CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE - (AMENDMENT NO. 2) BILL
Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." This Constitutional Amendment Bill contains three categories of amendments: (a) Civil Service and Personnel Matters; (b) Elected President Provisions; and (c) Miscellaneous Amendments. The first set of changes is to enhance the performance of the Civil Service and strengthen its foundations to serve the country into the next century. The second set of amendments is to fine-tune the Elected President provisions after three years of operating experience. The third set of amendments covers miscellaneous items, including changes in Parliamentary procedure and change of terminology from reservists to operationally ready national servicemen. A new provision will be proposed in Committee for questions on the interpretation of the Constitution to be referred to the Courts for an advisory opinion. One further group of amendments has not been included in this Bill. It concerns the mechanism by which the Elected President provisions are entrenched in the Constitution. There is a defect in the way this mechanism has been drafted which needs to be remedied in due course. I will explain the problem later. Category 1: Civil Service and Personnel Matters The background to these changes is that we inherited our personnel system from the British. The constitutional provisions are 43 years old. And in that period the world has changed. Then, the highly centralised personnel system worked as responsibilities of government were simpler, unemployment was prevalent, and government jobs were much sought after. Now, governing has become increasingly complex - we need first rate planners and implementers to work out long term strategies for the country. The private sector offers a wide range of exciting, challenging and rewarding jobs. The Civil Service is no longer the most sought after employer, and indeed faces great difficulty recruiting and retaining its share of talent. The new generation of Singaporeans has grown up in an age of fast growth and full employment. They have different expectations and priorities. They prefer immediate compensation to deferred rewards which tie them to the service. They are less concerned with job security or pensions. The basic flaws which make the existing personnel arrangements unworkable are over-centralisation of powers and the separation of authority from responsibility. We must remedy them urgently. The Prime Minister explained all this when he announced the changes to Civil Service personnel administration at the Administrative Service Dinner on 22nd April this year. He explained that the aim is to make the Civil Service and the public sector more responsive and flexible as an employer, while safeguarding high standards of integrity and impartiality of the Civil Service. We will liberalise the way the Civil Service hires and promotes officers. We will update personnel practices to be more in line with the private sector, in order to recruit and retain a fair share of top talent for the Service, as well as supporting staff at all levels whose commitment and dedication are essential to running the many functions of government. We must empower senior civil servants with the resources, give them the autonomy and authority to take decisions, and hold them accountable for the performance of their organisations. Currently, functions of promotion and recruitment (other than for legal officers) fall under the purview of the Public Service Commission, the Education Service Commission and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission. None of the members of these Commissions are public officers. The amendments provide for Personnel Boards, comprising public officers, to take over functions devolved from the Commissions, including recruitment and promotion. In devolving powers from the Commissions to the Personnel Boards, we will incorporate safeguards to preserve impartiality and high standards in the Civil Service. The Personnel Boards will be established by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Appointments to Personnel Boards for Division I officers will be subject to the President's discretionary veto power. Political appointment holders, MPs and trade unionists will be excluded from Personnel Boards. Powers in relation to officers in the Administrative Service and the Administrative Service (Foreign Service Branch) in and above the Significant Grade, which is currently Superscale B, will not be devolved to Personnel Boards but retained by the PSC. Individuals aggrieved by decisions of Personnel Boards can seek redress through a system of appeals to the relevant Commissions. These are major changes. I stress that these changes and reforms do not in any way reflect on the members of the Public Service Commission, or the officers in the Public Service Division, either collectively or individually. The Prime Minister explained this at the Administrative Service Dinner. But because it is important, I quote him again: "... these problems with Civil Service personnel management, and the reforms that we are making to the system, do not in any way reflect on the officers staffing PSD, or on the members of the PSC, either collectively or individually. They have given their best, within the constraints of the existing system. The PSD officers have served faithfully and conscientiously, operating within the rules which they have been given. The members of the PSC, the Education Service Commission, and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission are private individuals who have come forward to do public service for very little personal reward. They have volunteered to take on an onerous responsibility, and filled a key role in the personnel management system. Commission members