Public Prosecutor v Thina Vengades Rao [2026] SGHC 137

The accused, Mr Thina Vengades Rao (“the Accused”), is a 29-year-old Malaysian male. He claimed trial to the following two charges of importing controlled drugs without authorisation, in contravention of s 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”):

(a) the first charge pertained to ten packets containing not less than 4,512.6g of granular/powdery substance that had been analysed and found to contain not less than 42.18g of diamorphine; and

(b) the second charge pertained to one packet containing not less than 490.4g of crystalline substance that had been analysed and found to contain not less than 330.8g of methamphetamine.

After a ten-day trial, I found the Accused guilty of both charges and convicted him accordingly. Upon conviction, I sentenced him to a global sentence of life imprisonment and 24 strokes of the cane. The reasons for my decision are set out below.

Facts

At the material time, the Accused worked as a lorry attendant for a Malaysian company based in Johor Bahru – Dickson Agro Trading (“Dickson Agro”) – that delivers bean sprouts to Singapore. His job involved assisting with loading bean sprouts onto a lorry in Johor Bahru and accompanying the lorry to Singapore.

On 18 December 2020, the Accused accompanied one of Dickson Agro’s lorries (“Lorry”) from Johor Bahru to Singapore. The Accused sat at the front passenger seat of the Lorry, which was driven by his colleague (“Lorry Driver”). The Lorry arrived at Woodlands Checkpoint at 5.43pm, at which time the police were conducting routine operations at the Cargo Clearance Centre (“CCC”) for lorry arrivals. At about 5.50pm, police officers directed the Lorry aside for an inspection. They then proceeded to conduct checks on the Lorry Driver while an officer from the Singapore Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, Checkpoint Inspector 2 R Subramaniam (“CI2 Subra”), conducted checks on the Accused.

After getting the Accused to alight from the Lorry, CI2 Subra climbed up the passenger side of the Lorry’s cabin. Kneeling on the seat of the front passenger seat, CI2 Subra proceeded to inspect the space behind the front passenger seat (ie, behind the backrest). For better visualisation of the front passenger seat, two photographs of the Lorry’s cabin (captured from the passenger’s side) are set out below. The right photograph shows the front passenger seat with its backrest folded down, allowing the viewer to see the space behind it:

When CI2 Subra shone his torch into the space behind the front passenger seat, he spotted a dark blue bag bearing the Nike brand (“Blue Nike Bag”).5 He then climbed down from the Lorry’s cabin and asked the Accused to retrieve the Blue Nike Bag from behind the front passenger seat. The Accused replied that the Blue Nike Bag was too heavy, to which CI2 Subra insisted that he retrieve it. The Accused thus climbed up the Lorry’s cabin to retrieve the Blue Nike Bag from behind the front passenger seat. It was undisputed that at this point, the Blue Nike Bag contained bundles wrapped in black tape – referred to in this judgment as “black bundles”. The Accused took a few minutes to retrieve the Blue Nike Bag from behind the front passenger seat, prompting CI2 Subra to query about the delay. The Accused replied that the Blue Nike Bag was stuck. Eventually, the Accused managed to get the Blue Nike Bag out from behind the front passenger seat and passed the same to CI2 Subra.

It was from this point that the accounts of the Prosecution and Defence witnesses materially diverged:

(a) According to CI2 Subra, when the Accused handed the Blue Nike Bag to him, CI2 Subra had shone his torch into it only to see that it was empty. Sensing that something was amiss, CI2 Subra climbed up the passenger side of the Lorry’s cabin and, once again, shone his torch into the space behind the front passenger seat. This time, he spotted the black bundles there. CI2 Subra reached behind the front passenger seat to take out one of the black bundles. He showed the black bundle to the Accused and asked him what it was, to which the Accused replied that he did not know. CI2 Subra placed the black bundle on the seat of the front passenger seat and reached behind the front passenger seat to take out a second black bundle. CI2 Subra asked the Accused what this second black bundle was, to which the Accused again replied that he did not know. CI2 Subra then placed the second black bundle on the seat of the front passenger seat, together with the first black bundle. According to CI2 Subra, even after he had taken these two black bundles out from behind the front passenger seat and (after showing them to the Accused) placed them on the seat of the front passenger seat, there were still more black bundles in the space behind the front passenger seat.

(b) The Accused, on his part, explained that he had taken some time to retrieve the Blue Nike Bag because it was stuck behind the front passenger seat. To release the Blue Nike Bag, he had to tug at it with some force. This caused the zipper to come open, allowing the black bundles to tumble out of the Blue Nike Bag. Still, the Accused maintained that (contrary to CI2 Subra’s account), the Blue Nike Bag was not empty when he passed it to CI2 Subra. The Accused maintained that even after the black bundles tumbled out of the Blue Nike Bag, there was still one black bundle remaining in it when he handed the Blue Nike Bag to CI2 Subra.

Suspecting that the black bundles contained drugs, CI2 Subra had then notified the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”). At around 6.10pm, three CNB officers – Woman Staff Sergeant Goh Li May (“W/SSgt Goh”), Staff Sergeant Muhammad Munawwar bin Mohamed Ismail (“SSgt Munawwar”), and Staff Sergeant Abdul Hafiz bin Roslan (“SSgt Hafiz”) – arrived at the CCC. SSgt Hafiz noticed that the Blue Nike Bag was placed on the seat of the front passenger seat, along with the two black bundles that CI2 Subra had retrieved from behind the front passenger seat and shown to the Accused. SSgt Hafiz also spotted more black bundles in the space behind the front passenger seat. He then took one of the two bundles that CI2 Subra had placed on the seat of the front passenger seat and asked the Accused if he knew what it contained. The Accused replied “chemical”. SSgt Hafiz then used a scalpel to make a cut in the black bundle and saw brownish granular substance inside. SSgt Hafiz showed this to the Accused and asked if the latter maintained his answer, to which the Accused repeated his response: “chemical”. SSgt Hafiz then proceeded to retrieve the remaining black bundles from behind the front passenger seat. According to SSgt Hafiz, he retrieved an additional five black bundles from behind the front passenger seat which, together with the two black bundles that CI2 Subra had taken out and placed on the seat of the front passenger seat, amounted to a total of seven black bundles. After ascertaining that there were no more black bundles in the Lorry’s cabin, SSgt Hafiz seized the seven black bundles and placed them in a resealable bag. The Blue Nike Bag was also seized. The Accused and the Lorry Driver, as well as the seized items, were brought to the CCC office where SSgt Hafiz recorded the Accused’s first contemporaneous statement (“1st Contemporaneous Statement”).14

Thereafter, the seven black bundles were transported to the CNB Headquarters for processing, where they were found to contain: (a) ten packets of granular/powdery substance; and (b) one packet of crystalline substance. These were despatched to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) for analysis. The HSA subsequently issued reports confirming that:

(a) the ten packets of granular/powdery substance were collectively found to contain not less than 42.18g of diamorphine; and

(b) the packet of crystalline substance was found to contain not less than 330.8g of methamphetamine.

A urine sample was also taken from the Accused for testing. This was subsequently found to contain methamphetamine.

Parties’ cases

It was not in dispute that the Accused was in possession of the Blue Nike Bag and that he knew that this contained the black bundles, although he claimed not to have known exactly how many black bundles were in the Blue Nike Bag. Arising from these facts, two statutory presumptions were at play:

(a) the presumption of possession in s 18(1)(a) of the MDA, which the Prosecution relied on to establish that the Accused was in possession of the drugs in the black bundles; and

(b) the presumption of knowledge in s 18(2) of the MDA, which the Prosecution relied on to establish that the Accused knew the nature of those drugs.

Defence’s case

The Accused sought to rebut these presumptions by claiming that he thought the black bundles contained chemicals for cleaning toilets. Specifically, he claimed that one “Deva” had passed him the Blue Nike Bag while they were in Johor Bahru and asked him to bring it to Singapore, where the Accused was to then pass it to Deva’s brother “Mages”. According to the Accused, Deva had informed him that the black bundles contained chemicals that could cause a virus if touched – an explanation which the Accused claimed to have believed. The Accused testified that when Deva handed him the Blue Nike Bag, Deva assured him that the chemicals in the black bundles would not cause any issues at the customs checkpoint – the customs authorities would at the very most discard the chemicals if they were not allowed to be brought in.

Fuller details of the Accused’s account as to how he came to deliver the black bundles for Deva were set out in his second long statement recorded by the CNB on 26 December 2020 (“2nd Long Statement”). The most salient portions of the 2nd Long Statement are set out below:

(a) On the evening of 17 December 2020, ie, the day before the arrest, the Accused was attending a friend’s party in Johor Bahru. There, he was introduced to Deva. Deva had asked if the Accused could deliver food and clothing to Deva’s brother, Mages, in Singapore. The Accused agreed. Deva had then asked for the Accused’s contact number, which the Accused provided. The relevant section of the 2nd Long Statement is extracted below:

The party ended at about 4–5am on the morning of 18 December 2020, ie, the day of the Accused’s arrest.

(b) At about 12 noon on 18 December 2020, Deva communicated- with the Accused via WhatsApp, repeating his query as to whether the Accused could make the delivery to Mages in Singapore. However, this time, he asked if the Accused could deliver chemicals (as opposed to food and clothing) to Mages. Deva also asked the Accused if the customs authorities would be fine with this, to which the Accused replied that the items would be allowed into Singapore so long as they were permitted by the customs authorities. The relevant portion of the 2nd Long Statement is set out below:

(c) At about 4pm, Deva turned up at the factory in Johor Bahru where the Accused worked and met with him. During the meeting, Deva passed the Accused the Blue Nike Bag, asking him to bring it to Singapore and pass it to Mages at Kranji MRT station. The Accused opened the Blue Nike Bag and saw the black bundles inside. This was the first time that the Accused had seen such bundles wrapped in black tape, not ever having seen such black-taped bundles before. He had then taken one of the black bundles out of the Blue Nike Bag and asked Deva what it was. Deva replied that the black bundles contained dangerous chemicals that could transmit a virus if touched, to which the Accused promptly dropped the black bundle back into the Blue Nike Bag. The relevant portion of the 2nd Long Statement is as follows:

The Accused was not told by Deva how many black bundles were in the Blue Nike Bag, nor did the Accused count them.29

(d) The Accused then took the Blue Nike Bag from Deva and placed it behind the front passenger seat of the Lorry. Less than two hours thereafter, the Lorry was ferrying the Accused and the Blue Nike Bag to Singapore, where the Accused was arrested at the Woodlands CCC.

In his third long statement recorded on 28 December 2020 (“3rd Long Statement”), the Accused elaborated further on what Deva told him about the black bundles. Specifically, the Accused recounted how Deva told him that the black bundles contained chemicals for washing toilets and were dangerous, as anyone touching them could contract skin problems and a virus. The relevant portion of the 3rd Long Statement is set out below:

During the trial, the Accused retracted the portion of the 3rd Long Statement where he recounted that Deva told him that the chemicals were for washing toilets. The Accused clarified that while Deva told him that the black bundles contained chemicals that could cause a virus, Deva did not elaborate that the chemicals were for washing toilets. Rather, the Accused clarified that it was the Accused himself who surmised that the chemicals were meant for washing toilets.

The Defence also contended that the Accused suffered from mild intellectual disability (“ID”) and that this condition rendered him more gullible than others. According to the Defence, this explained why the Accused had been particularly trusting of Deva when the latter told him about the contents of the black bundles, when normal people might have questioned Deva’s motives.

Furthermore, the Defence submitted that the chain of custody over the drugs had not been proven by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Prosecution’s case

The Prosecution’s case was that the Accused knew that the black bundles contained drugs. It submitted that quite apart from the operation of the presumption of knowledge at [11(b)] above, the evidence sufficed to prove that the Accused knew about the nature of the drugs in the black bundles. To support this contention, the Prosecution raised the following factors:

(b) The constant evolution in the Accused’s account of what he thought the black bundles contained.

(c) Various circumstances that rendered the Accused’s claim of being ignorant about the black bundles’ contents implausible.

The Prosecution also rejected the Defence’s claim that the Accused suffered from mild ID, maintaining that he did not have ID and was, in any case, not so gullible as to have been misled by Deva about the contents of the black bundles.

Finally, the Prosecution maintained that the chain of custody had remained intact from the seizure of the seven black bundles until the point when the packets of drugs in them were sent to the HSA for testing.

My decision

I begin with an overview of the law on drug importation under s 7 of the MDA. This offence has three elements – see Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 254 (“Adili Chibuike Ejike”) at [27]:

It was undisputed that the Accused lacked authorisation to import the drugs in the black bundles. As such, the elements which were contested in this case were the possession requirement and the knowledge requirement. The key issues in this case were thus as follows:

(1) Whether the possession requirement was satisfied, ie, whether the Accused could be regarded as having been in possession of the drugs in the black bundles when he transported them to Singapore.

(2) Related to issue (1), whether the chain of custody over the black bundles and the packets of drugs extracted therefrom had been sufficiently established, such that what was in the Accused’s possession could be linked to the HSA reports at [9] (which certified the drugs as containing not less than 42.18g of diamorphine and not less than 330.8g of methamphetamine).

(3) Whether the knowledge requirement was satisfied – ie, whether the Accused could be regarded as having known of the nature of the drugs, if they were indeed in his possession.

(4) Related to issue (3) above, whether the Defence had successfully demonstrated that the Accused suffered from mild ID and, if so, the impact this would have on the knowledge requirement.

My conclusions on each of these four issues are set out below.

