Koh Siew Cheek v Matthew Tan Ying Che & 5 Ors [2026] SGDC 309

District Judge Teo Guan Kee:

Introduction

Parties

At all material times, the Claimant was a subsidiary proprietor (“SP”) in the condominium development at Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 4309 (the “MCST”), known as Thomson Grand (the “Development”). She was also, between 11 June 2020 and 15 November 2023, the council chairperson of the Management Council (the “MC”) of the MCST.

The six Defendants were, at all material times, SPs and residents in different units within the Development as well as council members of the MC.

Background

It is not disputed that, at an Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) of the MCST held on 19 December 2020 (the “2020 AGM”), acting through the 2nd Defendant as their representative, the Defendants made the following statement (the “AGM Statement”):

It is not disputed that the person identified as “Alison Koh” in the AGM Statement was the Claimant herein.

The Claimant considered that the AGM Statement, with the exception of the sentence stating “The brief details that we can provide at this point are as follows”, amounted to actionable defamation of her and accordingly commenced these proceedings seeking damages from the Defendants.

Relevant procedural background

The parties agreed that the trial of this matter would be conducted on an unbifurcated basis.

The following persons gave evidence (all as witnesses of fact) at the trial before me:

For the Claimant:

(a) the Claimant herself;

For the Defendants:

(b) each of the six Defendants;

(c) Danny Kim Chang Wei (“Danny”), the Deputy Managing Director of Smart Property Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Smart Property”), the Managing Agent (“MA”) of the MCST at the time of the 2020 AGM;

(d) Joan Chua See Muay (“Joan”), a Condominium Manager employed by the MA for the MCST;

(e) Lim Ming Hui (also known as “Dawn”), a manager employed by the MA for the MCST;

(f) Tan Xiang Ming (also known as “Aervin”), a General Manager of a company known as Accelerato Pte Ltd.

Following the trial, the parties filed the following written submissions:

(a) Claimant’s Closing Submissions filed on 15 June 2026 (the “CCS”);

(b) Defendants’ Closing Submissions filed on 15 June 2026 (the “DCS”);

(c) Claimant’s Reply Submissions filed on 17 July 2026 (the “CRS”); and

(d) Defendants’ Reply Closing Submissions filed on 17 July 2026 (the “DRS”).

Summary of the Claimant’s case

The Claimant’s basic pleaded case, as set out in her Statement of Claim (Amendment No.1, “SOCA1”), was that the AGM Statement, given its natural and ordinary meaning, would be understood to mean that:

(a) The Claimant dishonestly engaged in criminal activities or was involved in serious wrongdoing concerning the MCST’s funds; and

(b) Further and/or alternatively, the Claimant was complicit in fraudulent conduct to seek reimbursement from the MCST for work and expenses which were not in fact done and incurred.

For ease of reference, in the remainder of these grounds, the meanings set out in the preceding paragraph will be referred to as the “Alleged Meanings”.

The Claimant pleaded that the AGM Statement clearly referred to her and had effectively been published to the other SPs present at the 2020 AGM.

As such, the Claimant averred, she had been injured in her reputation as the chairperson of the MC and had suffered distress, embarrassment, damage as well as hurt to her feelings.

The Claimant also averred that the Defendants had acted with malice in making the AGM Statement, in that they knew that the defamatory imputations contained therein were untrue or were reckless or indifferent as to the truth thereof. The Claimant also alleged that the Defendants had made the AGM Statement to ruin the Claimant’s reputation in the eyes of the other SPs and ensure her removal as chairperson of the MC.

Accordingly, the Claimant averred that she was entitled to and sought the following remedies in this action:

(a) awards of damages, including aggravated damages, and interest;

(b) an undertaking by the Defendants not to make the AGM Statement or statements to similar effect in future, whether by themselves or through representatives;

(c) a written apology; and

(d) costs.

Summary of the Defendants’ case

The Defendants admitted that they had made the AGM Statement.

They also admitted that the AGM Statement referred to or would be understood to refer to the Claimant.

The Defendants denied, however, that the AGM Statement would be understood to bear the Alleged Meanings, or that the AGM Statement was defamatory of the Claimant. The Defendants also took issue with the Claimant’s averments as to the publication of the AGM Statement to the SPs attending the 2020 AGM.

In response to the Claimant’s allegations that they had acted with malice, the Defendants denied that this was the case. The Defendants averred that the AGM Statement was true and that they had believed the same to be true (the “Justification Defence”).

In this regard, the Defendants averred that the AGM Statement related to the Claimant’s actual involvement in an incident in which one Jethro Widjaja (“Jethro”) had submitted two fictitious invoices to the MCST in support of a reimbursement claim made to the MCST, further details of which are considered later in these grounds.

The Defendants have also taken the position that the AGM Statement was made in circumstances giving rise to qualified privilege, as the Defendants were, at the time the AGM Statement was made, members of the MC and had a duty to inform other SPs of the facts discovered, with the other SPs having a corresponding interest in receiving such information (the “Qualified Privilege Defence”).

The Defendants also denied, in any event, that the Claimant’s reputation was injured by the making of the AGM Statement, pointing out that she retained her position as chairperson of the MC beyond the 2020 AGM until November 2023.

Issues to be determined

Having regard to the parties’ respective pleaded cases as summarised above, in the remainder of these grounds, I will consider the following issues:

(a) Issue 1: Did the making of the AGM Statement give rise to actionable defamation of the Claimant?

(b) Issue 2: Has the Justification Defence been established in relation to the AGM Statement?

(c) Issue 3: Has the Qualified Privilege Defence been established in relation to the AGM Statement?

Issue 1: Did the making of the AGM Statement give rise to actionable defamation?

