YFY v YFZ [2026] SGFC 103

Introduction

The present case involved a relatively long marriage of approximately 36 years. The Plaintiff-Wife (“Wife”) and the Defendant-Husband (“Husband”) married in March 1988, and an Interim Judgment for Divorce (“IJ”) was granted on 28 August 2024 on the basis that the divorce be granted by mutual agreement.

The parties have 3 children of the marriage, all of whom are already adults. During the hearing of the ancillary matters (“AM”) proceedings in April 2026, both parties’ counsel confirmed that the only issue in dispute was the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev. Ed.) (“WC”), as the Wife was not seeking any order for post-divorce maintenance.

Both the Husband and the Wife have since appealed against my decision. These are my grounds of decision.

Division of Assets: Matrimonial Asset Pool

As the only issue in contention is the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets, I start my addressing what is contained within their pool of matrimonial assets (“Matrimonial Pool”), followed by my assessment on the just and equitable division of the said Pool.

By many accounts, this was a financially successful marriage with the parties being able to amass a sizable Matrimonial Pool. However, both parties’ counsel spent a significant part of their written and oral submissions on the treatment of certain loans taken the Husband and how these should be accounted for when determining the total value of the Matrimonial Pool. The Husband himself also raised certain concerns over the valuation of certain assets contained with the Pool.

It is trite that s 112(10) of the WC provides the definition of what a matrimonial asset is. This has to be considered in conjunction with the Court of Appeal’s decision in USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”), where the Court of Appeal held that “…[w]hen a marriage is dissolved, in general all the parties’ assets will be treated as matrimonial assets unless a party is able to prove that any particular asset was either not acquired during the marriage or was acquired through gift or inheritance and is therefore not a matrimonial asset…”.

The starting point of the Court’s assessment of the Matrimonial Pool would be on the footing that all of the parties’ assets as at the applicable operative date – whether it is the Husband’s or the Wife’s assets – would be included into the Matrimonial Pool and will be divided by the Court.

In the present case, both counsel’s written submissions discussed the relevant case law on the use of the IJ date as the default operative date in determining the constituents of the Matrimonial Pool, and for the parties’ assets to be valued at or around the AM hearing date. Both counsel also acknowledged the legal exception applied to the valuation of the parties’ Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) and bank account balances. These assets ought to be valued at the IJ date as well.

The parties’ acceptance of the aforesaid principles may be gleaned directly from the Husband’s submissions (and his counsel’s use of the IJ date to determine the Matrimonial Pool, and the AM hearing date for the valuation of the parties’ assets (other than monies in their bank account and CPF). While the Wife’s submissions did not address this issue directly, her AM Fact and Position Sheet sets out both parties’ assets as at September 2024, viz. the IJ date.

In other words, all assets which both parties owned as at August 2024 (being the IJ Date) would be included into the Matrimonial Pool and will be divided. Pursuant to directions given at the conclusion of the AM hearing, both parties filed supplemental affidavits to provide the Court with the corresponding values of their relevant bank accounts.

The loans taken/given to the Husband

Notwithstanding the broad agreement on the appropriate operative and valuation dates, a significant issue arose as to how the Husband’s liabilities as at the IJ date including, specifically, the mortgage loan with IFS Consumer Services Private Limited (“IFS Loan”) for the parties’ previous landed property in the north-eastern region of Singapore (“41 PVT”) should be accounted for.

The Wife’s counsel, Ms Carrie Gill (“Ms Gill”), submitted that these liabilities should be treated as the Husband’s personal liability and be deducted from his own share of the matrimonial assets, post-division. Put another way, Ms Gill’s proposed approach would be for the Court to ignore the value of the loan when assessing the Matrimonial Pool and carry out the division of the Matrimonial Pool as it would ordinarily do so by applying the relevant legal principles. It is only in the final apportionment and/or implementation of the division that the Court would deduct the value of the IFS Loan from what would have been the Husband’s notional share of the Matrimonial Pool.

On the other hand, the Husband’s counsel, Ms Lee Mong Jen (“Ms Lee”), argued that the IFS Loan, being a mortgage loan “tagged” to 41 PVT, should be treated as a joint matrimonial liability and be deducted from the Matrimonial Pool before the Court undertakes the division exercise.

I should add that 41 PVT was sold (with both parties’ consent) in September 2024, after IJ had been granted and for the proceeds of sale to be held on by the parties’ first pending the Court’s final decision on how it is to be divided. As such, it cannot be disputed by either party that the IFS Loan existed as at IJ date, although it no longer exists by the time of the AM hearing.

In my view, the appropriate resolution of this dispute lies with understanding how liabilities are treated under the law on the division of matrimonial assets.

