Hansard, Tuesday, 2 August 2022

1 Prof Koh Lian Pin asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether guidelines on managing heat stress at workplaces are regularly updated to incorporate the latest scientific evidence; and (b) whether these guidelines will consider any preliminary findings of the Third National Climate Change Study.

2 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment in view of the changing climate and increasing frequency of extreme weather events, in particular extreme heat, what targeted measures are being taken to mitigate the impact of these events on heat vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or lower income groups, who are more at risk of adverse effects, due to physiological or social obstacles to cooling solutions.

3 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether studies are being conducted or will be conducted to better understand the distribution of heat and energy inequality in our communities; and (b) what are the long-term plans to build heat resilient communities.

4 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether Singapore's island-wide temperature and urban heat island projections require revision in light of the ongoing climate crisis and recent heat waves reported around the world; and (b) what projections exist for how future temperature trends will affect (i) indoor temperatures (ii) building ventilation requirements and (iii) usage of air-conditioning.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, may I have your permission to address Question Nos 1 to 4, and written Question Nos 22 and 23 on today's Order Paper by a combined reply? And for any supplementary questions to Question Nos 1 to 4 to be taken after the reply to Question No 7 has been given, as the issues raised in Question Nos 1 to 7 are inter-related and will be addressed jointly by myself and the Senior Minister of State for National Development Tan Kiat How.

Please do.

I thank Members Prof Koh Lian Pin, Ms He Ting Ru, Dr Tan Wu Meng and Mr Christopher de Souza for their questions on how Singapore is preparing for rising temperatures. I will address them together with Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How in two parts. First, I will set out the broad context of how climate change and rising temperatures will affect Singapore and outline the Government's approach to strengthening Singapore's heat resilience. Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How will then elaborate on specific policies and measures to cool our neighbourhoods and community spaces.

In recent weeks, many countries have been experiencing heatwaves, including China, India, Pakistan and many European countries. Record-breaking temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius have resulted in deaths, heat injuries and damaged infrastructure. These heat waves are increasing in frequency and intensity worldwide as a result of climate change and portends the severe consequences we would face if we do not take significant steps today to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change.

Singapore will not be spared from the impacts of global warming – 2012 to 2021 was our warmest decade on record. The Centre for Climate Research Singapore, CCRS for short, has projected that climate change would lead to average temperatures rising by 1.4 to 4.6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Days with peak temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius may appear as early as 2045. This is compounded by the urban heat island effect, or "UHI" effect, where built-up areas are warmer due to heat trapped by buildings and heat generated by activities, such as transportation and industry.

To prepare for rising temperatures, the Government has adopted a science-based and proactive heat mitigation and adaption strategy, which has three prongs. First, we are deepening our understanding of the science behind how rising temperatures affects Singapore and our residents. Second, we are reviewing efforts to strengthen the community's resilience to heat. Third, we are designing effective heat mitigation strategies and scaling them up. Let me elaborate on the three prongs.

First, understanding the science of how heat affects Singapore and our residents. The CCRS translates global climate projections to understand the localised effects and implications for Singapore. For example, while we do not experience the extreme temperatures arising from high pressure systems that form across large continental masses in the mid-latitude region, we are affected by climate drivers such as El Niño, that are likely to be exacerbated by climate change. These projections are being reviewed and will be updated through the Third National Climate Change Study, or "V3", that will be released next year. This will enable our heat mitigation action plan and other climate adaptation planning to be informed by the latest IPCC findings and by local and regional warming trends.

To understand how heat affects the Singapore population, we are driving research and development to study the factors contributing to urban heat, test different heat mitigation strategies and assess the effects of heat on public health. For example, under the Cooling Singapore 2.0 project, we are working with researchers to develop a digital model to simulate Singapore's urban climate and predict the effectiveness of various heat mitigation strategies. This enables us to understand how heat affects different parts of Singapore and identify cost-effective heat mitigation strategies.

Second, we leverage science to design better policies and guidelines to strengthen community resilience to climate change, especially to account for the fact that some segments of our population, such as the elderly or outdoor workers, may be more vulnerable to rising temperatures. MOH and MSE are studying how heat stress could affect our population. MOH, MOM and the Workplace Safety and Health Council also work closely together to ensure that guidelines on managing heat stress at workplaces are regularly updated based on the latest scientific evidence, including the V3 study which I had earlier mentioned.

Third, designing effective heat mitigation strategies, of which there are two broad categories. First, measures to promote cooling in our urban environment, such as through urban planning and building guidelines, infusing more greenery and scaling up the use of cool materials on buildings. Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How will elaborate on these. Second, measures to reduce the heat generated from human activities, such as from our homes, our roads and our industries. These include, for example, efforts under the Singapore Green Plan to electrify our vehicle population and to increase the energy efficiency of industrial, commercial and residential buildings.

Individuals also play an important part. When we use less electricity, we not only reduce the heat emitted from our own electrical appliances, we also reduce the energy that needs to be generated by our power stations, thereby reducing both heat generation and carbon emissions at the system level. Hence, we have been enhancing community resilience to climate change by encouraging businesses and individuals to adopt greater energy efficiency, such as the introduction of the Mandatory Energy Labelling Scheme to help consumers choose more energy-efficient appliances.

Although Singapore has so far not faced heat crises on the same scale as other countries, it would not be possible to avoid the rise in temperatures due to global warming. We must continue to engage and co-create solutions with the community to enhance our resilience to climate change. We will also roll out policies and measures to cool our neighbourhoods and community spaces, which Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How will now elaborate on.

5 Prof Koh Lian Pin asked the Minister for National Development whether an update can be provided on the progress and impact of the initiative to plant more trees in our industrial estates to help cool these industrial estates and create a more conducive work environment.

6 Prof Koh Lian Pin asked the Minister for National Development whether the Ministry has conducted studies to assess what species of trees and other vegetation may provide the most optimal shading and cooling benefits for mitigating rising temperatures and the urban heat island effect, as part of the OneMillionTrees movement.

7 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for National Development (a) what studies have been conducted on the ambient interior temperature of HDB flats across different times of the day and weather conditions; (b) whether these temperatures are expected to increase, given climate change trends and, if so, by how much; and (c) whether such trends are considered when setting out design specifications for newer HDB projects.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 5 to 7 together, please?

Please proceed.

Let me elaborate on the specific measures we have put in place to cool the environment and address the urban heat island, or UHI, effect in our neighbourhoods, community spaces and industrial estates.

Prof Koh Lian Pin asked about the progress and impact of our initiatives to reduce ambient temperatures, such as the introduction of greenery on the top decks of our multi-storey carparks, the use of cool paint on HDB blocks, and the planting of trees in our industrial estates. He also asked whether we select specific tree species or vegetation to provide the most optimal cooling benefits. Dr Tan Wu Meng asked if studies have been conducted on ambient interior temperatures of HDB flats across different times of the day and weather conditions, and if we consider temperature trends in designing new HDB projects.

As Minister Grace Fu earlier highlighted, the Government adopts a science-based and proactive approach to various aspects of climate adaptation, including the rise in temperatures. BCA requires buildings to be designed to limit heat gain from the exterior, which helps to improve thermal comfort for building occupants. BCA's Green Mark scheme also recognises buildings that implement UHI mitigation measures, such as applying cool paints and providing greenery. In the design of HDB projects, HDB currently deploys various strategies to optimise thermal comfort. For example, our HDB buildings are predominantly oriented in the North-South direction to reduce heat gain. For new towns and estates, HDB conducts environmental modelling to site new flats, design building facades and refine building layouts to harness existing wind corridors and optimise wind flow.

For existing towns, HDB is conducting a pilot study on cool paint which could absorb less heat and reduce the ambient temperature of HDB blocks. Past trials have shown a reduction of ambient temperatures by up to 2 degrees Celsius. The pilot is expected to be completed in 2024. Based on the study's outcomes, HDB will consider extending the use of cool paint to more estates. Under the HDB Green Towns Programme, which covers all existing HDB towns, HDB is introducing greenery to the top decks of selected multi-storey carparks (MSCPs) in the form of urban farms, community gardens, or rooftop greenery using the Prefabricated Extensive Green (PEG) Roof Tray System based on the suitability of the carparks. These efforts also aim to reduce ambient temperature.

We are also intensifying greenery in our industrial estates, which are amongst the hotter areas in Singapore. To date, nearly 90,000 trees have been planted in our industrial estates under the OneMillionTrees movement, with the help of our partners and the community. These trees are planted to resemble the look and feel of natural forests, to provide pedestrians with shade and respite from the heat. These efforts have helped to beautify and cool industrial estates, such as Jurong Island, Seletar Aerospace Park and Tuas Industrial Estate, to create greener and more conducive workplaces. We aim to increase the total number of trees across our industrial estates from 180,000 trees today, to about 260,000 trees by 2030.

Studies have shown that intensified tree planting in Singapore can reduce mid-day temperatures in the surrounding areas by up to 0.9 degrees Celsius. We will continue planting more trees across Singapore under the OneMillionTrees movement, to mitigate the effects of climate change and provide Singaporeans with a more liveable and sustainable environment. We are also working with Institutes of Higher Learning to examine the cooling effects of various tree typologies and planting configurations. We will also deploy an island-wide network of sensors to monitor the cooling effects of our tree planting efforts. The data collected will support microclimatic research in Singapore and help NParks develop better greening strategies to cool Singapore.

In summary, the Government takes a broad-based holistic approach that will help all segments of the population cope with rising temperatures. Dealing with the impacts of climate change requires collective action and community resilience. Together, we will ensure that as a nation, we can adapt, adjust and remain resilient in the face of climate change.

Dr Tan Wu Meng.

I thank the Minister and the Senior Minister of State for their answers. I have three supplementary questions. Mdm Deputy Speaker, as background, yesterday, in the US journal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), a peer-reviewed report was published by the Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk. Entitled "Climate end game: exploring catastrophic climate change scenarios", it proposes serious consideration of worst-case scenarios in climate crisis. My three questions are as follows.

Firstly, the Minister mentioned that the temperature projections might reach peak daytime temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius in Singapore by the year 2040. Can I ask if this a median scenario or have worse, more severe scenarios been considered and are we getting ready for those as well?

Secondly, is the Government considering the possibility of low probability, high-impact situations? For example, if extreme climate situations affect energy resilience, and thereby, the ability of households in Singapore to maintain air-con across the island during a heat wave.

And thirdly, I am not sure if I had missed the answer, but has the Senior Minister of State from MND mentioned what is the data on the temperature of HDB dwellings across different times of the day, and in particular, whether HDB flats will continue to be safely habitable amidst very high temperatures, even in the absence of air-con?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I would like to thank Member Dr Tan Wu Meng for his questions, in fact, I am very gratified to see that Members are truly interested in climate change and its impact on Singapore and Singaporeans.

It is the greatest challenge to mankind and we should really devote attention and resources to address this global challenge squarely.

In our projection, we look at three broad scenarios. One is the business-as-usual scenario; the other is a scenario where we are taking good steps to mitigate emissions; and the third is to assume a situation where fossil fuels continue to be harnessed for energy. This is not a scenario that is determined by Singapore only. This is actually adopted by IPCC, which assesses a collection of thousands of scientific journals and scientific research. It is, in a way, an aggregation of the global thought leadership on climate change issues.

So, within these three scenarios, the peak 40 degrees Celsius forms one of the data points. But, obviously, we are looking at the three scenarios squarely and looking at how they would impact Singapore specifically. Because we are quite different from the Northern or Southern hemispheres – we have tropical weather, we are an island, we are not part of large continental masses. So, we do have our own climatic patterns that require careful local study. And that, in fact, is what we will be doing over the next few decades.

Indeed, I think Dr Tan Wu Meng is very wise to point out that there are low probability but high-impact events. We are constantly in discussions with the scientists. We just hosted the World Climate Research Programme Sea Level Conference in Singapore and had the chance to speak to many world-class climate scientists, which informs our planning.

While our long-term planning does not have these specific impact events in mind at this point, we are constantly looking for inputs and they will always shape our planning parameters. I will leave the third question to Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I thank the Member Dr Tan Wu Meng for his question. At the heart of it, I think he is asking whether HDB plans for the thermal comfort of residents as a priority. I would like to assure Dr Tan that it is indeed so.

I mentioned in my earlier remarks that we look at the environmental modelling and wind flow, and we consider how the occupants of an HDB building can be comfortable, even during the day. We do not take the assumption that everybody switches on their air-conditioning.

And perhaps, an additional assurance to Dr Tan, that the HDB Green Towns Programme looks at a 10-year plan to make HDB towns more sustainable and liveable.

To his question about the energy consumption of HDB towns, it is something that we are concerned about. The HDB Green Towns Programme, which I mentioned, focuses on reducing energy consumption, recycling rainwater and cooling HDB towns. We aim to reduce the energy consumption in HDB towns by 15% from 2020's level, by 2030.

I would like to add on about thermal comfort. We look at passive strategies in the design of these buildings to optimise thermal comfort. Like I mentioned, we do not make the assumption that everybody switches on the air-conditioning. Thus far, wind flow is the main focus of HDB's effort in thermal comfort design. For new towns and estates, HDB conducts environmental modelling to site the new flats – I mentioned about the North-South facing earlier – but also, we look at the building design facades and in refining the building layouts, the room layouts, to maximise the wind corridors and optimise wind flow. A specific example includes orienting the HDB buildings in the North-South direction and requiring 45% to 60% green cover in new estates to ensure sufficient greenery to create a comfortable living environment for all Singaporeans.

Ms Hany Soh.

Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. This is in relation to some of the responses that Senior Minister of State Tan Kiat How has provided. This is a follow-up supplementary question on that.

I understand that in relation to the HDB Green Towns Programme, there will be more features that will be introduced by HDB. In this regard, I wish to make a proposal to HDB for consideration. For many of our existing HDB flats, we incorporate full glass windows that admit a considerable amount of heat during the late afternoon. So, my question is whether HDB can consider installing the low-heat transfer, double-glazed windows for BTOs moving forward, and also, as part of the features for existing HDB flats as part of the Home Improvement Programme (HIP)?

This will really help, because, apart from new methods that HDB is introducing, for example, cool painting, I believe that there is a dire need for us to consider, to explore other suitable greener alternatives that help cool down HDB flats, especially since more Singaporeans are now adopting flexible working arrangements and working from home.

I thank the Member Ms Hany Soh for her questions. I fully agree that windows are a very important part of the HDB living residential unit. As earlier mentioned, the flow of the wind and the natural ventilation are important strategies to keep the thermal temperature within units comfortable for the residents.

We will certainly look into the suggestions by Ms Hany Soh – about the use of double-glazed windows to minimise heat transfers. These are some of the areas that we are always studying with the research institutes, as well as our partners.

Perhaps, just to give a little bit more assurance to Ms Hany Soh, I will explain how we design windows. Today, windows are provided with canopies, which provide sun shading and shielding from rain. The windows are also designed with larger, openable panels, as well as smaller top hung windows, such that the large panels are closed during heavy rain, while the top hung windows can still be opened slightly to provide natural ventilation within the flat.

