Public Prosecutor v Low Man Hong [2026] SGDC 152

Introduction

The accused, Mr Low Man Hong (“the accused”), was a bus driver. At the material time, he was driving a double-decker bus. When the traffic light in his favour turned green, he proceeded to make a left turn at a T-junction, onto a signalised pedestrian crossing. At the same time, the traffic light also showed a green man at the pedestrian crossing. The deceased started crossing the road at the pedestrian crossing. Expert evidence identified visual impediments to the accused’s line of sight while he was seated in his normal driving position. This was caused by two existing structures at the front left portion of the bus. Video footage from the bus showed that the accused performed checks on the left side of the bus at the start of the turn, but not while making the turn. The accused did not notice the deceased crossing the road at the pedestrian crossing. The front left portion of the bus collided into the deceased, knocking her down. The bus then ran over her, and dragged her along the road for more than 80 metres.

The accused faced one charge, which stated as follows:

The accused claimed trial to the charge.

After carefully considering the evidence adduced during the trial, and the submissions of both parties, I found that the Prosecution had proven the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused of the charge accordingly. After hearing submissions on sentence, I sentenced the accused to six months’ imprisonment and the mandatory minimum disqualification from all classes of driving licences for a period of eight years with effect from the date of release, pursuant to s 65(6)(a) of the RTA.

The accused filed an appeal only against conviction on the charge. The Defence applied for, and I granted, a stay of execution on the accused’s imprisonment term and DQAC.

When I delivered the verdict on the charge, I had provided oral grounds for my decision. These are the full reasons for my decision on conviction.

The relevant provisions

The relevant provisions of the RTA as at the time of the offence were as follows:

The trial

The trial took place over four days in October 2025. The Prosecution called two witnesses:

(a) Ms Lee Rui Lin, a Senior Forensic Scientist from the Forensic Chemistry and Physics Laboratory of the Health Sciences Authority (“Ms Lee”). Ms Lee was an expert witness in traffic accident reconstruction. Her evidence pertained to a report she had prepared describing the sequence of events in relation to the incident, evaluating the visibility of the deceased to the accused and assessing if the collision could have been avoided by him. I will refer to the relevant portions of Ms Lee’s evidence in the course of explaining the reasons for my decision.

(b) IO Kamaliah Binte Kamis (“IO Kamaliah”), an Investigating Officer from the Traffic Police. IO Kamaliah was the investigating officer in charge of this case. She testified on her involvement in the case, including attending at the scene, obtaining the relevant video footages, and recording the accused’s statements.

At the close of the Prosecution’s case, the Defence made the submission of no case to answer. The Defence’s submissions were similar to those made during closing submissions. After considering the evidence led by the Prosecution and the submissions of both parties, I found that there was some evidence not inherently incredible that satisfied each and every element of the charge, pursuant to s 230(1)(j) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”). I accordingly called upon the accused to enter his defence.

The accused elected to testify in his defence and was the only witness for the Defence.

Undisputed facts

An Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASOF”) was tendered pursuant to s 267(1) of the CPC. The following facts extracted from the ASOF were undisputed.

The parties

At the material time on 20 June 2022, the accused was on duty as a bus driver employed by Tower Transit Singapore Pte Ltd and was driving a double-decker bus (“the Bus”).

The deceased is See Guat Leng Agnes, a 61-year-old Singaporean female. She was a pedestrian at the time of the incident.

The first witness is Teo Sir Peng, a 61-year-old Singaporean male. At the material time, he was a private hire driver and was driving a motorcar (the “Car”).

The second witness is Koh Tua Soon, a 71-year-old Singaporean male. At the material time, he was a taxi driver and was driving a motor taxi bearing (the “Taxi”).

The third witness is Zhang Yong, a 56-year-old Singaporean male. At the material time, he was driving a motorcar (the “Passing Car”).

First information report

On 20 June 2022, at about 10.26 p.m., the Police received a ‘999’ call stating: “An old lady is lying in the middle of road. There is an accident and no car is here.” The location reported was along Ang Mo Kio Street 21.

Facts relating to the incident

On 20 June 2022, sometime before 10.26 p.m., the accused was driving the Bus along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 towards Boundary Road on lane 3 of the 3-lane road. When the Bus approached the signalised junction between Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 and Ang Mo Kio Avenue 3, the traffic light along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 was red and the Bus came to a complete stop before the stop line at the signalised junction. At this time, the pedestrian light in the same direction along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 also showed a red man. The deceased was standing at the pavement of the signalised pedestrian crossing of the said junction then.