attend an average of 100 sessions a year. Some have served for more than 20 years. The Government is grateful to them for their dedicated work, and appreciates their sterling service." The Government aims to implement these changes to Civil Service personnel management from 1st January 1995. We will fine-tune the arrangements as we gain experience from operating them. PSD will be briefing unions, staff and heads of departments and Permanent Secretaries. The proposals will succeed only if there is a change of mindset throughout the Civil Service, on the part both of civil servants and of those responsible for Civil Service personnel management. Decentralisation will give more authority to those in charge in exchange for greater accountability and increased performance. The changes will create a framework for attracting talent to take up public sector careers as challenging and rewarding as those in the private sector, and allow us to build upon what we have so far achieved to prepare the Civil Service to serve Singapore into the next century. The amendments in this category are contained in clauses 16 to 19 of the Bill. There will be consequential changes to the Public Service Commission Act. The Bill also contains other personnel-related amendments to change the retirement ages of the Auditor-General and the Attorney-General from 55 to 60. These are amendments to Article 148F(5) and Article 35(4) of the Constitution. Category 2: Elected President Provisions The second category of amendments pertains to the Elected President provisions. The Elected President provisions were passed in January 1991 and brought into effect in November 1991. Their aim was to provide a check on the powers of the elected Government mainly in two key areas - the spending of past reserves and the preservation of the integrity of the public service. It is impossible, with a complex and novel piece of legislation like this, to foresee all consequences and implications of the provisions upfront. The three years we have operated the new provisions has enabled us to understand better how the mechanism operates, where the loopholes and ambiguities are, what is practicable and what needs to be modified in the light of experience. We have discovered that the Elected President mechanism is even more complex than we originally anticipated. It is extremely difficult to balance the Government's need for operational flexibility with the President's duty to exercise effective oversight. As we operate the mechanism day to day, we are still discovering implications of the provisions which we had not realised. This will therefore not be the final set of amendments before we can safely entrench the Elected President provisions. A second and probably even a third round of amendments to fine-tune the provisions will be necessary. It will therefore be several more years before we entrench the provisions. This is consistent with the intention stated in the Select Committee Report and the Prime Minister's Third Reading speech to Parliament, when we debated the Elected President legislation, to delay entrenching the Elected President provisions for several years, in order to give the Government a free hand to fine-tune the provisions during a running-in period. The amendments to the Elected President provisions fall under two major groups - those to fine-tune the financial safeguards and those to the non-financial provisions. Let me take the financial safeguards first. Amendments to Fine-tune Financial Safeguards EDB and JTC Acts Under the EDB Act and the JTC Act, bonds and debentures issued by these statutory boards are automatically guaranteed by the Government. Article 144 of the Constitution was intended to prohibit guarantees given by the Government except with the concurrence of the President, but Article 144 accidentally excluded EDB and JTC. Article 144(3) will be amended to require the President's concurrence to future guarantees given by the Government under the EDB Act and the JTC Act. However, the MAS will continue to be excluded from this requirement to obtain the President's concurrence. The MAS routinely borrows and accepts deposits to manage the liquidity of our financial system and the Singapore Dollar. This confidence in MAS being able to repay obligations is derived from its assets and from the Government's unconditional guarantee. Including the MAS in this amendment would handicap MAS operations in a time-sensitive environment, and affect confidence in the banking system. The financial standing of MAS must be beyond question for it to operate effectively as a central bank. Transfer of Statutory Board and Government-linked Company (GLC) Reserves. New Articles 22B(9) and 22D(8) will allow the transfer of reserves from key statutory boards and Government-linked companies to the Government, provided the transferred reserves then form part of past Government reserves. Currently, the Government, key statutory boards and Government companies are regarded as separate entities for the purpose of determining whether they have drawn on reserves. Several companies and statutory boards have accumulated surpluses in excess of their needs. The amendment will allow them to return surplus funds, for example, proceeds from privatisation of a GLC, to the Government as past reserves rather than have the funds remain as reserves in the statutory board. The statutory board or GLC so transferring will be deemed not to have drawn on its past reserves. This will improve management of funds in these statutory boards and companies. Publication of Approval of Transaction Drawing on Reserves When we introduced the Elected President provisions, we envisaged that the President would exercise control over all past reserves and publish his opinion whenever there was a draw on past reserves. However, as