So, windows and how they are designed and the ventilation flows arising from that, are important design considerations for HDB.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. I refer to the urban heat vulnerability analysis report, published in June 2020 by Cooling Singapore, which is quite a detailed first stage analysis, I understand. A report where they stated that further research is being done, especially in relation to the regional effect of heat.

This report states that climate change intensifies not only the urban heat island effect, but also causes health, social and economic challenges.

So, I would like to know, in terms of these cross-Ministerial, whole-of-Government issues, which Ministry or agency is responsible for leading the cross-agency plans and coordination to address these challenges?

One of my supplementary questions would be what are the efforts to raise awareness of heat injuries in groups, such as the elderly, parents of young children and people who work outdoors more, because obviously these groups are more exposed to the heat, which will only intensify as the years go on?

Again, I refer to India's Heat Action Plan, for example, which identifies high-risk populations and groups, and increases outreach and communications about the dangers of increased heat to these groups.

So, I am just wondering, maybe this is something that MSE would be working together with MOH on? I would like to ask whether the Ministers are able to share more information about this at this stage.

Finally, I have one question for MND, in particular. I noticed that in the report that I quoted earlier from, the urban heat vulnerability analysis report, there was a segment where there was some analysis and studies done on access to cooler indoor spaces —

Ms He Ting Ru, get to your question, please.

Yes, I am referring to the indoor spaces, during particularly bad heat waves. I am just wondering whether this information is going to be or has already been integrated into town planning, and whether residents have adequate access to refuge in the day, during exceptional heat waves? Whether or not, this is something that MND is actually looking into?

Can I just remind Members to please keep your questions succinct, so that we can have more questions taken? Alright, Minister Grace Fu.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I would like to thank the Member for the supplementary questions. Indeed, I think it is important for us to think about challenges very holistically. And that is really the genesis of the Singapore Green Plan, which is to bring multi-agencies' work together and to integrate our plans, so that we are clear about the trajectory and pathway that we are heading towards.

Similarly, when we come to issues, such as how hotter temperatures are going to affect human health, there are also inter-agency work groups to study that, whether it is MOH with MSE on heat stress affecting human health, or MOH, MOM and the Workplace Safety and Health Council to study the impact of heat on our work practices.

So, that will continue to be the way the Government handles climate change. Each of the Ministries will have its own policy portfolio and they will continue to refine and review their policies going forward, with information that is coming in from the various studies that we are doing – whether it is with V3 or other studies, such as the one the Member quoted. It is really part of our research effort to understand various impacts of climate change on Singapore better.

And we also have the Inter-Ministerial Committee that is chaired by Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean that will bring the relevant Ministries together. As and when we are informed with new inputs, we will review the relevant policies and we will get the relevant Ministries together to study some of these cross-Ministry problems.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the short answer to the Member Ms He Ting Ru's question is yes. Mitigating UHI effect, both in our residential areas, community spaces and industrial areas, is something that the MND family is looking at very carefully and part of our design considerations.

And to add on to a point – Ms He Ting Ru mentioned the research of the Cooling Singapore project. Just to share with Ms He that it is not just about the covered spaces, but we are also looking at the outdoor thermal comfort and outdoor shading for Singaporeans as they go about their different activities outdoors.

For example, NParks is collaborating with researchers from the NRF-funded project, "Cooling Singapore 2.0", to study the impact of greenery on urban heat mitigation, specifically on tree shapes, planting configurations and size of green spaces.

I am actually very heartened that the recent modelling study of trees in HDB residential precincts preliminarily shows that trees with large canopies, such as umbrella- and oblong-shaped trees, are more effective in improving outdoor thermal comfort. In addition, increasing the tree planting densities, which we are doing under our OneMillionTrees movement, will lead to further improvements in outdoor thermal comfort.

And studies by other researchers have also shown that our structured multi-tiered planting – managed trees over shrubs, multi-layers of canopy – can reduce mid-day temperatures by up to 0.9 degrees Celsius.

So, holistically, we are not just looking at the design of indoor spaces, community spaces, facades of buildings, windows, ventilation, wind flow, but we are also looking at using greenery, which are nature-based solutions, to achieve outdoor and indoor cooling.

8 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Trade and Industry in view of the long-term geopolitical events affecting oil prices and the high volatility of energy prices, whether the Government will consider temporarily bringing the energy market under state control to keep electricity prices more stable for consumers and businesses in Singapore.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the world has been facing an energy crunch since September 2021. Global gas prices have increased significantly, due to high demand and tight gas supply. The global energy markets are expected to remain volatile and elevated with the protracted conflict in Ukraine, and this is also coupled with the seasonal increase in energy demand from countries in Europe and Asia, especially during the coming winter.

With Singapore relying on imported natural gas to generate around 95% of its electricity, our domestic energy prices would not be immune from the volatility in global energy markets. The higher fuel prices globally will result in higher domestic electricity prices. While our electricity prices will have to reflect the higher cost of electricity production, it is vital that the global volatility does not disrupt our electricity supply and impair the functioning of our domestic energy market.

I previously shared with the House measures that MTI and EMA have put in place to secure our electricity supply and ensure the orderly functioning of the wider energy sector. Specifically, EMA established a Standby LNG Facility, called the SLF, and also required generation companies (gencos) to bolster their own stockpile of fuel. Where there are potential shortages in electricity supply, EMA will also direct the gencos to generate. EMA also introduced the Temporary Electricity Contracting Support Scheme (TRECS) to help large consumers secure retail contracts.

These measures have helped to ensure uninterrupted energy supply and stabilised the Uniform Singapore Energy Price (USEP), without the need to bring the electricity market under state control within the short- to medium- term. EMA will continue to monitor the situation closely and we will not hesitate to introduce new measures, if necessary.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. I thank the Minister for his reply. As the Minister said, 95% of our energy is from natural gas, which is a single modality. I wish to ask whether the Ministry is considering diversifying our electricity sources to reduce concentration of risks?

I thank the Member for his supplementary question. I think we have also shared many times in public, and also in this House, that we have been actively looking at ways and means to diversify and improve our resilience and preserve our energy security. Other than the Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project, which is a pilot that we started, also known as the LTMS, EMA has an ongoing Request for Proposal (RFP), to import up to four gigawatts of electricity by 2035. EMA has received various proposals from countries in the region and beyond, demonstrating the abundant renewable energy potential within this region.

We welcome these proposals and we will diversify our supply sources to secure a reliable and sustainable supply for Singapore.

Other than tapping on electricity imports, we will also continue to actively preserve some of our existing energy suppliers and also to diversify our energy sources.

First, our natural gas switch. Natural gas will continue to be a key source of energy supply for Singapore. It is good as a transition fuel and it is the lowest, in terms of carbon emission, of all of the fossilised fuels. So, we will continue to ensure that this supply of natural gas is secure.

Secondly, we are also accelerating solar deployment and we aim to be able to achieve two gigawatts peak of solar energy within our country by 2030.

Third, we are developing low-carbon alternatives, such as hydrogen, and we are also exploring the use of carbon capture utilisation and storage; and at the same time, also exploring Singapore's potential for geothermal energy.

We will continue, on the international front, our exchanges with our regional, as well as global partners to advance our mutual interests – to provide energy cooperation and ensure greater energy resilience.

9 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for Manpower whether the CPF interest rate will be increased for the next few years to compensate for the high inflation rate that is expected to last for a considerable period, so as to strengthen the retirement adequacy of Singaporeans and seniors.

10 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Manpower in computing the CPF Ordinary Account interest rate based on the three-month average of major local banks' interest rates (a) which are the banks identified as major local banks and what are the criteria for selection; (b) what are the types of interest rates and parameters used in the determination; and (c) whether there has been a change in the banks or interest rate parameters used since the formula was introduced.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, CPF interest rates are pegged to returns on investments of comparable risk and duration in the market.

Ordinary Account (OA) savings is in a liquid account that can be withdrawn at any time for home purchases, for servicing mortgage loans or other specified purposes, such as investments.

Minister, I would just like to check. Are you taking Question Nos 9 and 10 together?

Oh, yes. Sorry, that switch from energy to CPF is quite a significant switch! [Laughter.] Can I take Question Nos 9 and 10 together, please?

Please do.

Thank you. I apologise. Ordinary Account (OA) savings is in a liquid account that can be withdrawn at any time for home purchases, for the servicing mortgage loans or other specified purposes, such as investments. Thus, the OA interest rate is pegged to the three-month average fixed deposit and savings rates of our three major local banks, which are DBS, UOB and OCBC. These three banks have a larger share of domestic deposits than other banks.

The formula was last changed in 1999 when the ratio of fixed deposits to savings was updated from 50/50 to 80/20. So, 80% fixed deposit, 20% savings. This was done to reflect the longer duration that CPF OA monies remained with CPF Board. As stated in the CPF Board's press release in May 2022, which announced the CPF interest rates effective from July to September 2022, the local banks' three-month average interest rate was 0.09%. Based on our latest estimates, the interest rate remains at around 0.09%.

The Special, MediSave and Retirement Account, or SMRA, interest rates are pegged to the 12-month average yield of 10-year Singapore Government Securities plus 1%. The peg was 2.72% as stated in CPF Board's May press release. It is around 3%, based on our latest estimates. CPF Board will announce in September 2022 the CPF interest rates effective from October to December 2022.

As these are below the effective floor rates for these accounts, the interest rates for the OA and SMRA are maintained at 2.5% and 4% respectively. The Government has maintained the floor rate of 4% for the SMRA since 2008 and we will continue to review this on an annual basis. Therefore, despite the low interest rate environment since the Global Financial Crisis, the Government has continued to pay generous interest rates due to the floor rates. If the pegged rates exceed the floor rates, members will correspondingly earn the higher interest rates on their CPF savings.

There is some time-lag in CPF interest rate adjustments to avoid subjecting members to unnecessary fluctuations. Members with HDB concessionary loans who pay the prevailing OA interest rate plus 0.1 percentage point also benefit from the stability vis-à-vis the market mortgage rates. This is the case when interest rates are rising, but the converse also applies when interest rates are falling.

The Government will continue to pay the 1% of extra interest on the first $60,000 of members' combined CPF balances, 55 and above can earn up to 6%. Members can also transfer their OA monies to the Special or Retirement Account to earn the higher, risk-free rate. I want to emphasise that this is risk-free.

We will continue to review CPF interest rates periodically. The interest rates on the Ordinary Account, Special Account and MediSave Account are reviewed quarterly, every three months, while the interest rate on the Retirement Account is reviewed annually.

Mr Louis Chua.

I thank the Minister for the reply. I have two supplementary questions. The first is in relation to Member Henry Kwek's question, in terms of the extra interest that can be granted, especially in the inflationary environment.

I note that if you look at the CPF monies, they are invested in special SGS Securities and, basically, these earn for the CPF Board a coupon rate that is pegged to CPF interest rates that members receive. If you look over the last 20 years, I think the GIC portfolio nominal returns were about 7% per year. So, what will be the hurdle for the Government to consider granting extra interest rates, as it has done from January 2008 and 2016?

The second supplementary question is in relation to the formula which Minister shared that was changed in July 1999. It has been more than 20 years since. I was wondering whether the Government would consider reviewing this formula. Because, even if you look within the fixed deposits and savings rates for the banks, I just had a look last night – just for DBS, for example, if you look at the 12-month deposit rate, for balances of $20,000 to $50,000, it is 0.05% which is indicated on the CPF Board's website. But for less than $20,000, the amount for a 12-month deposit rate would be 1.15% instead. And I think over the last few days, the various local banks have also raised their interest rates for their savings accounts, such as the Multiplier and so on. So, whether or not these changes in the account types would prompt the CPF Board to review its pegging of the formula?

I thank the Member for his two supplementary questions. Let me put this into a broader perspective and we also welcome suggestions. Many of the policies are decided with input from an Advisory Panel and a Board as well.

The CPF system is aimed at giving members over the longer horizon better security in retirement and old age.

I think what the Member was alluding to, in terms of all of these bank accounts, Multiplier accounts and so on, these are very short-term, volatile instruments. I do not want to belabour the point and take up too much time to go into an extended discussion on this thing.

Like I said, the emphasis is really on long term. For us, in being custodians of members' monies, we take a very long-term view in providing members with a fair rate of return. The CPF interest rates, I want to re-emphasise, continue to be attractive. Members below aged 55 can earn up to 5%, while members aged 55 and above can earn up to 6%. Members can also transfer their Ordinary Account monies to the Special or Retirement Account to earn the higher interest rate. And I want to emphasis on this again – the interest rate is risk-free. I think that really tells you how secure your savings are.

To his point about the longer-term returns as to whether we can peg it, if you look at where we are today, we peg the rates to the 10-year Singapore Government Securities plus 1%. The pegged rates have been below 4% since the Global Financial Crisis. This is since 2008. So, we are looking at about a 14-year horizon when the peg was introduced.

The average delta, that means the incremental difference that CPF has paid is 0.9%. It is quite substantial. That is just for the SMRA.

For the Ordinary Account, the interest rate peg has been below the legislated minimum floor of 2.5% because, if you appreciate the fact that for the Ordinary Account, we pegged it to the prevailing interest rates of the three local banks – DBS, UOB and OCBC. So, using the peg with our legislative minimum floor of 2.5%, since 1 July 1999, the average delta is double that of the SMRA, which is at 1.8%. And again, I want to emphasise to the hon Member, Mr Louis Chua, that this is risk-free.

So, I think that the rates that are chosen, these are effective rates, basic rates with no further conditions. What the Member was talking about earlier on, in terms of the banks' promotional deposit rates, they are contingent on customers providing fresh funds, or they are only valid for a limited period or for limited amounts of deposits.

Let us take, for example, the DBS Multiplier account. The bonus interest rates are typically contingent on customers. If you look at the promotional materials and read the fine print, they are contingent on customers fulfilling other criteria, such as spending on credit cards or crediting of salary. The effective interest rate, which is what would impact all of us, may be much lower because the bonus rates are usually kept to a certain amount.

So, I think, in other words, as financial advisors, it behoves us to actually be very transparent to all of our clients that these benefits are not uniformly applicable to all balances of all the depositors.

11 Mr Edward Chia Bing Hui asked the Minister for Trade and Industry with regards to the criteria for the new Energy Efficiency Grant for SMEs (a) what is the Ministry's intent and approach towards it; and (b) whether the Ministry plans to encourage more companies to be more energy-efficient at a systems level, that is, a total solution towards gaining energy efficiency by tiering the grants or focusing on specific capital investments, in order to gain momentum first.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the Energy Efficiency Grant supports and encourages local SMEs in the food services, food manufacturing and retail sectors to invest in energy-efficient equipment in six categories: namely LED lighting, air-conditioners, cooking hobs, refrigerators, water heaters and clothes dryers.

We have focused on these six categories of equipment because they tend to be energy intensive and are used for long hours. The types of equipment supported under each category are selected based on technologies that have been identified as energy-efficient or have high-efficiency ratings, under NEA's Mandatory Energy Labelling Scheme.

