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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Dec 2018

High Court

StreetSine Singapore Pte Ltd v Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers and others

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[2019] SGHCR 01Case no. Suit No 1207 of 2016(Summons Nos 2968 and 2970 of 2018)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [3] Having considered the parties’ respective evidence and submissions, I now give my decision on the applications.

  2. Background and procedural history

  3. [4] The Plaintiff is a private company incorporated in Singapore and carries on the business of an information technology company that integrates big data sets with mobile applications to provide property information and transaction tools to the real estate market. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of STG. The majority of the shares in STG are held by SPH Interactive Pte Ltd.

  4. [5] The 1st Defendant is a national body representing professionals who carry out various services relating to the real estate and construction industry, including land surveying, quantity surveying, property management, marketing, estate agency and valuation practice. The 2nd to 22nd Defendants are either individual members or employees of the 1st Defendant. The 23rd Defendant, which is also a member of the 1st Defendant, is a property consultancy firm that offers valuation advisory services.

  5. [6] The present suit was commenced by the Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant on 10 November 2016. At that time, the Plaintiff alleged that the 1st Defendant had engaged in a conspiracy with the predominant purpose of injuring the Plaintiff’s business. On 16 October 2017, the 2nd to 27th Defendants were added as defendants to the action pursuant to leave granted by the Court. The Plaintiff’s case is that as a result of the Defendants’ wrongful acts and breaches, the Plaintiff has been, amongst other things, unable to market its valuation products to banks, financial institutions or the public in any meaningful manner within Singapore or overseas.

  6. (a) The Plaintiff had made losses over the years in 2014 to 2017. The Plaintiff had made a net loss of $41,538 in 2017 and a net loss of $1,227,675 in 2015.

  7. (b) The Plaintiff had a negative total asset position and a negative current asset position over the years from 2014 to 2017. In particular, as at 31 August 2017, the Plaintiff had a negative total asset position of $1,354,238 and a negative current asset position of $2,402,275.

  8. (c) In the 2017 Financial Statements, the independent auditors, KPMG LLP (“KPMG”), had expressed a “material uncertainty related to going concern”, as follows:

  9. [8] In a reply affidavit filed by Mr Jason Barakat-Brown, the Chief Executive Officer of STG, the following points in response were made on behalf of the Plaintiff:

  10. (a) The profitability of a company from an accounting perspective did not necessarily reflect the company’s financial strength or its liquidity. In any case, the Plaintiff made a profit of $630,860 in 2016. Although it posted a small loss of $41,538 in 2017, its revenue had increased by more than 25% from $4,940,990 in 2016 to $6,192,499 in 2017. Further, the Plaintiff generated positive operating cash flow of $1,330,352 and $1,286,549 respectively in 2016 and 2017.

  11. (b) The claim that the Plaintiff might be in financial difficulties because it was a negative total asset and negative current asset position as at 31 August 2018 was premised on a misunderstanding of the Plaintiff’s business model. The Plaintiff was an information technology company that offered its services to customers using a subscription business model that allowed them to obtain access to its services over a 12-month membership period. The Plaintiff billed and received payment from its customers for the full amount of the subscription fee at the start of the 12-month period. As a matter of accounting treatment, these sums received were recorded as liabilities as they represented revenue which the Plaintiff had not earned when it received payment. However, the Plaintiff was free to utilise these sums for its business and to meet any obligations or liabilities. Further, under the Plaintiff’s contracts with its customers, these sums were not refundable in any circumstances. Thus, this line item in the Plaintiff’s balance sheet (referred to hereinafter as “billings in advance”), which formed 72% of the Plaintiff’s current liabilities as at 31 August 2017, should be viewed in this light.

  12. (d) STG entered into separate loan agreements with each of its three shareholders, under which STG’s shareholders agreed to provide loans to STG for the purpose of funding the legal costs incurred and/or anticipated by the Plaintiff in connection with the present action. Each loan agreement was for a term of two years from 11 January 2017 and could be extended for an additional year by STG and STG’s shareholders. STG was entitled to borrow up to $420,000 under these loan facilities.

  13. (e) The 2017 Financial Statements did not reflect the Plaintiff’s latest cash position. In this regard, the Plaintiff exhibited redacted bank account statements dated 30 June 2018 showing that it had cash and cash equivalents of $1,696,951.85, which was significantly higher than the sum of $924,511 reflected in the 2017 Financial Statements.