It is well established that, in order to make out a prima facie case of defamation, a claimant must show that:

(a) the statement was defamatory in nature (the “Defamatory Meaning Requirement”);

(b) the defamatory statement referred to the plaintiff (the “Reference Requirement”); and

(c) the statement was published (the “Publication Requirement”): Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 221 (“Foo Diana”) at [14] citing Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd and another and another suit [2009] 1 SLR(R) 177 (“Review Publishing (HC)”) at [23].

The Defendants have admitted in paragraph 25 of their Defence (Amendment No.1, “DA1”), that the Reference Requirement was satisfied, in that the AGM Statement, “read together as a whole or otherwise, clearly refers and/or was understood to refer to the Claimant”.

This leaves the Defamatory Meaning Requirement and the Publication Requirement to be considered.

Defamatory Meaning Requirement

The Claimant’s case is that the AGM Statement carried the Alleged Meanings when the words thereof were given their “natural and ordinary meaning”. The Claimant has, by way of the amendments effected in the SOCA1, expressly withdrawn an earlier averment which stated that the AGM Statement would also carry the Alleged Meanings by way of innuendo.

In considering the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court decides what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense. It is irrelevant what meaning was intended by the maker or publisher of the statement (ie, the defendant) or what meaning was actually understood by the claimant: Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [27] (“Review Publishing (CA)”).

Where a claimant in a defamation action pleads a certain defamatory meaning and the court finds a lesser defamatory meaning than that pleaded by the claimant, the claimant’s claim will still succeed, unless there is some valid defence to the claim: Review Publishing (HC) at [128], quoting Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at [25].

A statement is defamatory in nature if, given its natural and ordinary meaning, it tends to: (a) lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally; (b) cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or (c) expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule: Foo Diana at [15] citing Review Publishing (HC) at [47].

Did the AGM Statement carry the Alleged Meanings?

To paraphrase the CCS, the Claimant’s counsel have submitted that, giving the words thereof their natural and ordinary meaning, the AGM Statement conveyed that:

(a) There were two key parties involved in the matter reported in the AGM Statement, being Jethro and the Claimant.

(b) The two parties had committed financial impropriety in producing and submitting two fictitious invoices.

(c) The submission of the fictitious invoices eventually led the MCST to pay out monies to the Claimant under the later of the two fictitious invoices.

(d) The entire incident was a serious matter.

Subject to one exception, I accept that the foregoing accurately sets out the gist of the AGM Statement. Most of the terms used in the Claimant’s counsel’s submissions, as set out in the preceding paragraph, were in fact lifted verbatim from the words of the AGM Statement. In particular, I would highlight:

(a) the unqualified positive assertion that “there has been… financial impropriety”;

(b) the identification of “key parties” with one appearing to be Jethro;

(c) the submission of two “fictitious” invoices;

(d) the reference to payment being made to the Claimant’s account; and

(e) the reference to the incident as a “serious matter” in respect of which a police report had been made.

That being said, I do not accept that the AGM Statement positively accused the Claimant of having herself carried out acts of financial impropriety, as contended by the Claimant’s counsel.

In describing the alleged financial impropriety in question, the Defendants were careful to use words and expressions which avoided imputing such conduct to the Claimant. Specifically:

(a) In identifying the key parties, the words “appear to be” were used.

(b) There were no words in the AGM Statement expressly imputing any acts or omissions to the Claimant, even in connection with the payment of MCST funds into her account.

It is well established that, for the purposes of an action in defamation, the natural and ordinary meaning of the offending words is not confined to their literal or strict meaning, but includes inferences or implications that the ordinary reasonable person may draw from those words in the light of his general knowledge, common sense and experience: Review Publishing (CA) at [28].

It has also been said that “the ordinary, reasonable person reads between the lines”: Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 465 at [53].

Having regard to the words of the AGM Statement as a whole, the references to financial impropriety, the identification of only the Claimant and Jethro as “key parties” and the revelation of a police report pertaining to the submission of the invoices expressly described as “fictitious”, I accept that a person of “ordinary intelligence using common sense” and “experience of worldly affairs” would have construed the AGM Statement to be stating that the Claimant had been complicit in the matters described, this being essentially the second of the Alleged Meanings set out in paragraph 9 above.

The context in which the AGM Statement was made is also particularly relevant here. It was made at the 2020 AGM, effectively by a number of the other members of the MC, in relation to whom the Claimant was the chairperson, and who had duties in connection with the claims for which the fictitious invoices had been submitted. These considerations could only add to the suggestion of complicity I have mentioned above.

The Defendants’ counsel have submitted that the Defendants may not have intended to refer to the Claimant as a “key person” involved in the “financial impropriety” mentioned in the AGM Statement, as there appeared to be a grammatical inconsistency in the phrase “key parties appear to be a [Jethro]…”, in that only one name, not being that of the Claimant, was put forward despite the use of the plural “parties”.

With respect, it is unrealistic to suggest that this minor inconsistency would have, in the mind of the ordinary reasonable person, assumed such importance that it outweighed the repeated references to “fictitious” invoices culminating, ultimately, in payment to the account of the Claimant, who was expressly described as the “chairperson” of the MC, particularly since this was then immediately followed by the information that a police report had been made.

Whether the AGM Statement was defamatory

Based on the natural and ordinary meaning of the AGM Statement which I have ascertained above, I have little difficulty in concluding that the AGM Statement was prima facie defamatory of the Claimant.

Complicity in the financial impropriety mentioned in the AGM Statement, which was serious enough for a police report to be made, would, I accept, have led persons hearing the AGM Statement to tend to think that the Claimant had been complicit in dishonest or fraudulent conduct, especially given her position as chairperson of the MC.

To this extent, I am satisfied that the AGM Statement would have lowered the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, if not also caused her to be shunned or avoided, or exposed her to contempt or ridicule, particularly given her position as chairperson of the MC.

I emphasise, in this regard, that the test for defamation is whether a statement tends to cause the plaintiff’s reputation to be lowered in the eyes of right-thinking members of society generally. It is not whether the defamatory words actually caused such lowering, and words which are defamatory of a person remain as such even if they do not really lower him in the estimation of those to whom the words were uttered: Yeow Khim Seng Mark v Phan Ying Sheng [2021] SGHC 145 at [13].

