JIO v JIP [2026] SGPHC 5

Parties were previous partners who were not married. A biological child was born to them on 19 July 2025 (the “child”). At the time of the trial, the child was an infant and was not residing with either of the parties as it has been placed under care by the relevant authorities since July 2025.

The Claimant filed this suit on 16 August 2025 to seek a protection order under section 12(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act (“POHA”) against the Respondent. The Claimant had also made numerous allegations including complaints of criminal activity and issues relating to child protection which she filed in numerous police reports, separate from this suit in the Protection from Harassment Court (“PHC”). She confirmed on my enquiry at trial that she had yet to receive any updates or confirmation of outcomes of her police reports. She nevertheless wished to proceed with this trial at this juncture and understood that only matters within the jurisdiction of the PHC i.e. her section 12(2) POHA application, will form the basis of adjudication in this trial. The Claimant, having the benefit of legal advice, confirmed that she understood that no findings are made on any other matters outside this scope, and will pursue her own course of action on other matters if she finds necessary.

On 20 November 2025, I granted the Claimant a protection order. I now publish the reasons for my decision.

Issues and Scope of Adjudication

As a preliminary point, given that both parties have made mention of their “child” in court, I made an order under rule 72 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Protection from Harassment) Rules 2021 (“SCJ PH Rules”) that no person is to publish “any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of” or “do any other act which is likely to lead to the identification” of this child. This order is also made in reference to section 112(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1993 (“CYPA”) given that this child falls within the definition under the CYPA.

To particularise her specific claim for a protection order under section 12(2) of the POHA, the Claimant exhaustively listed 11 incidents where the Respondent had committed an alleged contravention under the POHA. She confirmed that she was seeking a protection order for the Respondent to be prohibited from doing two things: “communicating and being physically near” her and the child.

At trial, she confirmed that she would withdraw her claim for damages.

The focus of my adjudication at trial is therefore whether a protection order is to be granted to the Claimant against the Respondent under section 12(2) of the POHA based on the 11 cited incidents. As explained to all parties at the outset of the trial, in determining whether to grant a protection order to the Claimant in this suit, this Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

(a) the Respondent has contravened one of the sections of the POHA in respect of the Claimant;

(b) the Respondent is likely to continue that contravention or to commit another contravention; and

(c) it is just and equitable in the circumstances to make a protection order against the Respondent on the terms prayed by the Claimant.

In considering whether it is just and equitable to grant an order, I would reiterate the Singapore High Court’s explanation in Benber Dayao Yu v Jacter Singh [2017] 5 SLR 316 (“Benber”) at [54] that the court may consider factors that include, the nature and seriousness of the harassing conduct, the purpose and motive behind the conduct in question, the impact or harm on the victim, and the ordinary instances of daily living that may be expected to be tolerated by reasonable persons.

With this understanding of the relevant legal principles, I turn to my findings and application of law to the facts in this case.

Parties’ positions

On my directions, the Claimant summarised the basis of her claim in the 11 incidents and submitted this in C48 prior to trial.

The Respondent however, repeatedly and without valid reasons, failed to file any response or supporting documents explaining his position on the 11 incidents. He was content to instead, make verbal statements belatedly at trial, despite his attention having been drawn specifically to rule 26(4) of the SCJ PH Rules during the pre-trial and the trial court sessions. The Respondent gave various unspecific and unverified reasons for his repeated non-compliance. To give him the benefit of the doubt, I allowed the Respondent to give oral testimony at trial, and to have the opportunity to cross-examine the Claimant’s witnesses. The Respondent attended the first day of trial but failed to attend the second.

Findings

The Respondent made the following concessions in his testimony at trial. Only the admitted facts and incidents relevant towards my determination in this case are documented here.

(a) Incident 1 – On 12 November 2024, at Sengkang General Hospital, the Respondent testified that he did in fact represent himself to be a nurse and “assisted to remove the cannula...from [the Claimant’s] hands”. It is undisputed that the Respondent is not a registered nurse as his name does not appear in the register kept by the Singapore Nursing Board under the Nurses and Midwives Act 1999.

