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Grounds publishedDecided 4 Aug 2025

Singapore International Commercial Court

DKB v DKC

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[2025] SGHC(I) 21Case no. Originating Application No 10 of 2024 (Summonses Nos 25, 46, 51 and 1177 of 2024 and 17 and 18 of 2025)13 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Background

  2. [4] Prior to the hearing of the Stay Application, the Claimant filed several interlocutory applications. The ones relevant to this judgment are:

  3. (a) SIC/SUM 25/2024 (“SUM 25”), which was an application for leave to file affidavits in relation to expert opinion on US and English law;

  4. (c) SIC/SUM 51/2024 (“SUM 51”), which was an application for leave to adduce further evidence in the Stay Application, namely, a transaction record.

  5. [5] Following the determination of these interlocutory applications, I heard the Stay Application on 5 February 2025. The Defendant’s position was that an unconditional stay should be granted; the Claimant’s primary position was that a stay should not be granted because there was no dispute referable to arbitration given that there was an “unarguable” breach of the Settlement Deed. The Claimant’s alternative position was that if a stay was to be granted, it should be subject to: (a) a condition that the Defendant promptly commence an arbitration in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the “Stockholm Institute”) and (b) that security be provided. The quantum of security that the Claimant sought was US$315,913,988.82, but counsel for the Claimant eventually sought only US$15m in his oral submissions.

  6. [6] On 19 February 2025, I made orders on the Stay Application granting a stay of all proceedings in SIC/OA 10/2024 subject to the following conditions:

  7. (a) that the Defendant within 10 days of the making of these orders commences an arbitration in accordance with the Rules for Expedited Arbitration of the Stockholm Institute pursuant to clause 6.2 of the Settlement Deed seeking orders that in the events which have happened the Claimant is not entitled to enforce the arbitration award, the subject of these proceedings; and

  8. (b) that the Defendant diligently prosecute the arbitration referred to in clause (2)(a) and comply with all directions of the arbitrator or of the Board of the Stockholm Institute.

  9. On 16 April 2025 I published my reasons for making these orders (see DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 11).

  10. [9] The following issues arise from the parties’ written submissions:

  11. (a) Which party should be entitled to the costs of the Stay Application, SUM 25 and SUM 51 (being the applications in which I have not yet determined the parties’ entitlement to costs)?

  12. (b) What is the appropriate quantum of costs for each of the applications considered in this judgment (the Stay Application and SUMs 17, 18, 25, 46 and 51)?

  13. [10] I now summarise the parties’ submissions on these issues.

  14. The costs of the Stay Application

  15. The parties’ submissions

  16. The Defendant

  17. (a) costs are in the discretion of the court;

  18. (c) the general rule does not cease to apply because the successful party raised issues or allegations in which it failed, but the successful party can be deprived of its costs in whole or in part where it caused a significant increase in the length of the proceedings; and

  19. [14] The Defendant emphasises that the Claimant’s primary case was that no stay should be granted as there was no dispute referable to arbitration because the Defendant was unarguably in breach of the Settlement Deed. The Defendant also submits that in the Claimant’s alternative case, namely, that a stay should be granted subject to conditions, the Claimant pressed for two conditions, one of which (ie, the provision of security in the sum of close to US$316m) was not granted. The Defendant observes that this alternative case was raised for the first time in the Claimant’s submissions of 25 October 2024, some six months after the Stay Application was first brought.

  20. [16] The Defendant further submits it would be wrong in principle, as well as a logical fallacy, for a party’s post-hearing conduct to retrospectively colour its prior success in the proceedings.

  21. The Claimant

  22. [21] In its submissions the Claimant refers to what it describes as the Defendant’s impropriety in bringing the Stay Application, evidenced by the following matters: first, that the Defendant failed to cooperate in the framing of issues for the arbitration; second, that the Defendant applied at the last minute for an extension of time to comply with the conditions imposed on the stay; third, that the Defendant allowed the 12 April deadline to lapse and failed to comply with directions to justify that failure; and finally, that the Defendant applied for a further 49-day extension of the deadline to comply with the conditions at the hearing of SUM 18. The Claimant noted that by that time some 83 days had elapsed since the imposition of the stay.

  23. [22] In that context, the Claimant made the following submission:

  24. (a) For the Stay Application, costs of $208,000 and disbursements of $3,262,03.

  25. (b) For SUM 25, costs of $139,100 and disbursements of $25,046.20.

  26. (c) For SUM 17, costs of $68,375 and disbursements of $706.15.

  27. (d) For SUM 18, costs of $28,375 and disbursements of $578.79.

  28. (e) For the costs submissions, costs of $10,000 and disbursements of $100.

  29. For completeness, the Claimants do not appear to have made submissions on the entitlement and quantum of costs for SUM 51 and the quantum of costs for SUM 46.

  30. Consideration

  31. [26] In the present case, I am of the view that the Defendant can properly be described as the successful party in the Stay Application. It obtained a stay notwithstanding the Claimant’s opposition. The fact that conditions were imposed does not alter that fact. The situation may have been different if the Claimant had indicated from the outset that it consented to a stay subject to the condition I ultimately imposed; however, it did not do so. Although, in the letter from the lawyers for the Claimant to the lawyers for the Defendant dated 31 October 2024, it indicated that its client would consent to a stay on the conditions set out in its written submissions of 25 October 2024, its primary position at the hearing was that no stay should be granted and, in any event, one of the conditions for which it sought namely, security, was not granted.

  32. [27] I also agree with the Defendant that as a general rule the parties’ subsequent conduct is irrelevant. To the extent they raise issues between the parties, they would generally be decided in subsequent curial proceedings.

  33. [30] However, the events following the grant of the stay which I summarised in my grounds on the Variation Application (DKB v DKC [2025] SGHC(I) 14 at [14]−[25]), and the events subsequent to the grant of the Variation Application summarised by the Claimant in its written submissions, lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Defendant at no time had any intention of commencing an arbitration pursuant to its contractual rights under the Settlement Deed. The right to bring such proceedings provided the very foundation for the Stay Application. Whilst it is true, as the Defendant indeed submitted at the hearing of the Stay Application, that the Claimant could have commenced such proceedings, the Claimant was not the one seeking the stay.

  34. Costs of SUM 25 and SUM 51

  35. Costs of SUM 46

  36. Costs of SUM 17 and SUM 18

  37. Costs of these costs proceedings

  38. Conclusion

  39. [39] I would make the following orders: