[2020] SGHCF 22

I begin by introducing the parties and their family members, and the witnesses of fact who gave evidence at the trial. I will introduce the four expert witnesses whom the parties called when discussing Mother’s medical history later on in the judgment.

The parties and their witnesses of fact

The naming convention

Key medical terms

Bipolar mood disturbances are changes that are either (a) “high”, leading to manic behaviour as in Bipolar 1 disorder or hypomanic (less than manic) behaviour as in Bipolar 2 disorder, or (b) “low”, leading to depressed moods. In between the high or low mood changes, the patient’s mood is called “euthymic”, which means that it is “neither high or low”. Symptoms remission refers to “symptom reduction whereby the patient experiences few, if any, symptoms of the disorder and consequently suffers no or minimal impairment in day-to-day function”.

The undisputed facts and key findings

I first set out the facts on which the decision in this case is based. These comprise facts which are undisputed, and certain findings of relevant fact which I have made after considering the evidence of the witnesses. In relation to some matters, I have either made no express findings or set out my findings elsewhere in the judgment where required.

(1) From Mistress to Matriarch

(2) How Mother lived her life, her character and values

It is the Defendants’ case that Mother was a traditional woman who grew up in a conservative family and that she had conservative beliefs.

(a) According to Andrew, Mother believed that sons who carried on the family name were to be favoured over daughters. She saw Andrew, the eldest son, as the one to perpetuate the family name and take over the family business. She also held conservative views on the separate roles and expectations of men and women in society.

(b) Bernard testified that Mother was a traditional and conservative woman with fixed beliefs who had the philosophy and shared values of her generation that daughters should inherit less as they “marry out of the family and they do not bear the family surname”. Bernard further cited an example of Mother’s traditionalism in a handwritten note by Daniela in Mother’s condolence book at her wake:

(c) Mdm L also corroborated this view that she had known Mother to be a traditional woman, although she admitted that Mother had not specifically told her that information and it was purely Mdm L’s surmise based on people of that generation about “giving properties to woman.

(d) Eric’s email dated 2 March 2013 to Andrew, Celine and Bernard which was exhibited in Celine’s Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) stated:

Mother thus also subscribed to traditional Chinese customs that privileged the first-born child, which is consistent with evidence adduced at trial that Mother gave preferential treatment to Andrew as he was the firstborn (see [15(a)] above and [44] below).

(a) Celine testified that Mother was especially protective of her. She cited an example of how Mother would not practise favouritism towards sons and would look out for the daughters in the family as she had specially purchased and paid regular premiums towards an insurance policy in favour of Derek’s daughter, Daniela, so that she could purchase her own car when she came of age and be an independent adult woman, while no other grandchildren received such a gift from Mother. Gavin, a family friend called by the Defendants who was a freelance insurance agent, corroborated the fact that Mother did indeed purchase an endowment policy for Daniela and pay for the insurance premiums. Celine also said Mother was constantly worried about her well-being in Australia and would ask her to call home and visit as often as possible. She said that Mother was the one who had persuaded Father to bequeath to her an equal share of his estate, as he did in his will and Mother had told her about this incident in the late 1990s. Daniela testified that Mother was low-spirited after Celine left for Australia and that she had “never treated [Celine] any less than her brothers”. Celine and her brothers were also each given an equal share of the proceeds from the sale of a second property, the Upper Bukit Timah Property (registered in Mother’s name).

(b) Derek disagreed with the Defendants’ portrayal of Mother’s favouring sons over daughters, citing examples where Mother would always be excited whenever Celine was about to return to Singapore and would prepare Celine’s favourite foods and snacks, and would be very down whenever Celine left for Australia.

I describe here the individual relationships of the key family members with Mother. Some of these are not in dispute or have not been disputed. Where they are in dispute, I have set out my findings where necessary.

