report dated 1 April 2021 (the “IMH Report”).

C was referred thereafter to Pink Elephant Psychology Services (“Pink Elephant”) for counselling and psychological treatment. Between 25 June 2021 and 25 February 2022, C attended ten 90-minute sessions conducted by Ms Lau Wan Xin (“Ms Lau”), who was the Principal Psychologist and sole proprietor of Pink Elephant. Ms Lau’s Counselling Therapy Report (the “Pink Elephant Report”) dated 29 January 2024 explained that, because C presented with nightmares, difficulties with sleep, negative emotions, loss of interest, excessive nail scratching, and self-blame, C was referred to undergo Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. This sought to give careful and gradual exposure of a victim to their own memories of their trauma in a controlled manner through writing a “trauma narrative”. C narrated such a trauma narrative to Ms Lau over the course of four sessions between 21 December 2021 and 28 January 2022, and this was adduced into evidence and is referred to in this judgment as the “Trauma Narrative”.

The Defence’s version of events

DCC denied that any sexual acts between him and C had taken place.

At trial, DCC contended that there was no opportunity for him to have committed any such sexual acts for various reasons: First, this was so on account of his busy schedule. When he was in Primary School (from 2013 to 2015), he had tuition at the Residence every day which would last up till dinnertime. When he was in Secondary School (from 2016 to 2018), he had afterschool Co-Curricular Activities (“CCA”) twice every week, and tuition at the Residence on days when he did not have CCA. Second, the children were not allowed to lock the bedroom doors in the Residence. Furthermore, the door of the master bedroom in which the sexual acts allegedly took place had alignment issues with its doorframe which made it difficult to close, and that force would have to be used to do so such that any attempt to close it completely would result in a loud bang. Third, the adults, the helpers and the children in the home were constantly moving around the home and, thus, it would be highly improbable for the alleged sexual acts to have gone unnoticed.

Structure of analysis

In the present case, the first issue is to ascertain whether there is any corroboration between C’s testimony and other pieces of evidence before the court. If there is none, C’s evidence must be unusually convincing in order to sustain a conviction: see Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 (“GCK”) at [88]−[89].

Is there corroboration in the present case?

I start then with the issue of whether there is corroboration. Our courts adopt a liberal approach to corroboration, focusing on the substance, relevance and confirmatory value of the evidence in question: see AOF v Public Prosecutor [2012] 3 SLR 34 (“AOF”) at [173], citing Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 (“Mohammed Liton”) at [43].

During oral closing submissions, the Prosecution was asked to clarify its case on whether any evidence amounted to corroboration. The Prosecution clarified that its case on corroboration was limited to C’s symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), arising from the evidence of Dr Parvathy and Ms Lau.

The purpose of the IMH Report was to confirm if C was fit to testify in court. The IMH Report also contained C’s self-reported mental ailments, namely, that she had unpleasant and intrusive thoughts of DCC’s acts, flashbacks, and difficulty falling asleep. Dr Parvathy testified at trial that, as a psychiatrist, she also assessed whether C had any psychological issues which necessitated further assessment and management. In this regard, Dr Parvathy noted that C had presented with PTSD symptoms, including insomnia, flashbacks, and intrusive and unpleasant memories of what DCC did to her. Nonetheless, Dr Parvathy accepted that there was no finding of mental disorder under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (“DSM-5”) in the IMH Report, and confirmed that she “did not make a diagnosis of the full [PTSD]” in relation to C.

Ms Lau, on her part, testified that, at C’s first session with her, C presented with traumatic stress symptoms. The observation of the symptoms was based on the DSM-5 PTSD diagnosis criteria. However, as Ms Lau observed that C was still able to function normally, she did not make a diagnosis of PTSD. Instead, she diagnosed that C had traumatic stress symptoms not amounting to PTSD.

In my view, the medical evidence adduced does not amount to corroboration of the charges in this case. Dr Parvathy’s and Ms Lau’s assessments, made some two years after the last incident, were centred on how C could be treated for various symptoms she presented at the time they saw her. They relied on C’s self-reports made between 30 March 2021 to 28 January 2022. Neither verified any causal link between the alleged sexual assaults and C’s symptoms. In context, the reports did not show that C’s symptoms were caused by prior sexual assault or that the alleged assaults took place. Rather, on the assumption that such sexual assault took place, the observed symptoms were consistent with the assault having taken place. This is insufficient to found corroboration.

The applicable standard

Where the uncorroborated evidence of a single eye-witness forms the sole basis for conviction, this evidence must be so “unusually convincing” as to overcome any doubts that might arise from a lack of corroboration (see GCK at [88]).

As held by Sundaresh Menon CJ in GII v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 578 (“GII”) at [26]–[28], the issue of whether one’s evidence is unusually convincing is typically approached from two angles. First, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt within the Prosecution’s case, which means that the Prosecution’s case must itself be internally and externally consistent such that there is sufficient evidence to establish the accused person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at least on a prima facie basis. Pertinently, weaknesses in the case for the Defence cannot ordinarily be called in aid to shore up what is lacking in the Prosecution’s case. Second, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence, which includes a consideration of the case mounted by the Defence comprising both the assertions put forth by the accused person as well as the evidence he has adduced.

The Defence’s contentions on C’s evidence

I therefore turn to analyse the Prosecution’s case first, consonant with the approach in GII. In this context, I scrutinise the internal and external consistency of C’s evidence. The Defence raised “11 key reasons why [C]’s evidence does not rise to the level of being unusually convincing”. Three of these reasons relate to matters raised in DCC’s defence. I deal in this section with the eight that impinge directly on the consistency of C’s evidence and the first angle mentioned in GII. In this context, the Defence’s suggestions on the reliability of a complainant must be founded on an evidential basis; mere suggestion by counsel would not be sufficient: Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 824 at [27].

C’s “first reveal”

The Defence submits that C was inconsistent in her evidence on when she first revealed that she was being subjected to sexual assault. In her Trauma Narrative, C states that CGF was the first person she had talked to about the alleged rapes. Similarly, in a police statement recorded on 10 January 2024, C stated that she had “told [CGF] first […] before telling my mother about it”. However, in her testimony in court, C had stated that her mother, CMR, was the first person who she had informed.

C explained why she had omitted mention of her initial complaint to her mother as such:

This was consonant with C’s evidence on how the Laptop Incident transpired (as set out above at [35]) and how her mother had essentially disregarded her initial complaint:

This is also consistent with C’s testimony on her mother’s reaction when told about the incidents of rape on 29 September. CMR was:

That CMR did not understand C’s revelation as one of rape is supported by CMR’s text of 29 September to CFR. On the stand, CMR remembered the Laptop Incident but said she had not registered that C was telling her she had been raped.

Thus, while the Laptop Incident may have been C’s first report from C’s point of view, this was not a clear and direct report of rape, in contrast to her WhatsApps with CGF. CGF was the first person with whom she discussed the first incidents of rape. C’s first clear report to CMR was made after her WhatsApps to CGF. This explains the difference between the position taken in the police report and Trauma Narrative, and her evidence in court.