I want to assure the Members that in the coming months, EnterpriseSG (ESG) will be working very closely with the industry, seeking industry feedback on the Energy Efficiency Grant (EEG) as part of our ongoing engagements with the industry, Trade Associations and Chambers.

We certainly encourage companies to adopt a "total solution" approach towards energy efficiency, as suggested by the Member. NEA's Energy Efficiency Fund (EEF) provides support for companies in the manufacturing sector, including the integration of resource-efficient designs into new facilities and the installation of energy management information systems. In addition, SMEs can also tap on affordable energy assessments that is offered by the Energy Efficiency Technology Centre (EETC), which is a collaboration between NEA and the Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT), to help them make informed decisions on the kind of measures to take to improve their energy efficiency.

We welcome suggestions on how we can further help our SMEs become more energy efficient. Together, we can make the Singapore economy more sustainable.

Mr Edward Chia.

Thank you, Madam. I would like to ask the Minister of State if MTI is also looking at spurring adoption of energy-efficient measures upstream, at a more system level besides focusing on equipment.

In addition, food services businesses use a wide range of equipment and some of them could be very energy intensive. Will MTI consider widening the range of equipment considered, as this could be helpful to many businesses and reduce potential equipment wastage?

I want to thank the Member, Mr Edward Chia, for his two supplementary questions. And I want to assure him that MTI and ESG are very committed to work with the other Ministries and agencies to support our SMEs, to make the green transformation at the system level for those who are prepared to do so. But we also recognise that there are some SMEs who need to take the first baby steps and this is why we have the Energy Efficiency Grant. The EEG is one of the latest schemes amongst the suite of many other measures – between MTI, MSE, NEA and so on – we have in place to support our businesses to become more energy-efficient.

I want to assure him that we are committed to help our SMEs in their sustainability journey. And that is why, over the past few years, in particular, we have rolled out many schemes and measures that supports our SMEs to make the green transformation at system level, be it acquiring expertise, skills, technology or even capability.

So, for example, for SMEs that are building owners, they will be able to apply for the BCA's Green Mark Incentive Scheme for Existing Buildings 2.0 (GMIS-EB 2.0), because this provides building owners, including SMEs, with co-funding support of up to 50% to help them to retrofit and to help them raise the energy performance of their building. So, we have that for SMEs that are prepared to go upstream to really embark on their sustainability journey at the system level.

Other than that, for our industrial SMEs, if they are keen to also go upstream and make a system level green transformation and they do not quite know what to do, they can approach EETC. This is a collaboration between NEA and one of our Autonomous University (AU), Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT). So, what can they do for the SMEs? They will help them provide energy audits, because you need to start with knowing how much energy you are consuming, the whole of the organisation, your production lines and so on. They will also help SMEs build up their local energy efficiency capabilities. And if the SME has Research Scientist Engineers (RSE), they can also work in tandem with them to upskill their engineers and practitioners in energy efficiency.

On the Member's second question about why the six, can we go beyond the six categories? Allow me to take a step back and share why the three sectors, and then, why these six categories? In MTI and ESG, we have been working very closely with our industries, with our SMEs, across all sectors and we know that in the last nine months, it has been difficult, in particular, our SMEs in the food services, food manufacturing and the retail sectors. We know that they tend to have a larger electricity component in their overall business costs. So, we want to help them to see how to manage that and become more competitive and bring the business costs down.

This is why, we are going to roll out the Energy Efficiency Grant (EEG), the SMEs in these three sectors can apply for the EEG starting 1 September 2022 to 31 March 2023. Now, this grant will allow the SMEs in these three sectors to obtain a support of up to 70% to adopt energy efficiency equipment in the pre-approved categories that I have mentioned. Why pre-approved? Because we work very closely with NEA's licensing department to pre-approve the equipment, so that the SME applicants will be able to adopt this energy efficient appliances and equipment readily, very quickly and easily as well.

Let me share with you how we work with NEA to qualify the equipment. Essentially, these six categories are identified based on two key considerations. Number one, what would be the energy efficient technologies behind, whether it is the cooker, hob, refrigerators and so on. And the other one will be based on the High Efficiency Rating by NEA's mandatory energy labelling scheme. I want to assure the Member that, for any SME clients that have other equipment and would like to apply, the applicants may suggest other kinds of equipment or even technology within this six supportable categories that has higher or similar level of energy efficiency. We would like to invite them to make the submission to apply for the review and we certainly will evaluate accordingly.

Rest assured that MTI, ESG, in fact, together with EMA, as well as our colleagues in NEA and MSE, we are very committed to supporting our SMEs across various sectors to embark on their sustainability journey, be it at the system level, or be it taking the first few steps by adopting energy efficient equipment.

12 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for Health for each year in the past five years, what is the average and median nurse-to-patient ratio for (i) general wards and (ii) intensive care units respectively.

13 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for Health (a) what steps has the Ministry taken to reduce the administrative workload of nurses in restructured hospitals; (b) whether additional steps will be taken; and (c) if so, what are they.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, may I address Questions Nos 12 and 13 together?

Go ahead.

My answer will also address written Question No 36 from today's Order paper, oral Question Nos 20 and 21 and written Question No 53 raised by Mr Louis Ng from the Order Paper on 1 August.

Thank you, Mr Ng, for your concern over our nursing workforce. I believe it is also not too late to wish all nurses in Singapore, Happy Nurses' Day. [Applause.]

Over the last five years, there has been a slight overall increase in the attrition rates for local nurses. The attrition of local public sector nurses increased from 6% in 2017, to 6.3% in 2018 and 7% in 2019, then dropped to 5.4% in 2020, before increasing to 7.4% in 2021. For foreign public sector nurses, international competition has been more intense and attrition rate has increased more significantly, from 8.2% in 2017, to 9.1% in 2018 and 9.4% in 2019, then dropped to 7% in 2020, before increasing to 14.8% in 2021.

The typical nurse-to-bed ratio for general wards in the public acute hospitals is one nurse for every four or five beds. The typical nurse-to-patient ratio in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) in the public acute hospitals is one nurse for each ICU patient and could be higher, such as two nurses for more complex ICU cases. This has not changed significantly over the past five years.

Mr Ng has asked for salary comparison between private and public hospital nurses. We are reluctant to provide this so openly, as we know that both sectors compete for manpower. We also do not have data for the private sector.

I will, however, share a few data points. Staff Nurses (SNs) and Senior Staff Nurses (SSNs) form the largest proportion of our nursing workforce. The median annual salaries for SNs ranged from $42,800 to $53,700 in 2017, and rose to $46,300 to $58,500 in 2021, while that for SSNs ranged from $65,000 to $79,700 in 2017, increasing to $71,200 to $87,600 in 2021. In general, it takes an average four to six years for a fresh graduate to move up to SSN. Hence, an SN in 2017 may be drawing the annual salary in the SSN range by 2021.

The key issue is to retain the services of nurses. Our strategy to stabilise the nursing workforce covers several key aspects. These include reviewing the scope of work that nurses are doing to enable them to spend more time on direct patient care. Equally important is to ensure that remunerations are competitive, locally and also internationally.

On reviewing the scope of work, our public healthcare institutions adopt a multi-prong approach to reduce the administrative workload for nurses and enable nurses to focus on patient care. This includes streamlining care processes and deploying dedicated administrative and support care staff to assist nurses.

Over time, we have also introduced innovations in automation, technology, robotics and AI-enabled technology to assist nurses and healthcare staff, to ease the load of non-clinical and administrative tasks. An example of such technology is the Nursing Software Suite, introduced by Singapore Health Services (SHS) in their hospitals to enable patients to self-help, such as enabling them to check their results, medications, schedules for tests and indicating their requests to the care team.

Other than reviewing the job scope and administrative workload, as our population ages, there will continue to be growing demands on healthcare manpower. I also urge families and caregivers to be a partner in the care journey of your loved ones, as working together with us will help alleviate the workload faced by our healthcare staff.

Mr Louis Ng also asked if the National Wellness Committee for Junior Doctors (NWC-JD) could broaden its scope of work to include the working hours and conditions of nurses. We would like to explain that the NWC-JD was formed to specifically address issues related to junior doctors. These need to be tackled differently in the case of junior doctors because of their regular rotations across the public healthcare system, compared to other staff groups who are employed directly by the respective public healthcare clusters.

MOH and the public healthcare clusters have always been concerned about the well-being of nurses and other staff groups. For example, we had formed an internal cross-cluster Staff Well-being Committee in 2019 for clusters to share best practices with one another and provide feedback to MOH on enhancements to improve well-being across all categories of staff. One example of its recommendations was for MOH to look deeper into the issues of abuse and harassment of healthcare workers. Hence, we announced earlier in March 2022 the formation of a Tripartite Workgroup to address this nationally.

Clusters have also enhanced their support measures for staff. For example, Chief Wellness Officers have been appointed by clusters to oversee and develop system changes to improve the well-being of all healthcare staff. Counselling services, peer-support networks and staff support assistance plans have also been put in place to support staff.

The rest day provisions and work hour limits for public healthcare workers are stipulated in the Employment Act or set out in the public healthcare clusters' employment contracts, as previously explained to Mr Louis Ng in Parliament, in March. While the Ministry does not impose a minimum number of rest hours, duty rosters for nurses are planned in advance to ensure staff have adequate rest between shifts.

Even as we prioritise the well-being of our nurses, we appreciate the reality of their work, which is to deliver timely and quality patient care. The Ministry is working to ensure there are sufficient nurses on the ground. In fact, the registered stock of nurses over the past few years has remained stable, with a slight increase from around 42,800 at end 2019, to 43,000 at end 2021. Local nursing intakes have also increased from around 1,500 in 2014 to around 2,100 in 2021, to ensure that there is a stable inflow of nursing manpower into our healthcare system.

We understand the importance of recognising nurses' contributions and the Ministry has worked on reviewing their salaries and allowances. Over the last five years, the annual salaries of local nurses in public healthcare institutions – which comprises base salary, allowances and bonuses – have increased.

With the easing of COVID-19, public healthcare institutions have been allowing nurses to take time off work to rest and recover. This includes allowing foreign staff to return home to spend time with their loved ones, after a long period of time away from them in 2020 and 2021, when many borders were closed and travel restrictions were in effect. We know from clusters' data that leave is being approved and allowed.

MOH remains committed to provide support to the public healthcare clusters in our efforts to ensure that there is sufficient manpower on the ground, and look after the well-being of our nurses, as they continue to face pressures from COVID-19 surge waves and an ageing population.

Mr Louis Ng.

Madam, I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the reply. But I have three clarifications.

One, the Senior Parliamentary Secretary mentioned that the nurses should have adequate rest. But I am just wondering whether MOH can clarify what "adequate" means. I think a lot of nurses are sharing that they sometimes end their shift at 9.00 pm or 10.00 pm, and then they are back at work at 7.00 am, and that is insufficient rest for many of them.

Two, can I ask whether MOH has an ideal nurse-to-patient ratio and what are we doing to work towards that ideal ratio, both in the general wards and the ICUs as well?

Lastly, for the ancillary care staff, I asked for their median salary as well, but I understand we cannot provide. Still, I think they do help in reducing the nurses' workload. So, if I could ask the Senior Parliamentary Secretary what is MOH doing in terms of increasing the salary of the ancillary care staff, their career progression, as well as increasing the hiring of these staff members.

I thank the Member for the question. Let me address the first one, in relation to rest hours. There are many different arrangements within the public healthcare institutions in the different clusters on how they actually manage the rest hours amongst the healthcare workers. So, in some clusters, it is about ensuring that they typically work on rotating shifts and they are rostered such that they have adequate rest time within shifts. Guidance has also been given, so that they are given rest time for their breaks. Duty rosters are planned in advance and there are guidelines, so that they are not working consecutively beyond a certain number of days so that they get the rest they needed. Within the working space, they are also given dedicated hall rooms, staggered break times so that they can have sufficient rest.

The reality on the ground is that there are many challenges and these nurses work very hard. There are realities of their workplaces that require them to go beyond their call of duty. We really appreciate that and we know that it has been challenging for the nurses and all the healthcare workers.

So, the key thing is making sure that there is a sufficient number on the ground and that is something that we are continually looking at. The attrition rate is a reflection of this. The numbers that we are looking at in respect of the local nurses are actually stabilising. Our key issue and problems are that we are losing the foreign nurses.

The second question is related to the ideal nurse-to-patient ratio. This is a function of the type of wards and the work that they do, because it is a function of the care that is needed for the patient. And, as you know, they are all tiered in terms of what specific care needs to be given. So, this is a function of those two. And that is a priority because patient care is important. So, in a lot of the settings, what we are trying to do is also ensuring that they have sufficient time to dedicate to patient care.

What are the other pieces of work that they need to do? For administrative work, we are looking at various ways on how we can manage some of this work, so that there is sufficient time and they are able to dedicate their time to the work in relation to patient care.

In relation to the Member's concern and queries with regard to salaries, and also that of the other workers, the healthcare workers, I think this is something that we are constantly looking at because we know how valuable they are in our community. We are concerned about the pandemic still being around and also the fact that we have an ageing population. So, this is something we are constantly looking at, at making this sector a favourable one, something that is attractive, so that we can have people go into the sector and relieve the manpower on the ground.

But the reality is, as I have mentioned earlier, we are doing everything. It is a multi-pronged approach. The issue that we are seeing right now is the fact that we are losing foreign nurses due to the pandemic. Now that the borders are open, they can go back. They are also being attracted by prospects overseas. So, there is international competition and we are losing all these workers. That means that we are losing the numbers on the ground here, locally.

So, while salaries and working conditions are important and we are constantly looking at how we can improve these, we should not jump to the conclusion that they are always the root of the manpower problems.

MOH remains committed to trying to look at this issue holistically and adopt a multi-pronged approach in improving the situation on the ground.

Mr Louis Ng.

Just a quick last point. I do agree that we have a lot of guidelines in place. But I think it is very difficult to follow at this point because, as the Senior Parliamentary Secretary mentioned, a lot of the foreign nurses are leaving and that really puts the stress now on the local nurses.

So, we can rely on their passion, they are very passionate about it, but I think they are really urging for some protection, especially of their rest time. Again, I ask whether MOH can, at least, make sure that the guidelines on adequate rest for nurses are being adhered to at this point.

I thank the Member again for his question. Indeed, I understand the concerns and I mentioned earlier that there was an internal committee that was set up, the Staff Well-being Committee. And amongst some of the issues raised is clearly the issue of giving sufficient rest to the nurses. And this is something that they are looking at. There have been a few recommendations. The implementation of these different recommendations is being rolled out and we do hope to see that these recommendations and proposals are impacting the workflow and, hopefully, they will improve outcomes.

On the other hand, there are also other things that we hope to see, because I also mentioned earlier about how family members, there is a certain expectation of what nurses are expected to do in hospitals and this also does not help in terms of adding to their workload. The culture may be different elsewhere, and we may want to educate and look into this matter.

There is also a task force that is looking to address issues of abuse, which also impacts the work conditions of the staff and the nurses. These are also all things that we are currently looking at. So, give us some time to roll out some of the recommendations that have been put up. Hopefully, through all these efforts that we are putting up, there is improvement and we will constantly review this to see how it has impacted the ground.

