Public Prosecutor v Lee Jia Ming [2026] SGDC 222

District Judge Justin Yeo:

Introduction

Mr Lee Jia Ming (“the Accused”) distributed an intimate recording of a male victim (“the Victim”) engaging in oral sex with him to six anonymous Telegram users on separate occasions. Although the recording had originally been made with the Victim’s knowledge and consent, the Victim did not consent to its distribution. The Accused nonetheless distributed the recording knowing that doing so would cause humiliation to the Victim.

The Accused pleaded guilty to a charge under s 377BE(1) punishable under s 377BE(3) of the Penal Code 1871 (“PC”), which is a charge amalgamated pursuant to s 124(4) and punishable under s 124(8)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”). The charge reads as follows:

There is a gag order in place that prohibits the publication of the Victim’s name, address, photograph, or any other information likely to lead to his identification.

The Prosecution sought a sentence of six months’ imprisonment (after a 30% reduction on account of a timely plea of guilt). The Defence sought a sentence of four months’ imprisonment after the sentencing reduction. For the reasons explained in this judgment, I impose a sentence of four months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment.

Facts

The following facts are based on the Statement of Facts, to which the Accused admitted without qualification.

The Accused is a 32-year-old male Singaporean. Sometime in January 2022, he became acquainted with the Victim, also a male Singaporean, through Grindr. They had a sexual relationship between May and June 2022, during which they engaged in sexual acts including oral and anal sex. The Accused recorded these on video with the Victim’s knowledge and consent. One such video (“the Video”) was recorded by the Accused at the Victim’s residence. It captured the Victim performing oral sex on the Accused, with the Accused’s penis in the Victim’s mouth. The Victim’s face was fully frontally visible in the Video.

Sometime in 2023, the Accused engaged in conversation with at least six Telegram users on different occasions. The Accused had never met these users in real life, nor did he know their mobile phone numbers. He knew them only by their Telegram usernames “@plantation01”, “@spiltmilktea”, “@xxxylx”, “@suzie_sheep”, “@leon_lee81” and “@ettzen”. The Accused exchanged sexual images and videos with these users using the “disappearing messages” function on Telegram. Among the media distributed by the Accused to each of these users was the Video. The Victim did not consent to the Accused distributing the Video to others.

On 14 April 2024, the Victim received a Telegram message from an anonymous user containing a disappearing link. Upon clicking the link, the Victim saw a webpage with several pornographic videos, amongst which was the Video. The Victim subsequently discovered that the Video had also been posted to at least three different pornographic websites. He was shocked and humiliated as a result.

On 16 April 2024 at 1.40am, the Victim lodged a police report about this incident.

Law

Statutory Provisions

The relevant offence and punishment provisions for the present charge (PC s 377BE(1), punishable under s 377BE(3)) are as follows:

As the present charge is an amalgamated charge, it is necessary to have regard to CPC ss 124(4) and 124(8)(a)(ii). In gist, these provide that the court may sentence the Accused to up to twice the amount of punishment to which he would otherwise have been liable for the offence.

Sentencing Frameworks

The relevant sentencing frameworks are those established in Public Prosecutor v GED and other appeals [2023] 3 SLR 1221 (“GED”) and Prakash s/o Mathivanan v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 1386 (“Prakash”). It is to these frameworks that I now turn.

The GED Framework

The Prosecution and the Defence were aligned that the GED framework is the applicable sentencing framework for offences under PC s 377BE(1). This framework is modelled on the two-stage, five-step sentencing framework set out in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609 (GED at [44]). A brief outline of the framework is as follows:

(a) Step 1: Consider offence-specific factors to identify the level of harm caused by the offence, and the level of the offender’s culpability (GED at [46]).

(b) Step 2: Identify the applicable indicative sentencing range, based on the following sentencing matrix which applies to a first offender convicted after trial (GED at [102] and [104]):

(c) Step 3: Identify the appropriate starting point sentence within the indicative sentencing range (GED at [102]).

