Next, the reclamation of land from Bedok to Tanjong Rhu of about 1,000 acres, giving in turn another 600 acres of available land from sites where excavations are now being made for the filling. Then the Housing and Development Board plans for 60,000 units in the next five years. I do not think there is much doubt that these targets will he achieved. But I would like, if I may, in the next twenty minutes before I close the argument for the objectives which have been set out, the long-term objective which has been set out in the policy statements, to explain first the interim measures which we have had to take to stabilise and limit our liability; and, second, our long-term attitude on the future of Singapore and of the people that we consider one with Singapore the people in Malaysia. In the short-term, we have had to introduce certain new measures in order that we can take stock of what our liabilities are, our immediate liability to give jobs to our own people, our own citizens, provide schools for their children, hospitals and social and community services, housing and so on. To this end, identity cards and work permits will be implemented. The problem becomes particularly acute because it has been said, since the 9th of August this year, the flow of migrants, the flow of people across the Causeway, has ended up with considerable credits on our side. The rate has increased to twice the normal rate prevailing before the 9th of August. I have not got the complete figures for November and December., but the rough gross turn-over of people crossing the Causeway on both sides since the 9th of August shows an increase or a credit or plus on the Singapore side of about nearly 50,000. It is true that quite a number of these people may have come to Singapore in order to take ship or aircraft to go abroad. But I do not think it is feasible to explain this away on the basis that more than perhaps 5,000 could have travelled in this way. Assuming that 10,000 went abroad by ship and aircraft, we would still be left with a net credit of about 40,000 people. Sir, I would like to emphasise this point, that this is not designed to exclude Malaysians. It is designed to limit our liabilities so that we know what it is we have to cater for. For only by making our problems finite will we be able to know what it is that we must o in order to ensure the economic viability of Singapore. And only then will we be able to define the problems and the solutions to these problems which we hope will come by way of new markets being made available to us. I would like to emphasise that so far as we are concerned, we are one people in two countries. All that separation has done is to divide the one society into two not altogether dissimilar parts. But whereas before we would have sought one solution for the whole, now there are two experiments being carried out in these two halves. And the experiments on how to find a solution to the problems of multi-racialism, multi-lingualism and a multiplicity of religion, and the policies pursued in any one half are bound to have repercussions on the attitudes and assessments on the other side; and the side which produces a successful solution is the side whose views will ultimately prevail. This is one people now divided into two arenas. But in the last resort they are one people, and work permits and everything else notwithstanding, in extremis, in an emergency, it would be inhuman to believe, and unrealistic on our part to believe, that we could maintain a separate and a disinterested posture if a major catastrophe were to take place in South-East Asia. And this brings me to my last theme. The danger of a major catastrophe which we can precipitate if we are not conscious of the problems of finding a new balance in South-East Asia to take the place of a balance which was maintained by the European empires before the war. Mr Speaker, Sir, the multi-racial character of the population of Singapore and the States of Malaysia creates the probabilities of two different trends. As long as British rule kept everybody in place, multi-racialism or the problems of having a multiplicity of communities of different races, languages, religions, never gave rise to any problems of law and order, for in the ordered nature of former colonial society, the British Raj decided who should do what and who should fulfil what roles in their system. The disappearance of direct political control has brought about the necessity of finding an authority indigenous to the peoples who now reside in these territories, and with imperfection, a compromise was found in certain forms of elected representation weighted to hold the balance between people who were supposed to have been here longer, the indigenous people, and those who were supposed to be more recent migrants. As long as we were one, Singapore and Malaysia, the danger of the multi-racial communities going their separate ways was less than it is now. If we are not conscious of this and we each play only to our own immediate electorate, then having two halves of one whole - and not very equal halves of one whole - one in which the accent is inevitably that in Singapore, in numbers, the migrant community or people of migrant stock and, on the other hand, in Malaya peoples of indigenous stock, a polarisation of policies and attitudes would take place which in the end may well bring major calamity for all in South-East Asia, with repercussions throughout the whole of Asia. Mr Speaker, Sir, the problem is popularly presented to the Western world as the Problem of a Third China, which is the title of a fairly readable dissertation by a scholar in the Australian National University, and in historical terms he puts it in this way. This is a recent publication called Third China by P. C. Fitzgerald, Professor of Far Eastern History in the Institute of Advanced Studies in the Australian National University. He said - talking about the Second World War and its aftermath - on page 50: `In the latter part of the war the Japanese decided that for both military and political reasons, it would be desirable to grant a measure of self-government to the peoples of the occupied countries of South-East Asia. They did not see any reason to respect the arbitrary boundaries which the play of European political parties had imposed upon South-East Asia. They perhaps remembered that in the Middle