Evidence involving revelations to CGF

Three of the Defence’s “11 key reasons” deal with information given to CGF regarding the incidents in a series of WhatsApp messages. Before I turn to the Defence’s contentions, I make a preliminary point that is pertinent to the analysis of the WhatsApp messages as a whole. Reading the entirety of the WhatsApp messages, the girls’ exchange was informal and casual. They were also around 13 years old at the time. It would be inappropriate to put a literal interpretation on each word in the manner that the Defence’s submissions do.

The CCTV feed

It is asserted that C stated in her WhatsApp messages to CGF that the CCTV was the sole reason that DCC could carry on without suspicion, premised on this extract of C’s WhatsApp conversation with CGF:

I reiterate my opinion that this WhatsApp exchange must be viewed in its context. Fundamentally, C did not state that the CCTV was the sole reason that DCC avoided detection. I disagree with the Defence assertion that the exchange should be read in this manner. Further, C’s reference to the CCTV in that WhatsApp conversation was consistent with her evidence in court, that one of the reasons for the lack of detection was the use of the CCTV outside the master bedroom and the display of the CCTV feed overlooking the room’s exterior in the master bedroom itself, and that DCC would use this to see whether someone was approaching the master bedroom. C’s evidence on the CCTV feed formed part of her narrative as to how a typical incident of sexual assault would transpire. For example, in C’s examination-in-chief, she stated as follows:

Similarly, in a statement recorded by the police on 4 January 2021, C stated the following:

Therefore, the WhatsApp exchange was consistent with her evidence. While in the exchange C had not alluded to other scenarios not involving the use of the CCTV, to expect her to exhaustively list all the methods DCC used in such a casual WhatsApp conversation would be unrealistic.

Relatedly, the Defence submits that there is an “illogic” in this facet of C’s evidence, on the basis that it cannot be reconciled with C’s description of how DCC would be positioned while sexually assaulting her. As recounted above at [11], while DCC was performing the sexual acts, DCC would be covered by a blanket drawn up to C’s neck:

The Defence also drew attention to this portion of the Notes of Evidence, where C agreed that DCC would not have been able to refer to the CCTV feed while sexually assaulting her:

In my view, C’s explanation for her answer above during re-examination is acceptable:

A final point on the CCTV assertions is that, after the Defence’s witnesses came on the stand, a new contention was made that the CCTV system became defective shortly after the family moved into the home. Up to that point, it was not a part of the Defence case. This assertion was not put to C in cross-examination, nor was any independent evidence adduced as to the CCTV becoming defective. CFR mentioned in passing while recounting the family meetings that the light on the CCTV camera was on despite AMR contending that the CCTV was defective. Defence counsel did not cross-examine him on the light being on or put any alternative suggestion to him. In the circumstances, the written submission that C’s assertions are “plainly false because the CCTV system spoiled shortly after [DCC] and his family moved into [the Residence]” is bereft of evidential basis.

C’s message that her brother “saw [DCC] doing it”

The Defence took issue with the following set of WhatsApp messages between C and CGF:

Specifically, the Defence submits that, in these WhatsApp messages, C was alluding to CYR witnessing an instance of her being raped. In support of this specific interpretation of these messages, the Defence draws attention to the fact that, in C’s WhatsApp chat with CGF up till the point these messages were sent, C had not mentioned any other type of sexual contact with DCC other than rape. The Defence then seeks to crystalise a purported inconsistency by pointing to C’s evidence (both in court and in her Trauma Narrative) that CYR had witnessed DCC touching C’s thighs, but not raping C.

In my view, the Defence’s submissions on this point are contrived and put an excessively literal interpretation on the casual WhatsApp messages exchanged between C and CGF. C was talking in the present tense. Plainly, “him doing it” is an inherently vague phrase and, when read in the context of the entire message (that all three persons were watching a cartoon), it could not have meant that C’s brother had witnessed a rape. CGF’s omission to follow on with any query indicated CGF understood it was not that a rape was seen. C clarified in re-examination that, while there was no mention of the word “molest” in the messages, she mentally grouped molest and rape together as she had been talking about the sexual incidents in general and the rape and molest occurred together. I accept this clarification.

C saying that she was “still pure” and a “virgin”

C had said in WhatsApp messages to CGF that she was “still pure” and that she would “stay single 4 ever … [a]nd a virgin”.

Under cross-examination, C provided the following explanation for these WhatsApp messages:

Pertinently, C had sent these WhatsApp messages to CGF after she had told CGF about the sexual assaults DCC had allegedly visited upon her. CGF herself did not interpret the messages in the manner that defence counsel suggested. CGF explained under cross-examination how she interpreted “still pure”:

C’s evidence that these messages were “forward looking” was also consistent with CGF’s evidence:

Other inconsistencies raised

Finally, various alleged inconsistencies raised were not inconsistencies at all when seen in context that they pertained to statements made in a casual WhatsApp chat:

(a) C stated on WhatsApp that she was “5 or 6” years of age when the very first act of rape took place, whereas in evidence she stated that she was “about 6”. There is no inconsistency however because, in both cases, her reference was that it was before Primary School and her birthday is in October.

(b) C had only mentioned to CGF she had been “raped when younger” without raising charge A3. This is consistent with C’s evidence that she felt the Zip-lock Bag Incident was “extremely embarrassing”, and first disclosed the Zip-lock Bag Incident to Ms Lau while creating her Trauma Narrative between 2021 and 2022 because she trusted her and “felt personally closer to her”.

(c) C referred to “my maid” alluding to one helper whereas, in court, it became clear that two helpers were involved. In context, a simple explanation would be that C was referring to the domestic helper employed by her parents at the material time.

(d) C stated that the caretaking arrangement came to an end because she told her maid. This was correct as the second complaint led to the Second Family Meeting, which did result in the caretaking arrangement coming to an end.

(e) C said DCC would “drag me to his mother’s room…and then do it”. The Defence submits that this is inconsistent with C’s evidence that she would already be in the master bedroom when DCC would enter and commence his assault. This completely ignores C’s evidence in her examination-in-chief (recounted above at [14]), that there was an alternative scenario for how these assaults would commence, where she would be doing homework in AFR’s bedroom when DCC would drag her to the master bedroom.

I therefore reject the Defence’s submissions on the WhatsApp messages.

The Zip-lock Bag Incident

The Zip-lock Bag Incident is the focus of charge A3. The Defence submits that C’s evidence on the Zip-lock Bag Incident “appears to be an afterthought that was subsequently conjured”.