Issue 1: Whether the Accused was in possession of the drugs

The Accused was – without a doubt – in possession of the Blue Nike Bag as he had intentionally transported the same. The next question was whether he was in possession of the black bundles in it. For that, he must have been aware at the material time that the black bundles were in his physical possession. As explained in Adili Chibuike Ejike (at [31]):

In the present case, the Accused clearly knew that the black bundles were in the Blue Nike Bag. Upon receiving the Blue Nike Bag from Deva, he had opened it and taken out one of the black bundles to ask Deva about it – see [13(c)] above. The Accused must thus be regarded as having been in possession of the black bundles at the material time. His possession of the black bundles in turn triggered the presumption under s 18(1)(a) of the MDA, which reads:

As the drugs were contained in the black bundles, the operation of s 18(1)(a) of the MDA meant that the Accused was presumed to be in possession of these drugs.

The Defence’s submissions contended that the statutory presumptions under, inter alia, s 18(1) of the MDA had been rebutted. Yet, these submissions offered no explanation whatsoever as to just how it had been rebutted. In attempting to make sense of the Defence’s contention, I noted that an accused person can rebut the presumption of possession by demonstrating that the drugs were planted in his bag or vehicle – see Obeng Comfort v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 633 (“Obeng Comfort”) at [35]. Under such circumstances, he cannot be said to have known that the drugs were in his physical possession. Viewed from this lens, there appeared to be one angle which neither the Defence nor the Prosecution had touched upon. As explained at [7(b)] above, the Accused claimed that as he was attempting to retrieve the Blue Nike Bag, its zipper came open, allowing the black bundles inside to tumble into the space behind the front passenger seat. This then had to be juxtaposed against the Accused’s position that he did not know exactly how many black bundles were in the Blue Nike Bag – he claimed only to have known that there were multiple black bundles in it. That being the case, was it possible for any of the black bundles seized from behind the front passenger seat (see [8] above) not to have dropped from the Blue Nike Bag? Put another way, could any of the black bundles found behind the front passenger seat have been planted there by someone other than the Accused, prior to the Lorry’s departure to Singapore? If so, this could potentially pose an obstacle to establishing the possession requirement, at least in respect of any such planted bundle(s).

While this was not the case run by the Defence at trial, I nevertheless examined this issue for completeness. In doing so, I noted that when SSgt Hafiz recorded the 1st Contemporaneous Statement on the evening of the arrest, he specifically asked the Accused:

A perusal of the 1st Contemporaneous Statement clearly showed that the Accused’s possession of all seven black bundles was never in issue. SSgt Hafiz had referred to the “7 black bundles” and the Accused, in the course of his answer, alluded to the Blue Nike Bag containing “all the black bundles” which, viewed against the immediately preceding context, must have been a reference to the “7 black bundles” that SSgt Hafiz had just referred the Accused to.

More importantly, the thrust of the Accused’s case was that all the black bundles came from Deva, with nothing on the record to suggest that Deva (or anyone acting on Deva’s behalf) might have climbed up the Lorry and planted any of the black bundles into the space behind the front passenger seat.

I therefore concluded that the Accused had failed to rebut the presumption under s 18(1)(a) of the MDA. In other words, the presumption that the Accused was in possession of the drugs in the black bundles – triggered by proof of his possession of the black bundles – stood unrebutted.

Issue 2: Whether the chain of custody was broken

A further contention raised by the Accused pertained to the chain of custody over the drugs after they were seized from the Lorry’s cabin. Even if the Accused was in possession of the drugs in the seven black bundles, the importation charges would be undermined if a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the drugs seized from the Lorry:

(a) might not be the same drugs sent; or

(b) might have been contaminated prior to being sent,

to the HSA for testing. Such reasonable doubt would certainly stand in the way of me ruling that the Accused was in possession of the drugs that were the subject of the HSA reports at [9] above, upon which the charges were premised.

It is trite that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the drugs analysed by the HSA were indeed the ones seized from the Accused. In Mohamed Affandi bin Rosli v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 440 (“Affandi”), the Court of Appeal explained (at [39]):

The Court of Appeal in Affandi also cited (at [41]) the case of Lai Kam Loy v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 SLR(R) 143, where the Court of Appeal admonished (at [38]) that:

Notwithstanding this, the Prosecution in the present case did adduce evidence from every individual who handled the seven black bundles, as well as the packets of drugs extracted therefrom, to demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody from the point of seizure of the black bundles to the point when the packets of drugs therein were sent to the HSA for analysis. From the evidence, the following chain of events that can be pieced together:

(a) As explained at [7(a)] above, CI2 Subra’s evidence was that he had taken two of the black bundles from behind the front passenger seat and shown them to the Accused, before placing them on the seat of the front passenger seat. He then left both the black bundles there, with the other black bundles remaining behind the front passenger seat.

(b) CI2 Subra was then relieved by the CNB officers arriving at the scene. They included SSgt Hafiz, who saw the two black bundles placed by CI2 Subra on the seat of the front passenger seat, as well as the black bundles behind the front passenger seat. As explained at [8] above, SSgt Hafiz retrieved five black bundles from behind the front passenger seat. During this process, the Accused was standing outside the passenger side door and could see SSgt Hafiz retrieving the black bundles. SSgt Hafiz then placed all seven bundles in an empty resealable bag.

(c) W/SSgt Goh then took custody of the seven black bundles and the Blue Nike Bag, after which the party returned to the CCC office with the Accused and the Lorry Driver. There, W/SSgt Goh had at two junctures handed the seven black bundles to her fellow CNB officers for purposes of statement-taking:

(i) At around 6.59pm, she handed the seven black bundles to SSgt Munawwar to facilitate the recording of the Lorry Driver’s contemporaneous statement. After showing the seven black bundles to the Lorry Driver, SSgt Munawwar returned them to W/SSgt Goh.

(ii) Shortly after, at around 7.19pm, she handed the seven black bundles to SSgt Hafiz to facilitate the recording of the 1st Contemporaneous Statement from the Accused. Upon conclusion of the recording of the statement at 8.13pm, SSgt Hafiz returned the seven black bundles to W/SSgt Goh.

(d) At about 8.43pm, at the CCC office, W/SSgt Goh handed the seven black bundles to Woman Senior Staff Sergeant Siti Hawa binte Sulaiman (“W/SSSgt Siti”), who brought them to the CNB’s B3 office. At about 9.44pm, W/SSSgt Siti placed each black bundle and the Blue Nike Bag into individual tamper-proof bags and sealed the same, in W/SSgt Goh’s presence, before putting the seven black bundles into a locked cabinet.

(e) About 5½ hours later, at about 4.10am on 19 December 2020, W/SSSgt Siti withdrew the seven black bundles from the locked cabinet and handed them to Assistant Superintendent Ng Zhi Hao (“ASP Ng”). ASP Ng also took over custody of the Accused and the Lorry Driver and escorted them from the Woodlands Checkpoint to the Tanglin Police Divisional Headquarters, where he left both men to serve a “Stay-Home Notice” pursuant to COVID-19 measures.

(f) Thereafter, ASP Ng brought the seven black bundles back to the CNB Headquarters where, at about 6.03am, he handed them to Woman Inspector Tan Lye Cheng, Michelle (“Insp Michelle”).

At 6.07am, Insp Michelle and three other CNB officers commenced the processing of the seven black bundles, within the Exhibit Management Room (“EM Room”). As to what happened during the processing, this could be gleaned from the evidence of Insp Michelle and the three other CNB officers, ie, Assistant Superintendent Fernandez Anthony Leo (“ASP Anthony”), XT3 Haifaa binte Mohamed Anwar (“XT3 Haifaa”) and XT3 Lee Jia Ying, Cheryl (“XT3 Cheryl”). The processing of the seven black bundles was executed as follows:

(a) The seven black bundles and the Blue Nike Bag were placed on clean sheets of brown paper, with labels placed against each item, and photographed. The Blue Nike Bag was labelled as “A1” while the seven black bundles were respectively labelled as “A2” to “A8”.

(b) XT3 Haifaa and XT3 Cheryl had then proceeded to cut the wrappings of the black bundles to take out their contents. XT3 Haifaa explained that prior to cutting the black bundles, she noticed that one of them had “a partially cut mark”, although she did not specifically relate this to the cut that SSgt Hafiz had made with a scalpel on one of the black bundles (see [8] above). Upon cutting the seven black bundles open, it was found that:

(i) A2 and A8 each contained one packet of brown granular/powdery substance;

(ii) A3, A4, A6 and A7 each contained two packets of brown granular/powdery substance; and

(iii) A5 contained (inter alia) one packet of white crystalline substance.

The seven black bundles were thus found to collectively contain ten packets of brown granular/powdery substance and one packet of white crystalline substance (collectively, “the 11 Packets”).

(c) As XT3 Haifaa and XT3 Cheryl were cutting the seven black bundles open to extract the 11 Packets, they found that all of the 11 Packets were leaking. XT3 Haifaa testified that she could not tell if the leak was caused by their act of cutting of the black bundles open (to take the 11 Packets out) or whether the 11 Packets were already leaking before that. The 11 Packets were then swabbed by XT3 Haifaa for DNA and photographed by XT3 Cheryl. Given the leakage, powdery residue could be seen on the brown paper when the 11 Packets were being photographed. Thereafter, the 11 Packets were placed in resealable bags to preserve exhibit integrity, with the residue placed in the resealable bag containing the specific packet from which the residue had leaked.

The processing of the seven black bundles (and the 11 Packets extracted therefrom) ended at around 10.08am, following which XT3 Haifaa and XT3 Cheryl left for other duties. As for Insp Michelle and ASP Anthony, they remained in the EM Room from about 10.15am to about 10.20am to weigh the 11 Packets. Insp Michelle recorded the weight values in the investigation diary. After the weighing was done, the tamper-proof bags containing the 11 Packets were then sealed. As it was already Saturday morning, Insp Michelle brought the 11 Packets to her office within the CNB Headquarters and locked them inside, before leaving for the weekend. Only she could unlock her office as she held the only key.

On the morning of Monday, 21 December 2020, Insp Michelle returned to her office and retrieved the 11 Packets, which then passed through the following hands:

(a) At about 9.30am, Insp Michelle handed all the case exhibits (including the 11 Packets) to Inspector Muhammed Ridlwan bin Mohamed Raffi (“Insp Ridlwan”).

(b) At about 10.28am, Insp Ridlwan handed the case exhibits (including the 11 Packets) to Sergeant (3) Kovalan s/o Gopala Krishna (“Sgt Kovalan”) at the CNB Exhibit Management Team (“EMT”) office. Sgt Kovalan placed the 11 Packets inside a locked metal cabinet in the EMT office and kept the key to the cabinet.

(c) Sometime before 4.55pm, Sgt Kovalan retrieved the 11 Packets from the locked metal cabinet in the EMT office and handed them to Sergeant (3) Muhammad Sufyan bin Mohamed Khairolzaman (“Sgt Sufyan”). At 4.55pm, Sgt Sufyan handed the 11 Packets to the HSA Illicit Drugs Laboratory for analysis.

Notwithstanding the evidence above, the Defence raised the following issues to cast doubt on whether the chain of custody was indeed intact:

(a) Firstly, the Defence argued that there were questions as to how many black bundles were inside the Blue Nike Bag, especially since the Accused claimed not to have even known just how many black bundles were in it (see [24] above).

(b) Secondly, the Defence argued that there was uncertainty about the circumstances surrounding the custody of the black bundles while they were still at the Woodlands Checkpoint, given the following:84

(i) No photographs were taken of the black bundles when they were at the Woodlands Checkpoint.

(ii) After being removed from the Lorry, the black bundles were locked in a cabinet in the CNB’s B3 office at Woodlands Checkpoint by W/SSSgt Siti (see [30(d)] above). Yet, Insp Michelle made no checks on the black bundles while they were locked in that cabinet.

(c) Thirdly, the Defence challenged the process by which the black bundles and the 11 Packets within them had been processed by Insp Michelle and the three other CNB officers at the EM Room in the CNB Headquarters. Specifically, the Defence contended that the processing suffered from the following irregularities:

(i) The Accused was not present in the EM Room during the processing of the seven black bundles.

(ii) During the processing, powdery residue from the drug exhibits had leaked onto the brown paper (see [31(c)] above). Yet, there were no photographs focusing specifically on the spillage, ie, in isolation from the 11 Packets. This, argued the Defence, gave rise to questions as to whether the spillage was only from some of the 11 Packets or from all of them.

(iii) Although Insp Michelle had weighed the 11 Packets and recorded the values in the investigation diary (see [32] above), her conditioned statement failed to stipulate what these values were. This, argued the Defence, left a question mark over the weights of the 11 Packets, while they were still in the EM Room.

(iv) The 11 Packets were sealed in tamper-proof bags only after they had been weighed by Insp Michelle and not before. Insp Michelle testified that when XT3 Haifaa and XT3 Cheryl were done with photographing the 11 Packets and other exhibits, these were placed into tamper-proof bags without the bags being sealed. The tamper-proof bags were sealed only after the 11 Packets were weighed by Insp Michelle (see [32] above).

(d) Finally, the Accused took issue with the fact that the drug exhibits were in Insp Michelle’s office over the weekend, from the morning of Saturday, 19 December 2020 to the morning of Monday, 21 December 2020 (see [32] above).

The following sets out my assessment of each of the four points raised by the Defence above – all of which in my view hold no merit.

Firstly, as regards the contention that the Accused did not know how many black bundles were in the Blue Nike Bag, I failed to comprehend how this was even a chain of custody issue. Based on the evidence, there was nothing to suggest that any of the seven black bundles originated from anywhere other than the Blue Nike Bag, which had in turn been in the Accused’s possession at all material times. As explained at [25] above, the Defence’s case contained no suggestion to this effect – the Accused did not insinuate that any of the seven black bundles had been planted in the space behind the front passenger seat by someone else. Even if he did not know the exact number of black bundles in the Blue Nike Bag, while he was transporting it across the border, this did not alter the fact that he was in possession of the Blue Nike Bag’s contents.

