Sir, I wish to thank Members of the House for the various points that they have made. This is an important matter and the movers of the motion as well as the speakers who have taken the floor have raised points which, I believe, are in the minds of quite a number of Singaporeans. So it is good that we have this opportunity to debate them. I also wish to commend Mr Chiam See Tong for having taken a principled position even though he is a Member of an Opposition party, ie, a principled position of standing up for Singapore which I would like to see in other Members of the Opposition on such an issue. The points that have been raised by Members have only confirmed one point - that this whole episode about Flor Contemplacion is quite a complicated issue. It involves many dimensions. There are many phases to this whole problem. There was the investigative phase where you have criticisms of the police investigation, whether we arrested the right person, whether the autopsy reports by the pathologists were properly done, and so on. There was the judicial phase. Did she have a fair trial? Were the courts right in dismissing the defence of diminished responsibility? Was she given access to counsel at all times, and so on? Then there was the Executive or Cabinet phase, ie, the phase where petition for clemency and the appeal for stay of execution have to be considered. There was the diplomatic phase after the execution and the problems we have in bilateral relations. Did we handle it properly? For today, I intend to concentrate more on the Executive and the diplomatic phases because, although there were important points raised on the investigative and the judicial phases, my colleague, the Minister for Home Affairs, will deal with this when he takes the floor. Let us recall, very briefly, the basis for the clemency petition and later the appeal for the stay of execution. When we talk of the clemency petition, there was Flor Contemplacion's own clemency petition of January 1995. In that petition, she never stated that she did not do the crime. Then there was President Ramos' own letter to President Ong in January 1995, where he asked that clemency be considered "on humanitarian grounds". He said that "I address this request on behalf of the parents, spouse and children of Mrs Contemplacion". It is important that we recall what was the basis for the petition. It was on humanitarian grounds. Under the legal procedures in Singapore, after all the final appeals are exhausted, it is mandatory for the Attorney-General and the Trial Judge to give their opinions as to whether the law should take its course. These are considered by Cabinet and Cabinet advises the President. The Attorney-General's view was that there was nothing in this case that recommends a clemency and the law should be allowed to take its course. The Trial Judge, in his report, also stated that he saw no reason why the sentence should not be carried out. President Ong, on the advice of Cabinet, replied to President Ramos on 23rd February that clemency was not granted on the advice of Cabinet. Then we have the appeal for stay of execution. Here too, we need to remind ourselves what was the basis for the appeal. President Ramos' letter was dated 11th March and was delivered to the MFA duty office on 12th March. But I would like to point out, particularly in response to Dr Kanwaljit Soin, who said that in three or four days everything was done with, that the fact is that several days before that, officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Attorney-General's Chambers, the Police and the Foreign Affairs Ministry had already begun to examine and study the matter because the details of the so-called fresh evidence had been publicised in a Malacanang Palace statement on 9th March. That Palace statement had detailed this so-called fresh evidence claim and had also stated that President Ramos would be making an appeal. So we had already started studying the matter. What were the grounds for this appeal for stay of execution? President Ramos said that new evidence had come to light and I quote: `new evidence bearing directly on this case has just come to light from another Filipino citizen, Mrs Emilia Frenilla. Mrs Frenilla used to work in Singapore, personally knows Mrs Contemplacion. Since Mrs Frenilla is willing to come forward with a testimony, and as we are dealing here with a human life, I request Your Excellency for a stay of execution to allow this new evidence proper consideration. This appeal is addressed to Your Excellency with full respect for the laws of Singapore on humanitarian grounds and on behalf of the parents, spouse and children of Mrs Contemplacion.' Of course, as the House knows, the request was not granted and she was executed on 17th March 1995. I have listened to the views that have been expressed so far and also studied the terms of the motion. Basically, if I could sum up, I think the criticisms which have been made are two-fold. Firstly, the Government showed unseemly haste to execute her, giving the impression that proper consideration did not appear to be given to the request for stay of execution. Secondly, in any case, so the criticism goes, we should have anticipated all the consequences that unfolded. We should have anticipated the