Hansard, Tuesday, 15 February 2022

1 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether the Ministry plans to do more to encourage companies to sign up for the Singapore SMS SenderID Protection Registry; and (b) how does the Ministry intend to stay ahead of the curve and prevent scammers from circumventing the anti-SMS spoofing registry.

2 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) in the past two years, how many cases have been prosecuted under the Spam Control Act 2007 and the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 in connection with unsolicited SMSes offering job opportunities; and (b) what other actions are being taken to combat the problem of such unsolicited SMSes in addition to the establishment of the Do Not Call registry in 2014.

3 Mr Edward Chia Bing Hui asked the Prime Minister (a) what is the uniqueness of the recent phishing scam via SMS notifications which avoided rapid detection; (b) whether other technology solutions, such as artificial intelligence, will be used by MAS and the Police to support our banks to trace the funds; (c) whether the bank’s full goodwill payouts to all affected customers will be a guideline for future settlements of such occurrences; and (d) how will MAS be working with banks from other jurisdictions to enable systems-level responses for future scams.

4 Mr Sharael Taha asked the Prime Minister with regard to the recent phishing scams via SMS notification (a) whether OCBC Bank’s goodwill payouts will set precedence for such future occurrences; (b) how will the Ministry ensure that these payouts do not lead to complacency towards being vigilant to phishing scams; and (c) whether such goodwill payouts will encourage scammers to focus more on Singapore banks.

5 Mr Seah Kian Peng asked the Prime Minister (a) whether the Government can consider a requirement for banks to commit to a minimum ratio of online call centre officers to customers; (b) whether the Government has data on (i) such current ratio for the banks and (ii) the average waiting times for a call to be answered; (c) if so, what are they; and (d) whether the Government has guidelines for an acceptable waiting time and, if so, what is it.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I seek your permission, also on behalf of Minister Lawrence Wong, to take Question Nos 1 to 5 during our Ministerial Statements to be delivered later in the Sitting?

Yes, please.

6 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Health with regard to individuals who completed their primary vaccine course with non-mRNA vaccines (a) how many of these individuals’ fully-vaccinated status will expire by 14 February 2022; (b) whether those who are medically ineligible for mRNA vaccines can receive a booster dose of a non-mRNA vaccine; and (c) if not, when will non-mRNA boosters be made available.

7 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Health (a) what are the considerations for not making the Sinovac-CoronaVac and Sinopharm vaccines generally available to children and adolescents, except adolescents who are not medically eligible for the Pfizer-BioNTech/Comirnaty vaccine; and (b) whether the Ministry has plans to make at least one non-mRNA vaccine generally available to children under 18 in order to maximise the vaccination rate of the Singapore population.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your permission to take Question Nos 6 and 7 together, please?

Yes, please.

Sir, as of 9 February 2022, there were about 1,000 individuals who completed the primary vaccine course with non-mRNA vaccines and would have their “fully-vaccinated” status expire by 14 February 2022.

Persons who are medically ineligible to receive the mRNA vaccine and aged 18 and above, can receive Sinovac-CoronaVac vaccine under the National Vaccination Programme (NVP) as a booster vaccine.

The use of the Sinovac-CoronaVac vaccine under NVP is only for persons aged 18 and above, as the vaccine manufacturer did not include children and adolescents when filing for interim authorisation of the vaccine under the Health Sciences Authority (HSA)’s Pandemic Special Access Route (PSAR). Both Sinovac-CoronaVac and the Sinopharm vaccines are also not currently recommended for routine use in persons aged below 18 by the World Health Organization.

Notwithstanding the manufacturer’s filing on the use of the vaccine, limited data from the Sinovac-CoronaVac vaccine manufacturer’s early Phase I and II trials in healthy children and adolescents aged three to 17 do not show safety concerns and we recognise the need for alternative vaccines for persons medically ineligible for the currently approved vaccine in this age group.

MOH has, therefore, also separately introduced a dedicated public health programme – Sinovac after mRNA (SAM) – outside of the NVP, to offer the Sinovac-CoronaVac vaccine to individuals aged 12 to 17 who are medically ineligible for the Pfizer-BioNTech/Comirnaty COVID-19 vaccine, to afford them some level of protection against COVID-19 while closely monitoring their safety.

SAM is, therefore, part of a research study which, under our current regulatory framework, enabled the administration of the Sinovac vaccine to an age group outside the scope of PSAR approval. In January 2022, the programme was further extended to eligible children aged five to 11, after the data from the older age group indicated that the safety profile of the vaccine was generally consistent with that of other registered vaccines used in immunisation against other diseases.

MOH is working to bring in other non-mRNA options for those who are medically ineligible. The Novavax COVID-19 vaccine has been assessed by HSA to be safe and effective for persons aged 18 and above, with two doses demonstrating a vaccine efficacy of 90% against symptomatic infection and 100% against severe disease with the wildtype SARS-CoV2 and the Alpha variant, with no significant safety concerns.

Therefore, in February 2022, HSA issued its PSAR interim authorisation letter to Novavax for its COVID-19 vaccine. Novavax recently released data that the vaccine was found to be 80% effective against COVID-19 in a late-stage trial in adolescents aged 12 to 17 in the United States when the Delta variant was the dominant strain. HSA and MOH will evaluate the data from this study and will continue to monitor for more data on its efficacy and safety in children and adolescents.

The Expert Committee for COVID-19 Vaccination (EC19V) has also reviewed data on the vaccine’s safety and efficacy and has recommended the use of the Novavax COVID-19 vaccine under the NVP for primary and booster vaccination in individuals aged 18 and older.

We hope that the initial doses of the Novavax COVID-19 vaccine will arrive in Singapore within a matter of months, provided that there are no disruptions to the shipment schedule. Meanwhile, those who are medically eligible are encouraged to take the available mRNA vaccines as they offer more optimal protection.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Senior Minister of State for his reply. I have a related supplementary question on COVID-19. How are the healthcare workers and healthcare system coping with the increased number of infected cases from the Omicron wave?

Mr Speaker, the Member asked a question not quite related to vaccines but on healthcare workers, so, I thought I might as well answer.

Right now, we are getting 10,000 or more cases on a daily basis. It is within our expectations. We had earlier said that, at its peak, we may reach 15,000 to 20,000 cases a day or even more. That is within our expectations.

Right now, the week-on-week increase is about 1.

5. So, it is not increasing at three times multiples anymore. But whether cases will go up further, I think that is a possibility and we should be prepared for that.

Having said that, as we have always explained, what is important now is not so much the topline infection numbers but how that translates into disease severity and impact on our healthcare capacity. Yesterday, there were a few Written Questions on this topic, and we put out some responses to those.

By and large, our healthcare system is coping well. I will give an example – the ICU beds. At its peak, during the Delta wave, we had 171 ICU beds occupied, out of a capacity of 200-plus, close to 300. Today, even at 10,000 cases a day, as of last night, it was 23 beds occupied. The week before, at one point, it reached 30 and it actually came down and it is now 23. So, we see it hobbling between 20 and 30. So long as we maintain that, ICU is in good shape.

If you look at those who need oxygen supplementation, those who require hospitalisation, the healthcare system is coping.

But I think where we face pressure now is not on the clinical side of healthcare but on the operational side of healthcare because the number of calls from patients to our hotline is increasing. Fortunately, we have the help of many public agencies like CPF Board, and SAF stood up a fairly big team to support the operations. So, we are able to answer well over 90% of the calls without them dropping. So, that is coping well.

But the GPs are facing quite a bit of pressure. Queues are long. If you go to our community GP clinics, you can see there are queues. So, I think on that front, we have to help the GPs. GPs have given feedback to us that the patients either have mild or no symptoms. They had self-tested, got a positive result and decided, "I had better see a GP, either to get an MC or some ART kits from the doctors." Many of them also worry about travel. If they have to go through a PCR test while travelling, they like to say, "I register a positive result, but I am a recovered shedder". They want to show that, actually, they have had COVID-19, they are shedders and they have recovered.

So, for various reasons, people are visiting doctors and GPs, not because they are very sick. So, it is the operational side that is posing a challenge.

Later, MOH will be making an announcement. We are going to allow individuals to come to the Quick Test Centres (QTCs), go through a supervised ART test and, within 30 minutes, we can ingest their infection record, if they are tested positive, into their HealthHub record. From there, they can also withdraw ART kits. What they will not get is a doctor's MC because, for that, you would have to see a doctor.

So, that way, I hope we can divert many of the very mild cases away from GP clinics into the QTCs. We have about 200 QTCs now, all over, including in malls. We will start with about a quarter of them. So, by the end of today, you will be able to book an appointment with the QTCs and go through an ART test and then ingest the record, if you are positive, into your HealthHub.

I hope I have answered the question.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Sir, there remains about 3% of 12- to 19-year-olds who have yet to get vaccinated and this works out to almost 10,000 unvaccinated adolescents, not counting children aged five to 11. Given the findings that adolescents and children have a higher COVID-19 Omicron infection rate than older age groups, does the Senior Minister of State agree that it is better for them to get vaccinated with the Sinovac vaccine, than remain unvaccinated?

I recognise that it is generally better for them to get the Pfizer vaccine because it is more efficacious. However, these adolescents have chosen not to for various reasons. Anecdotally, from the residents I have met, either they or their parents have a preference for non-mRNA vaccines and are unlikely to change their stance. So, why not approve the Sinovac vaccine for adolescents so that they will get vaccinated and our population can reach closer to a full vaccination rate earlier?

Secondly, the Sinovac vaccine has already been approved in Singapore for adolescents who are medically ineligible for the Pfizer vaccine. Jurisdictions like China and Hong Kong have already approved it for those aged three and above. So, what are the residual safety concerns to it becoming generally available for children and adolescents?

Sir, as the Member will appreciate, the issue of safety when it comes to medication, vaccines, medical therapeutics, is not absolute. Nothing is completely absolutely safe or absolutely unsafe. It is about the relative risk and the relative benefit.

The individuals under the age of 17 who are getting the non-mRNA vaccines – currently, the Sinovac-CoronaVac vaccines – in those circumstances, because they are medically ineligible for the mRNA vaccines, the benefits of being vaccinated with any vaccine are, indeed, outweighed by the risks and safety concerns that currently exists for those vaccines, and weighed up against the risk of getting a Coronavirus infection. But for the others who are not medically ineligible, the safety and efficacy data are quite clear. Therefore, we would continue to recommend for them an mRNA vaccine.

Because it is not just about their risks and their immunity at this point in time, but over the next few months, as the pandemic continues to be a challenge for us and around the world, we have to think about how quickly their immunity will wane, what would be their ability to deal with the future waves or even this existing wave as it makes its way through our society. So, we continue to recommend the mRNA vaccines.

As I have explained, we are trying to bring in other options for these individuals in the near future.

8 Ms Tin Pei Ling asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether there are any updates from the Government’s discussion with SPH Media Trust and on the level of funding support that the Government will provide; and (b) how will the Government ensure that the funding provided will be used to achieve the necessary digital transformation.

9 Ms Tin Pei Ling asked the Minister for Communications and Information whether the Ministry will require SPH Media Trust to have adequate emphasis on thought leadership content from Singapore’s perspective so as to increase Singapore’s mindshare on the global stage.

10 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for Communications and Information with the commitment of the Government to provide funding support to SPH Media Trust, how will the Ministry ensure that editorial independence continues to be upheld in the newsrooms.

11 Ms Hany Soh asked the Minister for Communications and Information what steps will the Ministry take to ensure that its funding support for SPH Media Trust will go towards the development of news media on online platforms that are engaging for younger audiences.

12 Ms Hany Soh asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) how will the Ministry ensure that the Singapore Media Academy and the planned SPH Media Academy differentiate themselves in terms of skillsets and avoid an overlap of functions; (b) whether the Ministry has a definite roadmap for SPH’s upcoming media academy to help achieve the goal of nurturing more local talent for the mass communications industry; and (c) whether a collaboration with SG Women In Tech will be considered to attract, retain and develop more female talent in the infocomm workforce.

13 Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) how will SPH Media Trust remain relevant and sustainable in a highly competitive media industry given digital disruption and declining demand for print news; (b) how can the quality of local journalism keep pace with global standards since audiences can easily access digital versions of international newspapers; and (c) what are the desired outcomes for SPH Media Trust and how will the Government track the progress.

14 Mr Sharael Taha asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) what will be done to ensure the viability of our vernacular news media, given their limited local market sizes; (b) how will the Ministry (i) ensure that our vernacular news media has enough resources, talent and technology to continue to produce good quality news and (ii) create opportunities for our vernacular news media to grow beyond Singapore readership; and (c) how does vernacular news media remain relevant, given the declining use of vernacular languages amongst our younger generations.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your permission to address Question Nos 8 to 14, and for all related supplementary questions to be taken thereafter?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

I will also provide more information for written Question No 50 in yesterday's Order Paper, which was filed by Miss Cheryl Chan.

In May last year, Singapore Press Holdings Limited announced the restructuring of its media business to a not-for-profit entity. The restructuring process is complete and the new SPH Media Trust, or SMT, shared its plans with the public about two weeks ago.

I thank Members for their questions. My reply is organised around three themes.

First, the need for Government support for SMT’s transformation; second, how transformation preserves trusted media for our citizens and serves the larger public interest; and third, how the Government will maintain accountability.

Ms Tin Pei Ling and Miss Cheryl Chan asked about the Government’s plans to support SMT.

MCI has worked closely with SMT to understand the challenges they face. In fact, readership and trust in SMT’s journalism continue to be high. Based on a survey last year, SMT’s weekly reach extends to almost 75% of Singaporeans. Three in four Singaporeans trust SMT to produce reliable news and content.

However, the global digital shift has severely disrupted print business models. Traditionally, they have relied heavily on advertising revenue to support quality journalism. But today, the proliferation of free news aggregators and user-generated content compete with newsrooms for eyeballs and, correspondingly, advertisers. Globally, print advertising revenue is declining 7% year-on-year. Although digital advertising revenue has increased, a large share of it goes to Big Tech platforms like Google and Facebook, or Meta, as it is now known.

On top of the cost of producing quality content, newsrooms must also invest in reaching audiences in a crowded digital space. In 2019, German publisher Axel Springer committed €100 million in investments for digital growth projects at two of its papers. This is on top of its IT development projects supporting its digital business model, which amounted to another €100 million. The New York Times, prioritising its digital growth, has seen its product development costs increase over 25% year-on-year. In 2020, this exceeded US$130 million. The high costs to achieve success online, even for those who already have significant readership, are testament to the challenging industry conditions.

As an open, cosmopolitan city-state, we consume varied perspectives from around the world. Nonetheless, preserving our local news media remains critical. Our local news media provide a vital Singaporean lens through which citizens can make sense of global events. It is an essential public good in our multiracial, multi-religious society. In discharging this role, SMT now produces six daily newspapers in four languages. Few of its competitors do the same.

To achieve its mission, SMT must do three things: first, make long-term investments in the capability development of technology and talent; second, sustain and develop our vernacular news media; and third, position itself as a regional thought leader.

Ms Jessica Tan and Ms Hany Soh asked about maintaining SMT’s relevance amidst digital disruption, especially for younger audiences. It is vital to understand the media consumption habits of our digital native audiences. Based on an MCI survey, around 65% of respondents access SMT’s digital content frequently in 2020. This is a steep jump from about 40% a year before. In contrast, hardcopy reach declined from about 40% to 30% over the same period, a single year. The digital pivot of SMT will be key to growing its reach with the young and old, and even with overseas audiences. More will need to be done.

In terms of user experience, digital content must be delivered swiftly, websites must be intuitively designed, applications must allow for personalisation.

In the newsroom, content management resources, data analytics and investments into artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning tools can help newsrooms push out news quickly, accurately and effectively. Continual evolution of content forms will also be key. As with other major publications today, SMT must package complex information in a variety of ways – texts, videos, podcasts and interactive infographics. This is especially important for younger audiences, who demand engaging news they can consume on-the-go.

At the backend, infrastructure will have to be robust enough to support the digital transition. With increasing digital viewership, SMT will also have to ensure resilience and reliability in its news provision.

Ms Hany Soh rightly asked about talent development. In today’s landscape, the skills required of journalists have changed dramatically. For example, beyond covering announcements, journalists have to be data-literate. They need to know when, where and how to reach their digital audiences so that critical news is not buried under masses of information on social media. As part of the transformation, the new SPH Media Academy will update the newsroom’s training programmes for the digital age. They will also partner internationally renowned institutions like the Poynter Institute and the Reuters Institute at Oxford University. They will offer programmes and fellowships to local journalists.

To Ms Hany Soh’s question about external collaborations, SPH Media Academy’s immediate focus will be on equipping its own journalists with digital skills and multimedia capabilities. We believe there will be good areas of synergy with the Singapore Media Academy. We will work with Mediacorp and SMT, along with our Institutes of Higher Learning, to promote collaborative efforts. In the long term, SMT can look into extending its programmes to the larger media industry in Singapore and journalists around the region.