14 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how many SMEs have engaged with Centres of Innovation in local Institutes of Higher Learning (IHLs) to support their research and development efforts; (b) whether the Ministry can provide a breakdown of the successfully commercialised ideas by SMEs in partnership with IHLs according to industry sectors; and (c) how can SMEs' engagement with IHLs be boosted to better tap on the expertise and technological capabilities of IHLs.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, over the period 2016 to 2020, approximately 3,000 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged with the Centres of Innovation (COIs) in the local Institutes of Higher Learning (IHLs) and A*STAR Research Institutes (RIs). These engagements have resulted in about 300 innovation projects conducted, ranging from technology translation and adoption to Intellectual Property (IP) licensing, product co-development and co-innovation.

The feedback from SMEs has been very positive. An example of a local SME that has benefited from its partnership with a COI is You Tiao Man. The Food Innovation and Resource Centre (FIRC) COI which is located at Singapore Polytechnic helped refine the company's frozen "you tiao", that is, fried dough, manufacturing methods to improve the product's taste and quality, which then led to its successful commercialisation. The company is now supplying the frozen "you tiao" to many hotels, restaurants, airlines and food service companies. In addition, it has expanded into the B2C market by selling frozen "you tiao" directly to customers online and at retail outlets island-wide.

As announced in Budget 2022, the Government has increased support for local SMEs and, in particular, for R&D and innovation activities. More SMEs will now be able to tap on the higher capacity and research capabilities of over 80 Technology, Innovation and Enterprise (TIE) centres, including the eight COIs.

Over the next five years, these centres are expected to undertake close to 2,000 innovation projects across five pilot sectors: agri-tech, construction, food manufacturing, precision engineering and retail.

Besides the COIs, SMEs can also leverage our IHLs' capabilities by participating in technology collaborations and joint projects conducted by the academia and industry partners.

Through such partnerships, our SMEs can strengthen their technical competencies, stay up-to-date and learn the latest research trends and developments. Our SMEs also have the opportunity to work with IHLs and the A*STAR RIs via the Industry Alignment Fund – Industry Collaboration Project, in short, the IAF-ICP scheme. This programme encourages and enables research collaborations between the public sector and the industry to bring promising technologies to market.

Mr Desmond Choo.

I would like to thank the Minister of State for her reply. I have two supplementary questions. The first one is: how do these Centres of Innovation serve, assist and benefit the SMEs? The second would be: how does MTI intend to reach out to more SMEs to accelerate the pace of innovation and to foster greater innovation amongst SMEs?

I want to thank the Member Desmond Choo for his supplementary questions – I believe there are two. And I want to assure him that MTI and ESG will certainly give our strong support to SMEs that want to embark on technology innovation.

SMEs can tap on a wide range of resources at the eight COIs, or Centres of Innovation. Each of the Centres of Innovation is a one-stop hub that supports our SMEs' technology innovation efforts, based on a sectorial approach. For example, I talked about the Food Innovation and Resource Centre (FIRC) that is located at Singapore Polytechnic. We have other COIs that focus on environment and water technology, supply chain management – which is located at Republic Polytechnic – and electronics and the Internet of Things.

On his question on how a COI can assist and serve the SMEs, besides access to laboratory facilities, consultancies and training courses, SMEs can also receive help in feasibility studies and productivity improvements.

I also want to assure the Member that MTI and ESG work very closely with A*STAR. Because each COI takes a sectorial approach. In terms of outreach, the COI staff will work very closely with ESG to extend outreach to SMEs, especially the trade associations and chambers, the industry associations.

FIRC that is located at Singapore Polytechnic has very close links with the Singapore Food Manufacturers' Association. As for the Republic Polytechnic's COI that focuses on supply chain management, I know that they hold a monthly industry outreach event for their SMEs, showcasing the technologies that they have developed, and also past projects.

I want to assure the Member that MTI, ESG and A*STAR will work closely with COIs to support our SMEs' technology innovation efforts.

Mr Leon Perera.

I thank the Minister of State for her explanation. Just a few supplementary questions.

Firstly, is there a mechanism whereby our local SMEs can very easily access the IPs, the patents, for example, that are available – from COIs, IHLs, RIs and RCs under A*STAR? Is there perhaps an online mechanism where they can access these patents and see whether they can enter into negotiations to license these patents for their own operations? Notwithstanding that there are occasional meet-ups, gatherings and so on, is there this easy, online matching mechanism, for example?

Secondly, is there a mechanism for SMEs to inform IHLs and so on about their commercial priorities, so that they can influence the direction of R&D projects?

Thirdly, in the view of the Government, are these mechanisms working well right now to generate commercial impact?

Lastly, does the Government regularly benchmark the performance of other IHLs and innovation ecosystems around the world which are noted to be very good at bridging between academic research and commercial impact? I understand the Israelis, for example, are very good at this. They tend to generate very high commercial impact from academic R&D.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I want to thank the Member Mr Leon Perera for asking these questions.

I want to reassure him that ESG and MTI, as well as A*STAR, work very closely with not just the COIs. I talked about the 80 Technology, Innovation and Enterprise (TIE) centres.

For SMEs that want to embark on technology innovation, if they want to develop new innovation and new IP that will open up new revenue streams, expand their market opportunities the COI team will work very closely with them on projects with potential that may result in new IP, which can then lead to new revenue streams or even new jobs created.

It can translate into a few things. It can translate into technology translation, IP licensing, product development, R&D, prototyping of solutions, proof of concept (POC) and also collaboration with larger enterprises.

On one of the questions the Member asked, yes, certainly, we work very closely, between A*STAR and EDB. I believe we have the Singapore-Israel Industrial R&D Foundation (SIIRD). We collaborate with Israeli's R&D side, sharing our best practices and so on.

MTI, ESG and A*STAR will assess very regularly the effectiveness of these TIE centres, including the COIs. For example, we will assess if they are effective at enhancing our enterprises' competitiveness. ESG will commission an impact study. The last impact study, I believe, for the Research Innovation Enterprise (RIE) 2020 tranche, found that the eight COIs collectively helped to generate an Economic Value Added (EVA) of $150 million through working with local SMEs.

To the Member's question on whether there is a repository, other than a portal, it is best that for SMEs that are keen to take the first step in technology innovation and explore how they could work with A*STAR or any of the research institutes to potentially commercialise their IP into a product, to help them open up revenue streams, they can approach A*STAR.

ESG will work very closely with A*STAR to facilitate the discussion and to help them navigate the various RIs. Whether it is in the area of sustainability or electronics, there are sectoral RIs to support their technology innovation efforts. We can take the discussion further, like what I have mentioned, using the COI as an example.

15 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Transport given passenger traffic at Changi Airport in June 2022 has reached the target of 50% of pre-pandemic levels, whether the Government has reassessed passenger traffic targets for end- 2022 and 2023 and, if so, what are they.

16 Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong asked the Minister for Transport (a) what is the current progress of the reopening of Changi Airport's air routes; (b) how does Changi Airport currently rank amongst regional and global air hubs on connectivity and passenger volume; and (c) what is the projected progress of the reopening of Changi Airport's air routes by end of 2022.

Madam, may I take Question Nos 15 and 16 together?

Please go ahead.

As of the first week of July 2022, weekly passenger traffic at Changi Airport had recovered to about 55% of 2019's average weekly levels. This is on the back of weekly passenger services by airlines recovering to more than 50% of pre-COVID-19 levels. Changi Airport is also connected to 108 cities by passenger flights as of July 2022, which is more than 65% of the number of cities it was connected to before the pandemic.

The pattern of recovery across the world has been uneven. Air hubs in regions such as Europe, North America and the Middle East, which reopened their borders earlier, have seen a faster recovery. International passenger traffic at the Middle Eastern air hubs of Dubai, Doha and Istanbul had recovered to more than 90% of their pre-COVID-19 levels even before June 2022. The connectivity at these hubs, in terms of international city links, is also at 90% or more of pre-COVID-19 levels as of June 2022.

Within the Asia Pacific region, Changi Airport is leading the recovery. As of June 2022, compared to the major Asia Pacific air hubs, such as Incheon, Hong Kong and Bangkok, Changi Airport is ahead in terms of both international passenger traffic and city links vis-a-vis pre-COVID-19 levels.

Demand for air travel remains fundamentally strong. We expect the recovery at Changi Airport to continue and to gather pace when key markets in Northeast Asia, including Mainland China, Hong Kong and Japan, fully reopen their borders.

To ensure that Changi Airport will be ready to manage the anticipated traveller flows, the Changi Airport Group has announced that it will reopen Terminal 4 from 13 September and commence departure operations in the southern wing of Terminal 2 from October. This will enable the airport to handle up to pre-COVID-19 passenger traffic levels, or about 70 million passengers per annum, which represents about 80% of Changi Airport's pre-COVID-19 capacity.

To support this ramp up in capacity, our aviation stakeholders are also working hard to build up their manpower and restore the traveller experience that Changi Airport is renowned for.

With the efforts and support of the entire aviation community and our partners, we will be ready to welcome more passengers and airlines back to Singapore, and ultimately, restore Changi Airport's position as a pre-eminent global air hub.

Mr Louis Chua.

I thank the Minister for the response. Just one supplementary question, which is essentially my Parliamentary Question, in terms of the target passenger numbers for this year, as well as next year.

I ask that because I think STB has put out a visitor arrivals target of about four to six million this year versus 1.5 million in the first half of the year. That would enable the various supply chain partners to better project their own internal capacities to plan ahead, should there be a faster than expected ramp-up in passenger numbers coming through.

Minister.

Madam, I thank the Member for his question. As I said, it is difficult to set the target at this stage of our recovery for the total volume of passengers that can come in. The reason is simply because the source markets are at different stages of managing the recovery from COVID-19. Key markets like China, Japan and Northeast Asia in general, are still working their way through and we are not sure when exactly and how exactly they will make further changes.

With that in mind, having set an initial 50% target which has been well and truly met and exceeded, our focus now is to prepare our aviation ecosystem and Changi Airport in particular, for a potential volume of about 70 million, which is at about the level that it was pre-COVID-19. And it is about 80% or so of the pre-COVID-19 capacity of Changi Airport.

That, in itself, is no mean feat. What it means is we have to now further ramp up manpower. As I have shared with Members before, we have had an attrition of about one-third of the workforce in the aviation ecosystem over the course of COVID-19. Recovering from that, not just in terms of recruitment but in terms of making sure that the manpower is operationally ready, is a major challenge. One only has to consider the experience in many other airports around the world to appreciate the enormity of the task.

So, our focus, in response to the Member's question, is to ramp up capacity and as part of that effort, reopen Terminal 4, and also have both departure and arrival operations in the southern part of Terminal 2 and all of these to be fully executed by October, so that we are prepared for the year-end peak travel season.

Order. End of Question Time. Ministerial Statement, Minister for Defence.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), written answers to questions not reached by the end of Question Time are reproduced in the Appendix, unless Members had asked for questions standing in their names to be postponed to a later Sitting day or withdrawn.]

Minister for Defence.

Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. Madam, during the Parliament Sitting on 5 July this year, Mr Leong Mun Wai asserted that "citizens by registration are...not doing NS". He said this in his supplementary question after my reply on sporting privileges for National Servicemen.

Mr Leong's assertion is inaccurate and misleading.

Since 2000, on average, 3,400 new citizens are registered each year, who have been or will be enlisted like all male Singaporeans to serve their NS duties.

MINDEF had provided all relevant facts of NS liabilities for new citizens in a written answer to his Parliamentary Question that he had filed for that same Sitting in July. I quote in full MINDEF's reply: "Under the Enlistment Act, all male Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents between the ages of 18 and 40 for non-officers and 50 for officers are liable to serve National Service (NS). However, males who receive citizenship as mature adults, typically in their 30s and 40s, are not enlisted as they are not suitable for full-time NS at that age and did not enjoy any benefits prior to their citizenship.

New male citizens who stayed in Singapore when young and enjoyed economic and social benefits are enlisted when they reach 18 years of age or older. They number on average 3,400 each year, which constitute about half of all new male citizens registered each year."

In fact, we had prepared this same reply in May, because Mr Leong had filed a similar question then, but which he withdrew when there was no Sitting that month.

Even before the July Sitting, Mr Leong had been repeating these misleading statements in two Facebook posts: one in late May and another on 1 July. In late May, I quote: "Is it fair for foreigners to be given citizenship without doing NS while our locally-born Singaporeans have to serve NS despite having valid reasons to defer?" For his Facebook post in July, I quote: "Is it fair that we forfeit our local talents their chances of developing their talents while many new male citizens do not need to do NS?"

Let there be no doubt that for every young male citizen, whether by birth, registration or descent, the NS liabilities are the same. We do not differentiate. They will be enlisted for NS at 18 years or older to perform full-time NS, and thereafter must fulfil their Operationally Ready NS (ORNS) duties. That is universal and equitable.

But if a foreigner comes to Singapore and becomes a citizen as a mature adult, typically in his 30s or 40s, we exempt him from NS because he did not enjoy any socioeconomic benefits like young Singaporeans and also because he would be too old to enlist for full time NS.

On a topic as important as NS, Mr Leong should have waited for MINDEF's reply or sought the full facts. This policy is not new; in fact, it dates back at least to the early 1980s. We had to go some way back to find out when the policy started. But it is, at least, more than 40 years. It is in our Parliamentary records as Ministers and Members of Parliament have spoken on this policy previously.

For example, back in 2007, then-Minister of State for Defence Assoc Prof Koo Tsai Kee had already made clear that: "Each year, we have a number of new citizens in full-time NS. They are born foreign nationals, they took up permanent residency, but have since been naturalised as Singapore Citizens. Like those who are born Singaporeans, they are enlisted for full-time NS upon reaching enlistment age and contribute to Operationally Ready NS thereafter."

It is also easy to get the relevant information on the Internet. And you can try it even now. If you key in in your search engine: "NS, new citizens, Singapore", it pops up. Many fora make it known that new young male citizens must do NS and that those who become citizens as mature adults are exempted. So, this policy is well publicised on the Internet too.

This long-standing policy has served our defence needs. Over the years, Permanent Residents (PRs) and young male new citizens have formed an increasing proportion of NS enlistees. In the early 2000s, they were about 5% of all full-time national servicemen (NSFs) enlisted each year. In other words, PRs and young male new citizens formed 5% in the early 2000s. Today, they form about 20% of all NSFs enlisted. Of the 20%, slightly more than half are citizens by registration, with the remaining as PRs.

So, what Mr Leong asserts is not true. Many new citizens are enlisted for NS every year. New citizens and PRs are contributing to our national defence. And without that extra inject of new citizens and PRs, our smaller birth cohorts would have impacted SAF's manpower needs more acutely.

I have decided that it is important to correct the misleading statements put out by Mr Leong, because they strike at the foundations of equity and universality that underpin National Service in Singapore. Just think about it – if pre-enlistees are misled into thinking that new citizens of their age are exempted, where will they have the heart to serve NS? The correct facts must be put out to reassure the National Servicemen in the SAF and Home Team.