diplomatic fall-out and we should have given face to President Ramos. As Dr Kanwaljit Soin said, "what is the harm? What is the cost? She could have been given a few weeks' delay." Let me deal with the first issue: that the Government was unseemly hasty to execute her and proper consideration did not seem to be given to the fresh evidence. The impression the critics have is that we treated this in a rather cavalier, nonchalant and bureaucratic fashion. What are the facts? Firstly, the moment we knew of the claims of fresh evidence, and this was even before the formal letter was received, both the Minister for Home Affairs and I personally discussed the issue. We decided that we would ask the Attorney-General's Chambers officials, CID, and officials from both Ministries to study the new evidence. Assoc. Prof. Walter Woon and Dr Kanwaljit Soin have made the point whether the law should be changed, but that is a separate issue which the Minister for Home Affairs would deal with. But we have to deal with this issue according to the law and procedure which exist at the moment. That is exactly what we did. We decided that if the Attorney-General and the officials needed more time to study the matter, we would recommend to Cabinet a stay of execution. If they felt that there was any plausible basis for these claims of fresh evidence, a plausible basis which requires much further investigation, we would also recommend a stay. However, we felt that if it was very clear that there was no basis whatsoever and it was totally untenable, then we would not recommend a stay of execution. Both of us also personally spoke to the Attorney-General because this was an important matter. As it turned out, the Attorney-General and all the other officials who were studying this issue did not require that much more time, for reasons which will be spelt out in detail by the Minister for Home Affairs, and which were already spelt out in our press statement. The claims of new evidence were totally unfounded. We both decided that we would recommend to the Cabinet that there were no grounds for stay of execution. But precisely because this was a matter of life and death and because President Ramos had appealed, as Minister for Law, I took two additional steps. On 13th March 1995, first thing in the morning, I rang up the Attorney-General. I asked him to confirm whether he had addressed the issue personally. He said yes. I then told him that our recommendation was being finalised to Cabinet and asked him whether he had any qualms at all about not granting a stay of execution. I told him that if he had any qualms, he should let me know, and that I did not want him and the Chambers to feel pressured on account of the time factor. If he needed more time, he should let me know and I could still halt the process. He told me that he had no qualms. He was satisfied that the so-called new evidence was completely spurious and without any basis. He told me that he might have had some second thoughts if at any stage during the many years of trial, Flor Contemplacion had even once said she did not do it. But she did not. And in fact she maintained that she did it and even described in detail how the crime had been carried out. On the afternoon of the same day, Monday, 13th March, I also asked to see Mr Errol Foenander, Head of Crime Section at Attorney-General's Chambers. He is an experienced legal officer with some 29 years of service and he was the officer in the AG's Chambers who had gone into the details of the matter with the investigators and the other officials. You will recall that the House was then in session in the Committee of Supply. I was expecting the two Ministries under my charge to come up for debate. So I asked him to come and see me in one of the rooms in Parliament House. I went over with him in detail various aspects of Frenilla's affidavit, and he explained each point fully. I asked him if he had met with the Police investigator in charge of the case. He said yes. I asked him whether he had any doubts about the Police investigation. He had none. I told him I already had a word with the Attorney-General. But since Foenander had studied the matter carefully, I wanted to know if he had any reservations about the case. He had none. He explained to me why Frenilla's claims were totally unfounded. For example, and this is only one example, Frenilla had claimed in an affidavit that Flor's employer had fabricated the story that Flor had done the crime. But the fact was that the employer had no idea or knowledge of the existence of such a person called Flor Contemplacion. It was the Police investigations that led to Flor Contemplacion. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, why am I recounting all these? It is to show that far from arbitrarily brushing aside the new evidence, far from it being put on some bureaucratic auto-pilot, the matter had been given careful and urgent attention, not just by officials, not just by the Attorney-General, but also by the Ministers who had to advise the Cabinet who in turn advised the President. As I said, the Minister for Home Affairs will explain why this new evidence could not withstand scrutiny. Some of the Members here may accept what I have said about the process - that we took diligence in attending to it. But they may still hold the other criticism against us that, in any case, we should have granted a stay. What is the harm, what is the cost, as mentioned by some Members. Their view can be stated this way. We should have given face to an appeal from an ASEAN member. Nothing would have been lost. We should have known the elections were coming up on 8th May. We should have known that there would be a fall-out in bilateral relations. And if we had given a stay, all this strain in relations would not have taken place, which is the thrust of the first part of the motion, "when a stay could have prevented the present strain in Singapore-Philippine relations." But actually there are several questions here. Firstly, did we know? Did we anticipate what is going to happen? In other words, did we know, could we have known, the full extent of the consequences and therefore, nevertheless, proceeded with it? Secondly, how is it that we did not anticipate or know? Was it a major blunder on the part of my Ministry? So let us go over the information which was available to us at the point of time when the decision was given. I think that is important - at the point of time the decision had to be taken. The first point I would like to make is that the Philippine appeal for clemency or stay of execution did not suggest that it was due to a problem in the domestic front and did not suggest that it would affect bilateral relations. That is why I made it a point of recapitulating what was the basis for the stay and what was the basis for the clemency petition. We had no reason to conclude that they were appealing other than on compassionate grounds or other than on fresh evidence on the stay or petition. The next point I would like to make is the President of Singapore visited the Philippines. And that visit ended on 19th February, just three weeks and four days before the execution. I accompanied the President and I wish to tell the House there were no demonstrations, there were no protests, there were no placards at any place where we stayed or en route to our destination either in Manila, Baguio or Cebu. The issue did not come up in talks with either President Ramos or anyone else. President Ramos did hand a note to President Ong, although it did not feature in the talks. During that visit I had separate bilateral talks with Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo. He had one issue to raise. I had one issue to raise on my side. But both issues did not concern Flor Contemplacion. That gives you an indication of how important or significant an issue this was at that time - three weeks and four days. So we did not receive, Mr Deputy Speaker, any signal during this visit that there was going to be serious trouble for President Ramos domestically or for bilateral relations if the law took its course. Mr John De Payva asked whether we kept our lines of communication open. Yes. For example, on 3rd March, Foreign Secretary passed through Singapore just two weeks before the execution. He asked me to return his call. I called him on the telephone. He was on his way back to Manila. He said when he was back in Manila, the media was bound to interview him and he wanted to discuss with me the case and what he might say. I agreed, after discussion with him, that he could say that the decision on clemency had been taken at the highest level in Singapore and the law had to take its course. He did not give any intimation that the Philippine government was seriously perturbed about its impact on bilateral relations. Upon his arrival in Manila, he told the press and I quote: `Minister Jayakumar expressed to me his regrets. But the Cabinet reviewed the case and after giving it the highest consideration, there were no mitigating circumstances. So the judgment is now final and executory.' He added, and I quote: `The Philippines must comply with the regulations and the laws.' This is from the Philippine Journal, 4th March 1995. Now I like to make a point which was made by Dr Ong Chit Chung and Mr John De Payva. By all accounts, the Philippine leadership had also not anticipated the intense protests that ensued. Many in the Philippines, it would seem, were also surprised by the reactions in their country. No one foresaw this huge burst of emotion, probably not even those who had stirred it up. As the Asian Wall Street Journal, 31st March 1995, stated, and I quote: `It is obvious that neither government anticipated events spinning out of control.' Mr John De Payva referred to a Far Eastern Economic Review article. I believe he was referring to the 30th March 1995 article, page 12, and I quote: `The Philippines may have been in an uproar over Singapore's execution of Flor Contemplacion, but President Fidel Ramos didn't know it.' This is also what this article says: `A close aide complains that during the president's trip to Europe, his staff is giving him "sanitized" reports on the widespread indignation over Singapore's hanging of the Filipina domestic helper. "They were telling us that everything's okay in Manila, and that the backlash would be manageable."' The article goes on to say: `Ramos was shocked when he arrived home to find demonstrators blaming his administration for failing to save Contemplacion.' If, according to these reports, the