Public Prosecutor v Haryani Binte Juraimi [2026] SGDC 163

Introduction

Ms Haryani Binte Juraimi (“the Accused”) was an inmate of Institution S2 of Selarang Park Community Supervision Centre (“the Institution”). The Superintendent granted her leave for a specified period, for the purposes of employment outside the Institution and also to return to her place of residence. During the leave period, she failed to return to the Institution when required to do so, resulting in the cancellation of her leave. Following the issuance of a police gazette for her arrest, she remained unlawfully at large until she was arrested nearly nine months later. She was released on personal bond on the same day, with the requirement to report to an investigation officer on a specified future date. She failed to so report and another police gazette was issued for her arrest. During this second period of abscondment, she committed numerous other offences. She was subsequently arrested by the police nearly four years later and has been remanded since then.

The present case concerns the Accused’s offences under the Misuse of Drugs (Approved Institutions, Medical Observation and Treatment and Rehabilitation) Regulations (“MDR”), Computer Misuse Act 1993 (“CMA”), Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (“CDSA”), Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 (“MOA”) and the Penal Code 1871 (“PC”).

Overview of Charges

The Accused was charged for the following offences:

(a) First, for an offence under MDR regulation 12(5) (MAC-908665-2025, the “MDR Charge”). This concerned her failure to return to the Institution after cancellation of her leave.

(b) Second, for an offence under CMA s 8A(1) (MAC-900186-2026, the “CMA Charge”). This concerned her disclosure of her username and password of her Singpass (the national digital identity service) account to one “Sher”, having reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose of the disclosure was for the commission or to facilitate the commission of an offence. The disclosure of her Singpass credentials further led to the registration of two sole proprietorships under her name, namely “Starlight Brighten” and “Lumiflora finds”, which were involved in offences underlying various other charges as elaborated upon below.

(c) Third, for an offence under CDSA ss 55A(1)(a)(i) read with 55A(1)(b)(ii) (DAC-900533-2026, the “CDSA Charge”). This concerned her opening of a Maybank corporate bank account (“Maybank Account”) for “Lumiflora Finds” by deceiving Maybank that she would be the beneficial owner of the account, and enabling “Sher” to access the Maybank Account. There are two related charges concerning the Maybank Account taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing, for offences under PCA ss 417 read with 109 and CMA ss 3(1)(a) read with 12(1) (MAC-900185-2026 and MAC-900184-2026 respectively) (collectively, the “Maybank TIC Charges”).

(d) Fourth, for an offence under MOA s 39B(1), amalgamated under s 124(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”), and punishable under MOA s 39B(4)(a) read with CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii) (MAC-900188-2026, the “MOA Charge”). This concerned her provision to “Sher” of 105 subscriber identification module (“SIM”) cards that she had registered using her personal information, under the business name “Starlight Brighten”, having reasonable grounds to believe that the provision of those SIM cards was for the commission or to facilitate the commission of an offence. There is one related charge taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing, for an offence under MOA s 39C(1), amalgamated under CPC s 124(4), and punishable under MOA s 39C(4)(a) read with CPC s 1244(8)(a)(ii) (ie, MAC-900187-2026) (“MOA TIC Charge”).

The Accused therefore faced a total of seven charges. She pleaded guilty to four (ie, the MDR, CMA, CDSA and MOA Charges), and consented to the remaining three (ie, the Maybank TIC and MOA TIC Charges) being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing.

Summary of Decision

I impose the following sentences on the Accused:

The sentences for the MDR, CMA and MOA Charges shall run consecutively, while the sentence for the CDSA Charge shall run concurrently. The global sentence is therefore 33 months’ two weeks’ imprisonment, with a disgorgement fine of $500 (in default three days’ imprisonment).

I now elaborate on the reasons for my decision.

The MDR Charge

The MDR Charge reads as follows:

Facts relating to the MDR Charge

The following facts relating to the MDR Charge are summarised from the Statement of Facts that formed the basis of the guilty plea.

At the material time, the Accused was an inmate of the Institution. On 28 September 2020, the Superintendent of the Institution granted her leave, under MDR regulation 12(1)(a), to be employed outside the Institution for a period from 5 October 2020 to 1 May 2021. On 14 October 2020, the Superintendent granted her leave under MDR regulation 13(1) to return to her place of residence from 16 October 2020 to 1 May 2021, subject to her compliance with conditions that may be imposed.

On 5 January 2021, the Accused was required to return to the Institution to report to the officer on duty. However, she failed to do so because she had consumed “ice” (ie, methamphetamine). The Superintendent therefore cancelled her leave pursuant to MDR regulations 12(4) and 13(2). As she failed to return to the Institution that day after her leave had been cancelled, she committed an offence punishable under MDR regulation 12(5).

A police gazette was issued for her arrest. The police arrested her on 24 September 2021 and released her the same day on a personal bond. She was required by the conditions of the bond to report to an investigation officer on 8 October 2021. As she failed to do so, another police gazette was issued for her arrest. She remained unlawfully at large until she was arrested by the police on 28 September 2025. She has been in remand since.