National Service is the bedrock of the SAF and our national defence. Members of Parliament have the duty to ask questions and debate policies, including NS policies, in this House. But they should not make misleading statements that can weaken NS, the SAF and Home Team.

Mr Leong, before you ask your clarifications, can I just remind you that it is for clarifications, no speeches, please. Clarifications on Minister's Statement.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, first of all, I must register my objection. The Minister has spent the last 15 to 20 minutes talking about what I have written, what I have said, and has pointed some accusations at me. So, I think I am entitled to a full speech.

You can register your objection but no speeches, as per Standing Order No 23.

Okay, anyway, I accept that. First of all, I thank the Minister for responding today to my recent Parliamentary Questions and also for pointing out some of the views I have expressed. I think this really is good because it makes a robust response and debate in this House. My Parliamentary Questions are actually prompted by the Ukraine war and the passionate speech made by the Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan —

Mdm Deputy Speaker, what is the clarification?

Yes, I am getting to that. Mr Leong, just ask your clarifications, please.

Okay. In that case, I would like to ask the fundamental question. The fundamental question is, yes, the Minister has provided data on some of the PRs and the new citizens who have contributed to our National Service in recent years. However, I think there are still a significant number of new citizens who did not —

Ask your question, please.

Yes. Who did not perform NS. So, just based on some of the Parliamentary Questions I have filed recently, I make an estimate that over the last 21 years —

Mr Leong, I am going to ask you to please ask your questions and not make statements. Please. Otherwise, I would have to ask you to —

Okay, then I ask the Minister: what is the number of new citizens who did not do NS? You still have to give me that number. It does not mean that 10% of our annual enlistment now consists of new citizens, then all the new citizens have performed NS, right?

Minister.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, it is not in the interest of this House to further debate based on misleading statements and inaccurate statements. We have a full display of Mr Leong's modus operandi. He says I spent 15 minutes. We started at 3.00 pm and even with this speech, it is now 3.11 pm.

He says I did not give him the facts. I gave him all of the full facts. I said they form 20% of full-time NS enlistees, of which more than half are male new citizens while the rest are PRs. The facts speak for themselves.

In fact, when I replied to his question in this Parliamentary Question – why for sportsmen, we have to be very selective in their deferment – my principal argument was equity and universality. He ignored all of it and he jumped in, and now, he says, "Well, I wasn't really referring to the young ones. I was just referring to others who were exempted."

But he did not give the facts. He has not denied that he knew all the facts.

These are all the characteristics of misinformants. They give you half-truths, misleading statements.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I think in the interest of today's agenda, I propose that we continue. I have stated my views. He has not defended whether he knew, or he spoke out differently. He has just said, well, he has got other questions.

Mr Leong, I am going to allow you just one last clarification so that we can move on.

Yes, Mdm Deputy Speaker, I think the Minister opened up the debate. And now, he is running away from the debate. So, I will ask one more question. He told me, through my Parliamentary Question last month and he said again just now, that there were 3,400 new citizens and PRs who enlisted every year, on the average.

So, if he says 10% of that is new citizens, that would be 1,700. I got a number here just provided by MHA —

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I had better give all the facts again because he has again twisted the facts.

Mr Leong, since you have asked for the facts, let the Minister repeat it first, and then, you can clarify.

Yes, yes. Of course.

I will repeat what we have given him, the reply to him and the exact information he has asked.

Thank you, Minister. Mr Leong, you can take a seat for now. The Minister will go through the facts.

The information is both in the written reply and today's session. Since 2000, on average, 3,400 new citizens are registered each year, who have been or will be enlisted like all male Singaporeans to serve their NS duties. I further added today that new citizens and PRs form about 20% of all NSmen enlisted.

Mr Leong, the Minister has given the facts. I think we can move on now.

No, Mdm Deputy Speaker, no.

What is your clarification, then?

My clarification is: what is the number of new citizens who have not performed NS? The number the Minister has given only forms a subset of the new citizens. It does not form the whole new citizens' number.

Okay, Mr Leong, you have asked your clarification. Minister, would you like to reply to that?

Madam, his question has been replied to.

Mr Leong, I am going to advise you. Minister has given you the numbers. He has repeated it several times in his speech. I would ask you to look at that again. If you still have further clarifications, then I would advise you to file a Parliamentary Question for the next Sitting. Thank you.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, for the sake of time and for the sake of the proceedings, I accept that, but I must really say that the debate is not complete again. I have an estimate, but I am waiting for the Minister to give me more numbers. But anyway, I accept that and I will file a Parliamentary Question.

Thank you, Mr Leong. Order. End of Ministerial Statement. Introduction of Government Bills.

[(proc text) "to set out and declare the national symbols and presidential symbols of Singapore and to regulate their use, to repeal the Singapore Arms and Flag and National Anthem Act 1959, and to make related amendments to certain other Acts", (proc text)]

[(proc text) presented by the Minister of State for Culture, Community and Youth (Ms Low Yen Ling) on behalf of the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth; read the First time; to be read a Second time on the next available Sitting of Parliament, and to be printed. (proc text)]

Minister for Defence.

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

Madam, with your permission, MINDEF has two related Bills today on the Order Paper. I would like to propose that the debate on both Bills take place together, as the two Bills deal with the same substantive matter of the new SAF service to be stood up. If the first Bill is passed, the Second and Third Readings of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No 2) Bill will follow.

Please proceed.

Madam and Members of this House, the legislation that governs militaries around the world is not often amended. So, I do not stand on this podium very often, and for good reasons.

The mandate and powers provided to the military are clear and focused, and necessarily scoped by Parliament to keep within this remit. In peace, that legislation is usually adequate for the Armed Forces' crucial task of national defence, to organise themselves to build capabilities and protect the sovereignty and security of her country. For militaries that are often at war, or operating in periods of tension, legislative changes are more frequent, as varied conditions require timely adaptations. But during peace, one does not expect frequent changes to legal provisions. So, too, the SAF. The last time the SAF Act was amended was in 2009 to introduce the Military Domain Experts Scheme for SAF. We are thankful that Singapore has enjoyed a period of prolonged peace since our Independence.

Nonetheless, the amendments put to this House today represent a significant change militarily to establish a new fourth service, the Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS in short, alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force services which the SAF Act of 1972 brought into existence.

There will be other amendments which I will go through with Members, and they are related to discipline and administrative processes to update and to ensure the smooth functioning of SAF.

The SAF, incepted 57 years ago in 1965, has been a military constantly on the move. And that transformation is visible. All of you would have witnessed it through the years growing up; NSmen lived through it and some here are actually responsible for pieces of that transformation. From 13-tonne AMX-13 light tanks to 70-tonne Leopard main battle tanks; wooden hull ships to stealth frigates; Hawker Hunters to F16s, F15s and, in a few years, F35s, the SAF today is a modernised military, capable of prosecuting missions across the spectrum of security threats.

Singaporeans, too, have seen this SAF journey every year, through the National Day Parades (NDPs) when we allow SAF to play on the Floating Platform, Padang or National Stadium and into the heartlands. That display will take place in a few days' time on 9 August. I hope that Members will enjoy the dynamic display.

We, in this House, and Singaporeans out there are not the only ones who have noticed this impressive and progressive march. The Asian Military Review described the SAF as "one of the most well-trained and equipped forces in Asia Pacific". That others notice the SAF's competency and growing ability is good, and the core of deterrence.

Today's amendment, if approved by this House, will set up under the SAF Act a formal fourth service – DIS – and should be seen in the continuum of improvements for the SAF over the past 57 years.

For SAF commanders and troops, DIS affects primarily the intelligence community, and we call it the C4I community – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence. So, let me shift focus there to explain what needs to be done and why, by the DIS.

To protect Singapore, the Army, Navy and Air Force have built up capabilities in their respective domains on land, at sea and air. But it is not enough for each service to do so. Command and control are essential to maximise effects by orchestrating joint efforts, so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Pari passu, intelligence capabilities had to grow in tandem, to keep pace.

The C4I community has been growing alongside the three kinetic services, less visible but no less progressive. C4I operations have grown over the years, too, for example, in counter-terrorism, from our operations, from our NDPs to key high-security multilateral events, like the Trump-Kim Summit and ASEAN Summit in 2018. C4I soldiers were deployed for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Kuwait and Afghanistan. Our imagery analyst teams were part of the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters in Kuwait from 2014 to 2016. Then-US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed his appreciation for their contributions which helped stop ISIS' terror campaign.

Even despite these impressive developments and achievements hitherto, the C4I community's role has been largely that of a supporting agency, akin to combat support, logistics and maintenance. They enable the Army, Navy and Air Force to achieve their missions by providing actionable timely intelligence and ensuring that communications are secure to execute plans. And these responsibilities will still be part of DIS.

So, what then has changed to require DIS to be a fully-fledged military service arm? Simply put, the battleground. The digital domain, just like air, land and sea, has become a battle terrain which, if left unguarded, can impact the security and sovereignty of any country. And over the years, I have updated Members in this House about these security threats.

In 2015, I spoke about "hybrid warfare", "an orchestrated campaign" which "integrates the use of conventional and unconventional tools of warfare" to "fracture the solidarity of the target nation". I quoted former Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov, who said, "The very rules of war have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness." Reflect on this statement. We are all familiar with the dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of the gun". But the "Gerasimov Doctrine" upends it. And he says, "In many cases, the non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals have exceeded the power of the force of weapons". I described this concept as the exact antagonist of our Total Defence concept. To respond to the growing prevalence of hybrid warfare back then, I pointed out that SAF will have to contend with cyber threats and the growing use of disinformation in warfare.

In 2016, I shared about the unidentified hackers attacking Ukraine's power grid and disrupting electricity. In 2017, the Financial Times wrote on cyber warfare. In 2019, we introduced Digital Defence as the sixth pillar of Total Defence. Looking back over those years, this generation is witnessing real-time, and personally, the changing face of warfare.

Even as the public experiences it first-hand, this realisation by militaries of vulnerabilities and opportunities within the digital domain has not been uniform. Some militaries adapted earlier than others to the "Gerasimov Doctrine" and have steadily been building capabilities on many fronts, including the digital domain, for example, the German military that incorporated a new service, as we are proposing today, in 2017, to defend the digital domain. The Baltic States I visited recently have also beefed up their capabilities in their military and civilian organisations against digital threats.

Apart from states, non-state actors have also recognised that they can use the digital domain to achieve their ends, particularly terror cells. Whether to recruit vulnerable inductees, spread false propaganda, supply funds, procure weapons, sabotage or bypass state security systems, these areas have become standard fare for terrorist networks.

From a security perspective, we should ask, "what will be the scale of these digital threats going forward and can they threaten the well-being of citizens and even the entire country?" The questions are, of course, rhetorical and I think every Member here knows and agrees that these threats can only grow and have a very real physical impact on any country that is unprepared.

We are all convinced because we have seen for ourselves the many forms of cyber intrusions that develop quickly, even within the past few years. Cyber intrusions can affect many critical systems. Last year, we saw the Colonial Pipeline cyber attack that cut off gas supplies to many South and East Coast states in the United States and disrupted the lives of countless people. Earlier this year in February, a cyber attack on the European telco, Vodafone, restricted cellular communications for millions of people in Portugal. It will be horrendous, but not unthinkable, about the potential fallout from attacks on water systems, hospitals, air traffic, trains, financial systems, pension systems – the list goes on.

In fact, cyber threats, disparate in form and source, occur in the thousands, even millions, each day. However, they should be differentiated from the ones that have the most pernicious intent and seek to undermine our nation's sovereignty or security.

For the SAF, it has asked itself this simple question, just as it does if the threat came from air, land or sea: how does it detect, mitigate or repel any potential aggressor, an orchestrated cyber attack by state and non-state actors that mean to do Singapore and Singaporeans harm? The first response, just like the Army, Navy and Air Force, is that it will need a dedicated service to raise, train and sustain cyber troops and capabilities to defend our digital borders. In the digital domain, the fourth service is the force on the frontline, as it should be.

We are thankful that hitherto, our intelligence agencies have not detected any campaign against Singapore of that nature in the digital domain. But we should not wait for one and it would be prudent to start and build up the fourth service now. That alone would serve as a deterrent.

As with the mission of the three existing services, DIS will ensure Singapore is defended against the full spectrum of threats against potential aggressors. The digital environment is more porous than the physical one, but DIS will be responsible to guard against these aggressors in that domain.

For the SAF, DIS will protect its networks and systems and strengthen our soldiers' commitment and resilience in operations. It will also continue to provide accurate, relevant and timely intelligence to support SAF operations and capitalise on cutting-edge digital technologies to advance SAF's digitalisation as a networked force.

For threats to Singapore's internal environment – and this, I am referring to the digital environment, similar to the SAF's support to the whole-of-Government for counter-terrorism – DIS will work closely with the Home Team, CSA and other national agencies to leverage one another's strengths in protecting Singapore's digital networks and providing a strong digital defence.

Let me now touch on the key provisions of the Bill which relate to DIS and its leadership.

Sections 7(1) and 2(2)(c) are amended to include DIS as a Service under the SAF. This also requires related changes to other Acts to ensure that the legal statutes can be properly applied to DIS soldiers as well. Therefore, section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1965 and section 27(5) of the Wills Act 1838 are amended to respectively include DIS in the definition of "military" when used in relation to Singapore's military, and to include in the definition of "soldier", a reference to a DIS serviceman. Section 21(2) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 is amended to include DIS within the scope of that provision.

The DIS will be led by a Service Chief – the Chief of Digital and Intelligence Service, or CDI in short. Like the Service Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the CDI will be a member of the Armed Forces Council and have legal powers to discharge his or her duties and authority to lead DIS in times of conflict. Sections 2(1), 8(1), and 8B(2) are amended to effect these changes.

Based on the SAF Act and Constitution, the Chief of Defence Force and Service Chiefs are appointed by the President acting in her discretion. Section 10A of the SAF Act and Article 22(k) of the Constitution are amended to include the CDI as an appointment made by the President acting in her discretion.

Madam, I have spoken on the key change for this Bill, but there are quite a number of amendments related to disciplinary and administrative processes and training arrangements, which I will address now.

Let me deal with disciplinary provisions. Section 111 is amended to allow the three-year limitation period for the trial of offences in military courts to commence later in certain situations. Let me explain.

The SAF Act 1972 currently requires a serviceman to be tried within three years from the date of commission of the offence, or the date of reporting of the offence to a disciplinary officer or a military policeman, whichever is later, after which he can no longer be dealt with under the SAF Act. This is referred to as the default limitation period.

However, in some cases where both military and civilian offences have been committed by the same offender, time is required for Police investigations or related civil court proceedings to conclude, so as to allow MINDEF to assess all available and relevant information, before deciding whether to charge a serviceman for a related military offence.

To provide this flexibility, the amendments provide for four additional dates from which the three-year limitation period starts to run.

First, where Police investigations have commenced for a related civil offence before the end of the default limitation period, therefore, the three-year limitation period will commence from the date those investigations end.

