Public Prosecutor v Rajwant Singh Gill A/L Narajan Singh [2026] SGDC 205

Introduction

Sometime in February 2020, the first victim (“V1”) got acquainted with a person using the moniker “Mike”, a purportedly wealthy Caucasian male living in Malaysia, through Tinder, and entered a “sugar daddy” arrangement with “Mike” for certain sexual favours in exchange for a monthly payment. When V1 travelled to Malaysia to meet “Mike” on his instructions, the accused was the driver who had been arranged to pick her up at the airport. “Mike” coerced V1 into having sexual intercourse with the accused and subsequently extorted her into making multiple payments amounting to $177,434.25 over several months, amongst other demands, by threatening to disseminate the explicit videos of V1 in his possession. V1 never met “Mike” and never received any payment.

Sometime in January 2020, the second victim (“V2”) got acquainted with a person using the moniker "Thomas", a purportedly wealthy Caucasian male living in Malaysia, through Tinder, and entered into an arrangement for a dominant-submissive relationship with "Thomas". The arrangement included V2 playing the submissive role in the relationship, complying with “Thomas’s” instructions, sending “Thomas” videos of her having sex with others, and “Thomas” giving her a monthly payment. On 27 January 2020, “Thomas” instructed V2 to travel to Malaysia, where she met the accused at a bar, as arranged by “Thomas”. On “Thomas’s instructions, V2 had sexual intercourse with the accused, recorded the encounter, and sent the video to “Thomas”. When “Thomas” asked V2 to have sex with the accused again, she refused. “Thomas” then threatened to disseminate the explicit video in his possession and attempted to extort V2 for money. V2 did not comply with “Thomas’s subsequent demands and made a police report instead. V2 never met “Thomas”.

The Prosecution's case is that the accused had posed as "Mike" and “Thomas”, communicating with V1 and V2, respectively, via text messaging, and had cheated and/or threatened them into doing things that they would not have done had they not been so deceived or threatened.

The Prosecution initially proceeded with six charges at trial involving three different victims. Midway through the trial, the accused pleaded guilty to two charges involving a different victim, was convicted, and was sentenced in another court accordingly. The accused faced four remaining charges before me arising from his conduct against the two victims, V1 and V2. In respect of the first victim, V1, the accused faced one charge of cheating under s 417 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) ("Penal Code") and one charge of extortion under s 384 of the Penal Code. In respect of the second victim, V2, the accused faced one charge of cheating under s 417 of the Penal Code and one charge of attempted extortion under s 385 of the Penal Code. All four charges were deemed to have been committed in Singapore pursuant to s 4B(1)(a) of the Penal Code. The remaining 35 charges were stood down.

At the end of the trial, having carefully assessed the evidence and considered the parties’ submissions, I convicted the accused of the four charges on which the trial proceeded.

I sentenced the accused to a global custodial sentence of 12 years imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane as follows:

Being dissatisfied, the accused has appealed against his conviction and sentence. I now set out the reasons for my decision.

Undisputed facts

The following facts were undisputed at trial, as reproduced from the Prosecution’s Closing Submissions.

Facts pertaining to V1

The following facts relate to the first victim, V1 (PW2):

(a) Sometime before 27 February 2020, V1 matched with "Mike", an account purportedly belonging to a wealthy Caucasian male living in Malaysia, on Tinder. Shortly afterwards, the pair moved their conversation to WhatsApp, where "Mike" offered V1 USD30,000 per month to engage in a sexual relationship with him. V1 was to go up to Malaysia to have sex with "Mike" once or twice a month, and for the remainder of the month when she was in Singapore, she would have to film explicit media of herself engaging in sexual acts. "Mike" was the person in control during the relationship, which meant that he would make demands of V1 and she would comply pursuant to the terms of their relationship.

(b) V1 testified that she agreed to the paid arrangement for two main reasons:

(i) First, she was interested in exploring a long-term relationship with "Mike", as he appeared to be a good-looking and successful man; and

(ii) Second, the monthly sum of USD30,000 that "Mike" had promised far exceeded her own salary, and thus the money would greatly benefit her and her family's financial circumstances.

(c) Pursuant to these terms, on 27 February 2020, V1 sent "Mike" three videos of herself masturbating while fully nude, and three videos of her fellating a stranger. Subsequently, on the evening of 28 February 2020, V1 flew to Penang on "Mike's" instructions to meet him and to collect her payment. “Mike” told her he had arranged for a driver to take her to his location. The driver turned out to be the accused, who identified himself as "Raj".

(d) When Mike instructed V1 to change her clothes in the car on the way to him and she refused, "Mike" angrily told V1 to have sex with "Raj" or he would disseminate the sexually explicit videos that V1 had sent to him. This led V1 to beg "Raj" to have sex with her, going so far as to offer $1,500 as payment for sex with her. She testified that she reacted in this way out of fear that "Mike" would continue to threaten her with the dissemination of her explicit videos. V1 further testified that she had no romantic or sexual interest in "Raj” and would not have engaged in sex with him but for "Mike's" threats.

(e) Pursuant to the paid arrangement, V1 sent 73 suggestive and/or sexually explicit photos of herself and 164 videos of a similar nature to "Mike" between 27 February 2020 and October 2020. The videos included the following acts V1 performed on Mike’s instructions:

(i) Masturbating;

(ii) Finding and meeting unknown men to perform oral sex on them;

(iii) Being partially nude in a public place;

(iv) Having sex with the accused as “Raj”;

(v) Engaging a female prostitute to have sex with her and the accused as “Raj”;

(vi) Engaging a transgender prostitute to have sex with her;

(vii) Finding and having sex with a woman;

(viii) Engaging a dominatrix to flog her, causing pain and open wounds;

(ix) Buying and inserting large objects into her vagina on numerous occasions; and

(x) Prostituting herself to men, recording the encounters, and sending the videos to “Mike”. The payments received from prostituting herself were transferred to “Mike”.

(f) V1 testified that she would not have complied with "Mike's" instructions to send him these explicit videos if she had not been promised USD30,000 per month, and that she would not have agreed to the paid arrangement if she had known that "Mike" was not the person his profile represented him to be.

(g) V1 further testified that she transferred money to "Mike" in response to his threats to disseminate her sexually explicit videos, as she feared that she would suffer harm to her reputation if the videos were disseminated, especially since she worked in the teaching industry. Some of the money she transferred to "Mike" was her earnings from prostitution, an activity she would not have engaged in but for "Mike's" instructions. In fact, "Mike" was heavily involved in her prostitution. He coerced her into prostitution, chose her clients for her, and received her prostitution earnings.

(h) Pursuant to "Mike's" instructions, V1 transferred $185,334.25 to an OCBC account in Singapore belonging to Adelia Pramudita Mulyani Santoso, the accused's wife. The accused was the sole controller of the OCBC Account. Some of the funds that flowed into the OCBC Account from V1 were subsequently transferred to the accused's own DBS account. The transfer of funds from the OCBC Account to the DBS Account took place in Singapore.

(i) While V1 transferred a total sum of $185,334.25 to “Mike”, the Prosecution is only relying on the sum of $177,434.25 as stated in the charge under s 384 of the Penal Code.

(j) "Mike" never made any payment to V1. However, V1 testified that she held on to the hope that "Mike" would honour their paid arrangement and reimburse her for all the money she had transferred to him. This led her to continue sending sexually explicit videos and photographs of herself to "Mike" until October 2020.

(k) V1 finally lodged a police report on 19 October 2020.

