Mr Speaker, Sir, it is not our view that we have failed to discharge our sacred duty in protecting the internal security of Singapore. What we dispute in the amendment is that by not restraining known Communist and Communist-front leaders, from manipulating and controlling organisations like the Barisan Sosialis, we have endangered the well-being of the people of Singapore. So the purport of the amendment, therefore, is that the Government, in order to discharge its, duty, has got to restrain - a euphemism, restrain - known Communist and Communist-front leaders from manipulating and controlling organisations. Sir, it has been our view all along that this simple and blunt method of dealing with the Communists does not provide a complete answer to our security position. It is our intention to abstain on the whole amendment and let the Opposition decide. And on the decision of the Opposition to this amendment, certain consequences and significant conclusions will be drawn by the relevant authorities. But let me explain the Government's policy and the Government's approach to this problem. Yesterday we had the advantage of hearing the Member for Cairnhill admit in this Chamber that we do know the Communists and their methods. That is the compliment he has paid us. And because we do know how they manipulate things and how to counter their manipulations, we therefore abstained on a motion moved yesterday by the Member for Thomson. Now, I will move one step further, that not only did we know, and we still know, how they operate, how they manipulate, and therefore know how to counter them and their manipulations, but in the long-term, what we are doing is a necessary phase in the history of Malaya and of Malaysia. Sir, this is an aspect of the problem which I think the people of Singapore and of Malaysia must see clearly. Our view is that the problem of Communism and the Communists is not purely the security problem of restraining the - Communists from activity. Basically, this is an important aspect of security. restraining them from doing damage to society. I will later on explain how we have prevented them, within the play of democratic methods, from doing harm. But, first, let me explain the whole problem. The appeal, the pull of Communism, is basically one which springs from poverty and frustration. Economic and social distress provide a breeding ground upon which the Communist creed can grow, can recruit and gain strength. Without those conditions, it has been proved over and over again that however militant, however cunning, however active, their movement cannot gather strength. Sir, immediately after the Second World War, the Communist attack was on Europe, a war-ravaged and destroyed Europe. The industrial edifice of Europe was nearly completely razed to the ground, literally. Stalin's massive effort was to capture Europe, for once he captured Europe, he had captured the whole of the industrial potential of the known industrialised world, and he would capture the world. But what defeated the Communist was not the effectiveness of the strength of the Italian police, or the French police, or the West German police - although they were important factors in isolating and containing known Communist operators. The basic factor that prevented a Communist capture of Europe was the economic booster that they got from the United States in Marshall Aid that rejuvenated European industries that have built now, 17 years after the war, a prosperous common market in Europe, one so prosperous that even Britain is reluctantly compelled to consider joining. True the Italian Communist Party still has a following, particularly in the industrial north. It is also true that the French Communist Party is powerful. But what is true is that they have been halted, checkmated, not primarily by being contained, restrained and detained, but by the economic prosperity that dispels frustration, despair and banishes poverty and brings in prosperity. I have explained this thesis before. I will only broadly touch on the problem. Sir, a population that is advancing economically, that has something - to look forward to tomorrow, something better than today, and for their children even something better next year, the year after that, the next decade - that is not a population which is likely to throw away the past and grope madly for change and revolution. It is only, as in the case of China, when utter and absolute despair has enveloped a whole people; when the intelligentsia and the educated have lost faith in this system and the people have reached a breaking point, that they cast off the old because nothing could be worse than the old. That was the point. Communism expanded and overwhelmed China. When one day you found that your hundred thousand yen would buy half a katty of rice and two days later you find that it would probably buy you three tahils of rice - in that situation men's minds lose their bearings and they go for a change. In North Vietnam a situation approaching that took place, slightly different in that the colonial power by its stupidity in staying on brought about a united front not only of the Communists - even today the North Vietnamese Communist Party is not known as the Communist Party; the Vietcong Workers' Party brought about a united front which gathered together the Communists, the non-Communists, the liberals, the intellectuals and everybody against the society. The net result, of course, was that in such a united front, they being the best organised of the groups, when victory came, they were the dominant power. Over the years all the peripheral organisations allied to the united front will slowly wither away and the quintessence of the Communist elite will slowly take over. If I were a Vietnamese in that situation, I would have joined them in the united front, as I would have gone on with the united front, my colleagues and I, with the Communists and with everybody else to fight the British to end colonial rule. But, fortunately for us, we did not have to face our problems so hopelessly as the Vietnamese have. By the time they had finished with the colonial power, the whole of the Vietminh Army, the whole of the officer cadre were Communists. There was no question of any other alternative and going on with the united front. In the South, well, a different situation obtains and the light