According to Ellen, Mother told her that the PPO application was made because Derek was trying to strangle her and harm her. The allegations of violence by Mother against Derek were not believed by Andrew and Bernard, and Bernard even testified that Derek is not a violent person who would hurt Mother. Derek’s explanation for Mother’s PPO application was an incident on 10 September 1999, when Derek, who was unaware that Mother was standing outside his room, opened the door and accidentally knocked into her. Derek testified that in her delusion that he was out to hurt her, Mother applied for a PPO against him. The door latch caused a cut on her forehead. Derek denied all other incidents of violence alleged by Mother. He thus testified that the PPO application by Mother was not a result of any “quarrels and fights” between Mother and him.

(a) According to Derek, in 1992 Bernard had an altercation with Mother and shoved her, causing her to fall to the ground. As a result of the push, Mother ended up in the hospital and had to undergo stitches. This incident was witnessed and corroborated by Daniela and Diana. It had happened in the garden and Mother was bleeding profusely from her head. A police report was filed and Bernard was detained in the police station. Bernard moved out of the Family Property afterwards, and he and his family did not visit Mother and Father for several years. The account of this incident is further corroborated by the medical notes of Dr Wong Yip Chong ("Dr Wong"), a doctor from the Adam Road Hospital (“ARH”) who saw Mother on 5 October 1997, which stated “[f]all – pushed down by 2nd son. Accident. Police station.”

(b) Bernard did not dispute that Mother had a fall and that he was in fact called to the police station as a result. He testified that this isolated incident occurred in 1993. He said that he and Mother had quarrelled over a domestic arrangement issue as Mother had wanted Bernard to move into a different room in the Family Property. In her foul mood, Mother tried to push Bernard and somehow lost her balance, fell to the floor and sustained a head injury. They were the only people in the driveway when she fell, and the other family members only heard the commotion.

On a balance of probabilities, I accept the testimonies of Derek, Daniela and Diana over Bernard’s account, since the incident was witnessed by multiple family members and was also sufficiently significant such that Mother relayed the incident to Dr Wong in 1997. Further, I note that there were contradictions in Bernard’s evidence on this incident, which affected his credibility. On the stand, Bernard testified that there was no police report made by Mother and that he had merely explained to the police officer that he did not push Mother and she “fell by mistake”. However, this was squarely contradicted by a joint affidavit filed by Andrew and Bernard in an application for the appointment of deputies for Mother. This affidavit stated that Mother had “filed the police report to pressurise [Bernard] to move out of the house”. When confronted, Bernard provided an inadequate explanation that it was only after he read the joint affidavit that he realised that it was a mistake. I therefore accorded limited weight to Bernard’s evidence on this incident.

(a) On one hand, it is Eric’s testimony that the subject of the Will was raised for the first time by Andrew with Eric on or around 8 May 2002 during a discussion on Father’s will. Andrew suggested that it would be a good idea if Mother were to execute a will as it would ensure that there was a proper demarcation of the estate when Mother passed away. A week later, on 15 May 2002, the topic of making Mother’s will also came up spontaneously when Eric, Bernard and Andrew were chatting. Eric was surprised when he later found out that Andrew and Bernard had taken Mother to see a lawyer to make and execute the Will on 22 and 29 May 2002 respectively as he had not been informed of any scheduled appointment for Mother to execute the Will.

(b) On the other hand, it is Andrew’s testimony that a few months after Father passed away on 25 January 2002, Andrew, Bernard and Eric were at the Family Property discussing the progress of obtaining the Grant of Probate for Father’s estate. When they were on that topic, Mother told them that she wanted to make a will and give Andrew, Bernard and Eric a share of her estate each, but that she did not wish to give any share to Derek. Andrew testified that he asked Mother to reconsider but she told him to keep quiet. During the discussion, Mother told Bernard and Andrew that she wanted them to visit Mdm L’s office with her.

(1) Relationship between Mother and Mdm L

(2) Making of the Will on 22 May 2002

When giving instructions to Mdm L on the Will, Mother had thought for a moment and changed her mind about giving Derek $5,000. She told Mdm L that she would give Derek $10,000 instead, thus explaining the struck out “$5,000”. As such, Mdm L took note of the above instructions. As for the cancellation of the “$” sign beside the Daughter’s “½ share”, Mdm L explained that she had erroneously written down the “$” sign as she was scribbling down the instructions from Mother.

