Public Prosecutor v Toh Sze Ee [2026] SGHC 136

Introduction

On 16 March 2023 the accused, Toh Sze Ee, drove a van that collided into and ran over one Hossen Selim (the “victim”), who was riding a bicycle at the time. The central issue in the case is whether the accused voluntarily hit the victim, or (as the accused says) he fell asleep at the wheel in the seconds before the collision.

Background

The charge

The matter proceeded to trial on a charge of attempted murder under s 307(1) of the Penal Code 1871 (“Penal Code”). At the stage of closing submissions, however, the prosecution submitted that the charge should be amended to one under s 326 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. The accused did not object to this course of action, the charge was amended accordingly, and oral submissions were made in relation to the amended charge.

The amended charge reads as follows:

Agreed facts

Many of the facts in this case were agreed upon between the parties, including the following.

The accused and the victim

The accused was born in September 1974 (and so at the time of the collision he was some 48 and a half years old).

The victim was a Bangladeshi national.

were acquainted through their dealings in contraband cigarettes.

The collision on 16 March 2023

In the morning of 16 March 2023, the accused and the victim arranged to meet the same day. They exchanged phone calls and messages during the day, and agreed to meet at Kaki Bukit Avenue 5.

At about 5pm, the accused drove a van bearing registration plate number GBG 3567B which collied and ran over the victim along Kaki Bukit Avenue 5 towards Kaki Bukit Road 5, near Lamppost 26, Singapore.

The collision was captured by in-vehicle camera footage from a tipper truck bearing registration plate number XE9500D and a bus bearing registration plate number PH6666H, which were parked along Kaki Bukit Avenue 5 towards Kaki Bukit Road 5.

After the collision, the accused stopped near lamppost 24 (ie, two lampposts away from the collision). The accused subsequently phoned one Teo Kim Chiew (“Teo”, also known as “Ah Bao” – PW26). Teo drove to Kaki Bukit Avenue 5. The accused and Teo drove separately to an abandoned warehouse at Defu Lane 12 to dispose of the contraband cigarettes in the van. The accused then abandoned the van along the road outside the warehouse.

The van was rented by another individual on 11 March 2023, and it was handed over to the accused on the same day. This individual rented the van as the accused did not possess a valid driving licence to drive a van.

The victim’s injuries

The victim was conveyed to Changi General Hospital on 16 March 2023. As a result of the collision, the victim suffered serious injuries, which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (For the purpose of the amended charge, it is not in dispute that the collision caused grievous hurt to the victim.)

The victim underwent various surgical procedures, was discharged from the intensive care unit on 26 March 2023 to the high dependency unit, and was subsequently sent to the general ward on 3 April 2023. The victim was diagnosed with no capacity. (In its opening address, the prosecution adds – and the defence does not dispute – that the victim was repatriated to Bangladesh on 17 June 2024, where he eventually passed away on 12 February 2025.)

Psychiatric evaluation of the accused

Dr Charles Mak (PW18) examined the accused at the Complex Medical Centre of Changi Prison Complex on 11 July 2023, 13 July 2023, and 20 July 2023.

Dr Mak found that the accused had a background of Substance Use Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder, but that the accused did not otherwise suffer from a major psychiatric condition. Dr Mak also found, among others, that:

(a) The accused did not have impairment in his capacity for self-control or restraint.

(b) The accused had no impairment in his awareness and understanding of his actions at the material time.

(c) The accused did not meet the required DSM-5-TR diagnostic criteria for Stimulant Withdrawal on 16 March 2023.

(d) The accused was not of unsound mind at the material time, and was fit to plead in a court of law.

Dr Mak also opined that it was unlikely that the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel due to fatigue as a withdrawal symptom from his abuse of methamphetamine.

Statements of the accused

Six statements were recorded by the Police from the accused on the following dates, which he voluntarily gave without any threat, inducement or promise, and which were admitted into evidence by agreement:

(a) 28 June 2023, recorded under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”);

(b) 30 June 2023, recorded under s 22 of the CPC;

(c) 1 July 2023, recorded under s 22 of the CPC;

(d) 3 July 2023 (two statements), recorded under s 22 of the CPC; and

(e) 4 July 2023, recorded under s 22 of the CPC.

Whether the accused fell asleep at the wheel

The accused disputed one element of the charge – that he voluntarily hurt the victim. The accused says that he fell asleep at the wheel in the seconds before the collision, and that he had not intended to hurt the victim.