Accordingly, the fact that the Claimant was re-elected as chairperson of the MC after the AGM Statement was made does not preclude a finding that the AGM Statement was defamatory of her.

In the premises, I am satisfied that the Defamatory Meaning Requirement has been satisfied.

Publication Requirement

In the context of an action for defamation, a statement is published if it is communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff who would reasonably understand the statement to be defamatory of the plaintiff: Foo Diana at [16].

The Claimant’s case is that the AGM Statement was published to the SPs who were in attendance at the 2020 AGM when it was read out.

In the CCS, the Claimant’s counsel have highlighted that, based on the video recording of the 2020 AGM, which had been conducted via the Zoom online platform, 60 SPs attended the 2020 AGM and at least 23 SPs can be identified on the Zoom screen just before the AGM Statement was read.

The Defendants’ counsel have taken issue with the Claimant’s reliance on the Zoom recording of the 2020 AGM as proof of satisfaction of the Publication Requirement, arguing that “Even if there were a handful of accounts logged on to the Zoom call at the time the Statement was read out, there is no evidence anyone was actually listening to the reading of the Statement and had in fact heard it”.

In particular, the Defendants’ counsel took issue with the Claimant’s reliance on a portion of the recording which showed that, at around 5 hours 46 minutes and 33 seconds into the recording, at least 23 SPs were still logged onto the 2020 AGM Zoom meeting, a point which was confirmed by Danny, one of the Defendants’ witnesses. The Defendants’ counsel pointed out that the 2nd Defendant had only started reading out the AGM Statement around two minutes thereafter, and Danny could not tell how many SPs had logged off the Zoom meeting in the two minutes which had elapsed between the Zoom screen recording showing at least 23 SPs in attendance and the point at which the 2nd Defendant began reading the AGM Statement. As such, the Defendants’ counsel submitted, the Claimant had not shown that the Publication Requirement had been met.

With respect, this is grasping at straws.

The Zoom screen recording was at least probative of the Claimant’s assertion that there had been a substantial number of SPs in attendance very shortly before the AGM Statement was read and, as such, that there were still SPs who remained in attendance when the AGM Statement was read a mere two minutes later.

At the very least, the Zoom screen recording had the legal consequence of shifting the evidential burden on to the Defendants to show that essentially all of the SPs had dropped off the 2020 AGM Zoom meeting in the two-minute time gap that I have referred to in the preceding paragraph. However, the Defendants have adduced no evidence of their own in support of their contention that the AGM Statement was not published, beyond speculating that some SPs could have logged off or were not paying attention to the reading of the AGM Statement.

In this regard, the fact that only one person spoke after the reading of the AGM Statement (highlighted in the DCS ) is not, in my view, probative of any fact relevant to the Publication Requirement. Given the sensitivity of the matters which had just been revealed in the AGM Statement, it is unsurprising that no one immediately rose to comment on the same, particularly when even the makers of the statement themselves expressly stated that they “shall refrain from any further comment”. The absence of comment simply does not mean that no one heard the AGM Statement and cannot displace the evidential weight of the Zoom screen recording referred to earlier.

I am accordingly satisfied that the Publication Requirement has been satisfied.

Conclusion: Issue 1

Given my findings above that the Defamatory Meaning Requirement and Publication Requirement have been proven, and the Defendants’ admission of the Reference Requirement, it follows that the Claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation against the Defendants.

Issue 2: Justification Defence

For present purposes, the following principles pertaining to the defence of justification, endorsed in the decision of Golden Season Pte Ltd v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”), are apposite:

(a) It is an absolute defence in a civil defamation claim that the defamatory imputation is true or substantially true: Golden Season at [85].

(b) The burden of proving that a defamatory imputation is true lies on the defendant: Golden Season at [85].

(c) The meaning that must be proven true must be that which the relevant statement is held to bear, and the defence will not succeed if a materially less serious meaning is proved to be true: Golden Season at [85].

(d) The defendant need only prove the “sting” of the charge, and some leeway for exaggeration and error is given: Golden Season at [86].

(e) For the defence of justification, the state of mind of the publisher is irrelevant. A defendant can succeed in such a defence even when he publishes the defamatory article believing it to be false, for no amount of malice, bad faith or belief in the falsity of the statement will make it actionable when the allegation is true: Golden Season at [87].

As I have found earlier, the “sting” of the AGM Statement was that an ordinary reasonable person hearing it would infer that the Claimant had been complicit in financial impropriety in relation to fictitious invoices submitted by Jethro.

Accordingly, in order for the Justification Defence to succeed, both of the following propositions must be true:

(a) There had been financial impropriety in the form of submission of invoices to the MCST for the purpose of obtaining the reimbursement payments which were eventually made to the Claimant (the “Impropriety Proposition”);

(b) The Claimant was complicit in such financial impropriety (the “Complicity Proposition”).

I consider each of these in turn.

The Impropriety Proposition

Some further background is necessary for a proper consideration of the Impropriety Proposition.

The 2020 EGM

The fictitious invoices mentioned in the AGM Statement pertained to a reimbursement claim submitted to the MCST for expenses incurred in connection with an extraordinary general meeting of the MCST that took place on 6 June 2020 (the “2020 EGM”).

In or around March 2020, a number of SPs in the Development requisitioned an extraordinary general meeting of the MCST. The SPs who requisitioned the 2020 EGM included, amongst others, the Claimant, 2nd Defendant, 3rd Defendant, 4th Defendant, and 6th Defendant.

As was typical in the convening of such general meetings, preparatory work had to be carried out, including the printing and mailing of the necessary EGM materials (such as the notice of and agenda for the EGM) to the SPs.