Facts pertaining to V2

The following facts relate to the second victim, V2 (PW1):

(a) On 26 January 2020, V2 matched with a person named "Thomas" on Tinder, who was purportedly a wealthy Caucasian male living in Malaysia. Within half a day, V2 and "Thomas" moved their conversation to WhatsApp.

(b) During their WhatsApp conversation, V2 entered into a dominant-submissive relationship with "Thomas". At its core, the agreement was for "Thomas" to act as the "dominant" in a dominant-submissive relationship, while V2 was to play the "submissive" role. As the "submissive", V2 was to meet "Thomas" in Malaysia for two nights per month to engage in sexual acts with him. The agreement also required V2 to send "Thomas" videos of her engaging in sex with other persons when she was not with him. "Thomas" would pay V2 USD10,000 per month for her role in this relationship.

(c) V2 testified that she was agreeable to this arrangement, as she was seeking to enter a dominant-submissive relationship at the time, and she was keen to have such a relationship with "Thomas" because she liked his physical appearance as shown on his Tinder profile. V2 was also keen on the money that was promised to her.

(d) After establishing the dominant-submissive relationship, V2 did the following on “Thomas’s” instructions:

(i) On 26 January 2020, she sent an image of her breasts to “Thomas” while she was in the toilet in the National Gallery, Singapore;

(ii) On 26 January 2020, she sent “Thomas” a video of herself masturbating in the toilet in the National Gallery, with her face visible.

(iii) On 26 January 2020, she sent Thomas a video of herself engaging in sexual activities with two unknown persons;

(iv) On 27 January 2020, she travelled to Malaysia, met the accused at a bar who identified himself as “Sam”, as arranged by Thomas, engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused as instructed by Thomas, recorded the encounter, and sent the video to Thomas in two separate files. The videos depict V2 being digitally penetrated by the accused, giving oral sex to the accused, and engaging in penile-vaginal sexual intercourse with the accused.

(e) V2 testified that she would not have entered the dominant-submissive relationship with “Thomas” if he had not looked like the person in his Tinder profile or if the offer of paying USD10,000 per month had not been genuine. V2 further testified that she only sent the abovementioned photo and four videos of herself nude and/or performing explicit acts to “Thomas” and engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with “Sam” while being video recorded, pursuant to her arrangement with “Thomas”. She would not have sent the photo and videos if she had known the recipient was not the person “Thomas” had represented himself as.

(f) After receiving the videos, "Thomas" asked V2 to stay for another night to have sex with the accused again. V2 declined. "Thomas" then began threatening to disseminate the explicit videos that V2 had sent to him, in particular threatening to disseminate her videos to the school where she taught and to her connections on LinkedIn. One of his threats included “I’ll fucking make you the most famous person in Singapore”. V2 testified that these threats caused her to fear that her reputation would be tarnished and that she could lose her employment pass in Singapore.

(g) "Thomas" then told V2 that she needed to pay him $2,750 if she wanted him not to disseminate her explicit videos. V2 did not comply with his demands and instead lodged a police report the following day, 28 January 2020.

The Prosecution’s and the Defence’s case in brief

The Prosecution's case is that the accused, a 37-year-old Malaysian male, devised a scheme to obtain money and sexual gratification through deception and extortion. His general modus operandi involved posing as a wealthy Caucasian male on online dating platforms such as Tinder, luring female victims into a "sugar daddy" arrangement, then deceiving or coercing them into sending explicit photographs and videos of themselves, and finally threatening to release such material unless they transferred money to him.

The Prosecution's case is that the accused was, at all material times, playing the role of the Caucasian "sugar daddy", being "Mike" in respect of V1 and "Thomas" in respect of V2. He perpetrated deceptions upon both victims to cheat them into providing him with sexual gratification, and, under the guise of these personas, threatened to release sexually explicit images and videos of them if they did not transfer him money. In respect of V1, the Prosecution’s case is that V1 continued to send explicit photos and videos to “Mike” as she remained deceived that “Mike” would honour their paid arrangement, in addition to the extortionate threats she was receiving from him. Therefore, the Prosecution has framed the offence of inducing V1 to send the accused the explicit photos and videos as one of deception under s 417 of the Penal Code.

The Prosecution relied on the accused's own admissions in his statements to the police, the tracing of funds from V1 to bank accounts controlled by the accused, and the overall credibility of the victims' testimonies.

At its core, the Defence's case is that the accused was not “Mike” or “Thomas”, and that both V1 and V2 had engaged in sexual intercourse with him consensually. The accused claimed that he had received the money in his wife's bank account because he was acting as a money mule for unknown persons. The Defence further argued that the accused couldn’t have been simultaneously texting the victims as “Mike” or “Thomas” while being physically present with them, and that the Prosecution's failure to adduce forensic evidence linking the accused to the fictitious online personas was fatal to its case.

Issues to be determined

For the cheating charges under Section 417 of the Penal Code, the Prosecution had to prove that the accused had deceived the victims, thereby dishonestly inducing them to do acts they would not otherwise have done, causing harm to them.

For the extortion charge under Section 384 of the Penal Code in respect of V1, the Prosecution had to prove that the accused had intentionally put V1 in fear of harm to her reputation, thereby dishonestly inducing her to transfer money to him.

For the attempted extortion charge under Section 385 of the Penal Code in respect of V2, the Prosecution had to prove that the accused attempted to put V2 in fear of harm to her reputation to commit extortion, even though V2 ultimately did not comply with his demands.

The central issue in the present case was whether the accused had played the roles of "Mike" in V1's case and "Thomas" in V2's case. If so, the elements of the respective charges of cheating and extortion would be made out.

For the avoidance of doubt, I found the following Defence’s arguments unmeritorious and spurious:

(a) That V1 did not transfer the monies to “Mike” because of the threats she received from him. The Defence argues that V1 was not naïve or inexperienced, and that her continued engagement with “Mike” despite the alleged threats is inconsistent with the behaviour of someone who was under fear and coercion.

(b) That V1 did not file a police report until much later further suggests the absence of any immediate fear or coercion.

(c) That V1’s conduct in sending explicit images and videos to “Mike” was not induced by deception but was voluntary because she was in love with “Mike”.

(d) That V1 and V2 engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused (as “Raj” and “Sam”) consensually, not because she was deceived and instructed to do so by “Thomas”.

The accused had no basis to challenge the clear testimony of the two victims regarding their state of mind, and these arguments were inconsistent with the accused’s central defence that he was not “Mike” or “Thomas” at any material time. I therefore dismiss these contentions.

I focus these grounds on the core of the accused’s defence, namely that he is not “Mike” or “Thomas”.

Decision

Issue one: Whether the accused statements were given voluntarily

Before turning to the substantive issues, I address the joint ancillary hearing ("AH"), which was conducted in respect of nine statements challenged by the accused, namely Exhibits P16 and P23 to P30 (collectively, "the Challenged Statements"), comprising eight long statements and one cautioned statement.

Allegations

The accused made two general allegations of threat, inducement or promise ("TIP"):

(a) First, he alleged that there was a phone call between ASP Hatta (“PW3”) and IO Chia Ka Ying (“1AH-PW2”) on 29 January 2025, before the first statement, P23, was recorded, and that he overheard it. The alleged conversation "messed with his mind" for the next few days, thereby rendering the Challenged Statements involuntarily given. The words allegedly uttered by ASP Hatta were that the accused "needs to give me something so that I can help him" (the "Alleged Remark").