drafted, Articles 22B(7), 22D(6) and 148G(2) do not require the President to publish his decision if he approves of any proposed transaction which he thinks is likely to draw on past reserves. The amendment will put this right. Defence and Security Measures We need to make one exception to the principle that the President must concur with any drawdown of reserves, and must publish his opinion if he concurs with any drawdown. This is for defence and security-related measures. Firstly, the President will not have power to veto such transactions. Spending for defence and security purposes is qualitatively different from giving handouts to the population or subsidising social services, which were the dangers the Elected President mechanism was designed to protect against. The Prime Minister and Cabinet are ultimately responsible for Singapore's defence and security, not the President. Under the Constitution, they, not the President, decide whether to declare an Emergency. We cannot take the risk of a disagreement between the Prime Minister and the President over whether some spending is necessary for defence and security. Secondly, such defence and security transactions will not be made public, even if they are likely to draw on the reserves. To do so would compromise security. In a period of political tension, untimely publicity may worsen the crisis and alarm the population. Even in peacetime, Mindef has never published details of its equipment procurements, though of course Mindef's total budget is approved by Parliament every year. Nor do most other countries. Note that the President will still be informed about such transactions. But he cannot veto them, nor publish his opinion that they will draw on reserves. As this is a significant deviation from the principle of having two keys, we have incorporated a safeguard. The transactions must be recommended by both the Chief of Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, and then certified by both the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to be necessary for the defence of Singapore. The Chief of Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary (Defence) are both non-political appointments. Permanent Secretaries are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister from a list of names submitted by the Public Service Commission. The Chief of Defence Force's appointment is subject to the concurrence of the President, given in his discretion. Unless these two non-political appointees recommend the transaction, the Government cannot proceed with it. The amendment is set out in a new Article 151A. There will be consequential amendments to section 9 of the Audit Act to preclude untimely publicity for such transactions. Amendment to Fifth Schedule Singapore Technologies Holdings (STH) will be deleted from the Fifth Schedule. Singapore Technologies Holdings is a smaller company, both in terms of assets or turnover, than many other subsidiaries of Temasek Holdings, like Singapore Airlines or Singapore Telecom. For purposes of Presidential oversight, it will be more consistent to treat STH just like any other Temasek subsidiary. Furthermore, STH is being transferred to become a subsidiary of Temasek Holdings. With the Government linked companies centralised under Temasek, the President can exercise indirect control over the GLCs by vetting appointments to Temasek's board of directors and Temasek's budget. After this amendment, the Fifth Schedule will contain only three companies, Temasek Holdings, MND Holdings which, for other reasons, we are unable to bring under Temasek but which is largely a dormant company, and GSIC which manages our foreign exchange reserves. There are three other minor financial changes. In the event the President vetoes the Supply Bill and Parliament is unable to override that veto, the amendment to Article 148A(2)(a) and (3) will allow the Government to spend up to the total amount authorised by the President in the preceding financial year, and not just the amount provided in the main Budget. This is to prevent sudden withdrawals of essential services which may have been provided for in supplementary budgets in the previous year. Under Article 147(4), the Minister for Finance must present to Parliament together with the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure a statement certifying whether the Estimates are likely to draw on reserves accumulated by the previous Government. The amendment to Article 148 extends this provision to Supplementary Estimates. Article 148C now does not expressly require the President, before he vetoes or concurs with advances from either Contingencies Fund, to consider whether the advance will affect past reserves. The amended Article 148C will expressly empower the President to refuse to agree to an advance from a Contingencies Fund on the basis that it is likely to draw on past reserves. Now, let me turn to amendments to the non-financial provisions of the Elected President legislation. Acting President Presently, under Article 22N, if the office of President is prematurely vacated, the Chairman of the Council of Presidential Advisers, or if he is not available, the Speaker, shall act as President until a newly elected President assumes office. Article 22N is amended to extend to a situation where the incumbent is not successfully returned and the President-elect is for some reason unable to take office once the term of office of the incumbent expires. Timing of Presidential Elections The timing for holding Presidential Elections will be expressly stated in the Constitution. This is currently set out only in the Presidential Elections Act. Disqualification Criteria for MPs and the President Under the revised Article 45, any person who is found guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice committed in