Secondly, in relation to the window of time when the black bundles were still at the Woodlands Checkpoint, the Accused failed to identify any break in the chain of custody that might have occurred during this period. The fact that no photographs were taken of the black bundles while they were at the Woodlands Checkpoint is of little impact, given the comprehensive testimonies of the witnesses establishing that the black bundles seized from the Lorry were indeed those eventually sent to the CNB Headquarters. The evidence showed how the seven black bundles from the Lorry had been seized by SSgt Hafiz and passed to W/SSgt Goh, who then handed them to W/SSSgt Siti. W/SSSgt Siti had then locked the black bundles in the cabinet in the CNB B3 office, before taking them out and passing them to ASP Ng (who then transported the black bundles to the CNB Headquarters). That Insp Michelle did not check on the black bundles after they were placed in the cabinet by W/SSSgt Siti is also immaterial as there was no suggestion that anybody could have tampered with the black bundles while they were stored there. W/SSSgt Siti testified that she had locked the cabinet after placing the black bundles inside, unlocking it only to take the black bundles out and pass them to ASP Ng. When the Defence cross-examined W/SSSgt Siti on this, she made it clear that no one else had the key to the cabinet except her.

Moving on to the Defence’s contentions about the purported irregularities when the drugs were being processed in the EM Room (at [34(c)] above), I found that these failed to disclose any breaks in the chain of custody.

(a) Firstly, the fact that the Accused was not present in the EM Room when the seven black bundles were opened and photographed did not taint the process. The CNB had its reasons for placing the Accused in the Tanglin Police Divisional Headquarters despite the processing having been conducted in the CNB Headquarters – this was to comply with COVID-19 quarantine safety measures (see [30(e)] above). More to the point, the inability of an accused person to observe the processing of the drug exhibits does not mean that the chain of custody is broken for the duration of non-observation. I can do no better than echo the words of Philip Jeyaretnam J in Public Prosecutor v Yogesswaran C Manogaran [2024] 6 SLR 624 (“Yogesswaran”) at [45]:

In that case, the accused persons were present during the weighing of the drug exhibits but absent when these exhibits were subsequently photographed and sealed. Jeyaretnam J held (at [46]) that the Prosecution had established an unbroken chain of custody through the evidence of two CNB officers who were present throughout the photo taking and subsequent sealing of the exhibits – the officers attested that the drug exhibits did not (contrary to the accused persons’ assertions) get mixed up. Reverting to the present case before me, the processing of the black bundles and the 11 Packets extracted from them had similarly been attested to by multiple individuals: Insp Michelle, ASP Anthony, XT3 Haifaa and XT3 Cheryl. All of them had testified and subjected themselves to cross-examination as to how the drug exhibits had been handled in the EM Room. There was nothing to suggest that the chain of custody was broken at any point during the processing or when the 11 Packets were subsequently weighed and sealed in tamper-proof bags.

(b) As regards the Accused’s concerns about how powdery residue from the drug exhibits had leaked onto the brown paper, the purport of this submission was unclear to me. If the concern was with contamination, the CNB officers had explained that after the 11 Packets were photographed, they were placed into resealable bags, with the residue corresponding to each packet being placed into the resealable bag containing the packet from which the residue had leaked, to maintain exhibit integrity – see [31(c)] above. More importantly, there was no suggestion that the brown paper on which the seven black bundles had been placed, opened and photographed contained drugs from any other source.

(c) Next, the fact that Insp Michelle did not stipulate the weights of the 11 Packets in her conditioned statement was irrelevant. The Defence did not allege any discrepancy between the weights of the 11 Packets as recorded by Insp Michelle in the EM Room, as compared to the weights recorded at any other stage (eg, when they were weighed by the HSA). Under cross-examination, Insp Michelle re-iterated that she had recorded the weights of the 11 Packets in the investigation diary but the Defence did not even see a need to ask her for the recorded figures. Plainly, the weights of the 11 Packets as recorded by Insp Michelle was never an issue.

(d) Finally, the Accused did not explain why the processing of the exhibits should be viewed as tainted in any way, just because the 11 Packets were sealed within the tamper-proof bags only after (and not before) they were weighed in the EM Room. There was nothing to suggest that the weighing process itself might have tainted the integrity of the 11 Packets in any way.

Finally, the fact that Insp Michelle locked the 11 Packets (as sealed in tamper-proof bags) in her office for the weekend also did not break the chain of custody. She explained that no one else had the key to the office except her (see [32] above). There was also no suggestion of any unauthorised entry into her office over the weekend, while the 11 Packets were stored there. The Court of Appeal in Affandi was faced with a similar factual matrix, ie, where the seized drug exhibits had been locked in the investigating officer’s office over the weekend. The court rejected the defence’s argument that the possibility of the exhibits having been tampered with while they were in the investigating officer’s office broke the chain of custody (see Affandi at [54]–[55]). The Court of Appeal remarked (at [56]):

Those remarks applied with equal force here, as regards the duration of the weekend when the 11 Packets were locked in Insp Michelle’s office.

I thus found that the Prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the chain of custody, from the point the black bundles were seized from the Lorry’s cabin to the time when the 11 Packets were sent to the HSA for analysis, remained intact throughout.

Issue 3: Whether the Accused knew about the nature of the drugs in the black bundles

I now turn to the knowledge requirement, which was the focal point for the bulk of the disputes in this case. Given that the Accused was presumed to be in possession of the drugs in the black bundles, he was also presumed – by the operation of s 18(2) of the MDA – to have known about the nature of the drugs in the black bundles. That subsection states:

In Obeng Comfort, the Court of Appeal explained the purport of this presumption (at [36]):

The Court of Appeal then held (at [37]) that an accused person seeking to rebut the presumption must do so by proving, on a balance of probabilities, that he did not have knowledge of the nature of the drugs in his possession. In doing so, the accused person should be able to say what he thought the drugs were, so as to allow the court to assess if the presumption had indeed been rebutted. The Court of Appeal explained (at [39]):

The Court of Appeal then observed that the assessment of the accused’s claim as regards what he thought he was carrying would be “a highly fact-specific inquiry”: Obeng Comfort at [40].

The following sets out my assessment of whether the Accused had managed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he did not have knowledge of the nature of the drugs in the seven black bundles. I concluded that the Accused had failed to do so. That conclusion was grounded on the following findings by me:

(a) Firstly, the Accused’s reaction when the drugs were first discovered strongly suggested that he did know of the contents of the black bundles.

(b) Secondly, the Accused’s account of how he came to meet Deva – being the person whom the Accused claimed had passed him the black bundles and who was thus the central figure around which the Accused’s entire defence revolved – was underpinned by a highly material lie.

(c) Thirdly, there were numerous other factors which showed that the Accused’s claim to ignorance was simply not credible.

Each of these findings is covered in turn below.

The Accused’s reaction when the drugs were discovered

The Prosecution’s case was that after CI2 Subra spotted the Blue Nike Bag, the Accused had clearly tried to obstruct him from examining its contents. Specifically, the Prosecution contended that the Accused made not one but two attempts to resist passing the Blue Nike Bag to CI2 Subra, as set out below:

(a) When CI2 Subra first asked the Accused to bring the Blue Nike Bag down from the Lorry’s cabin, the Accused tried to sidestep the request by saying that the Blue Nike Bag was too heavy (see [6] above). It was only after CI2 Subra insisted on seeing the Blue Nike Bag that the Accused climbed up the Lorry cabin to bring it down.

(b) Even when the Accused was retrieving the Blue Nike Bag, he took a few minutes to take it out from behind the front passenger seat of the Lorry’s cabin, to the point that CI2 Subra had to query about the delay. The Prosecution’s case was that the delay was attributable to the Accused taking steps to empty the Blue Nike Bag of the black bundles before handing it to CI2 Subra. As set out at [6] above, CI2 Subra’s evidence was that when the Accused eventually brought the Blue Nike Bag down and passed the same to CI2 Subra, it was empty.

The Accused denied that he deliberately emptied the Blue Nike Bag of all the black bundles before passing the same to CI2 Subra. As detailed at [7(b)] above, he claimed that the Blue Nike Bag was stuck behind the front passenger seat and, when he yanked at it, the zipper came open. This resulted in the black bundles tumbling out of the Blue Nike Bag and into the space behind the front passenger seat. Based on this, the black bundles had thus fallen out of the Blue Nike Bag inadvertently. Furthermore, the Accused disagreed with CI2 Subra’s account that the Blue Nike Bag was empty when the Accused passed it to him, contending instead that there was still one black bundle in the Blue Nike Bag that was handed to CI2 Subra (see [7(b)] above). The Accused’s contention was presumably to convey the notion that if he was still handing one of the black bundles to CI2 Subra, it would not be open to this court to infer that the Accused was trying to hide any of the black bundles from CI2 Subra.

CI2 Subra was not in court to be cross-examined as he had unfortunately passed away by the time of trial. His conditioned statement was thus admitted under the hearsay exception in s 32(1)(j)(i) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed). Notwithstanding, I was of the view that CI2 Subra’s account (as encapsulated in his conditioned statement) – when coupled with evidence of the surrounding circumstances – was sufficiently compelling to sustain the conclusion that the Accused did attempt to obstruct CI2 Subra from gaining access to the Blue Nike Bag’s contents. In contrast, I found the Accused’s claims to be sorely lacking in credit, for the following reasons:

(a) Firstly, the Defence was unable to explain how CI2 Subra could possibly have been mistaken in perceiving the Blue Nike Bag to be empty, given that he arrived at this perception only after shining a torch into the Blue Nike Bag (see [6] above).

(b) Secondly, given how CI2 Subra had insisted that the Accused retrieve the Blue Nike Bag despite the latter’s protests about it being too heavy (see [6] above), it must have been obvious to the Accused that CI2 Subra was highly interested in the Blue Nike Bag’s contents. The Accused would thus have been acutely aware that if – as he claimed – all but one of the black bundles in the Blue Nike Bag had just dropped into the space behind the front passenger seat (through the Accused’s own actions, no less), this would have been highly material to CI2 Subra. Yet the Accused simply handed the Blue Nike Bag to him without breathing a word about the black bundles that the Accused knew had just dropped behind the front passenger seat. This omission was plainly incongruent with the actions of someone not trying to hide anything.

In my view, the evidence was far more consistent with the Accused’s act of dropping the black bundles into the space behind the front passenger seat being a deliberate (rather than inadvertent) one, leaving the Blue Nike Bag empty when it was passed to CI2 Subra.

During the trial, the Accused tried to explain why he did not alert CI2 Subra to the black bundles that had dropped behind the front passenger seat. Specifically, he suggested that there was no need to alert CI2 Subra to the black bundles that fell out from the Blue Nike Bag because CI2 Subra would likely have seen at least two of the black bundles which fell out. In this respect, the Accused testified that when he had tried to pull the Blue Nike Bag out from behind the front passenger seat (causing its zipper to come open), not all the black bundles fell behind the front passenger seat. One of the black bundles had fallen onto the seat of the front passenger seat while another had fallen onto the floor beneath the front passenger seat, in full view of CI2 Subra. As seen from the photograph at [5] above, the seat of and the floor beneath the front passenger seat appear to be within the line of sight of someone standing outside the Lorry (such as CI2 Subra). If the Accused’s account were true, it would detract from the suggestion that his failure to alert CI2 Subra to the black bundles dropping out from the Blue Nike Bag arose from any desire to conceal them – there would be no need to alert CI2 Subra if he could already see some of the black bundles dropping out.

As a preliminary observation, I note that the Accused’s account of how the two black bundles had fallen within CI2 Subra’s line of sight was not captured anywhere in CI2 Subra’s conditioned statement. More critically, it was plainly contradicted by the Accused’s own description of his interactions with CI2 Subra, as captured in the following paragraphs of the 2nd Long Statement:

It was thus evident from the 2nd Long Statement, as extracted above, that the Accused meant to convey the narrative that the black bundles fell behind (and not in front of) the front passenger seat, except for one black bundle remaining in the Blue Nike Bag. The 2nd Long Statement also described how CI2 Subra had then climbed up the Lorry’s cabin and spotted the black bundles behind the front passenger seat. Finally, it went on to record the Accused as saying that to his recollection, two bundles were dropped on the seat (and not on the floor beneath the seat) – this dovetailed with the account by CI2 Subra (at [7(a)] above) that he had taken two of the black bundles from behind the seat, showed them to the Accused and placed both black bundles on the seat of the front passenger seat. SSgt Hafiz had also confirmed that he had seen these two bundles on the seat of the front passenger seat when he arrived at the scene to relieve CI2 Subra (see [8] above). There was nothing in the 2nd Long Statement about any black bundles falling onto the seat – much less the floor – of the front passenger seat, when the Accused was retrieving the Blue Nike Bag. It was thus plain to me that the Accused’s assertion – that CI2 Subra saw two of the black bundles falling out of the Blue Nike Bag – was no more than an afterthought.

In a further bid to justify why he failed to alert CI2 Subra to the black bundles falling out of the Blue Nike Bag, the Accused testified that CI2 Subra had, upon seeing them fall out, immediately directed the Accused not to say anything or touch anything. However, the Accused’s testimony about being directed not to say anything had to be contrasted with the subsequent portion of his oral evidence, in which he explained that when CI2 Subra saw the black bundles falling out, he had asked the Accused what those items were (to which the Accused replied that they were passed to him by a friend). This directly contradicted the prior assertion that when the black bundles fell out of the Blue Nike Bag, the Accused was immediately directed not to say (or touch) anything. The Accused nevertheless sought to qualify that it was only after this verbal exchange – in which CI2 Subra asked the Accused what the black bundles were – that the Accused was asked to climb down from the Lorry’s cabin and directed not to say or touch anything. The Accused was evidently unable to maintain a consistent account of just when CI2 Subra issued the directive to him not to say anything. This inspired little confidence about whether such a directive was ever issued at all. Certainly, it was neither reflected in CI2 Subra’s conditioned statement, nor in the Accused’s own statements to the CNB.