The Claimant’s evidence was that the MA for the MCST at the time, Savills Property Management Pte Ltd (Smart Property was only appointed on 11 June 2020 after the 2020 EGM), declined to assist in the preparatory work for the 2020 EGM.

Consequently, the Claimant, along with the 3rd Defendant, Jethro and one Wesley Widjaja (“Wesley”), worked together to prepare the materials for the 2020 EGM in May 2020. By way of background, Jethro and Wesley were brothers and Wesley was an SP in the Development.

In her AEIC, the Claimant gave the following evidence about the work carried out:

(a) She and Jethro “incurred expenses for the organising, processing, printing, sorting, purchasing stamps and envelopes, binding and labelling, the delivery and transportation of the EGM materials, posting of the EGM materials and hand-delivering the materials to SPs who were staying in the estate”; and

(b) On or around 8 May 2020, she, her husband and Jethro used printers at the premises of two companies, named askJet Pte Ltd (“askJet”) and Bloomingdale Holdings Pte Ltd (“Bloomingdale”), to print EGM materials. Jethro was a director of askJet whilst the Claimant was a director of Bloomingdale.

(c) After the materials were printed, the trio then “compiled, sorted, stapled and bound the EGM materials”, “stuck labels” with the SPs’ addresses onto envelopes, and packed them for delivery. The office supplies used to print and compile the EGM materials purportedly belonged to askJet and Bloomingdale.

(d) The EGM materials had been transported using the Claimant’s vehicle to the post office and other locations in the process of preparing and delivering them.

This part of the Claimant’s evidence has not been seriously challenged by the Defendants in the DCS or DRS.

The 2020 EGM was eventually held on 6 June 2020. As part of the proceedings at that meeting, the Claimant was elected as a council member of the MC, along with the Defendants in this suit.

Submission of the reimbursement claim

Following the events described above, the Claimant’s evidence is that there were discussions between her, Jethro and Dawn (in her capacity as a representative of the MA) about submitting a claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred for the 2020 EGM.

Eventually, the Claimant claims, she “left it to Jethro” to prepare an “askJet invoice to make the reimbursement claim”.

The story then picks up with Dawn’s evidence, which was that sometime after 3 August 2020, Jethro submitted a claim to Smart Property for the reimbursement of expenses incurred for the 2020 EGM. One of the invoices submitted in support of this claim was an invoice issued by askJet.

This invoice (the “askJet Invoice”) claimed payment of a sum of $2,224, broken down as follows:

(a) $2,124 for printing, stapling and mailing/delivery of various EGM materials to 361 SPs of the Development; and

(b) $100 for “delivery and transport fees”.

By way of an email dated 25 August 2020 at 3.37pm (the “1st 25 August Email”), Dawn sent the askJet Invoice, as one of a number of reimbursement claims stemming from the 2020 EGM, to the MC for their consideration.

The 1st 25 August Email attaching, inter alia, the askJet Invoice, contained the following tabulation of the reimbursement claims made at that point:

The 1st 25 August Email also enclosed an unsigned cover letter which again set out the table above, immediately following a statement that the signatory of the letter was thereby submitting “an application to recover the following reasonable expenses incurred to convene the [2020 EGM]”. The putative signatory of the cover letter was named as Wesley.

The Claimant accepted that she was copied on the aforementioned email from Dawn.

Dawn’s evidence is that shortly after the 1st 25 August Email was sent, she received instructions via the WhatsApp messaging platform (“WhatsApp”) from Jethro to amend the cover letter to state that payment for the sums claimed under the askJet Invoice was to be made to the Claimant and that the signatory of the cover letter should be the Claimant instead of Wesley.

Dawn made the abovementioned amendments to the cover letter and circulated it to the MC by way of email at 5.04pm on 25 August 2020 (the “2nd 25 August Email”). The Claimant was again copied on this email.

This, however, did not mark the end of the changes made to the reimbursement claim.

On 26 August, Jethro sent Dawn another invoice, purporting to have been issued by a company named Accelerato Pte Ltd (“Accelerato”) and addressed to the MCST (the “1st Accelerato Invoice”) , accompanied by some receipts issued by SingPost.

This 1st Accelerato Invoice claimed payment of a sum of $1,228.50 for work described as follows:

Dawn’s evidence was effectively that Jethro instructed her to have the 1st Accelerato Invoice and the SingPost receipts take the place of the askJet Invoice in the reimbursement claim which she had circulated by way of the 2nd 25 August Email.

However, Dawn queried Jethro as to why the 1st Accelerato Invoice did not carry an invoice number or a date. In response, Jethro sent Dawn another invoice purporting to have been issued by Accelerato (the “2nd Accelerato Invoice”). The 2nd Accelerato Invoice was different from the 1st Accelerato Invoice in the following aspects:

(a) The 2nd Accelerato Invoice carried a date of 6 May 2020 and an invoice number of “INV-10340”.

(b) The words “saddle stitch” in the 1st Accelerato Invoice in the “Finishing” field were replaced with “staple binding” in the 2nd Accelerato Invoice.

(c) The 1st Accelerato Invoice had been addressed to the MCST but the 2nd Accelerato Invoice was addressed to the MCST “Requisitionists”.

Incredibly, Jethro subsequently submitted yet another purported Accelerato invoice (the “3rd Accelerato Invoice”) to Dawn. This 3rd Accelerato Invoice was identical to the 2nd Accelerato Invoice, save that it now claimed a sum of $1,263.50 based on a quantity of 361 units, instead of 351 units as had been provided for in the 1st and 2nd Accelerato Invoices.

In accordance with Jethro’s instructions, Dawn amended the tabulation of the reimbursement claims such that serial numbers 1(a) and (b) of the table set out in paragraph 75 above now read:

Thereafter, Dawn sent the amended table, cover letter and supporting documents (including the 3rd Accelerato Invoice) to the MC by email on 28 August 2020 (the “28 August Email”).