The Defence points to the fact that the first time C mentioned the Zip-lock Bag Incident was in her Trauma Narrative, which was prepared after she had reported her alleged sexual assault to her parents and to the police. It is not disputed that the first report of the Ziplock Bag Incident was during her Trauma Narrative. In this regard, C’s delay in reporting the Zip-lock Bag Incident is not, on its own, reason to disbelieve C’s evidence on this specific incident. As explained in Public Prosecutor v Yue Roger Jr [2019] 3 SLR 749 (“Yue Roger Jr”) at [30], there is no general rule requiring victims of sexual offences to report the offences immediately or in a timely fashion. Instead, the explanation for any such delay in reporting is to be considered and assessed by the court on a case-by-case basis.

In this case, C’s evidence-in-chief was that she had no idea of its significance and was confused by the incident. When cross-examined as to why she had not revealed the incident to the police earlier, she said: “I personally felt that the Ziplock bag incident was extremely embarrassing and I could not make sense of why it was happening to begin with.” Cross-examined at length about whether the other sexual acts embarrassed her, she explained the delineation in her mind in this way:

She explained she revealed the incident to Ms Lau because she trusted her. These two responses of embarrassment and confusion are consistent because it would have been the first time that C was confronted with the smell of her vagina and, at the age of nine or ten, would not have the maturity to make sense of it. I accept that C’s focus after her report to her mother on 29 September had been on rape, not digital penetration, and CMR’s WhatsApp text of 29 September also reflected that penile-vaginal penetration was the focus of her enquiry. This is consistent too with the focus of her realisation at the time of her report to her mother, that the acts of sexual assault committed by DCC were rape, and her flashbacks, which focused on vaginal penetration. I am satisfied that C has adequately accounted for her delay in reporting the Zip-lock Bag Incident.

Second, the Defence asserts two inconsistencies in C’s evidence in court on how the Zip-lock Bag Incident occurred and C’s account of it in her Trauma Narrative. I reproduce the relevant portion of the Trauma Narrative below:

This narrative recounted the use of a single finger. Subsequently, in her examination-in-chief, C said that DCC had used two fingers:

In my view, this discrepancy as to whether DCC had used one or two fingers does not amount to a material inconsistency in her overall testimony. The Trauma Narrative was the first time she recalled the incident to Ms Lau. C maintained throughout her testimony in court, in her evidence-in-chief, under cross-examination and re-examination, that DCC had used two fingers in the Zip-lock Bag Incident. The charge was therefore amended at the end of the re-examination from the use of the singular, finger, to the plural, fingers. C also maintained that she knew two fingers were used as DCC had brought the Zip-lock bag, with his fingers in it, up to her face.

The second asserted inconsistency lay in what occurred after DCC had ceased digital penetration. In court, C testified that, after DCC stopped digitally penetrating C her, he proceeded to have sex with her. The Defence submits that, in contrast, the account in her Trauma Narrative gave “the impression” that the Zip-lock Bag Incident “was a standalone incident of sexual assault”.

Ms Lau had explained in court that memories are often recorded in fragments, and the Trauma Narrative recorded the flow of memories.

Reading the Trauma Narrative in its context, I find that there was no inconsistency in omitting reference to vaginal penetration following after the Zip-lock Bag Incident. The Trauma Narrative does not “give the impression” that it was a standalone incident. Rather, it was recounted as an unusual event that had happened during one of the regular instances of assault. Relatedly, the reference started with “once”, and then the account reverts to her feelings about the usual instances of assault: “I was feeling confused again. It felt like I didn’t understand what was happening and why this is happening. I know that it is something I don’t look forward to [emphasis added].”

On a related note, I deal with the Defence submission in relation to C first stating in her Trauma Narrative that DCC used a “plastic bag” while in court, she explained it was a Zip-lock bag with a football design. The Defence submitted that: “it is unusual that [C] would be able to describe the ziplock bag in more detail in Court as compared to when she was constructing the Trauma Narrative, since: (i) the [Trauma Narrative] would have been closer in time to the alleged incident; and (ii) the [Trauma Narrative] was constructed in the context of [C] attending Court [sic] therapy and not an adversarial Court setting [emphasis in original]”. This scepticism about the refinement in detail was not put to C nor was it tested with Ms Lau. To the contrary, it could be equally in keeping with Ms Lau’s evidence (see [89]) to posit that the Trauma Narrative was the first time the memory surfaced as a fragment, and that C’s evidence in court could well have been a more considered view of what she thereafter recalled on fuller reflection over a longer period of time. Ms Lau’s role was also not to query for details but to record the memory fragments as they arose.

In conclusion, contrary to the Defence’s submission, in my view, C’s testimony of the Zip-lock Bag Incident is authentic and not “conjured”. C’s perspective on the incident was also peculiarly in keeping with her age and experience.

Generality of C’s evidence

In contrast to the Defence’s allegations regarding the Zip-lock Bag Incident, for the alleged incidents of rape, the Defence contends that, although C’s allegations concern more than 300 assaults, her evidence is vague and sweeping, and draws a conclusion therefrom that her evidence could not be probative.

In my view, this generality is unsurprising in the light of C’s age at the time of the incidents and the time which has passed since. The Defence counsel’s submission rested on an assumption that the larger the number of incidents, the more specificity there would be. The opposite assumption, however, could as easily be true, in that the larger the number of incidents, the harder it would be to distinguish between them. C had mentioned in examination-in-chief, “there were too many incidences so I tend to mix up”. At various points in her cross-examination, C was honest about her inability to recall, such as when asked how long the acts took after she was able to tell the time. At another point she spoke about her mind being “blanked out” at the material time of the incident, a point also mentioned in her Trauma Narrative. A salient issue, nevertheless, is the sufficiency of the evidence against DCC on each specific charge, a point to which I return to in this judgment, at [144].

Anal penetration

C testified that, as part of the sexual assaults, DCC had not only penetrated her vaginally using his finger, but anally as well. While these alleged instances of anal penetration were not the subject matter of any charge preferred against DCC, it featured in C’s narration of how some of these incidents transpired:

Similarly, in her KKH Report, C reported the following forms of penetration as having been inflicted on her by DCC:

Digital-anal penetration

Over the course of C’s testimony, two inconsistencies arose. First, C contradicted her initial evidence regarding digital-anal penetration in cross-examination a week later:

C was however not asked to explain this discrepancy. The Defence did not point this inconsistency out to her or ask her to clarify. In GII (at [40]−[42]), Sundaresh Menon CJ held that where a seeming inconsistency was not put to a witness during cross-examination, it was not open for the same party to then contend that the witness’ testimony should be rejected by reason of the said inconsistency. Instead, since the witness was not afforded the chance to provide an explanation, the court was entitled to consider all plausible possibilities for reconciling the alleged inconsistency.

In my view, C experienced difficulty of recall during her cross-examination, and it was clear on observation that the process was emotionally difficult for her. On a related note, C’s evidence was that she was confused as to her anus and vagina in the earlier years. While she was older by the time of the police report, this confusion in the earlier years could have affected her ability to recall the specificities of where or when this digital penetration had occurred. In my judgment, as she was not given any opportunity to explain, the single “I don’t think so” is not sufficient to cast doubt on her testimony. I disregard this discrepancy.

