Hansard, 1962-07-10

EXEMPTED BUSINESS - (Motion) Resolved, "That the proceedings on the items of business set down on the Order Paper for today be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 until 12 midnight."-[Dr Toh Chin Chye].

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL Order for Second Reading read. 2.32 p.m.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL Mr Speaker, Sir, I have His Excellency's permission to signify his recommendation for this Bill. Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second Time." The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1960, provided in section 83 that: `The President shall, once in each year, furnish to the Minister for presentation to the Legislative Assembly a report on the working of the provisions of this Ordinance relating to the Court, to arbitration and to the registration of collective agreements and of any other provisions of the Ordinance in relation to which he considers it appropriate to report, and in particular the extent to which the objects of the Ordinance have been achieved and any considerations or circumstances which have prevented or hindered the achievement of these objects.' Sir, the President of the Industrial Arbitration Court has submitted his report for the period 15th September, 1960, to 31st December, 1961, and this has been published in Paper S. 4 of 1962. In the course of his report, the President said (paragraph 33 of his Report): `A year of operation has shown that the Ordinance is in the main an effective Legislative measure. However, during the course of the Court's work it was discovered that some sections of the Ordinance could be amended to achieve greater clarity and to avoid certain anomalies arising out of its application.' Paragraph 34: `You are aware that as early as the 25th January, 1961, I suggested certain amendments to the Ordinance and that, at intervals, I consulted with your predecessor, with the State Advocate-General and, later, with the Minister for Law with a view to clarify and strengthen certain sections of the Ordinance and for the removal of anomalies.' Paragraph 35: `I was mainly concerned on the one hand, with the heavy burden of work, and on the other hand, with my desire to speed up proceedings. I also expressed certain views on the two panels of members, on representation before the Court, on the notification of trade disputes, the registration and certification of agreements, representation in negotiations and, at a later stage, on the review of cases. Paragraph 36: `Correspondence and discussions on these matters continued between the Court and the appropriate authority throughout the year, and I am satisfied that our discussions were most fruitful.' Paragraph 37: `The Minister for Law, with your concurrence, early in 1962, is to suggest to the Legislative Assembly certain amendments to the Ordinance.' Paragraph 38: `I am aware of the nature of the amendments. They cover nearly all points on which I sought clarification during the year.' Sir, this Bill has been drafted on the representations of the President and has been agreed to with him. The main purpose of the Bill is to enable the setting up of a second Industrial Arbitration Court to deal with the increasing work of the Court. This has been considered necessary, not only because of the disputes, which have been referred to the Court for arbitration, but also because of the large number of collective agreements presented for certification. Clause 2 of the Bill amends the definition of "Court" and the definition of "President" to provide for the setting up of more than one Court and the appointment of a Deputy President. Clause 3 of the Bill provides for the appointment of a Deputy President. Clause 4 of the Bill provides for the remuneration and allowances payable to him and gives him the same protection and immunities in the performance of his functions and duties as the President. Clause 5 of the Bill provides that for the purpose of constituting the employee panel for the Court, the Minister may invite nominations from trade unions of employees instead of from the Singapore Trade Union Congress, which has ceased to exist. The members of the Court will be required to take the oath of allegiance and the judicial oath. This is provided in clause 6. Clause 7 of the Bill will enable the Minister to intervene and direct a compulsory conference in all cases of trade disputes. The power of certification of collective agreements is proposed to be given to the Court. But for this purpose the Court is to consist of the President. Clauses 8 to 14 of the Bill provide for this. The purpose of this is to emphasise that the act of certification is the act of the Court and to equate the status of a collective agreement to that of an award. It will also enable proceedings to be taken to punish persons who are guilty of offences against the Court or contempt against the Court as provided in sections 65 and 66 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Court is given power to refuse to certify a collective agreement if it is of opinion that the memorandum of agreement does not set out satisfactorily or adequately the terms of the collective agreement between the parties. The Bill further provides that it will be an offence for the person or a trade union to fail or neglect to bring a collective agreement or any of the terms of such agreement to the notice of the Court in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance, or to deliver to the Registrar a memorandum which does not contain all the terms of the collective agreement. It is also made an offence for a person or a trade union to enter into a collective agreement, which is specified to continue in force for less than eighteen months, or more than three years, and which cannot be registered under the provisions of the Ordinance. The purpose of these amendments is to provide that all collective agreements shall comply with the provisions of the Ordinance and shall be registered under the Ordinance. Clause 11 of the Bill makes it an offence for a person or trade union to enter into negotiations in relation to industrial matters otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. The purpose of this is to ensure that all negotiations relating to industrial matters are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. The definition of "industrial matters" has been amended so as to exclude individual agreements or contracts of service between employer and employee relating to the employment or terms of employment of such employee. This is provided for in clause 2. The prohibition against representations and negotiations is extended