the course of a Presidential Election (not just a general or by-election) will also be disqualified from being an MP or the President. The person will also be disqualified from voting and being on the register of electors for a specified period. There will be consequential changes to the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Presidential Elections Act. Function of the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) The function of the Presidential Elections Committee is to ensure that the candidates for the office of President are persons of integrity and have the requisite financial experience, as specified in Article 19. Article 18 will be amended to make clear that the PEC's function is only to ensure that candidates are qualified under Article 19(2)(e) and, where applicable, under Article 19(2)(g)(iv). Administration of the Presidential Elections Committee Amendments to Articles 37B(2), 37F(1) and new Articles 37L and 37M will clarify some provisions concerning the Council of Presidential Advisers, enable staff to be appointed to assist the Council in performing their functions and authorise payment of honoraria to the Council members. Category 3: Miscellaneous Changes The third category of amendments are miscellaneous changes. Parliamentary Procedures Amendments to critical provisions must be supported by the correct number of elected MPs. Article 5(2) is amended to make clear that a Bill to amend the Constitution must be supported by two-thirds of the total number of elected MPs. Under the revised Article 22L(3), only elected MPs may vote on a motion to remove the President. The amendment to Article 148D allows only elected MPs to override the President's veto of a Supply or Supplementary Supply Bill. In all these cases, the minimum number of votes necessary will not be affected by any premature vacation of seats by elected MPs. Oaths of Office A new oath of office for the Acting President has been prescribed. The language of the oaths for the Prime Minister, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries has been revised and brought up to date. Amendments are in clause 28. Final Supply Bill Under Article 148(2), a Final Supply Bill or law is a Supplementary Supply Bill or law passed after the close of the financial year. Several Articles in the Constitution refer to Supply and Supplementary Supply Bills or laws but make no mention of a Final Supply Bill or law. For completeness, these provisions should also refer to a Final Supply Bill or law. Clause 30(a) to (c) remedy this. Operationally Ready National Service Since 1st January, 1994, Mindef has replaced the term "Reservists" by "Operationally Ready National Servicemen", or "NSMen" for short. To give the change of nomenclature permanent legal effect, the terms "reservists" and "reserve service" will be replaced by "operationally ready national servicemen" and "operationally ready national service" respectively in all the affected statutes. The amendment is to Article 128(2) of the Constitution. Referral of Constitutional Questions to a Tribunal of the Supreme Court The Singapore Constitution does not have any provisions for referring questions of interpretation of the Constitution to the Courts for an advisory ruling. The Malaysian Constitution does. This is a lacuna in our Constitution. From time to time, the Government will need to refer such questions to the Courts, especially in relation to new and complex provisions of the Constitution, such as the Elected President provisions. One such question has arisen about the interpretation of Article 22H, as I shall presently explain. The new Article 100, proposed in the amendment to the Constitutional Amendment Bill which I shall introduce in the Committee Stage, will allow the President, acting on the advice of the Cabinet, to refer to a tribunal consisting of at least three Judges of the Supreme Court, any question which has arisen, or is likely to arise, concerning the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution. The minimum size of the tribunal will be three Judges, because there are three Judges on the Court of Appeal and we should follow the same structure. The tribunal will deliver its opinion within 60 days, and this opinion will be final. Now, let me explain the problem with the entrenchment mechanism, in particular, Article 22H. We have discovered a problem with the mechanism by which the Elected President provisions are entrenched in the Constitution. When the Elected President amendments were passed in January 1991, the legislative intent was that, firstly, Constitutional amendments which circumvent or curtail the Elected President's discretionary powers should be subject to a referendum, and, secondly, the Elected President's veto over Constitutional changes which affect his powers should not be brought into effect immediately, but only after we have had several years of experience operating and refining the system. This was to have been achieved by placing the master entrenching mechanism clause in one Article - Article 5(2A), and then delaying bringing Article 5(2A) into effect until we were ready. This was done. Unfortunately, we overlooked another Article - Article 22H, which was incorrectly drafted, and which has been brought into effect. Article 22H was intended to cover non-Constitutional legislation. If such legislation circumvents or curtails the President's discretionary powers, the President can refuse assent, and if the Courts uphold the President, the matter is final. Article 22H applied to non-Constitutional legislation does not cause any problem. Such legislation should never circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. These powers are spelt out in the Constitution. If a Constitutional provision is unsatisfactory, the remedy is to amend the Constitution, not