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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Jun 2019

High Court

P & P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd v Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd

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[2019] SGHCR 10Case no. HC/S 1255 of 2016HC/SUM 2210 of 201919 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [2] I heard oral arguments on 15 May 2019 and received further written submissions on 27 May 2019. I dismiss the application for the reasons in this judgment.

  2. Background

  3. [3] P & P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“the Plaintiff”) brought a claim against Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“the Defendant), for steel fabrication work done under a fabrication contract (“the Contract”). The Plaintiff claimed a sum of $893,273.36 for the work done.

  4. [5] On 1 February 2019, the Defendant provided its verification and certification, quantified at $79,019.50. The Plaintiff did not agree with this sum. As such, the parties agreed to have the sum determined by a jointly appointed quantity surveyor, and to be bound by that decision. In view of the parties’ agreement, the Judge made the following orders on 27 March 2019:

  5. [7] On 30 April 2019, the Plaintiff filed the present application (“the Application”) for interim payment of $79,019.50 and interest.

  6. The relevant provisions

  7. [8] For ease of reference, I set out the relevant legislative provisions and rules relating to interim payment.

  8. [10] O 29 rr 10, 11, 12 and 17 of the Rules of Court set out the framework for interim payment, as follows:

  9. Parties’ arguments

  10. [11] At the hearing, Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr Andrew John Hanam (“Mr Hanam”), proceeded on the basis of O 29 r 11(1)(b) of the Rules of Court, which relates to interim payment in an “action for damages” where “the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed”. He made the following arguments:

  11. [12] Counsel for the Defendant, Mr Twang Kern Zern (“Mr Twang”), made the following arguments:

  12. (a) First, as a preliminary point, the Application and the supporting affidavit do not state the specific rules and sub-paragraphs upon which the Application was based. The Application was therefore defective from the outset.

  13. (c) Third, the Plaintiff cannot satisfy any of the provisions in O 29 r 11(1) of the Rules of Court because the claim for fabrication work under the Contract was not pleaded as a claim for damages, but rather, a claim for a liquidated sum due under the Contract.

  14. [13] While Mr Hanam proceeded on the basis of O 29 r 11(1)(b) of the Rules of Court, the Plaintiff’s supporting affidavit stated that the claim in the suit was for “work done”, which is conceptually distinct from “damages”. In view of the uncertainty, and also to clarify counsels’ positions on how the relevant provisions were to be interpreted, I sought further written submissions in relation to whether, on a literal or purposive understanding of O 29 rr 11(1)(b) and/or 12(c), the present suit would fall within the situations envisaged in those provisions.

  15. [14] In his further submissions, Mr Hanam made the following contentions:

  16. (c) Third, the Court “should be slow to adopt a construction which would… defeat the evident purpose of [O 29 rr 11 and 12 of the Rules of Court] forming, as they do, part of a single code” (citing Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc and another v Maclaine, Watson & Co Ltd and others [1987] WLR 480 (“Shearson Lehman Brothers”) at 492H). The Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff cannot avail itself of interim payment just because the quantification is being done by a third party outside the court is “repugnant to commonsense and contrary to the purpose of the interim payments code” (citing Shearson Lehman Brothers at 493H).

  17. [15] Mr Twang argued in his further submissions that the present situation would not fall within either O 29 rr 11(1)(b) or 12(c) of the Rules of Court, for the following reasons:

  18. (b) Second, it is clear that the present action would not fall within the description of “if the action proceeded to trial” in O 29 r 12(c) of the Rules of Court, because the trial has already concluded. O 29 r 12(c) of the Rules of Court requires a pending trial and judgment because interim payments are an interim remedy subject to final evaluation and adjustment as seen in O 29 r 17 of the Rules of Court. As such, there is no basis for ordering interim payment.

  19. Issues

  20. [16] The issues before me are as follows:

  21. Decision

  22. Preliminary Issue

  23. [17] The Plaintiff has not identified, in either the Application or the supporting affidavit, the rule and sub-paragraph upon which the Application is based. This is contrary to the guidance provided in Singapore Civil Procedure 2019 vol 1 (Justice Chua Lee Meng gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2019) (“Singapore Civil Procedure 2019”), which emphasises the necessity for an applicant to state, in the supporting affidavit, “upon which provision of r. 11(1) or r. 12 the application is based” (Singapore Civil Procedure 2019, at paragraph 29/10/6).