The newsrooms will also keep pace with the increasingly complex information landscape. SMT will set up a fact-checking service to debunk fake news and launch media awareness and financial literacy programmes for the public. These initiatives complement the newsrooms’ core strengths, educating readers on identifying misinformation and scams, which are key challenges in today's digital society.

Mr Sharael Taha asked about the viability, relevance and growing the reach of vernacular media. Although vernacular readership is smaller and, therefore, much more challenging to independently sustain, it is critical to provide credible news products that serve our multiracial society.

Mr Speaker, in the 1980s, it was founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who mooted the idea for the vernacular press to merge with the English press. He did so because he foresaw that the vernacular press would inevitably come under pressure as English became the language of business, Government and education. SPH was thus established in 1984 to preserve the Chinese and Malay media.

If we had allowed our vernacular media to wither, Singapore would have been the poorer for it and we would have lost our souls. Even if they were to be unviable business propositions – which they are not – we believe it is in the public interest to do all we can to preserve and develop all the vernacular outlets in both SMT as well as Mediacorp.

Government funding for SMT will go towards sustaining vernacular newsrooms and developing new content formats like videos and podcasts, to reach the younger generations.

In addition, support from the community is essential to achieve the shared goal of safeguarding our culture and heritage. In this regard, SMT will be partnering clan associations, community groups and schools to provide students with greater access to its vernacular products.

Ms Tin Pei Ling asked about thought leadership content. With Singapore’s position as a global hub, SMT is well-placed to provide deep domain knowledge about the region, with a Singapore voice. To boost its capabilities, SMT will expand its foreign bureaus, host more events and forums and establish more partnerships to build their international audience. Today, a third of The Straits Times’ readers come from overseas. Zaobao’s websites see around seven million unique visitors monthly, more than half of which are from outside Singapore. The Chinese Media Group will be partnering Berita Harian, Tamil Murasu, as well as other media outlets in the region to promote mother tongue language media to a wider audience.

As much as the media is coming under challenge throughout the world, we must be mindful that the major powers are waging a constant battle for hearts and minds worldwide – including our hearts and minds in Singapore. As a small country, we are especially prone to influence campaigns – overt and covert. And as a multiracial, multilingual country, we are especially prone to the cultural, social and even political influence that countries like China and India can continue to exert abroad.

As open as we must remain to the world, and as welcoming as we are to global media outlets broadcasting and reporting out of Singapore, we must also have Singaporeans reporting on the world from the Singaporean perspective. A Singaporean reporting on China, for example, would afford us a lens very different from an American or a European doing so. Thus, the growth of SMT’s overseas bureaus is an important area of capability development we want to support.

Mr Speaker, the direction that SMT is charting out is promising, but it will require significant investments over a period of time. During the transition, it will likely be loss-making. In the UK, The Guardian, which has a highly successful digital subscription model with almost a million paying supporters, has lost millions of dollars since 1998. It only returned to the black in 2019, after years of persistent transformation efforts. Yet, they still had to cut 12% of their workforce in 2020 to stay afloat.

The Government is ready to put support behind SMT’s transformation. We are committed to safeguarding the information space for our citizens.

Government funding of news media is commonplace in many countries and has increased in some cases during COVID-19. This underscores the public good that trusted journalism provides in a complex environment. In 2020, the French government introduced a subsidy package of over €480 million to support its news media in weathering COVID-19 losses and moving to digital platforms. In the same year, Norway and Sweden rendered €43 million and €65 million of aid respectively to their press.

Prior to its restructuring, Singapore Press Holdings Limited had invested almost $50 million annually in technology and digital talent. This has yielded some success but, from the kind of investments we see elsewhere, they clearly need to do more to accelerate the newsrooms’ transformation. The steep decline of print media and, correspondingly, the migration to the digital space, has brought SMT to an inflection point. It will tap on Government funding to make essential investments that move it decisively into the digital age.

MCI has, therefore, set aside funding support of up to $180 million annually, over the next five years. This will provide SMT with more capital to invest in the future while ensuring that they are able to sustain their current operations during this critical transition period.

In its initial years, we expect SMT to spend approximately 40% of the funding on tech investments and digital talent. The remainder will be spent on newsroom capability building and training, in particular, the vernacular newsrooms.

Ms Tin Pei Ling and Ms Jessica Tan asked about accountability measures. With such a significant amount of public funding, MCI will monitor SMT's performance closely through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that track total reach and engagement of SMT’s products, with a focus on their digital platforms; specific reach indicators for vernacular groups and youths; and resilience of SMT’s flagship products to minimise downtime and disruption.

SMT is required to provide progress update reports to MCI on a half-yearly basis. This allows MCI to track their progress and for the Government to help achieve its desired outcomes when necessary. We will also review the funding quantum after the first five years, based on the progress that SMT has made.

Mr Alex Yam asked how the Ministry will ensure editorial independence continues to be upheld in the newsrooms. SMT has exercised editorial independence since its establishment in 1984 as Singapore Press Holdings. Funding support does not change that, as is the case with Mediacorp since 2011.

In fact, the 2021 edition of the Reuters Institute Digital News Report indicated that 79% of respondents expressed trust in CNA. Is such a high level of trust attainable without objective and balanced reporting? The same report indicated that The Straits Times, one of SMT's flagship products, enjoyed a similarly high level of trust among 77% of respondents. Would SMT wish to erode this foundation?

If nobody is reading The Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao, Berita Harian or Tamil Murasu, if nobody is viewing Channel 8, Suria, Vasantham or CNA, there is no use in funding SMT or Mediacorp. It is precisely because people are reading, viewing and hearing our mainstream media that they deserve to be supported. It is because the public see them as trusted sources of news that we must do all we can to keep them as viable propositions.

As can be seen also through the KPIs set by MCI, the Government's key interest is to ensure the reach of SMT's products. No one gains if these products lack credibility and are ignored by audiences. On the contrary, we are funding them precisely because they do have readers who trust them.

Mr Speaker, to conclude, the coming years will be an exciting period as we expect a major digital transformation of our local news media landscape. MCI will work closely with SMT to ensure that our local news media upholds quality journalism delivered in innovative and engaging ways.

Mr Alex Yam.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank the Minister for the reassurance of the journalistic integrity of the newsroom with Government funding. I have two supplementary questions.

One, in terms of access to future print copies of the newspaper. I remember fondly riding in my father's car, rolling down the manual window and shouting out in dialect "ma biew po" and exchanging a couple of coins for a copy of the evening tabloid. Many of our older generation continue to rely on access to news via the printed copies. In this restructuring and the pivot towards digital, how will the Government ensure the continued availability of printed copies in the future so that our elders in society are not left out?

Two, in terms of the workforce in SMT. Over the last few years, I recall that in October 2009, there was a restructuring and 70 staff from SPH's Media Group were laid off. And I think in 2020, a further 5% of the workforce, over 100, were also laid off as part of addressing the challenges of COVID-19. As it continues to pivot and transform itself, how will the Government, through its funding mechanism, ensure that workers within the Media Group are fairly treated as it continues to pivot towards the digital sphere?

Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Alex Yam for both his questions. On his question about access to print, both the Government and SMT are very mindful that significant segments of our population rely on print to read about the daily happenings in Singapore and to get a perspective of the issues that are of importance to us. So, retaining the availability of print will remain a priority for quite a while, I believe.

The key issue is how SMT can do this in a way that is still efficient and does not drain its resources unnecessarily. Some of the moves that they have taken are practical and sensible ones, such as, assessing whether it makes sense for them to continue to have two evening papers, Shin Min Daily News and Lianhe Wanbao. And after a careful strategic review, looking at the reach of both evening papers and satisfying their own desire to ensure that the evening papers continue to reach a wide enough audience, decided that they will cease the publication of Lianhe Wanbao by focusing on Shin Min instead.

These kinds of decisions, I think, will continue to be taken, if necessary. But SMT as well as the Government are committed to ensuring that even those who access news mainly through print will be able to do so on a continued basis. So, I can give Mr Alex Yam that assurance.

Secondly, Mr Alex Yam has asked a very important question with regard to fair treatment of the staff of SPH and also how the Government funding will seek to ensure that. The best thing I think we can do to retain talents within SMT is to provide them with the support to make that transformation. Talents everywhere, including journalistic talents in media companies, want to know that they have a future. It is the main reason that they will stay on, invest their time and effort to produce quality journalism. And the only way we can do so is if the digital transformation is not a start-stop process, not a half-hearted process, but one that is taken with great commitment and passion. This is what energises them and this is what makes them want to stay.

At this present moment, as it turns out, there is intense competition for talent. So, SMT and, actually, all media companies, are working very hard to keep as many talent as possible. Against this backdrop, it would be most unwise if SMT or any other media company were to be perceived by their employees of unfair treatment. It is in their own interest to ensure that they paint a realistic vision of the future and they commit the resources to help their talent grow and develop along with the organisation's transformation.

So, I have confidence in SMT that they are minded to look after their people because they are committed to the public to provide quality journalism, which cannot be achieved without the talent within their vault.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Minister, with close to $1 billion of Government funding for SMT committed over the next five years, how will the Government assure Singaporeans that SMT's content will not be tainted by allegations of political interference?

Mr Speaker, firstly, the Government has committed to set aside up to $180 million dollars annually over the next five years. And I want to emphasise this: up to $180 million dollars. What is actually going to be disbursed will depend on the specific investments that SMT makes, through their progress updates to MCI, whether we are satisfied that these are the right things to do and that they will produce or they have the likelihood of producing good results. So, it is up to $180 million annually and, therefore, up to $900 million over five years.

I am actually not so surprised that Mr Pritam Singh put this question up. And if I may, Mr Pritam Singh's question, again asking about influence on editors, journalist, is too predictable, if I may put it this way. His question seems to suggest that he does not trust the journalists and our mainstream media to be objective in reporting, to apply their minds and to be discerning or to have a sense of responsibility to truthful reporting for the public. I hope I am wrong in thinking that this is what Mr Pritam Singh is suggesting, but that is what came to mind when he spoke those words.

Regardless of what I say or what Mr Pritam Singh may suggest, the true test is whether the public trusts the media and how they exercise their choice on a day-to-day basis in consuming news media, when so many alternatives are available to them at zero cost. And, fortunately for us, for all of us, our local mainstream media are trusted by people and we have every reason to keep it so.

Ms Hany Soh.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have filed a Parliamentary Question in relation to women and tech. I am very heartened to also find out recently that SMT has appointed a female CEO with vast experience in the IT industry to lead the organisation in this transformation. It is just a suggestion which I wish to put across to the Ministry to urge SMT to take into consideration that, in this transformation, they can be a very good and leading role model to encourage more women to enter, stay and progress with the organisation in this challenging yet meaningful journey.

Mr Speaker, I thank Ms Hany Soh for her very well-intended and wise suggestion to SMT. We will be more than happy to convey it.

I think, looking at the leadership of SMT all the way from its Chairman to its CEO and its senior team, I have no doubt that they are open to all kinds of talent, whether they are men or women, and they will do everything they can to hold as many of them in this organisation and help to propel its forward transformation.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Speaker. If I may just quickly follow up with the question for Minister Josephine Teo. She mentioned that she felt that there was trust in our local media. I am wondering: (a) if she would also argue that our local media marketplace is generally competitive; and, hence, part (b) of my question would be, if that is so, whether consumers are actually exercising their choice, but perhaps they do not entirely trust the local media, with not purchasing the various publications of our local media outlets, which has, therefore, necessitated this usage of public funds to fund SMT.

Mr Speaker, it is not me that feel that our local mainstream media can be trusted. This is the readers voting with their hands when they swipe their mobile phones on the screen and giving that demonstration of confidence in our local mainstream media through the reach and engagement data that is publicly available.

It is not me claiming that the local mainstream media is trusted. They are asked these questions through surveys conducted by institutions that have good standing; I mentioned the Reuters Institute. They did not give this response to a question that I put to them; this is an independent survey done by a respected organisation. So, the facts speak for themselves and it is not for us to speculate why.

But I think what Assoc Prof Jamus Lim is trying to say is that, if they trust these local mainstream media so much, why are they not buying or paying for subscription? And if they were doing so, then the local mainstream media would not have to turn to the Government for funding support.

I thought that in my earlier responses to Members' questions, I had made it quite clear that this situation for print media companies is not unique to SMT. It is worldwide, whether it is in the US with the New York Times, or in the UK with The Guardian. It is very hard to translate eyeballs into dollars. And without advertising revenue, these media outlets and companies will be loss-making. The Guardian's example is a very stark one. And the figures I quoted, since 1998, they have been trying to be in the black. They managed to only in 2019, after two decades of transformation. And even then, last year, they had to cut people, 12% of the workforce.

So, it is not just your ability to reach audiences. The audiences can get news content free of charge almost anywhere. You and I are beneficiaries of that. We do not have to pay to get news, but we will choose where we spend our time, in order to get trusted news. And that is what is the most important of all and that is why our local mainstream media deserve to be supported.

15 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for National Development (a) how many firms in the built environment sector have ceased operations in 2021 due to insolvency, as compared to 2018 to 2020; (b) given the intention for the extended relief periods under the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020 (COTMA) to expire in Q1 2022, whether the Government is considering any transitional measures to prevent firms from suffering a hard landing; and (c) what are the examples of “unforeseen circumstances” which would see a further extension of the relief period under COTMA.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Government has put in place a wide range of support measures to help construction firms cope with the cost pressures brought about by COVID-19. This includes the $1.36 billion Construction Support Package to help firms in the construction industry cope with the cost of implementing safe management measures at worksites, as well as to co-share prolongation costs for public sector projects. Firms have also received support for their manpower costs through the Jobs Support Scheme and Foreign Worker Levy waivers and rebates. The Government has also put in place unprecedented legislative measures through the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act, or COTMA, to provide relief for contractors and to enable equitable co-sharing of increased costs by project parties due to the pandemic.

These measures have helped the construction industry tide over the COVID-19 pandemic. About 2,200 construction firms ceased operations in 2021, which is comparable to the average number of firms that wound up annually between 2018 and 2020. There were 2,187 firms that wound up in 2018; 2,347 firms that wound up in 2019; and 2,027 firms that wound up in 2020.

We do not take decisions to intervene in private contracts lightly. The COTMA reliefs are meant to be temporary and firms will need to partner one another for long-term sustainability and resilience. However, given the significant impact of COVID-19 on the Built Environment (BE) sector, we have extended the relevant COTMA reliefs several times. This has provided firms with additional time and support to negotiate amicable outcomes between the parties.

And we have seen encouraging signs of the sector’s recovery. Based on project progress payments made at the industry level, the current level of construction output is close to pre-COVID-19 levels. This indicates that construction works are progressing at a steady state. As such, barring any unforeseen circumstances, such as a severe industry-wide disruption to construction works caused by COVID-19, the reliefs under COTMA Part 2 and Part 8B will end on 28 February 2022. We strongly encourage all contracting parties to agree on mutually beneficial arrangements to sustain their projects.

Part 10A of COTMA has been extended until 31 March 2022. This Part pertains to the co-sharing of cost increases attributed to foreign Work Permit holder salaries. While the foreign manpower inflow has been improving in recent months, we will continue to monitor the situation and review whether a further extension is needed.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

Mr Speaker, I would like to thank the Minister of State for his reply. I have two supplementary questions, short ones. The progress that the Minister of State mentioned is good news, especially if COTMA is going to be tapered off this year. But I have a bit of concern in terms of expectations of disputes probably going up later this year, especially between contractors and their respective employers. So, my first question is whether there will be any low-cost ways for these firms to resolve disputes going forward, especially if measures taper? Secondly, are there any specific arrangements to transition workers from these BE firms that go out of business?

Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Member for the two supplementary questions. On the first point, I would just like to assure the Member that we are very focused on this issue, making sure that the construction works in the BE sector proceed safely and seamlessly. There are very important public sector projects, from housing to transportation, to private residential projects that we know are important to Singaporeans and we want to make sure the construction works continue smoothly and safely and that the entire sector is on a steady keel.

We have been in regular contact with the construction industry, the BE sector, from developers to consultants, architects, engineers, contractors, facility managers, companies big and small. Especially since the Government accounts for almost 60% of the total construction output in Singapore, we have been working very closely with the industry. All the Government agencies, the Government procurement entities, like HDB and LTA, have been working very closely with their contractors and their subcontractors, making sure that work continues.

So, I would just like to reassure the Member that we are monitoring the situation very closely. In fact, my colleagues from MOM and MND meet these firms on a very regular basis, going through issues of payment, workers, inflow of workers, salaries and so on.

On a related second point around the movement of workers, we have been working together with the Singapore Contractors' Association Limited, or SCAL, to look at different mechanisms. For instance, if one firm decides to wind up or decide to shed workers, how can the workers be so allocated or shared with other firms which may be growing their business? There are certain mechanisms in place, including the Manpower Exchange. We are also in close contact with the various firms through the Association. These are issues that we are working on very closely and we will monitor the situation in the coming months.