(d) Step 4: Adjust the starting point sentence in view of aggravating and mitigating offender-specific factors. These are the well-settled factors that are generally applicable across all criminal offences (GED at [110]).

(e) Step 5: Where the offender has been convicted of multiple charges, consider whether the imprisonment terms should run consecutively or concurrently, and whether adjustments to the sentences for individual charges are required in view of the totality principle (GED at [115]–[118]).

The Prakash Framework

As the present charge is an amalgamated charge, the three-stage framework in Prakash s/o Mathivanan v Public Prosecutor [2025] 4 SLR 1386 (“Prakash”) applies. I recently summarised the Prakash framework in Public Prosecutor v Loh Guang Ze [2026] SGDC 211 (“Loh Guang Ze”), in the context of an offence under PC s 377BB(5). As stated in Loh Guang Ze at [100]:

Interaction between the GED and Prakash Frameworks

In sentencing for an amalgamated charge under PC ss 377BE(1) and 377BE(3) read with CPC ss 124(4) and 124(8), it is necessary to apply both the GED and Prakash frameworks.

Neither the Prosecution nor the Defence referred to the Prakash framework in their sentencing submissions. When I raised this at the hearing, both parties agreed that the Prakash framework could be applied for analytical clarity. They further indicated that while their submissions had not followed the analytical steps of the Prakash framework, their proposed sentences had already incorporated the necessary uplifts arising from the amalgamated nature of the charge, such that the application of the Prakash framework did not alter their proposed final sentences.

In my view, the Prakash framework should be applied as the overarching framework given that the present charge is an amalgamated charge (see my similar analysis in Loh Guang Ze at [101]–[102]). GED Steps 1 to 3 apply primarily in identifying the punishment for the “base offence” at the first stage of the Prakash framework. Of course, the harm and culpability factors identified in GED remain relevant at the second stage of the Prakash framework insofar as the court has regard to these factors in assessing aggregate harm and culpability (see Prakash at [45] and [129]). GED Step 4, concerning offender-specific factors, will be considered at the third stage of the Prakash framework, as this assessment rightly takes place only after the court has determined a starting sentence for the amalgamated charge. GED Step 5, which concerns the proportionality of the global sentence, will then be considered as the final step in cases involving multiple charges.

This approach is warranted for two reasons (see also Loh Guang Ze at [102]):

(a) First, the GED sentencing matrix was calibrated against the punishment range for a non-amalgamated charge. The highest sentence under the matrix is therefore 60 months’ (ie, five years’) imprisonment. However, an amalgamated charge attracts a maximum sentence of up to twice this duration in view of CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii). Applying the matrix to the “base offence” (rather than the amalgamated offence) helps ensure that the full sentencing range available for an amalgamated charge is not inadvertently overlooked.

(b) Second, anchoring the GED sentencing matrix to the “base offence” promotes analytical clarity. It allows the court to derive a coherent starting point for the “base offence” and to draw meaningful comparisons with precedents involving non-amalgamated charges. As will be seen later in this judgment, this comparative approach is helpful for the calibration of sentences.

Sentencing Analysis

I now apply the Prakash and GED frameworks to determine the appropriate sentence for the present case.

Prakash First Stage – Starting point sentence for “base offence”

Taking one of the six occasions of distribution as the “base offence” and applying only the first three steps of the GED framework, the starting point sentence for the “base offence” on a claim-trial basis would be five months’ imprisonment.

GED Step 1: Harm and culpability for “base offence”

(1) Harm done by the “base offence”

The Prosecution and the Defence agreed that the present case involved “moderate harm”. However, this characterisation must be understood in the context that they were referring to the aggregate harm done by the aggregate distribution to six Telegram users. As both the Prosecution and the Defence acknowledged at the hearing, had they considered the harm done by a single “base offence” for the purposes of the Prakash framework, the level of harm would have been lower than what they had proposed.