In WAS v WAT [2022] SGHCF 7 (“WAS v WAT”), Debbie Ong J (as she then was) explained (at [46]) that liabilities should be taken into account in the division exercise because s 112 of the WC involves a division of the parties’ net matrimonial assets. Debts proven to exist at the time of the divorce should therefore be deducted from the Matrimonial Pool which, in turn, would result in a reduction of the total value of the pool of assets. The effect of the observations made in WAS v WAT was again reiterated and explained by the Teh Hwee Hwee J in WXW v WXX [2024] SGHCF 24 (at [20]) and acknowledged by the General Division of the High Court (Family Division) (“HCFD”) in case such as XPA v XPB [2025] SGHCF 57 at [11], and XZC v XZD [2026] SGHCF 16 (at [137]). The Appellate Division of the High Court (“ADHC”) similarly alluded to this treatment of matrimonial liabilities in WOS v WOT [2024] 1 SLR 437 (at [39]).

The HCFD further explained, in WAS v WAT, that the difference between how liabilities incurred for the family’s benefit should be treated and liabilities incurred for one spouse’s personal benefit is that for the former (ie, for liabilities incurred for the family’s benefit), the Court may take the same into account when assessing the relevant spouse’s indirect contributions and make the necessary adjustments to give credit to him/her taking on such liabilities. On the other hand, no adjustments or credit will be given to liabilities of a personal nature: see WAS v WAT at [46(c)].

The upshot of the discussion above is this: where a debt has been proven to exist as at the IJ date, the debt must be deducted from the Matrimonial Pool, regardless of whether the debt was taken by one or both spouses, and regardless of whether it was used for their personal benefit or for the benefit of the family. This has been the consistent position taken by the HCFD and ADHC in recent cases, and it is not for this Court to take a different approach.

Accordingly, I was unable to agree with Ms Gill’s approach. The IFS Loan – which both parties accept existed as at the IJ date – would have to be deducted from the Matrimonial Pool before the Court decides on how the Pool ought to be divided. The application of the relevant legal principles thus resolves this issue.

In any case, even if the law had allowed for a differentiated treatment of liabilities depending on whether it was incurred by one spouse solely or by jointly for the family’s benefit (contrary to what the HCFD had held in recent cases discussed above), I would nonetheless have found that IFS Loan to be a joint matrimonial liability which must be taken into account before the division exercise.

In this regard, the Wife’s case was that 41 PVT had been purchased debt-free and that the IFS Loan had been taken up only subsequently by the Husband with 41 PVT being used as a collateral. The Wife further explained that the relevant correspondence surrounding the IFS Loan suggested that the Husband agreed to take it on as a personal liability.

In my view, the text messages referred to by the Wife must be considered in the appropriate context. While the messages may give some insight into the differing views the parties on how their family finances ought to be managed, and that the Wife had wanted the Husband to take financial responsibility in a certain way, these conversations were made in the context of a still intact marriage. Financial concerns may have been one of the triggers for the Wife’s eventual decision to seek a divorce, but I was not prepared to find that the alleged understanding (ie, that the Husband would be personally responsible for the IFS Loan) should be treated as an agreement as to how the parties ought to divide their assets upon divorce. Those were separate things entirely. Ultimately, the Wife did agree to take up the IFS Loan and did agree with the financial institution to have 41 PVT used as a collateral.

To avoid doubt, while the Wife alleged that the Husband would “bully” her into doing his bidding, I found that she had not shown sufficient evidence to support a claim that her free will had been overborne to the extent that her agreement to the IFS Loan was not voluntarily given, or that she had been “left with no choice” as alleged by her counsel.

I turn next to the Wife’s claim that she had loaned approximately $709,188 to the Husband over the years. In gist, the Wife submitted that she had extended this aggregate sum of money through “cash loans” to the Husband over an approximately 5-year period, ie, from January 2016 to November 2020.

Strictly speaking, the claim for this inter-spousal loan arose in the context of the Court’s assessment of the parties’ respective direct contributions to the acquisition of their matrimonial assets.

That said, the present discussion of the Husband’s loans provides a convenient juncture to address this related issue.

Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence presented, I was not persuaded that the Wife had sufficiently proven her claim that she had extended the total sum of $709,188 as alleged. In this regard, I agreed with Ms Lee that the Wife’s claim rested mainly on an ex post facto analysis of the documents disclosed through the discovery process, or from her unilateral “reconstruction” of various historical transactions. The Wife did not produce any written agreement or document evidencing the extent of the loans she had given to the Husband or the purpose of these transfers, save for a spreadsheet which the Wife had prepared in 2020 (hereinafter referred to as the “Computation Document”), which I will address below.