The Claimant was also copied on the 28 August Email. This email also contained an indication that the Claimant had to sign the cover letter for the reimbursement claims. As with the cover letters enclosed with the 1st and 2nd 25 August Emails, the cover letter enclosed with the 28 August Email also set out a table of the sums which the Claimant purported to claim by way of reimbursement, including the amended rows reproduced in paragraph 86 above.

I should highlight that there is no evidence that the Claimant ever signed the cover letter enclosed with the 28 August Email. The Claimant’s evidence is that she did not sign any version of this.

The absence of a signed cover letter notwithstanding, it is not disputed that the reimbursement claims for the 2020 EGM expenses were eventually approved by the MC and a sum of $1,891.60 was paid to the Claimant, including a sum of $1,263.50 pursuant to the 3rd Accelerato Invoice. However, there is no evidence available as to precisely which two council members of the MC (this being the number required under the then-existing protocol) had approved this payment to the Claimant.

The existence of financial impropriety

In my view, leaving aside for the moment the question of the Claimant’s complicity, the foregoing already suffices to demonstrate that there had been financial impropriety in the submission of the reimbursement claims.

To begin, there was no basis for askJet to be paid the sums claimed in the askJet Invoice. Even in the Claimant’s own recounting of the events leading up to the 2020 EGM, there was no assertion that askJet had ever entered into a contractual arrangement, whether with the Claimant or anyone else, to provide printing, postage or transport services for that meeting.

In any event, the Claimant’s own evidence shows that askJet did not even actually carry out some of the services for which payment was sought in the askJet Invoice. To elaborate:

(a) Printing of the EGM materials had been carried out at both the offices of Bloomingdale and askJet, using the office supplies of both companies.

(b) Delivery and transport of the printed EGM materials had been carried out using the Claimant’s own vehicle.

In the premises, I am satisfied that insofar as the first “fictitious invoice” referred to in the AGM Statement was the askJet Invoice, that was a fair characterisation.

The facts surrounding the reliance on the 3rd Accelerato Invoice for the reimbursement claims were even more egregious.

Aervin, a General Manager of Accelerato, gave evidence on behalf of the Defendants at trial. In summary, he testified that:

(a) Accelerato did not issue the 3rd Accelerato Invoice.

(b) Accelerato did not provide the services under the 3rd Accelerato Invoice.

(c) Accelerato did not receive any payment under the 3rd Accelerato Invoice.

(d) He suspected that someone had edited a quotation issued by Accelerato to make it appear to be the 3rd Accelerato Invoice.

It has not been suggested that Aervin’s testimony should not be believed or that he was not an independent witness. Indeed, he had to be compelled by an order of court to give evidence on behalf of the Defendants at the trial.

Aervin’s evidence clearly shows that the 3rd Accelerato Invoice was, as the Defendants’ counsel have described it, a forged or “fictitious” invoice.

In summary, in describing each of the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice as a “fictitious invoice”, the AGM Statement was stating the truth.

I accept that the submission of the aforementioned fictitious invoices to the MCST in support of the reimbursement claims connected to the 2020 EGM amounted to financial impropriety.

It suffices, in this regard, to note that the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice must have been knowingly submitted to Dawn for inclusion as part of the reimbursement claims.

Jethro was himself a director of askJet. He had also, according to the Claimant, been heavily involved in the preparatory activities leading up to the 2020 EGM. It was even the Claimant’s evidence that she had had discussions with Jethro leading up to a decision to claim the sum of $2,224 which was eventually set out in the askJet Invoice.

As for the 3rd Accelerato Invoice, given Aervin’s unequivocal and independent evidence that Accelerato had not issued that invoice, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the party which submitted it for inclusion as part of the 2020 EGM reimbursement claims must have done so knowing that it was fictitious or at least had no reason to believe that it was not.

The use of such fictitious invoices to obtain reimbursement was therefore, in my view, well-deserving of the epithet of “financial impropriety” used in the AGM Statement.

I would emphasise, in this regard, that I have not found that the sting of the AGM Statement lay in the making of any specific allegation of conduct that would give rise to criminal responsibility, much less for a specific offence. “Impropriety” is simply the noun form of “improper”, and it is hard to see how the use of the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice was proper in the given context.

I do not think that the reference to a police report in the AGM Statement changed this, given that the AGM Statement makes it clear that the matter had been reported to the police “for further investigation”.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that it was altogether improper for the Claimant or other persons who had incurred expenses in connection with the requisitioning and organisation of the 2020 EGM to claim reimbursement for their expenses; this was not the gist of the AGM Statement in any event. What was improper in this case was the use of invoices purportedly issued by companies which had either not actually contracted to carry out or had not carried out the work in question and, more egregiously, the use of an invoice that had been entirely made up.

The Complicity Proposition

I turn now to the question of whether the Claimant was complicit in the financial impropriety identified in the previous section of these grounds, the impropriety in question being the submission of the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice to the MCST in support of a claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred for the 2020 EGM.

As a preliminary point, the AGM Statement did not contain any assertion as to exactly how the Claimant had been involved in the submission of the askJet Invoice or the 3rd Accelerato Invoice. The “sting” of the AGM Statement was hence of a general nature, capable of encompassing different degrees of involvement in the submission in question, and this possible range of “complicity” would, in my view, have been appreciated by an ordinary reasonable person who was not “unduly suspicious or avid for scandal”. The Complicity Proposition would, accordingly, be true if the Claimant had been knowingly involved in the submission of the two aforementioned invoices.

With the foregoing in mind, I start with the Claimant’s own evidence.

In her AEIC, the Claimant affirmed, inter alia, that:

(a) She had been personally involved in the preparation of the 2020 EGM materials. She therefore must have known that askJet had not carried out at least some of the items of work listed in the askJet Invoice and that Accelerato had not carried out any of the items in the 3rd Accelerato Invoice at all.