Sentencing for the MDR Charge

For an offence under MDR regulation 12(5), the Accused is liable to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to both (see MDR regulation 12(5A)).

The Prosecution sought a sentence of between seven and eight months’ imprisonment for the MDR Charge. Defence Counsel did not disagree with this submission.

The following offence-specific factors are relevant to sentencing in the present case:

(a) First, the reason for cancellation of the Accused’s leave. In the present case, the Superintendent had cancelled her leave because she had not reported to the officer on duty when required to do so. It is aggravating that the officer on duty could neither contact nor locate her, especially given that conditions for the grant of leave included the need for her to “maintain a functioning digital mobile telephone with Internet access” and to allow any order of the Superintendent to be served on her “by a message transmitted to an electronic address represented by a mobile telephone number specified by the inmate” (MDR regulation 12(2)(g) and (h)).

(b) Second, the reason for the Accused’s failure to return to the Institution. That she had failed to return to the Institution specifically to avoid detection of her drug consumption when on leave is significantly aggravating. It is also a breach of one of the conditions for the grant of leave, ie, that she must “not consume any controlled drug, psychoactive substance or specified psychoactive substance” (MDR regulation 12(2)(e).

(c) Third, the period where the Accused remained unlawfully at large. Here, she was unlawfully at large for nearly nine months (from 5 January 2021 to her arrest on 24 September 2021).

(d) Fourth, whether the Accused committed offences when she was on leave or unlawfully at large. In the present case, the Accused committed multiple offences, but these took place when she had absconded after being released on a personal bond (rather than during the period where she was unlawfully at large when her leave was cancelled). In any event, the fact that she had committed various offences during her second abscondment will be taken into consideration in the sentencing for those respective offences. To avoid double counting, I do not grant further aggravating weight to this factor in the context of the MDR Charge.

In relation to offender-specific factors:

(a) First, it is aggravating that the Accused further absconded after she had been arrested on 24 September 2021 and released on personal bond. While this technically concerns her breach of the bond conditions rather than the subject matter of the MDR Charge itself, it is nonetheless indicative of a sustained disregard for the law. She had absconded twice in quick succession, and for a total of almost four years and nine months – a considerable period that speaks to a deliberate and persistent evasion of justice rather than a singular or momentary lapse in judgment.

(b) Second, while the Accused has numerous drug-related antecedents, the Prosecution’s position (which Defence Counsel agreed with) is that these are unrelated to the MDR Charge. I accept this position and therefore do not grant further aggravating weight to these antecedents.

(c) Third, it is mitigating that the Accused had pleaded guilty within Stage 1 of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s “Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas” (“Guilty Plea Guidelines”). On this basis, she may be afforded up to 30% reduction in a sentence of imprisonment.

Having considered the offence-specific and offender-specific factors above, I find that an appropriate sentence had this matter gone to trial would have been about 11 to 12 months’ imprisonment. Factoring in the sentencing reduction for the Accused’s early plea of guilt, I impose a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment.

Such a sentence is proportionate to the sentences in the reported precedents that have been brough to my attention. The present case is more serious than each of the precedents cited, having particular regard to the duration of the Accused’s abscondment – a period of approximately nine months – which significantly exceeds the duration of abscondment in the following cases:

(a) In Public Prosecutor v Hasrizan Bin Hashim [2025] SGDC 104, the accused was granted leave to be employed outside the approved institution. When the accused’s reintegration officer was unsuccessful in contacting the accused, the accused’s leave was cancelled and he was required to report to the approved institution that day. He failed to do so and was arrested about five-and-a-half weeks later. He also faced one proceeded charge for consumption of methamphetamine before his arrest. The court, citing Public Prosecutor v Goh Rong Fong [2020] SGDC 29 (“Goh Rong Fong”), imposed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment on a plead guilty basis, which was upheld on appeal to the High Court.

(b) In Goh Rong Fong, the accused was granted leave to participate in a programme at a halfway house. During the programme, the accused left the halfway house without authorisation. Calls were made to the accused’s family members, but they were unaware of the accused’s whereabouts. The accused’s leave was cancelled on the same day, thus requiring the accused to return to the approved institution. He failed to do so and was arrested on the third day of his abscondment. He also faced one proceeded charge for consumption of methamphetamine before his arrest. The court imposed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment on a plead guilty basis, which was upheld on appeal to the High Court.

(c) In Public Prosecutor v Tan Ah Kiat [2019] SGDC 270, the accused was granted leave to participate in a community-based programme outside an approved institution. He failed to return to the approved institution and was unlawfully at large for slightly more than two weeks. He also faced one charge for consumption of methamphetamine before his arrest. The court considered three unreported precedents which shared many similarities with the case before the court and imposed a sentence of six months’ imprisonment on a plead guilty basis. The sentence was upheld on appeal to the High Court.