  14. [9] The Plaintiff also relied on the evidence of an independent expert, Mr Premjit Dass, a chartered accountant and a director in Navigant Consulting (APAC) Pte Ltd. In his expert report, Mr Dass opined that:

  15. (a) The billings in advance were classified in the Plaintiff’s financial statements as current liabilities only because of the timing of the collection of the subscription revenues rather than because they were liabilities that needed to be settled by the outflow of cash at some point in the future. The Plaintiff categorised the billings in advance as liabilities to comply with paragraph B49 of the Financial Reporting Standard in Singapore (“FRS”) 115 which states that “the upfront fee is an advance payment for future goods or services and, therefore, would be recognised as revenue when those future goods or services are provided”. Thus, an assessment of the Plaintiff’s liquidity should exclude billings in advance as the Plaintiff “is not required to discharge those liabilities in cash”.

  16. (b) KPMG’s statement that “a material uncertainty exists” does not mean that the Plaintiff is unable to continue as a going concern. Under Singapore standards for auditing and financial reporting, a company’s management is required to make an assessment of its ability to operate as a going concern, and to disclose any material uncertainty related to events or conditions that might cast doubt on its ability to do so. An auditor’s responsibilities are in turn to review the appropriateness of such an assessment. In this case, the Plaintiff’s management was of the view that it was appropriate to prepare the 2017 Financial Statements on a going concern basis (see Note 21 to the 2017 Financial Statements set out at [61] below). The fact that KPMG concluded that its opinion was “not modified in respect of this matter” (see [7(c)] above) meant that KPMG was of the view that (a) that it was appropriate to use the going concern basis for the preparation of the 2017 Financial Statements; and (b) the Plaintiff’s financial statements had adequately disclosed any material uncertainty related to its ability to continue as a going concern.

  17. [10] In response to Mr Dass’ report, the 1st to 22nd Defendants instructed Mr Nicholas James Gronow to file an independent expert report. Mr Gronow, who was also a chartered accountant, was a senior managing director of FTI Consulting (Singapore) Pte Ltd. In his report, Mr Gronow stated:

  18. (a) Prima facie, the Plaintiff was balance sheet insolvent as at 31 August 2017. Further, the following reasons indicated that the Plaintiff “may also be considered cash flow insolvent” or at risk of becoming cash flow insolvent:

  19. (i) the Plaintiff incurred a net loss of $41,538 in 2017;

  20. (ii) the Plaintiff maintained a negative cash flow from 2014 to 2016 and only maintained a positive cash flow in 2017 taking into account cash flow from investing activities; and

  21. (iii) in the 2017 Financial Statements, the auditors stated that there is a “material uncertainty” as to whether the Plaintiff may continue as a going concern.

  22. (c) While KPMG expressed the opinion that it was appropriate to use the going concern basis for the preparation of the 2017 Financial Statements, the “material uncertainty” identified by KPMG could be ignored.

  23. [11] No expert report was filed on behalf of the 23rd Defendant. However, on the eve of the hearing, the 23rd Defendant filed a Notice of Intention to refer to Mr Gronow’s affidavit.

  24. (a) the plaintiff’s cash position and the financing and credit facilities available to the plaintiff (see Frantonios at [33]);

  25. (b) the plaintiff’s assets and liabilities (both current and long term) (see Frantonios at [33]);

  26. (c) the solvency of the plaintiff (see Elbow Holdings Pte Ltd v Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 219 (“Elbow Holdings”) at [9(a)]); and

  27. (d) whether there is any evidence that the plaintiff has failed to pay or delayed in making payment of a debt that has become due and payable (see, for example, Ho Pak Kim Realty Co Pte Ltd v Revitech Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 230 at [14]; South East Enterprises (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hean Nerng Holdings Pte Ltd and another [2011] SGHC 11 at [5]).

  28. (a) whether the plaintiff’s claim is bona fide and not a sham;

  29. (b) whether the plaintiff has a reasonably good prospect of success;

  30. (c) whether the plaintiff’s want of means was brought about by the defendant; and

  31. (d) whether the application for security for costs was being used oppressively, such as to stifle a genuine claim.