(b) She had discussions with Jethro about how much they should claim as expenses for “work done and expenses incurred” for the 2020 EGM and also knew, on 29 July 2020, that Jethro would be claiming a sum of $2,224.

(c) She had been the person who had suggested to Jethro that he “consolidate” the claim for reimbursement under the askJet Invoice.

(d) She knew the particulars of the claim made in the askJet Invoice because, on 25 August 2020 after Dawn circulated the reimbursement claim by way of the 1st 25 August Email, she sent a WhatsApp message to Danny informing him, inter alia, that the sums under the askJet Invoice “will reimburse to me to pay vendor” (emphasis added).

(e) After she sent Wesley a WhatsApp message on 26 August 2020 claiming that she did not know why the askJet Invoice could not be used to make the reimbursement claim, apparently in response to concern expressed to her earlier about doing so, Wesley informed the Claimant that the askJet Invoice was “the issue”, and followed up with messages stating:

(i) “No direct or indirect benefits for council members”; and

(ii) “He is the only shareholder of askJet”.

(f) After the submission of the askJet Invoice to the MC, between 25 August 2020 and 28 August 2020, the Claimant was the one who had suggested to Jethro that he reduce the reimbursement claim amount from $2,224 to $1,667.60, which would include an amount of $1,263.50 (the amount eventually stated in the 3rd Accelerato Invoice) for “work and expenses which Jethro and I had done and incurred in respect of the 2020 EGM”.

As mentioned earlier, the information contained in the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice was clearly untrue, as neither of those documents reflected work that had actually been carried out by, respectively, askJet or Accelerato.

As such, the Claimant was not only aware, at all material times, that the information being provided to the MC in support of the reimbursement claim was untrue, she had actively encouraged the provision of the untrue information in question.

Following the 1st 25 August Email, the Claimant had messaged Danny asking him to pay the sums claimed in the askJet Invoice to her “to pay vendor”. This message is telling, because the Claimant knew very well that no such “vendor” existed, yet actively sent a message to Danny giving the impression that there was a third party which had to be paid.

Thereafter, the Claimant was informed by Wesley of his apparent misgivings about the askJet Invoice on 26 August 2020. Despite this, she only suggested to Jethro that he should reduce the quantum of the reimbursement claim, a suggestion which she knew he accepted.

In light of the foregoing, the Claimant’s assertion that she had not known Jethro would replace the askJet Invoice with the 3rd Accelerato Invoice is beside the point for the purpose of considering the Complicity Proposition. The Claimant was clearly aware that a reduced reimbursement claim would be submitted by Jethro based on a fictitious invoice, one which would still not be proper even if it had continued to be submitted under cover of an askJet invoice.

The Claimant’s conduct when some of the other members of the MC began investigating the claim for reimbursement in November 2020 only reinforces the impression that she knew she had been involved in improper conduct.

In conversations which took place between the Claimant and Jethro in November 2020, which were disclosed by the Claimant but relied upon by the Defendants, the Claimant was recorded as telling Jethro, in relation to the 3rd Accelerato Invoice and the corresponding reimbursement claim, variously:

(a) to tell a “white lie” as to how the 3rd Accelerato Invoice had come to be submitted, which she claimed would make for a “good storyline”;

(b) to “replace the invoice, say this is the case, conveniently wrong invoice” (emphasis added);

(c) that “what we have to do is to create another invoice, another receipt, that permanently I can say that yes, and I have transaction I have paid to Jet”.

The following WhatsApp message sent by the Claimant to Wesley dated 20 November 2020 also demonstrated that the Claimant was aware that she had been implicated in the reimbursement claim submissions, although she still considered that the matter could be, effectively, covered up with a further falsified invoice from a “friendly 3rd party”:

For completeness, I should add that, despite the Claimant’s suggestions to the contrary, Jethro eventually returned a sum of $1,263.50 to the MC, representing that which had been paid pursuant to the 3rd Accelerato Invoice and its corresponding reimbursement claim, after the 5th Defendant started looking into whether Accelerato had actually been paid the sums claimed by way of the 3rd Accelerato Invoice as part of the MCST’s audit process. Generally speaking, having regard to the evidence adduced at trial, one is given the impression that Jethro’s actions in creating and submitting invoices for the reimbursement claims pertaining to the 2020 EGM were significantly influenced by the Claimant.

In view of the above, and given that the Claimant was the party which eventually received payment of the sums claimed in the 3rd Accelerato Invoice, I accept that the Claimant was complicit in the financial impropriety that was the submission of the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice to the MC for the purpose of claiming reimbursements for the 2020 EGM.

Conclusion: Issue 2

As I have found both the Impropriety Proposition and the Complicity Proposition to be true, it follows that the Justification Defence has been made out and the Claimant’s action herein cannot succeed against any of the Defendants.

Issue 3: Qualified Privilege Defence

Independently of the Justification Defence, the Defendants have also asserted that the Claimant’s action herein cannot succeed, if the AGM Statement was defamatory, because the statement was made in circumstances that clothed it with qualified privilege (“QP”).

In Chan Cheng Wah Bernard v Koh Sin Chong Freddie (“Bernard Chan”) [2012] 1 SLR 506 at [87], the Court of Appeal recognised that QP can arise where there is a legal, social or moral duty, or sufficient interest on the part of the defendant to communicate the defamatory statement to recipients who have a corresponding interest or duty to receive it.

Nevertheless, QP may not be relied on as a defence to an action in defamation if the defamatory statement was made with malice: Bernard Chan at [86], citing Gatley on Libel & Slander (Patrick Milmo and WV H Rogers eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 11th Ed, 2008).

Had the AGM Statement been made in circumstances giving rise to QP?

I accept the Defendants’ counsel’s submission that the AGM Statement was made in circumstances giving rise to QP.

First, the Defendants in this case were under, at least, a social or moral duty to communicate the information contained in the AGM Statement.