16 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked the Minister for Transport (a) what are the types and frequency of enforcement actions taken against errant active mobility device riders who speed or ride on pathways where they should not; and (b) whether more resources can be provided for stricter enforcement, especially on pathways affected by infrastructure works in the Central District.

Mr Speaker, Sir, for the safety of all path users, several teams of Active Mobility Enforcement Officers (AMEOs) are deployed daily, including at night, to deter and detect errant active mobility device riders. They also conduct frequent joint enforcement operations with NParks officers in parks and along park connectors. LTA has also been tapping on technology for enforcement, including a pilot deployment of mobile closed circuit televisions (CCTVs) to catch errant users and identification of hotspots based on public feedback from the MyTransport.SG mobile application.

Offenders caught speeding or using the wrong path, for example, e-scooter or power-assisted bicycle (PAB) riders who use footpaths, are issued with an offence form on the spot. AMEOs also conduct checks on active mobility devices to ensure that the devices meet the requirements stipulated by LTA and have not been illegally modified. Non-compliant devices will be immediately seized.

Where footpaths are affected by infrastructure works, LTA will ensure that alternative crossings or paths are available and signages are installed to guide path users. If necessary, LTA will deploy AMEOs to tackle egregious active mobility offences at these locations. With close to 6,000 kilometres of footpaths and cycling paths islandwide, enforcement alone will not prevent errant behaviour. Ultimately, path safety is a collective responsibility and we urge all users to play their part to use our shared spaces in a responsible manner.

Ms Denise Phua.

I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the answer. I would like to request special attention be given to especially the North-South Corridor (NSC), which is a long stretch of project works along roads in the Central District. Works, such as the NSC, are right in the residential areas in central Singapore, such as Thomson Road and so forth. Not anybody's fault, but it poses a lot of challenges for both LTA and the residents.

My grassroots and I meet very regularly with the LTA team. And I know they are trying really hard, but I think they will need a lot more resources to be dedicated to address a lot of these issues that happen. Things like the narrow pathways, where there are errant PMD riders and errant contractors who proceeded with noisy works even beyond the agreed hours. I feel so much that the LTA team needs a lot more support. I am, therefore, asking for MOT to direct more resources to support these staff, for a win-win for both the residents and the staff. I would like to request special attention and resources be given to the NSC staff working on the project in central Singapore.

I would like to thank Member Denise Phua for her very useful feedback, and also from grassroots leaders about the inconveniences caused by the works of the North-South Corridor, along Thomson-Balestier area.

Because of the works, a lot of the diversion has to take place and, therefore, the paths become a bit narrower than usual and, especially along bus stop areas, where there is a concentration of commuters, cyclists, it does pose a challenge.

So, with feedback, LTA has been periodically deploying enforcement officers at these areas to look out for errant riders. We really seek the public's understanding during this period. When the NSC is completed, there will be dedicated active mobility paths where users can enjoy such conveniences.

I also note Members' feedback about the works causing noise during certain hours. We will take note and we will work with the contractors to ensure that the works do not cause unnecessary disturbances or inconvenience to the Member's residents.

We will deploy necessary resources to manage this, but as the Member knows, the NSC is a huge project, spanning from the northern part of Singapore to downtown. So, we will have to manage our resources properly.

At this point, I would like to also take this opportunity to urge all path users, both pedestrians and active mobility riders, to really take note and, especially in crowded places, in narrow spaces, to look out for one another, slow down and play a part to ensure that our common spaces, our shared spaces, are being used safely by everybody.

17 Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan asked the Prime Minister in light of the Public Service being at the forefront of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and taking a toll on the workers in the Public Service (a) whether the Public Service is also seeing an increase in attrition; (b) what is being done to look after the health and welfare of workers in the Public Service; and (c) what is the Government doing to ensure that the compensation and benefits of workers in the Public Service remain competitive.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Public Service has seen an increase in attrition across the board. The resignation rate for the Management Executive Scheme, the largest generic scheme in the Civil Service, reached a 10-year peak of 9.9% in 2021 and the attrition has clearly picked up momentum in the last six months. Some specific segments, such as Info-communication Technology (ICT), are experiencing elevated competitive pressures in the face of talent shortages and facing resignation rates that are even higher.

There are various factors contributing to attrition from the Public Service, including pressures of the job, pay and opportunities for professional development and progression. In particular, over the past two years, public officers have had to face intense pressure, working tirelessly to sustain the fight against COVID-19. At times, they also have to deal with anxious and even demanding members of the public in the course of their COVID-19-related work. The shift to remote work has also blurred the line between work and life. There is a risk of an increase in attrition from the Public Service, as the economy recovers, and job offers from the private sector increase.

Amidst the high demands of the work, the Public Service will step up efforts to streamline processes and continue to provide clarity of direction in helping our officers relate their work and contributions to the core purpose of serving Singapore and Singaporeans. At the same time, the Service has also stepped up efforts to support and care for the health and mental well-being of public officers. We are conducting regular webinars on well-being-related topics, such as resilience, mindfulness, nutrition and physical exercise. We introduced a 24/7 counselling hotline as well as a "mindline at work", a digital platform to help public officers access mental health resources. We have also built up a community of over 900 Wellness Ambassadors from 80 agencies. These are public officers who have volunteered to be trained to provide basic emotional support to fellow colleagues and act as ambassadors for mental well-being.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Public Service will review salaries and benefits of public officers and adjust them where necessary to keep pace with the market. These periodic adjustments help to enable the Public Service to attract and retain its fair share of talent so that we can continue to deliver a high quality of services for Singaporeans. In addition, we have made several moves to enhance the employee value proposition of a career in the Public Service, by expanding job rotations and attachments outside the public sector, to make work more interesting and fulfilling as officers get to experience and learn new things constantly.

Mr Patrick Tay.

Sir, I thank the Minister for his reply. I have two supplementary questions. The first supplementary question is whether any of our Ministries, Statutory Boards or any key essential services in the public sector is at a critical manning level, hearing about the attrition earlier.

Secondly, what is the baseline work arrangement for the Public Service that is, the Ministries or the Statutory Boards, to ensure that as we move into the endemic state and the new normal, officers continue to have an acceptable level of mental health and wellness?

Mr Speaker, Sir, at this point in time, the general manning level of the Public Service is still healthy. But having said that, there are two areas of concern for me.

First, there might be some localised shortages, and we will have to redeploy our officers accordingly to serve the public and to maintain the standards of service we require. Thus far, we have been very fortunate that the Public Service officers have, in general, been able to be cross-deployed and help one another when the need arises. For example in the earlier reply to the Parliamentary Question (PQ), when MOH needed additional manpower to man the hotlines, we were able to mobilise resources from CPF and other volunteers from the Public Service in general, to be redeployed to help them on a temporary basis. So, we will continue to do this, and I would like to thank all the Public Service officers for stepping up to volunteer, to cover some of these gaps at the localised shortages.

But there is another area that I am concerned with, which is the longer-term impact, that is, our ability to make sure that we not only deliver the services for today, but we are also able to continue to improve our systems and processes for the future. In this particular area, the specific area of concern will be our ICT talent. Because in a lot of the ICT projects, we do need sufficient quantity and quality personnel in order to make sure that these projects are on track. Given the hot market in the private sector for ICT talent, it is, indeed, a big challenge for us to get our fair share of talent. Of course, we understand that in the Public Service, we do not compete just on the basis of pay, but we also compete on the basis of offering our people exciting and meaningful work. So, we will continue to work on this.

But, in general, to answer Mr Patrick Tay's first question, we are still able to hold up the system by redeploying and cross-deploying officers, as needed, to maintain the current level of service. But we must pay attention to the forward-looking services that we want to put in place to serve Singapore and Singaporeans better in time to come.

To Mr Patrick Tay's second question, there is not exactly a new baseline arrangement because the spectrum of Public Service officers' duties vary quite a lot. Quite a lot of the Public Service officers, including those in the Education Service, will not be able to have work-from-home arrangements because they do need to be present to man their stations. But having said that, for the rest of the Public Service who are able to work from home, then we will try to lock in some of these gains, whereby, they have more flexible work arrangements transiting between working from home and working at their respective stations, depending on the demands of the job situation at this point in time, and, of course, depending on the national posture for our plans to fight against COVID-19.

So, what the Public Service wants to do is to make sure that we lock in some of the gains that we have been able to achieve through the COVID-19 arrangement and allow greater and more flexible work arrangements for our people to the extent possible. But having said that, we all know that quite a large proportion of the Public Service officers are in jobs that are frontline, public-facing, and it will not be very possible for these jobs to have work-from-home arrangements. So, they will have to take turns, depending on their rotation cycles, to see whether they can enjoy some of these flexibilities that we also hope to give our public officers.

Mr Pritam Singh.

I would like to thank the Minister for his reply. Just to clarify with the Minister. The Minister shared that the haemorrhage in 2021 with respect to Public Service officers on the MX scheme of service was 9.9%. Can I just confirm, Minister, is this figure similar for Public Service officers in the ICT sector or is the percentage for that unique sector far higher than the 9.9% that Minister shared?

My second question pertains to the ICT sector. We all know, on the basis of what has happened over the last few years with regard to cybersecurity weaknesses and digitalisation being an important prong for the Government, that the need for ICT talent would be either increasing or certainly going to be a far, far more important aspect of the Public Service than it ever has been. Coming back to my question, the Minister has shared that the demand in the private sector for ICT talent is very hot. Indeed, that is true. The salaries are very high. What strategies does the Government have in mind to, in the Minister's words, attract the public sector's fair share of ICT talent, going forward?

Mr Speaker, Sir, the first answer to Mr Pritam Singh's question is, the attrition is higher in the ICT sector than the general 9.9% that I have mentioned. So, ICT sector is higher.

On the second part, it is an important question because in meeting our ICT needs for the Government as a whole, we do apply a multi-pronged approach. One, is, of course, we try to recruit our fair share of talent from the open market. That, we will continue to do. And that, we have to make sure that our projects, our work, they are all meaningful and fulfilling for the people who come in, over and above a competitive pay. So, hiring from outside is one.

Second, growing our own timber is another strategy that we adopt. When we say we grow our own timber, we talk about helping our people to upgrade their baseline ICT skills so that more people will be able to take on some of the tasks that are required in the overall public sector. Retraining some of our own people are also possibilities that we are embarking on. So, there is external recruitment, there is also growing our own timber.

The third prong that we use to meet our own ICT needs is also to rationalise the way we demand ICT manpower. For example, to the extent that we can aggregate projects of a similar nature, we will be able to do that because it helps us to save cost and reduce the demand on the ICT manpower. Of course, over the longer term, it also helps us to have a much more integrated Public Service ICT system.

So, through these various multi-pronged strategies, we hope to have a holistic arrangement to meet the ICT needs of our Public Service going forward.

18 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Health (a) what action is being taken to verify that all vaccinations or Antigen Rapid Test (ART) results administered by the clinics linked to the alleged vaccine fraud case are accurate and for any discrepancies to be corrected in the relevant database; and (b) what action will be taken against patients who receive falsified vaccinations or ART results.

Mr Speaker, MOH takes a serious view of the accuracy of vaccination records and Antigen Rapid Test (ART) results that are recorded and stored into our national systems, as this has a direct impact on public health and safety.

MOH had lodged a complaint with the Singapore Police Force as soon as our investigations against the alleged errant clinic detected false vaccination and false positive ART results. Both MOH and the Police are working closely to establish the false records in the clinical database. Investigations are ongoing but once the records are verified to be false, MOH will make the correction on our national systems immediately and these patients will have their vaccination or recovered status correctly recorded.

Patients who have obtained falsified vaccination status or false positive ART results and have had the false data uploaded to our national systems will also be referred to the Police for investigations.

Ms He Ting Ru.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for his reply. I think the second part of my question which relates to whether any further action will be taken against patients who have been found to have approached these doctors for false ART test results and vaccination records has not really been answered.

On the second part of my supplementary question, I would like to know whether there have been any proactive investigations carried out by the Ministry to find out if any other clinics are carrying out these false certifications, how many of these have been carried out and whether any other irregularities have been found.

Sir, I thank the Member for her question. The short answer is that we are always looking at the systems that we have in place to gather information for clinical results and information that is useful for us to fight the pandemic and to secure our public health systems. So, some of these include audits, some of these are about how we look after the licence issuing governance processes of the professionals at the clinical sites involved. But, so far, the system appears to be working well.

19 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what measures has the Ministry taken to diversify the sources of popular seafood and vegetable items ahead of major festivities; (b) whether existing measures have helped mitigate the rise in the costs of such items; and (c) whether more can be done to keep prices affordable for consumers.

Mr Speaker, the Government has been actively diversifying our food supply sources. Most of our top vegetable and seafood imports are well-diversified, with over 10 source countries, which include China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, various European countries, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and even Ecuador. This has helped to strengthen the resilience of our seafood and vegetable supplies.

Nonetheless, prices of popular food items tend to rise ahead of festive periods because of a surge in demand. Retailers and importers would try to mitigate this by planning ahead and securing more supplies from multiple sources.

Apart from the diversification of food import sources, the Government continues to work with the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE) to promote consumer awareness and help consumers make informed purchasing decisions.

Mr Melvin Yong.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have two supplementary questions and I thank the Minister of State for her reply earlier.

Singapore is a small city-state with very limited resources. Only 1% of our land is available for food production and over 90% of our food is imported. From a world that is increasingly being disrupted by both climate change and also supply chain issues, can the Minister of State share with us what are the factors that play a part in influencing food prices today and how is MTI helping to keep the prices of our food stable in spite of all these challenges?

Mr Speaker, Sir, I want to thank the Member Mr Melvin Yong for his two supplementary questions. I want to assure him and everyone in the House that MTI, the Government and the various Government agencies will spare no efforts in our multi-pronged strategy to keep our food supplies and food prices stable.

He has two supplementary questions. On the first one, he asked what are the factors that contribute to and influence the cost of food. There are many. There are a combination of factors and these include imported prices, animal feed, energy costs, freight costs, labour costs, seasonal weather patterns and possible supply chain disruptions. I want to share with Mr Melvin Yong that the regional weather disruptions that are currently putting upside pressures on Singapore's imported food prices should fade as the monsoon season passes. The general appreciation of the Singapore dollar against the currencies of many of our key import source countries will also continue to temper cost pressures.

To Mr Melvin Yong's second supplementary question, as a small and open economy that imports most of our food supply, Singapore is, indeed, impacted by trade and possible supply chain disruptions. The Government has in place a multi-pronged strategy involving import diversification, local production "30 by 30" and also stockpiling to reduce the impact of unforeseen disruptions to our food supply. This also serves to lower our vulnerability to larger price fluctuations and ensure that the prices remain competitive. This strategy is important because, to a certain extent, it will help to act as an important hedge to mitigate the risks of price and also supply disruptions.

I want to assure Mr Melvin Yong that to ensure the continuity of our food supply, MTI has been working very closely with our local companies, especially in the past few years, to ensure sufficient supply of essential food items.

Today, we import our food from 170 countries all over the world. I also want to add that our multi-level mitigation efforts include bringing in stocks ahead of time where possible by working closely with our importers, distributors and even our retailers to anticipate and even mitigate delays as well as closely monitoring and looking out for potential disruptors.

I was very heartened and I am sure all of us are very heartened to learn about the efforts by our retailers, such as the FairPrice Group and some of our supermarkets. They are making concerted efforts to moderate prices despite the cost pressures and disrupted supply chain. Just yesterday, we read that FairPrice supermarket announced their "Stretch Your Dollar" campaign which will give consumers and customers a weekly additional 5% discount on basic food items every Friday, I believe, starting on 4 March. And besides existing discount schemes for the Pioneer and Merdeka Generations and blue CHAS cardholders, FairPrice is lowering or holding the prices of popular breakfast items stable in their Kopitiam and Foodfare chains. And this morning, as I read the Lianhe Zaobao, I was also very heartened to read that not just FairPrice but other supermarkets, like Giant, Sheng Siong, Prime and also HAO mart, have also come up with very creative ways to keep the prices to consumers friendly. So, I want to assure Mr Melvin Yong and everyone in the House that MTI, the Government and relevant agencies, like SFA and MSE, will spare no efforts in our multi-pronged approach to keep our food supply and food prices stable.

20 Dr Shahira Abdullah asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment what measures will be introduced to ensure that supermarkets and other corporate entities do not pass on the costs of adopting sustainability-friendly measures to consumers.

21 Dr Shahira Abdullah asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment what measures will the Ministry introduce to encourage supermarkets to (i) reduce packaging waste (ii) use more sustainable forms of packaging and (iii) reduce the need for groceries to be pre-packaged, without passing on the cost of sustainability to consumers.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your permission to take the next two questions together?

Yes, please.

Thank you. The transition to a sustainable and greener economy is necessary for Singapore to thrive in a carbon and resource-constrained future. Consumers are increasingly demanding sustainable products and services. Consumers are also choosing to buy from businesses with more sustainable practices. Businesses have responded by adopting more sustainable practices and introducing greener goods and services. The pricing of these products and services is part of this commercial decision.