In my view, it would be important for the Wife to adduce clear documentation as to the purpose of her loans and/or transfers to the Husband. This is because a loan, by its nature, exists where a lender/creditor agrees to pay a sum of monies to the borrower with a promise by the borrower to repay the same upon demand or at a fixed future date (subject to whatever terms are attached to the loan): see for eg., City Hardware Pte Ltd v Kenrich Electronics Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 733 at [23] (per VK Rajah J).

The lender generally retains no proprietary rights or interests in the money lent, but a contractual right (ie, a chose in action) for its return. With the money in hand, the borrower is ordinarily free to use the same as he chooses subject to the obligation that he must pay the money back. There may be limited situations under general civil law where monies advanced for a specific purpose may create equitable rights (for eg., a Quistclose-trust type scenario). However, that was not how the Wife had advanced her case in these proceedings, and no evidence was provided to support any such finding.

Despite not providing any clear legal or evidential basis, what the Wife sought to do in the present AM proceedings was to argue that the money she had lent to the Husband should be traced into specific assets which he had acquired (or paid for) using the money borrowed, and/or that she should be treated as having made contributions to those assets.

I was not persuaded that the Wife should be entitled to take the benefit of the sort of tracing exercise which she had undertaken in these divorce proceedings as such an approach does not comport with what a loan is. A creditor would not ordinarily be able to claim that he or she has an entitlement, or any rights or interests, in an asset purchased by a borrower using borrowed monies. This should not be any different simply because the loan was extended between spouses during a marriage. Singapore family law adopts the concept of a “deferred community of property” (see Lock Yeng Fun v Chua Hock Chye [2007] 3 SLR(R) 520 at [40]) and during the pendency of the marriage, general civil law remains relevant: see for eg. CLC v CLB [2023] 1 SLR 1260 at [39] and [49].

To be clear, the observation above does not mean that no regard whatsoever would be given to the fact that the Wife had lent money to the Husband. While I am of the view that such loans, in the present case, ought not be “traced” into the various assets and treated as the Wife’s direct contributions thereto, s 112 of the WC is sufficiently wide to allow the Court to take into account such loans when assessing the parties’ overall indirect contributions. That, in my view, ought to be the preferred approach in the present case. This approach would also be consistent with the approach taken for the IFS Loan.

The parties, during the marriage, accepted the manner in which the Husband conducted his/the family’s financial affairs – viz. through the taking of loans, making repayments using family funds (from both spouses) or through taking new credit lines, and paying off the new loans again. When these transactions were carried out, neither party had considered how the monies borrowed or used would be accounted for if the parties divorced and the assets divided. In my view, the broad-brush approach allows the Court to consider these efforts and contributions as part of the parties’ indirect contributions to the marriage.

I now turn to the Computation Document which Ms Gill had highlighted to the Court during the AM hearing.

Having considered the email correspondence exchanged between the parties at the relevant time (ie, in late-October 2020), I am satisfied that the Computation Document was indeed a document which the Wife had sent to the Husband setting out her calculations as to how the sale proceeds from the parties’ previous landed property (also located in northeastern Singapore) (“36 BA”) ought to be apportioned between them. In this document, the Wife referred to the parties using part of the sale proceeds to first pay off the loans she had previously extended to the Husband to the tune of some $672,106.

Ms Gill’s submission was that while the figures used in the Computation Document itself may not have been accurate, the reference to the repayment of loans supported the Wife’s case that she had indeed extended loans of a significant amount to the Husband. The Husband’s case, on the other hand, was that the numbers the Wife had used in the Computation Document were erroneous and that he had initially agreed to her calculations due to his poor health at the material time.

To the extent that the Computation Document suggested the existence of various loans given by the Wife to the Husband, I agree that the document did in fact support her case. I also agree with the Wife that the aggregate quantum of the loans she extended was significant, and that the Husband acknowledged the existence of such loans (even if it was not in the amount asserted by the Wife).

Even if the Husband’s health had been as poor as he had alleged, I found it difficult to accept that he would have simply agreed to the Wife’s calculations that she had lent him money in excess of $600,000 without question or protest. In all likelihood, while the amount used by the Wife may not have been entirely accurate, the Husband accepted that it was a significant amount accumulated over a long period. That was why he had proceeded on that basis when the parties were discussing how the 36 BA sale proceeds ought to be apportioned.

Other Assets

Having addressed the loans taken by the Husband, and how they ought to be treated in assessing the Matrimonial Pool, I now move on to the arguments raised over the parties’ other assets.

(1) Wife’s GREAT Lifetime Payout 2 Special Policy

The Wife explained the nature of this policy and had proposed that a value of $100,000 be attributed to this insurance policy. The Husband initially took a differing view as to how this asset ought to be valued.

Although the Wife’s skeletal submissions explained how the Husband’s calculations would result in double-counting, I note that the Husband’s own submissions eventually ascribed a value of $100,000 to this asset.

There being no longer any dispute over this asset, I used the $100,000 value proposed by the Wife.