  32. The issue and the parties’ arguments

  33. The 1st to 22nd Defendants’ arguments

  34. The 23rd Defendant’s arguments

  35. The Plaintiff’s arguments

  36. [23] Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr Jaikanth Shankar, submitted that Mr Tng’s and Mr Chia’s arguments were premised on a fundamental misreading of the Plaintiff’s financial statements. In Mr Shankar’s submission, the issue to be decided in an application under s 388(1) of the Companies Act related to the company’s liquidity and not profitability. In this regard, the Plaintiff has a high degree of liquidity because:

  37. (a) The vast majority of the Plaintiff’s liabilities on its balance sheet in the 2017 Financial Statements related to the billings in advance. These were only liabilities in the sense that they represented an obligation on the Plaintiff’s part to perform a service in the future and were not debts. They did not represent a future outflow of cash and could not be said to have any effect on the Plaintiff’s liquidity.

  38. (b) The second largest group of liabilities on the Plaintiff’s 2017 Financial Statements were amounts owed to the Plaintiff’s immediate holding company, STG. Officers of STG have given evidence in affidavits filed on 8 August 2018 for the purpose of these applications that STG will not recall these monies within 12 months of that date.

  39. (c) As at 30 June 2018, the Plaintiff had a sum of $1,696,951.85 in its bank accounts. This sum far exceeded the amount of security sought by the Defendants.

  40. (d) The Defendants presented no evidence of a single creditor having made a demand against the Plaintiff, let alone a claim against the Plaintiff for any unpaid sums.

  41. [25] Finally, in respect of the 23rd Defendant’s application, Mr Shankar submitted that as Mr Gronow’s expert opinion was not offered on behalf of the 23rd Defendant, it was not proper for the 23rd Defendant to rely on Mr Gronow’s report as a response to Mr Dass’ expert opinion through the filing of a Notice of Intention to Refer under O 32 r 13 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). As each party had a separate legal burden to make out the ingredients of s 388(1), and as the 23rd Defendant neither found an expert to rebut Mr Dass’ evidence nor said that Mr Dass’ evidence was to be disregarded, the 23rd Defendant’s application was a non-starter.

  42. The decision

  43. [27] As one of the Defendants’ main submissions was that the Plaintiff is balance sheet and cash flow insolvent, it is useful to begin with an analysis of this particular question. Mr Tng submitted that this was a “primary consideration” for the Court in an application under s 388(1), and relied on cases which set out the two tests for solvency in the context of bankruptcy and insolvency law, being the cash flow test and the balance sheet test.

  44. [28] These two tests find their statutory embodiment in s 100(4) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2009 Rev Ed). For the purpose of the analysis, it suffices to note that this section provides that an individual shall be insolvent if (a) he is unable to pay his debts as they fall due; or (b) the value of his assets is less than the amount of his liabilities, taking into account his contingent and prospective liabilities. In Parakou Shipping Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Liu Cheng Chan and others [2017] SGHC 15, Chua Lee Ming J observed (at [64]) that the cash flow and balance sheet tests corresponded to the first and second limb of s 100(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. It has been held that the two tests are to be read disjunctively, and that therefore, no matter how asset rich the company might be, it will still be held to be insolvent under s 100(4) of the Bankruptcy Act if it can be proved that the company was unable to pay its debts as they fell due (see Living the Link Pte Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) and others v Tan Lay Tin Tina and others [2016] 3 SLR 621 (“Living the Link”) at [26] and [27]).

  45. The Plaintiff’s assets and liabilities

  46. [32] As at 31 August 2017, the Plaintiff had liabilities on its balance sheet amounting to $3,956,510. Of this sum, $70,859 was a loan from STG which was classified as a non-current liability. The remaining $3,885,651 were current liabilities and comprised the following:

  47. Description

  48. Amount ($)

  49. Accrued operating expenses

  50. 297,681

  51. Amount owing to STG (trade)

  52. 684,913

  53. Amount owing to ultimate holding company (trade)

  54. 13,364

  55. Amount owing to STG (non-trade)

  56. 594

  57. Other payables

  58. 54,647

  59. GST payable

  60. 19,496

  61. Billings in advance

  62. 2,814,956

  63. Total

  64. 3,885,651

  65. [33] Against these liabilities, the Plaintiff’s assets amounted to $2,602,272. These comprised non-current assets valued at $1,118,896 and current assets of $1,483,376 (which comprised $558,865 of trade and other receivables and $924,511 of cash and cash equivalents).