(b) Second, he alleged that each subsequent statement recorder would leave the interview room to call ASP Hatta whenever the accused denied something. Thereafter, the statement recorder would return to the room and (i) inform him that ASP Hatta had evidence to contradict the accused's claim, and/or (ii) suggest points to include in the statement which would allow ASP Hatta to help the accused.

The accused claimed that he trusted ASP Hatta to "help" him and therefore agreed to include the points suggested by the statement recorders in the respective statements, even though the points were untrue and would open him to liability for criminal offences that he did not commit.

Applicable law

The legal framework governing the admissibility of statements is well-established. Under s 258(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 ("CPC"), any statement given by an accused person in the course of investigations is admissible in evidence at his trial, subject to the requirement of voluntariness in s 258(3) of the CPC.

The question of whether a statement has been voluntarily given is a question of fact, and the test of voluntariness is part-objective and part-subjective. The objective limb of the test is satisfied if the Court finds that there was TIP, and the subjective limb is satisfied if it can be shown that such TIP operated on the mind of the accused through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charge: Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v PP [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 ("Kelvin Chai") at [53].

While the Prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Challenged Statements were voluntarily made by the accused, the Prosecution is not required to remove every lurking shadow of influence or remnant of fear: Kelvin Chai at [53].

Having considered the evidence at the ancillary hearing and applied the applicable test, I disbelieved the accused's allegation of an "inducement phone call" and find that the nine Challenged Statements were given voluntarily. My reasons are as follows.

(a) First, the accused's position at trial is inherently contradictory. On his own evidence, he gave his cautioned statements voluntarily, but gave the Challenged Statements involuntarily. This is even though the admissions made in the "involuntary" Challenged Statements are fully consistent with the admissions made in the “voluntary” cautioned statement. The accused's explanation for this position is that he wanted to remain consistent in his cautioned statements that were subsequently recorded. He further stated that if he had denied the charges, his denial would have been labelled an "afterthought". Hence, he decided to voluntarily admit to his charges relating to V1 and V2 to avoid being "called out" for having an "afterthought". If the accused's concern were about being seen as having an afterthought, the logical response would have been to deny the charges consistently from the outset, not to make admissions he claims are false. I therefore found the accused’s explanation to be contrived and illogical.

(b) Second, the allegations of this "inducement phone call" and of the statement recording officers applying pressure tactics to him during the process were unsubstantiated, apart from the accused's own bare assertion. In contrast, the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses was that no such phone call occurred. This was consistent throughout all the different Prosecution witnesses. The alleged phone call which gave rise to the Alleged Remark was unequivocally and consistently denied by ASP Hatta and ASP Chia, whose testimonies corroborated each other. ASP Hatta testified that he did not even engage in any phone calls with ASP Chia during the statement recording, and that matters relating to "helping" accused persons, such as the Alleged Remark, were not matters that he would discuss with other investigation officers. The remaining statement recorders, namely ASP Nasriman (“1AH-PW3”), ASP Lam Ai Ting (“1AH-PW4”), SI Azfarullah bin Abdul Aziz (“1AH-PW5”), and SI Lim Chew Boon (“1AH-PW6”), unanimously testified that they were not aware of the Alleged Remark or the occurrence of the phone call during which the Alleged Remark had been made. They further testified that they had no reason to believe that the accused had been induced to give the statements they recorded, nor had the accused given any such indication. I also note that the various statement recorders played no investigative role in this case and had only recorded the accused's statements due to the COVID measures in place at the time. As the statement recording process was the first and last time they had met the accused, they also had no reason to lie to incriminate him. The accused was unable to offer any explanation as to why ASP Hatta or the various statement recorders would have had a motive to frame him or fabricate the contents of his statements at any point. I therefore accept the Prosecution’s submission that all the statement recorders did not have a motive to frame the accused for offences that he had not committed.

(c) Third, having reviewed the statements, which contained both inculpatory and exculpatory elements, the contents of the statements did not suggest or substantiate the allegations that they were involuntarily given, nor did they support the accused's narrative that the statement recorders' pressure tactics procured them. Given the accused's position that the statement recorders wanted to create a particular narrative of him to satisfy ASP Hatta, to the extent that they would pressure him into making up incriminating stories about himself, I agree with the Prosecution that it makes no sense for the accused to have been allowed to amend his statements in ways that did not buttress ASP Hatta's narrative. The statement recorders all testified that they had read back each statement to the accused after concluding the recording process, and that the accused was allowed to amend his statements each time. These procedural steps were not disputed by the accused. The accused had the opportunity to amend his statements, which he did on some occasions. The fact that the accused was allowed to amend his statements and took the opportunity to do so on multiple occasions demonstrates that he retained the freedom to determine the contents of the recorded statements.

(d) Fourth, the allegations at the ancillary hearing were in flux and continually expanded throughout the hearing. Notably, the alleged remarks were absent from the accused’s Case for the Defence and were not put to the witnesses during their cross-examination. While some leeway may be afforded to the accused, as he was unrepresented and may be unfamiliar with the trial process, I found that these additions were material omissions for which there was no satisfactory explanation. This did not aid the accused's credibility.

(e) Fifth, I found that the alleged inducement would fail in law on the objective limb even if taken at its highest. Even if the Alleged Remark had been made, the Alleged Remarks were vague and did not specify what might be gained or lost on the part of the accused. This was explained by the High Court in the Prosecution’s cited case of Sim Cheng Yong [1994] 1 SLR(R) 689 (“Sim Cheng Yong”). In Sim Cheng Yong, the investigation officer merely informed the appellant that, if he cooperated, the officer would assist him, without specifying how. This, in itself, was held to be insufficient to fulfil the conditions of the proviso to s 258(3) of the CPC, to "give such person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him". Therefore, in the present case, any inducement, if at all, would have been self-perceived on the accused’s part. It is trite law that self-perceived inducement would be insufficient to constitute inducement in law that would render a statement involuntary. The same applies to any alleged remarks made by the recording officers that there was contrary evidence. Even if it is true that this was said, in my view, it cannot in law amount to any threat, inducement or promise. In other words, even if the allegations happened, which I did not find to be true, these allegations do not amount to sufficient “inducement” legally as they do not meet the legal requirements to constitute inducement that would render a statement involuntary.

For all the reasons above, I find the accused's allegations in the ancillary hearing inherently incredible. No reasonable doubt is raised about the voluntariness of the Challenged Statements, and their probative value far outweighs any prejudicial effect on the accused. On both limbs of the Kelvin Chai test, the accused's contentions fail. For completeness, I find that there was no unfairness in the circumstances and process by which the statements were obtained, and that admitting the accused's statements has no prejudicial effect.

I therefore admit the nine Challenged Statements as Prosecution exhibits P16 and P23 to P30. The weight to be accorded to the admitted evidence remains a separate matter for determination at the main trial.

Issue two: Whether the accused was “Mike” and/or “Thomas”

The main issue at trial is whether the accused played the roles of “Mike” in V1’s case and “Thomas” in V2’s case.

After carefully assessing the evidence, I find that the accused played the role of “Mike” in V1's case and the role of “Thomas” in V2's case. These are my reasons.

The accused’s admissions in his statements

First, the most compelling evidence against the accused was his own admissions in his statements to the police. The accused made various admissions in his statements to the police, including admissions as to his method of posing as other persons on online platforms to meet various women.