I consider the following:

(a) what the accused said (or did not say) about the collision to Teo and Kwok Mee Ling Irene (“Irene”, his girlfriend at the time – PW27);

(b) Dr Mak’s evidence, and other evidence about drug use and withdrawal symptoms;

(c) the circumstances surrounding the collision; and

(d) motive.

What the accused said (or did not say) about the collision to Teo and Irene

Teo was the accused’s associate in the contraband cigarette trade, and he was the first person the accused spoke to after the collision. Irene was the accused’s girlfriend and the accused lived with her, at least from time to time. If the collision had happened because the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel, one would expect the accused to have mentioned this to Teo and Irene. If he did not, that would undermine his version of events. If the accused gave Teo and Irene some other explanation for the collision, that would undermine his version of events further.

What the accused said about the collision to Teo and Irene was hotly contested. I consider what the accused, Teo, and Irene respectively said about this, in their testimony in court, and in statements they gave.

The accused’s version of events

In his cautioned statement of 28 June 2023, recorded under s 23 of the CPC upon the accused being presented with a charge for attempted murder, the accused said:

In his 30 June 2023 statement, the accused maintained that the collision had happened because he fell asleep:

Notably, in his 30 June 2023 statement, the accused said that he told Teo (Ah Bao) that he had knocked the victim over with his van, but the accused did not say that he told Teo the collision happened because he fell asleep.

In the same statement, the accused said that he also informed his girlfriend (Irene) that he had accidentally run over the victim, but the accused did not say he told Irene that the collision happened because he fell asleep:

The accused’s 1 July 2023 statement records his response to queries about para 1.24 of his 30 June 2023 statement, in which he had said that he fell asleep at the wheel:

The accused’s first statement of 3 July 2023 (timed at 2.50pm) records his response to queries about para 1.29 of his 30 June statement – he was specifically asked whether he told Irene that the collision happened because he fell asleep, and he said he could not recall if he had mentioned this to her:

In his second statement of 3 July 2023, timed at 6.55pm, the accused was asked about para 32.1 of his 1 July 2023 statement, in which he had said that he had been consuming “ice”:

The accused was also shown still images of the scene of the collision, and he commented on them, saying in particular:

In his 4 July 2023 statement, the accused responded to further queries about what he told Irene about the collision, and again he said he could not remember if he had told her that he had fallen asleep while driving:

In summary, in his statements to the police:

(a) the accused said the collision happened because he fell asleep;

(b) the accused said he told Teo about the collision, but he did not say that he told Teo he had fallen asleep;

(c) the accused said he told Irene about the collision, but he did not say that he told Irene he had fallen asleep; he said he could not remember/recall whether he had told her that he had fallen asleep.

In his testimony at trial, the accused maintained that the collision happened because he fell asleep at the wheel. But he added that he had told Teo, and Irene, that the collision happened because he had fallen asleep.

In relation to Teo, the accused said this was over a phone call he made while still at the scene of the collision:

In relation to Irene, this was the accused’s evidence:

I will evaluate the accused’s evidence after I set out what Teo and Irene said about their interactions with the accused in this regard.

Teo’s version of events

In Teo’s conditioned statement dated 8 January 2025, he said the accused told him that the collision happened because the victim had suddenly cycled into his path:

In para 18 of that statement, Teo declared that the statement was true to the best of his knowledge and belief. When he took the stand, however, he said that he wished to add that the accused did mention to him that he fell asleep while driving:

Teo’s assertion that the accused had told him that he fell asleep while driving was not only missing from Teo’s conditioned statement, but it was contrary to what Teo said in para 8 of that statement: that the accused had said the collision happened because the victim had suddenly cycled into his path.

Given this change on Teo’s part, the prosecution tendered a statement – P241 – recorded from Teo on 12 January 2026 (four days prior to him taking the stand), which contains the following:

When asked about this, Teo said:

Teo added that when the recorder asked him questions, Teo had said “Based on my impression, he [the accused] did not say that.”

His responses under cross-examination by the defence are also noteworthy:

Not only did Teo seek to suggest that on the day of the collision the accused told him (or may have told him) that he had fallen asleep at the wheel, Teo added that when he was sending the accused back to Irene’s home (the following day), the accused had told him that he fell asleep at the wheel:

In view of what Teo said about his 12 January 2026 statement, the prosecution called the persons involved in the recording of that statement, ie, the Investigation Officer PW43 Tan Li Beng (“IO Tan”) and the interpreter, PW45 Jason Ng. Both of them confirmed that the statement was read back and interpreted to Teo, and that Teo did not indicate that he wanted to make any amendments to the statement.