(a) It came as no surprise to Mdm L that Derek was only given a fixed monetary sum of $10,000 as compared to her other three sons. Mother had previously told Mdm L about her strained relationship with Derek.

(b) Her decision to give Celine only half a share of the estate was not unexpected as Mdm L knew Mother to be a traditional woman.

(c) Mother had also considered her step-children from Father’s first marriage and gave them pecuniary sums.

(3) Execution of the Will on 29 May 2002

(4) Mdm L’s recollection of Mother’s behaviour at both meetings

(a) About a month after the late Father's passing on, in late February 2002, Mother came to lodge the Notice of Death with the Singapore Land Authority for the Family Property.

(b) As the effective sole owner of the Family Property, she then instructed Mdm L to send a legal letter to Derek to evict him.

(c) When she came back to collect the updated Certificate of Title on 22 May 2002, she gave Mdm L instructions on the drafting of the Will.

(d) On 29 May 2002, Mother executed the Will (drafted in accordance with her instructions on 22 May 2002).

When the Plaintiffs discovered the making and execution of the Will and its contents, and how they and the other beneficiaries conducted themselves thereafter

(1) The 1st Plaintiff (Derek)

(2) The 2nd Plaintiff (Celine)

(3) Eric

Eric said Mother had never once mentioned to him that she was interested in making a will. Thus, he was surprised when he received a call from Mother on 29 May 2002 when Mother informed him that Andrew and Bernard had taken her to see a lawyer to execute the Will. Eric testified that he was never informed of any scheduled appointment for Mother to execute the Will. When Eric returned to the Family Property later in the day of 29 May 2002, he spoke to Mother about making the Will but Andrew allegedly lectured Mother against talking about the Will and she immediately kept quiet. On the other hand, Bernard testified that at Mother’s request, he had fixed an appointment for her on 22 May 2002 and had called to inform Andrew and Eric. On the day itself, Bernard called to remind Andrew and Eric, but Eric did not turn up. In respect of the 29 May 2002 appointment, he called to inform Eric, but Eric did not turn up. On balance, I accept Eric’s evidence over Bernard’s evidence and find that Eric only first knew about the Will on 29 May 2002. In my judgment, Eric’s evidence that supports the Plaintiffs’ case should be given greater weight than Bernard’s evidence as the success of the Plaintiffs in the case would be against Eric’s own financial interest. In the event that the Will is found to be invalid, Eric’s share would be reduced in value as the estate now has to be shared between 5 beneficiaries, instead of 4½ beneficiaries after the pecuniary gifts.

(a) During the visit on 17 March 1999, Mother accused Derek of threatening her with assault and “push[ing] door against her head” when she knocked on his door wanting to speak to him. It is crucial to note that this was several months before Mother’s unsuccessful PPO application against Derek on 14 September 1999 (see above at [35]).

(b) Mother defaulted follow-up consultations and medication in the first half of the 2000. On 22 May 2000, Mother was brought to IMH by an ambulance accompanied by Andrew, Bernard and Eric for the relapse of her illness that occurred a week after Celine left for Australia. Mother was dressed in black Buddhist robes and had threatened to move out of the house. She told Dr Lim in an interview on 23 May 2000 that she was better off dead as her husband did not love her.

(1) Outpatient visits proximate to the making and execution of the Will

In January 2002, Mother’s maid alleged that she had been assaulted by Mother. During investigations, the police requested a medical report on Mother from IMH. In this medical report, Dr Lim stated that Mother was not of unsound mind and certified that she was fit to plead. When Father’s health deteriorated as he was diagnosed with cancer, Daniela described Mother to be constantly irritable, emotionally detached and increasingly withdrawn. Mother informed Dr Lim during the outpatient visit on 16 January 2002 that she felt sad about Father’s heart condition and serious illness. This was shortly before Father passed away on 25 January 2002.