Philippine leaders were taken by surprise, the question is how could we have known much better than them? And I think it is fair to say that the facts were that some of the media there and some of the Opposition politicians had skilfully and quickly capitalised on this into an anti-government and anti-Ramos campaign, linking it at the same time with a broader emotional issue of their government's handling of millions of overseas Filipino workers. Looking back, had we known that we would provoke such an uproar, would we have still refused to delay the execution, as several Members have said? With hindsight, it is of course very easy to say that we should have known, we ought to have done this, and so on. To give a candid answer, yes, we could have conceivably granted a stay till after the Philippine elections on 8th May. But to those who say there is no harm, no cost, let me say it would not have been without cost, and it would have been a very difficult decision. Why? On the one hand, firstly, we have no intention to get involved in their internal domestic politics. Secondly, we have very good bilateral relations and it was not our intention to jeopardise it. It was our intention to build on it. Thirdly, we have considerable investments in the Philippines. On the other hand, we had to take into account certain other important factors. Firstly, we had to note that the agitation and the demonstrations in the Philippines were really not over the stay, not over whether we had given face, but over the grant of clemency. Those who were building up the excitement and agitation were really not interested in whether we were giving a stay. But they wanted a complete pardon for Flor Contemplacion because they were convinced that she was innocent. And we had to consider carefully the fact that if we granted a stay, it could be raising false hopes unjustifiably. Next, we had also to consider what would be the implications in view of the various security threats, bomb threats and threats to the life of various people in our Manila Mission. I do not want to go into the details but I should inform the House, and the House should know, that in the days before the Cabinet decision was taken, our Embassy was receiving several threats. Some of course can be dismissed as frivolous and hoax but not all. I will just take an entry from one of the logs in our logbook. Monday, 13th March, there were four threats. At 11.45 am, a man called to say that a bomb would explode that day. At 11.50 am, a man claiming to be a member of a terrorist group, and I am leaving out the name of the so-called terrorist group, telephoned the Embassy's receptionist and said that all Filipino employees should get out of the Embassy by the time of the execution so that no Filipino employees of the Embassy would be hurt. At 11.53 am, a man claiming to be a member of the same terrorist group said that they were going to destroy the Ambassador's car. At 2.30 pm, a man called and said, "In 30 minutes' time, please leave the Embassy." Now, Members should reflect: supposing we granted a stay in these circumstances? Would anyone really believe that we did it out of compassion and not because we had been cowed and intimidated? This question is worth reflecting. Another consideration, an important one, is whether we would be setting a most undesirable precedent for future similar cases. Let me explain. Firstly, if we agree to appeals for stay of execution or clemency for foreign offenders, when there are no grounds to do so on the merits of the case, or on the evidence of the case, is it not surely an invitation, in every other case, for a foreign national and his lawyers to pressurise his home government to intervene on his behalf? It must be. And the Singapore Government would be hard put not to yield if it had already established a precedent. In this regard, Members may not know this, but I should inform Members that we regularly receive petitions for clemency from various governments. Some are publicised and hit the headlines like in this case and in the case of the Dutch drug trafficker, Van Damme. But many do not hit the headlines because those governments prefer to do it in a quiet approach, in other words, quiet diplomacy. The way that we handle petitions from different governments is important. We must be even-handed and fair and treat all petitions with respect and seriousness on the merits of the case. What we do for one we will have to do for another. We value our relations with ASEAN colleagues highly. But there cannot be one standard for ASEAN appeals and another standard for non-ASEAN appeals. Also, it is not tenable for us to accede to appeals which have been highly publicised and turn down appeals which are of the same merit but were turned down because they have not become media issues and contentious issues. To do so, in fact, you are penalising governments which have opted for the quiet diplomatic approach. Next, if we make special concessions for foreign nationals, for reasons other than on the merits of the case, Members should consider what happens to our own Singapore nationals who are also sentenced to death, ie, our nationals who also have no basis on merits, on evidence, to warrant clemency or stay of execution. They do not have a foreign government