Penile-anal penetration

A second area related to penile-anal penetration. I regard this issue differently from the issue of digital-anal penetration because defence counsel did cross-examine C on it. C’s evidence on how DCC would be positioned relative to her whenever anal penetration took place was as follows:

C confirmed that DCC’s position on the bed, relative to her, would be the same for both penile-vaginal and penile-anal penetration:

The Defence pointed out that, if C was lying flat on her back with her legs on the bed, her anus would not be exposed, especially if DCC was positioned “over” C and between C’s legs, or at the very least, C’s legs would have to be significantly elevated while lying flat on her back in order for her anus to be exposed. C disagreed with the suggestion when it was put to her:

C was not able to articulate why she disagreed. C testified that, when she was “around six years old”, she could not tell whether the pain caused by penetration emanated from her vagina or anus because she “couldn’t tell which one it was at that point of time”. Her evidence was that the anal penetration only took place in the beginning, and “near the end” it was vaginal. Although she was sure DCC penetrated her vagina each time, she could not recall the frequency with which he penetrated her anus. It was clear that C found it emotionally difficult to recall and to give evidence on the assaults on the stand. The use of dolls pursuant to a Defence request did not assist, because the dolls had no knees or muscles. C also found it emotionally difficult to look at the dolls. C’s conclusion that there had been anal penetration rested on an assumption:

I find it unsatisfactory that her conclusion that there had been penile-anal penetration rested on an assumption. This assumption related to an area of pain, rather than a recall of penile penetration. I also find it unsatisfactory that C was not re-examined on penile-anal penetration. There were a range of possibilities arising from her assumption, her answer that she was unsure when the anal penetration occurred, the 90-degree angle of DCC’s position, or even the physical flexibility that may be observed in very young children. The Prosecution’s position was that the charges do not allege anal penetration. Nevertheless, C’s evidence on anal penetration was part of her general narrative as to how a typical incident of sexual assault would transpire, and this narrative was the basis of charge A1. I take this into account in the analysis below, at [144].

C’s continued presence on the third floor after the First Family Meeting

The last category of the Defence’s contentions on the inconsistencies in C’s evidence relate to her conduct at the Residence after the First Family Meeting and before the Second Family Meeting. As recounted above at [19], after the First Family Meeting, it was decided that C was not to go to the third floor of the Residence, and that she was to remain on the first floor of the Residence to study and play, whereas DCC and ABR would remain on the third floor of the Residence. However, C was bitten by mosquitos at the first floor, and decided to work in the master bedroom on the third floor instead:

The Defence submits that C’s version of events is “unbelievable”, and points to certain facets of C’s evidence in support of this submission.

First, C agreed that she was given instructions against going to the third floor of the Residence after the First Family Meeting:

Second, C agreed that she never complained about the mosquitos on the first floor of the Residence while she was told to remain there:

Third, C had acknowledged that there were areas in the Residence other than the master bedroom which had fewer mosquitos than the first floor:

Relatedly, C was clear that she was discomforted by and had experienced pain during the sexual assaults:

Further, C confirmed that the frequency of sexual assaults had increased from once a week to around two to three times a week at the material time:

C’s behaviour also was at odds with CMR’s testimony of CMR’s instruction. CMR stated that, after the First Family Meeting, she had told C to inform her if anyone touched her:

Additionally, CMR testified that she had reminded FDH and SDH that C was not to go to the third floor of the Residence alone. CMR recalled that FDH, SDH and AMR had all called her to inform that C had gone to the third floor in contravention of her instructions. CMR stated that, during these calls, she would request that they pass the phone to C. CMR would then ask C why she went to the third floor, to which C would reply that she wanted to study on the third floor as the first floor had “a lot of mosquitos” and the second floor had no table available for her use. CMR would then state that she was upset with C and that C had no reason to go to the third floor. According to CMR, C would then provide the following response:

According to CMR, she had received such calls on “a few occasions”, though she estimated that this occurred “less than 10” times. During cross-examination, CMR agreed that these calls “strongly suggested” that her domestic helpers and AMR would report to her every time they saw C on the third floor after the First Family Meeting. CMR also stated that, though she had told her domestic helpers that C was not to go to the third floor of the Residence alone, she was unsure if the domestic helpers had ensured this as they were busy with looking after CYR and CYT.

C’s explanations

In sum, it is not disputed that C returned, of her own volition, to the third floor to study after the First Family Meeting. While there was a standing instruction that she ought to study on the ground floor, from CMR’s evidence as well as her own, she did not abide by this instruction. In my assessment of the Defence’s submission that her evidence is not credible, I am mindful of the observation in GBR v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 3 SLR 1048 at [20], that victims of sexual crimes cannot be straightjacketed in the expectation that they must act or react in a certain manner (see also GHI v Public Prosecutor [2024] 5 SLR 607 at [35]). Therefore, I focus on C’s explanation. The issue under consideration pertains to the particular victim and her specific reality.

Regarding the other rooms in the house, C testified that she did not go to the second floor as she did not want to disturb her brothers, who were very young and would be napping in AGM’s room. C also testified that there was no space in the attic to study.

Regarding her continuing to go to the third floor, C explained in examination-in-chief that she tolerated the sexual acts because it was meant to be good for her:

Re-examined on the portion above, C testified that, at the material time, she was not actively trying to avoid being alone with DCC because she still did not understand that what DCC did to her was wrong:

C’s testimony was that she “did not know what [the sexual acts which DCC committed on her] [were] at the time”.

The familial factors relevant to the context of C’s explanations

The reasons C listed for continuing to study at the third floor after being told not to were, therefore: that she believed DCC when he told her the penetration was “good for her”; she was able to tolerate it; and that she did not know it was rape. These reasons must be examined in her specific familial context.

First, she and DCC were close. He was the cousin nearest in age to her, and they saw each other every weekday when they spent their afternoons at the Residence. He was “a sibling” to her (see [123] below), and was also four years older. For this reason, she explained with candid honesty that she did not understand the acts to be anything but innocent:

Second, she was extremely close to and trusted AMR and AGM. It is clear from the evidence that both AMR and AGM dismissed her views, and their doing so would have had significant impact on her, because of her close relationship with them.

She described her relationship with AMR, DCC and ABR as follows:

Similarly, C testified that she was close to AGM:

This second factor was linked to a third, that both AMR and AGM had essentially brushed C’s complaints aside as lies. Upon hearing her complaint which led to the First Family Meeting, AMR had scolded C and told her not to lie:

In a similar vein, AGM had told C to tell everyone at the First Family Meeting that she had lied about DCC touching her:

AGM was adamant under cross-examination that C was lying:

AGM did not furnish any basis for her belief that C lied even when asked specifically at the end of her evidence:

Fourth, the two families were extremely close. AMR was CFR’s elder sister and had brought him up. AGM looked after C while CMR and CFR were at work, and CMR and CFR ate dinner at the Residence every weekday evening. Even on Sunday nights, they got together with others within the extended family. In CMR’s words, AMR was “the best sister-in-law anybody could have”. AMR was a homemaker who ran and ordered matters at the Residence. In her words, arrangements were settled “all based on what I say”.