All of the Defendants were council members of the MC for the Development at the time the AGM Statement was made. As such, they were obliged, under the then-prevailing Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (“BMSMA”), to carry out certain duties in their capacities as council members, including duties touching on or in connection with the finances of the MCST.

Under section 61(1) of the BMSMA (and its successor legislation to date), a member of the MC is required to “at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office”.

The Defendants’ counsel have not sought to rely, in the DCS or the DRS, on any of the legal duties imposed under the BMSMA as giving rise to a legal duty in relation to the QP Defence. Accordingly, I consider there is no scope for me to do so either.

That said, the fact that the Defendants had legal duties touching on financial matters pertaining to the MCST, in my view, clearly supports the Defendants’ submission that they had a moral or social duty to keep their fellow SPs informed of any financial impropriety in connection with the affairs of the MCST, which had come to the Defendants’ attention, for instance, by the making of a statement such as the AGM Statement. To my mind, this was a demonstration of the Defendants acting honestly and with due diligence in the discharge of their duties as council members.

As for the recipients’ interest in receiving the information contained in the AGM Statement, on the Claimant’s own case, the statement was made to SPs still in attendance during the 2020 AGM. It is plain that SPs of the Development, who had contributed to the finances of the MCST, would have an interest in receiving information about financial impropriety in connection with those finances, and even more so if it was connected to the chairperson of the MC, which was the body tasked with duties in connection with the aforementioned finances.

In this regard, I consider that it was also relevant that the Defendants had chosen the 2020 AGM as the occasion on which the AGM Statement was delivered. This way of delivering the message reasonably ensured that the AGM Statement was delivered to SPs, as opposed to, say, the general public, who may not have had an interest in receiving the information contained therein corresponding to the Defendants’ duty to deliver the same.

By reason of the foregoing, I am of the view that the AGM Statement was made in circumstances giving rise to QP. The remaining question is whether the QP in question was lost because the AGM Statement had been made with malice.

Malice

Case law has established that malice may be proven in either one of two ways: (a) the defendant’s knowledge of falsity, recklessness, or lack of belief in the defamatory statement (the “1st Malice limb”); or (b) where the defendant has a genuine or honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, but his dominant motive is to injure the claimant or is some other improper motive (the “2nd Malice limb”): Bernard Chan at [90].

The Claimant’s counsel have submitted that in this case malice is made out in both ways, on the evidence.

Malice and multiple Defendants

Before I turn to consider the 1st and 2nd Malice limbs, I would record that the Claimant’s counsel have not, in the CCS or the CRS, identified specific Defendants to whom malice should be imputed for the purposes of considering the Qualified Privilege Defence.

As highlighted by the Defendants’ counsel in the DCS, where multiple defendants are being sued for defamation and rely on a defence of QP, the claimant, in order to defeat the defence and succeed in his claim against each and every defendant, must prove express malice on the part of each of the defendants. If the claimant fails to show that any one of them was actuated by express malice, then the QP defence of that defendant will succeed: Nirumalan K Pillay v A Balakrishnan [1997] 1 SLR(R) 953 at [33].

In dealing with the issue of malice, the CCS and CRS only addressed the Defendants collectively and made no argument that individual Defendants acted with malice. As such, for the purpose of considering whether there was malice in the making of the AGM Statement which would cause the QP enjoyed by that statement to be lost, I will consider whether the evidence supports a finding that all the Defendants collectively acted with malice in the making of the AGM Statement.

1st Malice limb

The Claimant’s counsel have submitted that none of the Defendants had any evidence which could form a basis for them to believe that the Claimant was involved in the making of the 3rd Accelerato Invoice. It was alleged that it was “not the Defendants’ case” that any one of them had sought out the Claimant to clarify her “involvement” and that this showed the Defendants were reckless as to the truth of the AGM Statement.

With respect, I do not accept this submission.

First, it is simply not true that the Claimant’s position was not sought out before the making of the AGM Statement. The Claimant’s counsel themselves have highlighted a WhatsApp exchange that took place on 21 November 2020, well before the 2020 AGM took place on 19 December 2020, in which the 5th Defendant informed the Claimant that “We as council can’t use factious [sic] invoice to submit the claim. To claim the expenses itself got nothing wrong”. It is not disputed that “factious” in the passage just quoted was to be understood as “fictitious”.

The implications of the 5th Defendant’s message were not lost on the Claimant. Her immediate reply was to quote the message reproduced in the preceding paragraph accompanied by the comments “hi I don’t know”, “you know good” and “are you done now?”

More tellingly, when the 5th Defendant responded by stating “We have told [Jethro] the same last nite”, the Claimant followed up with messages stating “why are you telling me for something I have not seen till ysdy” and “are you setting up to say I know” (emphasis added).

The Claimant’s position was abundantly clear from the exchange I have just cited, as was the defensiveness she displayed in response to the 5th Defendant’s messages. In the premises, I do not see how the Defendants can be faulted for not further asking the Claimant about her alleged involvement.

That being said, the Defendants were nevertheless still entitled to form views about the Claimant’s own involvement in the submission of the askJet Invoice and the 3rd Accelerato Invoice, based on other objective evidence which was already in their possession.

Such objective evidence included:

(a) the fact that payment of $1,263.50 under the reimbursement claim was made to the Claimant;

(b) the Claimant had been the one who instructed Danny to pay the reimbursement claims submitted by Jethro to her; and

(c) the Claimant’s failure to clarify the nature of the 3rd Accelerato Invoice, despite having been copied on Dawn’s 28 August Email.

For completeness, as revealed in the Claimant’s own AEIC, her assertion that she had only seen the 3rd Accelerato Invoice in November 2020 was a half-truth, as it conveniently obscured the Claimant’s involvement in the genesis of the broader plan to use a fictitious invoice to claim for expenses which had supposedly been incurred for the 2020 EGM, which had begun with the Claimant’s suggestion to Jethro to create an askJet Invoice for that purpose.