  66. [35] The largest item on the Plaintiff’s list of current liabilities, forming 72% of the Plaintiff’s current liabilities, is the item known as billings in advance. As stated in Note 10 of the 2017 Financial Statements, the billings in advance relate to subscription fees collected in advance from customers. This revenue is recorded as a liability on the Plaintiff’s balance sheet as the Plaintiff had not yet earned these sums at the time it received payment (see [8(b)] above).

  67. [36] In his expert report, Mr Dass explained that the manner in which the Plaintiff categorised this subscription revenue was in line with the accounting standard set out in FRS 115. As explained in paragraph IN7 of FRS 115, the “core principle” of the standard is that “an entity recognises revenue to depict the transfer of promised goods or services to customers in an amount that reflects the consideration which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods or services”. Under FRS 115, an entity is to recognise revenue in accordance with this core principle by applying the following steps:

  68. (a) identity the contract(s) with a customer;

  69. (b) identify the performance obligation in the contract;

  70. (c) determine the transaction price;

  71. (d) allocate the transaction price to the performance obligations in the contract; and

  72. (e) recognise revenue when (or as) the entity satisfies a performance obligation.

  73. [37] The last step is explained further in paragraph IN7(e) of FRS 115 as follows:

  74. [38] In this case, the Plaintiff recognises the subscription revenue on a straight-line basis over the period of the customer’s subscription (ie, a period of 12 months). Thus, one-twelfth of the total fees which the Plaintiff receives from a customer at the beginning of the customer’s 12-month subscription would be progressively recognised as revenue – and correspondingly deducted from the Plaintiff’s liabilities on its balance sheet – every month until the end of that 12-month period.

  75. [39] It may be seen from the above that the categorisation of the billings in advance as a liability on the balance sheet is the means of deferring recognition of the subscription revenue until the appropriate time (see Charles H Meyer, Accounting and Finance for Lawyers in a Nutshell (Thomson Reuters, 5th Ed, 2013) at p 128). The billings in advance are not debts in the sense that such sums will become due and payable at some time in the future. Hence, the fact that the Plaintiff’s liabilities exceed its assets as a result of the large sum of billings in advance categorised as current liabilities does not necessarily mean that the Plaintiff is insolvent or illiquid in the sense of having insufficient assets to pay its debts as they fall due.

  76. [40] The Defendant’s expert, Mr Gronow, accepted that the billings in advance did not entail any cash payment to parties. However, he contended that the billings in advance were still relevant to an assessment of the Plaintiff’s liquidity because the Plaintiff has to incur monthly operating expenses to fulfil its obligations to customers and must also continually reinvest in its business to maintain and grow the business. According to Mr Gronow, such operating expenses include advertisement expenses, professional fees, employee benefits expense and rental expenses. Thus, in relation to the billings in advance, Mr Gronow concluded:

  77. [46] Taking the above in totality, I am of the opinion that the billings in advance do not have as much of an impact on the Plaintiff’s liquidity as the Defendants seek to portray. In particular, though the billings in advance appear as a liability on the Plaintiff’s balance sheet, I am of the view that these sums cannot be treated as akin to debt for the purposes of an assessment of the Plaintiff’s liquidity.

  78. [50] The above sets out the Plaintiff’s financial position as at 31 August 2017. Is there any reason to believe that the Plaintiff’s financial position has deteriorated in the intervening period? On the evidence before me, I find no reason to believe that this would be the case. The Plaintiff has given evidence that as at 30 June 2018, its cash and cash equivalents had increased to $1.6m. Whilst it is true that the bank account statements reflect the position only as at 30 June 2018 and there is no explanation from the Plaintiff as to the sources of these sums, this is equally nothing to suggest that the increase in the cash and cash equivalents has caused a decrease in the Plaintiff’s liquidity. If anything, the evidence of the increase in the Plaintiff’s cash and cash equivalents suggested that the Plaintiff’s liquidity had improved since August 2017. Furthermore, and more importantly, there was no evidence of the Plaintiff having failed to make payment on a debt that was due and payable in the period after the 2017 Financial Statements were prepared until the time of the hearing. Thus, based on the evidence before me, the Plaintiff appeared to be in at least the same – if not better – financial position in June 2018 as compared to its position on 31 August 2017.