I find that the harm done by the “base offence” would fall at the higher end of the “slight harm” category. The relevant harm factors relate to the “objective aspects of harm” (GED at [50]–[55]), as follows:

(a) First, the nature of the recording. The Video was a video recording which contains more intrusive and distressing information as compared to a still image (GED at [51]). Its harmfulness must, of course, be individually evaluated based on its content (GED at [51]). In this regard, the Video captured the Victim engaging in a sexual act (ie, performing oral sex on the Accused). The Victim’s private parts were neither exposed nor visible in the Video.

(b) Second, the degree of identifiability of the victim. As a general principle, the more identifiable the victim in the recording, the greater the harm occasioned by the offence (GED at [52]). Here, the Victim was very identifiable given that his face was fully frontally visible in the Video. That this was no mere theoretical risk is borne out by the fact that an anonymous Telegram user was able to identify the Victim from the Video and sent him a link to a website on which it had been published.

(c) Third, the nature and extent of the actual or eventual distribution of the recording (GED at [53]–[54]). The court considers the breadth of distribution, whether the recording was distributed to recipients known to the victim, and the duration for which it remained accessible (GED at [53]). As a general principle, wider dissemination, circulation to recipients known to the victim, or having the recording available for a longer period would aggravate the harm caused (GED at [53]). Here, the Video was disseminated to six anonymous Telegram users and subsequently posted to at least three different pornographic websites. As at the time of the hearing, it appears that the Video had only been removed from one of the websites.

For completeness, no submissions were made, nor evidence adduced, in relation to other possible harm caused to the Victim:

(a) First, “subjective aspects of harm” concerns particular aspects of suffering that would shed light on the degree of humiliation, alarm or distress subjectively experienced by the victim as a result of the offence, including any impact on the victim’s mental health (GED at [56]–[58]). There is no evidence of any such subjective aspects of harm, given that the extent of harm to the Victim in the present case is limited to the general observation that the Victim “felt shocked and humiliated as a result”.

(b) Second, “consequential harm” encompasses harm other than the emotional and psychological consequences of the distribution, such as the loss of employment and other economic consequences (GED at [59]). There is no evidence of any such consequential harm in the present case.

(c) Third, “prerequisite harm”, namely, harm caused to the victim in the course of obtaining the recording (GED at [60]). Given that the Video was recorded with the Victim’s knowledge and consent, there was no prerequisite harm in the present case.

(d) Finally, there was no evidence of any other relevant harm-related factors such as those set out in GED at [61].

I am fortified in my finding that the “base offence” falls at the higher end of the “slight harm” category by comparison to the following three precedent cases involving offences under PC s 377BE. In each of these cases, the court assessed harm to be at the “moderate” level. As will be seen, each of these cases involved greater harm than the “base offence” in the present case.

(a) First, the magistrates’ appeal in GEH, as detailed in GED (see GED at [139]–[142]). While no sexual acts were captured in the recording, the victim was readily identifiable (indeed, he was referred to by name) and the victim’s genitalia was clearly visible. In addition, the GEH recording was distributed from the victim’s own mobile phone to over five hundred of the victim’s own contacts (including his colleagues, friends, neighbours and sporting teammates) (GED at [139]). For completeness, there were also other significant categories of harm in GEH, although these were considered in the context of a separate charge rather than the PC s 377BE charge. These comprised prerequisite harm in the form of physical violence inflicted on the victim in the course of obtaining the recording, lasting emotional and psychological harm suffered by the victim, and consequential harm in the form of medical expenses incurred and the non-renewal of the victim’s employment contract (GED at [140]–[141]).