As regards V1, the accused made the following key admissions in his long statements:

(a) He matched with V1 on Tinder sometime in late February 2020;

(b) He entered into a paid arrangement with V1 under which he would pay her money in exchange for having sex with her;

(c) He instructed V1 to travel to Malaysia and stay at a hotel, and thereafter told her to look for someone to have sex with and to record a video of her sexual acts;

(d) He received intimate photographs and videos of V1 via WhatsApp;

(e) He threatened V1 by telling her that he would post the videos online so that she would give him money;

(f) He estimated that he had extorted about $60,000 from V1 via bank transfers to his account over a period of 6 to 8 months, and he had spent it all on daily expenses; and

(g) He received the money through his wife's OCBC account, which he controlled.

As regards V2, the accused admitted to engaging in sex with V2 at KSL Hotel after a day of chatting, and identified himself as a participant in both V2's chat logs with "Sam" and "Thomas". The accused was also able to recall asking V2 for money after engaging in sex with her.

The accused also admitted to the following general features of his modus operandi, which are consistent with his specific admissions relating to V1 and V2.

(a) He admitted that he had used multiple names on the Tinder application, including "Sam" and "Mike";

(b) He used photographs of Caucasian men for his Tinder account and told the women that he had matched with on Tinder that he was a Caucasian man based in Malaysia;

(c) He pretended to be a Caucasian man when he conversed with his Tinder matches on WhatsApp and told them to have sex with their driver and record their sexual activities;

(d) He played both the roles of the Caucasian man and the driver;

(e) He threatened his victims by telling them that their explicit videos or images would be disseminated if they did not sleep with the driver or send him money; and

(f) The money that the women transferred went into his "one and only DBS account".

When the accused was charged with extortion and cheating in respect of V1 and V2, the accused expressed remorse for his actions in his cautioned statements.

The Defence contends that these statements were false confessions made under self-perceived inducement. I have already addressed and rejected this contention at the ancillary hearing. The accused's admissions are detailed, internally consistent, and corroborated by the objective evidence and the testimonies of both victims. I place full weight on these statements, which provided significant support for the Prosecution's case.

The funds flow into an account controlled by the accused.

Second, the objective financial evidence further corroborates the Prosecution's case, as the evidential tracing of funds from V1 to bank accounts controlled by the accused was significant and telling. The monies transferred by V1 were traced to the accused's wife's OCBC account, which the accused controlled, and, on occasion, further transferred to the accused's personal DBS account.

The Prosecution highlights four observations from the fund flow evidence.

(a) First, the numerous inward and outward transactions in quick succession, involving identical amounts, suggest that the accused knew of the incoming funds transfer to the OCBC Account and intended to transfer the full sum to the DBS Account for his own use.

(b) Second, of the $185,334.25 that V1 transferred into the OCBC Account, the vast majority ($164,192) went into the accused's own pocket. Given that the accused was the primary beneficiary of V1's fund transfers, which were carried out pursuant to threats from "Mike", it stands to reason that the accused orchestrated the scheme to extract money from V1 for his own gain.

(c) Third, the DBS Account was debited with payments for multiple Tinder subscriptions, corroborating the accused's admission of using multiple Tinder accounts under different names.

(d) Fourth, the accused's bank balance clearly indicates that he was desperately in need of money when he began extorting V1 in February 2020, with just $6.60 remaining in his DBS account before V1's first transfer on 29 February 2020.

The accused did not provide a credible explanation for these transfers. I found the accused's defence that he received this money because he was a money mule for unknown persons to be contrived and incredible. No credible evidence was adduced to support this claim, and the accused was unable to identify or provide any details of the alleged unknown persons for whom he purportedly acted. Furthermore, the money laundering defence is nowhere to be found in the Case for the Defence or in any of the accused's numerous statements to the police. The very first time the accused belatedly raised this defence was during his evidence-in-chief in the ancillary hearing.

As highlighted by the Prosecution, the accused initially stated that he would withdraw the laundered monies and pass them on within days. Yet the bank records showed periods when he retained V1's money in his account for over a month.

I find the money laundering defence to be an afterthought, contrived and raised only after the accused realised during V1's evidence that the money transfers could be traced back to him. The only logical inference from the totality of the financial evidence is that the accused was the mastermind of the extortionary scheme perpetrated against V1.

It was not impossible for the accused to be “Mike” and “Thomas”

Third, I reject the accused's argument that he could not have been “Mike” or “Thomas” while texting V1 and V2 simultaneously, given that he was physically present with them. The Defence argued that the accused couldn’t have sent 24 messages to V2 within one minute while he was physically with her, and that this proved he was not "Thomas".

On a careful review of the evidence, this was not impossible. “Thomas’s" messages to V2 were sporadic in nature, which meant that the accused could have replied at intervals and at opportune moments. Further, V1 also did not testify that she received messages from "Mike" continuously during the material period. The accused's argument therefore did not withstand scrutiny.

During the accused’s cross-examination, the Prosecution demonstrated a “flight mode methodology” whereby messages could be pre-typed into WhatsApp on a mobile phone while it was in flight mode. A short time after flight mode was turned off, these messages would be sent out in the order they were typed, with no further action required from the sender, and the recipient would receive them shortly thereafter. The Prosecution argues that the accused could have used the “flight mode methodology” to communicate with the two victims as “Mike” and “Thomas”, which would explain the bursts of messages within short time spans.

While I make no finding that the accused had used this ‘flight mode methodology” in his communication with V1 and V2, I find that it was not impossible for the accused to be “Mike” and/or “Thomas”.

The accused lacks credibility

Fourth, I find that the accused lacked credibility overall. The accused adopted various positions at trial that were inherently contradictory and illogical. He also failed to provide credible explanations for the contradictions raised during cross-examination. For example, the accused’s attempt to explain the funds transfers from V1 to his wife’s bank account by claiming that he was a money mule is unsubstantiated, contrived, and plainly incredible. His entire defence that he was not “Mike” and “Thomas” but that he had just inexplicably and coincidentally been asked to have sex with V1 and V2 voluntarily rings hollow in the face of the totality of the evidence presented by the Prosecution.

As the Prosecution has highlighted, the Defence case is inherently incredible. Taken at its highest, this would mean that the accused, over a sustained period, was approached by numerous women, all under the control of various "sugar daddies" who were unaffiliated with the accused. Woman after woman crossed the border from Singapore to Malaysia on their way to meet their respective "sugar daddies", where they would meet the accused along the way and insist on having sex with him just hours later. The accused would reject their advances, but the women would persist in wanting to have sex with the accused until he relented, all while secretly recording the act pursuant to their "sugar daddies'" instructions. None of these women met their "sugar daddy" and would eventually return home instead.

The sole beneficiary of the "sugar daddies' instructions appears to be the accused. Following this, when the "sugar daddy" extorted money from the woman, the money would coincidentally be transferred to a bank account controlled by the accused. Notwithstanding all these, the accused claims that he had nothing to do with any of the "sugar daddies”.

I agree with the Prosecution that this defence is inherently incredible and beggars’ belief. I reject it entirely. The sheer improbability of the accused's account, taken together with the admissions in his police statements and the fund tracing evidence, left me in no doubt as to his guilt.

The absence of forensic evidence was not fatal

Fifth, I reject the accused’s arguments that the Prosecution’s failure to adduce forensic evidence (in the form of devices, SIM cards, Tinder accounts, etc.) to link him to “Mike” and “Thomas” was fatal to the Prosecution’s case. I find that while such evidence, if available, would certainly have bolstered the Prosecution's case, its absence was not fatal.