The Accused’s behaviour was thus strongly supportive of the inference that he had attempted to obstruct CI2 from accessing the Blue Nike Bag. When the Accused failed to fob off CI2 Subra’s request to see the Blue Nike Bag with the excuse that it was too heavy (see [6] above), he resorted to deliberately emptying the Blue Nike Bag of all seven bundles before passing it to CI2 Subra. The Accused’s explanations for his omission to tell CI2 Subra about the black bundles that had dropped from the Blue Nike Bag were unbelievable.

Apart from his behaviour, another notable feature of the Accused’s reaction to CI2 Subra lay in his words – specifically his reply when CI2 Subra asked him what the black bundles were. To recapitulate, CI2 Subra’s evidence was that the Accused replied – not once but twice – that he did not know what the black bundles contained (see [7(a)] above). If the Accused truly believed that the black bundles contained chemicals which (according to Deva) would cause no issues at the customs checkpoint (see [12] above), it was inexplicable why he did not simply relay this to CI2 Subra in response to the latter’s query. Instead, the Accused mentioned that the black bundles contained “chemicals” only later, relaying this to the CNB officers who subsequently arrived at the scene to relieve CI2 Subra – see [8] above. The Accused’s behaviour towards CI2 Subra was reminiscent of the facts in Pang Siew Fum v Public Prosecutor [2011] 2 SLR 635, where the accused person who was caught in possession of heroin claimed that she thought that she was carrying precious stones and Buddha pendants. Yet, when the bag containing the heroin was first opened in her presence by the authorities, she showed no reaction upon seeing the drugs. The Court of Appeal in that case made the following observation (at [67]):

In my view, a similar inference could be derived from the Accused’s answers to CI2 Subra (that he did not know what the black bundles were), coupled with his attempts to obstruct CI2 Subra from accessing the Blue Nike Bag’s contents. Viewed collectively, these reactions were highly consonant with him knowing what the black bundles in the Blue Nike Bag contained.

The Accused’s false claims about his relationship with Deva

A further ground for my conclusion that the presumption of knowledge stood unrebutted stemmed from the blatant lie that the Accused told the CNB about his relationship with Deva, by falsely claiming that he first met Deva on the night before his arrest when he knew Deva long before that. It must be stressed at the outset that this was not a lie pertaining to a supporting actor in the plot, or an inconsequential fib about some ancillary detail. Deva’s involvement formed the centrepiece of the defence. According to the Accused, it was Deva who gave him the drugs and misled him into thinking that they were chemicals. It was Deva who was going to give the Accused instructions on delivering the drugs when the latter arrived in Singapore. That the Accused lied about such a pivotal feature of his case thus severely undermined the credibility of his attempt to rebut the presumption of knowledge. The following sets out the circumstances by which the lie was purveyed.

In multiple statements recorded by the CNB, the Accused maintained that he met Deva for the first time at a party in Johor Bahru on 17 December 2020, ie, on the night before the arrest. In the 1st Contemporaneous Statement, which SSgt Hafiz recorded from the Accused shortly after the arrest, the Accused explicitly stated that he never met Deva before the party on 17 December 2020. This was seen in his answer in A3, extracted below:

The rest of the Accused’s answer in A3, in which he recounted what happened when Deva met him the next day – ie, the day of the arrest – and passed him the Blue Nike Bag, is extracted at [25] above.

Thereafter, the Accused perpetuated his account that he was “introduced” to Deva at the party, in the following statements to CNB:

(a) His first cautioned statement recorded on 19 December 2020 (“1st Cautioned Statement”).

(b) His 2nd Long Statement, recorded on 26 December 2020. In fact, as seen in the extract from this statement at [13(a)] above, the Accused clearly recounted in this statement that during the party, Deva asked for the Accused’s contact number, and the Accused had provided it to Deva.

For completeness, I should add that after the CNB statements above were recorded, interviews with the Accused were conducted in January 2021 by Dr Koh Wun Wu Kenneth Gerard (“Dr Koh”), the psychiatrist called by the prosecution. In these interviews, the Accused repeated the same narrative, ie, that he had met Deva for the first time at the party on the night before the arrest.

However, the Accused’s narrative about meeting Deva for the first time at the party on 17 December 2020, as conveyed by him in the three CNB statements above and in his interview with Dr Koh, was flatly contradicted by a report subsequently issued by the Criminal Investigation Department’s Technology Crime Forensic Branch on 27 October 2021 (“TCFB Report”). The TCFB Report showed that based on records extracted from the Accused’s phone, the Accused was acquainted with Deva well before the party on 17 December 2020. Specifically, the call records for the month of December 2020 showed that there were over 100 calls between the Accused’s number and the number which he said belonged to Deva, from the beginning of the month of December 2020 to the day of the arrest. Records of voice and text messages sent between the Accused’s number and Deva’s number also suggested that they knew each other, even before the party.

Relatedly, the Prosecution argued that the call records suggested that the Accused likely carried out deliveries of similar black bundles for Deva in the past. Specifically, two videos were extracted from the Accused’s phone, with one taken at 11.31pm on 4 December 2020 and the other taken five minutes later at 11.36pm. The first video showed a black bundle being dropped into a white bag, while the second showed a black bundle being deposited at the foot of a tree near a bus stop. Shortly after that, from 12.53am to 1.01am, 12 missed calls were made from Deva’s number to the Accused’s mobile phone. At about 1.02am, the Accused answered the call and spoke to Deva for over a minute. During this period, no one else called the Accused and he similarly did not call anyone else. I was of course mindful that there was no conclusive proof linking the depositing of the black bundles in the two videos with Deva, apart from the proximity of the calls. Still, the call records conclusively showed that the narrative which the Accused had repeatedly relayed, ie, that he met Deva for the first time only at the party on 17 December 2020, was patently false.

The Accused was subsequently interviewed by the Defence’s psychiatrist, Dr Jacob Rajesh (“Dr Rajesh”), over the course of several sessions commencing in August 2022, ie, after the release of the TCFB Report. During these interviews, he told Dr Rajesh that he first met Deva six to seven months before his arrest. In cross-examination, the contradictions between the Accused’s CNB statements (in which the Accused said that he met Deva only at the party on 17 December 2020) and the account which he gave to Dr Rajesh (that he already knew Deva for six to seven months before that) were put to the Accused. The Accused confirmed that the correct version was that which he had given to Dr Rajesh, ie, that he had known Deva for six to seven months prior to the arrest. The Accused also conceded that this version was “completely the opposite” of what he had said in his statements to the CNB.

In his oral evidence, the Accused tried to rationalise the contradictions by saying that he was “in a state of shock” when giving the contemporaneous statement extracted at [53] above. While his statements to the CNB captured him as saying that did not know Deva prior to the party, the Accused explained that he actually meant to say that he did not know Deva well prior to the party – the party being the occasion where both men got the chance to speak at length – and not that he did not know Deva at all prior to the party.

Even then, this rationalised narrative failed to cohere with the text and voice messages between both men, which clearly suggested that they were well acquainted with each other, even before the party on 17 December 2020. Set out below are the messages that both men exchanged on 16 December 2020 (ie, the day before the party) – these have been translated from Tamil:

The messages providing the most revealing insights were those exchanged between both men on 17 December 2020 itself, ie, the day the party was allegedly held (ie, the day before the arrest). These are extracted below:

Bearing in mind the Accused’s position that he attended the party on 17 December 2020 at about 8pm, the following preliminary insights may be drawn from the phone records above:

(a) The Accused and Deva were already exchanging phone messages within the three-hour window leading up to the Accused showing up at the party. Yet the Accused stated in the 2nd Long Statement that after he and Deva were introduced to each other at the party, Deva had asked for the Accused’s contact number (see [13(a)] above). It was thus clear to me that the Accused, in a bid to portray a more diluted level of familiarity between him and Deva, told a blatant lie – the premise for which had been unequivocally debunked by the phone records. It was impossible to construe this patent falsehood as an inadvertent miscommunication, notwithstanding the Accused’s attempts at [58] above to rationalise the contradictions in his CNB statements. When the Accused was pressed on this in cross-examination, he could offer no explanation save for the incredible tale that Deva did ask for his number at the party despite having exchanged numerous messages with the Accused just hours before that.

(b) It was also critical to note that the party allegedly took place in Johor Bahru. Yet, there was a message from Deva timestamped 18:09 (see the table above), ie, less than two hours before the Accused’s arrival at the party, in which Deva said that he was still in Kuala Lumpur. There were no messages from Deva thereafter intimating that he had arrived in Johor Bahru or alluding to meeting up with the Accused at the party. In fact, although two tables above purported to capture the messages exchanged between both men on 16 and 17 December 2020, they contained no mention of the party (which both men allegedly attended) at all. It was thus highly doubtful whether the party even happened.

More importantly, even the Accused’s revised account – that he only came to know Deva well at the party on the evening of 17 December 2020 (see [58] above) – could not be reconciled with the messages sent on 17 December 2020. This could be seen in Deva’s message to the Accused timestamped 19:05 in the table at [60] above, about whether the Accused had undergone any checks the day before. By way of background, the Accused had travelled through the customs checkpoint on 16 December 2020. Deva’s message at 19:05 on 17 December 2020 had thus queried the Accused: “How was the checking yesterday. It must have been real warm inside.” In court, the Accused confirmed that the “checking yesterday” which Deva was asking about pertained to the checks that the Accused had undergone at the Woodlands Checkpoint on 16 December 2020. Twenty minutes after that message from Deva, the Accused responded with the following message timestamped 19:26 (see [60] above ): “That day there was no checking inside. Never check anything”. The Accused explained that he was telling Deva that no checks were done at the Woodlands Checkpoint and “everything was as usual”. This exchange took place less than an hour before the Accused turned up at the party, where he supposedly got to know Deva well for the first time and gave Deva his number. It was impossible to fathom why the Accused was discussing with Deva whether he had undergone customs checks when passing through the Woodlands Checkpoint the day before, if both men were still not well acquainted with each other then.

Clearly, the phone records demonstrated that the Accused knew Deva, and knew him well at that, long before the alleged party on 17 December 2020. Yet, over the course of three statements to the CNB, the Accused advanced the false narrative that he first came to know Deva only at the party and had exchanged numbers with Deva then. The only inference which can be drawn is that the Accused was actively attempting to conceal the true nature of his relationship with Deva from the CNB. It cannot be overemphasised that the Accused’s account of his relationship with Deva went to the very heart of his defence. That he had repeatedly lied about it inspired very little confidence in the credibility of his attempt to rebut the presumption of knowledge.

Other factors betraying the lack of credibility in the Accused’s account

Apart from the Accused’s lies about his relationship with Deva, there were other material signs of the abject lack of credibility in the Accused’s claim to ignorance as regards what the seven black bundles contained.

Firstly, as explained at [12] above, his defence at trial was that he thought that the black bundles contained chemicals used for cleaning toilets and could cause a virus if touched. However, his claim to having this belief was undermined by how his statements – as to what he thought the black bundles contained – kept evolving. The following sets out the chronology of the Accused’s ever-changing accounts:

(a) As highlighted at [7(a)], when the Accused was first detained on 18 December 2020, he was asked by CI2 Subra – twice – as regards what the black bundles contained. The Accused had replied to CI2 Subra on both occasions that he did not know. No mention was made of the black bundles containing chemicals.

(b) When the CNB officers subsequently arrived at the scene to relieve CI2 Subra, the Accused was questioned again as to what the black bundles contained. This time, the Accused described the black bundles’ contents as “chemical”. Specifically, the Accused told SSgt Hafiz this on two occasions, once before and once after SSgt Hafiz had used a scalpel to make a cut in one of the black bundles to reveal the brownish granular substance inside – see [8] above. The Accused made no mention to SSgt Hafiz about the chemicals (i) giving rise to a “virus” if touched; or (ii) being used for washing toilets.

(c) SSgt Hafiz had then brought the Accused back to the CCC office to record his contemporaneous statement, during which the Accused was referred to the seven black bundles and asked what they were. In his response (see [25] above), the Accused initially said “I don’t know. I swear I don’t know”, after which he said that he was told by Deva that “they were dangerous chemicals that cannot come into contact with anyone as it is like a ‘virus’.” The narrative that the “chemicals” could give rise to a virus was then repeated by the Accused subsequently, in

(i) the 1st Cautioned Statement; and

(ii) the 2nd Long Statement (extracted at [13(c)] above).

No mention was made in any of these statements about the chemicals being for washing toilets.

(d) Finally, in the 3rd Long Statement, the Accused mentioned for the first time that the chemicals were for washing toilets. He recounted that Deva told him that the black bundles contained chemicals for washing toilets and that anyone touching them could get a skin problem and a virus – see the extract of the statement at [14] above.

From the chronology above, it was clear that the Accused was incapable of providing a narrative that had any semblance of consistency, as regards what he thought the black bundles contained.

Furthermore, the delay by the Accused in expressing his belief that the black bundles contained chemicals for washing toilets gave rise to doubts whether he genuinely harboured such a belief. The nature of the “chemicals” would have been highly material, seeing as how that term could conceivably encompass a wide range of substances, from the innocuous (eg, cleaning chemicals) to the illicit (eg, prohibited drugs, hazardous toxins or even explosives). The Accused was explicitly warned when the 1st Cautioned Statement was recorded, one day after his arrest, that any fact or matter which he failed to raise may be regarded as less believable. Yet, it was only in the 3rd Long Statement (see [64(d)] above), which was recorded ten days after his arrest, that the Accused mentioned about the chemicals being meant for washing toilets. If he honestly believed this to be true, it is hard to see why he had waited so long to say it – see also Public Prosecutor v Lee Zheng Da Eddie [2022] SGHC 199 at [50].