(b) Second, Public Prosecutor v Lim Jun Jie [2025] SLR(StC) 63 (“Lim Jun Jie”). While no sexual acts were captured in the intimate media, the victim was readily identifiable as her face was clearly shown. Her breasts and buttocks were also visible in some of the media (Lim Jun Jie at [16]). In terms of distribution, the accused sold the media to four different buyers on Telegram over six days, as part of a “clandestine network of Telegram groups… where such materials were being traded”, and the court found that the fact that the victim was an “internet influencer increased the likelihood that the media would continue to be traded in these Telegram groups” (Lim Jun Jie at [20(a)]). It is also important to note two caveats when referring to the sentencing analysis in Lim Jun Jie.

(i) The first caveat is that the finding of “moderate” harm in Lim Jun Jie was in the context of aggregate harm caused by an amalgamated charge. It was not an assessment of harm in relation to a “base offence”. This is unsurprising, as Lim Jun Jie was decided before Prakash and would not have been guided by the Prakash framework for amalgamated charges.

(ii) The second caveat is that on appeal to the High Court, the sentence in Lim Jun Jie was reduced from nine to seven months’ imprisonment. In the absence of published grounds of the appellate decision, it is difficult to ascertain the precise basis for the reduction, and whether the appellate court had agreed that the aggregate harm was “moderate”. Some uncertainty therefore attaches to the weight that can be placed on Lim Jun Jie as a precedent on its analysis of the level of harm.

(c) Third, Public Prosecutor v Chan Kok Kit [2025] SGDC 171 (“Chan Kok Kit”). This case involved significant objective harm elements (Chan Kok Kit at [110(a)] to [110(c)]). The video in question was a recording of 9 minutes and 34 seconds in duration, which exposed the victim’s breasts and vagina, and captured her engaging in sexual intercourse with the accused (her boyfriend at that time). She was fully identifiable in the video because her face was exposed. In addition, the accused mentioned her nickname, nationality and area where she stayed in the title of the video. The video was widely distributed and was found on at least eight different pornography websites, and had been brought to the victim’s attention by a colleague. The court made a finding of subjective harm on the basis that the victim was “mentally destroyed”, suffered “sleepless nights” and became “afraid of guys” (Chan Kok Kit at [110(d)]).

Compared to these precedents where the harm was assessed to be “moderate”, it is proportionate to assess the harm in the present case as falling at the higher end of the “slight harm” category.

(2) Culpability for the “base offence”

In relation to the Accused’s culpability for the “base offence”, I find that this falls around the middle of the “low culpability” category. The relevant culpability factors are as follows:

(a) First, the motive for committing the offence. This relates to why the offender committed the offence, rather than whether he had the necessary mens rea for the offence (GED at [63]).

(i) There is no evidence that the Accused had committed the offence for monetary gain. That said, personal gain is not limited to monetary gain (GED at [65]). On the facts, in relation to the “base offence”, the Accused had “exchange[d] sexual images and videos” with an unknown Telegram user. The very nature of an “exchange” indicates that he had distributed the Video with a view to obtaining something in return, namely, other sexual images and videos. This constitutes personal gain for the purposes of the culpability analysis.

(ii) At the same time, there is no evidence that the Accused had acted to harm the Victim, or that his conduct was calculated to cause such harm. On the contrary, upon learning that the Video had been uploaded to various pornographic websites, the Accused wrote to the various websites requesting that the Video be taken down. This suggests that he had not intended that the Victim be harmed by his distribution of the Video.

(b) Second, the method of obtaining the recording. The present case falls within the “base or paradigmatic case” as defined in GED at [70]. Here, the Victim had consented to the recording and to the Accused being in possession of the Video, but not to its distribution.

(c) Third, the degree of planning, preparation and premeditation. As a general principle, an offence with planning, preparation and premeditation is more aggravated than one committed opportunistically or on impulse, because it demonstrates a considered commitment towards law-breaking (GED at [76]). In the present case, there is no evidence of any meaningful degree of planning, preparation and premeditation. For instance, there is no evidence that the Accused had recorded or retained the Video with a view to subsequent distribution, or that he had deliberately used “disappearing messages” on Telegram as a means of evading detection (a point discussed further at [26(g)] below).