to pressurise the Singapore Government. They do not have an irresponsible tabloid press to write up lurid, sensational, bizarre allegations. Is the solution then to also give them a stay of execution when there are really no grounds on merits to do so? Surely, that cannot be done. That is why I say that, even looking back, yes, we could have conceivably given a stay, but it would have been a close judgement call. Mr Deputy Speaker, let me say a few words about the diplomatic phase. Our objective during this diplomatic phase was really to manage the events in a way that did not lead to further deterioration in relations with the Philippine government. And this phase was marked by the following features. First, exercise of restraint. Second, cooperating with President Ramos and his government. Third, keeping lines of communication open. First, exercise of restraint. Members have already spoken and noted that we had exercised as much restraint despite many provocative articles. John De Payva asked, "Why didn't we reply to this article about Senior Minister?" In fact, the full article, if you read it, said Senior Minister was informed and his assistance obtained and he got Jayakumar and then the maid Flor Contemplacion was fixed. For those of us who had been reading every day the faxes of the many newspapers that were coming in, there were many, many wild and bizarre stories, and we decided to make a distinction between a tabloid press, media hype and make sure that we do not over-react to these absurd stories. They were so absurd and bizarre that no reasonable person would have given them much credence. But when reaction was called for, Members would agree that we gave a robust rebuttal. When the Gancayco Commission came out with the absurd allegations, we had to respond and respond we did in clear-cut terms. When the integrity of our pathologists and our United States consultants was attacked, we also had to come out rebutting the absurd allegations. Next, we cooperated with President Ramos and his government. I will give you some examples. When the Gancayco Commission was established, I was in touch with the Foreign Secretary and I assured him full cooperation. We sent bundles of documents about the court proceedings, all the relevant exhibits, photographs, autopsy reports. We even offered to send the police investigator in charge of the case. If the Gancayco Commission wanted to interview him, he would be at their disposal. We had nothing to hide. President Ramos proposed that when their National Bureau of Investigation's autopsy, after the exhumation, differed from our autopsy report and that there should be a third party panel, we agreed. Later on, they wanted our pathologists to go and view the remains in Manila. Our preference had been to go to a neutral venue so that emotions would not be there. But we were asked, "Please come.". We agreed. We wanted to bring our consultants with our pathologists, but they said that they should not be British or Commonwealth. We agreed. When our consultants were going there, they asked our consultants not to speak at the joint press conference. We agreed. Then they wanted the FBI to be the authority to submit the names of the panel. So we have tried to understand the predicament of the government in that particular situation and our interest was to cooperate and distinguish our objective of cooperating with the Philippine government from the other circus that was being orchestrated by opposition politicians and the media. As I said, during this diplomatic phase, while we kept the channels of communication open and while the sound and fury of the media and opposition thundered on, many did not know it. But we kept open the lines of communication between the leaders. For example, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and President Ramos spoke on the telephone at least on four occasions and had corresponded at least six times. Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo and I kept in regular touch with each other. We spoke on the telephone at least on 14 occasions. We corresponded, faxes to his office or to his home, and he was faxing things to my home or my office, at least about 20 times. We met in Bandung, not so long ago, and had three meetings. In other words, the Foreign Ministers were in almost daily communication during this delicate period. And, in fact, strange as it may seem, both Foreign Ministers were able to negotiate through the phone and fax and conclude a written agreement called Agreed Points on the steps to establish a third party panel. We concluded this agreement and we signed it on 29th April 1995, one day before Foreign Secretary Romulo stepped down. I have not met the new Foreign Secretary Domingo Saizon personally, but we have already established contact because we have spoken to each other on the telephone. In other words, while we were having this delicate and trying period, the leaders tried to keep their cool. We were aware of the broader considerations in maintaining bilateral relations on an even keel. And both Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers played their role in trying to keep contact with each other so that we would not read the signals wrongly about government-to-government intentions. Just to brief