to pass other legislation which contradicts it. But Article 22H, as it stands, has the unintended effect of covering Constitutional amendments other than the core provisions which have already been covered by Article 5(2A). This causes two problems. First, the non-core provisions of the Constitution are protected by an inappropriate criterion. Indeed, Article 22H protects the non-core provisions more stringently than Article 5(2A) protects the core provisions. Let me explain. Under Article 5(2A), if the Government wants to amend core provisions of the Constitution, it can either persuade the President to waive the requirement for a national referendum, or put the question to a referendum and win a two-thirds majority. The final test is a political one of policy, whether we should or should not circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. Under Article 22H, on the other hand, if the President refuses to assent to an amendment to a non-core Constitutional provision, the question is put to the Courts. The Courts must answer a narrow question whether the amendment does in fact circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. If the Courts agree with the President that it does, then the President's veto is upheld. The final test of the Constitutional amendment is a judicial one of law: whether it does or does not circumvent or curtail the President's powers. The Courts do not, and correctly cannot, decide the wider question whether it is desirable to modify the President's powers as proposed. Article 22H, therefore, is wrong because it provides no mechanism, such as a referendum, to decide this wider question. That is the first problem. The second problem is that Article 22H has prematurely conferred upon the President a power to veto non-core Constitutional amendments, eg, the removal of Singapore Technologies Holdings from the Fifth Schedule, or the amendments relating to the devolution of Public Service Commission powers. The Government has not brought Article 5(2A) into effect in order to preserve full flexibility to modify the Elected President provisions in the light of practical experience. This leads to an anomaly: amendments to non-core Constitutional provisions are subject to Presidential veto, if they circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers, whereas the core provisions setting out these powers have, correctly, not yet been entrenched. The solution is to separate Article 22H into two parts, which can be brought into effect separately: One is an amended Article 22H, confined to legislation other than Constitutional amendments, where the President's veto, once upheld by the Courts, is final. This will be brought into effect once the legislation is enacted and assented to, in order to prevent non-Constitutional legislation from circumventing or curtailing the Elected President's discretionary powers. A second part is a new Article 5A covering non-core Constitutional amendments, empowering the President to refuse assent if the amendments curtail or circumvent his powers. If the President refuses assent, the Government can refer the question to the Courts. If the Courts hold that it is a curtailment or circumvention, the Government can still proceed, through a national referendum. This new Article 5A will be brought into effect together with Article 5(2A) when we are ready to entrench the Elected President provisions. In addition, we will also have to amend Article 5(2A) which is a master entrenchment clause to cover the new Article 5A to make it a core provision. The Government intends to amend Article 22H along these lines to reflect the true legislative intent. We have not, however, included the new Article 5A and amendments to Articles 22H and 5(2A) in this Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill. This is because a question has arisen whether the President has under the existing Article 22H the right to veto these amendments to core Constitutional provisions. The Attorney General has studied this matter. His considered opinion is that the President has no power to veto amendments to core Constitutional provisions. The President, therefore, cannot veto amendments to Articles 22H and 5(2A), or the introduction of the new Article 5A. However, the President has stated that in the interest of testing out the system, he would like this question to be referred to the Courts for a ruling, and that he will accept whatever interpretation of Article 22H the Courts rule to be correct. The new Article 100 referring Constitutional questions to a tribunal of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to be inserted for this purpose. The Government will put this matter to the Supreme Court for a ruling after the present Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill has been enacted, and the new Article 100 which provides for Constitutional questions to be referred to a tribunal of Supreme Court judges has been brought into effect. After the tribunal has ruled and cleared the ambiguity, the Government will decide on the timing and approach to amending Article 22H. The question which has arisen over the amendment to Article 22H has highlighted the need for the President and the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA) to have access to legal advice, separate from the advice which the Attorney General gives to the Cabinet, in order to help the President carry out his duties. The President may especially wish to seek such a separate opinion on questions relating to his functions under the Constitution where he acts in his discretion. The President and the CPA should therefore be entitled to appoint formally a legal advisor, who can be a lawyer in private practice. The Government is presently studying how this can be done. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.