In some cases, products and services may cost a bit more. But in a competitive market, businesses will compete to provide consumers with the most value-for-money products and services. As sustainable products and services become more mainstream, economies of scale could bring down costs. There could also be cost savings from going green. For example, energy-efficient products may cost more upfront but provide savings over their life cycle.

Packaging waste is one of our main waste streams and a priority area for waste reduction for my Ministry. We have required large producers of packaged products and retailers, including supermarkets, to report annually the amount of packaging they introduce into Singapore, as well as their plans to reduce, reuse or recycle packaging. This Mandatory Packaging Reporting framework focuses companies’ attention on the packaging that they are placing on the market and encourages them to reduce packaging use. It also lays the foundation for an Extended Producer Responsibility scheme for packaging waste eventually.

Packaging serves an important function of reducing damage, minimising cross-contamination and enhancing the shelf-life of certain food types, thereby reducing wastage of food products. Supermarkets and businesses can preserve the quality of their products through more sustainable packaging models, such as reusable and refillable packaging.

The Singapore Manufacturing Federation and NEA launched the Packaging Partnership Programme in 2021 to support companies in adopting sustainable packaging waste management practices through workshops and resources.

I encourage businesses to minimise waste in their use of packaging and consumers to avoid the excessive use of packaging.

I thank the Minister for her clarification. I just have two supplementary questions.

I am very happy that we have this Packaging Partnership Programme. I realise it has been there for a few years. Would the Minister know how has the take-up rate for this programme improved over the years or has it stayed the same? And how are the companies being encouraged to take up this Packaging Partnership Programme so that consumers would have a wider range of choices who prefer food products or packages that have greener carbon footprints because I realise that they can actually put a logo for reduced packaging for these particular companies?

I thank the Member for the supplementary question. As I have mentioned, this Packaging Partnership Programme is something new that we have launched in 2021. At the moment, we have conducted 12 events, including sessions of workshops, two webinars, five training sessions for the companies. They are across the entire packaging supply chain from packaging, manufacturing and logistics service providers to retailers, such as supermarkets.

This is something new. It is for sustainable packaging, and we hope that more companies will come on board and we hope that the programme, through its time, will bring about more sustainable packaging practices into the market.

Order. End of question time. Ministerial Statement. Minister Lawrence Wong.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), Written Answers to Question Nos 22 and 24-59 on the Order Paper are reproduced in the Appendix. The remaining Questions have been postponed to a later Sitting of Parliament or withdrawn.]

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am speaking in my capacity as Finance Minister and also as the Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). Today, Minister Josephine Teo, Minister of State Desmond Tan and I will address a total of 39 Parliamentary Questions (PQs) that have been posed to MAS, MCI and MHA arising from the recent OCBC phishing scams. They cover a wide range of issues – from whether the banks can do more to mitigate the risks of such scams, to how the telco infrastructure, enforcement actions and consumer education can be enhanced to deal with this growing problem. The breadth of the issues raised underscores that we need to take an ecosystem approach to strengthen our collective defence against phishing scams and scams in general. Everyone in this ecosystem must play their part.

The Ministerial Statements will explain the Government’s comprehensive approach, working with each party in the ecosystem, to counter the threat of phishing scams. I will provide more details on the OCBC phishing scam and on the steps that MAS and the banks are taking to strengthen safeguards against such scams. Minister Josephine Teo will then set out the measures being taken to enhance the broader communications infrastructure. And Minister of State Desmond Tan will elaborate on measures to strengthen enforcement and consumer education.

None of these measures can be foolproof in and of themselves, but, collectively, they should work to significantly reduce the scope for scams to succeed and their cost. With everyone on guard, including individuals, the industry and infrastructure providers, we hope not to see a recurrence of a large-scale scam as was seen in the OCBC case.

Taken together, Minister Josephine Teo, Minister of State Desmond Tan and I will address Oral Question Nos 7 to 32 and Written Question Nos 1, 2 and 8 on yesterday’s Order Paper, Oral Question Nos 1 to 5 and Written Question Nos 1, 2, 9 and 27 on today’s Order Paper. Mr Mohd Fahmi Bin Aliman has filed an Oral Question scheduled for a future Sitting on these issues. As today’s Ministerial Statements will address these questions, Mr Speaker, I would like to invite these Members to seek clarifications should they have any on these issues after the Statements.

Let me first round up the key facts regarding the recent OCBC SMS phishing scam. Seven hundred ninety OCBC customers lost a total of $13.7 million to the scammers, mostly over the year-end festive period from 23 December to 30 December. This is by far the most serious phishing scam we have seen involving spoofed SMSes impersonating banks.

Spoofed SMSes were sent with a fake sender ID, which, in many cases, made them appear in the same message thread as genuine SMSes. The victims, having received the spoofed SMSes in the same thread of messages from OCBC, were deceived into clicking the links in these SMSes that led them to scam websites. These scam websites were almost indistinguishable from the real OCBC website, such that people could not tell the difference unless they compared the URL of the scam website with that of the genuine one. Hence, many keyed their login credentials and one-time passwords (OTPs) into the scam websites. The scammers used these credentials and OTPs to take control of the victims’ bank accounts and made fraudulent transfers.

I should add that this was not a cyber attack on OCBC but a phishing scam on OCBC’s customers who were deceived into providing their banking credentials and OTPs at scam websites set up by the scammers. At no time was the bank’s own systems breached.

In its efforts to stem the phishing scam, OCBC took various actions. It warned customers to be alert to spoofed SMSes, initially through general advisories on its website, and then, subsequently, through SMSes and emails to customers; it worked with the Singapore Police Force and the Cyber Security Agency to block and take down the scam websites; it ceased sending customers SMSes with clickable links; it enhanced its anti-scam controls; and it verified through a phone call every customer who submitted a request for digital token activation.

These actions were taken at various stages during the month as the phishing scams built up. OCBC should, however, have responded faster and more robustly at the first sign of the scams, which the bank had picked up in early December. OCBC informed MAS on 24 December that it had activated its incident response team. By then, the OCBC call centre was overwhelmed. It faced a surge in calls from affected customers as well as other worried customers who had not themselves received phishing messages. Despite the bank deploying additional resources, some affected customers experienced delays in reaching the bank to report the scams. To address Dr Tan Wu Meng’s query, prior to the OCBC incident, MAS had received only a few complaints concerning delays in customer service related to similar scams, in other words, the spoofed SMSes that impersonated banks.

OCBC has apologised for falling short of its own expectations in customer service and response. As a one-off goodwill gesture, the bank has undertaken to reimburse in full all customers affected by this phishing scam. It has made arrangements to do so with all the affected customers. To date, more than 90% of them have received reimbursements and the remaining reimbursements should be disbursed soon.

OCBC has also engaged an independent external party to conduct a thorough review of its anti-scam processes, including fraud surveillance, incident management and customer service, and to recommend necessary remedial actions, on top of what it has already done.

MAS will review these findings, take appropriate supervisory actions against the bank and closely monitor the bank’s implementation of remedial measures.

MAS has long had in place expectations for banks to have measures to secure the risk of digital banking. For example, banks have to implement multi-factor authentication, such as dynamic passwords or OTPs that can only be used once, to verify the customer’s identity and to authorise online transactions; they must maintain fraud monitoring systems to facilitate timely detection and blocking of suspicious transactions; and they must send notification alerts to customers for outgoing transactions, including credit card transactions, that exceed a threshold that customers can determine, so that they can report unauthorised transactions as soon as possible.

SPF, MAS and banks have also been issuing regular advisories to alert the public to online scams. Minister of State Desmond Tan will touch on that later.

In view of the increase in the number of scam cases, particularly in the last two years, MAS had, in the third quarter of last year, carried out a focused supervisory review of the adequacy of fraud controls in the digital banking channels of the three local banks.

The review surfaced a number of gaps. In October 2021, MAS conveyed to each of the banks its specific findings and recommendations for the remediation of the gaps observed.

The banks had committed to timelines to take these remedial actions, with most measures to be fully implemented by June 2022, while those requiring extensive changes in IT systems to be completed by December 2022, at the latest. In agreeing to the timelines for implementation, MAS was mindful that the banks had multiple priorities, including mitigating the overarching cybersecurity threat that has been rising and ensuring business continuity and robust risk management, amidst COVID-19.

When faced with the escalation in phishing scams in December 2021, OCBC fast-tracked the implementation of some of the measures identified in MAS’ supervisory review. For example, it extended the cooling period after a digital token is set up on a new mobile device, during which, higher risk transactions cannot be carried out.

The recent OCBC scam signifies a step-up in the persistence and deceptiveness of phishing scams involving banks. The scammers used a combination of well-orchestrated tactics, to achieve a level of realism not seen in previous phishing scams. The Government is, therefore, further strengthening the safeguards in digital banking channels and the broader ecosystem to help thwart this enhanced threat.

MAS has accelerated the process of strengthening anti-scam control standards across all retail banks. As an urgent first step in this process, MAS and the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) announced a set of additional measures on 19 January 2022 for immediate implementation by retail banks in Singapore. These measures will substantially bolster the security of digital banking against scammers employing similar tactics as the OCBC scam cases. The measures include removing clickable links in all bank emails and SMSes sent to retail customers; delaying by at least 12 hours before a new soft token can be activated on a mobile device; lowering to $100 or below the default threshold for sending transaction notifications to customers; sending a notification alert to the customer’s existing mobile number or email registered with the bank whenever there is a request for change; sending scam alerts directly to customers through email or SMS; and setting up dedicated call centre teams on a 24/7 basis to assist customers facing a potential scam and to freeze compromised accounts immediately to prevent further illicit withdrawals.

These measures have reduced the risk of successful phishing scams. But they do not eliminate them altogether. Beyond these immediate measures, banks can and should do more to safeguard their customers.

MAS and ABS have stepped up work on further measures to comprehensively strengthen banks’ ability to deter, detect and combat phishing scams. Members have also raised some useful suggestions on additional measures that can be put in place. Let me outline the key measures that are being considered with regard to banks.

First, banks are working to further strengthen their fraud surveillance capabilities to identify suspicious and anomalous transactions. This includes credit card transactions. Most banks do have some rule-based parameters to trigger suspicion, for example, large transfers to a new recipient. But these parameters need to be expanded to take account of a broader range of scam scenarios. Beyond pre-defined parameters, MAS will expect banks to develop more versatile algorithms employing artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect suspicious transactions. Such algorithms should be based on multiple sources of information, including customer profile and vulnerabilities, past transaction patterns, account activity and mobile device identification. I must caveat that while these advances will help, fraud monitoring systems are not a silver bullet. It is not possible to detect every scam.

Second, banks should step up their ability to immediately block suspicious transactions and reach out to their customers to verify their authenticity. The transactions will be unblocked and processed only upon confirmation by the customer. Banks today do have some of these capabilities, but they are not consistent across various types of transactions. We are also looking into enabling customers to trigger a freeze on their own accounts without having to contact the banks if they suspect their accounts have been compromised.

Third, MAS and the banks are looking to introduce additional customer confirmations – not just notifications – for significant changes to their accounts or high-risk transactions, such as changes in account holder details, activating a token on another device, fund transfers that are large relative to their overall balances and overseas transfers. This will introduce some friction to customers carrying out genuine transactions. But we will all need to adapt and get used to these inconveniences, in order to strengthen the security of digital banking.

Fourth, banks are exploring expanding the use of biometric technology, in addition to passwords and OTPs, as a means of authentication. This will add one more layer of security that cannot be easily phished by scammers to access a customer’s account.

Fifth, banks will accelerate the shift towards the use of mobile banking apps for customer authentication, transaction authorisation and delivery of bank notifications. If implemented well, it will be harder for scammers to abuse mobile banking apps. At the same time, MAS and the banks are reviewing the use of SMS to deliver OTPs and the potential measures that should be taken to reduce risk if such a practice should continue.

Sir, there is no single measure that can guarantee the security of digital banking. The techniques employed by scammers are constantly evolving and gaining in sophistication. This is why in the fight against scams, banks need to employ a combination of measures in prevention, detection, response and recovery, and constantly review and recalibrate these measures.

Most of our banks already have many of these measures in place in one form or another. MAS will work with the banks to strengthen these measures and set minimum parameters. But it would be counter-productive to publish the specific calibration of these controls. This is no different from why the red flags that banks look out for to detect money laundering transactions are not published in full.

The enhanced measures that banks are taking will mitigate the risks posed by phishing scams. But realistically, it will not be possible to eliminate such scams completely.

MAS has set out expectations for banks to treat their customers fairly when looking into reports of fraudulent transactions. These include comprehensively investigating all cases and suspending late fees for disputed card transactions. Disputed transactions will not adversely affect consumers’ credit records with licensed credit bureaus during the investigation period.

Beyond this, it is important to establish a common and equitable framework for sharing the losses incurred by the customer. No matter which bank you go to, you should still receive the same fair treatment. OCBC’s recent goodwill payouts to fully cover customer losses were made as a one-off gesture and do not set a general precedent for future cases.

The Payments Council chaired by MAS has been working on a framework for equitable sharing of losses arising from scams. Under this framework, both banks and their customers have their respective responsibilities and the share of losses each party bears will depend on whether and how the party has fallen short of its responsibilities. Financial institutions should bear an appropriate share of losses arising from scams, but care must also be taken to ensure that any compensation paid to customers does not weaken their incentive to be vigilant.

MAS aims to publish the framework for public consultation within the next three months. Other than financial institutions, the players operating the communications infrastructure play a key role in digital security against scams. So, MCI and MAS will consider the shared responsibilities of all the key parties in the ecosystem to ensure that there is proper accountability.

To conclude, Sir, let me assure Members that digital banking itself is safe and secure. The threat we are facing is one of deception of customers, where scammers mimic bona fide communications and transactions to gain the trust of victims, induce in them a heightened state of anxiety or excitement, and exploit their lapse of attention to steal their credentials and passwords.

In the same way that we are all vulnerable to misinformation, we are also vulnerable to scams and must not be complacent. The digital world we live in today demands a posture of constant vigilance. The additional measures put in place by banks will mean more controls that a scammer will have to overcome, but they cannot guarantee that a customer will not be deceived.

SPF and MoneySense, the national financial education programme, will continue to step up their public education efforts to provide useful tools and tips that can help members of the public avoid falling prey to scams. There is no dominant customer profile of scam victims across different scam types, whether by education, wealth, age or gender. Everyone needs to be on their guard.

The problem of scams requires robust responses at the individual, industry and infrastructure levels – in short, an ecosystem approach where the various measures work in synergistic fashion. We are addressing the risks at every part of the digital ecosystem, so that, taken together, the measures will significantly mitigate risks for the entire system and enable us to operate safely in a digital world.

As I had explained earlier, this must involve the financial sector but it must go beyond it. MAS has been working in close coordination with MHA and MCI on a Government-wide approach towards scams. So, Minister Josephine Teo and Minister of State Desmond Tan will elaborate on this in their Statements.

Minister for Communications and Information and Minister of State for Home Affairs will be making related Ministerial Statements. I will allow Members to raise points of clarifications on all three Statements after the third Statement. Minister Josephine Teo.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scams have been around a long time. However, technology has increasingly enabled scammers to operate at scale across the globe and their tactics have become more sophisticated by the year. Yet, while the tactics have changed, at its heart, scammers use the tried-and-tested formula of exploiting their victims’ fears and hopes.

Scammers do not respect geographical boundaries, seeking out victims wherever they can. These scams would often have originated abroad.

Minister Lawrence Wong has spoken about the enhanced protections in our banking system. I will focus on the upstream measures – how we can intervene through our communications infrastructure to fight scams. Minister of State Desmond Tan will speak later about enforcement as well as the continuing, crucial efforts in public education.

But, first, let me assure Members that the OCBC scams were not the result of a cyber attack or weaknesses in cybersecurity. This addresses questions by Mr Alex Yam regarding CSA’s assessment and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim on whether financial institutions met cybersecurity standards.

If I could use an analogy in the physical world, the scammers in this case did not manufacture a special key or special keys to break into the bank premises and to steal from the customers’ deposit boxes. Instead, they stood in front of the bank and tricked customers into handing over their identity cards (IC) and keys. They then pretended to the bank teller that they were the real customers, accessed the deposit boxes and cleared them out quickly.

Why did the victims fall prey? Because the scammer looked real by wearing the correct uniform and name tag bearing the bank’s logo. Why did the bank fall prey? Because the scammer was in possession of items that only real customers were expected to have.

In the physical world, the scammer’s pressure tactics to hand over the IC and key might have raised an alarm. Likewise, for the bank, branch managers might have noticed and made gentle enquiries as to the hurried manner in which the deposit boxes were emptied out. But in the digital world, where we have become so used to instant communications and transactions, our guard is down.

The OCBC scam was, therefore, not a result of a cyber attack or a breach of cybersecurity, which, typically, involves hacking or breaking into a system to steal information or assets. Instead, it was a classic case of deception, executed with speed and repeated at scale.