The CMA Charge

The CMA Charge reads as follows:

Facts relating to the CMA Charge

The following facts relating to the CMA Charge are summarised from the Statement of Facts that formed the basis of the guilty plea.

After the Accused absconded for the second time on 8 October 2021, she borrowed a sum of money from an acquaintance known as “Sher”. In return, on or before 3 March 2025, the Accused disclosed her Singpass account’s username and password as a means of repaying the borrowed money. She did so, having reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose of the disclosure was for any person to commit, or to facilitate the commission by any person of, any offence under any written law. This constituted an offence under CMA s 8A(1).

The disclosure of her Singpass credentials resulted in the registration of two sole proprietorships under her name, namely “Starlight Brighten” and “Lumiflora Finds”, which were involved in the offences underlying the MOA, CDSA and Maybank TIC Charges.

Sentencing for the CMA Charge

For an offence under CMA s 8A(1), the Accused is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to both.

The Prosecution sought a sentence of between 7.5 and eight months’ imprisonment for the CMA Charge. Defence Counsel did not disagree with this submission.

Part V of the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s “Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences” (“Scam Guidelines”) provides guidance for sentencing in relation to the CMA Charge.

At “Step 1”, the court identifies the appropriate starting sentence with reference to the relevant CMA offence (Scam Guidelines at para 24(a)). The starting sentence for a first-time offender convicted after trial is six months’ imprisonment (Scam Guidelines at para 26). This is based on an archetypal case involving (Scam Guidelines at para 25):

At “Step 2”, the court adjusts the starting sentence based on offence-specific and offender-specific factors that distinguish the case from the archetypal case (Scam Guidelines at para 24(b)).

In relation to offence-specific factors, an uplift of three months’ imprisonment is warranted, in view of the following factors:

(a) First, the Accused was motivated to commit the offence for personal gain (Scam Guidelines at para 28(a)), as she had disclosed her Singpass credentials to “Sher” for the purpose of repaying the money she had borrowed from “Sher”. This factor warrants an uplift of about 1.5 months’ imprisonment (see the illustration at para 33(b) of the Scam Guidelines).

(b) Second, the Accused’s disclosure of her Singpass credentials led to the registration of two sole proprietorships under her name. In this regard, the Scam Guidelines provide (at para 28(d)) that if the disclosure of Singpass credentials led to the “incorporation of companies”, an appropriate uplift should be added, the extent of uplift depending on (among other factors) the number of companies created. While sole proprietorships are not technically “companies”, the same principle ought to apply. This factor warrants an uplift of about 1.5 months’ imprisonment.

(c) Third, for completeness, the actual harm or loss that results from the disclosure of Singpass credentials ought ordinarily to be accounted for by way of an appropriate uplift in sentence (Scam Guidelines at para 28(f)). However, as the offences relating to the two sole proprietorships are the subject of the CDSA, MOA and Maybank TIC Charges, the Prosecution rightly did not seek a further uplift for purposes of the CMA Charge.

In relation to offender-specific factors:

(a) First, it is aggravating that the Accused committed the offence whilst unlawfully at large. This factor warrants an uplift of two months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, it is mitigating that the Accused had pleaded guilty within Stage 1 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines.

In view of [26] to [29] above, a claim trial sentence would have been 11 months’ imprisonment. With a 30% sentencing reduction applied in view of the early plea of guilt, the sentence imposed is seven months’ two weeks’ imprisonment.

At “Step 3”, the court considers the use of a disgorgement fine in addition to imprisonment (Scam Guidelines at para 24(c)). In relation to the CMA Charge, given that the extent of the Accused’s financial gain cannot be ascertained on the facts, I do not order a disgorgement fine.

The final sentence for the CMA Charge is therefore seven months’ two weeks’ imprisonment.

The CDSA Charge

The CDSA Charge reads as follows:

Facts relating to the CDSA Charge

The following facts relating to the CDSA Charge are summarised from the Statement of Facts that formed the basis of the guilty plea.

On 18 May 2025, “Sher” and the Accused opened a Maybank corporate bank account for Lumiflora Finds. “Sher” and the Accused deceived Maybank into believing that the Accused would be the beneficial owner of the account, by indicating so on the account opening form. This resulted in Maybank opening the Maybank Account under the business name “Lumiflora Finds”.

The Accused was unaware of the purpose of the Maybank Account. “Sher” did not inform her about the purpose of doing so, and she failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose of “Sher” having access to the Maybank Account. She had agreed to open the Maybank Account only because “Sher” offered her $150 to do so.

Following the opening of the Maybank Account, the Accused disclosed the relevant internet banking login credentials to “Sher”. “Sher” gave the Accused $100.

From 13 to 19 June 2025, $279,659 was received in, and $279,657 was transferred from, the Maybank Account. Of the amounts, $277,000 belonged to a 66-year-old victim of a Government official impersonation scam. There is no evidence that the Accused knew of the transactions in the Maybank Account, or that vulnerable victims would be affected.