The Accused’s account of how he came to believe that the black bundles contained chemicals for washing toilets was also marred by a material contradiction. As explained at [64(d)] above, the Accused recounted in the 3rd Long Statement that Deva told him that the chemicals were for washing toilets (see extract at [14] above). However, during the trial, the Accused retracted this and said that Deva did not tell him that the chemicals were meant for washing toilets, and that it was the Accused himself who deduced that the chemicals were meant for washing toilets. Pertinently, this subsequent iteration of his story raised even more doubts about his defence. The Accused had previously worked in two different jobs as a cleaner, but he had never seen washing or cleaning products packed in the same manner as the black-taped bundles. In fact, he claimed never to have seen such black-taped bundles before (see [13(c)] above). That being the case, I found it difficult to conceive how he could have come to deduce – of his own accord and without Deva or anyone else telling him – that the chemicals were meant for washing toilets.

The difficulties riddling the Accused’s account thus pointed strongly to one conclusion: Deva never told him that the black bundles contained chemicals, whether for washing toilets or any other purpose.

That conclusion was also reinforced by what happened after the Accused was arrested on 18 December 2020. After his arrest, the CNB officers had created a cover story for him to relay to Deva, to facilitate follow-up operations for nabbing the intended recipient of the black bundles. The cover story contained the following key points:

(a) the Lorry was delayed because the Lorry Driver had a fever which necessitated COVID-19 tests at the customs checkpoint; and

(b) the Lorry had just been released and was on its way to Pasir Panjang, so Deva should arrange for the black bundles to be picked up.

For context, the messages exchanged between the Accused and Deva on the evening of the arrest, ie, on 18 December 2020, are set out below:

The hiatus in messages between 17:40 and 22:43 presumably reflected the window of time when the Accused was in custody. The message containing the cover story sent by the Accused to Deva was the one timestamped 22:49.

Deva’s response to the cover story, captured in the entry timestamped 22:50, was telling. That response made no mention of “chemicals” and instead alluded to “motor parts”. If it were indeed true that Deva had duped the Accused into thinking that the black bundles contained chemicals, this response (referring to motor parts) would have been plainly inexplicable. Even if Deva had somehow caught on that the game was up and the Accused’s message was no more than bait set by the CNB, there was still no reason for Deva to allude to “motor parts” in his message. After all, the “chemicals” narrative was – by the Accused’s own account – coined by Deva to conceal the true nature of the black bundles’ contents. If Deva had meant to maintain the charade in front of the CNB, he would logically have continued using the “chemicals” façade. There was no conceivable reason for him to make a reference – out of the blue – to “motor parts”. When asked why Deva had alluded to “motor parts” instead of “chemicals”, the Accused conceded that there was no reason for Deva to have done so. In my view, Deva’s response pointed strongly to the inference that he never told the Accused that the black bundles contained chemicals. I thus felt compelled to agree with the Prosecution’s deduction as to what must have happened, as set out in the following extract from its submissions:

It was also noteworthy that the messages exchanged on the day of the arrest contained absolutely no mention of Mages, thereby detracting from the Accused’s account that Deva wanted him to deliver the black bundles to Mages.

Apart from the above, there were also other material contradictions in the Accused’s testimony. His case was that Deva had passed him the black bundles on 18 December 2020 (ie, the day of the arrest), at about 4pm (see [13(c)] above). In court, the Accused explained that in doing so, Deva had assured the Accused that the chemicals were not going to pose any issues, even if discovered by the customs authorities, as they would at most discard the chemicals (see [12] above). However, in the 2nd Long Statement, the Accused recounted that sometime earlier that same day, at about 12 noon, Deva had contacted him via WhatsApp and questioned the Accused whether the authorities would be fine with the chemicals being brought through the checkpoint (see the extract of the 2nd Long Statement at [13(b)] above). The Accused’s account of his dealings with Deva on the day of his arrest thus simply did not add up: At noon, Deva was raising concerns about whether the chemicals would face issues with the customs authorities but, just four hours later at 4pm, he was reassuring the Accused that the chemicals would not cause any issues at the customs checkpoint. When this inconsistency was highlighted to the Accused, he agreed that both accounts were inconsistent. He nevertheless explained that there was a mistake in the 2nd Long Statement, in that during the WhatsApp exchange at 12 noon, it was he who questioned Deva (and not the other way around) about whether the chemicals would raise any concerns at the customs checkpoint. I reject the Accused’s attempt to explain the contradiction, given that he never corrected the purported error in the 2nd Long Statement when it was read back to him. An inference could be made that Deva never offered him any assurances about the chemicals posing no issues at the customs checkpoint.

Conclusion on the requirement that the Accused knew about the nature of the drugs in the black bundles

Accordingly, I found that the knowledge requirement was satisfied. The Accused was presumed under s 18(2) of the MDA to know the nature of the drugs in the seven black bundles. His attempt to rebut that presumption failed, given the utter lack of credibility in his claims that he thought that the black bundles contained chemicals for washing toilets.

Issue 4: Impact of the Accused’s claim that he had mild ID on the knowledge requirement

It cannot be gainsaid that by the Accused’s own account of how he had been approached by Deva, the circumstances by which the Accused came to be handed the black bundles were awash with red flags. I set some of these out below:

(a) As explained at [13(a)] above, it was the Accused’s case that when Deva first approached him at the party on 17 December 2020, he began with a rather innocuous request – for the Accused to send food and clothing to Mages. However, Deva subsequently followed up with a request that the Accused transport something much more unnerving: “chemicals” that could cause a virus. Deva made this request with nary an explanation as to just what these chemicals were. The Accused initially gave a statement to the CNB saying that Deva told him that the chemicals were meant for cleaning toilets (see [64(d)] above) but subsequently retracted this at trial, saying that it was the Accused himself who surmised that the chemicals were meant for cleaning toilets (see [66] above). Effectively, this meant that Deva never told him what the chemicals were, despite the cryptic warning that they could cause a virus.

(b) The appearance of the black bundles was also highly unusual, even from the Accused’s subjective perspective. In recounting how he first opened the Blue Nike Bag and saw the black bundles, the Accused affirmed that he had never seen such black-taped bundles before (see [13(c)] above). Deva’s request to transport something that looked so obscure, coupled with his lack of explanation about their contents, must have given the Accused more than ample cause for hesitation.

(c) Furthermore, the instructions which the Accused claimed to have received from Deva for delivering the black bundles to Mages sounded like something from the plot of a spy movie. The Accused was not given Mages’s contact number. He also did not know what Mages looked like, so there was no way for him to recognise Mages. As Mages similarly had not met the Accused before, he would have to identify the Accused from the logo on the Lorry. No timing was arranged for the meeting between the Accused and Mages. The precise location was also not confirmed, save that it would be at Kranji. The Accused was supposed to contact Deva upon arrival in Singapore, upon which the latter would arrange for Mages to meet the Accused. If the Accused failed to meet Mages at Kranji, he was to proceed to his next destination at Pasir Panjang. As with the Kranji rendezvous, neither the timing nor the exact location of the meeting point at Pasir Panjang was fixed, with the Accused again having to rely on Deva as regards what to do upon arrival.

(d) Any reservations about Deva’s request for the Accused to embark on such a clandestine errand must surely have been amplified by the fact that Deva (on the Accused’s own evidence) was someone with whom the Accused had little familiarity. As explained at [53] above, the Accused gave multiple statements to the CNB saying that he came to know Deva only at the party on the night before his arrest (ie, 17 December 2020) and they had exchanged contact numbers then. The Accused then retracted this at trial, saying that he already knew Deva for about six to seven months before the party but only came to know Deva well at the party itself (see [58] above). Even if the latter account were accepted, it still meant that the Accused had known Deva “well” for less than 24 hours before he undertook to import the black bundles for Deva, despite the suspicious circumstances enumerated above.

(e) What would really have set the alarm bells off was the fact that before the party on 17 December 2020, Deva was querying the Accused about whether the latter had undergone any checks when travelling through the customs checkpoint the day before (see [61] above). That this was even of concern to Deva would have made anyone question Deva’s motives in asking the Accused to transport the black bundles.

Despite these red flags, the Accused did not make further inquiries as to what the virus-causing chemicals in the black bundles were. All he did was to blithely assume that they were chemicals used for washing toilets, even though:

(a) as explained by the Accused at trial, Deva did not tell him this (see [14] above); and

(b) by his own account, the Accused (despite previously having held two different jobs as a cleaner) had never seen cleaning products packaged in such a manner (see [66] above).

If a person is asked to transport illicit substances under highly suspicious circumstances, the fact that he readily agrees to do so without making further inquiries can (when coupled with the surrounding circumstances) support the inference that he must have known about the nature of what he was asked to transport. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Adili Chibuike Ejike:

The Accused’s willingness to transport the black bundles, despite the patently suspicious circumstances at [74] above, thus lent itself to the inference that he actually knew what the black bundles contained. Axiomatically, this also served to undermine his attempt to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA.

The Defence nevertheless sought to address this by contending that the Accused had mild ID and was, by virtue of that, gullible. Accordingly, even if people of normal intelligence in the Accused’s shoes may have suspected that the contents of the black bundles were not what Deva represented them to be, the Defence argued that the Accused could not be expected to react in the same way. At trial, one of the key documents adduced was the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 5th Ed, 2013) (“DSM-5”). The portion of the DSM-5 most relevant to the Defence’s contentions on gullibility is set out below:

As the Defence bore the burden of rebutting the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA on a balance of probabilities (see [42] above), it would correspondingly have to establish, on a balance of probabilities, its contention that the Accused was suffering from mild ID. As observed by the Court of Appeal in Obeng Comfort (at [37]):

To show that the Accused had mild ID, the Defence adduced expert evidence from the following witnesses:

(a) Dr Rajesh, a Senior Consultant Psychiatrist at Promises (Winslow) Clinic, who prepared a psychiatric report dated 3 April 2023 (“Dr Rajesh’s Report”).

(b) Ms Pearlene Lim (“Ms Lim”), a Senior Clinical Psychologist at Promises Healthcare Pte Ltd, who prepared a psychological report dated 8 November 2022 (“Ms Lim’s Report”).

The Prosecution, on its part, responded with expert evidence from the following witnesses:

(a) Dr Koh, a Senior Consultant at the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”), who prepared two psychiatric reports – a first report dated 20 January 2021 (“Dr Koh’s 1st Report”) and a second report dated 10 November 2023 (“Dr Koh’s 2nd Report”).

(b) Dr Jackki Yim (“Dr Yim”), a Principal Clinical Psychologist at the IMH, who prepared a psychological report dated 30 October 2023 (“Dr Yim’s Report”).

The experts for both the Prosecution and the Defence agreed that the relevant diagnostic criteria for ID were those in the DSM-5, which states that the following three criteria must be satisfied to support a diagnosis of ID:

The three criteria are conjunctive, ie, a subject must satisfy all three before he can be diagnosed as having ID. The experts agreed that if one (or more) of the three criteria is not met, a diagnosis of ID cannot be reached.

Based on the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, Dr Rajesh and Ms Lim opined that the Accused suffered from mild ID, on account of what they perceived to be deficits in all three criteria above. In contrast, Dr Koh and Dr Yim opined that the Accused did not have ID. In arriving at their respective conclusions, the experts from both sides relied heavily on clinical interviews which they conducted with the Accused’s family members and acquaintances. As these family members and acquaintances were not called to testify, the factual assertions made by them during the clinical interviews were technically out-of-court statements caught by the rule against hearsay evidence – see Anita Damu v Public Prosecutor [2020] 3 SLR 825 at [30]–[31]. Nevertheless, I did not take issue with this as neither party objected to the veracity of the factual assertions. Rather, both sides focused their respective attacks on the methodology employed by the other side’s experts in drawing conclusions from these factual assertions.

In the face of the conflicting expert views, it was necessary for me to assess the “consistency and logic” of the experts’ conclusions, as per the guidance in Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983 (“Sakthivel”), where V K Rajah JA explained at [75]:

Having scrutinised the expert evidence with these guidelines in mind, I found the views of the Prosecution’s experts to be far more persuasive than those of the experts for the Defence. The reasons for my conclusion, set out below, sequentially address the three criteria (A, B and C) needed for a diagnosis of ID.

Criterion A: Deficits in intellectual functions

I began with Criterion A, which relates to deficits in intellectual functions. The relevant section of the DSM-5 elaborating on this deficit is set out below:

The DSM-5 explains that intellectual functions are “typically measured with individually administered and psychometrically valid, comprehensive, culturally appropriate, psychometrically sound tests of intelligence.” To that end, the psychologists from both sides each administered tests to measure the Accused’s intellectual functions. Dr Yim administered the Leiter International Performance Scale – Third Edition (“Leiter-3”), while Ms Lim administered the Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence, Second Edition (“CTONI-2”). Both these tests were non-verbal in nature. Dr Yim and Ms Lim both shared the view that non-verbal tests were more appropriate in this case as they were not biased against someone with poor proficiency in the English language such as the Accused (as opposed to tests that may require the subject to heavily call upon linguistic abilities in the English language).

The DSM-5 also prescribes the scoring range under which a subject may be regarded as suffering from deficits in intellectual functions:140

Both the Leiter-3 and CTONI-2 adopt this scoring range, ie, a mean score of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Accordingly, under either test, a score falling within the range of 65–75 would indicate a deficit in intellectual functions for the purpose of Criterion A.