These factors accounted for C’s omission to raise an alarm. C explained that, up to the time she WhatsApp-ed CGF about DCC raping her, she had decided not to raise the matter again because of the relationships at stake:

This context was reflected in C’s Trauma Narrative, which gave insight into her thinking:

C’s normalisation of the sexual incidents within this familial context was reflected in her Trauma Narrative. After the First Family Meeting, she recounted:

This normalisation is also reflected in her characterisation of the period between the First and Second Family Meetings:

Defence counsel cross-examined C at length on the thigh incident. In brief, C maintained that DCC had hit her inner thigh as described in her Trauma Narrative, and that this had occurred after the First Family Meeting. C recalled that she reported this hitting of her inner thigh to her parents. C could not recall the exact words she used when she reported this, but agreed that she did not say that she was “touched”. When asked why C reported this incident to her parents, C stated that “it was embarrassing” because CYR had witnessed this specific incident.

In my view, while the slapping on the thigh was not a sexual assault, it was intimate and disrespectful, which was clear even to her younger brother who supported her in her report of it. Her evidence that she was embarrassed by this public display of disdain for her bodily autonomy on her cousin’s part in front of her brother is believable. The feeling of being “helpless” which she associated with this incident is also believable. This same helplessness is reflected in Chapter 8 in her characterisation of the Second Family Meeting:

Pulling the threads together, it was CMR’s evidence that C continued to go to the third floor to study. CMR testified after C and so there was no opportunity to question C on it. In any event, C’s view was that AMR knew that she had returned to the third floor. That CMR was unable to deter C from going to the third floor reflected their lack of a close relationship where problems could be resolved with communication and joint problem-solving. In my view, C’s continuing to go to the third floor in these circumstances did not reflect defiance, as defence counsel suggested, but a common response of children to rules that they do not understand as meaningful or rules that are not strictly enforced. C similarly did not follow through on AGM’s instruction after the First Family Meeting for her to tell the whole family that she was lying. At the same time, C was deeply trusting of DCC, AMR and AGM. Fundamental to this is her lack of understanding at the material time that what was happening was rape. Her going to the third floor despite the incidents could be rationalised by her close relationship with DCC, and her deep trust in AMR and AGM. She had no reason to surmise that DCC would deeply harm her, or that AMR or AGM would brush aside a situation that was dangerous to her. Within her childish context, the pain of mosquito bites would be constant, and the continued itch could well be unbearable. While the sexual incidents were twice or three times a week, she was used to that particular form of pain, which she testified that she found tolerable over time. In her naïve mind, being sent to childcare and having to eat the food served there posed a greater terror. Her false thinking was explained by her age, particular experiences and familial circumstances. These same factors also explained, and were fully consistent with, her late realisation and late reporting.

In the light of the overall context, C’s behaviour was consistent with her familial circumstances and character.

Was C unusually convincing?

The above analysis forms the heart of the answer as to whether C was unusually convincing. The unusually convincing standard is a stringent one, requiring a complainant to be “so convincing that the Prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt solely on the basis of her evidence”: see Mohammed Liton at [38], citing Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890 at [73]. Any doubt must be resolved in favour of the Defence.

At the same time, a case such as the present calls for a close assessment of the particular child, with her particular daily circumstances, her own development and awareness, and her specific familial and parental context. Children exist on a wide spectrum of maturity, intelligence, practical awareness and resilience to pain. In GCK, Menon CJ observed at [97]:

In this context, I consider the whole of C’s conduct over the years from her first complaint up to the time of the police report. The Defence’s submissions focus very substantially on how these events were not corroboration. Nevertheless, the various events are still relevant under ss 9, 11 and 14 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”) in reflecting either a consistent or inconsistent course of conduct and explaining C’s thinking and approach. C’s complaint that led to the First Family Meeting occurred prior to charges A1−A3. While it is less relevant in probative value in respect of a specific offence, it explains C’s subsequent thinking. While the Second Family Meeting was on the same day as the incident underlying charge A2 and came within the timeframe envisaged by s 159 of the EA, the section contemplates a former statement “relating to the same fact”. It therefore has little corroborative weight. Nonetheless, C’s hand gestures, as reflected in the testimony of her parents, are consistent with her age at the time of the reporting and her evidence on the stand as to her understanding. C’s later complaints − in the Laptop Incident, her WhatsApp conversations with CGF, and her reporting to her parents on or around 29 September 2020 – are outside the window of s 159 of the EA. Nevertheless, the absence of corroboration is not fatal. The unusually convincing standard is premised on the absence of corroboration. Evidence that is not corroborative remains relevant and must be considered in the context of the question of whether the whole of C’s conduct forms part of a context that is consistent. I have held at [120]–[137] that her familial context explained how the assaults continued. C’s reaction on her 12th birthday and her subsequent reports and conduct thereafter, viewed in the round, give texture to her consistency and reflect a child finally finding the courage to speak for herself.

Returning to the medical evidence, while I hold that the symptoms of PTSD cannot amount to independent corroboration, as I observed above at [54], these symptoms were not inconsistent with the assaults having taken place. Again, the absence of corroboration is not fatal. It is material and unreconciled inconsistency that is fatal. I view the gynaecological evidence similarly. Dr Li examined C on 3 February 2021. Her KKH Report noted old tears at the three and eight o’clock positions of C’s hymenal ring, but no fresh tears or bleeding. Dr Li explained that tearing between the three and nine o’clock positions of the hymenal ring was “suggestive of possible penetration”. Dr Li explained her conclusion as such:

As C was not examined within 72 hours of the alleged penetration, Dr Li was unable to testify as to the age of the tears. Arising from this, Dr Li’s evidence is not definitive as to whether penile-vaginal penetration had occurred. It is, nevertheless, not inconsistent with C’s evidence.

Having considered the whole of the evidence, I find C’s evidence on her reasons, context and conduct convincing and compelling. In doing so, I clarify that I do not take into account the Prosecution’s submission that C had no motive to lie. The absence of a proven motive is in itself insufficient to render a complainant’s testimony unusually convincing and thereby establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: see Yue Roger Jr at [50].

Charge A1

I turn then to the specific charges, as each charge must be proved on its own merits. The Prosecution’s case for charge A1 relies on C’s evidence as to a general course of conduct. In this context, the general course of conduct includes anal penetration on occasion, and the issue of anal penetration is not well explained. I pointed out these aspects at [100]–[104]. While the Prosecution points out that anal penetration is not alleged within A1, it was not clear whether anal penetration was said to have occurred during the specific incident that is the subject matter of A1. C did not particularise a specific incident said to have given rise to charge A1. While I accept she was a truthful witness, I am concerned with the sufficiency of detail on A1. I find it unsafe to hold that the Prosecution has met its burden of proof on this charge.