The use of SMS to reach potential victims is, unfortunately, becoming even more common and sophisticated. But it is not the only channel. Scammers have used it together with phone calls and emails to phish for information or spoof legitimate organisations. In other words, scammers are taking advantage of our communications infrastructure to reach even more potential victims, faster.

To combat phishing and spoofing by scammers, we should disrupt as many parts of their modus operandi as possible. Apart from enhanced safeguards in the banking system to prevent scams from easily succeeding, upstream measures are also needed to disrupt scammers’ reach to potential victims. Ms Joan Pereira and Mr Christopher de Souza are, therefore, right to ask how we can strengthen our defences through our telco networks.

It is useful to first step through how a phishing and spoofing scam is usually carried out. Typically, the scammer starts by contacting the victim, through phone calls or SMS. The victim is then tricked into surrendering their credentials or personal information.

In many cases, the act of surrendering credentials and personal information takes place on a scam website, something designed to look like the real website of a legitimate organisation. Compared to asking for such information by phone or SMS, no direct human interactions are required since victims themselves enter their details on a scam website. This allows such scams to be processed with greater scale and speed. And this is why much of our upstream measures have focused on blocking scam websites. It is a key part of disrupting the scammers’ plans.

On any given day, more than 90% of Singaporeans go online for various activities. SPF and IMDA work closely with Internet Service Providers to block scam websites. When consumers are led by scammers to these websites, they will be alerted to be vigilant.

In 2020, we blocked about 500 suspected scam websites. By 2021, the net had been cast much more widely and 12,000 such websites were blocked. Countless more victims would have been otherwise scammed. In fact, we have the capacity to block many more suspicious websites.

However, this does not mean that they will completely disappear from our screens. This is because scammers react quickly and dynamically to such blocks.

In the OCBC case, more than 350 scam websites have been blocked. At the peak, we blocked around 52 sites in a single day or one every 30 minutes. But the scammers were quick to create new websites over the course of their campaign.

This pattern of behaviour will persist. Nonetheless, website blocking remains important. We will continue to strengthen detection and reporting mechanisms to be more responsive.

As mentioned by Minister Wong earlier, the banks will be enhancing their fraud surveillance systems. Government agencies will also explore the use of artificial intelligence to more quickly identify and block scam websites.

In addition, the National Crime Prevention Council will start a WhatsApp channel to crowdsource from the public, information on scam websites and messages. To ensure processes are in place for proper follow-up, this channel will be launched by the third quarter of this year.

Website blocking is part of the suite of upstream measures to disrupt the scammers’ plans. But before they are lured to a scam website, victims may have been contacted by phone or SMS. Sometimes, the scammers get what they want without even leading the victim to a scam website.

Members will be familiar with scam callers impersonating officials from China. These scams started several years ago.

During COVID-19 times, the scam callers switched their masquerades, pretending to be the Police or other trusted organisations, such as MOH. Their messages were adapted to exploit concerns about vaccination or other COVID-19-related measures.

These calls deploy what is known as "social engineering" techniques to cause fear and panic in their victims, using topical concerns that scammers know people are worried about. As most of these calls come from overseas, scammers will often seek to appear more credible by spoofing local numbers.

An important set of upstream measures, therefore, involves blocking these suspicious calls. Every month, the telcos block around 15 million, or one in seven of all incoming overseas calls to Singapore.

We expect the number of scam calls to rise, given the changing tactics of scammers to increase their reach. They include, for example, incoming overseas calls that resemble phone numbers of our local Government agencies or emergency services.

Overseas scam callers may also add a prefix "65", without the "+" prefix, to give the impression that they are calling from within Singapore. Since April 2020, telcos have also added the “+” prefix for all incoming overseas calls, to help alert their customers.

Many scam calls were averted through such measures. But more is needed. Our telcos plan to incorporate additional analytics to block more of these suspected scam calls. We estimate that up to 55 million calls will be blocked each month.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked about the Do Not Call (DNC) registry.

The DNC registry was not designed to prevent scam messages. Instead, it was created to allow individuals to opt out of receiving unsolicited telemarketing messages or calls. Scammers will, of course, not take the trouble to check this registry before conducting their illegal activities.

Mr Speaker, the extent of call blocking needed shows just how persistent scammers are in reaching potential victims. Even if our telcos can block millions of incoming overseas calls, we must not be lulled into a false sense of security. Moreover, as each avenue becomes harder to break through, scammers turn to other channels. In the case of the OCBC scams, the SMS channel was exploited.

To better understand how it happened, it is useful, firstly, to recognise that SMS is an old technology.

For many Singaporeans, it is more common these days to communicate with each other using messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Nevertheless, SMS is still being used by many organisations because it is a cheap and convenient way to reach many customers. All handphones, whether smart or not, can receive SMS. But the SMS system was never designed for secure communications. Together with its widespread use, this makes it an attractive channel for scammers to reach potential victims.

For example, legitimate senders can use an alphanumeric ID to make themselves more easily known to customers. Instead of a string of numbers, customers receive an SMS from a sender identified as, say, "ABC company". However, this alphanumeric ID is not automatically protected as part of the SMS protocol. This means, unfortunately, that a scammer can use the same alphanumeric ID "ABC Company" and enter the message thread between the legitimate business sender and its customer. Members know by now this was what happened in the OCBC scams. As a result, the victims did not even realise they were communicating with the scammer, rather than OCBC itself.

Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Yip Hon Weng and Mr Melvin Yong asked how SMS could be made safer.

The gap I described above had, in fact, been identified by MAS and IMDA. Last year, the agencies started a pilot for SMS Sender ID protection. An organisation can register the alphanumeric ID that they use, thus reducing the risk of an illegitimate sender spoofing the same alphanumeric ID and having the message appear within the same message thread. MAS has decided that all major retail banks must sign up to register the alphanumeric IDs they use to communicate with their customers. The Government has also committed that all its agencies will do likewise.

In addition, IMDA will require SMS service providers and telcos to check SMS senders against the registry. SMSes that try to spoof registered IDs will thus not be delivered, as the sender details would not match registry records. All organisations seeking to send SMSes using registered IDs to phone subscribers in Singapore must also have a valid Unique Enterprise Number (UEN). This will help Police with investigations in the event of a scam.

Once these immediate measures are completed, the threat surface will be reduced. However, if an alphanumeric ID is not placed by an organisation into the registry, it cannot be protected. Observers have also pointed out that scammers can still use similar-looking alphanumeric IDs that are not in the registry, to trick potential victims.

To further close these gaps, we will consider requiring all users of alphanumeric IDs to be registered. Scammers will then not be able to send SMS using alphanumeric IDs except by joining the registry. This protects legitimate senders. It will also provide more assurance to receivers of SMS messages that an alphanumeric ID indicates a registered source.

These further measures will take time to implement and come at a cost, including to businesses. Businesses that choose not to register alphanumeric IDs will have their SMS messages appear only with their telephone number. Their customers can then choose to save the number in their own contact list to help them recognise future messages.

Given the implications, IMDA will study this matter carefully before deciding whether or not to mandate the registration of all alphanumeric IDs.

At the same time, organisations should rethink how they use SMS to communicate with their customers. As I have mentioned earlier, SMS was never meant for secure communications. Where the message contains or will lead to the transmission of sensitive, confidential information or high value transactions, there should be more restraint. It is like our postal services. They are generally safe, but we would not send very valuable items even using registered post.

One other area that Dr Shahira Abdullah asked about was clickable links. Although her question was related to its use by MOH, the considerations are applicable to many other agencies and companies.

Members will know that clickable links are everywhere. They appear on websites, in our emails and, of course, our SMS messages. You find them, too, in WhatsApp, Telegram and many other apps. They are used extensively because they are highly effective in getting people to take action. For example, using such links, millions of vaccination appointments were quickly and conveniently booked.

Unfortunately, clickable links have also been used for criminal purposes. MAS has ensured that banks discontinue their use in SMS communications with customers. However, the removal of clickable links in many other settings will only erode convenience. More importantly, the loss of effective outreach in cases like vaccination registration could be detrimental to our people. A blanket removal must, therefore, be very carefully considered.

Mr Speaker, please allow me to briefly summarise in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, some Members asked if the OCBC scam was a result of a cyber attack, or a breach of the bank's IT system which had enabled the criminals to carry out their crimes.

This is not the case. In the series of scams, the criminals did not hack into the bank's IT system to steal money. What they did were classic acts of deception by misleading the victims into believing that they were communicating with the bank and, therefore, tricking the victims into providing their account details. With these stolen account details, scammers then logged into the victims’ bank accounts and stole the victims’ hard-earned monies via electronic transfers.

Once again, the communication system has become the channel for scammers to get into contact with victims at scale and quickly. However, compared to the past, the scammers’ acts of deception were far more realistic this time.

MAS has since stepped-up countermeasures. Meanwhile, IMDA has enhanced preventive measures in the communication infrastructure, and MHA has also strengthened public education efforts. In combination, these multi-layered measures are aimed at disrupting scam syndicates' modus operandi.

However, we all know that every move that we make to derail the syndicates will be countered by more sophisticated moves by them. When carrying out their crimes, the scammers have no regard for borders nor the law; whenever we come up with new countermeasures, they will certainly also be cooking up new ways to continue with their operations.

Even with new measures in place, everyone in the ecosystem must work together and raise our defences in all areas to prevent these criminals from succeeding easily.

(In English): Mr Speaker, our additional safeguards underscore the importance of telcos in combating phishing and spoofing scams.

As part of our efforts to continuously strengthen our defences, we will require telcos to put in place enhanced safeguards in our networks. This includes blocking scam calls, SMSes and websites. We also expect them to do more to help their customers avoid becoming victims. Scammers change methods and tactics to evade detection and our capabilities will need to, likewise, adapt. IMDA will work with the telcos to continuously strengthen their anti-scam capabilities.

We should recognise that, even with best efforts, the network defences alone cannot block all scams. At every part of the chain, upstream and downstream, we are taking steps to reduce the risk. The measures in our communications infrastructure, for example, reduce the available avenues for scammers to reach victims. As mentioned by Minister Lawrence Wong, MCI is also working with MAS to consider the shared responsibilities of all the key stakeholders in the ecosystem. Taken together, we should be able to significantly reduce the risk of consumers falling victim to scams.

Mr Speaker, I believe Mr Christopher de Souza has correctly characterised the problem of scams as one needing a multi-pronged response. Indeed, I would add that our approach is an ecosystem approach — what was described by Minister Lawrence Wong. This has multiple layers of defence – no single layer providing a complete answer, but all layers reinforcing each other to disrupt the scammers' plans.

To Mr Sitoh Yih Pin's question, this will prevent some types of scams from recurring. But our best defence against new types of scams is a vigilant public. Ultimately, they determine the extent to which we can prevent scams.

The public should, therefore, also arm themselves with knowledge on scams and how to protect themselves and their loved ones who might be less tech-savvy. There are tools, such as ScamShield, that can help to prevent some scam calls and SMSes. Minister of State Desmond Tan will say more on these later.

At the same time, for our own long-term success as a nation, digital transformation must continue. Mr Alex Yam is rightly concerned about the impact of these scams on digital adoption.

We will strengthen public confidence in online transactions, raise awareness on good cyber-hygiene habits and bolster the digital resilience of our citizens, a call also made by Miss Cheng Li Hui. This is part of a whole-of-nation approach to safeguard Singaporeans against online threats, especially for the more vulnerable groups.

As part of these efforts, IMDA launched the Digital for Life (DfL) Movement to galvanise the people, private and public sectors to provide Singaporeans with skills, tools and habits to navigate the digital domain safely and confidently.

Many partners have kickstarted projects related to digital literacy and wellness. For example, the Lions Befrienders led a project, "Say No to Scams", where staff and volunteers teach seniors about staying safe from online scams and harms. This included measures, such as changing settings and installing apps, to increase security on smartphones. They are also working on a scam simulation app to help seniors identify scams.

The DfL Movement will do its part to complement efforts by SPF, the National Crime Prevention Council and CSA.

For example, the curriculum for seniors offered by the SG Digital Office has been updated to provide cybersecurity tips on topics, such as Digital Government services, e-payments and digital transactions. The Media Literacy Council (MLC) has also produced tip sheets on e-commerce scams, online impersonation scams and loan scams. These are available and translated into the vernacular languages for different audiences.

All of us – banking institutions, telco operators, Government, businesses, individuals – have a role to play in the fight against scams.

Across the ecosystem, making these changes may result in additional cost and some loss of convenience. But they are necessary to better safeguard our people from scams. Equally importantly, they will help to uphold confidence in our digital journey.

Minister of State Desmond Tan.

Mr Speaker, Minister Lawrence Wong and Minister Josephine Teo have given an update on the measures to secure banking and communications channels from phishing scams.

I chair the Inter-Ministry Committee on Scams, or IMCS in short, which was set up in April 2020. The IMCS brings together Government agencies, such as MHA, SPF, MCI, MAS and MTI, and also works with private sector partners, such as the Association of Banks in Singapore, or ABS, to coordinate efforts to combat all scam types. These include phishing scams, job scams, loan scams, just to name a few, as well as e-commerce scams. IMCS focuses its efforts to coordinate across agencies to review the scam types and trends, as well as to propose countermeasures. It also enhances enforcement and responses to these scams. Thirdly, IMCS strengthens public education and vigilance against scams.

My Statement will focus on two aspects of our anti-scam strategy: enforcement and education.

The main challenge in enforcement is that the vast majority of scams are perpetrated by syndicates that are based overseas. Such cases are difficult to investigate and prosecute for three reasons.

Firstly, our ability to solve these cases depends on the level of cooperation from overseas law enforcement agencies, as well as their ability to track down scammers in their own jurisdictions.

Second, these scammers are typically part of an organised criminal syndicate. They run sophisticated transnational operations which are not easy to detect or dismantle. The syndicates are well-resourced and adept at using technology to cover their tracks.

Thirdly, when monies have already been transferred out of Singapore, recovery is very difficult.

SPF works closely with our overseas counterparts to exchange information and conduct joint operations. For example, in 2021, SPF’s collaboration with law enforcement agencies, such as the Royal Malaysia Police, as well as Hong Kong, led to the takedown of 16 scam syndicates and the arrest of around 230 persons.

Coming back to the OCBC phishing scams, Dr Tan Wu Meng, Mr Sitoh Yih Pin and Mr Dennis Tan asked for an update on the ongoing investigations into the OCBC phishing scam.

As at 13 February, SPF has frozen 121 local bank accounts and recovered about $2 million. In addition, about $2.2 million of victims’ funds have been traced to 89 overseas bank accounts.

Based on SPF’s preliminary investigations, at least 107 local and 171 overseas IP addresses were linked to the unauthorised access of the victims’ Internet banking accounts. Many of the scam websites used in the phishing scam were hosted by web hosting companies that are based overseas.

SPF has commenced investigations into the local IP addresses linked to the scam and the owners of the local money mule accounts. SPF is now also working with INTERPOL and foreign law enforcement agencies to investigate the beneficiaries of the funds transferred overseas and the hosts of the scam websites.

As investigations are right now ongoing, we are not able to divulge any more information at this moment.

The OCBC phishing scam cases occurred amidst a rise in the number of scams reported in Singapore, which Mr Ang Wei Neng, Dr Tan Wu Meng and Miss Cheng Li Hui asked about.

In 2021, 23,931 cases of scams were reported, of which 5,020 were phishing scam cases. This is more than a fourfold increase from the 5,147 cases of scams reported in 2017, of which only 16 were phishing scam cases.

Specifically, for phishing scams involving SMSes impersonating banks in Singapore, there were no cases in 2017, but there were 91 in 2018; 57 in 2019; 149 in 2020; before increasing significantly to 1,021 in 2021, in view of the OCBC phishing scams. The OCBC phishing scam alone accounted for 790 customers in the two months from December 2021 to January 2022, by far the largest phishing scam involving spoofed SMSes, as mentioned by Minister Lawrence Wong earlier. The use of a combination of highly-orchestrated tactics, involving spoofed SMSes appearing in the same thread as genuine messages from the bank and links directing victims to a scam website, as well as the large number of customers targeted in the OCBC scam, shows that the threat is now significantly heightened.

On Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim’s query, in 2021, card fraud cases reported by major credit card issuers in Singapore to MAS formed less than 0.1% of total credit card transactions. MAS and SPF do not track the percentage of funds recovered for these unauthorised credit card transactions.

Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Ang Wei Neng asked if SPF is sufficiently resourced to combat scams. Police are extremely stretched. Our officers have been trying to cope with increasing workload and expectations, without proportionate increase in manpower. We will need to review this untenable situation.

Nevertheless, with whatever resources we have, we have reorganised ourselves for greater efficiency and effectiveness. For example, SPF set up the Anti-Scam Centre (ASC) in 2019 as a specialised unit focused on anti-scam interventions and enforcement.

In 2021, the ASC conducted 26 islandwide anti-scam operations, which resulted in the arrest of around 7,500 money mules and scammers.

