JHS v JHT [2026] SGPHC 3

The Protection from Harassment Court (“PHC”) was set up pursuant to amendments to the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Revised Edition) (“POHA”) which came into effect on 1 June 2021. The jurisdictional limits of the PHC are therefore of legal interest.

On 22 May 2025, I struck out this claim under Rule 26(2)(g) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Protection from Harassment) Rules 2021 (“SC(PH) Rules”), having found that the claim was not within the jurisdiction of the PHC. Brief reasons for my decision were given to parties then.

I now publish the reasons for my decision.

Background facts

The Claimant was engaged by the Respondent company as an independent contractor. The Respondent company was incorporated in Singapore.

Relations between the Claimant and Respondent personnel soured over time, which eventually led to the Claimant stopping the provision of her services to the Respondent.

The Claimant filed this claim under Part 2 of the SC(PH) Rules, which applies to simplified proceedings. In her second amended claim form filed on the Community Justice and Tribunals System (“CJTS”) on 17 February 2025 , she alleged that Respondent personnel had harassed her between July and October 2024, via “unprofessional treatment”, “harassment on the basis of nationality”, a discrepancy in salary received, “violations under the Employment Act”, “bullying” and “defamation”, and false statements made to the Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management (“TADM”).

It is undisputed that both the Claimant and the Respondent personnel involved were not in Singapore during the relevant period between July and October 2024.

The Claimant sought the following orders via this claim:

(a) A protection order against the Respondent company;

(b) Damages of $20,000; and

(c) A mandatory treatment order (“MTO”) against one of the Respondent directors.

Issue of jurisdiction and the parties’ cases

It was noted that both the Claimant and the Respondent personnel allegedly responsible for the harassment were not in Singapore during the relevant period.

Parties were therefore directed to file submissions on the issue of jurisdiction, which would determine whether the PHC had jurisdiction to hear the claim.

The Claimant’s case

This Claimant acknowledged in her written submissions that the alleged harassment had originated outside Singapore .

However, she submitted that the claim was within the jurisdiction of the PHC , for the following reasons:

(a) The alleged harassment was directed at the Claimant while she was working for a Singapore-incorporated company, and had been reported to the Singaporean authorities, such as the Ministry of Manpower, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, Personal Data Protection Commission, the police, and TADM.

(b) The follow-up by the various Singaporean authorities on her complaints evinced a “strong connection” of this claim to Singapore, and the Singaporean authorities’ awareness of this harassment brought the claim within the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.

(c) The Claimant’s online reviews have “helped to make this case well-known in Singapore, and worldwide” .

(d) The PHC should make a “fair and just decision in this matter, taking into account both the substantial impact on my health and career, as well as the moral and financial damages I have suffered.”

The Respondent’s case

The Respondent had indicated on CJTS, when objecting to proceedings being conducted via Zoom, that the Respondent was “fully willing and prepared to attend the court hearings on the scheduled dates and are ready to comply with all necessary actions to manage the case without any limitations”.

However, the Respondent submitted that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the PHC, for the following reasons :

(a) There was no territorial nexus to Singapore, with both parties outside Singapore.

(b) Incorporation of the Respondent in Singapore did not confer jurisdiction on the PHC.

(c) There was no statutory basis for jurisdiction.

(d) There were “policy and precedential risks” which would “undermine the integrity of the Singapore judicial system” , as adopting the Claimant’s approach would open the courts to matters with no real connection to Singapore, allow forum shopping, contradict legislative intent and create uncertainty for businesses.

Applicable law

Section 16E(1)(a) POHA states that the PHC is a District Court designated as such. Section 16G POHA further states that the PHC has all the civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction of a District Court.

Section 19(2) of the State Courts Act 1970 (“SCA”) states that subject to subsections (3) and (4), a District Court has all the jurisdiction of the General Division of the High Court to hear and try any action in personam where the defendant is served with an originating claim or any other originating process in Singapore in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court or outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court; or where the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of a District Court.

Further, s 17 POHA sets out the circumstances, where a person is outside Singapore, where the PHC has the jurisdiction to make any order under s 12 or s 13 POHA, on the basis of a contravention of ss 3-7 POHA.