Shortly after, the traffic light along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 turned green and the pedestrian light also turned to show a green man. The accused executed a left turn from Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 to Ang Mo Kio Avenue 3. At around the same time, the deceased began walking from the abovementioned pavement and started crossing the road at the signalised pedestrian crossing along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1. The accused did not notice the deceased crossing the road and the front left portion of the Bus collided into the deceased (“the Collision”), causing the deceased to fall and to be run over by the Bus. The accused did not notice the collision between the Bus and the deceased and continued driving the Bus. The deceased was dragged along the road under the Bus for approximately 82.2 metres before she was eventually separated from the rear of the Bus near the junction of Ang Mo Kio Avenue 3 and Ang Mo Kio Street 21.

While the deceased was lying on the road, she was subsequently run over by the Car and the Taxi. Due to her state at the time, the first and second witnesses could not detect and recognise her as a person and were not able to react and perform evasive manoeuvre to avoid running over her. The Passing Car was travelling adjacent to the Car at the time and was not involved in any collision in respect of the deceased.

At the time of the Collision, the traffic volume was moderate, the road surface was dry, and the weather was clear.

The paramedics and police subsequently arrived at the scene. The deceased was pronounced dead onsite at 10.40 p.m. by an attending paramedic.

The events above were captured in part on the following footages:

(a) The footage of an LTA junction eye camera (AB9);

(b) The in-car camera footage of the Bus (AB10-1 to AB10-13);

(c) The in-car camera footage of the Car (AB11-1 to AB11-4));

(d) The in-car camera footage of the Taxi (AB12); and

(e) The in-car camera footage of the Passing Car (AB13).

The accused only became aware of the Collision on 21 June 2022 after the police notified his company and his company informed him about it.

Cause of death

The accused accepted that the deceased’s death was caused by the Collision with the Bus and not by the subsequent collisions involving the Car and the Taxi.

The accused’s statements

The following statements recorded from the accused were made voluntarily:

(a) Statement recorded under s 22 of the CPC by IO Kamaliah on 21 June 2022 at 0630hrs (AB2); and

(b) Statement recorded under s 23 of the CPC by IO Kamaliah on 31 March 2023 at 1405hrs (AB3).

All the exhibits (AB1 to AB20) were admitted by consent. These included the First Information Report, the accused’s statements under s 22 and s 23 of the CPC, photographs of the accident scene, a sketch plan of the accident scene, the vehicle damage report of the Bus, the mechanical inspection report of the Bus, autopsy reports, Ms Lee’s traffic accident reconstruction report and video footages from the Bus and other passing vehicles.

Based on the facts above, the accused admitted that he was driving the Bus along Ang Mo Kio Avenue 1 towards Boundary Road on the day of the accident. When he executed a left turn at the signalised T-junction of Ang Mo Kio Avenue 3, while the traffic light in his direction was showing green, the front left portion of the Bus collided onto the deceased who was walking across the pedestrian crossing while the traffic light in her direction was showing green man. He also admitted that the Collision caused the death of the deceased.

Sole disputed issue

The only issue in dispute during the trial was whether the accused drove without due care and attention when he was making the left turn at the said junction.

The Prosecution’s case was that the accused did not exercise due care and attention when executing the left turn because:

(a) First, he failed to give himself enough time to assess if it was safe to proceed. He executed the left turn in a continuous motion without stopping or visibly slowing down.

(b) Second, he did not adequately and continuously check behind two structures on the Bus that obscured his vision, namely, the left A-pillar and the front left door structure, especially when the Bus entered the junction of the pedestrian crossing.

The Defence’s case was that the Prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, essentially because the accused had taken all reasonable steps when executing the turn. In particular:

(a) The accused had followed procedure and performed all the requisite checks when executing the left turn. He testified during his evidence-in-chief (“EIC”) that he was taught during his training to check for pedestrians by scanning the pedestrian crossing and the left side of the Bus, to lean his body forward to check his blind spots, to check the left side-mirror and rear-view mirror, and finally to turn his head to look outside the left side of the bus body and door. Based on the in-car camera footage from AB10-1, the accused leaned his body forward while looking diagonally left, looked forward and then turned his head to the left in a sweeping motion. The accused explained in his EIC that he leaned his body forward to look behind the blind spots that were obstructed by the front left A-pillar. The Bus was travelling at a slow speed (which he estimated to be 8km/h) and he had placed his foot near the brake pedal in case a pedestrian suddenly appeared. The Prosecution had not led evidence to show that a reasonable bus driver would have stopped or re-checked the blind spots when completing the left turn.