(2) Insurance Policies in the children’s name

In his written submissions, the Husband argued that these policies were purchased for the children and he had, in 2023, transferred one of these policies to their oldest child, [S]. Accordingly, the Husband asked that the other policies for their daughter, [M], and son, [L], be similarly excluded so that he could eventually transfer these policies to the two younger children.

Ms Gill disagreed with this approach and submitted that there was no basis to exclude these policies. I agreed with the Wife’s submission that there was no legally sustainable basis to exclude these policies.

As I had noted above, the Court of Appeal’s decision in USB stands for the proposition that upon divorce (that is, as at IJ date), all of the parties’ assets would form part of the Matrimonial Pool. The Husband provided no legal or evidential basis to exclude those policies which were not yet been given away to [M] or [L]. These policies thus formed part of the said Matrimonial Pool.

(3) The Wife’s motor-vehicle: BMW iX1

Both parties next disagreed over how the Wife’s motor vehicle ought to be treated in the division exercise. Some effort was spent by both counsel, in the their respective submissions, over how the Wife’s current car – a BMW iX1 – ought to valued. Arguments were put forth over whether the Wife ought to have purchased such a vehicle and the correct valuation methodology to be applied for this vehicle.

I am of the view that the parties’ dispute could be resolved by reference to the legal principle which has now come to be referred to as the “TNL Dicta” (see the Court of Appeal’s decision in UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN”) at [62]).

This principle – which was first explained by the Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [24] – seeks to “add-back” into the Matrimonial Pool the value of certain assets which had been expended by one spouse without the other party’s consent. The expenditure itself need not have been a culpable act. The rationale is simply that the other spouse has a putative interest in the money expended when divorce is imminent or where the legal proceedings are ongoing, and the expending spouse ought not incur the expenditure without the other party’s consent.

In the present case, the Wife explained that her previous motor vehicle (a BMW 316i) was involved in an accident in end-May 2024 and she had therefore purchased a new vehicle in June 2024 (after the present divorce proceedings had commenced). The Husband’s position was that he did not agree with the Wife’s purchase of the BMW iX1.

While the BMW iX1 was, strictly speaking, a matrimonial asset as it was in existence at the IJ date, I accepted the Husband’s position that he did not consent to the purchase of BMW iX1.

In my view, the value which should be ascribed to this asset ought to be ascertained with reference to what had been expended by the Wife in acquiring this asset (which, on the Wife’s own case, was valued at $29,483.68). This, in turn, depended on what the Wife had paid purchase the BMW iX1. In this case, that would be the value of the BMW 316i – which, by the Wife’s own account, would continue to have been in existence but for the car accident in end-May 2024 – plus any additional payments made from the parties’ matrimonial monies.

Considering the evidence adduced, I found it reasonable to use the trade-in value of the BMW 316i (which the Wife had taken the benefit of when she purchased her current car) as the base amount. This would be the sum of $53,000, ie, the value given to the Wife by the car dealer, Sime Darby Auto Selection, which purchased the older car on 2 June 2024.

I added to this trade-in amount an additional amount of $62,054 which the Wife had used, between June and August 2024 (prior to the IJ date), towards the purchase of the BMW iX1. With this amount included, the BMW iX1 should be valued at $115,054.

(4) The Husband’s motor-vehicle: Mercedes Benz E200K

The parties’ disagreement over the value of the Husband’s car was considerably narrower as compared to the dispute over the Wife’s car.

Put simply, the Husband used the value of $18,000 for his car given its age and the fact that the Certificate of Entitlement for the car will expire in 2027. The Wife, on the other hand, preferred the value of $24,833 which the Husband had declared in his Affidavit of Assets and Means filed in 2024.

I agreed with the Husband that a more updated value – closer to the AM hearing date – ought to be used as that is what the law requires. I therefore accepted his figure of $18,000 (which was based on the list prices of cars of a similar make and vintage) set out in his supplemental affidavit filed in May 2026.

(5) The Husband’s shares in [EBA] Pte Ltd (“EBAPL”)

The parties’ disagreement over the Husband’s shares in EBAPL related to the value which should be ascribed to the same. This was, by comparison, a relatively small amount.

The Wife used EBAPL’s 2023 financial statements and valued the Husband’s 5% stake in the company at $96.25. The Husband’s case was that EBAPL has been struck-off from the companies register and had exhibited a letter from the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority sent in November 2025 in regards the same.

I agreed with the Husband that a “NIL” value should be ascribed to his shares in EBAPL. Apart from the fact that the Wife’s figures (which were themselves de minimis) were outdated, the fact remained that the Husband’s 5% shareholding of a private limited company would have had limited value, including but not limited to the fact that it was only a minority share and that would significantly affect its value.