The court's task is to assess whether the totality of the evidence adduced meets the legal threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the Prosecution's case rests on a convergence of multiple strands of evidence: the accused's own detailed admissions in 16 statements; the consistent and corroborated testimonies of both victims; the objective financial evidence showing the flow of funds into accounts controlled by the accused; and the accused's own evasive and contradictory conduct at trial. Taken together, all this evidence overwhelmingly establishes the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of forensic evidence, such as devices or SIM cards.

For completeness, the accused admitted to throwing away the phones containing evidence in P23 at paragraph 12.

The accused's admission to the disposal of the phones containing evidence is itself consistent with guilt and inconsistent with his claim that he had nothing to do with "Mike" or "Thomas".

Conclusion on conviction

The Prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence proving that the accused played the roles of “Mike” and “Thomas”, who cheated and then threatened the two victims, is overwhelming. In contrast, I find the accused incredible, and he has not produced any credible evidence supporting his case. Having found that his defence carries no weight, I convict the accused on the four charges proceeded with.

Antecedents and prescribed penalties

The accused has no prior antecedents.

For offences under s 417 of the Penal Code, the prescribed punishment is imprisonment for up to 3 years, a fine, or both.

For the offence under s 384 of the Penal Code, the prescribed punishment is imprisonment not less than two years and up to seven years, and with caning.

For the offence under s 385 of the Penal Code, the prescribed punishment is imprisonment not less than two years and up to five years, and with caning.

Parties’ submissions

Prosecution’s submission on sentence

In submitting that this case is the very worst of its kind, the Prosecution sought a global sentence of 13 years imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane as follows:

(a) DAC-909082-2021 (Cheating, against V1, s 417 PC): 3 years' imprisonment (consecutive)

(b) DAC-924044-2020 (Extortion, against V1, s 384 PC): 7 years' imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane (consecutive)

(c) DAC-911013-2021 (Cheating, against V2, s 417 PC): 3 years' imprisonment (consecutive)

(d) DAC-911011-2021 (Attempted Extortion, against V2, s 385 PC): 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment and 3 strokes of the cane

In support of this position, the Prosecution made the following arguments:

(a) The Prosecution highlighted the following aggravating factors:

(i) The accused’s conduct was depraved, sadistic and malicious.

(ii) The harm caused by the accused was at the very highest end.

(iii) The offences were highly premeditated.

(iv) The offences were committed in an extremely manipulative way.

(v) The offences were difficult to detect.

(vi) The victims were vulnerable.

(b) There are no mitigating factors in the present case. The accused claimed trial to the bitter end and forced his victims to relive their traumatic ordeals on the stand.

(c) For the cheating offences under s 417 of the Penal Code, the sentencing framework established in Wong Tian Jun De Beers v PP [2021] SGHC 273 (“De Beers”) applies. Given the aggravating factors present, nothing short of the maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment is warranted.

(d) For the extortion charges against V1, the accused displayed high culpability and caused extensive harm to the victim, warranting the maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane.

(e) For the attempted extortion charges against V2, the Prosecution highlighted the precedent case of Ramasamy Ashwin [2012] SGDC 38, where the offender was sentenced to two years and six months' imprisonment with three strokes of the cane on a plea of guilty. The Prosecution characterised the present case as more egregious, seeking 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment and 3 strokes of the cane.

(f) As the charges involve different victims and invade separate legally protected interests, the sentences for three of the four proceeded charges should run consecutively (Mohamed Shouffee bin Adam v PP [2014] 2 SLR 998 (“Shouffee”) at [30] and PP v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 5 SLR 799 (“Raveen”). This does not violate the totality principle or the one transaction rule.

Defence’s submission on sentence

The accused made no submissions on sentence and did not mitigate. He only asked that his sentence be ordered to run concurrently with his previous sentence and that it be backdated.

Decision on sentence

The cheating charges

In assessing the appropriate sentence for the cheating charges under s 417 of the Penal Code in the present case, I applied the sentencing framework set out by the High Court in De Beers for offences of cheating to procure sex and other sexual acts.

In De Beers, the offender devised a scheme to falsely represent that he was a "freelance agent" for "sugar daddies" who procured "sugar babes" for his well-to-do clients. He claimed that he needed to receive and/or take nude images or videos and engage in sexual acts with women who wanted to be "sugar babes" to assess whether he could recommend them to his wealthy clients. However, there were in fact no such wealthy clients, and the offender was merely scamming the victims for sex and sexually explicit material. This scheme ensnared at least 11 female victims, who were aged between 18 and 24 years, and went on unabated from April 2015 to February 2016 before the offender was reported to the authorities. In furtherance of his deception, the offender created fabricated chat conversations that appeared to be between himself and his clients to convince the victims of the veracity of his narrative. The offender also exploited the fact that he held nude photos and/or videos of the victims to deter any of them from going to the police. By use of these deceptions, the Appellant was able to procure, among other things, unprotected penile-vaginal sex, unprotected oral sex, and the receipt and/or creation of several sexually explicit videos and photos from the victims. The offender in De Beers pleaded guilty to and was convicted of ten charges. Seven charges were for cheating under s 417 of the Penal Code, two were for criminal intimidation under the second limb of s 506 of the Penal Code (as was in force before 1 January 2020), and the remaining charge was for an offence under s 29(1)(a) of the Films Act (Cap 107, 1998 Rev Ed). A further 26 charges, comprising cheating, criminal intimidation, and offences under the Films Act, were taken into consideration for sentencing purposes. Menon CJ classified the harm and culpability at the very highest end of the spectrum and enhanced the offender’s sentences for the s 417 Penal Code offences on appeal to 33 to 36 months’ imprisonment per charge, with a global sentence of 8 years and 5 months' imprisonment and a fine of S$20,000.

In the present case, I find the factual matrix equally egregious, if not more egregious, than in De Beers for the following reasons:

(a) First, the sexual intrusion in the present case was far more extreme and degrading. In De Beers, the victim "Belle" permitted the offender to take nude photographs of her and engage in unprotected penile-vaginal sex with her. The victim also sent nude photographs to the offender. In respect of V1 in the present case, the accused caused her to suffer physical abuse such as being flogged and whipped (leaving behind numerous wounds), performing homosexual acts despite her being of heterosexual orientation, engaging prostitutes to have sex with her, and ultimately prostituting herself to unknown persons. V1 sent 73 explicit photos and 164 explicit videos of herself in total to “Mike”, involving acts that were derogatory and demeaning. This vastly exceeds the nature and volume of explicit material involved in De Beers.

(b) Second, while both cases involved accused persons who devised elaborate deception schemes to procure sex and sexually explicit material from vulnerable women under the guise of a "sugar daddy" arrangement, the accused’s scheme in the present case was considerably more elaborate. In De Beers, the offender created falsified chat conversations which appeared to be between himself and his clients in order to convince the victims of the veracity of his narrative. The accused in the present case communicated with the victims using multiple personas and physically impersonating distinct characters (“Mike”, “Thomas”, “Raj”, “Sam”, etc.), each deliberately kept separate, to conceal his identity. The accused also lured his victims across national borders to perpetrate his scheme.

(c) Third, a sentencing discount of a year was extended to the offender in De Beers on account of his plea of guilt, having saved the victims from needing to testify and relive the trauma caused by his acts. The accused here claimed trial to the bitter end and showed no remorse, forcing his victims to relive their traumatic ordeals on the stand. His conduct at trial was itself an aggravating factor, which I will further elaborate on later. The sentences here must be higher than those imposed in De Beers.