The ASC also partners private sector stakeholders to disrupt scammers’ operations. For example, it has worked with telecommunications companies to terminate scam-tainted phone lines, and with online marketplaces to remove suspicious online monikers and advertisements.

Since 2019, the ASC has frozen around 24,000 bank accounts suspected of being involved in scam activities and recovered about $160 million in scam proceeds.

This would include part of the $17 million lost since 2020 to about 1,300 cases of phishing scams involving spoofed SMSes impersonating banks in Singapore, a question which Dr Tan Wu Meng asked about. SPF does not track the amount of funds recovered by scam type.

Recovery of monies lost to scams is very difficult. Where we have been able to, it involved close partnerships with financial institutions, in particular, by having a DBS staff co-located with SPF at the ASC to provide swifter and real-time coordination and intervention.

ASC and MAS are working with more banks to co-locate their staff at the ASC, to further enhance the ASC’s capabilities to freeze accounts, as well as to trace the flows of money.

SPF will be forming an Anti-Scam Command this year to consolidate expertise in scams across all SPF land units, and thereby further improve coordination of anti-scam enforcement and investigation. The Command will also oversee the newly-formed Scam Strike Teams in the seven Land Divisions, which were set up to enable us to take swifter action against scams.

As Mr Edward Chia and Mr Christopher de Souza suggested, SPF has also leveraged technology and will continue to do so.

The ASC uses technology to automate manual work processes, such as the generation of electronic production orders to the banks for the freezing of bank accounts that are associated with scams and sending out personalised crime advisories to members of the public. This will allow the Police resources to focus on essential criminal investigations and enforcement work.

SPF also uses technology, such as ScamShield, to crowdsource information on scam calls and SMSes. It provides SPF with information on emerging trends. This enables SPF to react faster to the various scams.

Another example is SPF and MAS’ ongoing study with banks to explore the use of enhanced fraud surveillance systems based on artificial intelligence to flag suspicious transactions and identify possible fraudulent behaviour in real-time.

Next, I will touch on improving public education.

Enforcement, by itself, is not sufficient. To Ms Foo Mee Har’s question on how consumers can be better protected, the best defence is a discerning public. Hence, the Government has been creating strong public awareness on scams.

Miss Cheng Li Hui asked about the challenges in educating Singaporeans on anti-scam precautions and measures. A key finding from the 2019 National Prevalence Survey of Scams was that scam victims tend to lack practical knowledge on safe practices. While the majority of scam victims had come across anti-scam public campaigns and messages, many of them could not recall specific scam prevention tips. They also exhibited poor online hygiene, such as opening emails from unknown sources.

The Government’s anti-scam public education campaign, called "Spot the Signs. Stop the Crimes", aims to address these challenges. The campaign emphasises the importance of individual responsibility and also uses real-life examples to build awareness and vigilance on the tell-tale signs of scams. As part of this campaign, we have disseminated materials advising the public on scam prevention tips, such as never to share one-time-passwords (OTPs) with unverified parties and to be wary of requests for gift cards and online credits.

Mr Mohd Fahmi Bin Aliman asked if there is an age group that is most vulnerable to phishing scams and the common scams that different segments of the population fall prey to.

Scam victims are of a wide range of ages; everyone is susceptible. That said, different profiles of victim falls prey to different types of scam.

For phishing scams, job scams, e-commerce scams, investment scams, loan scams, China official impersonation scams, as well as fake gambling platform scams, we found that young adults between 20 and 39 years old formed the largest group of victims, compared to other age groups. For social media impersonation scams, Internet love scams, and fake friend call scams, adults between 40 and 59 years old formed the largest group of victims. Hence, the Government has also rolled out prevention initiatives targeted at specific population segments.

SPF and NCPC have partnered ABS on various initiatives to educate bank customers. For example, the banks have introduced an online quiz on scam prevention. They have also sent out advisories to customers to remind them not to share their OTP with others.

Banks have also stepped up their efforts to also train their frontline staff to help customers spot signs of scam. For example, in June 2021, OCBC staff helped to prevent a 57-year-old customer from being scammed. The customer had wanted to remit around 6,000 euros to her Internet “boyfriend” based in the United States. OCBC branch staff noticed that the fund transfer was to be made to a personal bank account in Thailand and suspected that the customer was being scammed. The OCBC staff spent hours trying to dissuade the customer from transferring the funds and worked with SPF officers to try to advise the customer from sending any money. Eventually and thankfully, they managed to convince the customer that she was being scammed, after the “boyfriend” was not available for a video call that bank staff worked with the customer to arrange.

Another example of a preventative initiative is the “SG Cyber Safe Seniors Programme” launched in June 2021 by the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and SPF. The programme seeks to raise seniors’ awareness of online scams and encourage them to adopt good cyber hygiene. Under the programme, CSA and its partners, such as the SG Digital Office, offer scam prevention tips, including how to spot signs of phishing and avoiding the sharing of personal information and OTPs.

The IMCS will step up our public education efforts by scaling up targeted outreach. We will partner agencies and stakeholders that serve as key touchpoints for population segments of interest and leverage their communications channels to push out anti-scam messages targeted at different segments.

For example, IMCS has started working closely with the Agency for Integrated Care, MOE, MOM and MoneySense to push out anti-scam information and awareness programmes for our seniors, students, even migrant workers and professionals.

The IMCS has also started to work with stakeholders from the private sector: partnering ABS to reach out to consumers who use banking services and major e-commerce platforms and marketplaces to reach out to consumers transacting on those online platforms.

Everyone should also download ScamShield, to filter out scam messages and block scam calls.

To date, ScamShield has been downloaded about 257,000 times. About 3.5 million SMSes and calls have been picked up as potential scams by the in-app algorithm and user self-reporting through the app. About 15,500 phone numbers have also been blocked. We are unable to provide Mr Gerald Giam with the percentage of scam calls and SMSes successfully blocked, as ScamShield does not track the number of calls and SMSes made or received by the users.

ScamShield picked up and filtered about 2,000 scam messages used in the OCBC phishing scams. Unfortunately, a lot more scam messages managed to reach the SMS inboxes of ScamShield users, mainly because they appeared in the same thread as legitimate messages. This gap will be addressed as agencies enhance our SMS ecosystem, as Minister Josephine Teo explained.

That said, ScamShield, in itself, is not a panacea and all parts of the ecosystem need to work together to combat scams, including vigilance from all members of the public.

When ScamShield was developed, we made it available to iOS devices first as it was functionally easier to build. We had, initially, planned to launch the Android version of ScamShield in late 2021, but it was delayed as GovTech had to reprioritise resources towards supporting our efforts against COVID-19. Agencies are now working towards developing and releasing the Android version in the coming few months.

IMCS will continue our efforts to encourage the public to download ScamShield, including through community engagements by SPF and Volunteer Crime Prevention Ambassadors. I would also like to call on Members of this House to encourage your residents to download ScamShield.

In concluding, combating scams needs a whole-of-society effort. Even as SPF steps up enforcement, members of the community still play a vital role. We urge the members of public to be individually alert and also to raise collective awareness by sharing scam prevention tips with your friends and family. Together, I am confident we can build a safer Singapore. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Dr Tan Wu Meng.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Ministers for their Ministerial Statements. I have two questions and one suggestion. Sir, many of my Clementi residents were very worried to hear about what happened and it is important that MAS has recognised that there needs to be equitable sharing of losses when an incident happens.

My first question is, will this proposed equitable sharing look at the difference between an unforced error compared to a forced error, where a customer was led or pressured into making an error, as appears to have been the case with the OCBC phishing scam?

The second question, Mr Speaker, will this proposed framework for equitable sharing of losses also consider the speed of the bank response when a consumer is trying to get help? One of my Clementi residents described it thus. He said, "Imagine you got tricked, someone copied your house keys, they are looting your house now, you call for help and you are put on hold. You wait to press a number or get to the right department." That is what my resident said and they are worried what happens if this is their experience in a scam.

Sir, for the suggestion, may I suggest to the Ministries, if they have not already done so, there can be Red Teams looking at not just fighting the last scam war, but the next one because, today, we know there are deepfakes for voices, deepfakes for video calls as the technology improves. We have to be ready for the next character of scams. Likewise, is there a role for white hat scammers, just like there are white hat hackers – white hat scammers actively testing the bank's procedures to look for vulnerabilities before fellow Singaporeans suffer avoidable losses?

Mr Speaker, I thank Dr Tan Wu Meng for his suggestion on the last point. Indeed, we cannot be fighting the last war, we have to look ahead, anticipate vulnerabilities and continually look at different ways to improve our system, and MAS is certainly committed to this process.

On the framework for the sharing of losses incurred by customers, this is a complex issue. I mentioned just now that it is being deliberated upon by the Payments Council, which is chaired by MAS, and it aims to put up something for public consultation within the next three months. I do not want to get ahead of the process, but I would just want to set out some key principles which the Council is using to guide its deliberations.

First, the framework for the sharing of losses should be consistent and common. So, it should not matter which bank you go to; it has to be applied consistently across the entire industry.

Second, the framework should be equitable in determining how losses are to be shared, because both banks and customers have their respective responsibilities. So, Dr Tan Wu Meng talked of some scenarios about speed and whether or not it is a forced or unforced error. But what we intend to do is to be quite clear and specific about what these responsibilities are for financial institutions and customers and what each party is expected to do to prevent scams. Then, the share of losses each party bears will depend on whether and how the party has fallen short of these very clearly stated responsibilities.

I think that is a fair and equitable principle, But, obviously, there are many details to be worked out. So, the Payments Council chaired by MAS will go about these deliberations with the different stakeholders. And I should add, the stakeholders, as I have mentioned earlier, also include players operating the communications infrastructure because we want to ensure that there is proper accountability across the entire ecosystem.

Ms Foo Mee Har.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Ministers for their comprehensive replies. I agree with the Minister that we need to adopt an ecosystem approach to tackle banking scams. I have two supplementary questions for the Minister for Finance.

First, given the unprecedented wave of online banking frauds hitting consumers – actually, not just in Singapore, we have read about such accounts in the UK and around the world – may I ask how does MAS fare in terms of anti-scam controls, compared to some of the best practices in other jurisdictions to protect the interests of our consumers?

Sir, the second question relates back to the new framework being debated to establish how losses behind scams are to be shared between consumers and financial institutions. I want to ask, specifically, whether MAS will be imposing a set of minimum standards for the banks' fraud surveillance system to better protect consumers.

Mr Speaker, I thank Ms Foo Mee Har for the very important question. MAS' approach and what MAS has done so far has, in fact, gone beyond the usual practices among financial regulators. In major jurisdictions, regulators do not themselves prescribe the specific anti-scam controls for the banks. Instead, they take a supervisory approach, which means they set up the broad supervisory expectations of the banks, then they place the responsibility on the banks to develop the specific anti-scam measures. Then, the regulators will assess the adequacy of these measures and they will impose penalties if the banks fall short of expectations. So, that is the approach that other regulators take, most regulators will take, and that is also the basic approach that MAS has undertaken.

But, as I mentioned, MAS has, in fact, gone beyond most regulators in being quite clear about its expectations, as well as the specific anti-scam measures that are required. Amongst the three local banks, this started last year, following MAS' focus supervisory review. Then, earlier this year, in January, as I mentioned just now, MAS and ABS put in place a comprehensive suite of measures and controls that will apply across all retail banks. That is, in fact, more than what major jurisdictions have in place.

And we are going beyond that, because, as I have highlighted in my speech, MAS is also considering and studying further enhancements to the measures that we can put in place across banks to reduce the risk across our digital banking channels. So, let me assure Members that MAS takes this work very seriously. It has been, and will continue to do everything it can, working together with other partners and stakeholders to strengthen the security across our digital banking channels and also across the entire digital ecosystem.

On the second question on the framework for the sharing of losses, I do not want to get into details because, as I have highlighted, this is still work in progress. But, as I mentioned just now, our intention is to clearly set out basic responsibilities expected of financial institutions. Indeed, if financial institutions were to fall short of these responsibilities, then they should bear their share of the losses. So, this is work in progress and we will put out the details in due course when we are ready.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Sir, I have clarifications for the Minister for Communications and Information as well as the Minister for Finance.

For the Minister for Communications and Information, once the sender ID registry becomes a whitelist like what she described just now, will scammers still be able to send SMSes from overseas with the sender ID that is not registered in Singapore's registry? And if so, how would such scam messages be prevented? Secondly, is there a fast-track channel in which scam websites can be reported even by members of the public and blocked expeditiously?

For the Minister for Finance, recent scams have demonstrated that SMS is an insecure channel for sending either one-time passwords or hyperlinks. According to MAS' Technology Risk Assessment Guidelines to financial institutions, end-to-end encryption should be implemented for the transmission of customers' passwords. SMS is not an end-to-end encrypted channel. So, why is MAS not immediately prohibiting the use of SMS one-time passwords, especially to protect the less tech-savvy customers who are at risk of getting scammed?

Mr Speaker, I do not mean to be too technical, but to answer the Member's question, I will have to explain how the SMS service providers will interact with the SMS sender ID registry.

Basically, the SMS service providers will be approached by a party to say that here is a message that I would like to send to these numbers in Singapore. The imposition that we are making on the SMS Service provider is to look at the header that is being requested by the customer to send it under and check against the registry.

So, if a name already appears on the registry, then, regardless of who the customer is or where they are requesting this service from, as long as the name appears in the registry and this party's details do not match the other record in the registry in terms of their UEN, in terms of the path that they described, how they want to send the SMS across, then this business has to be turned away by the SMS service providers. So, the purpose of having the registry is to allow the SMS service providers to know whether this is a legitimate request and if these signs of legitimate requests are not matched, the requirement for the SMS service provider is to turn away the business.

So, I hope that that provides an answer to the Member's question.

Mr Speaker, on the use of SMS to deliver OTPs, I mentioned just now that we are reviewing this practice and, if we were to continue, whether potential measures should be taken to reduce the risk. I should highlight that, really, as I mentioned in my speech, there is no single measure that can guarantee the security of digital banking.

Issuance of SMS, even if it were to be done through a very safe and encrypted channel, for example, that would not stop deception from happening and, if the scam succeeds in identity theft, as has happened here, impersonating a bank, getting the person to think that this is, in fact, a genuine bank, then the person with the OTP will still provide the OTP to this scam website or scam account or whatever it is.

So, it is a broader issue that we have to look at holistically and, as I mentioned, we are determined and committed to this process to review the entire ecosystem and strengthen it.

Mr Don Wee.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] With the sharp increase in online fraud cases amidst the COVID-19 pandemic which has led to most institutions to minimise in-person transactions, will the Singapore Police Force step up collaboration and education efforts with SG Digital Office and the Silver Generation Office to reach out to and assist seniors, such as increasing its presence in the heartlands by setting up more SG Digital Community Hubs and sending out more Silver Generation Ambassadors to visit seniors at home? Many grandmas and grandpas are unable to understand how ScamShield works.

I will reply in English and I will say a few remarks in Mandarin. I thank the Member for the question. Actually, Minister Josephine Teo has highlighted many of the measures that we have implemented in relation to helping our seniors go digital as well as to continue on our digital transformation journey. I think the question is a valid one in relation to how this incident may have affected some confidence, especially among our users and seniors. I want to emphasise that, as I had mentioned in my speech earlier on, the groups of people who are affected by scams are not just the seniors. In fact, our data showed that the younger people who have been transacting more online are more susceptible, or just as susceptible, to scams.

So, there are two areas that we need to focus on in relation to the Member's question.

One is how can we bolster confidence among our users? That is something that Minister Lawrence Wong, Minister Josephine Teo and I have been trying to explain and let Members know the measures that we are taking to make the digital space a safer environment for all of us to operate in.

The second area is to build a more resilient community in the use of the digital space. That is something that we have been working with the different stakeholders and partners – Government as well as the private sector – to strengthen.

More specific to Member Don Wee's question on the seniors' programme, we have introduced a number of programmes and, given this incident, we will continue to step up our outreach to our seniors to not just help them to acquire the skillsets but also to explain to them what are the telltale signs of scams and how to protect themselves from scams.

Today, the SDOs have done a good job in reaching out to 130,000 seniors in our community at the community centres, different libraries and so on. So, we will continue to step up these efforts.

I want to end off by saying that this education effort is an important one. We want to build a Smart Nation. We also want to build a Scam Smart Nation, where our people understand the telltale signs and to protect themselves and help one another.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Singapore has seen a rising number of scam cases in recent years. Therefore, MHA and other Ministries will do our best to work with community partners to strengthen prevention measures and raise awareness against scams.

In 2021, online phishing scams were on the rise. Scammers used various ways to mislead victims into revealing their personal information. Here, I urge everyone to stay alert and not to believe strangers easily, nor to share your personal information or even transfer money.

The public can also download ScamShield from Apple Store. Mr Don Wee said our grandmas and grandpas might not understand ScamShield. However, I believe that once they realise the benefits of ScamShield which offers them greater protection, they will be able to use digital platforms more confidently.

Ms Hazel Poa.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Ministers and the Ministries for the efforts that they have put in and continue to put in to prevent future scams. I have two supplementary questions.