Second, if court proceedings for a related civil offence are instituted in a civil court before the end of the default limitation period, the three-year limitation period will commence from the date that those proceedings end. If the person is sentenced to imprisonment, detention or reformative training, the limitation period will commence from the date on which the person completes the sentence.

If the person is sentenced to imprisonment, detention or reformative training before the end of the default limitation period for any unrelated civil offence, the three-year limitation period will commence from the date on which the person completes the sentence.

Fourth, if an arrest warrant was issued before the end of the default limitation period and could not be executed within that period despite all reasonable efforts as the whereabouts of the accused were unknown, the three-year limitation period will commence only on the date the person is arrested.

Let me clarify that a serviceman will not be charged in the civil court and military court for the same offence. Any charges in the military court would be for discrete and separate military offences to be dealt with in the military courts after the conclusion of the civil court proceedings.

These new time limits for military court trials will also apply to summary trials, in accordance with section 78(3), as the considerations are similar.

Let me now move on to composition fines.

Currently, all military offences under the SAF Act have to be dealt with either by summary trial or the military courts. There is no option for MINDEF to offer composition for minor military offences. The proposed amendments allow for composition fines up to a limit of $5,000, or half of the maximum fine prescribed for the offence, or half the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offence at summary trial, whichever is lowest, to resolve minor offences efficaciously while maintaining deterrence. Designated officers will be authorised by the Armed Forces Council to offer composition to such offenders.

To effect these changes, a new section 79A will be created to provide for the composition of military offences. Sections 60 and 62(1) will also be amended to define an "authorised composition officer", and to provide for the disciplinary option to refer an accused serviceman to an authorised composition officer to compound the offence.

The new section 79A will provide that the authorised composition officer is not to be in the same chain of command as the accused serviceman. This will ensure that an independent officer assesses the circumstances of the case before making an offer of composition.

Presently, service offences committed under the Civil Defence Act 1986 are dealt by a disciplinary officer or the civilian courts, while disciplinary offences committed under the Police Force Act 2004 are dealt by disciplinary proceedings or the civilian courts. Similar to the SAF, there is no option for SCDF or SPF, respectively, to offer composition for minor service or disciplinary offences.

Similar to the SAF, the SCDF and SPF propose to allow composition of minor service or disciplinary offences, by paying a composition fine up to a cap of $5,000, or half the maximum fine that is authorised to be imposed by a disciplinary officer, whichever is lower. Designated officers will be authorised by Commissioner SCDF or Commissioner of Police, respectively, to offer composition to offenders who meet the criteria.

To effect these changes in the Civil Defence Act 1986, a new section 85A will be inserted to provide for the composition of service offences committed by full-time National Servicemen, NSmen, volunteer ex-NSmen and auxiliary members. Section 70(1) will be amended to provide for the above-mentioned officers to be referred to an authorised composition officer for composition of the offence.

Similarly, in the Police Force Act 2004, a new section 84A will be inserted to provide for the composition of disciplinary offences committed by special police officers, which refer to full-time National Servicemen, NSmen, volunteer ex-NSmen and volunteers serving under the Special Constabulary. It also provides for special police officers to be referred to an authorised composition officer for composition of the offence.

Just like in the SAF Act, the amendments to the Civil Defence Act 1986 and Police Force Act 2004 will provide that the authorised composition officer is not to be in the same chain of command as the accused serviceman and will ensure that an independent officer assesses the circumstances of the case before making an offer of composition.

Next, increase in maximum fines.

It is an accepted principle for financial penalties to keep pace with inflation and increases in wages and allowances for adequate deterrence. The fine limits imposable by the Subordinate Military Court under section 118(7) will be increased. The last increase was in 2006. For officers, the maximum fine will increase from $10,000 to $30,000. For soldiers, it will increase from $5,000 to $15,000. The fine limit for a Senior Disciplinary Committee under section 72(6)(b)(ii) will similarly be increased from $10,000 to $30,000. These increases also take reference from civilian courts and are similar to the District Courts' fine limit, which is currently set at $30,000 in the Criminal Procedure Code.

The maximum fines imposable by Disciplinary Officers in the SAF who deal with minor offences by Summary Trial will also be increased correspondingly. At the lowest tier, a Junior Disciplinary Officer will be able to impose on a soldier of third sergeant rank and below a maximum fine of $600, up from $300. The most senior Disciplinary Officer is the Chief of Defence Force, who will be able to impose a maximum fine of $10,000, up from $6,000. These proposed fine limits do not exceed the Magistrates' Courts' fine limit, which is currently set at $10,000.

Sections 68, 69, 70, 70A, 70B, 72(6) and 118(7) are amended to effect the above changes.

Next, maximum imprisonment.

Section 19 is amended to increase the maximum imprisonment term for the offence of insubordinate behaviour by assaulting a superior officer from five to seven years. The SAF Act currently provides for a maximum five-year imprisonment sentence for any insubordinate behaviour, including the act of assaulting a superior officer. In contrast, the Penal Code provides for a maximum imprisonment sentence of seven years for someone who abets an SAF serviceman in assaulting his superior. Therefore, an inconsistency exists, as the abettor can be punished more harshly than the actual offender.

The proposal, therefore, increases the maximum imprisonment sentence for the act of assaulting a superior officer from five to seven years if the act was committed during active service. The maximum imprisonment sentence for the same offence committed during peacetime will be increased from two to four years. These changes remove the disparity with the punishment for abetment in the Penal Code. There will be no changes to the penalties for other acts of insubordination.

The amendment in section 112(1) is to maintain consistency of punishment powers of the military and civil courts for the same civil offence. Maximum punishments that may be imposed by a military court for a civil offence tried under section 112 are aligned with those which may be awarded by a civil court subsequent to changes in the relevant legislation.

For civil offences for which caning can be imposed by a civil court, the military court would be able to impose caning for those same offences.

The proposed amendments to section 72(1) on power of a Senior Disciplinary Committee will provide that a senior military expert of or above the rank of ME8, when created, will be subject to the same disciplinary processes as an officer of or above the rank of Brigadier-General.

Next, proposed amendments are made to the administrative processes within the SAF Act.

Section 129 is amended to allow the Military Court of Appeal to serve court appeal documents via other means, including sending to an electronic mail address designated by the appellant in the notice of appeal. This is already the practice in civil courts; we are just catching up.

Section 167 is amended to clarify that suspected deserters arrested by SPF may be released instead of being brought before a civil court. Currently, an SAF serviceman arrested by the Police for Absence Without Official Leave or Desertion shall be taken as soon as possible before a civil court. There is no option for the Police to take any other course of action. The present amendment now gives the Police the option to release such arrested persons instead of bringing them before the civil court. This, thus, aligns the SAF Act with Article 9(4) of the Constitution which requires that an arrested person be either released or brought before a Magistrate within 48 hours.

Amendments are proposed to section 205A to provide that the regulations made under section 205A(1) may provide for the Armed Forces Council to determine rates and contributions of various superannuation benefits by issuing General Orders. These superannuation benefits refer to the SAVER Plan or Premium Plan for our uniformed Officers, Warrant Officers and Specialists.

Section 205C is amended to remove the requirement for a periodic examination of the SAVER-Premium Fund. The SAF Act currently requires an actuarial examination of the SAVER-Premium Fund to be conducted at least once in five years because the fund had a "Defined Benefit" portion. However, with the removal of this portion in 2006, there is no longer such a need.

Finally, amendments to enhance training arrangements for the SAF. Since the 1970s, there has been an arrangement between SAF and the Public Utilities Board, for the conduct of military training in certain water catchment areas. We are regularising this and the Military Manoeuvres Act is amended to reflect this.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, let me conclude. Singapore and Singaporeans have enjoyed peace and progress these past six decades since our Independence. From an improbable nation, we have defied the odds time and again, to maintain our sovereignty and way of life to become one of the leading cities in Asia. These impressive strides were achieved because of a strong national defence and united people. These amendments to the SAF Act to establish a fourth service – the Digital and Intelligence Service – will further strengthen our national defence, to build, for the next generation, an even better and stronger Singapore. Mdm Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Vikram Nair.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill. The creation of the armed forces for Independent Singapore started with the Singapore Army Act in December 1965. The creation of the Singapore Navy and Air Force followed in 1967 and 1968 respectively. These three services have formed the core of Singapore's armed forces ever since. The creation of a fourth service some 54 years later is, therefore, a significant milestone.

The reality of digital threats has been recognised for some time and have been raised in the course of MINDEF's Committee of Supply (COS) debates for several years. Earlier this year, Minister Ng Eng Hen addressed this issue during this year's COS and foreshadowed the creation of the Digital and Intelligence Services (DIS) Unit in the course of this year. This Bill facilitates that process.

The digital domain is undoubtedly critical in our daily life. Our civilian life depends heavily on it. Our bank records, health records, transactions with Government and even daily expenditure are all increasingly electronic. This is why each institution that deals with electronic data needs to ensure the security of that data and the integrity of those systems.

Important infrastructure and daily operations are also dependent on technology. Earlier in his speech, Minister Ng highlighted how fuel shortages across the US East Coast in May last year were due to ransomware attacks on the Colonial Pipeline. Another example raised during the COS debates was how Iranians could not top up their gas and petrol stations in October last year because the payment systems were hacked.

As a matter of international law, it is unlawful for a state to target civilian infrastructure. And I would argue that this should cover digital attacks on civilian infrastructure to disable their operations as well. There is much debate on this however, and not all experts are agreed that such attacks would constitute violations of international law and the prohibitions against armed conflict.

Additionally, there is also difficulty of pinpointing whether an attack originated from a specific state, especially if it takes place in the digital domain and many of these attacks may continue to persist even in times of peace.

It does not take much imagination to expect that military technology and infrastructure, which is increasingly dependent on technology, can also be subject to digital attacks. As we move to more automated warfare, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, we must also equally protect the technology that drives those new systems. To me, there is no doubt that the digital domain is as important as the kinetic one and countries are just as vulnerable to serious disruption and paralysis from digital attacks as they would be from kinetic ones.

Based on the Minister's speech introducing this Bill, I understand that the creation of this new DIS is an evolution. The DIS will be evolving from the existing C4I unit: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.

I have a few clarifications for the Minister for Defence on this topic.

First, to what extent would the DIS be built on the existing people and infrastructure in the C4I unit, as opposed to new appointees?

Second, when does the Minister expect the DIS to be operationally ready?

Third, currently the C4I team supports the operations of the Army, Navy and Air Force and is an integral part to their operations planning. Would the DIS continue to deploy people into the other services to support their operations?

Fourth, given the significantly different skills involved in the DIS as compared to the rest of the armed forces, would DIS recruits and employees be required to go through the same type of training as other parts of the armed forces are, such as, for example, BMT and IPPT? If so, is there a chance we may lose people who have special talents in the cyber domain, but who may not have other military skills? Would the DIS also be staffed with civilians, for example, rather than uniformed military personnel? And would the chief of the DIS be a civilian?

Fifth, would the DIS also take over responsibility for intelligence gathering for the whole armed forces, or would each of the services, such as the Army, Navy and Air Force, still have their own intelligence capabilities?

The final point on the first Bill is this – and this is actually a question that is interesting from an internal law perspective as well. Would Singapore consider an attack on our key civilian or military digital infrastructure by a foreign state actor a hostile act in contravention of international law? This has important implications, for example, on whether and how we believe we would be entitled to respond in the event we are subject to such attacks, including, for example, whether hackers are legitimate targets in the event of such an attack.

I do have a short comment for the Constitution (Amendment) Bill and since it is a short Bill, the comment is short. I note that the commander of the DIS is going to be put on the same level as the other service chiefs, such as those in the Army, Navy and Air Force, and it will be one of the appointees in which the President has a discretion to approve. This is similar to the power the President has in relation to other key public appointments including Permanent Secretaries and the Judiciary.

This, of course, makes the Chief of the DIS more difficult to appoint and replace in the event there is a disagreement between the Government and the President. But given the importance of this appointment, I think it is necessary to have this safeguard. The one clarification I have, though, is if the DIS chief is in the same line as the Chiefs of the Navy, Army and Air Force, this actually means that that person could potentially be a target in times of war. But if this person happens to be a civilian, then, is that really the intention of this Bill? That is a simple clarification. Of course, if the chief is going to be a military person, then, this is not an issue.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, in my speech today, I will be focusing on the amendments to the Singapore Armed Forces Act to establish a new Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS. MINDEF plans to establish a DIS, which will be a fourth armed service, alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force. This is timely, given the growing importance of cyber warfare and cyber defence.

Cyber warfare involves attacks on critical infrastructure systems of an adversary. These could include "soft kills" that damage key operating software or hardware without kinetic action, such as through hacking. The objective is to weaken the target country by compromising its core systems. Cyber warfare takes many forms. Cyber attackers may conduct espionage using spear-phishing attacks to gain remote access to an adversary's computer to extract sensitive information. They may hack critical infrastructure like the electrical power grid, which will disrupt communications and even cause deaths if, say, life-supporting medical equipment is shut down. Or they may crash modern economic facilities like banks and payment systems. Propaganda attacks may be employed to control the hearts and minds of the people living in the targeted country or make them lose faith in their own country and sympathise with the enemy.

These are not hypothetical scenarios. They have been employed by nation-states for many years. With the digitalisation of almost everything, the cyber threat is increasing by the day. Up until recently, a war was usually fought by sending the air force to bomb the target nation's critical infrastructure and defence installations before any ground troops were sent in. In modern warfare, cyber attacks are likely to be one of the first modes of attack, because they can be employed so easily without any detection – the Gerasimov doctrine, which the Minister alluded to earlier in his speech.

The DIS aims to bolster SAF's capability to defend Singapore in the digital battlefield. With the establishment of the DIS, the other armed services must be careful not to develop a mindset that the DIS alone is responsible for all things digital in SAF.

In the commercial world, there is now much less distinction between tech companies and non-tech companies. The Fourth Industrial Revolution has forced all companies to become technology companies in some form or shape. Those that do not digitalise will find themselves losing customers to more digital-savvy competitors and may even go out of business.

Similarly, in the military realm, every armed service – the Army, Navy, Air Force and DIS – will need to use digital capabilities to keep ahead of our nation's potential adversaries. Digitalisation, cyber defence and cybersecurity cannot be left to the DIS alone to handle. Could the Minister share the broad parameters regarding which digital responsibilities fall under the purview of DIS and which do not?

The DIS will not be the first technology-focused agency to be set up within the Government. How will the role of DIS be different from that of the Cyber Security Agency (CSA) and the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX) in countering cyber threats to Singapore? How will these agencies, together with the Government Technology Agency (GovTech), work together, so that knowledge and information is shared, where appropriate and duplication of work is avoided?

I hope DIS, CSA, HTX and GovTech plan to establish a common communication platform, so as to not only share information occasionally but actively work together on a regular basis to counter the cyber threats that Singapore faces. I note that a Digital Ops-Tech Centre will be established as a centre of excellence for SAF's digital expertise, partnering with the Defence Tech Community, whole-of-Government digital agencies, academia and the industry, to remain innovative in its approaches and culture. Could the Minister elaborate more on how this partnership will work in practice?