During the outpatient visit when she was seen by Dr Lim on 27 February 2002, Mother mentioned that Father died a month ago and that she was grieving. Mother said that she missed him and that he had loved her.

During the outpatient visit when she was seen by Dr Lim on 10 April 2002, it was noted that Mother’s mood was stable and she still missed Father. She was “at times tearful” as she was grieving but her sleep and appetite were normal. This was the most recent visit to IMH before the making and execution of the Will by Mother on 29 May 2002.

The case

Summons 125: the amendment to the Statement of Claim

First, in order to arrive at a comprehensive decision, I was of the view that it was necessary to deal with the issue on the existence of the delusions and overvalued ideas suffered by Mother when she was in a euthymic state.

Second, I disagreed with the Defendants’ submission that the amendment contradicted the evidence. On the contrary, there was some evidence that supported the amendment.

Third, this case concerned the mental state of Mother. Most of the factual evidence on this matter had been ventilated, and what remained could be elicited from further cross-examination. The rest turned on the expert evidence of the doctors. There was a divergence in expert opinion, in particular between Dr Tan and Dr Lim, on the existence of delusions and overvalued ideas in Mother when she was in remission, which remained unresolved and was dealt with in the second tranche of the trial.

Fifth, the focus of the additional enquiry was limited to the sole issue of Mother’s mental condition when she is in a euthymic state and its impact on her testamentary capacity. Therefore, allowing the amendment would not cause substantial prejudice to the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs furnished Further and Better Particulars of the amended para 6 in Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2). The Plaintiffs pleaded that Mother suffered from psychosis as a mental disorder independent from bipolar syndrome and that the symptoms of her psychosis, in particular her delusions or overvalued ideas, intensified when she was suffering from a mood episode. In particular, the Plaintiffs claimed that Mother’s psychosis was diagnosed and recorded by Dr Wong in ARH on 5 October 1997, and subsequently recorded as “acute psychosis” in Dr Lim’s medical notes on Mother when she was admitted to IMH on 24 September 1998 as well as in a nursing note dated 2 November 1988. However, no distinction was sought to be made as to whether Mother’s psychosis was independent of her bipolar condition. The Plaintiffs further asserted that Mother’s delusion/overvalued idea that Derek was out to harm her caused Mother’s decision to only bequeath $10,000 to Derek.

Issues to be determined

(a) whether Mother lacked testamentary capacity at the time of making and executing the Will; and

(b) whether Mother made and executed the Will under the undue influence of the Defendants.

(a) The Joint Expert Report by Dr Tan and Dr Ung adduced in the first tranche of trial stated that Mother’s paranoid delusions against Derek and his wife had probably influenced the Will in disposing of Mother’s assets, which if she had been sound, would not have been made. The Joint Expert Report did not address the question of whether Mother’s bipolar disorder was in relapse or in remission. The Joint Expert Report stated that during Mother’s severe manic relapses requiring involuntary admission to ARH and IMH, she had psychotic symptoms of hallucination and paranoid delusions. Thus, the expert evidence given by Dr Tan and Dr Ung only briefly touched on the possibility of delusions affecting Mother’s decision-making ability at the time of making and executing the Will, and having paranoid delusions was only listed as a symptom when Mother’s bipolar disorder with psychosis relapsed in its manic phase. Read in its totality, the Joint Expert Report expressed an opinion that it was probable that at the time of making and executing the Will, Mother had displayed paranoid delusions during a manic relapse of her bipolar disorder.

(b) The same position was expressed by Derek and Celine on the stand during the first tranche of trial, where they both testified that it was only during Mother’s manic episodes that Mother ostensibly had the alleged delusions about Derek and expressed her desire for Derek to leave the Family Property.