For ease of reference, ss 17(1)-(6) POHA are set out in full below:

The PHC did not have jurisdiction over the claim

As can be seen from the applicable law, jurisdiction must be examined at two levels, namely:

(a) Whether the PHC was seised of jurisdiction generally, via valid service, or submission of the Respondent to the jurisdiction of the PHC; and

(b) Whether the PHC had the jurisdiction to hear claims, where the alleged harassment had taken place outside Singapore.

The PHC was seised of jurisdiction at the general level

It was noted that the Respondent, as a Singapore-incorporated company, had been served the claim and supporting documents via registered post to its proper address, as shown by the Declaration of Service dated 22 October 2024. The Respondent had therefore been properly served, as the Claimant had satisfied the service requirements set out in Rule 68 of the SC(PH) Rules.

The Respondent, via its indications on CJTS that it was “fully willing and prepared to attend the court hearings on the scheduled dates”, and subsequent participation in the case management conferences and at trial, had also evinced an intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the PHC generally, as was required under s 19(2) SCA.

I therefore found that the PHC was seised of jurisdiction at the general level.

The PHC did not have jurisdiction to hear these claims involving acts occurring wholly outside Singapore

The PHC did not have jurisdiction to make protection orders under ss 12-13 POHA for this claim

(1) Section 17 POHA did not confer jurisdiction on the PHC to hear this claim for a protection order

As stated above, s 17 POHA sets out the circumstances, where a person is outside Singapore, in which the PHC can make protection orders under ss 12-13 POHA.

An examination of s 17 POHA reveals that the PHC has jurisdiction to make orders under ss 12-13 POHA, where one party was outside Singapore at the point of the alleged act(s), in the following circumstances:

(a) Where the respondent was in Singapore at the point of the alleged act(s) (ss 17(2), 17(5) POHA); or

(b) Where the victim was in Singapore at the point of the alleged act(s) (ss 17(3)(a), 17(4)(a), 17(6)(a) POHA), and the respondent knew or had reason to believe that the victim/claimant would be in Singapore at the point of the alleged act(s) (ss 17(3)(b), 17(4)(b), 17(6)(b) POHA).

I gleaned two points from this analysis.

First, the only persons referred to in s 17 POHA which the PHC could take reference from, in determining whether it had jurisdiction, were the parties, namely the victim (Claimant) and the Respondent. There was no reference in s 17 POHA to the location of any other person by which the PHC could derive jurisdiction from.

As such, the Claimant subsequently raising the harassment issue to Singapore authorities, such that the Singapore authorities were aware of the claim, did not confer jurisdiction on the PHC. Likewise, the Claimant broadcasting her displeasure online, such that other persons in Singapore may have become aware of the alleged acts, was irrelevant in my determination of whether the PHC had extraterritorial jurisdiction over her claim.

Second, it was undisputed that both the Claimant and the Respondent personnel allegedly responsible for the harassment were not in Singapore during the relevant period. There was also no reason for the Respondent personnel to know or believe that the Claimant was in Singapore when the alleged harassment had taken place.

The requirements in ss 17(2)-(6) POHA were therefore not satisfied, for the PHC to have the jurisdiction to make protection orders under ss 12-13 POHA in this case.

(2) The PHC did not have discretion to hear the claim where the requirements in s 17 POHA were not satisfied

The Claimant, in her oral arguments during the hearing, had invited the PHC to go beyond the plain wording of s 17 POHA, and find that the PHC had jurisdiction to hear her claim. I had interpreted this submission as an argument that s 17 POHA was meant to be non-exhaustive, and that the PHC had discretion to hear the claim, even if the requirements in s 17(2)-(6) POHA were not satisfied.

I had rejected this argument at trial for the following two reasons.