The DIS will likely have significant capabilities and powers to intrude in the private space of the functionaries of would-be adversaries. What protections are in place to make sure that such capabilities are not turned on citizens or abused? It is necessary in any developed democracy to put in place legal safeguards and channels for recourse to prevent the abuse of power by current and future governments. One form of oversight would be for MINDEF to provide confidential reports to a cross-party Parliamentary Select Committee for Defence, which can then scrutinise those reports and ask questions in a confidential setting.

I note that DIS will focus efforts to attract and develop both military and non-uniformed digital experts to grow SAF's digital workforce. Will the need for a high level of security clearance mean that DIS will hire only Singapore Citizens? Will DIS be engaging technology contractors to supplement their own manpower? If so, how will it ensure that the contractors and their employees, who may be reporting to foreign managers based in other countries, how will they ensure that they would not leak sensitive information?

Members will recall how Edward Snowden, who leaked highly classified information from the US National Security Agency (NSA), was not an NSA employee but a contractor with a consulting firm hired by the agency. The need for security clearance will naturally limit the pool of manpower available to DIS, in what is already a very competitive labour market for tech talent. This will make it a challenge to find sufficient local tech talent to join DIS. In fact, the introduction of the DIS could further draw talent away from the private sector, as many Singaporean tech workers are likely to be attracted to the pay, benefits and job stability that DIS has to offer.

In order to expand the pool of tech manpower, our Polytechnics and local Universities must urgently increase enrolment in IT and technology-related majors. This is a point I raised before in this House. More funding should be provided to our local institutions to achieve this. This will benefit the recruitment pipeline of both DIS and the private sector.

I am glad to know that NSFs and NSmen with tech talents will be leveraged to support the SAF's digital core. The Central Manpower Base should identify such talents early, even before enlistment, so that they can be drafted into the DIS during their full-time National Service and later during their Operationally-ready NS cycles.

Next, zero-day vulnerabilities are software or hardware bugs in systems that have yet to be discovered or patched by the developer or manufacturer. When governments or individuals discover these "zero-days", they can create software code to exploit the vulnerabilities, known as "zero-day exploits". Zero-day exploits can potentially enable their owner to access sensitive information in other computer systems or take control of those systems remotely, often undetected. One of the most well-known zero-day exploits is Stuxnet, a cyber operation that sabotaged Iranian nuclear centrifuges.

I would assume, but will not ask the Minister to confirm, that the role of DIS will include building capabilities to conduct offensive cyber operations. In the course of this, DIS may discover and stockpile zero-day vulnerabilities in operating systems that run critical infrastructure and the military networks of potential adversaries. It would be natural for DIS to want to keep the knowledge of these exploits secret, so that our potential adversaries do not patch their systems and DIS maintains its offensive capability.

However, there is an offence-defence trade-off between stockpiling zero-day exploits and helping other local Government agencies and private organisations patch these vulnerabilities so our own critical infrastructure does not get hacked by others.

In 2016, a group of hackers calling themselves the Shadow Brokers released a cache of top-secret cyber spying capabilities that likely belonged to NSA. Some of these included zero-day exploits, which could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in products produced by companies like CISCO, Juniper and Fortinet, that protect US companies and critical infrastructure. The existence of these zero-days raised questions about whether NSA should have told the vendors about these vulnerabilities, so that the vendors could patch them.

The US Government has a policy, whereby, any agency that wishes to keep a zero-day exploit has to argue their case through what is known as a Vulnerability Equities Process (VEP). The VEP comprises an Equities Review Board chaired by the National Security Council and attended by senior officials from agencies concerned with the security of critical infrastructure, like the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Commerce. This Board reportedly meets quite regularly.

The Singapore Government should consider developing a VEP process of its own for determining whether to retain or disclose vulnerabilities to vendors, so that our own critical infrastructure is protected from hacking attempts.

The last point I wish to raise concerns the potential for commercialising defence technologies to benefit Singapore. Many technologies that we use every day originated from military technology. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, invented TCP/IP, which is the plumbing that makes the Internet possible. The Global Positioning System, or GPS, was originally developed by the US Department of Defense and is now used in almost all our mobile phones. Israel is widely recognised as a "startup nation". Many of Israel's high-tech companies were founded by soldiers who completed their National Service in Unit 8200, the Intelligence Corps of the Israel Defense Forces.

In Singapore, we hardly hear of commercial technology or tech start-ups originating from the Defence Tech Community. I can understand why MINDEF would rather not share any defence technology discoveries publicly, because that may cause us to lose our edge over our adversaries.

With the establishment of the DIS, there is likely going to be billions of dollars from the public purse spent on developing digital capabilities within the SAF. There should be some scope for allowing some limited commercialisation of defence technologies that would benefit our nation, economy and society.

MINDEF should develop a framework for allowing some of these technologies to be commercialised without compromising national security. This framework should also have safeguards in place to ensure that commercialised products are not abused by private organisations or foreign governments for nefarious purposes, as this could have a negative effect on Singapore's international reputation.

The interaction between defence and commercial technologists could also spark ideas, innovations and discoveries within the DIS and the wider Defence Tech Community, and help the SAF improve its technological edge.

In summary, I support the creation of the DIS within the SAF but hope the Minister will consider the points I have raised.

First, the DIS must not operate in a silo. All armed services need to continually digitalise in order to maintain their edge on the battlefield. The DIS should work closely with other digital Government agencies to jointly counter the cyber threats that Singapore faces.

Second, the significant technological capabilities of the DIS must be balanced with adequate checks and balances, legal safeguards and oversight to prevent the abuse of power and violations of citizens' right to privacy, especially during peacetime.

Third, the establishment of the DIS will create a greater demand for local tech talent. Local higher education institutions must increase the intake of Singaporeans in IT-related majors to meet this demand.

Fourth, to safeguard Singapore's critical infrastructure from being hacked, the Government should consider implementing a Vulnerability Equities Process to decide whether to retain or disclose to vendors any vulnerabilities that its agencies, including the DIS, discover.

And fifth, MINDEF should develop a framework for allowing some defence technologies to be commercialised to benefit our nation, but without compromising national security or allowing the technologies to be abused.

Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.25 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.05 pm until 4.25 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.25 pm.

[Deputy Speaker (Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo) in the Chair]

[(proc text) Debate resumed. (proc text)]

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the move to establish the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) is timely. Warfare has moved away from conventional means as technology now pervades all aspects of our lives. As the Minister for Defence indicated in his opening, sovereignty is now being challenged, even in the digital sphere.

Over the last decade, threats to society have made their presence felt in the digital sphere – scams, organised crime, misinformation campaigns, cyber disruptions of critical services and transnational hacking.

The overall concept of cyber attacks is not new. These attacks seek to infiltrate and disrupt vital data services and systems, conduct sabotage, espionage or manipulation, resulting in damage to the state and even widespread casualty and loss of life if critical infrastructure is affected. The consequences of hybrid warfare are no less than those of physical conventional warfare.

Sophisticated and large-scale cyber warfare used to be something that we associated with the distant future. But as technology advances rapidly, societies and governments around the world have developed greater reliance on digital infrastructure and data storage capabilities. Naturally, this leads to higher stakes in the cyber domain when it comes to national security.

Today, we do not have to search our imagination to envisage the impact of extensive cyber warfare.

The war waged by Russia on Ukraine rages on, involving a hybrid of physical and cyber attacks. According to a report by Reuters, the day that the Russian forces invaded Ukraine, hackers crippled tens of thousands of satellite Internet modems in Ukraine and across Europe, resulting in a massive loss in communications. Following that, several important Ukrainian nuclear power companies, media firms and government entities were also compromised.

For many Singaporeans, the Ukraine crisis is a stark reminder that "we must never lose the ability to defend or look after ourselves" – to quote Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

It is imperative that we maintain our security and stability through a strong, capable and credible SAF that includes building up our digital intelligence and defence capabilities.

This, of course, is not a new journey as we had introduced digital defence as a new sixth pillar of Total Defence in 2019.

But an organisation is only as good as the people it has. Therefore, I will focus my speech on the people in DIS, in particular, and in SAF in general.

I am heartened that recruitment and talent development efforts are underway for DIS. As I mentioned, people are at the heart of all organisations and we must spare no effort to nurture them. Certainly, it takes time to train up personnel to a certain level of competency.

I note that SAF intends to leverage both on NSFs, as well as our NSmen through the expansion of the Command, Control, Communications and Computers Expert (C4X) and Defence Cyber Expert (DCX) schemes. Selected NSFs will also undergo a work-and-learn scheme with NTU, where they can take up modules to earn academic credits, eventually, leading to a degree in data science and AI, computer science or computer engineering. In turn, they would serve four years of National Service.

I seek a few clarifications in this regard and related matters.

Can SAF define how these NSFs and NSmen will be selected for DIS? How does differentiated National Service models impact other arms of SAF? What is the current size of the initial core of our DIS and what is the plan and rate of ramping up?

Are there also plans to expand the scheme to other tertiary institutions that will offer relevant foundational courses beyond NTU? What efforts will be taken to retain suitable talent after National Service (NS) is up for our NSFs? Can SAF offer remuneration, benefits and a career that can rival some of our most sought-after tech companies?

How do we also ensure that our personnel involved would be highly security-conscious, who practise excellent cyber hygiene and do not flout secrecy laws?

We have had instances of information leaks even by experienced civil servants at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The damage to our national security would be very serious if this happens in the cybersecurity set up. So, candidates must be specially picked and trained so that they do not commit these errors.

In addition, because certain NSmen or NSFs will have particular access to sensitive data, will the Ministry consider a moratorium on them becoming employees of foreign governments or organisations when they leave DIS without prior permission from MINDEF?

There is also some misplaced concern that new vocations within DIS may be seen or regarded as a more comfortable vocation to serve NS obligations compared to the other services. This is a potentially damaging mindset to have as it would adversely affect the morale of our soldiers within the wider SAF. All NS vocations come with high amounts of responsibilities and stress, and should be respected and regarded seriously as such.

In addition, my view is that DIS offers an opportunity for women in Singapore to contribute towards our efforts for a strong digital core. The cybersecurity industry faces a talent crunch, and the Government has been investing in efforts to better involve women in the field. I consider DIS as an invaluable opportunity for women who are keen to join the field to develop their talents and passion, as well as to reduce the gender gap in the industry. Therefore, will women have the option to voluntarily serve NS under the scheme?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, cyber attacks and warfare that target social media and personal devices indicate that cybersecurity defence is not and cannot be the sole responsibility of the Government or SAF alone.

It has to be a whole-of-nation effort encompassing the relevant organisations, such as social media platforms, cybersecurity groups and also our citizens.

Every one of us has the personal responsibility to take necessary precautions against malware, and to educate ourselves against disinformation, online fraud and online security threats.

These impact not just us as individuals, but also other persons and organisations that we communicate with, given the high interconnectivity of devices.

Special attention must also be given to the less technology-literate among us, so that they will not be left behind in our national defence against cyber attacks.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, as we mark our national birthday this coming weekend, let us reaffirm our sacred commitment to the defence of our national and our affirmation of our shared responsibility to uphold unity, democracy, justice and equality. I therefore support this Bill to establish DIS and the related constitutional amendments.

Mr Dennis Tan.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, this Bill proposes amongst other things, to amend the SAF Act 1972 to establish a Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) to be led by a new Chief of Digital and Intelligence Service, alongside other existing service Chiefs, make changes and enhance punishment in the SAF and to permit military manoeuvres being carried out in catchment areas under PUB.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support the establishment of DIS. I do seek some clarifications from the Minister regarding some details of the Bill.

Firstly, MINDEF has said that for the proposed DIS, SAF will grow the initial core of digital experts through recruitment in service conversions and professional partnerships with the wider digital ecosystem and that it will also be leveraging on NSF and NSmen personnel with tech talents.

May I ask the Minister, for a start, what is the proportion of servicemen which MINDEF expects to recruit from outside from MINDEF or SAF? What is the expected proportion of uniformed and non-uniformed staff? Will non-Singaporeans or PRs be allowed to serve in DIS? And, if so, what are the security safeguards in place to ensure national security?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I would also like to ask Minister, what measures are in place to ensure that in carrying out its work to safeguard the security of our country, DIS will be bound by clear regulations governing the conduct of their investigations and other areas of their work, which will prevent any misuses of its investigation powers or resources, especially during peacetime?

I have full confidence in our Armed Forces and its personnel. Nevertheless, clearly spelt out regulations will ensure that all personnel will know the legal limits of their operational work and ensure surveillance investigation and other actions will be taken in full compliance with the law, including if the service is expected to work with other Government agencies,

Next, this Bill also introduces the concept of the composition of offences to the disciplinary regimes of SAF, the Civil Defence and the Police Force. May I ask the Minister, what is the thinking behind the introduction of the composition of offences? Why is this considered to be a positive enhancement of the disciplinary regime?

I recall from my experience in SAF some years ago as an NSman, as well as a unit disciplinary officer, that the conviction, pursuant to a summary trial, will be captured in the records of an errant serviceman and may possibly affect the performance assessment of such servicemen.

May I clarify with the Minister, under the proposed composition offences regime, will an offence, or the fact on an offence being compounded, be recorded in the disciplinary or the personnel records of an errant serviceman? And, if so, will this be a relevant factor, for the purposes of the assessment of the serviceman's performance and his promotion prospects?

On the other hand, if compounded offences are scrubbed from the personnel records, will the records not show an inaccurate picture of a serviceman's disciplinary records, with misdemeanours and commission of less, so-called "serious offences" not being reflected?

Next, may I also ask the Minister to elaborate a little on the guidelines for the independent disciplinary officers deciding on whether to allow the serviceman to compound the offence. For example, will a repeat of a similar offence by a serviceman disallow the independent disciplinary officer to compound the offence again?

I note that this Bill is enhancing the existing maximum punishments under the SAF Act, which can be awarded for certain offences, as well as by the relevant officers assigned to officiate summary trials.

Clauses 12 to 7 increase the current fine amounts that may be awarded in a summary trial by a disciplinary officer or a senior disciplinary committee. Besides the reasons given by the hon Minister in his speech for the enhancement of the punishment under the SAF Act, may I also ask the Minister whether there has been a significant or proportionate increase in summary trials and our convictions at summary trials in the last five or 10 years. And, if so, whether this plays a part in the Government deciding to enhance the punishments? Can the Minister share with the House, the number of summary trials carried out each year in the past five years?

The last point I would like to raise relates to clause 37 of the Bill which proposes to amend section 7 of the Military Manoeuvres Act to permit the SAF to carry out military manoeuvres in catchment areas with the approval of PUB.

While military action can occur across any geographic feature and training has to be as realistic as possible, the impact of military equipment could well be damaging and polluting to the waterways and its surroundings.

I would like to know, besides approval, what oversight of the military exercises will PUB have? Does PUB have complete say in its pre-exercise or pre-training assessment of the environmental impact of the proposed SAF training? Does PUB have a continuing duty to supervise the training being carried out on the ground, so that PUB is able to ensure that the actual environmental impact of any SAF training in any of its public reservoirs or waterways is minimised? If not, can PUB be given such a power to supervise the actual use of its lands and waterways by the SAF?