IO Tan said that he did not hear Teo telling the interpreter that what he wanted to say was that he had no impression of the accused telling him that he had fallen asleep.

The interpreter, Jason Ng, said he did not recall Teo saying that he had no impression of the accused telling him that he had fallen asleep at the wheel; he accepted it was possible that Teo had used the Chinese words for “impression”, but as far as he was concerned, the statement was accurately translated.

From Teo’s evidence, it also emerged that on 15 January 2026 (the day before Teo testified), the accused and Teo had spoken – they had been transported to court in the same vehicle, and placed in the same holding area. Teo said, “Ah Gee said that he told me about him falling asleep, and he wanted me to say this out.” Teo agreed that he had no recollection about the accused telling him he had fallen asleep, until they met and spoke on 15 January 2026. When he was then asked again whether, immediately after the collision, the accused told him or did not tell him that he fell asleep at the wheel, Teo’s response was:

Irene’s version of events

In Irene’s conditioned statement dated 11 December 2024, which she affirmed on the stand, she said that the police had gone to her home on 17 March 2023 (the day after the collision) looking for the accused, and they told her that the accused had knocked down a person who was severely injured. Her account of what the accused told her about the collision is as follows:

Irene did not say that the accused told her that the collision happened because he fell asleep at the wheel. Instead, she (like Teo) said that the accused said the victim had suddenly turned into his path, and that is why the collision happened. The in-vehicle camera footage shows that the victim did not swerve into the accused’s path, and this was not the accused’s case at trial either.

Irene maintained in her oral testimony that the accused had never told her that the collision happened because he fell asleep at the wheel.

It was suggested to Irene that she had communicated (on the accused’s behalf) the accused’s position that he had fallen asleep at the wheel, to lawyer Edmund Wong; but Irene did not agree with this, and Edmund Wong was not called as a witness.

Irene admitted that she had lied to the police about the accused’s drug use because she did not want to get into trouble, but she maintained that the accused had not told her that he had fallen asleep at the wheel.

Analysis

Having considered the evidence of the accused, Teo, and Irene, and the statements they gave, I find:

(a) the accused did not tell Teo that he had fallen asleep at the wheel, at any time prior to 15 January 2026 (the day before Teo testified); and

(b) the accused never told Irene that he had fallen asleep at the wheel.

The accused never said in his statements to the police that he had told Teo that he had fallen asleep at the wheel. All he said is that he told Teo that he had knocked the victim over with his van.

In Teo’s 12 January 2026 statement to the police, he said at para 13: “All the time till date, Ah Gee never mentioned before that the collision was because he had fallen asleep.” I believe that, rather than Teo’s attempted change of position at trial, after the accused had told him (the day before) that he wanted Teo to say that the accused had told Teo about him falling asleep.

It is moreover clear from what Teo said in court that Teo did not hear the accused saying this to him on the day of the collision. Thus, Teo said “the words were missing, so I can’t say whether he said that or did not say that”, that he had no impression of the accused saying this, and that he could not confirm whether the accused had said this. Teo sought to soften the statement in his 12 January 2026 statement that the accused had “never” said this to him, by saying that that was his “impression”, but that does not amount to affirmative evidence by Teo that the accused had said this to him. In any event, I accept the evidence of IO Tan and the interpreter, Jason Ng, that the 12 January 2026 statement was accurately translated and recorded.

I do not accept Teo’s even more belated addition of a supposed conversation between him and the accused on 17 March 2023 (the day after the collision), where the accused said that he had fallen asleep. That too flies in the face of Teo’s 12 January 2026 statement that the accused had never mentioned that the collision was because he had fallen asleep. Such a conversation on 17 March 2023 is also inconsistent with Teo’s conditioned statement in which he said that the accused blamed the collision on the victim suddenly cycling into the accused’s path.

As for Irene, the accused said in his first statement of 3 July 2023, and in his 4 July 2023 statement, that he could not recall/remember if he had told her that he fell asleep at the wheel. That weakens his testimony at trial (some two and a half years later) that he did tell her this, and I do not accept his testimony on this.

Instead, I accept Irene’s consistent evidence that the accused had never told her that he had fallen asleep at the wheel.