Summary

In light of the findings set out above, the parties’ Matrimonial Pool would be as follows:

For completeness, I make the following additional observations with regard to the figures which were used for the Husband’s personal loans owing to two (2) financial institutions.

(a) UOB Cashplus Account ending 447-4. At the AM hearing, the Husband’s counsel – through additional documents annexed to her written submissions – sought to explain the actual overdraft amount which had been drawn on the Husband’s credit account to reflect what the Husband’s liability was as at the IJ date. Understandably, the Wife objected to this late (and procedurally improper manner of) submission of a document by the Husband.

(b) As I had noted above, to ensure that relevant and updated figures were put before the Court, I directed both parties to file supplemental affidavits to enclose the relevant documents, including those which Ms Lee had sought to admit through her written submissions.

(c) In the Husband’s supplemental affidavit filed after the AM hearing, he included additional statements for the Husband’s UOB Cashplus account for the months of August and September 2024, which went beyond what Ms Lee had annexed to her submissions. This was met by a further objection by Ms Gill through her firm’s letter of 18 May 2026.

(d) Notwithstanding Ms Gill’s objections, I agreed with the Husband that his bank statements covering the period in or around 28 August 2024 (being the IJ date) were relevant as they provided a more accurate picture of his finances and liabilities at or around the IJ date. This was especially given that the figures which both parties had used in their respective written submissions as representing the Husband’s liability for the UOB Cashplus account were markedly different.

(e) Having considered the evidence provided, I used the figure of $8,616.04 as being the Husband’s liability under the UOB Cashplus account. This was the overdraft amount as at 24 August 2024.

(f) While IJ was only granted about 4 days later, I noted that there had been further drawdowns on the account which occurred on 26 August 2024 (2 days prior to IJ), but which was promptly repaid on 4 September 2024 (less than a week after IJ had been granted). In my view, given that the Husband’s figures for his other bank balances were based on various dates, many of which were around the end of August 2024, I was of the view that there was a risk of double-counting of some of these transactions (which may have captured the repayment of the UOB Cashplus drawdown from his other bank accounts) and would not provide an accurate picture of the Husband’s asset/cash position.

(g) Overall, I found the use of the outstanding balance as at 24 August 2024 to be a reasonable one.

(h) Citibank Credit Card (PremierMiles World Mastercard). As regards the Husband’s credit card debts, an issue arose as to the accuracy of the amount asserted in Ms Lee’s written submissions as the underlying document provided in support thereof was not the relevant credit card statement for August 2024, but was instead a bank statement for 2022 (2 years earlier).

(i) This discrepancy, however, was not addressed in the Husband’s supplemental affidavit which similarly exhibited the Husband’s September 2022 credit card statement. The Husband’s counsel sought to rectify this matter through Ms Lee’s letter to the Court dated 20 May 2026 which explained the mistake and exhibited what was asserted to be the correct statement.

(j) While I appreciate the Husband’s acknowledgement of his error, I was unable to accept into evidence documents admitted via a letter to the Court especially when objections had previously been raised by Ms Gill (on the Wife’s behalf), and when I had already accorded a further opportunity to address this matter through the filing of a post-hearing supplemental affidavit.

(k) In my view, it would have been prejudicial to the Wife to require her to repeatedly address the different positions taken by the Husband on this matter. Once again, context is important – the Husband’s outstanding debts/liabilities on his personal credit cards as at the IJ date would clearly have been a matter well within his knowledge and should have been disclosed as early as his first Affidavit of Assets and Means, especially if he intends to claim a deduction to his net asset position on account of his debts/loans.

(l) Yet, the Husband did not do so. He did not even declare the said Citibank PremierMiles credit card as being a liability in his initial affidavit. Instead, he claimed that he owed the sum of $389.64 for a different card, ie, his Citi Rewards Visa Signature credit card.

(m) Notwithstanding his failure to do so initially, he was given ample opportunity to put forward the relevant documents to substantiate his case, but this was not done even as late as the AM hearing.

(n) That being the case, I was not prepared to accept the Husband’s attempt to admit new documents via letter post-hearing, and where the Wife had not been given the opportunity to address the same.

(o) Accordingly, I did not take into account the credit card statements provided by the Husband in his counsel’s letter. In light of my decision above to deduct the Husband’s legitimate debts/liabilities from the Matrimonial Pool, I only included the $389.64 figure for his Citi Rewards Visa Signature credit card number ending -6779 (and not the Citibank PremierMiles card), per his declaration in his Affidavit of Assets and Means.

(p) The final amount for the Husband’s personal liabilities would be $238,596.09, taking into account what Ms Lee had put forward in her written submissions, and in light of my findings for the UOB Cashplus and Citi Rewards Visa Signature credit card in the foregoing paragraphs.