to all trade disputes. This is provided for in clause 10. Clause 12 of the Bill provides that referees may be appointed only from persons included in the list of names maintained by the Minister. It also provides for an appeal from the decision of the referee to the Court. Clause 13 provides that no award or decision or order of the Court or the President or a referee shall be challenged or be subject to review by any court. The present position under which the decision of referees may be challenged in court, with the result that costs might be awarded against the referees, has created difficulties as referees who have been nominated have refused to serve. The Bill has been referred to the Bar Committee, but I regret to say that there are certain matters on which there appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the functions of the court, with the result that certain provisions of the Bill have not been approved by the Bar Committee. The purpose of the Industrial Arbitration Court is not to decide disputed questions of law, but to register collective agreements which are made between the parties or to make agreements for employers and employees when they cannot reach agreement on their own account. It cannot therefore be treated like an ordinary court of justice and it is in recognition of this fact that the Ordinance provides that the Court shall not be bound to act in a formal manner or be bound by the Evidence Ordinance, but shall act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms. It is for this reason, too, that legal representation is restricted. It will be disastrous if the work of the Court could be delayed by arguments on legal technicalities or questions of law. The Ordinance itself provides for a summary decision on questions of law by reference to the State Advocate-General. This might not be perfect. It has at least the merit of having a quick decision without long drawn out legal arguments and costs. All this shows that the processes, the purpose and the orders of the Industrial Arbitration Court cannot be regarded as those of courts of justice. The Court is, as I have said, concerned with the registration of collective agreements made between the parties and the making of agreements for employers and employees when they cannot reach agreement on their own account. Once this is accepted, I feel it will be wrong to allow appeals from such agreements and awards. It has already been accepted that the parties should not be represented by advocates and solicitors in negotiations under the Ordinance. This has, on the whole, worked very well in practice and the parties have been able to deal with the substantial merits of their claims without regard to technicalities and legal forms. As it is the view of the Government that all negotiations should be conducted under the provisions of the Ordinance, it is logical that prohibition against legal representation should be extended to all negotiations relating to industrial matters. The amendment to section 21 of the Ordinance by clause 7 of the Bill will enable a relaxation to be made in the general prohibition against participation in negotiations in industrial matters by advocates and solicitors. Where the Minister feels that the presence or assistance of an advocate and solicitor may be useful, he may direct such advocate and solicitor to attend for compulsory conferences under section 21 of the Ordinance. This was agreed in a meeting which I held with the last committee of the Singapore Bar Committee. As regards the transfer of power of certification of collective agreements from the President to the Court, the purpose of it is to equate the certifying of agreements with the making of awards and to enable proceedings to be taken where offences are committed in relation to the Court and in the case of contempts of the Court under sections 65 and 66 of the Ordinance. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed. 2.44 p.m.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill which the Minister has moved amending the Industrial Relations Ordinance contains certain provisions that will bring about significant changes in industrial relations in Singapore. Sir, first of all, it will be remembered that the Industrial Relations Ordinance was drawn up after thorough discussions with the representatives of workers and trade unions. It is also well known that certain provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance were themselves of a controversial nature and the overall Bill presented to this House was, in fact, a compromise Bill which contained as much of the unions' views as the Government considered possible, and the unions agreed to certain provisions as a general compromise, provisions which the Government had advocated. Sir, it will be remembered perhaps that I was one of the Members of this House who supported the Industrial Relations Ordinance. But that support was a conditional support. I recall that I did clearly say that if it were the Lim Yew Hock Government then proposing the Industrial Relations Ordinance, then there would be pickets outside the Legislative Assembly House. I said that the unions were prepared to accept the Industrial Relations Ordinance as it was introduced here because the workers and unions had confidence then in the Government and they believed that the Ordinance would be put to use in a manner that would bring great advantage to the unions and workers in the process of collective bargaining. Sir, unfortunately, experience has only brought about disappointment to many unions. I notice in the amendment that the intention of the Government seems to be to provide another Court. I must say whether it is to be one Court or two Courts is not as important as to what purpose these Arbitration Courts are to be put to use. Sir, if the Arbitration Courts are to be looked upon by workers and employers as political institutions of the Government, and if workers are to regard them merely as instruments of the P.A.P. and even if employers are to look upon them as instruments of the Government for taking decisions which are politically advantageous to the Government, then I say that one, two or three Courts are not going to help industrial relations in any way. Sir, this does not mean that the Barisan Sosialis are against the amendment to provide for more than one Court. We do realise that the present Arbitration Court is not able to cope with the cases. I am told that some cases which were referred as early as late last year are still to be heard by the Court. Therefore, in principle, we have no objection to having two or three Courts as the case may be. But what we are against is