In view of the above, the Accused was convicted on the CDSA Charge, for an offence under CDSA ss 55A(1)(a)(i) read with 55A(1)(b)(ii), punishable under CDSA s 55A(5).

Sentencing for the CDSA Charge

Under CDSA s 55A(5), the Accused is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $50,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to both.

The Prosecution sought a sentence of between 12.5 and 13.5 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $100 for the CDSA Charge. Defence Counsel did not disagree with this submission.

Part IV of the Scam Guidelines provides guidance for sentencing in relation to the CDSA Charge.

At “Step 1”, the court identifies the appropriate starting sentence with reference to the relevant CDSA offence (Scam Guidelines at para 9(a)). For the subject matter of the CDSA Charge, the starting sentence for a first-time offender is six months’ imprisonment. This is on the basis of an archetypal case involving (Scam Guidelines at para 10):

At “Step 2”, the court adjusts the starting sentence based on offence-specific and offender-specific factors that distinguish the case from the archetypal case (Scam Guidelines at para 9(b)).

In relation to offence-specific factors, an uplift of 8.5 months’ imprisonment is warranted in view of the following factors:

(a) First, the Accused was motivated the commit the offence for personal gain (Scam Guidelines at para 13(d)). Here, the Accused had opened and relinquished the Maybank Account to “Sher” in exchange for promised financial gain of $150 (although she eventually received $100). Based on the illustration at para 20(b) of the Scam Guidelines, this factor warrants an uplift of about 1.5 months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, the Accused open a new bank account (ie, the Maybank Account) to be handed over (Scam Guidelines at para 13(a)). Based on the illustration at para 33(b) of the Scam Guidelines, this factor warrants an uplift of about 1.5 months’ imprisonment.

(c) Third, the account opened is a corporate account, rather than a personal account. As submitted by the Prosecution, this effectively circumvented Maybank’s “Know-Your-Client” requirements, which are due diligence obligations that banks fulfil before opening a corporate account. The Prosecution cited the cases of Public Prosecutor v Goh Hai Shan [2024] SGDC 178 (“Goh Hai Shan”) and Public Prosecutor v Jonathan Neo Choon Hian [2025] SGDC 297 (“Jonathan Neo”), where the courts found that the opening of a corporate bank account was an aggravating factor (see Goh Hai Shan at [23] and Jonathan Neo at [31]). In Jonathan Neo, the court imposed an uplift of two months’ imprisonment for the opening of a corporate account using the business registration details of an entity in another individual’s name. In the present case, the Accused opened the Maybank Account for Lumiflora Finds, a sole proprietorship under her own name. While aggravating, it is less aggravated than the situation in Jonathan Neo. This factor therefore warrants an uplift of one month’s imprisonment.

(d) Fourth, significant funds ($279,659 received and $279,657 transferred out) were transacted through the Maybank Account. The Scam Guidelines at para 13(f) provide that for funds of $100,000 or more, an uplift of at least 25% of the starting sentence (or about 1.5 months’ imprisonment) should be considered, with such an uplift commensurate to with the quantum of funds involved. Given that the amount transacted significantly exceeds the threshold amount for application of an uplift, this factor warrants an uplift of 2.5 months’ imprisonment.

(e) Fifth, a significant proportion of the funds flowing through the Maybank Account belonged to a 66-year-old scam victim, who lost $277,000. The Scam Guidelines at para 14 suggests an uplift of at least 25% of the starting sentence (or about 1.5 months’ imprisonment) if vulnerable persons (which includes persons above the age of 65) were affected by the scams, even if the vulnerable persons were not specifically targeted and the offender did not know that vulnerable persons would be affected. This factor warrants an uplift of two months’ imprisonment, given that the vulnerable victim lost a substantial amount of money.

In relation to offender-specific factors:

(a) First, it is aggravating that the Accused committed the offence whilst unlawfully at large. This factor warrants an uplift of two months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, it is aggravating that there are two Maybank TIC Charges that are taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. However, as they concern essentially the same transaction that is the subject matter of the CDSA Charge, they warrant a smaller uplift of 0.5 months’ imprisonment.

(c) Third, it is mitigating that the Accused had pleaded guilty within Stage 1 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines.

In view of [43] to [46] above, the sentence that would have been imposed had the Accused claimed trial is 17 months’ imprisonment. Applying a 30% reduction to account for the Accused’s early plea of guilt, the sentence imposed is 12 months’ imprisonment, together with a disgorgement fine of $100 (see [45(a)] above), in default one day’s imprisonment.

The MOA Charge

The MOA Charge reads as follows:

Facts relating to the MOA and MOA TIC Charges

The following facts relating to the MOA and MOA TIC Charges are summarised from the Statement of Facts that formed the basis of the guilty plea.