(d) Fourth, the psychological harm in the present case is far more severe and wide-ranging, affecting both victims deeply and permanently. In De Beers, the victim "Belle" suffered anxiety attacks after the offences, and was diagnosed by the Institute of Mental Health with adjustment disorder with anxiety.

In the present case, V1 was so severely manipulated by the accused that she was unable to ascertain right from wrong, causing her to delay going to the police. She was so traumatised that she became afraid of meeting new people and has not engaged in romantic relationships for years because of the devastation wrought on her by the accused. V1 has been unable to find significant help in therapy. She has left the country because she has been unable to live in Singapore after what the accused has done to her. I reproduce the victim impact statement submitted by V1:

After leaving the country to start afresh, V1 travelled back to Singapore to testify against the accused and relived her trauma on the stand for 2 days.

For V2, she has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from the incident. She has had to spend $2,500 on psychology and counselling sessions. She had to tell her parents, university, and employer about the incident. She deferred her education due of the stress caused by this incident. She became socially isolated, and felt like she could no longer trust others. Her flashbacks continue even years after the incident. I reproduce the victim impact statement submitted by V2.

Additionally, I find that the accused showed an utter lack of remorse arising from his conduct at trial:

(a) During cross-examination of V1 and V2, the accused attempted to ask scandalous questions relating to V1’s and V2’s sexual history, which this court found to be irrelevant and disallowed.

(b) During the ancillary hearing, the accused, in an attempt to challenge the admissibility of his recorded statements, made baseless allegations against multiple IOs, alleging that they had applied pressure tactics on him during the recording of his statements, which this court has rejected.

(c) During the Defence case, the accused applied to the court under s 230(1)(q) of the CPC to compel the attendance of the various unknown men seen in V1’s videos having sexual intercourse with her. V1 had testified that she had prostituted herself to these men on “Mike’s” instructions. The accused wanted to call these unknown men to ascertain the circumstances of their meeting:

(i) Whether they knew that they were being video recorded;

(ii) How much had they paid V1 for her sexual services, if they had paid?

This court dismissed the application under s 230(1)(r) of the CPC as I found the accused’s intended purpose to call them as witnesses to be irrelevant to the charges, inconsistent with the accused’s defence that he was not “Mike”, and that the application was vexatious and intended to delay proceedings. This application, which sought to expose V1's clients to scrutiny and potentially to embarrass V1 further, demonstrated a callous and predatory attitude towards the victim that is entirely inconsistent with any genuine remorse.

(d) The accused also repeatedly tendered further submissions piecemeal during the proceedings, despite clear timeline directions given by the court. This was unfair to the Prosecution, who repeatedly had to respond to last-minute submissions. The accused’s conduct further protracted proceedings.

(e) Towards the close of the trial, the accused alleged that the Prosecution had breached its disclosure obligations in refusing to disclose the recorded statements of V1 and V2 to him and applied to the court to compel the Prosecution’s disclosure of these statements. Having heard and considered the submissions of parties, I dismissed the application, having found no basis to warrant the statements’ disclosure or to substantiate the accused’s allegation that the Prosecution has breached its disclosure obligations.

Applying the framework in De Beers, it was clear to me that the harm caused by the accused and his level of culpability were at the very highest end. The accused had procured penetrative sex from the victims, which represented one of the most grievous intrusions of bodily autonomy, and which has left the victims still picking up the pieces of their destroyed lives many years after their traumatic experience. The accused also acted with clear premeditation and subterfuge, without any consideration for his victims, whom he treated as playthings for his own selfish gratification. The accused showed no remorse during his offending spree, during the trial proceedings, and even after he was convicted of the charges against him. I agree with the Prosecution on the aggravating factors they submitted, and that there were no mitigating factors in this case.

For completeness, I highlight that the accused pleaded guilty to two charges, one under s 417 of the Penal Code and one under s 420 of the Penal Code, involving a different victim mid-way through this trial and was sentenced to the maximum sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment for the s 417 Penal Code charge in another court.

The accused, having been convicted after trial here, was not entitled to any sentencing discount. I therefore impose the maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment for each of the two s 417 Penal Code charges. In my view, any lower sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offences disclosed and the harm caused.

The extortion charges

Extortion against V1

For the extortion charge against V1, the minimum prescribed punishment is two years imprisonment and up to seven years imprisonment, with caning.

Several features of s 384 bear emphasis at the outset. First, the provision prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of two years' imprisonment, reflecting Parliament's view that extortion is an inherently serious offence that invariably warrants a custodial sentence of some substance. Second, the maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment is significantly higher than the maximum for attempted extortion under s 385, reflecting the greater gravity of a completed extortion offence. Third, the provision expressly permits caning as an additional punishment, signalling Parliament's intention that it should be considered in appropriate cases.

The Prosecution highlights that the facts of the present case are egregious and far exceed any sentencing precedent. The Prosecution seeks the maximum prescribed punishment of seven years’ imprisonment, together with 12 strokes of the cane. The following aggravating factors are highlighted:

(a) The threats made to V1 were protracted and continuous, from March to October 2020.

(b) The accused exercised significant control over V1’s life as he made her share her whereabouts (using WhatsApp’s location sharing function) with him at all times. He also conducted searches to obtain information about V1’s personal life, including the identities of her parents and employer.

(c) The total amount extorted, $177,434.25, is large and far above any amount in the precedents.

(d) The harm caused to V1 is severe and extends beyond the stated figure in the charge. V1 performed intensely demeaning acts for the accused’s pleasure, including finding and meeting unknown men to perform oral sex on them, being partially nude in a public place, engaging a female prostitute to have sex with her and the accused, engaging a transgender prostitute to have sex with her, having sex with a woman, and engaging a dominatrix to flog her. V1 also prostituted herself on the accused’s instructions to earn more money for him.

(e) V1’s life has been irreparably damaged by the accused’s conduct, as elaborated in her victim impact statement.

In assessing the appropriate sentence, I considered the relevant harm and culpability factors. I fully agree with the aggravating factors highlighted by the Prosecution and that the present case is unprecedentedly serious, given the level of harm caused and the accused's culpability.

(1) Harm

I find that the harm in this case is exceptional and falls at the very highest end of the spectrum.

The extortion of V1 was not a single act or a brief episode. It was a sustained campaign of terror that lasted from 29 February 2020 to 7 October 2020, approximately eight months, during which V1 was extorted into transferring a total of $177,434.25 to the accused.

However, the true financial devastation wrought upon V1 is even more severe than the raw figure suggests. To meet the accused's relentless demands, V1 emptied her bank account and took out bank loans. She remains in debt to this day. Furthermore, the accused did not merely take money from V1. He drove her and her family into financial ruin. The harm caused to V1's parents, who had their savings depleted by their daughter's desperate attempts to satisfy the accused's demands, is a further dimension of harm that the court must consider.

The harm caused to V1 extended beyond financial harm. To earn money to meet the accused's demands, V1 was forced to prostitute herself, with the accused vetting her clients and directing her activities. I find that the psychological harm suffered by V1 is severe and lasting. V1’s victim impact statement speaks for itself. The depth and permanence of V1's psychological harm are a powerful indicator of the gravity of the accused's conduct. The accused did not merely take money from V1. He destroyed her sense of safety, her capacity for trust, her ability to form relationships, and ultimately her ability to continue living in the country she called home. This is harm of the most profound and lasting kind.