(c) However, the Plaintiffs subsequently resiled from their original position that Mother’s paranoid delusions against Derek only manifested itself during her relapses. In their further closing submissions, the Plaintiffs adopted the new position that Mother had delusions which could persist into remission, and that Mother’s delusions or overvalued ideas existed and operated independently of Mother’s bipolar illness. The Plaintiffs submitted that Mother’s pleaded psychosis was independent of her bipolar condition and there was no causal relation between the two. They provided further and better particulars that (a) Mother suffered from psychosis as a mental disorder with symptoms independent from bipolar syndrome; and that (b) the symptoms of her psychosis, in particular her delusions or overvalued ideas, intensified when she was suffering from a mood episode.

(1) Bipolar disorder with psychosis

(a) Dr Tan and Dr Ung assessed Mother to be suffering from paranoid psychosis since the 1970s, probably bipolar disorder with manic psychotic episodes that needed involuntary admissions to the hospital. Mother had psychotic states with hallucinations, grandiose and paranoid delusions, thought disorders and violent behaviour. During these periods, she had paranoid ideas about various things including her husband having an affair, her maid stealing things from her, Derek and his wife, and the government.

(b) Dr Lim clarified that the diagnosis of bipolar disorder with psychosis was a more accurate diagnosis of Mother, noting that not every bipolar patient has psychosis. In the second tranche of the trial, Dr Lim gave evidence that “psychosis” is a “non-specific umbrella term” that does not exist in isolation. If psychotic symptoms are observed, a treating physician must diagnose the condition giving rise to the psychosis, which could be caused by a brain tumour, substance-induced psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia or delusional disorder. Mother was however not diagnosed with psychosis as an independent psychiatric condition on its own.

(c) Dr Chee diagnosed Mother with bipolar disorder, and clarified on the stand that as a mood disorder, the bipolar disorder could be presented with psychotic symptoms.

(2) Schizo-affective disorder

The Plaintiffs also relied on the possibility of Mother’s mental condition falling within the rubric of schizo-affective disorder in their closing submissions.

I start with the medical evidence. There were mentions of Mother’s mental condition as schizo-affective disorder in medical notes on two instances and once in a nursing note on 26 September 1998. The experts disagreed on whether Mother could have suffered from a schizo-affective disorder. Both Dr Tan and Dr Ung were consistently of the view that a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder could not be ruled out. However, under cross-examination, Dr Tan accepted that it was unlikely that Mother suffered from schizo-affective disorder. On the other hand, in his 2nd Expert Report, Dr Lim took the view that “[s]ince there were no signs or symptoms to suggest she had schizophrenia in the period I was treating her, this makes a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder unlikely”. Dr Lim thus ruled out a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder. Dr Chee expressed no view on this issue.

I note that the Plaintiffs’ submission goes beyond its pleaded case. Since it was never pleaded that Mother had schizo-affective disorder, whether Mother suffered from schizo-affective disorder is a non-issue. The Plaintiffs sought to argue that their contentions on this point were sufficiently pleaded because the Joint Expert Report states that “Schizo-Affective Disorder is basically Bipolar Disorder with psychotic features”. Dr Ung also clarified on the stand that a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder did not differ that much from a diagnosis of bipolar disorder with psychotic manifestations. However, there is nevertheless a difference between the two distinct mental disorders, as they were defined separately in the Agreed Glossary of Medical Terms. It therefore follows that Mother’s schizo-affective disorder should have been separately pleaded, as required by Rule 398 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014), which the Plaintiffs failed to do.

In any case, I find that the Plaintiffs have simply not proved that Mother had schizo-affective disorder at the time of making and executing the Will. The Plaintiffs’ own expert, Dr Tan, had conceded that it was unlikely that Mother suffered from schizo-affective disorder and contradicted the Plaintiffs’ own position. Dr Tan testified that a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder simply remained a possibility, although the diagnosis was likely to be bipolar disorder with psychosis instead. This diagnosis was fairly accepted by the Plaintiffs in their closing submissions. Dr Ung also merely took the view that there was a “possibility” that Mother might have been suffering from schizo-affective disorder on or around the time of making and executing the Will. In my judgment, a possible diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder is plainly insufficient to prove that Mother suffered from the said disorder. Further, Dr Lim testified that since there was no existing diagnosis of schizophrenia of Mother (a position that was also accepted by Dr Tan and Dr Ung – see above at [141]) and there were no signs or symptoms to suggest Mother had schizophrenia in the period he was treating her, this made a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder unlikely. Dr Lim thus concluded that Mother did not manifest features of schizo-affective disorder at the time of making and executing the Will. In light of the above, I find that the references to Mother’s mental condition as schizo-affective disorder in the medical notes and nursing note must have been inaccurate and only preliminary assessments of Mother’s condition in 1998, and were therefore of limited evidential value.