(b) Incident 3 – On 6 December 2024, the Respondent testified that he did in fact call the Claimant “stupid” and “bitch”. He denied “pulling” the Claimant as he said he was only “normal holding hands” with her. He agreed however that he intended to physically remove the Claimant from her friends that day, explaining that this was because those friends were “criticising men” and talking about “irregular gender feminist” issues during mealtime.

(c) Incident 4 – On 14 February 2025, the Respondent admitted that he told the Claimant “I will slap you”, although he denied actually slapping her.

(d) Incident 6 – On 14 May 2025, the Respondent admitted that he pushed the Claimant’s head to the wall and punched the Claimant in her face at the jaw. The Claimant also took a photograph of a bruise on her jaw on 16 May 2025 at C46.

(e) Incident 7 – On 25 May 2025, the Respondent denied that he called the Claimant “stupid” but asserted that he “only called her useless”.

(f) Incident 10 – on 20 July 2025, he denied that he threatened the Claimant he would slap her but admitted that he threatened to “call IMH on the Claimant” if she did not stop crying after she delivered the child.

(g) Incident 11 – On 23 July 2025, he admitted that he “confronted” the Claimant about unpacked boxes in the rental unit provided to them by the authorities after the Claimant was discharged from the hospital post-delivery. He admitted “scolding” her because she allegedly threw away some “friend’s cooking which [he] wanted to eat”. He testified that he told her that “you’re being completely useless”. On the same day, the Respondent said he tripped over some of the boxes in the unit, so he got angry and told the Claimant “What the hell are you doing [Claimant’s name], I told you to move the boxes…”. The Respondent also admitted to punching a standing fan in the Claimant’s presence, in anger.

For the purposes of my determination in this application, the Respondent’s concession on these facts alone suffices for me to find that the first element under section 12(2)(a) of the POHA is established i.e. that the Respondent has contravened one of the sections of the POHA in respect of the Claimant, minimally section 4.

The words that the Respondent admitted to using on the Claimant at [11] are clearly abusive and insulting, when he told her that she was useless, stupid, and a bitch on several occasions such as incidents 3, 7 and 11. The Claimant was likely to be caused distress by these words. The Respondent’s words and behaviour were, in addition, threatening, in incidents 4 and 11 and obviously in incident 6 when he admitted to causing actual physical hurt to the Claimant. None of his self-professed reasons for why he acted the way he did on those incidents would satisfy a reasonable conduct defence under section 4(3) of the POHA. I will explain this further below.

I further find that the second element under section 12(2) is also present as there is a likelihood of further contravention.

First, as at the time of this trial, the Claimant had declared her intention to take further action on issues relating to how the child would be cared for in future, including taking independent legal advice to initiate the necessary legal proceedings in other court forums which have jurisdiction over these issues. These contemplated and possibly contested proceedings may involve the Respondent and thus there is a likelihood of some further interaction between the parties.

Second, I have considered various aspects of the Respondent’s testimony and positions he chose to advance at trial, which evinced his lack of insight into his actions and its impact on the Claimant when she had to be at the receiving end of his words and behaviour. They also demonstrated his tendency to downplay the seriousness of his actions. Some of the more obvious examples are cited below to illustrate that there is a likelihood of further POHA contraventions if he were to have further interactions with the Claimant.

I observed that the Respondent downplayed his actions several times when he admitted at trial to insulting, threatening or even assaulting the Claimant but quickly adding that he had only done it “once”. He also rationalises his actions by saying that he felt his behaviour was not as bad as what other unrelated people had done to him in the past. For example, in incident 4, he said that he merely threatened to slap the Claimant but did not actually do so, because there is only “one time” that he did in fact physically assaulted the Claimant (in incident 6). The Respondent explained that when there is conflict between parties, he would generally first warn the Claimant to “stop it” or that he is “really pissed off right now”, before he does anything to her. If he deems that the Claimant has not complied with his warnings, he regards it reasonable to issue threats of physical assault to the Claimant. Nothing can be further from reasonable.