The results of the tests conducted by the psychologists from both sides diverged significantly:

(a) Under the Leiter-3 conducted by Dr Yim, the Accused attained a score of 95, which placed him in the “average” range of intellectual functioning. This score exceeded that of 37% of peers in his age group. Dr Yim accordingly concluded that the Accused did not suffer a deficit in intellectual functions, thus failing to satisfy Criterion A.

(b) Under the CTONI-2 conducted by Ms Lim, the Accused attained a score of 72, which placed him in the “poor” range of intellectual functioning. This score matched or exceeded only 3% of individuals his age. Ms Lim consequently concluded that the Accused did suffer a deficit in intellectual functions, which satisfied Criterion A.

In addition to performing the CTONI-2, Ms Lim also applied another test called the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV). This test measures four areas of intellect: verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory and processing speed. However, Ms Lim performed sub-tests under the WAIS-IV for only two of these areas:

(a) Working memory, being the ability to “temporarily retain information, perform some operation or manipulation with it and produce a result”; and

(b) Processing speed, being the ability “to quickly and correctly scan, sequence and discriminate simple visual information”.

Ms Lim explained that she decided to measure only these two areas because they were not covered by the CTONI-2 and she wanted to get a more comprehensive picture of the Accused’s cognitive abilities. She also explained that she did not administer the full gamut of the WAIS-IV as its tests were largely “language dependent” (unlike the CTONI-2, which was non-verbal – see [85] above) and thus not suited to someone such as the Accused, who was not proficient in English. Accordingly, she had selected only those sub-tests for working memory and processing speed that did not rely on language. Having performed these sub-tests, she found the Accused’s scores for working memory and processing speed to lie in the “low average” range. According to Ms Lim, these scores did not on their own suffice to demonstrate a deficit in intellectual functions, as required by Criterion A.

As for Dr Yim, she explained that she declined to apply the CTONI-2 and the WAIS-IV as these tests had been administered by Ms Lim on the Accused only recently. Dr Yim thus wanted to “minimise practice effects”, ie, prevent the test scores from being influenced by the fact that the subject had taken the same test before. In this respect, just a month before Dr Yim assessed the Accused, the latter had relayed that he recalled being seen by Ms Lim and could recall the tests performed on him. Dr Yim also explained that as regards the WAIS-IV specifically, she did not see a need to perform the sub-tests done by Ms Lim because they had just been conducted by Ms Lim and (as explained in the preceding paragraph) the results did not indicate any deficit in either working memory or processing speed.

The Defence nevertheless sought to discredit Dr Yim’s choice of the Leiter-3 test on two fronts:

(a) Firstly, the Defence’s experts alluded to the Leiter-3 being less commonly used. Ms Lim testified that the CTONI-2 is more widely used than the Leiter-3. Dr Rajesh went further and said that he had not heard of the Leiter-3 before and “in so many years of practice in both IMH or even the UK” had never seen any psychologist use the Leiter-3.

(b) Ms Lim also explained that the CTONI-2 used a larger sample of individuals to derive its norms (about 2,800 people) compared to the Leiter-3 (about 1,600 people) and would therefore yield a more stable and reliable estimate of test characteristics, such as the mean score and the standard deviation (alluded to at [86] above). That would in turn contribute to the consistency of the test results and reduce the potential for bias that might otherwise arise from smaller samples.

As regards Dr Rajesh’s claim that he had never heard of the Leiter-3 test in all his years of practice, I derived no assistance from this as it was, with respect, no more than a hyperbolic declaration devoid of underlying science. In contrast, Ms Lim’s views contained much more granularity that helped cast light on what both tests were about. In her examination-in-chief, Ms Lim explained how both tests are conducted. As regards the Leiter-3, Ms Lim explained that this test focuses on the subject manipulating physical items:

Ms Lim thus said that the Leiter-3 “could be something that lends itself to … someone who is more used to working with his hands or someone who is perhaps used to thinking … in more concrete ways” [emphasis added]. In contrast, Ms Lim explained that the CTONI-2 requires the subject to manipulate pieces of information in his head, as opposed to manipulating the same in a concrete manner, and may consequently disadvantage individuals with less abstract reasoning abilities:

In cross-examination, Ms Lim elaborated on the distinction between concrete thinking and abstract reasoning, commenting that the Accused’s thinking appeared a bit more concrete and he thus seemed less predisposed to abstract reasoning:

Seizing on Ms Lim’s statements that the Accused appeared predisposed to concrete thinking rather than abstract reasoning, the Prosecution tried to get Ms Lim to concede that the CTONI-2 was a less appropriate test of the Accused’s intellectual functions than the Leiter-3 that Dr Yim had applied. As alluded to at [85] above, both Dr Yim and Ms Lim had respectively adopted the Leiter-3 and CTONI-2 because both tests are non-verbal in nature and (unlike tests that might be more linguistic-based) would not be biased against someone with poor proficiency in the English language such as the Accused. The Prosecution suggested to Ms Lim that this showed how psychologists selecting a test to measure intelligence must avoid tests which are inherently disadvantageous to the subject’s peculiar traits, as this could create a bias that artificially brings the test scores down. Accordingly, the Prosecution suggested to Ms Lim that the CTONI-2 was inappropriate because, as Ms Lim herself had explained (see [92] above), this test taxes the subject’s abstract reasoning more heavily and would thus unduly disadvantage the Accused who – in Ms Lim’s own words (see the extract in the immediately preceding paragraph) – was more predisposed to “concrete” thinking. However, Ms Lim responded that the CTONI-2 was not inappropriate, simply because a subject’s abstract reasoning ability is part of the intelligence that the test is supposed to measure:

I found the Prosecution’s attempt to paint the CTONI-2 as being inherently less appropriate for the Accused to be rather speculative, especially since the Prosecution’s own psychologist, Dr Yim, had not cast any such aspersions on the CTONI-2. Nevertheless, Ms Lim’s testimony above prompted me to clarify with her whether this meant that the Leiter-3 might be regarded as inadequate – in terms of failing to sufficiently stretch the Accused’s abstract reasoning abilities – despite abstract reasoning being a part of intelligence that such tests are supposed to measure. To this, Ms Lim confirmed that the Leiter-3 is also not inadequate as compared to the CTONI-2, clarifying that both tests simply measure intelligence in different ways:

I also asked Ms Lim whether a subject who is predisposed to concrete (rather than abstract) thinking would be at a greater disadvantage taking the CTONI-2, as compared to tests with lower demands for abstract reasoning such as the Leiter-3. Ms Lim agreed in cross-examination that this was possible:

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the extract above, Ms Lim’s response was couched in a highly tentative manner. More importantly, although Ms Lim had earlier testified that the Accused’s thinking was more concrete and simplistic rather than abstract (see the extract from her oral evidence at [93] above), she subsequently explained her comments, saying that it was the Accused’s expressions (rather than his “thinking”) that tended to be concrete and simplistic:

Ms Lim’s qualification above was also consistent with what she had stated in her report, which described the Accused’s expressions (rather than his thinking) as concrete:

Ms Lim then explained that just because a person’s expressions are concrete, this does not mean they are incapable of thinking in an abstract manner:

Thus, it was clear to me from Ms Lim’s evidence that the Leiter-3 was not in any way less appropriate than the CTONI-2, for purposes of measuring the Accused’s intellectual functions. There was nothing to suggest that the Accused’s concrete and simplistic expressions (which Ms Lim claimed to have observed) were necessarily indicative of a deficit in abstract reasoning that would have limited his score under the CTONI-2. By the same token, there was nothing to suggest that the Leiter-3 would confer an artificially high score on the Accused, simply by virtue of its relatively lighter focus on abstract reasoning. Critically, Ms Lim testified early on in her evidence that she did not believe that it was easier to do better on the Leiter-3 than on the CTONI-2.

In the end, just as I was unconvinced by the Prosecution’s efforts to paint the CTONI-2 as a less appropriate test of the Accused’s intellectual functions (see [95] above), there was also nothing to suggest that the Leiter-3 would have been in any way inappropriate for measuring his intellectual functions.

The Defence sought to impugn Dr Yim’s conclusions by arguing that the Leiter-3 does not include sub-tests for working memory and processing speed, which can be found under the WAIS-IV (and which Ms Lim had performed – see [88] above). The Defence complained that Dr Yim failed to perform these sub-tests despite agreeing that they measured areas that were relevant to ID. In my view, this submission failed to undermine Dr Yim’s conclusions. As set out at [89] above, Dr Yim clearly applied her mind to this and concluded that it was not necessary for her to conduct the WAIS-IV sub-tests as Ms Lim had just administered them and the results did not demonstrate any deficit in working memory or processing speed. Dr Yim’s position cohered with Ms Lim’s conclusions (at [88] above) that the Accused’s scores for these two areas, which fell in the “low average” range, did not on their own suffice to demonstrate any intellectual deficit.

Given that the application of both the CTONI-2 and the Leiter-3 had yielded different conclusions, I had to assess the validity of the results for both tests. Having done so, I concluded that there was stronger reason to accept the test results under the Leiter-3 (conducted by Dr Yim) than those under the CTONI-2 (conducted by Ms Lim). The Prosecution’s experts explained that where an individual has two very different scores on tests of intelligence, the true score is likely to be the higher one. Dr Yim explained that “it is easier for someone to underperform to get a lower score than to achieve a higher score” than he would ordinarily get. She explained that a person can underperform for a myriad of reasons, including tiredness or a lack of interest.

Dr Koh voiced a similar view in his report:

In court, he explained why it would be harder for higher scores to be false:

In contrast, Ms Lim sought to defend the validity of the test scores derived by her from administering the CTONI-2 on the Accused, saying that he was unlikely to have performed badly on purpose, given that the Test of Memory Malingering performed by Ms Lim on the Accused revealed no concerns. Ms Lim also opined that the Accused’s test scores were unlikely to have been impacted by tiredness, given that her report reflected that he showed good attention and motivation throughout the assessment. However, Ms Lim’s explanations failed to address the gaping question: if these vitiating factors were absent, what was the explanation for the Accused scoring so much lower on the CTONI-2? Critically, when asked if a test subject could come across as more intelligent than he actually is, Ms Lim conceded that this was “[q]uite unlikely, if the test results are valid”.

Accordingly, I preferred the results of the Leiter-3 performed by Dr Yim as being the more accurate reflection of the Accused’s intellectual functions, over the results of the CTONI-2 performed by Ms Lim.

The Accused’s score of 95 on the Leiter-3, being less than one standard deviation below the mean of 100 (see the scoring range prescribed by the DSM-5 at [86] above), showed that his intellectual functions were average. At the trial, Dr Rajesh also accepted that if Dr Yim’s results were accurate, the Accused’s intellectual functioning fell squarely and conclusively in the average range and did not even approach the low range. In my view, the evidence thus failed to sufficiently demonstrate any deficit in the Accused’s intellectual functions, as required by Criterion A. Given that this criterion is one of three criteria that must be conjunctively satisfied before a diagnosis of ID can be sustained (see [81] above), my finding on Criterion A sufficed to unhinge the Defence’s case that the Accused suffered from mild ID. Nevertheless, for completeness, I went on to assess parties’ submissions as to whether the other two criteria for establishing ID were met.

Criterion B: Deficits in adaptive functioning

Criterion B is concerned with the subject’s adaptive functioning, which the DSM-5 describes as “how well a person meets community standards of personal independence and social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and sociocultural background”. Adaptive functioning encompasses three domains: (a) conceptual, (b) social, and (c) practical. Each domain is described by the DSM-5 as follows:180

The DSM-5 states that Criterion B is met when at least one of these three domains is “sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed … to perform adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community” [emphasis added]. Additionally, the DSM-5 requires the adaptive functioning deficits to “be directly related to the intellectual impairments described in Criterion A” [emphasis added], to meet the diagnostic criteria for ID.

To assess if the Accused had deficits in adaptive functioning, both Dr Yim and Ms Lim administered the same test: the Adaptive Behaviour Assessment System – Third Edition (“ABAS-3”). This test is based on self-reporting, with respondents providing ratings going towards the three domains. Notably, Dr Yim and Ms Lim each arrived at scores under the ABAS-3 which were rather similar, across all three domains:

It is immediately apparent from the composite scores above that the Accused scored much lower for the conceptual domain, as compared to the social and practical domains of adaptive functioning. As a result of this significant variation, both Dr Yim and Ms Lim explained that it was not possible to derive a General Adaptive Composite score – being the overall score of adaptive functioning based on the composite scores from all three domains.

The ABAS-3 test scores are nevertheless not meant to be conclusive as to whether there is a deficit in adaptive functioning. The DSM-5 states:

In other words, the tester must not simply rely on the scores from psychometric tests such as the ABAS-3 (which are in any event based on self-reported ratings) to conclude that a deficit in adaptive functioning exists. Rather, the tester must also conduct a clinical evaluation. Dr Yim explained that in the case of the Accused, a clinical evaluation was all the more imperative given the significant variation between his score for the conceptual domain versus that for the social and practical domains (as set out in the immediately preceding paragraph). She testified that according to the ABAS-3 manual, when there is such a wide discrepancy in the scores of the respective domains, the subject’s adaptive functioning is best understood by a practical examination of the subject’s performance in all three domains. Ms Lim, on her part, similarly placed significant emphasis on a practical evaluation, explaining that an assessment of adaptive functioning did not rest on the ABAS-3 scores alone but had to be conducted with clinical examination.

To that end, both Dr Yim and Ms Lim conducted clinical interviews with the Accused and his mother. Additionally, Dr Yim conducted clinical interviews with the Accused’s two supervisors from Dickson Agro (see [3] above) and his sister. Having concluded their respective clinical assessments, both psychologists again arrived at different conclusions. Dr Yim (with whom Dr Koh agreed ) opined that Criterion B was not met. Ms Lim (with whom Dr Rajesh agreed ) opined that it was.

