Golden Mango Pte. Ltd. v Sudip Bijay Dutta and another [2026] SGMC 94

This is a common type of tenancy dispute. By way of a tenancy agreement dated 14 July 2022 (“TA”), the Claimant and Defendant-in-Counterclaim (“GMPL”) leased one of the houses at Cove Drive (“Premises”) from the Defendants and Claimants-in-Counterclaim (“Duttas”). The tenancy initially ran from 1 August 2022 to 31 July 2023.

The relevant tenant’s covenants in the TA were as follows:

It was undisputed that the parties agreed to extend the tenancy by four days, until 4 August 2023, without additional rent. It was also undisputed that after the tenancy ended, the Duttas refused to refund any part of the $39,000 Security Deposit to GMPL, despite clause 2(b) of the TA.

They also alleged that GMPL did not yield up the Premises until 23 August 2023. In that regard, their only pleaded remedy was “[d]amages to be assessed”. At trial, however, they raised an unpleaded counterclaim for double rent of $24,700. The Duttas did not apply to amend their pleadings. Instead, they simply repeated the counterclaim for double rent in their closing submissions.

GMPL’s sole witness was Mr Lu Yunfan (“Lu”), who was a director of GMPL and its representative for the purposes of the TA. The Duttas did not give evidence. Instead, they served orders to attend court on Mr Tan It Song (“Ricky”) and Ms Jean Leong Kim Bee (“Jean”). Jean was a personal assistant to Mr Dutta at the material time, and Ricky was Mr Dutta’s agent for the purposes of the TA. Both gave oral evidence-in-chief at trial.

After considering the evidence and submissions, I gave a decision on 28 May 2026 with brief reasons. The decision was as follows:

Subsequently, I fixed the costs of the action to be paid by the Duttas to GMPL.

There were four substantive questions that I determined at trial:

Whether the Premises were yielded up on 4 or 23 August 2023

When the tenant sought to return the keys to the landlord, the landlord refused to accept the keys on the ground that the requisite reinstatement works were incomplete, though it eventually accepted the keys several days later under protest. The landlord also demanded that the tenant continue the reinstatement works. Afterwards, the landlord made a claim for double rent for the tenant’s purported holding over after the determination of the tenancy. The Court of Appeal held that there was no holding over by the tenant. To establish that there was a holding over of the demised premises, the landlord must show that “even after the expiration of [its] tenancy, the [tenant] continued to exercise a degree of possession and control over the demised premises which precluded the [landlord] from excluding [the tenant] from the demised premises at [the landlord’s] will” (at [15]). The obligation imposed by clause 2(19) was “to yield the demised premises and to reinstate the same to their original state and condition. It was not a condition precedent that the [tenant was] not entitled to yield the demised premises unless [it] had reinstated the same to their original state and condition” [emphasis added in italics] (at [18]).

Such an interpretation of clause 2(19) was commercially sound, as the Court of Appeal explained:

In the present case, GMPL wished to yield up the Premises on 4 August 2023. Lu testified that on that day, he had returned “most of” the access cards and keys to the Premises to Ricky. Ricky’s evidence was consistent with Lu’s evidence. As Jean explained, GMPL still held an access card “to access the place for repairs”. This retention of an access card did not preclude the Duttas from excluding GMPL from the Premises if they wished to. Indeed, the reason why GMPL had retained some means of access to the Premises to carry out repairs after 4 August 2023 was because GMPL was requested to carry out those repairs by Jean, Ricky or both.

I held that GMPL had attempted to yield up the Premises under clause 2(h) of the TA on 4 August 2023. It was the Duttas, through their representatives, who refused to take possession of the Premises on 4 August 2023. Instead, they demanded that GMPL perform repairs to various parts of the Premises. By making this demand, the Duttas had granted a licence to GMPL to remain in possession of the Premises to perform such repairs until 23 August 2023. There was therefore no holding over by GMPL.