First, it was clearly stated in s 17(1) POHA that the PHC has the jurisdiction to make an order under ss 12-13 POHA “in the circumstances specified in subsections (2) to (6)”. This showed that s 17(2)-(6) POHA was meant to be an exhaustive list of when the PHC had extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Second, the explanatory statement of the Protection from Harassment Bill (“Bill”) and the Parliamentary debates during its Second Reading supported the interpretation that s 17 POHA was meant to specify the circumstances where the PHC had jurisdiction, and that some nexus to Singapore was required.

The explanatory statement to the Bill states the following in relation to Clause 17, which became s 17 POHA, making it clear that the PHC is only conferred jurisdiction in specified circumstances:

The issue of extraterritoriality was also examined in Parliament before the POHA was passed. Then-Minister for Law Mr K Shanmugam SC had stated the following in Parliament during the Second Reading of the Bill :

It can be seen from the above that there must be some nexus between the acts of harassment, and either party being in Singapore. Acts of harassment which occurred entirely out of Singapore without any nexus whatsoever to Singapore should not be caught.

In this case, both the Claimant and the Respondent personnel had not been in Singapore during the relevant period. The Respondent also had not known, or had reason to believe, that the Claimant had been in Singapore during the relevant period. The Respondent being a Singapore-incorporated company, without more, did not constitute sufficient nexus as envisioned by s 17 POHA, not having been included in the specified circumstances in s 17(2)-(6) POHA.

I therefore found that the PHC did not have the jurisdiction to hear the claim for a protection order under s 12 POHA.

The PHC did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim for an MTO

Having found that the PHC did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim for a protection order, I next considered whether the PHC had the jurisdiction to hear the claim for an MTO to be made against the Respondent director.

Section 13B POHA sets out the circumstances in which a mandatory treatment order can be made. Pertinently, s 13B(1) POHA states the following:

As can be seen from s 13B(1) POHA, the PHC only has the power to make an MTO where a protection order was made under s 12(2) POHA. Further, the PHC only has the power to make an MTO against a respondent specifically, and not against any other person.

In this case, I had found above that the PHC did not have jurisdiction to make a protection order in this claim. It followed from this analysis that the PHC similarly did not have the jurisdiction to hear a claim for an MTO in this case. In any event, the MTO was not being sought against the Respondent itself, but against a Respondent director who was not a respondent to the claim.

I therefore found that the PHC did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim for an MTO in this case.

The PHC did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim for damages

The final issue which I had to consider was whether the PHC had jurisdiction to hear the claim for damages under s 11 POHA.

Section 11 of the POHA states the following:

At first blush, there is no territorial limitation in relation to a claim for damages under s 11 POHA. Further, s 17 POHA appears to only apply to the criminal jurisdiction of the PHC, as well as its powers to make a protection order under ss 12-13 POHA. Section 17, as well as other provisions within the POHA, are silent on whether the PHC has extraterritorial jurisdiction over a claim for damages.

An argument may therefore be made that the PHC generally has jurisdiction over claims for damages, regardless of whether the alleged act had taken place in Singapore or otherwise. This is also consistent with the general approach in civil claims, where the appropriate order to be made, where there is a successful argument of forum non conveniens, is a stay, rather than a finding that the claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.

However, it is a common adage that Parliament does not legislate in vain. If the PHC generally had extraterritorial jurisdiction over civil claims, ss 17(2)-(6) POHA would have been wholly unnecessary and otiose, as the PHC would already have had the power to make civil protection orders under ss 12-13 POHA. Section 17 POHA, by its very existence, must have been enacted to confer on the PHC jurisdiction it did not already have.

It followed from this analysis that the PHC does not generally have extraterritorial jurisdiction for civil claims, including claims for damages under s 11(2) POHA.

I therefore found that the PHC did not have jurisdiction over the claim for damages under s 11(2) POHA in this case.

Summary of findings

To summarise, I found that the PHC did not have jurisdiction over the claims in this case for a protection order, an MTO, and damages.

Decision

Rule 26(2)(g) of the SC(PH) Rules state that the powers of the PHC in simplified proceedings include an order that any claim be struck out on the basis that it is not within the jurisdiction of the PHC.

As I had found that this claim was not within the jurisdiction of the PHC, I ordered that the claim be struck out, without any assessment of its merits.