  24. [18] The need to identify the specific provision is not just good general practice; it is an integral part of verifying the “grounds of the application” as required in O 29 r 10(3)(a) of the Rules of Court. The failure to identify the specific provision under which the Application is brought would lead to ambiguity and confusion vis-à-vis the basis of the application, as was evident in the present case (see also HRA Corp (SG) Pte Ltd v Cheng Mun Yip Marcus and others [2018] SGHCR 7 (“HRA Corp”) at [21]–[22], [25] and [31]). On a reading of both the Application and the supporting affidavit, it is impossible to determine whether the Application is based on O 29 rr 11(1) or 12 of the Rules of Court, let alone the specific sub-paragraphs in those rules. As each rule and sub-paragraph deals with a different situation, the Defendant had to consider and address the various possibilities. The failure to identify the specific provision also resulted in the need for further submissions so as to obtain a better understanding of which specific rule may be applicable to the present case (see [13] above).

  25. Whether there is basis to exercise the power to order interim payment

  26. [21] The issue is whether the fact that the proceeding before the quantity surveyor is pending would render the present action “a pending proceeding” for the purposes of paragraph 15 of the First Schedule. I do not think it does, for the reasons elaborated below.

  27. [22] The term “proceeding” is used twice in the same paragraph. Read in the context of the paragraph, both references must refer to the same proceeding. Put another way, the reference to “the proceeding” in the latter half of the paragraph ought to be understood as a reference to the “pending proceeding” mentioned in the former half. In this regard, I am of the view that the term “proceeding” in paragraph 15 of the First Schedule refers to a pending proceeding in court where the court has yet to determine the “damages, debt or other sum” payable. There are two reasons for this interpretation:

  28. (a) First, the First Schedule is situated within the SCJA – “[a]n Act relating to the constitution and powers of the superior courts of judicature” – and expressly relates to additional powers of the High Court.

  29. Whether the requirements of O 29 rr 11(1)(b) or 12(c) of the Rules of Court are met

  30. [28] For the avoidance of doubt, there is also no room for contending that a purposive approach would widen the meaning of “damages” in O 29 r 11 of the Rules of Court to include “sums other than damages”, in view that O 29 r 12 of the Rules of Court is specifically intended to cover “sums other than damages”.

  31. [29] In relation to O 29 r 12(c) of the Rules of Court, I recognise that Mr Hanam initially proceeded only on O 29 r 11(1)(b) of the Rules of Court, and that his arguments on O 29 r 12(c) of the Rules of Court were made only following my request for further written submissions. However, leaving that fact aside, I agree with Mr Twang that the reference to “if the action proceeded to trial” in O 29 r 12(c) of the Rules of Court must mean that the present situation does not fall within the provision. In addition, I am unable to agree that the term “trial” can be extended to the quantity surveyor’s determination, given the ordinary meaning of the term, and also the use of the term throughout the SCJA as a reference to a trial in court.

  32. [30] Finally, I address Mr Hanam’s arguments relating to Shearson Lehman Brothers (see [14(c)] above). The citation of this case does not assist the Plaintiff’s cause. In Shearson Lehman Brothers, the English Court of Appeal was concerned with the situation where the Court was satisfied that the applicant would recover either “damages” or “sums other than damages”, but it was impossible to tell, at the interlocutory stage, whether the sum claimed would be in the nature of damages or otherwise (see also HRA Corp at [28]–[31]). It was against this backdrop that the Court observed (per Nicholls LJ) the need to “be slow to adopt a construction which would… defeat the evident purpose of [O 29 rr 11 and 12 of the Rules of Court] forming, as they do, part of a single code” (Shearson Lehman Brothers at 492H). Indeed, Nicholls LJ had expressly noted in the same case that the underlying purpose of O 29 rr 11 and 12 of the Rules of Court is “to mitigate hardship or prejudice to a [party] which may exist during the period from the commencement of an action to the trial” (emphasis added) (Shearson Lehman Brothers at 492G). In other words, the observations relating to the “single code” were not intended to, and do not, extend the reach of the provisions to the present case.

  33. Conclusion