(2) Culpability

I find that the accused's culpability also falls at the very highest end of the spectrum.

The accused's conduct during the extortion phase was premeditated and unrelenting. He conducted searches on V1’s personal life to determine the identities of her parents, employer, and other personal information to make his threats more credible and more terrifying. He required V1 to share her whereabouts with him at all times via WhatsApp's location-sharing feature. He took control of her social media. He monitored and directed her activities with a level of control that far exceeded that typical in an extortion case.

The accused also took active steps to maximise the financial yield of his extortion. When V1 had exhausted her own resources, the accused directed her to prostitute herself to earn more money for him. He vetted her clients and directed her activities as a prostitute. This represents a level of exploitation and control that is deeply aggravating and has no parallel in typical extortion cases.

The accused fully exploited the power imbalance created by his possession of V1’s explicit material. He held over her the constant threat of public humiliation and the destruction of her personal and professional relationships. This gave him a degree of control over V1 that was total and suffocating, and which he exploited without mercy or restraint.

The present case is, by any measure, one of the most serious extortion cases that have come before the courts. There is no doubt in my mind that the appropriate sentence in the present case should fall near the highest end of the sentencing range prescribed. However, I remain slow to conclude that this case is said to be the worst of its kind that will ever come before the courts. To be clear, while I stop short of characterising this as the absolute worst case, it is nonetheless one of the most serious extortion cases to come before the courts, and the sentence imposed must reflect this.

(3) Caning

I turn next to the question of caning. I am satisfied that caning is warranted in the present case, and I impose 12 strokes of the cane. My reasons are as follows.

(a) First, the physical harm caused to V1 in the course of the extortion is a powerful factor in favour of caning. The accused's extortion drove V1 to subject herself to physical abuse, including being flogged and whipped, leaving behind numerous wounds, to satisfy his demands. It is appropriate that the accused, who caused V1 to suffer physical harm, should himself experience a measure of physical punishment.

(b) Second, the accused's conduct was characterised by a complete and callous disregard for V1's physical and psychological well-being. He treated her as an object to be exploited and degraded for his own financial gain. Caning is an appropriate response to conduct of this nature, reflecting the court’s condemnation of the accused's behaviour and the need to impose a punishment that is commensurate with the gravity of his offending.

(c) Third, the need for deterrence, both specific and general, strongly supports the imposition of caning. The accused's scheme was premeditated and designed to be difficult to detect. A sentence of imprisonment alone may not be sufficient to deter the accused or others from engaging in similar conduct. The addition of caning sends an unambiguous message that such extortion will be met with severe physical punishment.

Given the aggravating factors present, in my view, a sentence of six years and six months’ imprisonment, together with 12 strokes of the cane, is appropriate and warranted. This places the sentence in the present case near the highest end of the maximum prescribed punishment. While the harm and culpability are exceptional, the court stops short of the maximum in recognition of the fact that this is not characterised as the absolute worst case of its kind. The court must have regard to the full sentencing range provided for by Parliament, and must not shy away from imposing sentences at the higher end of the range where the facts warrant it: De Beers at [40].

Attempted extortion against V2

For the attempted extortion charge against V2, the minimum prescribed punishment is two years imprisonment and up to five years imprisonment, with caning.

The charge pertains to the accused's attempt to put V2 in fear of harm to her reputation by threatening to release her sexually explicit video online, telling her, inter alia, "I'll fucking make you the most famous person in Singapore... You will see yourself everywhere", and demanding that she transfer S$2,750 to him if she did not want him to release the explicit video. V2 ultimately did not comply with the accused's demands.

In assessing the appropriate sentence, I considered the relevant factors of harm and culpability.

(1) Harm

Although V2 ultimately did not comply with the accused's demands, the harm caused by the attempted extortion was nonetheless severe and lasting. The fact that the extortion was not completed does not diminish the gravity of the offence. The accused had already, by the time of the extortion attempt, obtained a sexually explicit video of V2 through his prior deception. The threat to release this video was therefore not an idle one. It was a credible, targeted threat, supported by the accused's actual possession of the material in question.

The nature of the threatened harm was particularly grave. The accused threatened to release V2's sexually explicit video online, telling her that he would make her "the most famous person in Singapore" and that she would "see herself everywhere." The accused's threat was not vague or general. It was specific, targeted, and designed to maximise the fear and distress caused to V2. This threat was directed at V2’s reputation, dignity, and personal relationships. The potential consequences of such a release, including public humiliation, damage to personal and professional relationships, and lasting reputational harm, are severe.

The psychological harm caused to V2 has also been canvassed above as demonstrated by V2’s victim impact statement. While not all of this harm is attributable solely to the attempted extortion, the attempt did come after the accused had already subjected V2 to sexual exploitation. This undoubtedly compounded and deepened the psychological trauma she suffered.

I therefore find that the harm in this case falls at the high end of the spectrum.

(2) Culpability

The accused's conduct was highly premeditated. He first exploited her by posing as a wealthy Caucasian sugar daddy, offering her financial security, and then using the sexually explicit material he had obtained through deception as a weapon against her. As Menon CJ observed in De Beers at [49(b)], the reluctance of victims to come forward when offences are committed against them, because of the stigma associated with being cheated and sexually exploited, clearly renders them vulnerable. The accused exploited this vulnerability to the fullest.

The accused carried out his scheme from Malaysia, targeting victims in Singapore. This cross-border dimension of his offending significantly increases his culpability, as it made detection and apprehension considerably more difficult. A joint covert operation between the Singapore Police Force and the Royal Malaysian Police Force was required to apprehend the accused.

I therefore find that the accused's culpability falls at the high end of the spectrum.

(3) Caning

S 385 of the Penal Code expressly provides for caning as an additional punishment, signalling Parliament's intention that caning should be considered in appropriate cases. The accused's conduct in this case was predatory, sophisticated, and callous, having first obtained sexually explicit material through deception before weaponising it against his victims. I am satisfied that caning is warranted in the present case, and I impose 3 strokes of the cane.

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that a sentence of three years' imprisonment with three strokes of the cane is justified for this charge. A sentence of three years' imprisonment represents 60% of the maximum sentence. In arriving at this sentence, I am mindful that the extortion in this case was attempted and not completed; V2 did not comply with the accused's demands. This distinguishes the present charge from the completed extortion charge involving V1, which attracted a higher sentence. The fact that the extortion was not completed provides some basis for calibrating the sentence for this charge at a level below that imposed for the completed extortion offence, while still reflecting the gravity of the accused's conduct. Nevertheless, the imposed sentence must be substantially above the minimum sentence of two years imprisonment to reflect the fact that the accused was convicted after trial and has shown no remorse.

The global sentence

Having determined the individual sentences for each of the four proceeded charges, I turn to consider how the sentences ought to run, and whether the resulting aggregate sentence is appropriate. In doing so, I apply the analytical framework for sentencing an offender with multiple offences set out in PP v Raveen Balakrishnan [2018] 5 SLR 799 ("Raveen").

The Raveen framework

The Raveen framework involves three stages as follows:

(a) The first stage requires the sentencing court to consider the appropriate sentence for each individual offence, having regard to the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors that bear upon each discrete sentence. I have already addressed the first stage in my earlier grounds dealing with the individual charges.