Whether Mother’s bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission at the time of making and executing the Will

I now turn to the issue of whether Mother’s bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission at the time of making and executing the Will.

(1) The medical evidence

(A) Dr Chee

(B) Dr Lim

(C) Dr Tan and Dr Ung

(2) Mdm L’s factual evidence

(3) Conclusion

Whether Mother suffered from delusions or overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm her at the time of making and executing the Will

(1) Delusions or overvalued ideas during Mother’s manic phase of bipolar disorder

(2) Delusions or overvalued ideas that persisted into remission

(A) Delusions or overvalued ideas from psychosis independent from bipolar disorder

I turn to the new position taken by the Plaintiffs at the second tranche of the trial, which is that the delusions or overvalued ideas persisted into remission of Mother’s bipolar disorder and were independent of Mother’s bipolar disorder. The Plaintiffs provided further and better particulars that (a) Mother suffered from psychosis as a mental disorder with symptoms independent from bipolar syndrome; and (b) the symptoms of her psychosis, in particular her delusions or overvalued ideas, intensified when she was suffering from a mood episode. Read together, the Plaintiffs’ new position is that the alleged delusions and overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm Mother stemmed from the Plaintiffs’ pleaded psychosis, which was independent from Mother’s bipolar disorder.

(a) Ellen testified that Mother told her that Derek had strangled her, even though it was untrue. She testified that Mother thought that Derek was trying to harm her since she gave birth to him because he was a “big baby” and she had “difficulty in delivery”. Mother repeated these stories to Ellen “all the time”, even when Ellen observed that her mood was “fine”. Ellen also testified that Mother’s mood was either “very nice” or “very violen[t]”. This was evidence of an instance where Mother still held such delusions or overvalued ideas against Derek even when her bipolar disorder with psychosis was in a euthymic state.

(b) The respective PPO applications of Mother and Derek against each other in 1999 (see [35] above) provided the factual support for the existence of Mother’s delusions or overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm her. In particular, in Mother’s unsuccessful PPO application, she alleged that Derek had pressed her head against a table and pointed a knife at her neck. Derek testified that Mother was “experiencing one of her episodes in the courtroom” and that she had “started bowing to the District Judge and command[ing] him to order [Derek] to move out of the family home”.

(c) No evidence was adduced of Derek ever actually inflicting harm on Mother in the manner she described in her PPO application or as she allegedly told Ellen, save for the incident where Derek admitted to opening the door and hitting Mother on her head accidentally. In fact, Andrew testified that Derek would not have hurt Mother (by pointing a knife at Mother’s neck) and Bernard testified that Derek was not a violent person.

In my judgment, the Plaintiffs’ case that Mother suffered from delusions or overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm her stemming from the Plaintiffs’ pleaded psychosis that was independent of her bipolar condition cannot be sustained. I say so for the following reasons.

First, the Plaintiffs wrongly relied on Dr Lim’s assessment of Mother’s condition at the time of her PPO application. The Plaintiffs argued that Mother’s delusions concerning Derek were not linked to Mother’s bipolar illness because the delusions or overvalued ideas existed during the time of Mother’s PPO application “which Dr Lim opined was when [Mother] was not manic”. However, Dr Lim’s exact words on the stand were that there was “not enough evidence” to suggest that Mother was in a manic phase when she brought the PPO application against Derek. This is an opinion on insufficiency of evidence, which is entirely different from the submission put forth by the Plaintiffs that Dr Lim gave a positive assessment that Mother was not in a manic phase at the time of Mother’s PPO application. There is also no other evidence to suggest that Mother’s bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission during the time of her PPO application (as she was during the time of making or executing the Will based on Mdm L’s evidence). In fact, Derek’s testimony that Mother was having an episode and her actions when appearing before the District Judge (see above at [186(b)]) seem to suggest otherwise.