Facts relating to the MOA TIC Charge

I first address the facts relating to the MOA TIC Charge. These are relevant to the MOA Charge because the MOA TIC Charge is an offender-specific aggravating factor in sentencing for the MOA Charge. These facts are also relevant because the Accused’s gain from the MOA TIC Charge ought to be disgorged.

In April 2025, the Accused entered an arrangement with “Sher” for the Accused to provide her personal information to be used by “Sher” for the purpose of registering SIM cards with SIMBA (a telecommunications company operating in Singapore), in return for the Accused’s financial gain.

The Accused did so on two or more occasions from April 2025 to August 2025, without knowing or having taken reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose of “Sher” registering SIM cards using the Accused’s personal information.

On one occasion, “Sher” instructed the Accused to collect five SIM cards from a SIMBA physical store and hand them to a courier, after they had been registered with the Accused’s personal information. “Sher” paid the Accused “around $10.00 to $12.00 for each of the five SIM cards”. The Accused therefore received at least $50 for her actions.

From 5 April to 30 August 2025, 19 SIM cards so registered under the Accused’s name were activated. A telephone number linked to one of the 19 SIM cards was featured in 13 scam reports, involving total losses of $577,800 suffered by five victims. Three of these victims were above 65 years of age at the material time, and suffered total losses of $484,800.

Facts relating to the MOA Charge

I turn now to the facts relating to the MOA Charge.

In April or May 2025, “Sher” told the Accused that she could earn more money if she registered SIM cards under a business name, as opposed to under the Accused’s personal name. This was because the number of SIM cards registrable under a business name was more than the number that could be registered under an individual’s name.

On at least two occasions from May to August 2025, “Sher” and the Accused went to a SIMBA physical store at a shopping mall known as Orchard Central to register multiple SIM cards under the business name “Starlight Brighten” (see [22] above on the genesis of “Starlight Brighten”). On all occasions, the Accused provided her personal information to the retail staff of the store for the purpose of registering the SIM cards. She did this because the SIM card registration process required the “Authorised Officer” of Starlight Brighten, being the Accused, to upload her identification documentation or authenticate her identity through Singpass.

In this manner, the Accused registered a total of 105 SIM cards with SIMBA under the business name “Starlight Brighten” (“Starlight Brighten SIM cards”). She provided the Starlight Brighten SIM cards to “Sher” without knowing or having taken reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose for which “Sher” obtained them. In return, “Sher” paid the Accused $350.

The Starlight Brighten SIM cards were activated from 4 May to 5 August 2025. The telephone numbers linked to 10 of those SIM cards were featured in 41 scam reports, involving total losses of $657,950 and MYR6,000 (approximately $1,980) suffered by nine victims. Three of these victims were above 65 years of age at the material time, and suffered total losses of $213,950.

Sentencing for the MOA Charge

Under MOA s 39B(4)(a), the Accused is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or to both.

As the MOA Charge is a charge amalgamated under CPC s 124(4), the Accused is liable to be punished for up to twice the amount of punishment (CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii)).

The Prosecution sought a sentence of between 18.5 and 24 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $400 for the MOA Charge. Defence Counsel did not disagree with this submission.

Sentencing approach for amalgamated charges

As this is an amalgamated charge, the three-stage sentencing approach in Prakash s/o Mathivanan v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 1386 (“Prakash”) applies. The first two stages involve determining the appropriate starting point sentence based on offence-specific factors, while the third stage concerns offender-specific factors (Prakash at [46]).

(a) At the first stage, the court identifies the punishment prescribed for a single incident of the offences committed, ie, the “base offence” (Prakash at [42] and [129(a)]). The court has regard to the relevant sentencing framework or benchmark for the base offence, or analogises to precedents where there is no framework or benchmark for the base offence. Sentencing factors relevant to the base offence are offence-specific factors such as harm caused and factors which relate to the manner and mode by which the offence was committed (Prakash at [42]).

(b) At the second stage, the court determines the appropriate starting point sentence for the amalgamated offence, based on a holistic assessment of the offence-specific factors concerning the aggregate harm caused and the offender’s overall culpability over the entire course of conduct (Prakash at [43] and [129(b)]). In doing so, the court has regard to the doubled punishment limit in CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii), and also considers the following factors in assessing the aggregate harm and culpability over the course of conduct:

(i) First, the duration and frequency of the offending conduct (Prakash at [45(a) and [129(b)(i)]). It is aggravating if the offending conduct was repeated multiple times over a sustained period of time.

(ii) Second, in assessing the harm caused by a course of conduct, the court has regard to the factors identified at the first stage (Prakash at [45(b)] and [129(b)(ii)]).

(iii) Third, in determining the starting point sentence that is appropriate for the entire course of conduct, the court considers whether a different type of sentence is warranted (Prakash at [45(c)] and [129(b)(iii)]). For instance, repeated offending behaviour may tip the balance from a fine to a custodial sentence.

(c) At the third stage, the court adjusts the starting point sentence in view of the relevant offender-specific aggravating and mitigating factors (Prakash at [46] and [129(c)]). These are the same factors as those considered for non-amalgamated offences (Prakash at [46] and [129(c)]).