The Respondent explained his behaviour in many incidents as being justified because either (i) the Claimant herself was also allegedly badly behaved, or (ii) that he already warned the Claimant beforehand or that (iii) he personally had a hard time in his childhood or that he just was in a bad mood that day. For example, in one of the most egregious incidents involving physical assault, in incident 6, the Respondent’s unhealthy mindset was telling from his testimony in court when I asked him whether he did punch the Claimant. He replied that he did, and it was just “one time”. When I asked him why is punching the Claimant ever justified (whether it is one or more times), his response was to embark on a long explanation about him punching her because he was “stressed and angry” that day due to a myriad of other alleged unrelated problems he faced with his life. He also proceeded to complain about how he was made to be the Claimant’s “caregiver” after she was injured from his punch because she allegedly refused to go to the doctor. Crucially, he felt justified in hitting the Claimant simply because of his own negative emotions over other things that he was upset with in his life. His actions are not justified.

The Respondent even goes further in various incidents to completely mischaracterise his actions as being for the Claimant’s well-being. For example, in incident 7, he denied the Claimant’s allegation that he “snatched and smashed [her] phone on the floor in public at a phone store”. He was eager to explain however that all he did was to “smack [her] phone towards the corner of the table” and painted this as a positive deed to “help” the Claimant because the Claimant allegedly had been complaining about her phone for some time but did not want to buy a new “proper phone”. He further tried to downplay his actions by saying that he “only cracked the screen protector” and not the main LCD screen, although “out of his own stupidity” he later “accidentally dropped the phone and damaged the LCD screen”. In the same incident, when faced with the testimony of the Claimant and her witnesses at trial, he denied that he called the Claimant “stupid” but admitted that he “only called her useless”, again explaining that he takes the view that there is nothing wrong with calling someone “useless” and that since the Claimant was not “actually endangered”, his behaviour was reasonable. It is not reasonable.

This same point is made again in incident 9. He admitted that he deliberately induced himself to cough blood (or attempted or pretended to do the same) in the presence of the Claimant and paramedics, again for a good reason from his perspective. He said he was doing this to “help” the Claimant “get sent” to the hospital, because one would need to be physically injured before the paramedics would be convinced enough to transport the Claimant to the hospital. He also alleged that parties “both wanted to lie to paramedics” together. Aside from his thinking being fundamentally flawed, this also showed that he had no inhibitions against lying on serious matters in order to, from his misconceived perspective, “help the Claimant”. He demonstrated a similar inclination in incident 1 when he lied about being a nurse so as to “help” the Claimant with a medical procedure.

In his general conduct of the trial, he tended to redirect questions posed to him about the 11 incidents, by making self-serving statements regarding his alleged achievements, or otherwise baseless and irrelevant allegations about the Claimant. The Respondent’s lack of insight or regret towards any of his actions (which he admitted to), went towards my finding that the second element of section 12(2) was present.

I find it just and equitable under section 12(2) to make a protection order against the Respondent, albeit not on the exact terms pleaded by the Claimant.

In particular, the Claimant had asked the PHC to order that the Respondent be prohibited from communicating or being physically near to the child. I do not find it just and equitable for the PHC to make such an order, on the facts before me. As explained during the trial, the Claimant has expressed plans to initiate the necessary proceedings in the appropriate forum to conclusively determine all issues pertaining to the child’s care in future. At this time, neither party has custody of, or is residing with or given unbridled access to the child. This lawsuit in the PHC was filed by the Claimant, solely for the purpose of adjudicating her allegations of the Respondent harassing her. Even taken at its highest, there has been no specific allegation (much less evidence) of the Respondent deliberately committing any acts of ill-will towards the child, and with the intention of such an act causing harassment to the Claimant. The Respondent does not even have access to the child or knowledge of the child’s location at this point in time.

Decision

I therefore make the following order pursuant to section 12 of the POHA that:

The Respondent be prohibited from doing the following things in relation to the Claimant:

(a) Making or attempting to make any communication with the Claimant through any mode or means, whether physically or virtually, whether directly or indirectly through third parties, unless the Respondent has been permitted or directed to do so by any written law or by any lawful direction of any authority in Singapore.

(b) By any mode or means, using any threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or making any threatening, abusive or insulting communication which is heard, seen or otherwise perceived by the Claimant, who is likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.

Both parties were already known to psychologists, social services and/or were otherwise connected through the Court Counsellor to the relevant service providers. Parties are advised to follow up with their respective case managers to receive the appropriate support outside the courtroom to rebuild healthy and meaningful relationships in their lives, which they have wholly ahead of them.