Division of Assets: Assessing Contributions / Ratio of Division

Having addressed the total value of the Matrimonial Pool, I now move on to determine the appropriate ratio of division. This was another area of serious dispute between the parties.

That said, it was common ground between both parties’ counsel that the structured approach recognised in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”) should be used in the present case, given that this was a dual-income marriage. Given their agreement on the matter, I will accordingly apply the said structured approach (hereinafter referred to as the “ANJ Approach”).

It is trite that the ANJ Approach involves the following steps: (i) the court ascribes a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets; (ii) the court next ascribes a second ratio to represent each party’s indirect contribution to the well-being of the family relative to that of the other; (iii) using each party’s respective direct and indirect percentage contributions, the court then derives each party’s average percentage contribution to the family that would form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets; and finally, further adjustments can be made to the parties’ average percentage contributions to take into account, among other things, the other facts enumerated in s 112(2) of the WC: see ANJ v ANK at [22]; see also WQP v WQQ [2024] 2 SLR 557 at [49].

ANJ Approach: Direct Contributions

With regard to the assessment of the parties’ respective direct financial contributions (“DFC”) to the Matrimonial Pool, the parties’ dispute centre of the following matters:

(a) Whether a part of each party’s assets should be attributable to the other spouse as his or her DFC given that the source of funds came from the other party; and

(b) How the sale proceeds from 41 PVT be apportioned between the parties on account of the Wife’s contributions to the funds used to acquire 41 PVT initially.

Insofar as the Wife sought to argue that part of the Husband’s assets should be attributed to her as her DFC on account of the loans she had provided to him, I have already explained above that appropriate approach in this case would be to account for the Wife’s efforts in supporting the Husband financially through an adjustment of her indirect contributions, rather than to undertake a notional tracing exercise to map what the monies she had lent onto how the Husband had used the borrowed funds, given the lack of clear evidence of the purpose of such monies.

As such, I saw no reason to undertake any additional exercise or analysis to investigate how the DFC for each party ought to be treated for specific assets. Instead, the general rule applies – where an asset is held in a spouse’s sole name, the value of that asset would be used as a proxy of that spouse’s overall DFC to the Matrimonial Pool: see UTJ v UTK [2019] SGHCF 6 at [56]; AZZ v BAA [2016] SGHC 44 at [151]; see also WTL v WTM [2024] SGHCF 40 at [34] and [35]; WFE v WFF [2023] 1 SLR 1524 at [37]. This is also consistent with the overall tenor of the parties’ written submissions.

The Husband submitted that since he paid for the Wife’s SGX shares and GE policy, these should be attributed to him as his DFC to the Matrimonial Pool. As the Wife did not challenge this claim substantially, I therefore accepted his case that those assets should be treated as his DFC towards the Matrimonial Pool.

For completeness, I have not dealt with a point raised by the Husband’s counsel apropos an inheritance received by the Wife amounting to $175,000 in 2018. It did not appear from the Wife’s own submissions that she sought to exclude the funds in her OCBC bank account, and thus this issue was not a live one for the Court to address. In any case, I would have agreed with the Husband that given how the family managed its finances, any such monies would have already been commingled with marital funds and/or had been utilised for the family’s benefit over the years.

The more difficult issue related to how the parties’ DFC towards 41 PVT ought to be assessed. In this regard, both parties acknowledged that this question required the Court to consider how the parties had financially contributed to their previous property, ie, 36 BA. Indeed, the Wife goes further and sought to trace how the parties had contributed to all of the matrimonial homes they had purchased in the past 36 years.

In my view, this is where the Court of Appeal’s observations in ANJ v ANK (at [23]) that “…even in respect of direct financial contributions of the parties, not infrequently, the situation is less than clear. In a case where the documentary evidence falls short of establishing exactly who made what contribution and/or the exact amount of monetary contribution made by each party, the court must make a “rough and ready approximation” of the figures” is especially apposite.

Based on the evidence, neither party provided satisfactory evidence as to the exact amount which each had paid towards their earlier properties – ie, both the HUDC property at Tampines Street 11 or their subsequent terrace house (which I will refer to as, “6 SR”). I saw no reason to “trace” the parties’ contributions beyond the sale of 6 SR.

In this regard, Ms Gill submitted that the parties’ mortgage payments made through their CPF accounts (for which there were records of) can be used as a reference point to ascertain how the profits from the sale of 6 SR should be notionally apportioned between the parties. I found this approach position to be a reasonable one which accorded with the “rough and ready” approximation noted by the Court of Appeal in ANJ v ANK. I therefore accepted her case that the apportionment should be in ratio of 36% (Wife) : 64% (Husband).