(b) There was no breach of Rule 4 or Rule 7 of the Road Traffic (Pedestrian Crossing) Rules (“Pedestrian Crossing Rules”). Specifically, Rule 4 and Rule 7 must be read to mean that a driver was only required to stop his vehicle at the pedestrian crossing if he noticed a pedestrian. Consequently, since the accused did not notice the deceased, he was not required to stop.

(c) The Prosecution had failed to prove that slowing down or stopping the Bus, or re-checking the accused’s blind spots would have allowed the accused to detect the deceased and avoid a collision.

The Court’s decision

I found that based on the totality of the evidence, the Prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did drive without due care and attention. I explain.

The applicable standard of care

I begin with the applicable standard of care. The standard of care was that expected of a reasonable and prudent driver. This standard was not determined in a vacuum, but in accordance with the type of road and prevailing traffic conditions faced by the accused: Public Prosecutor v Tubbs Julia Elizabeth [2001] 2 SLR(R) 716 at [26].

The accused was making a left turn at a signalised T-junction while the traffic light in his direction was green. The deceased was walking across a pedestrian crossing while the traffic light in her direction was also showing a green man.

The following traffic rules governed this scenario:

(a) Rule 9 of the Road Traffic Rules stated that where left turns were permitted at junctions, the driver of the vehicle shall proceed “with due regard for the safety of pedestrians crossing the road”.

(b) Rule 7 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules stated that pedestrians who were about to enter or have entered a crossing shall be permitted free and uninterrupted passage over the crossing by all drivers of vehicles who were approaching the crossing, notwithstanding that such drivers might already have received a signal to proceed from light signals (eg, in this case, a green light allowing drivers like the accused to turn left).

(c) Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules stated that the driver of a vehicle who was in the process of turning his vehicle at a junction where there is a pedestrian crossing shall stop his vehicle in order to give way to any pedestrian who was either crossing or was starting to cross the junction. This was consistent with para 75 of the Highway Code, which stated that when turning left (or right), drivers must always give way to pedestrians.

(d) This was why, at Rule 5 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules, the driver of every vehicle approaching a pedestrian crossing must proceed only at such speed as would enable him to stop his vehicle before reaching the crossing. This was consistent with para 79(a) of the Highway Code, which stated that when approaching a pedestrian crossing, drivers must always be ready to slow down or stop so as to give way to pedestrians.

What I discerned from the rules above was that pedestrians had precedence at pedestrian crossings. When drivers of vehicles made left turns, they must proceed with due regard for the safety of pedestrians, eg, by keeping a proper lookout and proceeding only in a speed and manner with due regard for the safety of pedestrians. For instance, a driver in the process of turning his vehicle at a junction where there is a pedestrian crossing must stop in order to give way to any pedestrian who is either crossing or starting to cross the junction.

I agreed with the Prosecution that the present case involved a straightforward application of these rules to the common scenario of a driver making a left turn at a junction where there was a pedestrian crossing. In my judgment, there was no need for the Prosecution to have called a witness to testify on what a reasonable bus driver in the accused’s situation ought to have done in the accused’s situation.

The accused fell below the standard of care

Having established the applicable standard of care, I turn to the next question, which was whether the accused fell below the standard of care.

Before I set out the key planks of my analysis, I first address the Defence’s argument (at [31(c)] above) that the Prosecution had not adduced evidence to show that slowing down or stopping the Bus or re-checking the accused’s blind spots could have led to the accused noticing the deceased and avoiding the collision. This argument, with respect, missed the point. The main inquiry in the present case was whether the accused drove without due care and attention, by failing to take steps required of a reasonable and prudent driver. It was irrelevant to the establishing of this element whether the harm could have been avoided if he had driven in another manner. In other words, if the accused had taken all reasonable steps, he would not be guilty of an offence, regardless of whether the accident occurred. The reverse was also true.