(b) The second stage of the sentencing analysis is to determine how the individual sentences should run. The starting point of the analysis is whether the offences are unrelated, and this is determined by considering whether they involve a single invasion of the same legally protected interest. As a general rule, sentences for unrelated offences should run consecutively. In contrast, sentences for offences that form part of a single transaction should run concurrently, subject to the requirement in s 307(1) of the CPC.

(c) The third stage of the sentencing analysis is to apply the totality principle and take a "last look" at all the facts and circumstances to ensure that the aggregate sentence is sufficient and proportionate to the offender's overall criminality. Specifically, there are two limbs to the totality principle. First, the court should examine whether the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal range for the most serious of the individual offences committed. Second, the court should examine whether the sentence's effect on the offender is crushing and not in keeping with his past record and future prospects.

The offences against V1 and the offences against V2 are unrelated. They were committed against different victims, at different times, and in the context of separate and distinct criminal episodes. The charges relating to each victim cannot be said to form part of a single transaction, and the prima facie position is therefore that the sentences for the charges relating to V1 and those relating to V2 should run consecutively.

The more nuanced question is whether the two charges relating to each individual victim can be considered unrelated. I find that they can. In particular, the cheating charge against a victim operated against the accused's invasion of the victim’s interest in not being deceived and induced to engage in sexual acts under false pretences. The extortion charge, by contrast, operated against the accused's invasion of the victim’s entirely distinct interest in not being subjected to unlawful threats and coercion designed to extract money from her. The offences therefore violate different legally protected interests. In De Beers, Menon CJ observed that the cheating charge pertaining to "Belle" operated against the offender’s invasion of "Belle's" interest to not be deceived and suffer loss as a result, while the criminal intimidation charge pertaining to "Belle" operated against the offender’s invasion of "Belle's" distinct interest in not being placed under unlawful duress such that she was forced or compelled to not report his acts to the police. The same reasoning applies here.

As a prima facie position, all four sentences ought to run consecutively. However, this is subject to the operation of the totality principle at the third stage of the Raveen framework, to which I now turn.

The totality principle

If all four sentences were to run consecutively, the total sentence would be 15 years and 6 months imprisonment with 15 strokes of the cane.

(1) First limb of totality principle

In the present case, the most serious individual offence is the extortion charge against V1 under s 384 of the Penal Code, for which I have imposed a sentence of six years and six months' imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane. An aggregate sentence of 15 years and six months' imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane would be substantially above this figure. The first limb of the totality principle, therefore, provides some basis for moderation of the aggregate sentence.

(2) Second limb of totality principle

Under the second limb, I am satisfied that running all four sentences consecutively would result in an aggregate sentence that, while arguably warranted given the accused's overall criminality, would violate the totality principle when considered against the accused's overall sentencing position. I am mindful that the accused has already served a sentence of 54 months' imprisonment arising from his earlier plea of guilt mid-trial in February 2025 in respect of another victim. The accused's sentence of 54 months was backdated to his arrest date on 28 January 2021. In default of the imposed compensation order, the accused also served an additional 70 days' imprisonment. He has since completed that sentence, and for the current charges, the accused has been remanded since 25 March 2025. As the accused will be serving a continuous period of custody, it is appropriate for this court to consider the totality of his aggregate sentence, including the sentence of 54 months that he has already served.

Taking into account the totality of the accused's custodial exposure across all sets of offences, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to run only three of the four sentences consecutively, rather than all four. I order the following three sentences to run consecutively: the cheating charge against V1 (three years’ imprisonment), the extortion charge against V1 (six years six months’ imprisonment and 12 strokes of cane), and the cheating charge against V2 (three years’ imprisonment). These are my reasons:

(a) First, the cheating and extortion charges against V1, while both relating to the same victim, protect entirely distinct legally protected interests, as explained above. These are fundamentally different interests, and the offences cannot be said to form part of a single transaction. They must therefore run consecutively.

(b) Second, the cheating charge against V2 must run consecutively with the sentences for the V1 charges because it was committed against an entirely different victim, at different times, and in the context of separate criminal episodes. Running the cheating charge against V2 consecutively with the V1 sentences is necessary to capture the full criminality of the accused's conduct in targeting multiple victims.

(c) Third, running these three sentences consecutively is necessary to reflect the distinct yet cumulative nature of the accused's criminality. The accused did not commit a single offence or a single episode of offending. He operated a sustained and multi-faceted criminal scheme targeting multiple victims, using deception to procure sexual material and then leveraging that material for financial gain. The accused's conduct demonstrated an exploitative and simply callous disregard for his multiple victims over an extended period of time, underscoring his overall criminality. Running only two sentences consecutively would fail to reflect this adequately.

Finally, taking “a last look” at the overall total sentence and applying the totality principle, I make a slight downward adjustment to the extortion charge against V1, reducing it to 6 years' imprisonment instead of 6 years and 6 months' imprisonment. This reduction is made solely on account of the totality principle and not because of any reassessment of the individual sentence. The total sentence for the current set of charges is therefore 12 years and 15 strokes of the cane. When the current aggregate sentence of 12 years is considered alongside the 54 months already served, the total custodial exposure of approximately 16 years and 6 months is, in my judgment, a sentence that is condign to the accused's behaviour and prospects and that is proportionate to the totality of his criminal conduct across all three victims.

I order the current aggregate sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane to be backdated to his date of remand on 25 March 2025.

For completeness, I address the accused’s submission seeking to have his current aggregate sentence run concurrently with his previous sentence of 54 months’ imprisonment. This argument was misconceived as a matter of law because, at the time of sentencing for the current charges, the accused had already completed his previous sentence. Therefore, it is not possible for the sentences for the current set of charges to run concurrently with those he has already served.

The accused also asked for his current sentence to be backdated to before his remand date of 25 March 2025. Under s 318(3) of the CPC, a court may direct that a sentence of imprisonment take effect on a date earlier than the date the sentence is passed. However, in doing so, the court must consider the following:

(a) The date on which the offender was arrested for the offence;

(b) The length of the period (if any) during which the offender was remanded in custody in relation to the offence;

(c) The length of the period (if any) during which the offender was remanded in a psychiatric institution (whether for observation or otherwise) under Division 5 of Part 13 in relation to the offence;

(d) the length of the period (if any), after the offender was arrested for the offence, during which the offender was not in custody.

In this case, the Singapore Prison Service has indicated that the accused has completed his previous sentence and that his custody status was converted to remand on 25 March 2025. In other words, in relation to the present offences that he has been convicted before me, his period of custody in remand starts from 25 March 2025. Therefore, it was appropriate for the accused’s current sentence to be backdated to 25 March 2025 under s 318(5)(b) CPC.

Conclusion

The accused's conduct in this case was predatory, calculated, and callous. He devised and executed an elaborate scheme of deception and exploitation targeting vulnerable women, using explicit material he had obtained through deception as weapons against them. He showed no remorse throughout the proceedings, forced his victims to relive their traumatic ordeals on the stand, and conducted himself at trial in a manner that was itself aggravating. The harm he has caused to V1 and V2 is severe and lasting. V1 was driven to financial ruin, forced into prostitution, and ultimately compelled to leave the country she called home. V2 was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and continues to suffer the consequences of the accused's actions years after the offences were committed.

The courts must not shy away from utilising the full sentencing range provided for in the offence-creating provisions where the facts warrant it. In my view, the sentences imposed in the present case reflect the exceptional gravity of the accused's offending, the very highest level of harm caused to the victims, and the complete absence of any mitigating factors.

I therefore sentence the accused to an aggregate sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with 15 strokes of the cane, backdated to the date of remand on 25 March 2025.