On this issue, the Husband argued that he was the person responsible for making most of the cash payments for the mortgage in relation to 6 SR, and so his direct contribution to the property was higher. However, he did not show any clear proof that such payments were actually made. His main assertion was that the mortgage payments would have been deducted directly from his salary back in the day as he had taken a staff housing loan from the bank her worked at. However, no evidence was adduced to prove the exact amount paid. Given that 6 SR was sold in 1996 (some 30 years ago) and the lack of clear evidence, I found that the use of the broad-brush approach for this property was well justified in law.

I therefore applied the 36 (Wife) : 64 (Husband) ratio (which represented the parties’ respective share of the 6 SR sale proceeds) to the initial outlay paid for the purchase of their next property, ie, 36 BA.

As the Wife had noted in her submissions, it was the Husband’s own case that 6 SR was sold at a handsome profit. Accordingly, I accepted the Wife’s submission that the cash payment for the Option to Purchase relating to 36 BA (amounting to $20,000) and the initial cash downpayment of $150,000 was funded from the profits from the sale of 6 SR.

As for the remaining mortgage payments for 36 BA, I will add the amounts reflected in the parties’ CPF documents (as being used for mortgage repayments) to the cash repayments made by the Husband. As regards the latter, the Wife stated in her submissions that she is prepared to accept the “quantum stated by the Husband”, ie, $812,368.40.

How then should this $812,368.40 be apportioned between the parties?

The Wife once again relied on the fact that she had loaned the Husband a substantial amount of money over the years and argued that this Court should “consider the actual source of funds” which the Husband had used to pay the mortgage. For the reasons I have set out at [32] above, I did not agree with that approach and thus the entire amount should be treated as the Husband’s DFC.

I also found the Wife’s approach to be problematic in that the evidence suggested that the Wife herself never saw those “loans” she gave to the Husband as vesting in her proprietary, equitable or legal rights over the sale proceeds of 36 BA. Let me explain.

(a) To illustrate this, I return to the Computation Document which Ms Gill had referred to during the AM hearing – this spreadsheet set out a detailed breakdown regarding the utilisation of the sale proceeds from the sale of 36 BA, including the required CPF refunds to each party, payment of agent commissions, etc.

(b) Thereafter, the Wife provided her own calculations which saw her attributing a line item entitled “Balance payment to property due to [the Husband]” in the sum of $1,246,706. From this sum, she made further deductions attributing these as debt repayments to her, including a sum of $672,016 which the Wife claimed were her personal loans to the Husband.

(c) It was clear from this Computation Document that the Wife herself saw the monies she had extended to the Husband as loans repayable to her, and not that had a stake or could was entitled to a greater share to the sale proceeds because the “actual source” of the Husband’s mortgage payments came from her. Had that been the case, there would be no need for to notionally attribute the sum of $1,246,706 to the Husband at all.

Further, I agreed with the submission from the Husband’s counsel, Ms Lee, that the 2016 – 2020 period in which the Wife claimed to have extended the various loans to the Husband did not match the actual amount he had paid towards the mortgage both in quantum and in timeframe. In other words, the Husband could not have used the Wife’s $672,016 to pay for the mortgage over 36 BA because he did not pay that much during that period in the first place.

Finally, as regards renovations, I found neither party to have satisfactorily proven the exact amount of money which they had paid to renovate 36 BA. It bears emphasising that 36 BA was acquired more than 30 years ago. The complete lack of actual evidence thus rendered it highly speculative to accept the Husband’s claim that he had spent $100,000 back in 1996 to renovate the home. As he has not discharged the burden to prove his case, I find it appropriate to disregard this claim.

Accordingly, the overall apportionment of the sale proceeds arising from the sale of 36 BA would be as follows:

The apportionment ratio of 34 (Wife): 66 (Husband) would then be applied to the net sale proceeds for 41 PVT of $2,596,060.10 (being $3,099,703.05 less the IFS Loan).

Taking into account the findings set out above, the parties’ overall DFC ratio in relation to the Matrimonial Pool is as follows:

ANJ Approach: Indirect Contributions

I now come to the appropriate ratio to be ascribed for the parties’ indirect contributions (“IDC”). The parties’ position on this issue was diametrically opposed.

Ms Gill, on behalf of the Wife, submitted that the appropriate IDC ratio should be 65:35, in her favour if the loans given by the Wife were treated as her direct contributions. Alternatively, if the loans were treated as the Wife’s IDC, then the appropriate IDC ratio should be 80:20 in the Wife’s favour.

Ms Lee, on the other hand, submitted that the IDC ratio should instead be 65:35, in the Husband’s favour.

The law on how IDC ought to be assessed by the Court is trite, and both counsel referred to a plethora of cases on the applicable principles in their respective submissions.