(B) Delusions or overvalued ideas stemming from bipolar disorder with psychosis

(a) Dr Ung testified that for bipolar disorder patients, there are “paranoid-type delusions or ideas” even when there is no prominent depression, hypomania or mania.

(b) Dr Tan testified that someone with bipolar disorder who has a delusion during the manic phase would also have the same delusion during remission, when he or she is in a euthymic state.

(c) On the other hand, Dr Lim testified that for a patient diagnosed with bipolar disorder (such as Mother), when the patient’s mood stabilises or returns to a euthymic state, his or her hallucinations or delusions would disappear.

However, I observe that Dr Tan’s testimony on the stand as regards the applicability on the above evidence to Mother was self-contradictory. Dr Tan testified that (a) the classification in the ICD-10 had to be put in perspective and would not apply to an individual with existing overvalued ideas or delusions; (b) Mother was a person with existing overvalued ideas or delusions; and (c) yet, the ICD-10 classification nevertheless applied to Mother. Additionally, I note that the extract from ICD-10 only applied to “[p]atients with mania that is responding to neuroleptic medication” and it was not established whether Mother fell within this category of patients.

Whether Mother lacked testamentary capacity

The propounder of the will bears the burden of proving that the testator possessed testamentary capacity (Muriel Chee at [40], [46] and [52]). The legal burden of propounding the Will thus lies with the Defendants.

In the present case, I am satisfied that the Defendants have successfully rebutted the presumption that Mother continued to lack testamentary capacity, given my above finding that Mother made and executed the Will when her bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission (see above at [180]). In particular, I give considerable weight to Dr Chee’s assessment of Mother’s condition on 30 May 2002 and Mdm L’s evidence on Mother’s behaviour and rational decision-making during their meetings on 22 and 29 May 2002 when she made and executed the Will. I also reject the Plaintiffs’ case that Mother suffered from delusions or overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm her when she was in a euthymic state at the time of making and executing the Will that arose from psychosis that was independent of her bipolar disorder (see above at [187]–[201]). Further, I reject the alternative case that the delusions or overvalued ideas experienced by Mother stemmed from her bipolar disorder (see above at [202]–[210]). The medical evidence instead supports a finding that Mother had testamentary capacity when her bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission, and she would have been capable of making and executing the Will at the material time. Dr Lim’s evidence, which I accept, is that (a) a patient suffering from bipolar disorder can have the capacity to make a will when the condition is stable and the symptoms were brought under control; and (b) Mother’s testamentary capacity at the time of making and executing the Will was not affected by any alleged delusions or overvalued ideas.

(a) Mother’s rationale for giving Derek only a fixed monetary sum of $10,000 can be logically explicable when one takes into account Mother’s poor relationship with Derek and her dislike of Derek’s lack of employment and his persistence on living with his entire family in the Family Property against Mother’s wishes (see above at [29], [31] and [34]). It is crucial to note that Derek was not completely left out of the Will, and she had even increased his initial entitlement from $5,000 to $10,000. It would have been plainly irrational for Mother to have done this if Mother’s alleged delusion or overvalued idea that Derek was out to harm her still persisted at the time of making and executing the Will. Further, I observe that Mother’s drafting of the Will was consistent with her decision to evict Derek. Given their strained relationship, it is unlikely that she would have wanted Derek to receive an equal share as Andrew, Bernard and Eric. Mother’s later consideration of changing her Will during February 2003 to give substantial pecuniary bequests to Daniela and Derek’s children (see above at [84]) was aligned with this original decision, as she knew what she wanted Derek to have, but considered providing for his children separately in the Will.