Charge A3

Charge A3, in contrast, carried specificity. Its details, and C’s reaction, were unique and consistent with her confusion and naïveté. For the reasons that I detail at [81]–[92] and [120]–[143], I am of the view that her evidence on this charge is unusually convincing.

Charge A2

Charge A2 was a further specific incident. This happened prior to DCC’s tuition session, and on the same afternoon as C’s report to AMR that led to the Second Family Meeting. C recalled that DCC penetrated her vagina and touched her breasts. In contrast to A1, her evidence on this charge is not tainted by her confusion in relation to anal penetration, as anal penetration was not alleged in this instance. She recalled that after the Zip-lock Bag Incident, the incidents involved kissing and touching of her breasts and penetration of her vagina with his penis. Her evidence of this incident recalled the intrusion of breasts and vagina only. Further, this charge concerns the last instance of rape and C was clear that “closer to the end it was the vagina”. The Second Family Meeting stemmed from this incident, even though the report C made is of limited value as corroboration because C was unable to specify the assault with particularity. For the reasons highlighted at [120]–[143], I find C’s evidence unusually convincing on charge A2.

With this in mind, I address the second angle mentioned in GII and review whether the Defence has raised a reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence.

Case mounted by the Defence

The Defence’s case was premised on the consistency of DCC’s denials, and multiple implausibility arguments. I address these in turn.

Consistency of DCC’s denials

The Defence submits that DCC was “remarkably consistent in denying any allegation of wrongdoing” at the First Family Meeting, the Second Family Meeting, in his Video-Recorded Interview (“VRI Statement”) with the police on 4 January 2021, and in his testimony in court. This consistent denial was relied upon in written submissions as “a striking feature of the present case” which “lends an air of credibility” to DCC’s testimony.

In my judgment, the repetition of a denial cannot imbue it with probative force. Previous consistent statements cannot prove a statement to be true; nor can mere repetition render a witness credible.

Relatedly, I make a point about DCC’s denials. I pause to note the extreme nature of DCC’s denial at the Second Family Meeting. On DCC’s own evidence, when he was confronted with the allegation that he had touched C at the Second Family Meeting, he responded with, “I will jump down the building to prove my innocence”. When questioned on why he would say such a thing, DCC explained as follows:

In my view, the offer to commit suicide is extraordinary as a response to C’s opaque and unclear complaint. However, DCC’s view of the Second Family Meeting was that it was heated and that CFR was not giving him an opportunity to speak. DCC could be given the benefit of the doubt as an exasperated 15-year-old. Nevertheless, I agree with the Prosecution’s submission that DCC’s response is incongruous with his defence at trial. At trial, DCC raised, for the first time, that he did not, over the course of the many years, have any opportunity to be alone with C. If this were the case, it would have been a natural and easy response for DCC to say at the Second Family Meeting that there had been no opportunity to be alone with C on any recent date. Under cross-examination, DCC agreed that he did not raise this lack of opportunity at the First Family Meeting, the Second Family Meeting, and during the recording of his VRI Statement.

In this context, I turn to the multiple implausibility arguments made.

The Defence’s implausibility arguments

The remaining two of the eleven contentions made by the Defence on C’s evidence in its written submissions relate to implausibility.

Implausibility because the door could not be locked

As recounted above at [10], it was C’s evidence that, as a prelude to a typical incident of sexual assault, DCC would first close and lock the master bedroom door. The Defence asserts that C’s testimony on this point is implausible, as:

(a) There were house rules in place which prohibited the children in the Residence from locking doors; and

(b) In any event, the door to the master bedroom was defective and could not be properly locked.

The Defence submits that DCC, ABR and AMR “all unanimously testified that there was a house rule that doors could not be locked”. The Defence also points to AMR’s testimony that she would enforce her house rules and discipline the children if they disobeyed. Conversely, C stated that the only clear house rule was not to place bags on AMR’s bed, and that it was permissible to close and lock doors in the Residence.

One would expect that if clear house rules were in place, these would be understood in the same way by DCC, ABR and AMR. The evidence provided by the Defence’s witnesses on the house rules varied save for their insistence that doors could not be locked:

(a) According to DCC, the house rules prohibited the closing and locking of doors, the use of air-conditioning in the day, and specific to him, the use of the computer in the Residence.

(b) According to ABR, the house rules prohibited the slamming of doors and the locking of doors, and required permission to be granted for the use of air-conditioning in the day.

(c) According to AMR, the house rules prohibited the closing and locking of doors, the use of air-conditioning in the day, the use of mobile phones till 8pm, and the use of the iPad or television in the day.

These variations were not major. Tellingly, however, ABR was explicitly asked to clarify if there was a house rule prohibiting the closing of doors, to which ABR confirmed that he could not recall such a rule:

Aside from the content of the house rules, there was also inconsistencies between the Defence’s witnesses as to the enforcement of the same. DCC testified that AMR was “very strict with her rules”, and that the consequence of breaking a house rule was being “scolded by both my parents”. ABR also testified that the consequence of breaking any house rule was being “harshly scolded” by AMR. At trial, AMR described herself as a “tiger mum”. However, AMR also stated that, from 2013 to 2018, she was not aware of a single occasion where the children would watch television in contravention of the house rules as construed by her. This is contradicted by AMR’s own statement to the police, in which she recounted an incident where C was in the master bedroom watching television with DCC.

Plainly, and as pointed out by the Prosecution, if it were true that there were clear and unequivocal house rules which were strictly enforced, these house rules would have been something that the Defence’s witnesses would have given a consistent account of. However, this was not so and, accordingly, I disbelieve DCC’s assertion that there were clear house rules.

I similarly disbelieve the Defence’s assertion that the master bedroom door was defective. The evidence provided by the Defence’s witnesses on the functionality of the door is materially inconsistent with one another. I summarise the differing and fluid accounts below:

(a) DCC initially stated that, since he never locked the master bedroom door, he did not know if it could be locked. When asked whether this state of knowledge persists to-date, DCC stated that he continued not to know, only to then state that he in fact knew that the door could be locked.

(b) ABR stated that the master bedroom door could be closed only if it is locked. To lock the door, one would have to “push the door in completely, and then […] lift up the handle at a certain degree and then the – that thing in the door will align with the hole in the wall”. It “could take about a minute to completely close” the door.

AMR gave inconsistent evidence on the lock. In her police statement, AMR inserted a handwritten paragraph which read “I wish to add that the lock for my master bedroom door is spoilt and cannot be locked. I wonder why [C] mention [sic] that [DCC] locks the door?”. While she posed the query in her police statement, her cross-examination revealed that she knew of C’s position that the door was locked:

More importantly, when cross-examined, AMR stated that, from 2013 to 2018, the master bedroom door could be locked “with effort”. Subsequently, AMR stated that the lock worked intermittently or, in her words, “sometimes can lock, sometimes cannot lock”. She equivocated as follows:

When asked again about the lock the next day, AMR replied that “the door actually cannot be locked. Only I know how to do it. The adult know how to do it”. She was not re-examined on these various iterations.