the use of the Arbitration Court for political purposes. Sir, I do not have to go into examples to quote what some unions and employers have said about the Arbitration Court. I am quite certain that the Minister for Health and Law is aware and I am quite certain that Members, generally in the Government Benches, are aware of this. Sir, when the Arbitration Court was appointed, it was stated that the purpose of the Court was to assist in industrial relations. The Government statement and the statement of the President of the Court made at the opening of the Court, and even the Government manifesto made it quite clear that the Arbitration Court was not going to mean compulsory arbitration, that the Arbitration Court was not going to mean interference in industrial relations. Sir, there have been cases, but before I come to them, clause 11 in page 4 of the amending Bill to insert a new section to the Ordinance provides for compulsory conciliation together with clause 7 in page 3. There have been cases in the past where the Government conciliation machinery had thought fit to interfere in legitimate trade disputes. We have nothing whatsoever against the Government for assisting the settlement between employers and employees. But we cannot have the Government interfering in collective bargaining when it is not called upon to interfere. We cannot accept the position where the Government interfere with collective bargaining to make political capital. I need only quote, Sir, the notorious case of the Government intervention in the Shaw dispute.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL You said you won.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL It is important that if the Government want to honour what they said in the election manifesto and what the Court President and what the Government themselves stated at the opening of the Court, that the actual purpose of the Court is to try and assist both unions and employers in bringing about a settlement, then they must try and avoid unnecessary interference in trade disputes. That again, I believe, is well known to Members. Today when collective agreements are drawn up and sent to the Court for certification, even in the wording of the agreements, quite a lot of fuss is made by some people in responsible positions in the Arbitration Court. Sir, I do not know whether the Minister for Health and Law will agree with me that it is necessary when drawing up collective agreements to have phraseology that is acceptable to the workers and the employers. It does not necessarily mean that the legal form of wording is necessarily understood and accepted by workers and by employers. Sir, it has been found in practice that a good agreement is an agreement that is simple and straightforward with no legal jargon. But unfortunately, in practice, we have found the Arbitration Court wanting to change "shall" to "will" and "but" to "and", and "a" to "b", and so on. I am sure, Sir, if the Minister wishes to be serious, he will agree with me that this is not the important criterion for wanting to certify an agreement. There have been cases where I have myself been told personally that because I have refused to change one word "will", the agreement must not be certified. Sir, in the principal Ordinance, the President of the Arbitration Court can only refuse to certify an agreement if he considers it to be against public interest. I notice there is an amendment moved here - and basically that is maintained - viz, clause 8, at page 3 of the Bill: `The Court may in its discretion refuse to certify a memorandum delivered under subsection (1) of this section if it is of opinion that it is not in the public interest...'. And principally the position is that only if the Arbitration Court considers that a collective agreement is not in the interests of the public, then it can refuse to certify a collective agreement. But, Sir, there have been cases where collective agreements have not been certified for various other reasons. Sir, what I have to say in respect of the various clauses I would rather reserve until we come to the Committee stage. But what I do want to say. Sir, in conclusion is that this amendment Bill is being rushed through in quite some haste. We in the Barisan Sosialis feel that the unions must be consulted on this amendment before it is adopted. Thus, Mr Speaker, Sir, it is a fair and reasonable suggestion that we are making. The principal Ordinance was drawn up only after consultation with the unions and their representatives. And I say that the amendments, particularly the amendments which would in my view bring about very significant changes - for example, changes to provide for compulsory conciliation which is just one step below compulsory arbitration - we have reason to believe, Mr Speaker, that the Government are, in fact, thinking of compulsory arbitration. We feel that amendments of this nature and of this significance are matters that will affect radically all trade unions, all employers and every aspect of industrial relations in Singapore. Therefore, we think it is only fair that the Government arrange to have proper consultation with trade unions and their representatives before they seek to pass this Bill. 2.58 p.m.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL Mr Speaker, Sir, there are one or two points on which I wish to address the House. If I may say so, Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to deal with what I consider to be the legal aspects of this Bill, and my colleague, the Member for Cairnhill, will deal with what may be called the trade union aspect of this Bill. Sir, I agree with the Member for Thomson that the purpose of moving the original Bill was, as he says, to assist industrial relations in Singapore. You may recollect, Mr Speaker, Sir, that when that Bill was brought into the House originally, there was a difficult situation prevailing in the industrial world, a situation that was tending to upset the economy of the country. And therefore it became necessary to introduce the Bill in order to bring some stability in industrial relations. The justification for this Bill, Mr Speaker, Sir, from my point of view is this: the employer and the employee as a result of this legislation would be able beforehand to know where either stands in matters related to industrial disputes. So that unless there is a firm base on which both parties to a dispute could work on and unless that firm base continues throughout the dispute and also throughout the hearing of the dispute in the Court, we could have a situation where either party could have any confidence in this law. The first point I wish to bring up