(b) As for Celine’s share, the fact that she received a half share, which was less than what Andrew, Bernard and Eric each received but more than what Derek received, is also explicable. As Mdm L and Andrew testified, Mother was a traditional woman who shared values of her generation that daughters should inherit less once they “marry out of the family”. There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mother was a woman who subscribed to traditional values and Chinese customs. Celine had been living overseas for decades and was not as involved in Mother’s day-to-day life as Andrew, Bernard, and Eric, who were present in Singapore (see above at [26], [42]–[43]). Celine had also married a Caucasian man which upset Mother (see above at [43]). Even though Mother may have doted on Daniela, her eldest granddaughter, it did not mean that her views towards her daughter had to be aligned with that as well. The fact that people of Mother’s generation treated daughters differently from sons did not appear to be disputed by the Plaintiffs. The real dispute is whether the evidence of Mother’s affection towards Celine and Daniela (see above at [16], [41] and [55]) was sufficient to show that she had would have acted differently from other people of her generation when deciding how to divide her own estate. On balance, I am of the view that there is insufficient evidence adduced to demonstrate that it was irrational for Mother to have given Celine half a share, given her traditional values and views on the gendered roles. I further observe that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated how Mother’s alleged delusion or overvalued idea of Derek wanting to harm her was relevant to Celine’s share in the Will.

(c) Despite their previous difficult relationship, the giving to Bernard of one share can also be considered a rational decision by Mother. By the time of the making and execution of the Will in 2002, Mother and Bernard had a close relationship of trust which was much improved from what they had in the early 1990s (see above at [51]). It was unsurprising as well that Andrew and Eric received one share each given that Andrew and Eric were Mother’s favoured sons (see above at [44] and [52]).

(d) Mdm L was of the view that Mother had exercised rational decision-making in their meetings on 22 and 29 May 2002 (see above at [171]–[172]). The specific bequests made by Mother were also consistent with what Mdm L knew of Mother and her relationships with her children from their “chit chat” sessions (see above at [69]).

In my judgment, the court must be mindful not to displace Mother’s subjective preferences, especially when the Will is rational on its face.

Undue Influence

Relevant legal principles

The Plaintiffs’ claim

Application to the facts

(a) Derek testified that Mother had a “stubborn streak”;

(b) Bernard testified that “I would like to add that my mother was an independent person with a mind of her own. She was stubborn by nature. Whenever my mother made a decision, it was near impossible to convince her to change her mind on it”;

(c) Andrew testified that when he asked Mother to reconsider not giving any share of her estate to Derek, Mother told Andrew to “keep quiet” and that he said no more as Mother was “very stubborn and single-minded”.

(d) Despite knowing what they would receive under the Will immediately after it was executed (around 29 and 30 May 2002), neither of the Plaintiffs approached Mother to discuss their shares of the Will when she could have easily addressed any of their concerns. This fact corroborates Mother’s stubbornness. Although I note that this fact could also have suggested that the Plaintiffs knew it would be futile to persuade Mother to amend the Will given the alleged undue influence exercised by Andrew and Bernard over Mother, I find this unlikely given all the evidence about Mother’s freedom to conduct her daily affairs and the easy access by Mother’s family members to her.

Conclusion

Whatever legacy that children may expect to receive under the will of a parent who has passed on, it should be remembered that a testator has full autonomy on how to dispose of his estate. A parent is entitled to have favourite child(ren) and least-favoured child(ren), in accordance to his or her subjective preferences. When the parent chooses to divide the estate based on his own preferences, even if he decides to bequeath nothing to one or all of the children, unless it can be shown that the will that is made on that basis is invalid for lack of testamentary capacity of the parent, or is a result of undue influence, or for some other reason that invalidates the will in law, the parent’s wishes have to be respected and followed.

Indeed, given the evidence of the relationships of Mother with the Siblings, the way in which Mother chose to dispose of her estate was perfectly understandable, and was in full alignment with the places they occupy in her heart and her views of them, and of her personal beliefs, at the time when she made her Will. It is fair to say that the Will did reflect Mother’s true wishes.