goes on, not a fight which I would have liked to be involved in. But we are in a happier position, that even before independence, the British made it quite clear that they were going to withdraw from the political arena. That is important. True, they have got economic interests in this country, large vested interests in rubber or tin and the distributive trade. But politically they made it quite clear, as far back as 1955 in the Federation, that they were prepared to withdraw. So the objective of the united front became possible of consummation before the Communist forces became strong enough to overwhelm all the other parties. Sir, let me take our problems of Singapore. The British offered no such escape. Their original plan in 1955 and 1956 was to hold Singapore indefinitely as a military base. I remember vividly the first conference in 1956. I did not think the Member for Anson knew who was playing what game. He had a delegation of 13, but I am quite sure the Barisan Sosialis would not be as unlucky as the former Chief Minister's band of 13. He wanted independence to allow Singapore to send representatives to the United Nations. That is one of the most important things, Sir. But without independence you cannot go to the United Nations. Sir, a worthwhile national aspiration. We have a delegation there in the United Nations to play on the world stage. After all, Singapore is a small place, has a small audience, but there, there is the world Press. So he devised a scheme whereby we would get independence and he would hand back almost in perpetuity by treaty, defence and external affairs. It was a mad scheme which I did not think had half a chance of getting off the ground. However, he was encouraged by the Member for Bukit Timah to fight for no less. We finally persuaded him. They said, "All right. Let foreign affairs and defence be in British hands." The clash came on security. The British wanted the predominant voice, the chairmanship and the casting vote. We proposed an alternative with the concurrence of the then Member for Bukit Timah, which is important, Mr Speaker, Sir, for then I could not be outflanked by leftist adventurers in Singapore. He agreed that a fair compromise was that the Federation should have the casting vote, because we all believed in merger; we all believed that that was the way towards independence. Believe it or not, Mr Speaker, the Colonial Secretary refused. May 1956. The intention was that they were to stay here indefinitely. No freedom was in sight. And if no freedom was in sight, the united front struggle must go on. Sir, I put this argument to the then Colonial Secretary. He was an extremely able man who not only could run one conference at any one time whilst he was doing the Singapore conference, looking after the ups and downs of the Member for Anson, who was then the Chief Minister; but he was also looking after Malta and several other places besides, places which were all on the boil. I put to him this simple argument, if you lose Malaya to Communism, then you have lost Singapore. There is no hope of holding Singapore. There is as much chance of holding Singapore from a Communist Malaya as Hong Kong from a Communist China. If tomorrow the Chinese Communist Government decide to take Hong Kong, nothing can stop it. He did not see the logic of it or he did not want to admit the logic of it. I argued with him that as long as Malaya is non-Communist, his base survives. And what better way of deciding the security of Singapore than to have the casting vote in the hands of a Government that has a direct and vital interest in Singapore, because its own survival is intimately tied to Singapore? But the Colonial Secretary refused - 1956. The events that followed are familiar to you, Mr Speaker, Sir. Tumultuous scenes in this House. Moments of great excitement. Then the anti-climax. And in 1957 we reached agreement. In that one year some progress was made in thinking in London, that if Malaya became Communist, then the base in Singapore anyway would be useless. Therefore, it was agreed that the casting vote would be with the Federation of Malaya. That was crucial. If one side disagreed, then a new phase opened. In other words, an admission was made that the two territories were intimately linked. If one was lost, the other was lost. Mr Speaker, Sir, from that moment the gradual drift away from the united front tactics began. In June, we reached agreement in London that Malaya should have a casting vote. In August Malaya itself became independent. You will recall that I reported in this Assembly a conversation I had with the boys then in camp - the people intimately connected with the leadership of the P.A.P. to whom we owed a responsibility. They said that that brought about a metamorphosis of the whole situation. From then onwards the Malay soldiers, the Chinese Home Guard, the Indian policemen - they are no longer mercenaries of the colonial power, but they are sentinels guarding the independence of the newly-acquired Malayan independence. A basic and fundamental change of role. And the continuance of the M.C.P. struggle thereafter became an attack not on the colonial power but on a newly independent Government freely elected by the people. That began the new phase. From then onwards we set down our new stakes - what we were fighting for. Sir, the Member for Queenstown has talked about our mandate - that we had no mandate - to bring merger about. Let me read to him his pledge signed, sealed and delivered with Tann Wee Long, the legal adviser of the Barisan Sosialis, attesting. He said here, signed, sealed and delivered on the 11th day of May 1959: "I, Lee Siew Choh, of No. 358G Dunearn Road, Singapore, 11, hereby acknowledge that I have read and understood the 4th Anniversary Celebration Souvenir issue of the Petir, the organ of the P.A.P. published on the 22nd November, 1958, and the Five-Year Plan of the P.A.P. announced at a Special Party Congress of Saturday, 25th April, 1959, and I declare that I am in full agreement with the P.A.P.'s policy as set out therein. I hereby covenant with the P.A.P. that if I am elected to the Singapore Legislative Assembly and if I should ever later resign or be expelled from the P.A.P., I shall forthwith resign from the Singapore Legislative Assembly." Solemn words, Sir. This is what he read and said he understood.