At the Permission Hearing, counsel for the Duttas, Mr Tan, challenged the factual findings at [16]. Mr Tan relied on his affidavit, which averred:

Mr Tan drew my attention to a portion of the certified notes of evidence of the trial which recorded the following exchange during his examination of Jean:

Jean’s evidence therefore supported my factual findings rather than undermined them. Mr Tan went on to stress that there was an “agreement” between GMPL and the Duttas for GMPL to retain access to the Premises to repair the defects. I informed Mr Tan that such an “agreement” was the essence of a licence: see eg Neo Hock Pheng and others v Teo Siew Peng and others [1999] 1 SLR(R) 592 at [20]. Mr Tan then sought to distinguish Lee Wah Bank, but I was unable to discern the proposed distinction from his oral argument and did not have the benefit of written submissions.

Even if I were wrong and GMPL did hold over the Premises from 5 to 23 August 2023, the Duttas could not be granted a remedy. An appeal brought on this issue would be moot. The trial was not bifurcated pursuant to O 9, r 25(2) of the Rules of Court 2021. Accordingly, having pleaded “[d]amages to be assessed”, the Duttas were required to adduce evidence at the same hearing to prove the losses allegedly caused by any holding over. This was not done.

As for the unpleaded counterclaim for double rent, this is a remedy based on s 28(4) of the Civil Law Act 1909. It is a distinct statutory remedy which a landlord can elect to pursue as an alternative to a claim for damages: Liau Beng Chye v Chua Wei Jiea and another appeal [2026] 3 SLR 797 at [36]. Having pleaded only a claim for “[d]amages to be assessed”, it was not open to the Duttas to belatedly assert a right to double rent without amending their pleadings. The counterclaim for holding over was therefore dismissed.

Whether GMPL was entitled to recover $6,238

Whether GMPL breached clause 2(k) of the TA and caused the Duttas to suffer loss

The Duttas claimed that GMPL breached clause 2(k) of the TA and that this prevented them from securing a replacement tenant during the final two months of the lease. The only evidence in relation to this issue came from Jean. She was asked during cross-examination, “Was there any prospective tenants brought to view the [Premises]?” Her answer was, “Last few months of tenancy, the tenants were not at home, we did not carry out viewings. And the tenant gave the impression that they maybe wanted to renew the tenancy.” This testimony did not prove a breach. Clause 2(k) of the TA did not require GMPL to be present during the viewings, and Jean did not say that the Duttas (or their representatives) had attempted to make an appointment with GMPL for “interested parties” to view the Premises in GMPL’s absence, only to be rebuffed.

Even if there was a breach of clause 2(k), there was no evidence on which to assess damages. For example, it was unknown when exactly the Premises were subsequently leased out, and whether another lease could have commenced sooner at a rent equal to or higher than that payable under the lease eventually executed. The Duttas did not seek permission to appeal in relation to this issue at the Permission Hearing. I turn to the final issue decided at trial.

Whether the Duttas were entitled to recover $4,065 as the costs of rectifying defects

In a letter dated 25 August 2023, GMPL admitted that there were some “minor works to be rectified” on the Premises. On the stand, Lu’s testimony established that there were some “minor defects” left on the Premises as of 23 August 2023. Lu was also shown some contemporaneous text messages which Jean had sent to him and Ricky on 23 August 2023 (in a group text chat), in which Jean asked GMPL to “proceed the remaining repairs”. The response from Lu in the group text chat was, “Agree but deduct from deposit”. This meant that at the material time, Lu agreed that there were defects to be repaired. I therefore found that the Duttas had proved, on a balance of probabilities, that there were defective items left on the Premises as at the end of 23 August 2023.

At the Permission Hearing, Mr Tan referred me to the following paragraph in his affidavit:

Mr Tan’s affidavit contained no exhibits or particulars of the evidence that I had allegedly overlooked at trial. The trial closing submissions that he filed on 15 May 2026 made no mention of the Duttas incurring any expense for rectification works at all, let alone a reference to proof of such expenses.