First Stage – Punishment for base offence

Deterrence is the predominant sentencing consideration for offences under MOA s 39B (see Muhammad Darwiis Bin Zainuddin [2025] SGDC 265 (“Darwiis”) at [16]–[17]). Parliament had, in 2024, specifically criminalised the misuse of local SIM cards to deter such conduct, in response to the growing number of scams which have been perpetrated using local mobile lines. Some of the key statistics on such scams are found in the Ministry of Home Affairs’ press release on the “Law Enforcement and Other Matters Bill” (dated 7 March 2024) (also cited in Darwiis at [16]).

(1) Whether the Scam Guidelines apply to the MOA Charge

There is presently no established sentencing framework for offences under MOA s 39B. The first reported sentencing precedent for an offence under MOA s 39B is Darwiis, which is currently on appeal to the General Division of the High Court. In Darwiis, the court accepted the Prosecution’s submission that while the Scam Guidelines did not expressly cover offences under MOA s 39B, reference should be taken from the Scam Guidelines (insofar as these relate to offences under CMA s 8A) when sentencing for such offences (Darwiis at [22], [27]–[29]).

I agree with the approach taken in Darwiis, for the following five reasons:

(a) First, the specific legislative purpose of MOA s 39B was to address conduct of the same character as that targeted in the Scam Guidelines. This included, in particular, the unlawful disclosure of Singpass credentials as proscribed under CMA ss 8A(1) and 8B(4). While scams relating to the unlawful disclosure of Singpass credentials were tackled through those provisions, there was a lack of similar mechanisms for addressing scams perpetrated through Singapore mobile lines (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Vol 95, Sitting Nov 33 (2 April 2024) (speech by Minister for Communications and Information and Second Minister for Home Affairs Mrs Josephine Teo) (“Minister Teo’s Speech”)). As Minister Teo explained, MOA s 39B was enacted to address the lacuna in the existing law. Prior to its introduction, it was very difficult to successfully prosecute irresponsible SIM card subscribers who gave away local SIM cards without taking reasonable steps to ascertain the identity and physical location of the recipient, or to inquire into the recipient’s purpose in obtaining the SIM card.

(b) Second, as observed in Darwiis at [28], MOA s 39B is structured very similarly to CMA s 8A, and shares a very similar mens rea element. A comparison of the statutory language makes this clear. The CMA s 8A offence broadly involves disclosure or provision to another person of Singpass credentials, with the mens rea element of “knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that the purpose of the disclosure or provision is for any person to commit, or to facilitate the commission by any person of, any offence under any written law” (CMA s 8A(1)(b)). This is very similar to the offence under MOA s 39B, which involves provision or offering to provide another person a SIM card registered with the offender’s personal information, with the mens rea element of “knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that the provision of the SIM card is for any person… to commit, or to facilitate the commission by any person of, any offence under any written law” (MOA ss 39B(1)(a) read with (b)(i)).

(c) Third, the punishment for MOA s 39B offences was specifically “pegged to those for the misuse of Singpass credentials under the [CMA]” (see Minister Teo’s Speech).

(d) Fourth, and because of the similarity in purpose, statutory language and prescribed punishment (see [66(a)]–[66(c)] above), there are fewer concerns about drawing equivalences between the sentencing approach and scale for MOA s 39B and that for offences under CMA s 8A. As observed in Darwiis (at [28]), it is in fact “natural, expedient and appropriate” to modify the characteristics of the archetypal CMA s 8A case (reproduced at [26] above) for the purposes of MOA s 39B. I elaborate more on the archetypal case under MOA s 39B later in this judgment (see [68]–[69] below).

(e) Fifth, MOA s 39B was introduced only after the promulgation of the Scam Guidelines. As such, the sentencing approach to MOA s 39B could not have been considered by the Sentencing Advisory Panel when formulating the Scam Guidelines. For the reasons highlighted in [66(a)]–[66(c)] above, I agree with the observation in Darwiis (at [25]) that the Sentencing Advisory Panel would likely have extended its recommended sentencing approach to MOA s 39B had the provision been enacted prior to the Scam Guidelines.

I am mindful that in Public Prosecutor v Siraj Munir Bin Mohamed Basheer [2025] SGMC 13 (“Siraj Munir”), I declined to adopt the Prosecution’s proposed approach of applying the Scam Guidelines’ starting point sentences and sentencing uplifts to offences under CMA s 3(1) and PC s 417 (neither of which were expressly covered by the Scam Guidelines). My reasons for that position are set out at [34]–[58] of Siraj Munir. For completeness, the concerns that I expressed in Siraj Munir do not arise, or do not arise with equal force, in the context of MOA s 39B. This is so for the following four reasons:

(a) First, the provisions in Siraj Munir differed significantly in legislative objectives and spectrum of conduct from the proposed reference provision, ie, CDSA s 55A (see Siraj Munir at [38]–[41]). In particular, PC s 417 encompassed a significantly broader range of conduct than both CDSA s 55A and CMA s 3(1), while CDSA s 55A criminalised a much narrower set of conduct than CMA s 3(1) (see Siraj Munir at [40]). No such concerns arise in the present case: see [66(a)] above.