Ages before the rise of the colonial powers or the intrusion of the Europeans, there had been a powerful State comprising both Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, Sri Vijaya. The proposed to revive this State under the name of Maha Malaya or Greater Malaya. General Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in South-East Asia, summoned various Malay and Indonesian, Sumatran leaders to his headquarters in Saigon for consultations. On other occasions he flew to Ipoh in Malaya and held similar meetings there. These were attended by, amongst others, Hatta, the Indonesian nationalist leader in Sumatra, and Dato Onn bin Jaffar. There is nothing in the record to show that the Japanese proposals were unwelcome to these leaders and the project began to take shape. The end of the war made it abortive. Maha Malaya was never proclaimed. This wartime incident revealed the fact that among the Malay leadership there had already arisen a new nationalism which looked for a political order should the British and the Dutch never return, which would secure Malay majority rule, This was agreeable to the Japanese who knew well that they would never obtain the allegiance or loyalty of the Chinese community. Singapore under this plan was to remain a Japanese naval base and colony excluded from Maha Malaya. It will thus be seen that the separation of Singapore from Malaya devised by the British project of the Malayan Union agreed with the abortive Japanese plan of Maha Malaya, a fact which certainly did not escape the notice of the Chinese. On the other hand, the Malayan Union offered the Malays a great deal less than Maha Malaya would have given them, for under that plan they would have been a large majority in the new State with Sumatra added to Malaya, and Sumatra is the ancestral home of a great part of the present Malay population of Malaya.' Mr Speaker, Sir, I just want to quote another extract from Prof. Fitzgerald's short treatise: `Singapore has always resented and deplored the policy, first conceived by the Japanese and later implemented by the British, by which the City on its relatively small island was separated from the rest of the Malay Peninsula and treated as a different community with lesser political rights. This separation was the one feature of the abortive Malayan Union which survived the demise of that ill-fated scheme. It was also the one feature of the Malayan Union which the Chinese thoroughly detested. The British could not deny their responsibility for this development, but the reason why they had originally separated Singapore was still present. Singapore added to the Federation would give the Chinese community a clear majority of the population, and thus ultimately of the voters.' That was pages 88 and 89. And on page 101: `Internal changes in the political representation of the States giving more equitable distribution of seats would do something to effect such a change of attitude, but it may well be that more than this would be required before the allegiance of the younger generation of Chinese is won, They will require some positive evidence that Malaysia is to be a progressive and increasingly democratic community; not continue as aristocratic society dominated by the Malay feudal families. If these changes do not materialise, the opposition of the Chinese will continue and probably be intensified, ultimately veering more and more towards the support of the Communist movement.' Mr Speaker, Sir, I quote these extracts to show the dangers into which we are inevitably going to slide if we begin to think in terms of race arid racial hegemony. Hence the recurring theme of multi-racialism, of tolerance, of understanding and sympathy, and forbearance of other people's habits, customs, susceptibilities. If, on the Singapore half, account is taken only of the Singapore sector of this one people, then the solution that will be derived out of that one sector will be very different from the solution which will be derived `if we take into account the whole. And the very different solution attempted here, based on the demographic features of Singapore, will in turn act as a spur to contrary measures being taken on the other side; and so it could go on until inevitable conflict. Conflict not only between two independent and sovereign nations, but between two independent and sovereign nations both with plural societies. We are no longer in a position to decide or in any way to influence directly the course of political events in Malaysia. That is the price of independence for Singapore. But we would be dishonest to ourselves if we did not express a profound interest in the policies and the consequences of such policies upon the relationship between the communities in Malaysia, which would, in turn, help to influence attitudes and relationships between communities in Singapore. The future is more fraught with danger than before separation -- the long-term future -- for if there is a failure to understand this nexus between us, then it is extremely easy for one to embarrass and to influence attitudes and policies in the other, which, as I have said, must end up in the polarisation of two opposing attitudes based on two opposing assumptions of superiority of race, language, and culture, which can only spell disaster for all. But whilst we have no control over events there, independence has given us a unique opportunity to order our way of life, and I would like to believe that the two years we spent in Malaysia are years which will not be easily forgotten, years in which the people of migrant stock here who are a majority learnt of the terrors and the follies and the bitterness which is generated when one group tries to assert its dominance over the other on the basis of one race, one language, one religion. It is because of this that my colleagues and I were determined, as from the moment of separation, that this lesson will never be forgotten. So it is that into the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore will be built safeguards, in so far as the human mind can devise means whereby the conglomeration of numbers, of likeness, as a result of affinities of race or language or culture, shall never work to the detriment of those who, by the accident of history, find themselves in minority groups in Singapore. There will be this Commission which will hear the views of all