Having considered the totality of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the master bedroom door could be locked throughout 2013 to 2018, and the Defence’s implausibility arguments premised on this point must fail.

Implausibility because of lack of opportunity

The Defence asserts that C’s evidence is implausible given the circumstances at the Residence on weekdays between 2013 and 2018, namely:

(a) That DCC had tuition every weekday which would last till dinnertime.

(b) That other persons at the Residence would be on the third floor of the Residence, where the master bedroom is located.

I deal with these two assertions in turn.

(1) Lack of time spent together

The upshot of DCC’s evidence was that, from 2013 till 2018, he had no opportunity to be alone with C. To that end, DCC claimed that, on a typical weekday afternoon, the following sequence of events would occur. First, AMR would fetch him, ABR and C from school. Then, all of them would go to VivoCity to have lunch and buy groceries. Thereafter, they would return to the Residence, where he would shower and then have tuition, which started at 3.30pm. When tuition ended at 5.30pm, he would immediately go to the first floor to have dinner. When DCC started to attend Secondary School, this sequence of events remained the same, save for Wednesdays and Fridays when he had CCA in school till 6.30pm.

The Defence’s witnesses provided contradictory accounts on the frequency of DCC’s tuition:

(a) DCC stated that when he was in Primary School (from 2013 to 2015), he had tuition at the Residence every day which would last up till dinnertime. On school holidays, DCC stated that he would have “more tuition”. DCC also stated that, when he was in Secondary School (from 2016 to 2018), he had CCA twice every week and tuition at the Residence on the remaining three weekdays. However, when cross-examining C, defence counsel stated that “my instructions are that there were days that there were tuition and there were days that there was no tuition”. Crucially, when this discrepancy was pointed out to DCC, he could not offer any explanation.

(b) AGM stated that, from 2013 to 2018, DCC would have tuition “three times a week”.

Additionally, it was DCC’s evidence that tuition usually started at 3.30pm on weekday afternoons and would last for 1.5 hours to 2 hours. It was also DCC’s evidence that “usually straight after tuition I will have dinner”. Chronologically, this would correspond with a dinnertime of either 5pm or 5.30pm. However, the Defence’s witnesses provided contradictory accounts as to what time dinner typically was:

(a) When cross-examining C, defence counsel stated that “[d]inner, my instructions are usually maybe 6’oclock onwards”.

(b) AMR had initially stated that dinnertime was 5.30pm. Under cross-examination, prior instructions to defence counsel (that dinner was “maybe 6’oclock onwards”) were brought to AMR’s attention and, when asked if she agreed with this set of instructions, AMR responded with “Yes, I say maybe 6’oclock onwards”.

ABR, too, asserted that, from 2013 to 2018, DCC and C would never be alone together in the master bedroom in the afternoon. His evidence was internally inconsistent. On ABR’s own evidence, he had tuition from 5.30pm to 7.30pm at least four times a week, and would remain in school till 6pm for CCA every Friday. Yet ABR refused to concede that he would have no personal knowledge as to DCC’s whereabouts when he had tuition. Although ABR did agree, under cross-examination, that he would not have personal knowledge on the goings-on at the Residence while he was at CCA, he was content to subsequently and repeatedly assert that “there was never an instance” where DCC and C would be alone in the master bedroom in the afternoon on weekdays. In my view, ABR was not a reliable witness.

Taken together, I find that the conflicting accounts provided by the Defence’s witnesses on the frequency of DCC’s tuition and when dinnertime typically was (which goes towards the duration and timing of DCC’s purported tuition, since DCC asserts that he had dinner immediately after tuition) cannot be said to contradict C’s evidence. I also note that the Defence has not adduced any independent evidence to support the existence of such a rigorous tuition or CCA schedule.

DCC’s cross-examination also reflected how untenable his assertion was. I reproduce a portion of DCC’s testimony on how he would spend time at the Residence if he did not have lunch at VivoCity, which starts with how rare such occasions were, followed by how long he took with his lunch, and ends with a rather surprising allusion to rushing his homework in the toilet:

Further, DCC’s evidence that he would never be alone with C was contradicted by other Defence witnesses. AMR accepted that there were days when she would first drop off C and DCC at home together before she fetched ABR. I have dealt with ABR’s and AGM’s evidence at [169] and at [167(b)] respectively.

(2) Presence of others at the residence

I similarly disbelieve the Defence’s assertion that other persons in the Residence would be on the third floor, with the effect of depriving DCC of the opportunity to sexually assault C.

At face value, ABR’s testimony provided the most support to the Defence’s assertion on this point. Indeed, ABR testified that he would be on the third floor on weekday afternoons, studying at the L-shaped table. To that end, ABR agreed that he would be able to know who would be on the third floor. Despite this, ABR testified that he was “not too sure” where C would study both before and after the First Family Meeting. For reference, it was DCC’s evidence that C would study on the third floor before the First Family Meeting. Thus, ABR’s assertion that ABR was “always upstairs studying” is internally inconsistent and cannot be relevant to an analysis of C’s evidence.

The Defence also pointed to the testimony of AMR and AGM. In essence, AMR testified that, though she was usually pre-occupied with preparing dinner in the kitchen on weekday afternoons, she would occasionally go to the third floor to rest or check if her children were doing their homework. C was confined to the second floor for work and, if C went upstairs, it was with her. AGM, on her part, said that on weekday afternoons, she would usually be on the second floor taking care of CYT and CYR, though “sometimes [she] [would] go up to water [her] plants”. This point about AGM watering plants was not put to C. It was also clear from the evidence that AMR was often out of the house or cooking in the kitchen. No specific occasion of AMR going upstairs with C or AGM meeting C upstairs was put to C. There is therefore no merit in the assertion that at all times, there were others on the third level such that DCC would not have had an opportunity to assault C.

Additional implausibility arguments

Aside from the implausibility arguments raised by the Defence in its closing submissions, DCC raised other additional implausibility arguments while on the stand.

First, he attempted to distance himself from C, saying in his examination-in-chief that his relationship with C “wasn’t very good”. Similarly, under cross-examination, DCC stated that he did not consider himself close to C when growing up, and denied that he had ever played with C when there were no adults present. This was contradicted by his VRI Statement recorded by the police, where he describes how “[they] were very close”:

DCC gave similar evidence when he was asked, in his VRI Statement, to recount the last time he met C:

DCC’s assertion on the stand that he was not close to C at the material time was also contradicted by:

(a) ABR’s evidence that, before 2013, the cousins “share[d] a very close bond because after school they would usually come over”, that relations were “as equally close for me and my cousins and well as [DCC] and the cousins as well”, and that it was “quite upsetting to see” that “[C’s family] didn’t really come over any more”;

(b) AMR’s police statement, in which she stated that DCC and C were quite close with each other, and her statement in court that C and DCC did “play together”; and

(c) AGM’s evidence in court that C and DCC “played together when they were young”.