Having assessed the experts’ reasons for their findings, I agreed with the Prosecution that Criterion B was not met. In other words, the Accused was not suffering from a deficit in adaptive functioning. My reasons for this conclusion, set out below, canvass each of the three domains of adaptive functioning in the following sequence: conceptual, practical and social.

(1) Conceptual Domain

As seen from the scores at [109] above, the Accused had tested the lowest for the conceptual domain of adaptive functioning, under the ABAS-3 test performed by both psychologists.

As regards the findings by the Prosecution’s experts, Dr Yim noted that while the Accused had “marked difficulty managing aspects of functional academics, mainly writing and reading of documents and managing financial resources”, this did not necessarily point to an impairment in the conceptual domain of adaptive functioning. Critically, Dr Yim explained that these difficulties could be explained by reasons other than ID, such as the Accused’s low educational level, lack of proficiency in the English language and possibly learning difficulties. Dr Koh took a similar view, noting that any reading and writing impairments may be a result of the Accused “having not invested in academics at a young age”. Dr Koh also did not rule out the possibility that the Accused had a reading or writing disability but emphasised that this was quite distinct from whether a subject has ID.

As regards the findings by the Defence’s experts, Ms Lim opined that the Accused’s adaptive functioning in the conceptual domain was “extremely low”, supporting this view by pointing to the Accused’s inability to:

Dr Rajesh agreed with Ms Lim’s views, relying on factors such as the Accused’s “poor academic functioning during his schooling years, … his history of him dropping out of school in early secondary years, [and] his history of holding unskilled jobs”.

Having examined the views of the experts from both sides, I was not persuaded that the challenges faced by the Accused, as listed by Ms Lim in the preceding paragraph, were necessarily suggestive of any impairment in the conceptual domain. As Dr Yim and Dr Koh pointed out, these shortcomings could simply have been the result of low education and lack of proficiency in English. In her report, Ms Lim did not contradict this view but stated explicitly that the Accused’s poor score for the conceptual domain was “consistent with his poor academic records and with his difficulties with speech and writing”203 and “a reflection of his poorer scholastic achievements and reported speech and writing difficulties”. Critically, Ms Lim agreed that factors such as lack of education, language difficulties, and some learning disabilities are not necessarily indicative of ID. By the same token, the factors raised by Dr Rajesh were entirely explicable on account of the Accused’s limited education and language difficulties.

As such, the evidence did not in my view suffice to establish that the Accused’s adaptive functioning was impaired in the conceptual domain.

(2) Practical Domain

Dr Yim also found that the Accused did not suffer any impairment in the practical domain of adaptive functioning. In her report, she noted that the Accused demonstrated the ability to “exercise independence in many day-to-day tasks”. In particular, both Dr Yim and Dr Koh raised a multitude of examples to show that the Accused was able to live independently, including the following:

(b) With respect to navigation, the Accused was able to ask people for directions, use public transport as well as ride a motorcycle and drive. As regards driving specifically, this was a skill that the Accused had taught himself, thus showing that he could acquire new skills with minimal supervision and guidance.

(c) The Accused was familiar with technology, as seen in how he could (i) navigate unfamiliar destinations using the Google Maps application, (ii) communicate using a variety of applications on his mobile device, including WhatsApp, MyChat, and Facebook Messenger and (iii) maintain Facebook and Instagram accounts.214

(i) the Accused displayed manual dexterity;207

(ii) for his role at Dickson Agro, the Accused would often drive the company lorry around the Pasir Panjang wholesale centre's carpark to assist in the loading of goods, while his supervisors had provided feedback that the Accused was able to work with minimal supervision; and

(iii) the Accused could follow instructions and enforce work safety regulations207 (eg, when working as a cleaner, he could explain the importance of placing the “Slippery” warning sign on areas that had just been mopped; when he worked as a security guard, he recognised why it was necessary for vehicles entering the premises to be issued with visitor passes).

(e) In terms of household responsibilities, the Accused could (i) do household chores, despite not being accustomed to such responsibilities, (ii) attend to minor household repairs (such as clearing clogged pipes and changing light bulbs) and (iii) maintain his family car and his motorcycle.

(f) As regards his hobbies, the Accused (i) enjoyed dismantling and re-assembling parts of his motorcycle218 and (ii) reared fighting cockerels, caring for them and seeking advice from others as to how to keep them in good condition.

Dr Yim further explained that while the Accused may have faced challenges in areas such as planning recreational activities, making independent choices and exhibiting self-control, the “significant contributory factors” for these challenges stemmed from the Accused’s attitude and lack of self-discipline rather than from any cognitive impairment.

Ms Lim, on her part, concluded that the Accused’s adaptive functioning did suffer from impairment in the practical domain. She observed that while the Accused was “fairly independent” in self-care, household chores (when told to do so), and at work, he still suffered from the following failings:

(a) In terms of personal grooming, the Accused’s mother had alluded to various practices that a normal person would have been expected to perform regularly, including getting out of bed on time, brushing one’s teeth before leaving for work or appointments, washing and rinsing the sink after brushing one’s teeth, cutting and filing one’s nails and wearing a variety of clothes. The Accused’s mother reported that the Accused would only do some of these things sometimes, when needed.

(b) As regards diet, the Accused did not regularly consume a variety of foods and he also failed to avoid unhealthy food and drinks. He also did not know how to plan his meals to get the necessary nutrition.221

(d) He needed support with money management222 and did not carry any credit or debit cards.221

(e) He required support when searching for a job222 and had difficulty following a daily work schedule without reminders.

(f) He did not carry any personal identification when travelling to nearby places in the community.221

(g) He would fail to buckle his seat belt when travelling in vehicles.221

I failed to see how the factors listed by Ms Lim above (whether taken individually or collectively) were necessarily indicative of impairment in the practical domain. I agreed with Dr Yim’s assessment at [119] above that these factors appeared to be explicable on account of the Accused’s attitude and lack of self-discipline. Given the Accused’s ability to partake in hobbies that would have required careful attention (eg, raising fighting cockerels, as well as dismantling and re-assembling his motorcycle), his failure to properly engage in relatively mundane activities such as those listed by Ms Lim in the preceding paragraph could simply have been attributable to a lack of interest. Ms Lim conceded as much in cross-examination:

I also found Dr Yim’s clinical assessment of the Accused’s adaptive functioning to have been more comprehensive than Ms Lim’s. Specifically, Dr Yim conducted clinical interviews with the Accused’s work supervisors from Dickson Agro, when Ms Lim did not. Dr Yim explained that it was crucial to obtain corroborative information from a subject’s employers about his work performance and interaction with colleagues, as these were very important facets of adaptive functioning that should be factored into the clinical assessment. As seen from [118(d)(ii)] above, the inputs from the Accused’s supervisors in this case had provided material insights into his ability to operate independently and with minimal supervision at work, thereby detracting from the suggestion that his adaptive functioning was impaired in the practical domain. Under cross-examination, Ms Lim conceded that information from the subject’s supervisors was relevant to an assessment of adaptive functioning.

In addition to functioning independently at work, there were also various tasks that the Accused was able to perform which suggested a certain level of cognitive abilities, which Ms Lim did not factor into her assessment. These included the Accused’s ability to dismantle and reassemble his motorcycle and his ability to navigate using the Google Maps application. While I would hesitate to conclude that these abilities would in and of themselves undermine a diagnosis of mild ID, they did (when taken together with the rest of the evidence) paint a more complete picture of the Accused’s cognitive abilities. As Dr Koh explained, it was not enough to simply focus on the test subject’s impairments, many of which may exist even in persons who are not labouring under ID. Dr Koh stressed that a balanced clinical assessment would necessitate looking at the subject’s capabilities as well.

I thus preferred the views of the Prosecution’s experts, to the effect that the Accused’s adaptive functioning did not suffer from any impairment in the practical domain.

(3) Social domain

As regards the social domain of adaptive functioning, the Prosecution’s experts similarly found that the Accused did not suffer any impairment. In arriving at this opinion, Dr Koh highlighted the following traits of the Accused:

Dr Yim similarly observed that the Accused was able to demonstrate empathy and was attuned to his family members.

The Defence’s experts, on their part, sought to show impairment, particularly in terms of how the Accused had placed himself in harm’s way through his association with others who may take advantage of him. Ms Lim explained:

Ms Lim also stated that the Accused “was indicated to have significant difficulty … distinguishing truthful from exaggerated claims” [emphasis added], although I note that her report failed to elaborate on the basis on which she had arrived at this observation.

As for Dr Rajesh, his report was far more explicit on this point, alluding to how his clinical assessment of the Accused elicited, inter alia, “evidence of poor judgment in agreeing to transport items without due diligence and checking”. Dr Rajesh accordingly concluded that the Accused was gullible. To substantiate this, Dr Rajesh highlighted that the Accused’s sister had recounted how people used to come to the Accused’s home and give, inter alia, bags containing clothes for the Accused to transport to Singapore, some of which had locks on them. For those bags that were not locked, the sister had on occasion gone through them but was scolded by the Accused for doing so. The specific portion of Dr Rajesh’s report capturing the sister’s account is set out below:

The Accused’s sister had recounted to Dr Rajesh that some of the people who handed bags to the Accused were persons whom he had not met before, being “friends of his friends”. She claimed that the Accused would nevertheless trust people easily and believe what they said at face value, instead of questioning them about the items they had asked him to transport.235

More pertinently, Dr Rajesh reasoned that the very circumstances under which the Accused came to take hold of the drugs from Deva evinced the Accused’s gullibility. The relevant portion of his report reads:

The Prosecution’s experts had a different view on whether the evidence did indeed demonstrate gullibility on the part of the Accused. In Dr Yim’s report, she explained that while the Accused “would help his friends if they were in trouble”, he “would not hesitate to confront or hit them if they were to cheat him”. In court, Dr Yim explained this portion of her report, saying that while the Accused was willing to help others, the fact that he was prepared to confront those who lied to or cheated him showed that he had an ability to reflect, reason and understand the consequences of certain actions. As for Dr Koh, he also voiced doubts over the Accused’s purported gullibility. The relevant portion of Dr Koh’s oral evidence is set out below:

In the course of her clinical interviews, Dr Yim was informed by the Accused’s mother that the Accused had a tendency to trust his friends and that this made him prone to being taken advantage of. For example, the Accused’s mother recounted how a friend had asked the Accused for his identity card so that the friend could apply for a loan. Dr Yim had followed up by conferring with the Accused about this. The Accused had replied that he understood the possible consequences but was not at all concerned, smiling and saying: “I just have to service the loan”. Similarly, when Dr Yim asked the Accused about certain driving offences that he had committed in Malaysia, he said that it is common to drive without a licence in Malaysia and that if he was arrested, he would “[j]ust pay the fine”.

From the Accused’s responses, Dr Yim reasoned that rather than showing impairment in the social domain of adaptive functioning, the Accused’s actions demonstrated what appeared to be indifference, in that he knew the potential consequences of his actions but still went ahead. This was also supported by the inputs that Dr Yim sought from the Accused’s employers at Dickson Agro. In her report, Dr Yim explained how the Accused was wont to ignore warnings that his supervisors had given him:

Dr Yim accordingly concluded that rather than displaying gullibility, the Accused was simply someone who preferred to do things his own way, in line with his avowed dislike (set out in the extract above) for being told what to do. Dr Yim’s views on this point were reinforced by Dr Koh, who observed that the Accused appeared to have made conscious choices to ignore cautionary advice from others, including his employers and his sister, in favour of financial gain.

Having assessed the views of the experts from both sides, I concluded that the Defence did not sufficiently demonstrate that the Accused’s adaptive functioning was impaired in the social domain. I accepted the views of Dr Yim that the alleged impairments were consistent with poor decisions by someone who was indifferent to the consequences and disinclined to heed prudent advice. As Dr Yim stated in her report:

As for Dr Rajesh’s categorical assertion that the Accused was gullible (see [128] above), I rejected this as I found the factual basis for his conclusions to be suspect. Dr Rajesh had stated in his report (see [128] above) that the Accused “was gullible and trusted Deva easily, even though he had met him only once and that too, on the day before the alleged offence” [emphasis added]. However, this very premise ran directly counter to a statement in the very same report by Dr Rajesh that the Accused “mentioned that he had first met Deva in a car wash in Johor around 6 to 7 months prior to his arrest.” It troubled me that Dr Rajesh was not able to even get the basic facts right, when these were cited to underpin such a central conclusion in his report. As explained at [62] above, the narrative that the Accused met Deva only once, on the day before the offence, was a lie that the Accused had told the CNB.

This was not the only finding from Dr Rajesh that lacked factual grounding. As explained at [127] above, another plank undergirding Dr Rajesh’s conclusion about the Accused’s gullibility rested on the account given by the Accused’s sister that “friends of his friends” would come to their home and give the Accused locked bags to transport to Singapore. According to the sister, she was only able to check the contents of the bags that were unlocked and – even then – the Accused would scold her for going through other people’s things. Presumably, the point being made here was that the Accused’s willingness to transport bags that he was not even able to access (on account of them being locked) highlighted just how oblivious he was to the risks of doing so, which in turn underscored his gullibility. However, Dr Rajesh’s Report recorded the Accused’s sister as merely saying that there were locks on the bag, with the implication that she was unable to open the locks (since she only managed to check the contents of those bags that were not locked). Critically, Dr Rajesh’s Report said nothing about whether the Accused had access to the locked bags. Given that the Accused did not want his sister rummaging through the bags’ contents and had scolded her for doing so, it is hard to see why he would have given her the keys if he had them. If the Accused did indeed have access to the locked bags, the entire narrative about him being willing to transport bags whose contents he had no ability to inspect would fall apart.