arising out of the point I have now made, Mr Speaker, Sir, is this: the first base - the first inescapable base - on which industrial relations can be regulated is the base of the law. Now, both parties to a dispute must clearly understand the law affecting an industrial dispute; and how that legal position will be effected in a dispute as a result of a decision by the Industrial Arbitration Court is a matter which concerns both parties to the dispute. Mr Speaker, I agree with the Minister for Law that the Industrial Court must have a great deal of latitude and that it must have a great deal of room in which to manoeuvre - if I may use that phrase, and I use it in no disrespectful sense - in order that industrial peace might be maintained. But, Mr Speaker, Sir, if in the latitude given to this Court it violates the law of the land, then that Court is bringing about a situation in Singapore when neither party to the dispute can have any confidence in the Court because neither party will know what the Court will do next, if it is not firmly anchored to the base of the law. To make my point clear, Mr Speaker, I will refer to two cases which the Court decided. I think one is the case of the newspaper known as the Kerala Bandu where there was a dispute between an employee and the employer, the newspaper. So far as I could read the judgment of the Court, it held that the dismissal of this employee was justified. Having held that the dismissal of the employee was justified, the Court then went on to order six months' compensation to the employee whose dismissal was justified. Now, the Court cannot have it both ways, Mr Speaker, Sir, If the dismissal was justified, no question of compensation arises. That would be the normal decision in a Court. Now, is the Industrial Court then to be allowed to set itself above the law of the country and while holding that the dismissal was justified, yet to say, "I feel you the employer should give him six months' compensation"? If it says six months, it could well say two years. What point does one then reach, Mr Speaker, Sir, if the Industrial Court is allowed arbitrarily to flout the law of the land? Might I mention just one other case? I think it was in a dispute between a transport company and its employees where the Industrial Court ordered that the transport company should take back the employees whose case the Court had tried. The first principle of law in a contract of employment is that there can be no specific performance of a contract of employment. That is the base of the law on which we all securely rest. If the Industrial Court is allowed to upset that base, I ask you, Mr Speaker, Sir, what confidence can there be in the employing public? In our economy the employing public is just as important as that section of the public which is being employed. Unless both of them know what their rights and liabilities are under the law of the country, and how the Industrial Court will honour the law of the country, it will be impossible, in my submission, Mr Speaker, Sir, to establish a state of affairs where both parties could have any confidence in this Court. That brings me to the present Bill by virtue of which the Government is now seeking to give this Court even greater powers and greater latitude by trying to make it absolutely impossible, in so far as human ingenuity can, to take any dispute from this Court to the High Court. It appears that there are certain loopholes under the existing Ordinance through which the decisions of the Industrial Court were taken to our normal Courts and as a result of which certain decisions of the Industrial Court have been queried. Some of the amendments here are intended to plug these loopholes. I do seriously ask the Government to consider this: whether it is their intention, by giving the Industrial Court this immunity by not allowing any appeal to any other tribunal, to enable the Industrial Court to go on such a rampage as to over-ride the law of the land and to formulate their own laws in making decisions. Mr Speaker, Sir, the second point is the question of referees. Under the existing Ordinance, it is possible now for the President of the Industrial Court to be named a referee either under a collective agreement under section 23 of the Ordinance or under an award made by the Court - where either the parties privately amongst themselves could nominate the President of the Court to be a referee or the Court itself could nominate the President to be a referee. Now the situation was reached where the referee's decision was challenged and the referee himself sat as a court on his own decision - a situation highly undesirable, however much one may contend that it is quite legal under the provisions of the existing Ordinance. I see that the Government is taking steps to alter the existing law by making it not possible for the President or the Deputy President to sit as a referee. I welcome that, because it is contrary to the accepted principle of law that a person who makes a decision should be allowed to sit in judgment on an appeal from his decision. But I do draw the attention of the Minister to this. Under section 23 - these are matters on which I will elaborate when we come to the clauses in Committee - it would appear from the general phrasing of the Industrial Relaxations (Amendment) Bill now before us that the right of appeal from referees appointed under section 23 of the Ordinance is not the same as under the section which provides for an appeal from a referee under a Court award. A point the Minister was making was that a collective agreement will now go to the Court for approval, meaning the President and two other persons appointed from the panels instead of as now to the President alone, and thereby implying that the position is being made much better than it is today. But what he gives with the left hand he takes back with the right by moving another amendment to section 55 of the Ordinance which says that the powers of the Court under sections 23, 52, 53 and 54 of this Ordinance shall be exercisable by the Court constituted by the President alone. So although he says under section 23 the agreements will be approved by the Court, but under section 55 he brings in an amendment whereby the President acting under section 55 means the Court itself. I do suggest to the Minister that wherever a referee has given a decision, that referee's decision should go to an Industrial Court composed of three persons and not to the President alone. And I make this further point. That any appeal from the decision of an Industrial Court on a point of law should be treated like that of an appeal from the normal courts of the country.