the minority communities. It may well be that their recommendations would be sufficiently wide to ensure not only that individuals shall not be penalised or discriminated against by reasons of race, language or culture, but also that their views should always be taken into consideration when formulating policies which affect their collective interest. It is more than just an idealistic desire to create a just new world that has motivated us. Mr Speaker, Sir, we have a vested interest in multi-racialism and a secular State, for the antithesis of multi-racialism and the antithesis of secularism hold perils of enormous magnitude not just for the people living in South-East Asia, but dangers of involvement by bigger powers who see in such a conflict fertile ground for exploitation of either ideological or other power interests. The future is not ours to see, Mr Speaker, Sir, but we can safely conclude that there are two possible trends in which events can unfold themselves. One, the emergence in one half helping the emergence in the other half of a tolerant society not based on the concepts of exclusiveness of race, language, religion, which means an ultimate re-association, a political re-association, of the parts which form the one larger federation of which we were a member until so recently; and the other a trend towards a bias and emphasis on exclusiveness of race, language, religion, which must have fissiparous effects, divisive effects, on the other. There is an element of urgency in this and we are reassured to see an air of more confidence in dealing with problems of language and culture now that we are out of Malaysia. This in turn helps us in our solution of the problems on this side. For us we can only hope that ultimately our policies will also be able to help our neighbours in reaching similar rational adjustments in their own domestic arrangements. In the meantime, the business of life and administration has to go on. I do not wish to go into the figures given by my colleague, the Minister for Finance, yesterday, but I would like to add this comment, that however important statistics are in giving weight to an argument or to demonstrate the validity of certain premises, they are never able in themselves to give a complete picture of what the performance is going to be, for they fail to bring forth one important quality --- the effectiveness of the digits of the units that the statistics comprise. Sir, we are nearly two million people --- 1.9 million --- in an island of 224 square miles with a few adjacent islands. The statistics do not tell the world the factor that really decides performance, the quality of each individual digit, the intensity of the effort that the digits are capable of, and the efficacy of the framework within which they can be marshalled and organised for high performance. For us, survival has always been hazardous. We sought to make it less so by seeking the larger framework of Malaysia, but it was not to be. We are on our own, not unfriendless, not helpless, but nevertheless in the centre of an extremely tumultuous arena of conflict. Our survival depends upon our capacity first to discern where the dangers are for us as a distinct and separate community in South-East Asia; and, second, our ability to convince the bigger powers interested in this region that it is in their interests to ensure our separate survival, and in the end, whatever happens, to ensure that we have got enough will and capacity to see that no policies, no solutions, are attempted which will destroy our right to be ourselves in this corner of South-East Asia. Whilst we are unable to say, having gone through so many changes in a matter of two years, what will happen in the next two years, I think we can safely predict that in two decades, either there is a tolerant multi-racial society comprising us in this region, or this will be an area of constant strife, very much like what the Balkan States were before and after the First World War. We are here in South-East Asia for better or for worse, and we are here to stay. Our policies are designed to ensure that we stay peacefully in South-East Asia in accord and amity with our neighbours, but with a right to decide how we order our own lives in our own home. Every action, every policy, must be decided by this yardstick. Any policy which endangers our long-term interests as a separate and distinct community in this region must be eschewed. Any act, any programme, any decision which will help to secure a more enduring future for ourselves and our progeny in this region must be pursued whatever the sacrifice. We have not sought this particular formula of survival, but it is now the basis on which we move forward; and with independence comes an independence of action in policy and planning which can help establish that enduring basis for ourselves in South-East Asia. It is with confidence - a confidence born out of the past performance of our people - that we feel we can overcome problems of economic development, problems of unemployment. But in the other wider fields of inter-racial harmony and tolerance, there are so many other factors that even though we are independent, we have not got an exclusive prerogative to decide what is to be that relationship even between our own citizens. For as I have said, Mr Speaker, Sir, there are other factors, factors outside our dispensation, which can affect our own position. But whatever the result will be, we would like those who come after us to believe, and to have grounds for believing, that we did not leave a stone unturned in seeking a just and enduring future for all the people who made up the society - those who were here when the British came, those who came when the British were in control, and those who are willy-nilly now rooted in this corner of South-East Asia and whose destinies are interwoven - whatever we would have wished it to be. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the motion* standing in my name. *The motion reads as follows: 'That the following Address in reply to the speech of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara be agreed to:- "We, the Legislative Assembly of Singapore, express our thanks to the Yang di-Pertuan Negara for the speech which he delivered on behalf of the Government at the opening of the present Session of this Assembly.".' Question proposed. 4.11 p.m.