Dr Rajesh sought to plug this gap in his oral evidence, although he did so by going beyond what was in his report. Specifically, when Dr Rajesh was being cross-examined, he positively affirmed that the Accused was unable to view the contents of locked bags, going so far as to attest that the Accused did not have the keys to the locks on the bags. Yet, these were critical factual assertions that had not been captured anywhere in Dr Rajesh’s Report. The report made no mention of Dr Rajesh confirming with the Accused that the latter was asked to transport locked bags or, more importantly, ascertaining if he had access to the contents of such locked bags (if he did indeed transport them). There was also no evidence from any factual witness at trial (including the Accused) about the Accused transporting locked bags, let alone evidence that he had no key to their locks.

As mentioned at [82] above, parties appeared content to accept the veracity of factual assertions emanating from the Accused’s family members and acquaintances over the course of clinical interviews by the experts, notwithstanding that these would technically have constituted hearsay. Even then, the assertion about the Accused (as opposed to his sister) having no keys to the locked bags that he was asked to transport was one step removed, in that this assertion did not appear to have emanated from the Accused or from any of his family members or acquaintances. If this assertion had indeed been made to Dr Rajesh during clinical interviews, one would expect it to have been captured in his report. Yet, it was not, meaning that if one looks at the record, the only person from whom this assertion emanated was Dr Rajesh himself. With respect, it is unacceptable for an expert to supplement his report with fresh factual assertions made under cross-examination, when these find no substantiation anywhere in the body of evidence adduced. In any event, I decided against discounting Dr Rajesh’s expert opinion on account of this flaw – significant though it was in my view – since it was not picked up by the Prosecution in cross-examination.

Having said that, I still found Dr Rajesh’s anecdote about the locked bags to be unhelpful. Dr Rajesh’s report mentioned that according to the Accused’s sister, the Accused had transported bags for “friends of his friends” whom the Accused had not met before (see [127] above). However, in so far as the locked bags were concerned, I had no inkling as to the relationship between the Accused and the persons who passed these bags to him. Neither did Dr Rajesh, who testified: “I don't know the relationship between the owner of the locked bag and [the Accused]”. Without any backdrop to the Accused’s relationship with these persons, it was not possible for me to draw any meaningful inferences from the anecdote concerning the locked bags, as regards the Accused’s purported gullibility.

In the end, I found myself in agreement with the Prosecution’s experts. There was nothing to satisfy me that the Accused’s adaptive functioning had any impairment in the social domain. Rather, it was clear that his actions arose out of a conscious choice to disregard the words of caution sounded to him by his family and employers, as he felt that the financial gain merited the risk.

(4) Conclusion on Criterion B

Accordingly, on the issue of whether Criterion B (deficit in adaptive functioning) was satisfied, I preferred the evidence of the Prosecution’s experts over that of the Defence. The Defence’s experts relied on factors that were not necessarily indicative of ID and which could instead be explained by other causes, such as the Accused’s limited proficiency in the English language and his difficulties in reading and writing (stemming in part from his limited education). Rather than being suggestive of cognitive deficits, the behaviour that the Defence’s experts relied upon in supporting their conclusions could also be attributable to the Accused’s attitude and lack of self-discipline.

I also preferred the Prosecution’s experts’ evidence because their clinical assessment was based on more relevant sources of information, some of which had been omitted by the Defence’s experts. For example, only Dr Yim conducted clinical interviews with the Accused’s work supervisors from Dickson Agro. Their inputs had proven material to the assessment of whether the Accused’s adaptive functioning was impaired in the practical (see [118(d)(ii)] above) and the social (see [131] above) domains. At the trial, Ms Lim conceded that because her clinical assessment did not include interviews with the Accused’s work supervisors (while Dr Yim’s assessment did), Dr Yim’s assessment was “more complete” in the context of work.

From a holistic perspective, the approach of the Prosecution’s experts was also more consistent with the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria. As alluded to at [108] above, the DSM-5 states that Criterion B is satisfied if a domain of adaptive functioning is sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed for the subject to perform adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community. The Prosecution’s experts convincingly demonstrated how the Accused could carry out his daily activities quite independently.

Finally, it must be noted that the DSM-5 requires that the deficits in adaptive functioning under Criterion B be “directly related to the intellectual impairments described in Criterion A” (see [108] above). Consequently, even if the Accused was impaired in any of the three domains of adaptive functioning, the Defence had to show how these deficits were related to a deficit in intellectual functions under Criterion A. Having already found no such deficit in Criterion A (see [106] above), I was reinforced in my conclusion that any deficits in adaptive functioning, even if they did exist (which they did not), failed to support the Defence’s case that the Accused suffered from mild ID.

Criterion C: Onset of deficits during the developmental period

Finally, I turned to Criterion C, which requires that the onset of the intellectual and adaptive deficits occurs during the test subject’s developmental period (ie, childhood or adolescence): Criterion C thus does not appear to be a standalone criterion but relates to when the deficits under Criterion A (intellectual functions) and/or Criterion B (adaptive functioning) commenced. As explained in the DSM-5:

Accordingly, if a subject has not been shown to possess deficits under either Criterion A or Criterion B, Criterion C becomes moot as there would be no deficits to speak of, for which the timing of the onset may be traced.

Nevertheless, I had some views on the expert evidence relating to Criterion C. Ms Lim found that this criterion was met, basing her conclusion on the fact that the Accused only started speaking when he was seven years of age. Dr Rajesh agreed and sought to support his opinion with his observations about the Accused’s poor academic performance, history of holding unskilled jobs and his reliance on family members to manage his financial affairs. Dr Koh aligned himself somewhat with the Defence’s experts in his assessment of Criterion C, opining that this criterion may be deemed as satisfied because the Accused’s inability to speak until the age of seven could show some “grave developmental impairment”. Dr Koh’s opinion about Criterion C being met was of course conditional on the premise that the deficits in Criterion A and Criterion B persisted to adulthood which, in his view, they did not. In this respect, Dr Koh was careful to caveat that the Accused’s subsequent achievements in the social, practical and conceptual domains “all seem to be very intact” and that the Accused “seems to have caught up after that period of time”.

Given the evidence at hand, I was not particularly convinced that Criterion C was met. The conclusion by Ms Lim and Dr Koh about this criterion having been satisfied rested principally on the account by the Accused’s mother that her son started to speak only at the age of seven. However, as pointed out by Dr Yim, the Accused’s school reports would have better documented his developmental history and provided key insights into whether the developmental delay was indeed due to mild ID or other factors (such as language problems). I also found the circumstances surrounding the absence of these school reports to be disquieting: the Accused’s mother informed Dr Yim that she had given these reports to Dr Rajesh, while Dr Rajesh denied that he had received them. Yet, the Accused’s mother was not called to explain the discrepant accounts.

I was thus more persuaded by Dr Yim’s view that the conclusion about Criterion C having been met was not backed by any objective facts. In any event, as I mentioned in [144] above, since the Defence failed to establish that either Criterion A or Criterion B was met, this alone sufficed for me to conclude that Criterion C was moot.

Conclusion on whether the Accused had mild ID

Accordingly, I concluded that the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the Accused was suffering from mild ID. Having scrutinised the opinions of the experts and assessed them for “consistency and logic” (see Sakthivel at [75]), I concluded that the opinions of Dr Rajesh and Ms Lim – to the effect that Criterion A to Criterion C were all satisfied – could not stand. Rather, I preferred the opinions of Dr Yim and Dr Koh, which I thought to be based on much stronger grounding. To recapitulate:

(a) As regards Criterion A (deficits in intellectual functions), the Defence was unable to rationalise why the Accused could have achieved the higher scores under the Leiter-3, if he indeed possessed deficits in intellectual functions. The psychologists from both sides agreed that it is quite unlikely for a test subject to come across as more intelligent than he truly is if the test results are valid. I also accepted the evidence of both Dr Koh and Dr Yim that the Accused’s lower test scores on the CTONI-2 could be explained by factors other than intellectual deficits.

(b) As regards Criterion B (deficits in adaptive functioning), the factors raised by the Defence to demonstrate impairments in the conceptual and practical domains could be explained by factors that were discrete from ID, including language difficulties, as well as attitude and self-discipline. As for the Defence’s attempt to show that the Accused was impaired in the social domain, I rejected Dr Rajesh’s conclusion about the Accused being gullible, as the factual bases for this conclusion were suspect.

(c) As regards Criterion C, this could not be met if both Criterion A and Criterion B were not satisfied.

Once the Defence’s contention that the Accused had mild ID was rejected, the attendant claim – that mild ID had rendered him so gullible that he failed to suspect that Deva was asking him to transport something illicit – fell away.

I would observe that even if it was accepted that the Accused suffered from mild ID, the Defence had still failed to detail exactly how this went towards rebutting the presumption of knowledge. I found Dr Rajesh’s reasoning – that ID had rendered the Accused so gullible that he could be duped into transporting drugs – to be questionable. The relevant section of Dr Rajesh’s Report is extracted below:

Further portions of this section of the report can be found at [128] above.

In essence, Dr Rajesh’s line of reasoning was that the Accused had mild ID which rendered him gullible, and that this gullibility led the Accused to accept Deva’s instructions without question. Before assessing if Dr Rajesh’s conclusions withstood scrutiny, it was necessary to have regard to Dr Koh’s explanation that gullibility is not something which can be clinically measured. Dr Koh also explained that if claims about an accused person’s gullibility are pegged at a very general level, this would be no more than an exercise in theory, as the analysis must address whether the accused person displayed gullibility with respect to the offence committed. Dr Koh testified:

Even Ms Lim was aligned with Dr Koh’s view on this point, conceding that clinical interviews and IQ tests are not intended to measure the extent of one’s gullibility. Ms Lim agreed that to determine whether someone was gullible in the context of a particular scenario, it is important to go beyond clinical interviews and IQ tests and consider all the facts relating to that scenario.

In short, a finding that an accused person was gullibly tricked into committing an offence must be sufficiently grounded on the factual circumstances of the case. This was where the paucity in Dr Rajesh’s reasoning became apparent. Dr Rajesh’s Report merely asserted that the Accused was gullible as he had trusted Deva, despite hardly knowing him. With respect, this was nothing more than a bald statement that had not been sufficiently correlated with the specific facts of the case. Based on the Accused’s own account of what happened, he had agreed to transport the black bundles for Deva under highly suspicious circumstances – see [74] above. Dr Rajesh failed to elaborate on how the Accused’s purported gullibility, induced by the mild ID which Dr Rajesh had diagnosed to exist, might have operated to render the Accused oblivious to such a plethora of red flags staring him in the face.

Dr Rajesh also failed to explain how his conclusion about the Accused being gullible could be reconciled with the Accused’s behaviour when the latter was caught with the drugs. Rather than relaying to the authorities the narrative which Dr Rajesh claims the Accused to have gullibly accepted from Deva, ie, that the black bundles contained chemicals that would not cause any problems at customs, the Accused had displayed patent stealth and deception:

(a) He tried to impede CI2 Subra from getting his hands on the black bundles – first by claiming that the Blue Nike Bag was too heavy (see [6] above) and then by emptying the Blue Nike Bag’s contents before passing it to CI2 Subra (see [50] above).

(b) He had also falsely claimed ignorance about the black bundles’ contents (see [7(a)] above).

(c) He further lied about highly material facts such as his relationship with Deva (see [62] above).

The behaviours above were particularly significant because the Accused knew that unauthorised importation of heroin and methamphetamine into Singapore was wrong and carried heavy consequences. As stated by Dr Koh in his report:

In short, when attempting to link the diagnosis of mild ID with the Accused’s purported gullibility, Dr Rajesh had based his findings on sweeping assertions that failed to sufficiently engage with the facts.

Conclusion on conviction

I therefore found that the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA stood unrebutted. This conclusion stemmed from the following factors:

(a) The Accused’s behaviour when the drugs were discovered;

(b) His false claims about his relationship with Deva; and

(c) The lack of credibility of the Accused’s claim that he thought the black bundles contained chemicals, including his ever-evolving accounts of what he thought the black bundles contained.

Furthermore, when these factors were viewed together with how the Accused had agreed to transport the black bundles despite the patently dubious circumstances under which he claimed to have received them from Deva (see [74] above), a strong inference arose that the Accused must have known what the black bundles contained. Axiomatically, such an inference would also undermine the Accused’s attempt to rebut the presumption of knowledge.

As for the Defence’s submission that the Accused was suffering from mild ID and therefore gullible to the point that he was unable to spot the red flags in his dealings with Deva, this was wholly unconvincing.

With both the possession requirement and the knowledge requirement established, I found that the Prosecution had proven both the charges of importation beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore found the Accused guilty of both charges and convicted him accordingly.

Sentence

Both charges of importation that the Accused faced were punishable with a capital sentence. However, under s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, the court has a discretion to sentence the offender to life imprisonment and caning of not less than 15 strokes, in lieu of the capital punishment, so long as both the following conditions in s 33B(2) of the MDA are met:

Following the Accused’s conviction, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s role in the offences underlying both charges was restricted to the acts set out in s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA – ie, that he was a courier. The Defence also agreed with this submission, which I accepted. Based on the evidence, the Accused had not done anything beyond transporting, sending or delivering the drugs, or acts preparatory to that purpose. The Prosecution further confirmed that a CSA had been issued to the Accused, on account of him having substantively assisted the CNB in disrupting drug trafficking activities.

As the requirements under s 33B(2) of the MDA were met, I decided to exercise my discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment and caning – instead of the death penalty – for both charges. Specifically, I sentenced the Accused to life imprisonment and the minimum of 15 strokes of the cane, for each of the two charges. As the global number of strokes imposed could not exceed 24, under s 328(1) and (6) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), the aggregate sentence of caning to be administered on the Accused was thus 24 strokes.