Nevertheless, it remains important to recall what the Court of Appeal had emphasised in ANJ v ANK, ie. that “… contributions in the form of parenting, homemaking and husbandry, by their very nature, are incapable of being reduced into monetary terms. No mathematical formula or analytical tool is capable of capturing or accommodating the diverse and myriad set of factual scenarios that may present themselves to court as to how the parties may have chosen to divide among themselves duties and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. It is in making this determination that what is known as the broad brush approach would have to come into play…”: see ANJ v ANK at [24].

The HCFD and the ADHC have, in various cases, explained that the assessment of the appropriate IDC ratio is not “a rigid and mechanistic calculation exercise” (see WTL v WTM [2024] SGHCF 40 at [49]) and that the broad indicators – eg. the length of the marriage, number of children, etc – matters: see WRX v WRY [2024] 1 SLR 851 at [50]. Consequently, the Court would not be bogged down by the minutiae of the day-to-day aspects of the party’s marriage: see WVS v WVT [2024] SGHC(A) 35 at [31]; see also USB v USA at [43] – [44].

In the present case, I found it fair and reasonable to ascribe an IDC ratio of 70:30, in favour of the Wife.

While I accepted the Husband’s argument that he had provided financially for the family in the sense that he had been responsible for much of the family’s financial affairs, I was of the view that the Wife’s indirect financial contributions, especially in the later years of the parties’ marriage (after his step down from more active work in 2016) was significant. For the reasons stated earlier, I agreed with the Wife’s submission that she did advance a large amount of loans to the Husband (for which he had acknowledged, even if not for the full amount). This had a material impact on the Court’s assessment of the Wife’s indirect financial contributions.

As regards indirect non-financial contributions, I similarly found that the Wife’s efforts were greater than that of the Husband’s having regard to the parties’ more than 3 decade-long marriage which bore 3 adult children.

I agreed with the Wife’s submission that even in households where both parties were working full-time, absent clear evidence otherwise, the wife would usually be the party who renders greater indirect contributions. This observation was made by the Court of Appeal in ANJ v ANK at [24]. This is, of course, neither an immutable rule nor a gender-biased one; rather, it reflects a recognition of the efforts made by a wife which comes along with bringing up young children and managing the non-financial aspects of a household, including homemaking and parenting.

On the facts of this case and the evidence presented, I accepted the Wife’s submission that she was the children’s primary caregiver when they were younger (even if she did so with the Husband and other external assistance), and recognised the efforts she expended when the children were babies and infants, including breastfeeding them and caring for their needs. The fact that the children are now adults and may have different interactions with the parties did not discount what the Wife had done for the family in the earlier years of the marriage.

While the Husband may have extended financial support to their adult children in more recent years, I considered this fact as being qualitatively different and was undertaken by the Husband qua parent to their adult children, rather than qua husband. The purpose of s 112 of the WC is to split the parties’ marital wealth and the financial fruits of the marriage and thus primacy must be placed on efforts made by the Husband in that capacity.

Moreover, I was of the view that the Husband’s departure from full-time corporate work and his transition to his personal business ventures, and subsequent his eventual retirement, all occurred in the period between 2012 and 2020. By then, the children were well into their teenage years, with the eldest child [S] already an adult of 22 years (in 2012). The extra time and flexibility which the Husband claimed to have in order to care for the children (and whether they even required constant supervision/monitoring by either parent) must be seen in that light. That said, I accept the Husband’s submission that the care he had rendered to the Wife’s adoptive father was also relevant and should be considered as well.

Overall, I find an IDC ratio of 70 (Wife) : 30 (Husband) to be fair and reasonable, and which accounts for both spouses’ indirect contributions and efforts in the 36 years prior to IJ. The ratio takes into account the increase in indirect financial contributions arising from the financial assistance (including the loans) extended by the Wife to the Husband.

ANJ Approach: Average Ratio and Adjustments

Accordingly, the average ratio under the structured approach would be as follows:

As neither party argued for a different weightage to be applied between the DFC and IDC ratios, nor did ask they for any adjustment on account of any adverse inferences to be drawn, I made no further adjustments to the Final Ratio, which would be applied to the Matrimonial Pool.

Division of Assets: Implementation

I set out below how the Matrimonial Pool should be divided and apportioned between the parties:

Based on the Table above, the Husband ought to receive a sum $336,903.06 from the Wife. I therefore ordered the Wife to pay the said sum to the Husband within 1 month of the Certificate of Final Judgment.

Save as set out above, each party is to retain the assets in his or her own possession.

Conclusion

In the premises, I made the following final orders on 24 June 2026:

(a) The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $336,903.06 within 1 month from the date of Final Judgment of divorce as part of the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112 of the Women's Charter 1961.

(b) Save as set out above, each party shall retain all other assets in their name (whether owned solely, or jointly with third parties).

(c) By consent, there shall be no maintenance for the Plaintiff.

(d) Liberty to apply.