Firstly, is MAS considering the contingency reimbursement model in the UK where banks reimburse scam victims which started on a voluntary basis but there are now plans to legislate it?

The second supplementary question: in working out the shared responsibility between banks and their customers, would MAS consider putting the onus more on the banks on the basis that: one, the banks are more tech-savvy and scam-savvy than the average bank customer and they have better resources to keep up-to-date with the latest tactics; two, it provides additional incentives on the banks to adopt a pre-emptive approach, for example, to consider the scam potential before pushing out new procedures or facilities; and thirdly, it is probably more cost-effective to focus on scam prevention efforts from the ends of a few banks rather than public education on a whole wide range of bank customers?

Mr Speaker, this must be my third question on the loss-sharing framework. I can appreciate that there is a lot of interest in this and, as I have said, it is a work-in-progress. But to quickly answer Ms Poa's two questions.

Number one: MAS will certainly look at models around the world in developing the details of this framework for the sharing of losses in an equitable fair share.

Number two: as the Member has highlighted, the responsibility will be different for individuals and financial institutions. We are very mindful that individuals have a different set of resources and capabilities, compared to financial institutions. So, in developing the specific responsibilities for individuals and financial institutions, we will certainly take that into consideration.

Mr Vikram Nair.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have one clarification for the Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs. One of the issues with scams is that the perpetrators are normally based abroad. I just wanted to check whether there is any framework in place for us to actually cooperate with foreign agencies in order to identify the perpetrators and have them prosecuted for these actions?

I thank the Member for the question. I mentioned in my speech that this is an area that MHA and SPF will continue to sharpen, to build our networks across the different foreign law enforcement agencies as well as working with Interpol to enhance our ability to respond and to investigate across jurisdictions.

At the same time, I also mentioned some of the difficulties, including how we can get our foreign law enforcement agency partners to work within their jurisdiction. And once the money has been transferred, there are also some difficulties as well. But it is an effort we will continue to do, as we have done in recent times, and we will step up this collaboration with the partners – foreign law enforcement agencies – to try and strengthen our enforcement as well as recovery of lost monies with the foreign banks as well.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have two questions.

The first is for Minister Lawrence Wong. I wonder if the Ministry has plans to introduce complementary legislation to bolster the additional regulatory actions that he has already proposed and the reasons are, because while regulation is often useful for guiding actions, to use the example Minister Lawrence Wong raised earlier about allowing certain transactions to be disputed, without the force of law, it might still fail to adequately ensure an equal distribution of liability even in the presence of, as he described, the fair, equitable framework.

Using the same example, if I may, requiring charges above $50 to be subject to dispute under the Fair Credit Billing Act in the US has meant that financial institutions have, actually, been a lot more proactive in deploying fraud detection systems and securing fraud insurance. This is something that Member Hazel Poa has mentioned as well.

My second question is for Minister Josephine Teo and it is to ask if there are plans to comprehensively audit the compliance of technology systems with their official safeguards. I say this because, in a recent little experiment with my Sengkang colleague, Louis Chua, we tried to test the limits of the PayNow system, as applied by banks. The stated PayNow transfer limit, in the absence of additional authentication via token, is meant to be $1,000. However, we were able to transfer sums in excess of this amount just by instantaneously changing the daily transfer limits, and, again, without any two-factor authentication beyond the PIN prior to executing the transfer. Others have reported similar lapses in banks' checks and balances in guaranteeing customer security. One banking customer, writing to The Straits Times, shared that they were able to breach the credit limit by 1.8 times in transactions occurring over multiple countries in foreign currencies without the incident being flagged.

Mr Speaker, in developing any new measures, MAS will want to ensure that these measures are effective – effective in reducing the risk in our banking system, effective in implementation. And if new legislation is necessary or amendments to the laws are necessary, we will certainly not rule out those options.

Mr Speaker, there are two parts to the Member's question. One is in terms of the banks' information systems, IT systems, we classify them as part of our critical information infrastructure. As a result of this classification, they are subject to higher requirements and also regular audits. So, earlier on, when I had explained, and Minister Lawrence Wong had also explained why this was not a cyber attack or cybersecurity breach, that has to do with the kind of defences that are part of the banking system being a critical information infrastructure. Is it subject to regular audits? It has to be. Otherwise, we would not know whether the cyber defences that are intended to be put up are, in fact, effectively done. So, that part is done.

But I would always caution that this is not something you brag about. Just because the system is sound at any point in time does not mean it is not continuously being subject to testing. And whether it is banks, whether it is our telcos, as part of the operators of our critical information infrastructure, they always also have to conduct their own penetration testing, in order to assure themselves that there are no vulnerabilities or gaps that are glaring and that have not been patched. So, that is one part of it.

The second part of it, and his experiment with Mr Louis Chua using PayNow, I think it is very similar to what Dr Tan Wu Meng had already suggested earlier, whether you would consider subjecting your own banking processes to white hat scammers. And I think Minister Lawrence Wong had already responded to that question to say that the answer is yes; it is a good suggestion. And we should be seriously thinking about how to do so.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

Thank you, Speaker. I thank the Ministers and the Minister of State for their comprehensive replies. I would like to ask a couple of supplementary questions. We understand from Minister of State Desmond Tan that once the money is transferred out of Singapore during an Internet scam, it is almost as good as gone.

So, I would like to ask the Minister for Finance what the proportion of Internet transfers is involving accounts overseas. Is it possible for the local user to opt, by default, to not allow the transfer of money out to overseas, unless authorised otherwise with the two-step verification? This is similar to what local mobile phone users do, where they can disable the auto-roaming so as to minimise the cost.

Secondly, when banks are alerted to the significant increase in banking scams, can the bank deactivate all overseas bank transfers for a short period, so as to minimise the scam's impact?

Mr Speaker, the short answers to both questions are yes. As I have mentioned in my speech, MAS is, indeed, looking to introduce additional customer confirmations for higher-risk transactions, and that would include fund transfers that are large, relative to the overall balances, as well as overseas transfers, recognising that once the funds leave our local banking system, they are very hard to recover, indeed.

So, as I have mentioned, these are additional strengthening and enhancements we are looking at, which will require customer confirmation. It will add friction to the transaction for genuine customers but we hope that everyone understands that these inconveniences are necessary to have a safer digital banking system in Singapore.

The second point about having a cooling-off period, if the banks are aware of the scam and whether or not they can put in place some cooling-off periods, indeed, that is something that has been done. And we will continue to look at how these sorts of measures and safeguards can be strengthened.

Ms Yeo Wan Ling.

I thank the Ministers for their comprehensive replies. I would like to follow up on the hon Member Ms Foo Mee Har's question on anti-scam standards set by MOF.

My residents who came to me to seek help on the recent OCBC bank scam incident shared that information from the bank during the investigation process and the support during the processes itself, were found wanting. Many of them had interactions only with the call centre staff and this has left them very afraid and stressed and, indeed, worried that their life savings were kept in limbo.

So, I would like to ask if the Ministry, or the agencies in charge of this, will be putting in standards and requirements for the banks in the management of scam victims during the investigation process.

Mr Speaker, again, the short answer is yes. But I should clarify the standards are not set by MOF; they are set by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and I am speaking also in my capacity as the Deputy Chairman of MAS. This is under MAS' purview.

As I explained in my speech just now, we have assessed that OCBC itself, in this incident, could have done better. There were areas, in terms of its responses to customers, which, certainly, could be improved. That is why we are reviewing the conduct of OCBC, and we will take the appropriate actions. That is for the OCBC incident.

But with regard to standards, expectations and responsibilities, these are in place today for all the retail banks and we will continue to review and ensure that these standards are set in such a way that provide assurances to customers and hold the banks accountable to meeting these high standards.

Mr Melvin Yong.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It is sobering to learn that our current anti-scam systems are blocking millions of scam calls each month. I would like to ask Minister Josephine Teo whether this useful protective filter extends to blocking scam calls made using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), which allows calls to be made over the Internet as well as telecommunications applications, such as WhatsApp call, which is also becoming very popular even among our seniors. If not, are there any plans by the Ministry to safeguard these channels?

Mr Speaker, as a general point, we are constantly looking at what channels are being exploited for scams to be perpetrated. But the Member is right. The current call blocking, as well as the website blocking, is now mainly done through Domain Name System (DNS) blocking. So, unless my technical understanding is flawed, and I would have to check this up, my understanding is that it does not block VoIP calls. But I will have to get back to him properly.

Order. Business Motion. Leader.

Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That, notwithstanding the Standing Orders, the Motions on:

"Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan)"; and

"Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim)", be taken together, and the debate on these Motions and on any amendment proposed thereto be proceeded with simultaneously as though the debate were on a single Motion.

Mr Speaker, both Motions arise out of the Report of the Committee of Privileges issued last week in respect of the complaint against Ms Raeesah Khan for untruth spoken in Parliament.

The First Motion deals with the Committee’s findings and recommendations in respect of the conduct of former Workers’ Party Member of Parliament (MP) Ms Raeesah Khan which I had previously referred to the Committee.

The Second Motion deals with the Committee’s findings and recommendations in respect of the conduct of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, and Workers’ Party MPs Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim, which arose in the course of the Committee’s inquiry.

Given that both Motions arise out of the same report and, further, given that the facts and matters pertaining to the Motions are interlinked and the same set of evidence applies to both, I wish to move that the two Motions be considered together and debated concurrently. A concurrent or simultaneous debate will allow Members to address both Motions in a single speech and enable the issues raised in the two Motions to be considered holistically. It will also allow for more efficient conduct of parliamentary business.

To be clear, and for avoidance of doubt, it is only the debate that is to be concurrent. The Motions remain as two separate Motions and, at the end of the debate, the votes on the two Motions will be taken separately. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Resolved, That, notwithstanding the Standing Orders, the Motions on: (a) "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan)"; and (b) "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim)", be taken together, and the debate on these Motions and on any amendment proposed thereto be proceeded with simultaneously as though the debate were on a single Motion. (proc text)]

The Clerk will now proceed to read the Notices of Motion.

Leader.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your permission to move both the Motions standing in my name on today's Order Paper one after another and for my opening speech and reply at the end of the debate to range over both Motions.

In view of the earlier decision of this House to have both Motions taken together and the debate to proceed simultaneously on both Motions, I will allow the Motions to be so moved. Leader, please proceed.

Mr Speaker, I beg to move the First Motion standing in my name on today's Order Paper titled "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan)".

I also beg to move the Second Motion standing in my name on today's Order Paper titled "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim)".

Sir, with your permission, can I ask for the distribution of the copies of the two Motions that I have referred to? I thought that it might be more convenient for Members to have copies so that they can refer to them as I am speaking.

Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members.]

Sir, may I proceed as the copies of the two Motions are being distributed?

Yes, please.

Mr Speaker, on the face of it, the Motions before us today require us to make certain decisions about the conduct of certain Members of Parliament (MPs). However, the Motions are of a far deeper and greater significance.

Fundamentally, the Motions are about safeguarding the essence of democracy – our democracy – and preserving its most vital and essential characteristic, which is, trust. They are about the need to ensure the integrity of our institutions, and Parliament in particular, and about the confidence Singaporeans can have in their elected representatives.

These things are not given. Established democracies, like Australia and the United Kingdom, have, in recent months, had to deal with allegations of senior parliamentarians being untruthful. The consequences are the erosion of public trust. Now, regrettably, we have to deal with our own situation of parliamentarians being untruthful.

How we deal with this will reflect on our values and the standards of conduct to which we hold ourselves as MPs.

How did we come to this point? Let me provide a quick recap.

On 3 August 2021, Ms Khan spoke during the debate on the Workers' Party's Motion titled "Empowering Women". She claimed that the Police's response to sexual assault survivors who lodged Police reports was sometimes "disheartening". She alleged that three years ago, she had accompanied a sexual assault survivor to make a Police report against a rape that was committed against the survivor.

She claimed to have witnessed the survivor come out crying. The Police officer had allegedly made comments about her dressing and the fact that she had been drinking. Ms Khan made that statement twice on 3 August and repeated it during a later session on 4 October.

However, on 1 November 2021, Ms Khan confessed in Parliament that she had not, in fact, accompanied the survivor to the Police station. I will refer to this as "the Untruth".

I raised a complaint under Standing Order 100(7)(b) against Ms Khan for breaches of privilege and the matter was referred to the Committee of Privileges (the Committee).

The Committee was duly convened and began its inquiry on 29 November 2021. The Committee completed its work and presented its Report to Parliament on 10 February 2022, making findings and recommendations in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan’s conduct. However, in the course of its inquiry, the conduct of three senior members of the Workers' Party leadership also came into question. This led the Committee to also make certain findings and recommendations relating to them as well.

Before I go into the Report, Mr Speaker, let me say something about the privileges and immunities of Parliament and the corresponding duty that arises.

One of the most powerful things about a parliamentary democracy is the ability to speak freely and candidly in Parliament. This is so that MPs can raise matters of public importance, safe in the knowledge that they have immunity from civil or criminal proceedings outside this House. That is a great privilege. In Singapore, this is enshrined in the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1962, the PPIPA. But because it is such an important privilege, it must also be used responsibly and must not be abused. This includes the need to be truthful on, and to be able to substantiate, matters said in Parliament or any committee of Parliament.

The other aspect of parliamentary democracy is that MPs are expected to act honourably and to respect the processes of Parliament as an institution, and not act in a manner that would undermine it or the work of its committees.

Thus, dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege and contempt of Parliament, including its committees, are offences under the PPIPA.

Parliament is expected to keep its own House in order. Hence, the Act gives Parliament power to deal with such offences ranging from a reprimand, suspension of privileges from Parliament, a fine or even committal to prison and expulsion from Parliament. In addition, if the conduct constitutes an offence listed under Part 5 of the PPIPA, Parliament also has the power to refer the matter to the Public Prosecutor.

Let me now deal with the findings and recommendations of the Committee.

First, in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan for abuse of privilege.

In terms of liability, the case against Ms Khan is clear and straightforward. She has admitted that she lied in Parliament twice on 3 August 2021 and again on 4 October. The Committee has, therefore, found she “acted with disregard for the dignity and decorum of the House” and recommended that Parliament find Ms Khan guilty of abuse of privilege on all three occasions. You will see that this is dealt with in para 2(a) of the First Motion.

The next issue is what penalty she should receive for these abuses of privilege.

Here, it is undisputed that when she lied on 3 August, she was the only one who knew that what she had said was untrue and, therefore, acted entirely of her own accord. Hence, she should bear the full and sole responsibility for those transgressions. The Committee has accordingly recommended that a fine of $25,000 – that is, half of the maximum penalty – be imposed on Ms Khan for lying twice on 3 August. That is dealt with in para 2(b) of the First Motion.

I turn now to the penalty for the lie that was repeated on 4 October 2021. This is the issue that occupied the bulk of the Committee’s inquiry. Because by this time, she had disclosed the Untruth to the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, and the two senior Workers’ Party (WP) leaders, Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Faisal Manap, who are the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of WP respectively.

So, the issue is this: when Ms Khan repeated the lie in Parliament on 4 October, was she acting on her own accord or was she acting on the guidance of her senior party leaders?

If she was acting on her own, then the penalty should be higher, because it means that she and she alone was responsible for deliberately repeating the lie despite being told otherwise – as claimed by Mr Pritam Singh – showing a lack of remorse.

But if as a young and inexperienced MP, she was acting on the instructions or guidance of her party leaders, to whom she deferred and to whose views she gave weight, then that would be a mitigating factor, because then she is not the only one responsible. In this case, the penalty should be lower.

Here, the accounts of Ms Raeesah Khan and the three senior WP leaders are diametrically opposed – so much so that, in fact, there can be no possibility of this being a case of differing interpretations or of any misunderstanding. It is a situation where either Ms Raeesah Khan lied to the Committee, or else Mr Pritam Singh, Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Faisal Manap lied to the Committee. There is no in-between.

Ms Khan’s evidence is that when she repeated the lie on 4 October, it was her understanding, based on what Mr Singh said to her on 3 October, that there would be no consequences if she continued with the Untruth.

Mr Singh, on the other hand, says that Ms Khan did so on her own accord and contrary to instructions given.

Ms Lim and Mr Faisal say they did not discuss the issue with her. They left it to Mr Singh.

Two meetings are key to this issue: the meeting between Ms Khan and the three senior WP leaders on 8 August 2021, or "the 8 August meeting”, and the meeting between Mr Singh and Ms Khan on 3 October 2021 at her home, or “the 3 October meeting”.

Regarding the 8 August meeting, Ms Khan’s evidence was that the three senior WP leaders told her to continue with the Untruth. There was no need for her to clarify the truth in Parliament, and Mr Singh told her to “take the information to the grave”.

The three WP leaders, on the other hand, say that there was simply no discussion on the matter after Ms Khan confessed to them, or, indeed, for nearly two months which passed thereafter. Instead, the discussion moved on to other matters.