the House quickly on the current developments in the diplomatic phase. In the Agreed Points between the two Foreign Ministers, we have agreed that since the first stage of examining the remains in Manila was inconclusive and there were still contradictory findings, both our Prime Minister and President Ramos had agreed to resolve this difference in the contradictory findings. And to resolve it conclusively, there shall be a third party panel. Both leaders agreed also to abide by the findings of the third party panel. The two Foreign Ministers worked out the Agreed Points that there will be a third party panel of three. In order to establish the three, we originally approached FBI but FBI recommended the American Board of Pathologists who had in turn recommended seven names. In fact, I have already written to Foreign Secretary Domingo Saizon to say that Singapore is ready to proceed with the process of selecting three out of the seven. Hopefully, this will be done soon and the third party panel will get down to work. Under the Agreed Points, the remains of Della Maga will be sent to a neutral place, United States, and the final conclusive determination will be made by the third party panel. To summarise, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I hope at the end of the debate and after you have heard my colleague, the Minister for Home Affairs, Members will be satisfied that all due attention, including the due full process of the law, was given to Flor Contemplacion. And I wish to stress that there was no indication at that time that the case would be so intensely involved in the internal politics of the Philippines and would blow up the way it did. Sir, the job of the Government is to make decisions based on national interest. Maintaining law and order, apprehending offenders, prosecuting offenders, are part of our national interest. Maintaining friendly relations with foreign countries is also in the national interest. In the case of Flor Contemplacion, we have to balance, on the one hand, keeping relations between Singapore and the Philippines on an even keel and, on the other hand, upholding the integrity and transparency of our legal and judicial process. Whether or not things would have turned out differently if our decision had been different, ie, allow a stay even though we felt there were no merits, I am afraid, is a matter of speculation. But it is unlikely that this will be the last such incident. I say it is unlikely because we have nearly seven million tourists every year. We have more than 300,000 work permit holders, including more than 80,000 domestic workers. Fortunately, the majority are law abiding. But, inevitably, some are not. Some commit offences. Due process of the law must follow. We cannot waive prosecution and grant clemency only because the accused is a foreigner. That will mean double standards, one for foreigners and one for Singaporeans. When we enforce our laws, from time to time such problems will surface and indeed may be more serious than what we have encountered in this episode, and Singaporeans must be prepared for this. Sir, at the government-to-government level, relations between Singapore and the Philippines remain cordial. We value our relations with the Philippines. We hold nothing against the Philippine government or the Philippine people. As I said, the leaders of the two governments and the Foreign Ministers are in close contact. In fact, Singapore and the Philippine delegations continue to work closely in ASEAN. But both sides must also strive to restore people-to-people relations, and restore it to what it was before the Flor Contemplacion case. And this is what President Ramos has also said and is reported in today's papers. We need to cool down emotions and restore mutual confidence. And businessmen, investors and tourists must feel completely assured that they are indeed welcome by the hosts and neither the persons nor the businesses will be threatened or, worse, endangered. Then only the flow of trade, investments and tourism will return to normal. This may take some time. In order to get this process of people-to-people relationship on the way, both governments should now proceed to appoint a third party panel of experts which both sides have agreed will resolve the contradiction in findings between the Philippine NBI experts and Singapore pathologists. This will determine whether Flor Contemplacion was a victim of grave injustice, as the Gancayco Commission claimed, or whether she was properly convicted and sentenced for the murder of Della Maga, as our courts have found. Thereafter, as the two governments have agreed, if the neutral panel finds the Philippine NBI is correct, Singapore will reopen the Flor Contemplacion case. And if the panel finds that the Singapore pathologists are correct, then the Philippines will abide by this finding. Sir, we must not leave any lingering doubts over the death of Della Maga and the execution of Flor Contemplacion to poison relations, especially people-to-people relations between Singapore and the Philippines. This issue must be conclusively settled one way or the other. Only thus can we put the matter to rest permanently and achieve a full reconciliation between the people of Singapore and the people of the Philippines.