(d) Fourth, the level of sophistication employed in committing the offence. As a general principle, an offence committed by sophisticated means (such as through carefully orchestrated efforts or elaborate steps to avoid detection) is more aggravated than one which is committed simplistically (GED at [77]). The Accused’s distribution of the Video leans towards the simpler end of the spectrum. The only ostensible sophistication was his use of “disappearing messages” on Telegram, a point discussed further at [26(g)] below.

(e) Fifth, the duration and persistence of the offending behaviour (GED at [78]). I reserve this factor for analysis at the second stage of Prakash.

(f) Sixth, whether there was any abuse of position by the offender in committing the offence (GED at [79]). The Accused and the Victim were in a sexual relationship when the Video was recorded. However, there is no indication that the Victim was disadvantaged in relation to the commission of the offence by reason of his relationship to the Accused, nor is there any evidence of a power or authority imbalance between them (GED at [79]).

(g) Seventh, the use of anonymity. As a general principle, an offender’s use of anonymity may bear on culpability in two respects: it may heighten the alarm and distress experienced by the victim by reason of the anonymity itself, or it may evince a deliberate attempt to evade detection and escape accountability (GED at [80]). Only the latter is potentially relevant in the present case. The Prosecution submitted that the Accused’s use of “disappearing messages” and the Telegram platform point towards the Accused’s attempt to achieve anonymity. The Defence’s account was that the Accused had used the function in the belief that it would prevent the Video from being saved, and that he had not considered the possibility of the recipient bypassing the function to save the Video. The Prosecution did not dispute this account. In the circumstances, I am unable to draw the inference that the use of “disappearing messages” and the Telegram platform necessarily evinces an attempt to evade detection. The analysis may well differ where there is evidence that an accused had systematically leveraged Telegram to conduct anonymous commercial transactions in “a dark marketplace of obscene and explicit material”, as was the case in Lim Jun Jie (at [30]–[31]).

In view of the factors above, I find that the Accused’s culpability for the “base offence” falls around the middle of the “low culpability” category. This assessment is fortified by a comparison with Lim Jun Jie and Chan Kok Kit, both of which involved offenders with higher culpability than the Accused:

(a) First, in Lim Jun Jie, the court found the accused’s culpability to be “on the higher end [of low culpability] and close to the border between low and medium culpability”. The accused had committed the offence for financial gain (Lim Jun Jie at [25]). He was an “active participant” in various Telegram groups set up for the express purpose of trading or selling pornographic material and explicit media, and had intentionally engaged in a commercial transaction to obtain the victim’s intimate media (Lim Jun Jie at [28]–[29]). The offence was premeditated and involved distinct steps. After acquiring the victim’s intimate media, the accused advertised it for sale and received payment, as part of the abovementioned “dark marketplace” for such material (Lim Jun Jie at [30]–[31]). The same two caveats concerning Lim Jun Jie that I had raised when discussing the harm-related analysis (see [24(b)] above) also apply here.

(b) Second, in Chan Kok Kit, the court found the accused’s culpability to be “medium”. The accused had distributed the video (of him and the victim engaging in sexual intercourse) after their relationship ended. The court inferred that he had intended to hurt and humiliate the victim as the video exposed her face and naked body, and he had also deliberately added to the video’s title her nickname, nationality and area where she stayed (Chan Kok Kit at [111(a)]). The victim did not know that she was being recorded and did not consent to it. The offence was also premeditated, planned and prepared, given that the accused had recorded the video using a camera that he had positioned in his bedroom for that purpose (Chan Kok Kit at [111(c)]).

Compared to these precedents, it is proportionate to assess the culpability of the Accused as falling around the middle of the “low culpability” category.