Both Teo and Irene said that the accused told them the collision happened because the victim had suddenly moved into his path. Teo sought to change his evidence on this – although it was in his conditioned statement, and he did not ask to correct that aspect of it when he took the stand, he later said that paragraph 8 of the statement was not correct, where it said that the accused told Teo that the victim had suddenly cycled into his path. Teo offered no explanation why a specific statement like that was incorrect, and moreover it accords with Irene’s evidence of what the accused had said. Teo was just changing his evidence in an attempt to help the accused.

I accept that the accused had, in relation to both Teo and Irene, sought to blame the victim for the collision, and this is inconsistent with him telling either of them that the collision happened because he fell asleep.

As I said at the start of this section, if in fact the collision happened because the accused fell asleep at the wheel, one would expect him to have told that to Teo and Irene, but he did not, and instead he gave them a false version of what had happened – that the victim had suddenly cycled into his path. This undermines the accused’s version of events. It is incongruous for the accused not to have told Teo and Irene that he had fallen asleep at the wheel – if that is really what had happened; but it is inconsistent with him having fallen asleep at the wheel, for him to tell them another version of events altogether – that the collision happened because the victim had suddenly cycled into his path, and so he had no time to brake.

Dr Mak’s evidence, and other evidence about drug abuse and withdrawal symptoms

The accused told Dr Mak that he had fallen asleep at the wheel due to methamphetamine withdrawal – he said that he last abused methamphetamine the previous day and that he would usually feel sleepy the day after abusing the drug; but he also said that he had never fallen asleep on any other occasion while driving a motor vehicle.

Dr Mak assessed that the accused did not meet the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for Stimulant Withdrawal on the day of the collision: [16(c)] above. In particular, the accused did not present with dysphoric mood (an element of one criterion), and he also did not suffer clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (another criterion), in that the accused was able to socialise and carry out his usual line of work, coordinate the delivery of contraband cigarettes, use the Waze navigation app to navigate to Kaki Bukit, and socialise and complete a U-turn shortly before the collision, all of which was not in keeping with him suffering from significant fatigue.

Dr Mak was also of the opinion that it was unlikely that the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel due to fatigue as a withdrawal symptom from his abuse of methamphetamine: [17] above.

The defence nevertheless contended that, notwithstanding Dr Mak’s evidence, the accused’s account of falling asleep at the wheel was plausible, and that there was at least a reasonable doubt whether he had fallen asleep at the wheel, due to withdrawal from methamphetamine, fatigue, or a combination of the two.

The defence pointed out that Dr Mak had not seen any videos of the collision, and that he had not been told that the van had scraped against a parked tipper truck before hitting the victim. I consider these matters in the next section. For now, I accept that based on what Dr Mak had considered, it is unlikely that the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel due to withdrawal symptoms from his abuse of methamphetamine.

The defence also relied on an article by the US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (marked as D1) about a “crash” phase following binge methamphetamine use with “intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and catnapping”; Dr Mak accepted that if the accused were a methamphetamine user, and had stopped using it, he “may feel tired”.

Further, Dr Mak accepted that people may fall asleep while driving, and that this may happen independently of methamphetamine use.

The fact that withdrawal from methamphetamine use may cause users to feel tired, and that people may fall asleep while driving – even if they are not methamphetamine users – still begs the question whether that happened to the accused on the day of the collision. Is there at least a reasonable doubt whether the accused fell asleep at the wheel in the seconds before the collision?

The defence also relied on the evidence of one Rashid (DW2) about the accused dozing off after using methamphetamine:

Rashid was however not talking about withdrawal symptoms a day after stopping methamphetamine use (which is what the accused says happened to him), his evidence was about him and the accused falling asleep right after methamphetamine use. Moreover, Rashid’s evidence was that he himself fell asleep “because [his] problem is too heavy”, and not because he used, or stopped using, methamphetamine. Rashid’s evidence that he and the accused sometimes fell asleep while talking after using methamphetamine, is of little assistance in determining whether the accused fell asleep at the wheel on the day of the collision.

The circumstances surrounding the collision

The collision was captured on video: there was in-vehicle camera footage from vehicles parked along Kaki Bukit Avenue 5 towards Kaki Bukit Road 5. The video footage shows the van making a U-turn from the other side of Kaki Bukit Avenue 5 at the 17:00:19 mark, with the U-turn completed at the 17:00:27 mark. The van was then in the left lane of that side of the road (which had two lanes on each side). The victim was then cycling in front of the van.