Hence, I asked Mr Tan to identify an example of the “sufficient and cogent evidence” that I was said to have failed to properly consider. He told me that there were “invoices”. When I asked him to identify any such invoice, he conceded that he could not identify one. I informed him that, in those circumstances, the averments made at paragraph 8 of his affidavit were extravagant. I reminded him that prudence and common practice dictate that substantive positions should rarely be taken in a solicitor’s affidavit (even when couched as the client’s view) and that, where it is necessary for a solicitor to express such a position, that position must be stated cautiously. I also informed Mr Tan that it was concerning that, despite having been the Duttas’ counsel at the trial, he laboured under such a misapprehension of the documentary evidence that was adduced at the one-day proceeding.

After receiving my comments, Mr Tan appeared to retract his concession. He told me that he had just realised — ie at that very moment — that there were some invoices listed in a List of Documents filed by the Duttas on 30 May 2024. However, Mr Tan was mistaken because the relevant entry in the said List of Documents was stated as “List of Invoices and Photos of Premises” — the individual invoices were not themselves listed in the List of Documents. In any event, when I asked Mr Tan to identify any invoice that was listed in the list in the List of Documents, or that was adduced at trial, he replied that he could not identify one. He nevertheless submitted that — as far as I could understand him — it had been unnecessary to adduce the invoices at trial because they had been disclosed to GMPL’s solicitors during discovery. When I asked Mr Tan how I, as the trial judge, could have considered the contents of the purported invoices if none had been adduced at trial, he repeatedly insisted that they had been listed in the List of Documents filed by the Duttas. That submission reflected an ignorance of the difference between the production of documents during discovery and their admission in evidence at trial. By then, I had given Mr Tan sufficient opportunities to make his case, so I did not permit him to develop his submission further. I dismissed the application without calling on GMPL.

Applications for permission to appeal

An application for permission to appeal is difficult to argue, particularly when it must be brought before the trial judge, who is naturally disinclined to believe that he or she has fallen into error. But an applicant must appreciate that the trial judge remains open to reasoned submissions that are supported by references to the relevant parts of the trial record and citations of the applicable law. The trial judge will not take issue with such submissions merely because they ultimately fail to persuade the court. The courts understand that lawyers are often instructed to advance weak cases. There is, however, a significant difference between a hopeless application that is properly argued and one that is argued in a thoughtless and thoroughly unprepared manner.

The applicant must ordinarily demonstrate a prima facie error of law (eg Anthony s/o Savarimiuthu v Soh Chuan Tin [1989] 1 SLR(R) 588 at [2]); though there is obiter dictum stating that an obvious error of fact apparent from the record may exceptionally suffice (Engine Holdings Asia Pte Ltd v JTrust Asia Pte Ltd [2022] 1 SLR 370 at [10]). This burden cannot be discharged if the applicant’s counsel is not in command of the relevant facts and applicable law. At the Permission Hearing, Mr Tan rapidly lost the confidence of the court because it became apparent that he had not adequately prepared for the application. Only during the hearing itself did he begin downloading softcopies of the relevant cause papers from the online court file for his own reference, toggling between his laptop and smartphone screens — the latter ringing — in a manner that could only invite sympathy. I offered to grant a short adjournment of the hearing for him to prepare, but he declined to accept it.

Mr Tan compounded the problem by pressing obviously unsustainable points beyond tolerable limits. Counsel should note that once the court makes it clear that a particular point cannot be sustained, it is generally useful to follow the example of the Attorney General for England and Wales (1762-1763 and 1765-1766) Charles Yorke, who under such conditions was said to have “rested the matter where it was, without proceeding any further in his argument” (Money v Leach (1765) 3 Burr 1742 at 1768). If counsel wishes to persevere with the point, he or she would do well to keep to a modest submission.