(b) Second, CMA s 3(1) and PC s 417 were phrased and structured differently from CDSA s 55A. There were also concerns with drawing equivalences to the “archetypal case” identified for offences under CDSA s 55A (see Siraj Munir at [45]–[49]). No such concerns arise in the present case: see [66(b)] and [66(d)] above.

(c) Third, CMA s 3(1) and PC s 417 carried prescribed punishments that differed in scale and scope from those under CDSA s 55A. That disparity was precisely what necessitated the proposal for a “linear scaling” approach across different legislative provisions in Siraj Munir – an approach that gave rise to challenges relating to cardinal proportionality and consistency in application of scaling (Siraj Munir at [18], [20], [42] and [43]). No such concerns arise in the present case: see [66(c)] above.

(d) Fourth, the Sentencing Advisory Panel did not include CMA s 3(1) and PC s 417 within the Scam Guidelines, notwithstanding that both provisions were already in existence at the time the Scam Guidelines were formulated and that other provisions of both statutes were expressly covered. That omission is a “tacit caution” against applying or extrapolating from the Scam Guidelines in the context of offences under CMA s 3(1) and PC s 417 (see Siraj Munir at [54]–[55]). No such concerns arise in the present case: see [66(e)] above.

While I agree with Darwiis that the sentencing approach for CMA s 8A offences should be adopted in the context of MOA s 39B offences, I find it necessary to supplement the “archetypal case” set out in Darwiis at [27] with one further characteristic – namely, that the SIM card in question was registered in the offender’s name as an individual rather than in the name of a business entity. This characteristic was not in issue in Darwiis as the SIM card there was registered in the offender’s name as an individual. In my view, a more complete articulation of the archetypal case ought expressly to encompass this characteristic. This makes clear that the fact that a SIM card was registered under a business entity is an aggravating factor, given that business entities can register a greater number of SIM cards.

As such, the “archetypal case” under MOA s 39B is as follows:

(2) Sentence for base offence

I turn now to consider the appropriate sentence for the base offence under the MOA Charge. Drawing on guidance from Part V of the Scam Guidelines, the starting sentence in an archetypal case for a first-time offender convicted after trial is six months’ imprisonment.

It is difficult to comprehensively determine the likely punishment for the base offence in the present case. This difficulty arises from the nature of the information before the court, which is presented in aggregate rather than on a granular basis. Specifically, the aggregate information available is that:

Focusing only on the offence-specific factors that can logically be analysed in the context of a single base offence (because these factors apply to each of the Starlight Brighten SIM cards individually), an uplift of three months is warranted in view of the following two factors:

(a) First, the Accused was motivated to commit the offence for personal gain (Scam Guidelines at para 28(a)). Here, she had registered the Starlight Brighten SIM cards and provided them to “Sher”, in exchange for payment from “Sher”. Based on the illustration at para 33(b) of the Scam Guidelines, this factor warrants an uplift of about 1.5 months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, each of the Starlight Brighten SIM cards was registered under a business name, ie, Starlight Brighten. This factor warrants an uplift of 1.5 months’ imprisonment.

The appropriate starting point sentence at the Prakash first stage, on the basis that other considerations relating to harm and culpability are reserved to the Prakash second stage, is therefore nine months’ imprisonment.

Second Stage – Starting point sentence for amalgamated charge

At the Prakash second stage, the court has regard to the doubled punishment limit in CPC ss 124(8)(a)(ii) read with 124(9), which increases the potential punishment in the present case to a fine not exceeding $20,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years.

In the present case, I find that the amalgamated offence warrants an 8.5-month uplift from the starting sentence at the Prakash first stage, having regard to the following three aggravating factors:

(a) First, the provision of the Starlight Brighten SIM cards facilitated the commission of scams against nine victims, who collectively suffered significant losses amounting to $657,950 and MYR6,000 (approximately $1,980). The Scam Guidelines at para 28(e) provide that where funds of $100,000 or more are involved, an uplift of at least 25% of the starting sentence (or about 1.5 months’ imprisonment) should be considered, with such an uplift commensurate to with the quantum of funds involved. In the present case, the losses are more than six times the threshold amount. This factor accordingly warrants a substantial uplift, which I assess at four months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, a significant proportion of the losses was suffered by three victims who were above 65 years of age at the material time. They lost $213,950 in all. The Scam Guidelines at para 29 suggests an uplift of at least 25% of the starting sentence (or about 1.5 months’ imprisonment) if vulnerable persons (which includes persons above the age of 65) were affected by the scams, even if the vulnerable persons were not specifically targeted and the offender did not know that vulnerable persons would be affected. I am satisfied that this factor warrants a further uplift of 2.5 months’ imprisonment, given that three vulnerable persons were involved, and that they lost substantial sums of money.