If the van had continued its course after the U-turn, it would have collided into the back of a tipper truck that was parked in the left lane, before the bus. The video footage shows that the van moved away from the left side of the road, towards the middle of the two lanes (demarcated by a broken white line). The van thus did not collide into the back of the parked truck, although it appears that the van’s left-wing mirror scraped against the right side of the truck – blue paint was recovered from the mirror that could have originated from that side of the truck, and the video shows that van passing close to the truck, possibly coming into contact.

The collision took place at the 17:00:36 point of the video footage. The victim was then cycling along the broken white line between the two lanes on that side of the road, in front of the van. At the point of the collision, the bicycle had just passed the parked truck.

From the time the van completed the U-turn to the point of collision, some nine seconds had passed, and in those nine seconds the van covered some 80 to 100 meters, at a speed in the range of 28.6 to 37.6 km/h, based on the Health Sciences Authority Report analysing the video footage.

The van continued past the point of the collision, past the parked bus, and then moved leftward to stop by the left side of the road some two lampposts ahead (40m after the point of collision).

The video footage shows the accused getting out of the van and going to the front of the van to check the damage to the van. At most, the accused thereafter only glanced in the direction of the victim for a split second.

I agree with the prosecution that the circumstances of the collision are more consistent with the accused being in control of the vehicle, rather than him falling asleep in the few seconds between the time the van completed the U-turn, and the collision.

The van moving away from the left side of the road, towards the middle of the two lanes, thus avoiding a collision with the back of the parked truck, is more consistent with the accused not having fallen asleep at the wheel. The defence suggests that the accused could still have fallen asleep after setting the van on a path that would avoid such a collision with the truck, but that would at least narrow the window of time within which the accused supposedly fell asleep.

The fact that the wing mirror of the van scraped against the side of the truck does not mean that the accused had fallen asleep. It is consistent with the accused having simply misjudged the clearance with the truck, while focusing on the victim who was cycling in front of the van. It should also be borne in mind that the accused did not have a valid driving licence to drive a van.

The video footage shows that the van did not slow down through the point of collision with the victim and his bicycle, and that it only came to a stop some two lampposts or 40m away. The accused agreed that the normal reaction of a person who realised that he had hit something, would be to brake immediately and stop; but he did not do so.

The fact that after stopping the van, the accused first went to the front of the van to check the damage to the van, rather than look back to see what he had hit, is more consistent with the accused knowing what he had hit – the victim on his bicycle.

As for the van’s speed being relatively constant from the time the U-turn had been completed through the point of collision, I see that as being neutral – I would not say it points one way or the other as to whether the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel in those few seconds.

Returning to Dr Mak’s medical opinion that it was unlikely that the accused had fallen asleep at the wheel, one of Dr Mak’s considerations was that the accused was able to socialise (with the victim) and complete a U-turn shortly before the collision; moreover, the accused said that this was the first time he had fallen asleep at the wheel. I find it unlikely that in the nine seconds (or less) between the time the accused completed the U-turn and set the van on a course that would avoid a collision with the back of the parked truck, and the point of collision, the accused fell asleep at the wheel.

Motive

Finally, the accused had a motive for wanting to hurt the victim, and indeed, to cause the victim grievous hurt.

The accused and the victim had known each other for some two months by the time of a customs raid in February 2023, when the victim and one “Meimei” were arrested but the accused evaded arrest. The accused was worried that either the victim or Meimei might implicate him. The accused says that he asked the victim whether he had implicated him, the victim said he had not, and the accused believed him. The accused claims that he believed the victim because they were in the same trade, they were good friends, and they saw each other almost every day.

The accused spoke to Irene and told her that he was worried because he did not know whether the victim would point him out. Irene corroborates that. She says in her conditioned statement, an extract of which is set out at [48] above, that she asked the accused if he was angry with the victim and that was why he had purposedly knocked him down. She explains that she asked this because the accused had told her the victim had been arrested by Customs officers and the accused was worried that the victim may give him away. The accused denies that Irene asked him whether he had knocked the victim down because he was angry with the victim. On this point, I accept Irene’s evidence over the accused’s denial.

Further, I do not accept the accused’s claim that he accepted the victim’s word that he had not implicated the accused. The accused admits that he told Irene he was worried because he did not know whether the victim would point him out. He never told her that his worries were laid to rest because the victim said that he had not implicated him. Moreover, given the relationship between the victim and the accused, I do not accept that the accused would simply accept the victim’s word for it.