Next, the 3 October meeting. This is of critical importance because it took place the evening before the Parliament Sitting of 4 October, where Ms Khan said the lie for the third time. This meeting involved just Ms Khan and Mr Singh. No one else was present.

The issue with regard to the 3 October meeting was whether Mr Singh had made it clear to Ms Khan that she had to tell the truth. Or Mr Singh gave Ms Khan a choice as to whether to tell the truth or keep to the Untruth, and if he did give her such a choice, whether he pointed her in the direction of how that choice should be exercised.

Ms Khan’s evidence is that “the conversation was that if [she] were to retain the narrative or if [she] were to continue the narrative, there would be no judgement”. Her understanding of this therefore was that there would be no consequences if she continued with the lie. She was not instructed to tell the truth.

Mr Singh’s evidence, on the other hand, was that he did not give Ms Khan a choice and that he made it “crystal clear” that she had to tell the truth.

Presented with such conflicting evidence, there is only one way to tell who is telling the truth, and, that is, to test it against objective evidence, which is what the Committee did. They assessed it against the contemporaneous evidence, against written documents, against the conduct of the parties both before and after the relevant events, and they tested it against whether the evidence given to the Committee made sense.

Taking all these into account, the Committee found that Ms Raeesah Khan was telling the truth and that Mr Pritam Singh, and to a lesser extent, Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Faisal Manap, had lied to the Committee.

Immediately after the 8 August meeting, Ms Khan sent a WhatsApp message to her assistants, stating “they’ve", meaning Mr Singh, Ms Lim and Mr Faisal Manap, "agreed that the best thing to do is to take the information to the grave”. So, there is written, contemporaneous evidence immediately after the meeting.

Her evidence was corroborated by Ms Loh Pei Ying and Mr Yudhishthra Nathan.

On the three WP leaders’ own evidence, between 8 August and 3 October, nothing was discussed about clarifying the lie, but they all agreed that telling the Untruth in Parliament was a serious matter and should be corrected.

There were no correspondence or documents from them on the issue at all.

They did not speak with Ms Khan on the issue.

While Mr Singh had claimed he was concerned with ensuring that Ms Khan’s family was told about the sexual assault before clarifying the Untruth, not once did he or the others check if she had spoken with her parents.

No steps were taken for any clarification to be made in Parliament, ahead of the September or October Sittings.

The other WP CEC members were kept in the dark. Mr Singh established a Disciplinary Panel consisting of the very same people who knew that she lied – himself, Ms Lim and Mr Faisal Manap – and they did not disclose this to the CEC.

All of these are consistent with a situation in which she was told to maintain the lie.

As to the 3 October meeting, the Committee found “the evidence was quite clear that Mr Singh strongly pointed Ms Khan towards continuing with the Untruth on 3 October”. They found as follows.

On 3 October, Mr Singh visited Ms Khan at her home specifically to advise her on what to say at the 4 October Parliamentary Sitting because he “had a feeling” that the topic might come up. He did not tell Ms Lim or Mr Faisal Manap about the meeting.

At this meeting, Mr Singh did not tell Ms Khan to proactively raise the matter, or to tell the truth. This is not disputed but this common position was only arrived at after inconsistencies in Mr Singh’s evidence was pointed out and he changed his evidence.

Mr Singh initially said Ms Khan had to proactively clarify the truth on 4 October even if the issue did not come up. But when it was pointed out that no preparations had been made, there were no draft statements, for example, then he said no preparatory steps were taken because it was uncertain if Ms Khan would have to clarify the truth. At this point, he realised his earlier evidence was untenable and he changed his position and admitted that he did not tell Ms Khan to come clean proactively on 4 October. He then said she should tell the truth if raised.

But Mr Singh’s claim that he made clear on 3 October that Ms Khan should clarify the truth if raised is contradicted by the fact that no preparation whatsoever was made prior to 4 October to prepare for the truth to be told. Ms Lim admitted, in the context of whether it would have been possible on 4 October to have Ms Lim clarify the truth the next day on 5 October, that this was not possible because time was needed to carefully structure Ms Khan’s clarification and to make the necessary preparations. [Please refer to "Clarifications by Minister, Prime Minister's Office and Leader of the House", 15 February 2022, Vol 95, Issue No 48, Corrections by Written Statement section.]

This is borne out by what happened after the decision was taken to come clean on 12 October when the whole WP machinery swung into action – there were discussions on what the draft statement should look like, the drafts were personally vetted by Mr Singh and shown to their CEC, their activists and their social media teams were prepped and so on.

On 4 October, as Minister Shanmugam was asking Ms Khan in this Chamber to confirm if the incident had really occurred as she had described, Ms Khan texted Mr Pritam Singh to ask “What shall I do Pritam?” If, as he claimed, he had been clear that, if asked, she should tell the truth, there would have been no need for her to text him for guidance.

Further, if Mr Singh’s evidence was true, it would mean that when Ms Khan lied again on 4 October, she would have flagrantly disobeyed his instruction of the previous day. So, you would expect that in such a situation, he would immediately have demanded an explanation. Yet Mr Singh did not speak to Ms Khan for the rest of the day, until close to midnight. And even then, there was no instruction to clarify the truth the following day on 5 October when Parliament was still sitting.

Mr Singh told Ms Khan that he would not “judge her”. This makes no sense if he had told Ms Khan to tell the truth, as there would be nothing to judge. However, it makes a lot of sense if he had told or encouraged her to continue the lie.

Ms Loh Pei Ying’s and Mr Yudhishthra Nathan’s evidence contradict what Mr Singh said. On 12 October, Mr Singh told Ms Loh and Mr Nathan that he had met Ms Khan on 3 October and told her “I will not judge you”. Both Ms Low and Mr Nathan understood this to mean that Mr Singh had given Ms Khan a choice as to whether or not to come clean, and that if she chose to repeat the Untruth she would not be judged.

Mr Singh claimed he did not give Ms Khan a choice as to whether to tell the truth. But this is contradicted by Ms Lim’s notes taken during the Disciplinary Panel, in which she recorded Mr Singh as telling Ms Khan that “I told you it was your call”.

On 7 October, Ms Khan had sent an email to Mr Singh, Ms Lim and Mr Faisal Manap seeking their advice on what to do because she had just received an email from the Police requesting her assistance. In her email, she thanked the senior WP leaders “for listening to me, for caring for me and for guiding me throughout this without judgement”. The Committee found that if Mr Singh had, indeed, told Ms Khan on 3 October to tell the truth, then after she lied again on 4 October, which would have been a breach of that instruction, she would not be thanking them for guiding her without judgement. Here, the operative word is "guiding". Implicit in her email is that she had followed their guidance until then.

The Committee found that by telling Ms Khan on 3 October that "there would be no judgement", Mr Singh had left her with the view that if she were to continue with the Untruth, there would be no judgement on her. The Committee further found that taken together, the events of the 8 August and 3 October meetings would essentially point Ms Khan in one direction, which is, to keep to the Untruth if the issue was raised, with the assurance that Mr Singh would not judge her if she did so.

The Committee therefore found that Ms Khan’s culpability in respect of her repetition of the Untruth on 4 October was mitigated by the following:

the fact that she was a first-time MP who confessed to and sought guidance from her Party leaders as to what to do;

regrettably, the guidance they gave, and which she followed, was to maintain the lie; and

her conduct and evidence showed that she would have come clean, if she had been advised to do so from 8 August.

The Committee also took into account that Ms Khan's mental health had been "unfairly and publicly attacked, in particular, by Mr Singh", and that Ms Khan had resigned as a Member of Parliament. The Committee has, therefore, recommended a lower fine of $10,000 in respect of the repetition of the Untruth on 4 October 2021. This is dealt with in paragraph 2(c) of the First Motion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I turn now to the recommendations regarding Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim.

Based on the objective evidence before the Committee, the Committee made these findings:

that all three senior Workers' Party leaders have lied to the Committee as to what was discussed at the 8 August meeting, and that they guided Ms Khan to maintain the Untruth she had told;

that Mr Singh lied about what had happened at the 3 October meeting and essentially gave Ms Khan to understand that it would be all right to maintain the Untruth if the matter came up in Parliament the next day.

In addition, Mr Faisal Manap refused to answer a question from the Committee at least eight times, despite being reminded that he had been called before the Committee to assist with its investigations, and that his refusal would amount to an offence and constitute a contempt of Parliament.

The Committee considered that Mr Singh and Mr Faisal Manap's conduct could constitute contempt of Parliament and offences under Part 5 of the PPIPA. As the Committee was convened to look into the complaint against Ms Khan, the Committee noted that it was beyond its purview to recommend any penalty in respect of the three senior Workers' Party leaders for their conduct which arose in the course of the inquiry.

Parliament, however, has the power to consider what should be done and take the appropriate action. To assist Parliament in this task, the Committee has made the following recommendations for our consideration:

that while Parliament has the option to refer the three senior Workers' Party leaders to another Committee of Privileges, it is unlikely that another Committee would make much progress in terms of uncovering more evidence; and

that a distinction should be drawn between the conduct of Mr Singh on the one hand, and Ms Lim and Mr Faisal Manap on the other, given their different roles and conduct. The Committee noted Ms Lim's and Mr Faisal Manap's roles were "relatively subsidiary", while Mr Singh appeared to have played "the key and leading role in guiding Ms Khan in respect of the Untruth".

The Committee has therefore recommended that Parliament refer Mr Singh's conduct to the Public Prosecutor (PP), with a view to considering whether to institute criminal proceedings. This is addressed in paragraph 2 of the Second Motion.

Mr Speaker, some may wonder why Mr Singh and Mr Faisal Manap should be referred to the PP and why this cannot be dealt with "in-house" by Parliament. Others may also wonder why it is the case that, for Ms Khan, who lied to Parliament, a fine is proposed whereas in the case of Mr Singh, who also lied, but to a Committee of Parliament, he should be referred to the Public Prosecutor (PP) instead of just being fined like Ms Khan.

These are important questions and I want to address them. Let me just explain a little bit about the PPIPA and how it works.

Under the PPIPA, there are what, I would term, and this is my term, general offences: offences of dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege and contempt. These, Parliament can and often would deal with itself. But there is also a certain category of offences which could be dishonourable conduct or you could classify them as contempt, but they are very specific under Part 5 of the PPIPA. These include lying to a Committee in Parliament and refusing to answer questions as well as refusing to produce documents. There are other offences listed in Part 5. These are a special category. What is common about them and why they are also regarded as serious, is that they, essentially, pervert, obstruct or prevent the processes of Parliament. For the Part 5 offences, Parliament has the power to refer these to the PP. The PPIPA does not provide for other offences to be referred to the PP. It has to be under Part 5.

And you could have an offence, which is a Part 5 offence, but which Parliament may choose not to refer, if it does not think it is that serious. So, in this case, the Committee found that all three lied, but it is only recommending to refer Mr Singh to the PP, not Ms Sylvia Lim, not Mr Faisal Manap because their roles were subsidiary and their lies were not as egregious.

Then you may ask, so what is the difference between Mr Pritam Singh's lie and Ms Khan's? The seriousness of the conduct on the part of Mr Singh is this:

Ms Khan lied to Parliament, and that was bad enough. But Mr Singh on the other hand, if what the Committee found is correct, not only lied but lied under oath. And not only that, but this was in proceedings before a Select Committee of Parliament conducting a formal inquiry and tasked with finding out the truth. Then, there is the question of the consequences of a lie in this context – because it would, if believed, have had a bearing on the punishment to be meted out to Ms Khan. The lies would have determined the fate of another MP who was being looked at before the Committee of Privileges. And that is a different order of seriousness altogether. That is a Part 5 offence under the PPIPA, and that is the reason why the Committee had recommended referring Mr Singh to the PP.

The other thing is that it would mean Ms Khan was following his guidance when she lied on 4 October. And that is also very serious.

So, given the seriousness of the matter, it would be the fairest course of action to all concerned to refer it to the PP. The PP will have the opportunity to consider all evidence afresh, including new evidence, in deciding whether or not to prefer criminal charges against Mr Pritam Singh.

It would also give Mr Singh the opportunity to defend and vindicate himself, with legal counsel, if criminal charges are brought.

Fourth, the matter would be adjudicated by the Courts which are independent.

In the case of Mr Faisal Manap, his refusal to produce documents or answer questions can also amount to an offence under the PPIPA, and that is the Part 5 offence, so the Committee has recommended that he also be referred to the PP. This is addressed in paragraph 2 of the Second Motion.

Apart from the offences to be referred to the PP, there remain the following potential offences under the PPIPA that need to be dealt with by Parliament:

Dishonourable conduct and contempt of Parliament on the part of Mr Pritam Singh, for lying to the Committee, and for his role in guiding Ms Khan to lie to Parliament. The Committee has recommended that Parliament defer any action on this until the criminal proceedings (if any) are completed. This is dealt with in para 3(i) of the Second Motion.

Dishonourable conduct and contempt of Parliament on the part of Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Faisal Manap for lying about the 8 August meeting and for their initial concurrence in the guidance to maintain the lie by agreeing that it should be taken to the grave. Likewise, the Committee has recommended that any decision on this be deferred until the outcome of the referral of Mr Singh's conduct to the PP. This is dealt with in paragraphs 3(i) to (ii) of the Second Motion.

In conclusion, the conduct of Mr Singh and Mr Faisal Manap will be considered by the PP under the criminal justice process. Parliament will only consider the remaining issues (if any) after the criminal justice process has taken its course, by which time we will have the benefit of what emerges from that process. This is the fairest way forward for all.

Mr Speaker, the recommendations made by the Committee are sound and balanced, given the circumstances. I would ask Members to accept them and to support the Motions, as I do, so as to uphold public trust in Parliament and in our democracy. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

The first Question is as moved by Leader of the House on the Motion titled "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Ms Raeesah Khan)".

The second Question is as moved by Leader of the House on the Motion titled "Committee of Privileges Report (Recommendations in respect of Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Faisal Manap and Ms Sylvia Lim)".

In accordance with the earlier decision of this House to have a simultaneous debate on both Motions, I will now call on Members to make their speeches. Members are allowed to consider both Motions in a single speech.

At the end of the debate, I will put the questions on both Motions separately so that the House can express its vote on each Motion. In addition, I will also disallow any amendment to either Motion that has the effect of negativing or nullifying the other Motion.

Any Member who wishes to vote against either Motion can do so directly without such amendments. Leader of the Opposition.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It has been about 25 years since a Committee of Privileges (COP) Report has been tabled in this House. When seen as a whole, the COP's processes and the Report before Parliament leave many questions, gaps and omissions and, by extension, suggest political partisanship.

A key question is: who did this House commit to the COP? Raeesah Khan or the Workers’ Party leadership? The COP did not appear to want to get to the bottom of why Ms Khan lied in Parliament nor why she had a propensity to lie with respect to her anecdote, both in and out of this House. The fact that she had concocted a lie to bolster her anecdote in Parliament was not balanced against her evidence to the COP. What took centre stage instead was her uncorroborated testimony that she was instructed to take her lie to the grave by the Workers' Party leadership, a fabrication which never came out from any witness at the COP except Ms Raeesah Khan herself.

I reject this finding completely. At no time did I instruct Ms Khan to hide the truth. At the meeting on August 8, none of the three Workers' Party leaders told Ms Khan to take her lie to the grave.

I will speak on two main areas before concluding with a section on candidate selection in the Workers' Party. First, I will reflect on my judgement with respect to Ms Khan's reasons for lying in Parliament, arising from my meeting with her on 8 August. Second, I will raise some broad points about the selective nature of how the COP Report dealt with the evidence before it. However, as I intend to clear my name and cooperate with the Public Prosecutor, my comments on the COP Report will be limited in scope.

The most difficult aspect of this episode for me personally, and most certainly something that I have reflected on, is the approach to take when a fellow MP tells you, first, she is a rape victim; and second, how this episode caused an untruth to be told in Parliament.

From the moment I learned after the August Sitting that Ms Khan had lied in Parliament, there was no doubt in my mind that she would have to confess in Parliament that she had lied and that she would have to apologise for it in this House. I have shared publicly that the matter of the lie was something for Ms Khan to explain in Parliament.

My firm belief is that a Member of Parliament must be accountable in Parliament for what they say in Parliament. In addition, I considered that whenever she confessed, Ms Khan would have to explain her reason for telling her lie. I did not want Ms Khan's parents or loved ones to be caught by surprise before she had a chance to speak with them.

Looking back though, I gave Ms Khan too much time to settle herself before closing this issue with her. Between 8 August and 30 September, I should have been proactive and checked where she was in addressing the matter with her family. That omission is mine alone. I acknowledged the same to the COP in my evidence.

However, I will continue to be as sympathetic to anyone who shares such deeply personal details with me. My instinct, even today, would be to keep the information of the sexual assault to myself, or to a very small group of trusted individuals, given its highly personal and sensitive nature. I would allow such a person space to deal with the matter. I still believe that it was right that the clarification was made in Parliament rather than out of it.

That said, I will discuss with my party colleagues how, as an organisation and political party, we can handle such matters better while taking into account how delicate they are.