  79. The Plaintiff’s business and cash flow

  80. [51] I turn now to the Plaintiff’s cash flow position, which complements the balance sheet analysis above by providing information about the Plaintiff’s cash flow over the period from 1 September 2016 to 31 August 2017.

  81. [52] In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Plaintiff generated cash flows from its operating activities in the sum of $1,330,352 and $1,286,549 in 2016 and 2017, respectively. As pointed out by Mr Shankar during the hearing, these cash flows from operating activities are derived after deducting any operating expenses. This demonstrates that the Plaintiff has the ability to generate substantial cash inflows from its operations, even after expenses are accounted for.

  82. [53] It will be seen from the Plaintiff’s cash flow statements that over 2016 and 2017, it was the Plaintiff’s investments activities that generated an outflow of cash, with an amount of $1,547,732 and $963,584 used for investing activities in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The fact that a significant amount of cash was used for investing activities in 2016 led to the Plaintiff having a negative cash flow for that year, but in 2017 the Plaintiff achieved an overall positive cash flow of $393,845. This was likely due to the fact that the Plaintiff’s cash outflows from investment activities decreased from $1.5m to $0.9m.

  83. [54] Mr Barakat-Brown has given evidence that the Plaintiff can reduce the amount it invests to free up cash for other purposes (see [8(c)] above). In response, the Defendants submit that there is no evidence to show that the Plaintiff’s investment activities are discretionary apart from the Plaintiff’s self-serving statements on affidavit to this effect. In particular, the Plaintiff did not produce its annual budget, records of its monthly expenditure, the contracts underlying its expenditure or correspondence evidencing the nature of these investments. Neither did the Plaintiff identify the type or nature of the investments it asserted that it could simply cease making at any time, or explain how such investments could be reduced, suspended or terminated at the Plaintiff’s discretion. Moreover, the Plaintiff must continue to invest in growing its business or risk falling behind its competitors. In this regard, Mr Gronow opined:

  84. [56] In any case, the Plaintiff achieved a positive cash flow of $322,025 in 2017 even after cash outflows for investing activities were taken into consideration, and a total overall positive cash flow of $393,845, after cash flows from financing activities are accounted for. This is a matter that Mr Gronow accepts. However, he states that “[i]t is not yet clear if this is a sustainable position”.

  85. [57] In my view, the totality of the evidence points towards the sustainability of the Plaintiff’s positive cash flow position as evidenced in the 2017 Financial Statements. First, the Plaintiff’s revenues have been steadily increasing since 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, the Plaintiff’s revenue increased slightly from $4,239,215 to $4,940,900. In 2017, there was a significant increase in the figure, with the Plaintiff managing to bring in revenue of $6,192,499. This trend may also be seen from the increase in the amount of billings in advance, which has increased from the sum of $2,043,367 in 2014 to the sum of $2,814,956 in 2017. It will be recalled that billings in advance represent the subscription revenue already received by the Plaintiff for services that it has yet to render. In the ordinary course of its business, the Plaintiff would recognise these sums as revenue in its accounts in the next financial year. The increase in billings in advance from 2014 to 2017 correlates to the increase in revenue from 2014 to 2017, and indicates that this trend of increasing revenue is likely to continue into 2018 as the billings in advance in the 2017 Financial Statements would be recognised in 2018. Given the positive trend over these four years, indicating that the Plaintiff’s business is acquiring more custom and sales as time progresses, there is no credible basis on which to ground a belief that the Plaintiff’s sales and revenue would be likely to deteriorate in the future. Second, the increase in revenue has also been accompanied by an increase in the Plaintiff’s profitability. The large losses suffered in 2014 and 2015 of $2.4m and $1.8m, respectively, have been replaced by a profit of $630,860 in 2016 and a much smaller loss of $41,538 in 2017. In totality, the factors strongly suggest to me that the Plaintiff’s business is gaining momentum.