In summary, the Defendants cannot be said to have known that the AGM Statement was false (especially as it was not false) nor to have been reckless as to its truth, given the objective evidence available to them.

2nd Malice limb

In the CCS, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the AGM Statement had been made with malice also because the Defendants’ dominant intention in making it was to ruin the Claimant’s reputation in the eyes of the other SPs and to try to remove her from her position as chairperson of the MC.

In summary, the Claimant’s counsel asserted that after the true nature of the 3rd Accelerato Invoice became known to the Defendants in November 2020, the Defendants resorted to “demands, threats and blackmail”, with an objective of “booting” the Claimant out of the MC.

In this regard, there is some evidence that a few of the Defendants wanted the Claimant out of the MC, at least in mid-December 2020 prior to the 2020 AGM.

For example, the 3rd Defendant admitted that a meeting had taken place involving the 1st to 3rd Defendants, Wesley, Jethro and another SP, Benny Teo, on or about 17 December 2020, shortly before the 2020 AGM, the “idea” of which was to “negotiate”, with persons close to the Claimant, “an arrangement” regarding “upcoming elections” during the 2020 AGM, which specifically would result in the Claimant no longer being on the MC. The 3rd Defendant also accepted that during this meeting, it had been suggested to Wesley that if “some kind of resolution… can be reached with the [Claimant]”, then the issue of Jethro forging the 3rd Accelerato Invoice could be “kept quiet”.

The 2nd Defendant also characterised the meeting on 17 December 2020 as having been one in which at least those of the Defendants who attended tried to find an “off-ramp” which would obviate the need for the Defendants to “escalate” the incident of the 3rd Accelerato Invoice.

I accept that the evidence demonstrated that at least some of the Defendants felt that the Claimant’s continued presence on the MC was not tenable or at least undesirable.

I do not accept, however, that this meant that the dominant motive for making the AGM Statement was to injure the Claimant, in the sense that would be relevant to the issue under consideration.

The Court of Appeal in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another and another appeal [2010] 4 SLR 331 (“Peter Lim”) at [36] emphasised the following passage from the English decision of Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135:

I have found earlier that the Defendants did not make the AGM Statement knowing that it was false or being reckless as to whether it was true. I have also found that the Defendants had at least a social or moral duty to make the disclosures contained in the AGM Statement.

As such, the mere fact that some of the Defendants knew that reading the AGM Statement at the 2020 AGM could have an adverse effect on the Claimant’s re-election to the MC would not suffice, on its own and applying the principle set out in paragraph 158 above, to defeat the QP that the AGM Statement otherwise enjoyed.

This conclusion is reinforced by the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of the Australian decision of Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1 in Peter Lim (at [40]). In Roberts v Bass, the rationale underlying the principle that malice defeats QP was expressed as the idea that “[a]n occasion of qualified privilege must not be used for a purpose or motive foreign to the duty or interest that protects the making of the statement”. It was also held that malice “is any improper motive or purpose that induces the defendant to use the occasion of qualified privilege to defame the plaintiff”.

In this case, I do not think that the Defendants’ motive for making the AGM Statement on the occasion of the 2020 AGM was “foreign to the duty or interest” which gave rise to QP in connection with the making of that statement. In this connection, the Claimant’s counsel have also argued that there was no reason why the AGM Statement could not have been communicated to SPs in another manner, for instance, by mailing it to them. According to the Claimant’s counsel, this showed that the Defendants wanted the AGM Statement to be read out when the election of the MC for the following year was taking place.

I have already explained why I am satisfied that the Defendants were under at least a social or moral duty to communicate the financial impropriety to the other SPs. Even if they appreciated that this could have an impact on the Claimant’s re-election, this was an effect incidental to the performance of that duty and did not amount to a misuse of the occasion giving rise to the QP.

The allegation that the Defendants were bent on influencing the elections is also undercut by the fact that the Defendants did not insist on reading out the AGM Statement prior to elections for the MC for the following year. In this regard, by the time the AGM Statement was read out, the Claimant had already been re-elected to the MC.

Separately, the Claimant’s counsel have also submitted that the AGM Statement omitted certain matters which were contained in the police report referred to in the AGM Statement, and that this also showed that the Defendants had been acting with an improper motive.

The two facts highlighted in the CCS in connection with this argument were: (a) Jethro had returned a sum equivalent to that paid out under the 3rd Accelerato Invoice; and (b) the 1st and 5th Defendants, knowing the foregoing, had initially informed Jethro that they would let the matter rest.

With respect, it is not at all clear to me how the omission of the two aforementioned facts from the AGM Statement improved the Claimant’s position insofar as the 2nd Malice limb is concerned.

First, the fact that it was Jethro and not the Claimant who had returned the sum of $1,263.50 would arguably have caused an ordinary reasonable person to have an even lower estimation of the Claimant than that resulting from the AGM Statement as read out at the 2020 AGM, because it was the Claimant who had received the sums paid out under the 3rd Accelerato Invoice but restitution was eventually made by someone else.

Secondly, the actions of the 1st and 5th Defendants had no bearing on the financial impropriety that was the subject of the AGM Statement. As such, I do not see how this omission supported the Claimant’s contentions as to the dominant motive of the Defendants in making the AGM Statement at the 2020 AGM.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Defendants’ dominant motive for making the AGM Statement was neither to injure the Claimant nor some other improper motive.

Conclusion: Issue 3

As I have concluded that the AGM Statement was made in circumstances that clothed it with QP and that the making of the same was not actuated by malice, it follows that the Qualified Privilege Defence has been established, giving rise to a second basis for the dismissal of the Claimant’s claim herein.

Judgment

By virtue of the foregoing, the Claimant’s claim is dismissed.

Teo Guan Kee District Judge

Poon Guokun Nicholas, Chan Michael Karfai (Breakpoint LLC) for the claimant;

Joavan Christopher Pereira (Virtus Law LLP) for the 1st to 6th defendants.