In fact, the victim did implicate the accused, and the accused was informed of this after he was arrested in June 2023. The accused’s stated response to this is recorded in his 30 June 2023 statement:

The accused claims that he was only angry with the victim because he said that the victim had paid him money for the cigarettes, which the accused said was not true; the accused says he was not angry that the victim had implicated him. I do not accept the accused’s evidence on this. I consider that the accused would have been angry at finding out that the victim had implicated him to the customs officers, especially since (as the accused says) the victim had told him that he had not pointed him out to the customs officers.

The fact remains that the accused was worried about whether the victim might identify him to the customs officers, which the victim might already have done, or might yet do. This gave the accused a motive to cause hurt – indeed, grievous hurt – to the victim.

The defence contends that the accused would not have wanted to harm the victim because they had a good relationship, they dealt with each other in the contraband cigarette trade on at least 20 occasions, and smoked methamphetamine together. The defence also says it would have been irrational and self-defeating for the accused to attack the victim while carrying a vanload of contraband cigarettes, which might end up being abandoned (as was the case). Further, the defence says that it was the victim who chose where and when to meet, and the victim even asked the accused to make a U-turn: the accused did not plan any of that.

However, there need not be planning well ahead of time, or indeed sensible planning, for the accused to have formed the intention to cause grievous hurt to the victim. If the accused acted impulsively in hurting the victim, that would still be voluntary behaviour on his part.

Conclusion on whether the accused fell asleep at the wheel

For the above reasons, I do not accept that the accused fell asleep at the wheel in the seconds before the collision.

Elements of the charge

To establish a charge under s 326 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, the following must be proved:

(a) first, that the victim suffered “grievous hurt”;

(b) second, that the accused “voluntarily” caused such grievous hurt; and

(c) third, the van was an instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death.

Grievous hurt

Regarding the first element, the defence expressly accepted that the hurt caused to the victim was grievous hurt, based on the injuries that were agreed to.

In any event, the hurt caused to the victim amply satisfies the definition of “grievous hurt” in s 320 of the Penal Code, which includes fracture or dislocation of a bone, and any hurt which endangers life, or which causes the sufferer to be, during the space of 20 days, in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. Here, the victim suffered several fractures, the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and the victim was diagnosed with no capacity: [13]–[14] above.

Voluntarily caused by the accused

Regarding the second element, “voluntarily” is defined as follows in s 26A of the Penal Code:

In this regard, the defence correctly points out that it is the prosecution’s burden to prove that the accused acted “voluntarily”, it is not the accused’s burden to prove that he fell asleep at the wheel. Nevertheless, the accused relied on his claim to have fallen asleep at the wheel to rebut the prosecution’s case that he had voluntarily collided into and run over the victim. That he fell asleep is the only basis on which the accused says the collision was accidental. He does not say, for example, that the collision happened because the victim had suddenly swerved into the path of the van, such that the accused could not brake in time (a version of events the accused told to Teo and Irene, but which was contradicted by the video footage, and the accused did not maintain at trial).

As explained above, I have rejected the accused’s claim to have fallen asleep at the wheel in the seconds before the collision. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused remained in control of the van at the material time, and that he intended for the van to collide into, and run over, the victim.

An instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death

On the third element, I accept that the van was an instrument, which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death. In J Ravinthiran v Public Prosecutor [2004] SGHC 273, the High Court upheld a conviction under s 326 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) where the offender had knocked down the victim with a motor vehicle, and moreover the High Court commented that the use of a motor vehicle was an aggravating factor: at [54]. That a motor vehicle satisfies the element of “instrument which, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death” is also supported by Indian cases on the Indian equivalent of s 326 of Singapore’s Penal Code, ie, s 324 of the Indian Penal Code, such as:

(a) D Prasad S/O Parameswaran Nair vs Unknown Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 1532 of 2022 at [4]: “A car when used for causing hurt to a person would certainly come within the purview of dangerous weapon as contemplated u/s 324.”; and

(b) Manoj vs State of Kerala and Ors Crl. Rev. Pet, No. 162 of 2013 at [12]: “A motorbike, if used to strike or run over someone, could cause their death. While a motorbike is not inherently a weapon, its potential to cause death or serious injury when used to injure someone qualifies it as a dangerous weapon in such circumstances. Therefore, a motorbike can be considered a dangerous weapon outlined in Section 324 of the IPC if it is used to cause harm to another person.”.

The defence did not dispute that this third element was satisfied in this case.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the amended charge under s 326 of the Penal Code has been proved; I find the accused guilty of that charge, and convict him accordingly.

I will hear the parties on sentence.