  86. [58] At this juncture, it is important to differentiate the Plaintiff’s cash flow from its profitability. As explained by John Flower and Gabi Ebbers in Global Financial Reporting (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) at p 478:

  87. Operation as a going concern

  88. [61] Overarching the above analysis is the assumption that the Plaintiff will continue to operate as a going concern for the foreseeable future. The basis of preparation of the 2017 Financial Statements on a going concern basis was explained in its financial statements in Note 21 as follows:

  89. In preparing the 2017 Financial Statements, KPMG referred to Note 21 and stated that its “opinion is not modified in respect of this matter” (see [7(c)] above).

  90. [62] It important to understand the significance of phrases such as “material uncertainty” and an “unmodified opinion” in the context of financial statements. Paragraphs 25 and 26 of FRS 1 require a company’s management to assess the company’s ability to continue operating as a going concern. Paragraphs 25 and 26 of FRS 1 states:

  91. [63] The Singapore Standard on Auditing (“SSA”) 570, in turn, states that an auditor’s responsibilities are to conclude on the appropriateness of the management’s use of the going concern basis in preparing the financial statements. Under SSA 570, if the auditors conclude that the use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate but a “material uncertainty” exists, it shall draw attention to the note in the financial statements that discloses such matters but state that the auditor’s opinion is not modified in respect of this matter. It is not disputed that the import of KPMG’s opinion was that the going concern basis was appropriate for the preparation of the 2017 Financial Statements, and the 2017 Financial Statements adequately disclosed the material uncertainty in question. In other words, despite the existence of “negative conditions”, the auditors agreed with the Plaintiff’s management that the Plaintiff was not in a situation where it had no realistic alternative but to cease trading. Indeed, as can be seen from the analysis above, I am of the view that this is far from the case.

  92. Financing facilities available to the Plaintiff

  93. [72] In this regard, it is relevant that the company in Frantonios was in dire financial straits. These difficulties were summarised by AR Eunice Chua in Diamond Exchange of Singapore v Singapore Diamond Exchange Pte Ltd [2013] SGHCR 10 at [21] as follows:

  94. [74] In a similar vein, the company in Elbow Holdings was found to be struggling financially. It was found to be able to continue to remain in business only because of continuing financial support from its shareholders. In fact, the company’s own officers had admitted that its financial situation was dire and that the viability of its only business – the operation of a bar and bistro – was at risk (Elbow Holdings at [9(b)]). There also appeared to be evidence that the company had failed to pay the arrears due from its lease of certain property (Elbow Holdings at [7]).

  95. [76] Neither is there any evidence to suggest that the Plaintiff has to rely on the loans from STG’s shareholders to meet its operational expenses and debts and to continue as a going concern. There is nothing in the Plaintiff’s financial statements that suggest that this is the case. In addition, the Plaintiff’s evidence is that it does not need the monies, as Mr Barakat-Brown explains in his affidavit:

  96. Summary and conclusion on stage one

  97. [81] In summary, the evidence suggests that the Plaintiff is a company with healthy levels of liquidity and which has the ability to pay its debts as they fall due:

  98. (a) Although the 2017 Financial Statements reflect the Plaintiff as being in a negative total and current assets position, I am not satisfied that this reveals an inability to pay its debts as they fall due. When the nature of the billings in advance as deferred revenue is accounted for in the analysis and the amount owed to STG is re-classified as a non-current liability, it appears that the Plaintiff had, as at 31 August 2017, more than $1m in current assets to satisfy any further debts that would fall due within the next 12 months from that date.

  99. (b) The Plaintiff generated a positive operating cash flow of $1.33m in 2016 and $1.28m in 2017, and a positive overall cash flow of $393,845 in 2017. The evidence also suggests that the Plaintiff can divert funds it uses for investment – which amounted to more than $1.5m in 2016 and close to $1m in 2017 – to pay legal costs, if necessary.

  100. (c) As at June 2018, the Plaintiff had a sum of more than $1.6m in its bank accounts. This suggests that the Plaintiff’s cash position had improved since 31 August 2017.

  101. (d) There was no evidence that the Plaintiff had failed to pay any creditors or had delayed in making payment of debts that were due and payable, whether prior to or after the date of the 2017 Financial Statements.

  102. (e) In addition to the above, the exists the additionally possibility of obtaining further funds from STG’s shareholders, who have evinced a willingness to provide the Plaintiff – through STG – an interest-free loan of $420,000 until January 2020 (of which a sum of $100,033.95 had already been disbursed in July and August 2017).

  103. Conclusion

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