GED Step 2: Applicable indicative sentencing range

In GED, the court envisaged that relatively fewer cases would fall within the lower end of the matrix, such as the category involving slight harm and low culpability (GED at [105]).

Given the harm-culpability analysis above, I am of the view that the “base offence” here is an example of one such case. The applicable indicative sentencing range for the “base offence” is accordingly a fine and/or up to six months’ imprisonment.

GED Step 3: Starting point sentence within the range

Given my finding that the “base offence” falls at the higher end of the “slight harm” category, and around the middle of the “low culpability” category, an appropriate starting point sentence for the “base offence” is five months’ imprisonment on a claim-trial basis.

Prakash Second Stage – Starting point sentence for amalgamated charge

At the Prakash second stage, the court has regard to the doubled punishment limit in CPC s 124(8)(a)(ii), which increases the potential punishment for the Accused to imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with caning, or with any combination of such punishments. It thus follows that at this stage, the starting point sentence may be increased beyond the relevant indicative sentencing range in the GED sentencing matrix, given the increased aggregate harm and culpability involved in the recurrent offending.

I find that the amalgamated offence warrants a two-month uplift in imprisonment term, having regard to the following factors:

(a) First, duration and frequency of the offending conduct. In terms of frequency, the Accused distributed the Video on six occasions, each to an anonymous Telegram user. This heightens his culpability from that in the “base offence”. For completeness, there is no evidence on the timeframe within which the Video was distributed across the six occasions.

(b) Second, the aggregate harm caused by the entire course of conduct, involving distribution of the Video to six different anonymous Telegram users, aggravates the harm caused by the “base offence”.

The starting point sentence for the amalgamated offence is therefore seven months’ imprisonment on a claim-trial basis.

Prakash Third Stage – Offender-specific factors

At the third stage of the Prakash framework, the court considers offender-specific factors.

There are no offender-specific aggravating factors in the present case. The Accused is untraced, and there are no charges taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing.

Apart from the Accused’s early plea of guilt, there are two other relevant offender-specific mitigating factors in this case.

(a) The first mitigating factor concerns the Accused’s remorse and active efforts to limit the harm caused to the Victim. The Accused first became aware that the Video had been uploaded to pornographic websites when he was asked to assist with investigations on 18 April 2024. Shortly thereafter, the Accused wrote to two of the websites requesting that the videos be removed on the basis that the videos had been uploaded without his consent. One of the websites agreed to do so. I am mindful that these steps were taken at a time when the Accused already knew that he was under investigation, albeit before he had been charged. Nevertheless, I am of the view that the Accused deserves some credit for having taken concrete steps to mitigate the harm to the Victim by seeking to curtail the availability and further dissemination of the Video. The Prosecution has, indeed, acknowledged that the Accused’s emails to the websites demonstrated some degree of remorse on his part.

(b) The second mitigating factor is the Accused’s cooperation with the authorities (GED at [110]). He offered information on who he had sent the Video to and the platform on which he had sent the Video. I accord him appropriate credit for this cooperation.

As stated in the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s “Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas” (“Guilty Plea Guidelines”) at paragraph 8, the demonstration of remorse in ways other than the guilty plea can be considered as a mitigating factor, prior to the application of the sentencing reduction on account of the plea of guilt. In my assessment, the two mitigating factors mentioned at [37] above warrant a two-week reduction in imprisonment term, thus bringing the sentence to six months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment.

Applying a 30% sentencing reduction on account of the Accused’s plea of guilt within Stage 1 of the Guilty Plea Guidelines, the appropriate sentence is an imprisonment term of four months’ and two weeks.

Conclusion

As this case concerns a single charge, there is no need to consider GED Step 5 (relating to proportionality of the global sentence). The sentence imposed is therefore four months’ and two weeks’ imprisonment.

Justin Yeo District Judge

Mr Timothy Ong (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the Prosecution; Mr Aristotle Eng (Andre Jumabhoy LLC) for the Accused.