Thus, the focus of my analysis will be on whether the accused fell below the standard of care required of him and therefore drove without due care and attention. Having considered the evidence, I found that he fell below that standard in two key respects: (a) he failed to keep a proper lookout when executing the left turn and (b) he failed to stop at the pedestrian crossing to give way to the deceased, thereby breaching Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules. I will examine each point in turn.

Failure to keep a proper lookout

On the day of the accident, the traffic volume was moderate, the road surface was dry, and the weather was clear. The deceased was walking across the road at a pedestrian crossing when the green man was in her favour. She appeared to be walking at a normal pace. The road was well-lit with overhead lights and the deceased would likely have been illuminated by the overhead lights. There was thus no impediment inherent in the road or traffic conditions.

However, there were obstructions to the accused’s view when he was seated in his usual driving position in the driver’s seat of the Bus. These were detailed in the HSA report prepared by Ms Lee. Specifically, there were two zones of obstruction caused by the left A-pillar and left front door structure of the Bus, which I have highlighted in red outlines in the figure below:

The boundaries of visibility at the front left region of the bus through the front windscreen and the front left door were plotted from the accused’s estimated ocular point, ie, the approximate mid-point of the accused’s two eyes when he was seated in the driver’s seat of the bus. These accounted for the accused looking forward and leftward without moving his body:

Figure 3a of the HSA Report (AB19)

The deceased would likely have been obscured when she was within the two obstruction zones (indicated by the faded grey planes in Figure 3a above). She would likely have been available to be seen by the accused when she was transitioning between the two obstructed zones through the glass panel between the left A pillar and left front door structure, but might have been difficult to recognise.

According to Ms Lee, the deceased transitioned through the zones of visibility not once but three times in the course of the Bus’s left turn. She would have been available to be seen through the glass panel between the two obstructed zones, ie, between the zones obstructed by the left A-pillar and left front door structure. I have added red arrows to the figure below to indicate the three times the deceased would have transited through the zones of visibility:

Figure 6 of the HSA Report (AB19)

If the accused had leaned forward or leftward in his seat, the zones and angles of the planes shown in Figure 3a of the HSA report (that is, the zones of visibility and obstruction) would change. In particular, if he had moved his body to the left, the zone of visibility through the left door would be wider. If he moved his body to the front, the zone of visibility through the front windscreen would be wider. Depending on how he moved, zones which were previously obstructed would be available to be seen. In other words, by adjusting his body position, it would be possible to see behind the region obstructed.

In addition, the two areas of obstruction changed continuously as the Bus made the turn, and hazards and pedestrians could come into the path of the Bus. In this context, as stated by the District Judge in Public Prosecutor v Tan Phuay Khoo [2023] SGDC 292 (“Tan Phuay Khoo”) at [57] and [63], “for a driver to keep a proper lookout, he or she needs to have a proper view of the road in order to check for potential hazards, and where this view is impeded or obscured – whether partially or entirely – then steps ought to be taken to compensate for the obscuration to ensure that a proper view is had”. In other words, the driver ought to “take the necessary steps to overcome that sight barrier in order to keep a proper lookout for any pedestrians”.

Despite the accused repeatedly maintaining during his oral testimony that he had done all the requisite checks, based on the in-car camera footage of the Bus at AB 10-1, it was clear to me that he only turned his head a few times to the left and leaned forward slightly for a few seconds at the start of the turn, before the Bus reached the dotted lines demarcating the pedestrian crossing. He then looked straight ahead and made the turn in one continuous motion without visibly slowing or stopping. He also admitted that he did not re-check the blind spots as he was executing the turn as he had already “checked and confirmed that there were no pedestrians”. This was consistent with his cautioned statement where he stated “When I turn I never see any pedestrian… I look left side mirror and turn my head to left side then turn to look infront. after that I looking infront and just drive go” [emphasis added]. This was reflective of his state of mind that the checks done at the initial period when the Bus had just moved off from the stationary position, were sufficient.

But I found that checks done at the beginning of the turn were insufficient to account for the dynamic field of vision that constantly changed as he navigated the turn. The accused himself admitted during cross-examination that what could be visible or clear behind the left A-pillar and left front door structure when he first leaned forward would have been completely different by the time he was actually turning left. In this regard, he should have looked leftwards and leaned his body forward or leftward to re-check his blind spots again when making the turn. This would have increased his fields of visibility by overcoming obstructions to his line of sight, and ensured that he had a proper view of the road when he was making the turn.