A final implausibility contention was that DCC was too small to have carried or lifted C. DCC was four years older than C. From the photographs, it is clear that he was of a height and size consonant with his age – a stocky, healthy boy – and she was of a height and size consonant with hers. On the evidence before the court, there is no basis for such an allegation.

Arising out of the conclusions I make in response to DCC’s assertions, I hold that DCC is not a credible witness.

Are there any Lucas lies?

Regarding DCC’s assertions, the Prosecution submits that three in particular are corroborative of guilt (referred to in the case law and therefore this judgment as “Lucas lies”), namely:

(a) That he did not have a close relationship with C from 2013 to 2018;

(b) That he had no opportunity to be alone with C from 2013 to 2018 on weekday afternoons; and

(c) That he had not been alone with C in the master bedroom from 2013 to 2018 on weekday afternoons.

In Public Prosecutor v Ilechukwu Uchechukwu Chukwudi [2015] SGCA 33 (“Ilechukwu”) at [60], the Court of Appeal explained that Lucas lies have four requirements: (a) the lie told out of court was deliberate; (b) it related to a material issue; (c) the motive for the lie was a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth; and (d) the statement was clearly shown to be a lie by independent evidence.

I do not accept the Prosecution’s submission on the Lucas lies as there is no independent evidence regarding the lies. I note that, while CCA schedules for 2016−2018 would have been helpful, all three assertions were raised by the Defence at trial in 2025. Notwithstanding that I disagree that there are any Lucas lies, this does not detract from my conclusion at [181] that DCC is not a creditworthy witness.

Credibility of AMR

AMR was key to the Defence’s case. I therefore deal briefly with her credibility.

I find AMR’s credibility as a witness impeached. At trial, the Prosecution had identified material inconsistencies between the account AMR had provided in her statement to the police dated 4 January 2021 (“AMR’s Police Statement”), and the account she provided in court. AMR could not proffer a satisfactory explanation for any of the following inconsistencies.

(a) AMR provided two different accounts of what occurred at the First Family Meeting. In AMR’s Police Statement, she stated that, during the First Family Meeting, DCC explained that C, CYR, and himself were watching TV in the master bedroom when he smacked her on the leg as he found her irritating. In court, she said DCC did not tell her what transpired. When cross-examined on her police statement, AMR merely stated “I can’t explain that”, followed by “I cannot remember”.

(b) AMR provided two different accounts on C’s complaint to her prior to the Second Family Meeting. In AMR’s Police Statement, she stated that C told her that DCC locked the master bedroom door and hugged her inside and, in response, AMR asked C if she had struggled or screamed when DCC did that. However, in court, AMR stated that C did not tell her where this incident occurred and did not tell her that DCC locked the door and hugged her inside the master bedroom. AMR later stated that C did say that DCC locked the door, though AMR maintained that C did not say this was in the master bedroom. When asked for an explanation, AMR stated “I actually cannot remember”.

(c) AMR provided differing evidence on whether the children in the Residence would be in the master bedroom unaccompanied. In AMR’s Police Statement, she stated that there was an incident in which a domestic helper told her that the children, including C, were in the master bedroom watching TV. However, in court, AMR stated that, whenever C was on the third floor, C would always be accompanied by her. When asked for an explanation, AMR stated that “if they could be able to watch TV together it is very, very rarely to have this time […] so they might have that 5 minutes watching TV at that one incident”. This was unsatisfactory, as it does not explain why AMR took such a categorical position while on the stand, even if it was, on her own evidence, a rare occurrence.

(d) AMR’s multiple versions on the status of the locking mechanism in her master bedroom are discussed above at [162]-[163].

The Defence’s evidence on the two family meetings

Finally, it is pertinent to draw together the threads of the Defence evidence on the two family meetings, as these were C’s first reports of anything untoward. Both DCC and AMR testified that C did not cry or gesticulate during both Family Meetings, while it was CMR’s and CFR’s evidence that C had cried and gesticulated towards her body at both Family Meetings. C herself had no recall of the content of the meetings.

AMR’s evidence is dealt with at [186(a)]-[186(b)]. DCC provided two different accounts of how the First Family Meeting came to be. In his evidence-in-chief, DCC stated that the First Family Meeting was convened as a result of C accusing him of inappropriately touching her, and his subsequent denial of the same. He said that the thigh incident (alluded to above at [134]) was not related to either of the family meetings. However, in the course of defence counsel’s cross-examination of C, it was stated that “[DCC] recalls that this first family meeting … was because of this particular incident”, where he had hit C’s outer thigh because she was disturbing him while he was watching YouTube. When he was cross-examined on this inconsistency, DCC did not explain why but instead simply disagreed that there was even such an inconsistency.

For the Second Family Meeting, DCC could not remember anything C said or did. He said he stormed out of the room after offering to jump down a building because he felt CFR had not given him any opportunity to speak. In his oral testimony, DCC stated that he could not remember AGM saying anything at the Second Family Meeting, save for her shouting at him to go to her room. However, in his VRI Statement, DCC stated that, after being called into her room, AGM proceeded to “talk [to] and reprimand” him and C. In his VRI Statement, DCC also stated that AGM said “don’t so close la. If all these things is [sic] going to happen and she’s going to say that, then might as well just don’t, don’t be so close”. When this inconsistency was brought to DCC’s attention, DCC could not explain.

AGM’s evidence did not assist. Although the Second Family Meeting took place in her room, when asked about the meetings, AGM responded that she could not remember as it “happened a long time ago”. AGM subsequently stated that she also did not know what had led to the Family Meetings. Despite her asserted ignorance, AGM was able to categorically deny the veracity of C’s evidence on the Second Family Meeting. She confirmed that she told C that she was lying at the Second Family Meeting (as recounted above at [126]–[128]).

Arising from the unreliable and differing positions, I accorded no weight to any of the Defence witnesses’ versions of the family meetings, save for the undisputed assertion that DCC offered to commit suicide at the second meeting. In my view, it is not material to draw detailed conclusions as to what in fact happened at the two meetings, in the light of my earlier findings on C’s consistency. It is not disputed that the two meetings arose from C’s complaint of a sort that fell short of a report sufficiently specific to amount to corroboration.

Summation on the Defence’s evidence

I hold that the evidence of the Defence’s witnesses does not raise any reasonable doubt on the totality of the Prosecution’s case.

Conclusion

In conclusion, C’s evidence on charges A2 and A3 is unusually convincing. DCC’s evidence is not credible.

In GCK at [91]–[92], the Court of Appeal observed:

Bearing these principles in mind, I acquit DCC on A1. I find him guilty and convict him accordingly on A2 and A3.