(c) Third, the sheer number of SIM cards involved is itself an offence-specific aggravating factor distinct from the aggregate harm caused (addressed at [75(a)] above). The point is best illustrated by an example. Consider two offenders, each of whose offending results in the same eventual loss to the same number of victims. The first offender provided a scammer with a single SIM card; the second provided a hundred SIM cards. In both cases, five victims were defrauded of $50,000 each. While the aggregate harm caused and victim count are the same in both cases, the second offender is more culpable than the first. Here, the Accused’s conduct in providing 105 SIM cards reflects a complete and callous disregard for the consequences of her actions. Her heightened culpability must be reflected in the sentence by way of an uplift of two months’ imprisonment.

The starting point sentence for the MOA Charge at the second stage of the Prakash approach is therefore 17.5 months’ imprisonment.

Third Stage – Offender-specific factors

At the third stage of the Prakash approach, the relevant offender-specific factors are:

(a) First, it is aggravating that the Accused committed the offence whilst unlawfully at large. This factor warrants an uplift of two months’ imprisonment.

(b) Second, it is aggravating that there is a MOA TIC Charge taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. This is an amalgamated charge that involved 19 SIM cards registered in the Accused’s name as an individual, and which resulted in significant harm ($577,800) suffered by five victims, of whom three were vulnerable victims who suffered total losses of $484,800. Indeed, the MOA TIC Charge arguably caused even greater harm than the MOA Charge from the perspective that vulnerable victims lost more than twice as much money in relation to the MOA TIC Charge. This factor therefore warrants a significant uplift of six months’ imprisonment.

(c) Third, it is mitigating that the Accused had pleaded guilty within Stage 1 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines.

A claim trial sentence would therefore have been 25.5 months’ imprisonment. With a 30% sentencing reduction applied in view of the early plea of guilt, the sentence imposed is 18 months’ imprisonment.

I further impose a fine of $400, representing the disgorgement of the Accused’s gains from the offences underlying both the MOA Charge ($350 – see [58] above) and MOA TIC Charge ($50 – see [53] above), in default two days’ imprisonment.

Global Sentence

CPC s 307(1) mandates that where an accused person is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment on at least three distinct offences, the court must order that the sentences for at least two of those offences run concurrently.

The interaction between CPC s 307(1), the “one-transaction rule”, and the “general rule” was considered in Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 4 SLR 799 (“Raveen”). Briefly stated, the one-transaction rule provides that sentences for offences forming part of a single transaction should run concurrently, while the general rule provides that sentences for unrelated offences should run consecutively: see Raveen at [39] and [41].

In the present case, the four proceeded charges arose from unrelated instances of offending. By virtue of the general rule, all four sentences ought to run consecutively. That said, the Court must also take a “last look” at the totality of the facts and circumstances to satisfy itself that the aggregate sentence is sufficient and proportionate to the Accused’s overall criminality (Raveen at [73]).

The Prosecution submitted that the sentences of imprisonment for the MDR, CMA and MOA Charges should run consecutively, with the imprisonment term for the CDSA Charge running concurrently, resulting in an aggregate imprisonment term of “between 33 and 40 months”.

Defence Counsel did not disagree with the individual sentences sought by the Prosecution for the various offences (see [14], [24], [41] and [62] above; there was also no disagreement expressed in the written mitigation plea). However, Defence Counsel submitted that the overall sentence was “unduly harsh given [the Accused’s] personal circumstances and mitigating factors”. At the hearing, Defence Counsel emphasised the following four points in support of this submission: (a) the Accused had been taken advantage of the same person, ie, “Sher”; (b) that she has cooperated with investigations and was prepared to be a prosecution witness against “Sher”; (c) that she did not profit materially; and (d) that her sentence would affect the welfare of her daughters (aged 19 and 17) given that her husband is currently serving a sentence for drug-related offences. Defence Counsel therefore asked that the court “allow for maximum concurrent sentences”, ie, for only two of the sentences to run consecutively.

I order that the sentences of imprisonment for the MDR, CMA and MOA Charges run consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 33 months’ two weeks’ imprisonment, with a disgorgement fine of $500 (in default three days’ imprisonment). In my view, this is an appropriate sentence from a global perspective. It is proportionate to the Accused’s overall criminality, especially given the number of distinct offences involved and the fact that almost all of them were committed whilst the Accused was unlawfully at large. It also gives effect to the principle of deterrence, particularly in respect of the scam-related offences.

Conclusion

My decision on the sentences is therefore as follows:

The sentences for the MDR, CMA and MOA Charges shall run consecutively, with the imprisonment term for the CDSA Charge running concurrently, resulting in an aggregate imprisonment term of 33 months’ two weeks’ imprisonment, with a disgorgement fine of $500 (in default three days’ imprisonment).