When the accused was challenged during cross-examination on why he did not lean forward to check behind the left front obstructors after his initial checks, he stated that the steering wheel was blocking his chest and the turning of his body, impeding his ability to lean forward while executing the turn. I found this to be an afterthought intended to belatedly explain away the checks he failed to do, as the position of the steering wheel clearly did not prevent him from doing the same action at the beginning of the turn.

In summary, this meant that (a) the accused failed to keep a lookout by re-checking leftwards for pedestrians when he was executing the left turn and (b) he failed to move his body leftwards or forwards so as to overcome the visual impediments caused by the blind spots behind the left A-pillar and the left front door structure while he was executing the turn to increase his field of visibility, despite the dynamic situation on the road.

Failure to stop to give way at the pedestrian crossing

The accused also did not stop the Bus when executing the left turn in order to give way to the deceased, who was crossing at the pedestrian crossing, Ms Lee testified that if the accused had stopped, it was likely that the pedestrian would have transitioned and been available to be seen through the front windscreen of the Bus.

Since the accused did not stop to give way to the deceased, who was crossing at the pedestrian crossing, I found that he had also breached Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules.

Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules stated:

The Defence argued that Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules should only be interpreted to mean that every driver turning his vehicle at a junction where there was a pedestrian crossing must stop his vehicle only if he noticed a pedestrian who is crossing or starting to cross the junction. This was because:

(a) The prescription for a driver to stop was closely tied to the purpose of giving way to pedestrians who are either crossing or starting to cross the junction. Therefore, if the driver did not perceive that there are any pedestrians at the crossing, the prescription to stop did not kick in.

(b) If Rule 4 was interpreted to mean that every driver must stop before a pedestrian crossing, regardless of whether he noticed any pedestrian at the crossing, then Rule 5 was rendered superfluous. The assumption underlying Rule 5 was that it was not mandatory for drivers to stop before a pedestrian crossing. That was why Rule 5 prescribed for drivers to travel at a slow speed, thus enabling them to stop their vehicles when this obligation is triggered by the perception of a pedestrian crossing the road.

(c) Since the accused did not see the deceased, he was not obligated to stop, and thus had not breached the rule.

I would first observe that Rule 4 did not mandate that a driver must always stop at all junctions with a pedestrian crossing, regardless of whether pedestrians were present. This was neither the Prosecution’s submission, nor was it the conclusion of the District Judge in Tan Phuay Khoo at [66], in the context of right turns.

Rule 4 instead set out an objective rule that where there was a pedestrian either crossing or starting to cross the junction, drivers must stop in order to give way to the pedestrian.

As I explained earlier, Rule 4, together with its surrounding rules I set out above, established the precedence of pedestrians at pedestrian crossings and was meant to ensure the safety of the pedestrians at such crossings. When drivers of vehicles approach a pedestrian crossing – and all the more so when the traffic light was showing a green man in the pedestrian’s favour – drivers should expect pedestrians to be using the crossing. This was an “imminent zone of potential hazards” (Tan Phuay Khoo at [61]). Thus, the standard of care expected of drivers making left turns was that they must proceed with due regard for the safety of pedestrians, eg, by keeping a proper lookout and proceeding in a manner with due regard for the safety of pedestrians, including proceeding only at such a speed which would enable him to stop (Rule 5), or stopping when the pedestrian was crossing or about to cross the junction (Rule 4). I agreed with the Prosecution’s submission that “Rule 4 inherently presuppose[d] that a driver must perform proper checks” to detect such pedestrians, and “to give way to pedestrians” who had priority at such crossings, “because a driver [could not] claim to have given way to someone they did not actively [and I would add properly] look out for”.

In this regard, it could not have been Parliament’s intention that the driver’s mandatory obligation to stop is contingent on whether a driver subjectively perceived the pedestrian. If that were the case, every driver would be able to escape liability by stating that he simply did not see the pedestrian, regardless of whether he did any of the requisite checks and regardless of his manner of driving. This would render the protective purpose of the rule meaningless.

Since the accused did not stop to give way to the deceased, who was crossing at the pedestrian junction, he had breached Rule 4 of the Pedestrian Crossing Rules. As he breached a traffic rule, I was fortified in my conclusion that he had driven without due care and attention.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, I found that the charge against the accused had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I convicted the accused of the charge accordingly.

The accused is currently on bail pending appeal.