Mr Desmond Choo.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. The establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) as SAF's fourth standalone arm is timely. But this is also not new to SAF. Over the past decade, MINDEF and SAF have built up what is known as the SAF C4I Community – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence – along with the establishment of the Defence Cyber Organisation (DCO) in 2017. The Bill will allow SAF to develop and scale up its operational capabilities to respond to modern welfare.

I will speak on three key areas: the importance of DIS, ways to expand the manpower catchment pool for DIS and the projected scale and size of the outfit.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the security threats we now face are no longer limited to the traditional battlefield. For example, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been weaponised; the use of cyber warfare has increased over the years. We can either scale up and incorporate advanced technologies in our Armed Forces, or increasingly falter behind other countries. In addition, DIS can, and must, leverage new technological capabilities to make up for our manpower constraints. The number of NSmen is projected to fall in the next decade. DIS can make up for manpower constraints by integrating and expanding our capabilities in the virtual terrain.

Talent pool is critical for any tech outfit to succeed. I would like to offer three suggestions for the Ministry to consider.

First, on grappling with the war on tech talent in Singapore and, in fact, globally. Competition for tech talent in Singapore will continue to be heated with firms aggressively raising wages and other benefits. For example, surveys have surfaced that Big Tech firms, such as Amazon Web Services, Meta, Apple and Google, are dangling some of the highest salaries in the market. These salaries are pegged up to 56.5% more than the market median, according to a latest survey. Other top talents command even higher salaries and that is straight from school.

A key difference between working for DIS and private companies is undoubtedly the mission in serving the nation. Yet, wages are a hygiene factor that we must address. Can the Ministry share its plans to effectively attract top talent, considering the intense competition from Big Tech firms and startups? How do we also attract Singaporean talent currently working overseas?

Second, on improving youth inflow to DIS. Digital natives are clearly the future backbone of DIS. In some countries, many 18 to 21-year-olds are selected to join military and intelligence services even while in school. Preparatory programmes are offered to them to develop their skills and also pique their interest in serving the nation in the longer run.

We could explore the possibility of developing such feeder programmes for our youths. I believe this would suitably complement the top-tier scholarships for digital and intelligence talents for which the Ministry has already planned.

Next, on career conversions within SAF. As service in the DIS may not be as physically demanding as compared to the existing tri-services of SAF, joining DIS may be a tenable pathway for mid-career SAF servicemen or Singaporeans. Would the Ministry to consider structuring a pathway for mid-career conversions? What are the plans to help mid-career servicemen and women to similarly be trained and transit to DIS?

Many countries are already ahead of us in formalising a cyber warfare force in addition to their tri-services. Examples of these include Norway's Cyber Defence Force, founded in 2012, and the United States Cyber Command, founded in 2010.

While the SAF's C4I Community has been the backbone of the SAF's digital intelligence services over the past decade, the formal establishment of DIS will enable us to scale up our digital capabilities efficiently and effectively. Could the Ministry share the intended scale of DIS in terms of manpower? Is it also envisioned for DIS to partner with GovTech and other related Government tech agencies as part of the whole-of-Government digital security infrastructure roadmap?

Could the Ministry also share how DIS will strive to keep its knowledge current and cutting-edge, tapping on partnership with the private sector?

Mdm Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding my clarifications and suggestions, I reiterate my support of the Bill. The DIS will ensure that our nation is well-equipped to adapt and conquer the evolving face of modern warfare. It is also, perhaps, the most significant stride thus far towards building a truly future-proof Next Gen SAF.

Next week, as other Members in this House have also recognised, Singapore will be celebrating our 57th birthday. The sovereignty we enjoy today did not come easy and we must never take the peace we enjoy today for granted. Ultimately, the success of SAF's mission to safeguard our nation's sovereignty is dependent on the commitment of our servicemen and servicewomen. Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Louis Ng.

Madam, Singapore must guard against cyber attacks and the creation of DIS is an important move in the right direction.

I have four areas of clarification for this Bill.

My first clarification is on the possible intrusion of DIS' activities on civilian life. DIS has been given a broad remit to tackle cyber threats. Its work will reportedly include cyber incidents response, network monitoring, vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. Because its powers are so extensive, there will be concerns that, in its mission to defend Singapore's national security, DIS may track the lives and activities of average Singaporeans, even when there is no clear and significant security purpose.

Can the Minister share what checks are in place to ensure that DIS' extensive powers are not misused? How will the Ministry and DIS draw the line between reasonable counterintelligence and excessive surveillance?

My second area of clarification is on the composition of offences. Compounding an offence is significant because it means that no further criminal proceedings will be brought against an accused upon payment of a composition sum. In this Bill, the new section 79A allows certain offences to be compounded, similar to the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).

I have several questions arising from a comparison of this Bill and the CPC.

First, this Bill does not provide for the compounding of the abetment of, conspiracy to commit and attempt to commit a compoundable offence, even though the CPC does. Can the Minister clarify if the schedule to the SAF Act will clarify if such offences may be compounded?

Second, this Bill does not state that a composition has the effect of an acquittal, even though the CPC does. Can the Minister clarify if a composition under the SAF Act will either be a "discharge amounting to an acquittal" or a "discharge not amounting to an acquittal"?

If a composition will have the effect of a "discharge not amounting to an acquittal", can the Minister clarify whether a composition for a military offence will be considered an antecedent for: first, future military offences and second, civil offences?

Third, section 243(1) of the CPC provides that a person authorised under any Act aside from the Penal Code to compound offences must exercise the power of composition subject to the general or special directions of the Public Prosecutor.

Can the Minister clarify if the Public Prosecutor will provide directions for how authorised composition officers should exercise their composition powers? Will every composition decision be subject to the review and authorisation of the Public Prosecutor?

My third clarification is on the increased penalties for offences.

The amended section 118 will triple the maximum amount of its fine. Can the Minister share how it arrived at this significant increase? Were the fines benchmarked against punishments provided under other pieces of legislation? Can the Minister also share whether clear sentencing guidelines will be set by the military court to address the transition from the previous ranges for fines to the updated ranges? This is essential, given that the previous sentencing precedents will no longer provide a useful guide on the likely quantum of fines.

My final clarification is on the limitation period. The Bill amends section 111 to provide that the limitation period of three years, where there are Police investigations or civil proceedings involved, only commences at the end of those processes or of the sentence of imprisonment, detention or reformative training.

Military courts do, of course, benefit from waiting for the conclusion of civil proceedings and sentences. But we have to balance this against the experience of the accused, who face the prospect of a military trial hanging over their heads for many years.

Police investigations and civil proceedings can take years to complete. Sentences of imprisonment, detention or training can take years to complete.

Taken together, the accused may have to wait for years, even decades, before their limitation period starts counting down. Can the Minister share if there are specific cases that have prompted such a significant amendment? For instance, were there cases where the three-year limitation period expired while civil proceedings were still ongoing and it negatively affected the conduct of military proceedings?

Relatedly, can the Minister share if the military court will also consider the impact of the preceding civil proceedings and any sentences served by the accused for related civil offences when imposing a sentence for the military offences?

Notwithstanding these clarifications, I stand in support of the Bill.

Mr Zhulkarnain.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, I rise in support of this Bill and the establishment of Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) of the SAF.

Today's battleground is shaped not only by kinetic weapons of war, but by a potent blend of data, technology and innovation that forms our digital world.

In this age of increased information warfare and information-enabled warfare, the way these advances are deployed will be pivotal in achieving a competitive advantage over adversaries. In an interview, Major-General Robin Anderton-Brown, a director at UK Strategic Command in the UK Ministry of Defence stated: "The term 'domain' in a military sense reflects the fact we traditionally considered Defence in terms of the environmental domains of maritime, land and air, but now there is the growing importance of space – a domain in its own right – as well as the virtual domain of cyber, which affects not just Defence but the whole of society."

Other jurisdictions have had similar services. In the US, its Army Cyber Command integrates and conducts cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and information operations, to ensure dominance in the cyber domain and information warfare. The UK established its National Cyber Force (NCF), which is a partnership between defence and intelligence in 2020. There is, hence, a need for MINDEF to take the lead here. In Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Fake news or misinformation and disinformation have been used as weapons during peacetime to de-stabilise a country. We have seen examples, through online campaigns, where terrorist organisations, such as ISIS, recruits and mobilises their members to carry out attacks.

We have also seen the presence of foreign influence in the 2016 United States presidential elections.

In times of war, the battlefield is not just about conventional warfare, but we also need to strengthen defence in cyberspace. This is due to cyber attacks and hackings of key institutions with sensitive information. Besides cyber attacks, information operations should also be addressed collectively. An example is the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, where there has been the deployment of information warfare comprising disinformation campaigns and false-flag videos that aim to deceive the public. These were harnessed to influence public opinion and manipulate information to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and break their defensive spirit.

Therefore, when faced with such scenarios, we need MINDEF and the SAF to spearhead our information defence in both wartime and peacetime. This important role should not just be within the purview of MHA or MCI. Therefore, this Bill will establish a Digital and Intelligence Service in the SAF, which will play a crucial and critical role in strengthening our information defence especially in the ever-changing battlefield.

(In English): I would like to raise three areas of concern.

Firstly, we need to attract the best of talents, but at the same time be selective and protective in the process. In a tight labour market, SAF needs to attract the best talents for our DIS and groom the expertise. To cite an example, in 2015, the Pentagon launched the Defense Digital Service office (DDS). Brett Goldstein, the Director of DDS, described his team of technologists, which come from various public/private-sector backgrounds and which includes engineers, designers and developers, as a "SWAT team of nerds" to show the diverse and deep levels of expertise at hand.

MINDEF has announced that it will establish a Digital Ops-Tech Centre (DOTC) and a Centre of Excellence for Cyber Range (CCR) to stimulate capability development of SAF in the digital and cyber frontier. I humbly propose that SAF can consider specific scholarships in key areas and expertise to attract, groom and train in specialised fields local talents for DIS.

Would SAF consider recruiting from private-sector expertise and if so, will this be on contractual basis? For example, in the US DDS, although scope is not similar, the team is recruited on a two-year limited appointment to focus on a specific mission; after which they return to the private sector or the academia.

However, we have to balance this with how SAF protects the sensitivity of information and screening of recruits. To illustrate this, Dickson Yeo was a Singaporean academic who was arrested by US authorities for being an illegal agent of Chinese intelligence. Yeo's former PhD supervisor in LKY School of Public Policy was Chinese US citizen Huang Jing, who was expelled and identified by MHA as an "agent of influence of a foreign country". This underscores the importance of screening and protection, especially in the fields of cybersecurity, information and intelligence.

Secondly, we need to build capability and cooperation across and within jurisdictions on a whole-of-Government approach. Within Singapore, DIS has to work on this collectively with other Governmental agencies. For instance, in the UK, the National Cyber Force (NCF) is part of the UK Ministry of Defence, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters. Similarly, SAF's new DIS cannot operate in silo and has to integrate into the whole-of-nation approach to combating the growing digital and information threats now and in the future.

Hence, I propose that our DIS officers should have exposure and experience of operations across all SAF services and perhaps, key DIS officers should also have experience and exposure within the various relevant agencies within MHA or MCI.

Across jurisdictions, it is important to have an updated exchange of ideas and innovation in the industry so that the latest of ideas and best-of-class technology can be deployed within DIS.

In this regard, I welcome the announcement that SAF's CCR will host bilateral and multilateral exercises, bringing together "militaries, industries, and academia" to facilitate information exchange.

Digital defence cannot be done on our own. Would there be efforts to formulate a joint comprehensive defence framework for the region? How will such bilateral or multilateral digital defence take shape in the light of certain geopolitical tension or relations? I hope to hear more plans on this from the Minister.

My third and last concern is this. We cannot just focus on defence per se, but it is important for us to also build up pre-emptive strike capability. I cite two examples from the UK and the US.

In the explainer published during the establishment of the UK National Cyber Force (NCF), part of the stated objective of the UK NCF was that it "is responsible for operating in and through cyberspace to disrupt, deny, degrade and contest those who would do harm to the UK and its allies".

The US Army Cyber Command's mission is to "integrate and conduct cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare and information operations, ensuring decision dominance and freedom of action for friendly forces in and through the cyber domain and the information dimension, while denying the same to their adversaries".

Both the stated missions of the UK NCF and US Army Cyber Command can be read to include not just defence, but strike capabilities.

It is vital that that MINDEF and SAF develop strong capabilities to detect and defend against similar threats. It is also critical not just to prevent such threats, but also, to build up offensive or strike capability and intelligence network, as a deterrence to those who want to do us harm. Such has been our Defence philosophy. There is, hence, an important need to ensure that sufficient budget and resources are allocated for our DIS of SAF in this regard.

In our history, we have not been immune to such disinformation attacks during peace or war time.

During the Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore in World War II, propaganda leaflets were airdropped onto the population. They contained messages of demoralisation, encouraging surrender. These leaflets were frequently dropped towards the end of the war and they were varied, depending on the target audiences, and in different languages.

In conclusion, we need to treat the defence of information and intelligence as a key part of the defence of our nation. This Bill sends a message to potential attackers and provocateurs that they cannot break our body nor our spirit without a fight. It is apt that in the month of celebrating our nation's 57th year of independence, we table this Bill to further enhance the protection and defence of our nation. Mdm Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of the Bills.

Mr Don Wee.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, as the world becomes increasingly reliant on digital technology in almost every aspect of life, the impact of attacks in cyberspace is magnified manifold in our physical world. Warfare is no longer limited to land, sea and air. For example, by disrupting electricity and communications systems via online attacks, enemy forces can substantially weaken a nation's defence before launching a physical invasion.

Hence, I fully support the establishment of the DIS to boost our SAF's capability to defend Singapore.

So far, MINDEF has been running our military cyber defence and intelligence teams in the absence of a specific service branch. MINDEF already has its Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Community and the Defence Cyber Organisation, which coordinates cybersecurity across the defence sector.

Such an arrangement is quite similar to those in many other countries, such as the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel and South Korea. In these countries, the defence ministries manage cyber defence and military intelligence departments without creating another distinct service branch.

An exception is Germany, which set up its Cyber and Information Domain Service branch to take command of its cyber, IT, military intelligence, geoinformation and operative communication units.

Would the Minister share, with the House, the Ministry's considerations in creating a separate service branch? Why is this necessary and what are the specific advantages of doing so?

One of my greatest concerns is that our resources, in terms of both manpower and finances, are limited.

Our resident total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.1 remains substantially below the replacement rate of 2.

1. We are a rapidly ageing society. National defence is not a sector which we can easily augment with foreign manpower or talents. In this shrinking pool of human resources, how will MINDEF ensure that we will be able to recruit and retain the necessary talents to join DIS?

With a sharp shortage of talent in the IT sector, not just in Singapore but all over the world, what strategies does MINDEF have to beat the competition, particularly the private sector, and hire the right talent to join this service?

The situation is acute as we can only hire Singaporeans who embrace these three hallowed words – duty, honour and country. They must see the big picture and understand the importance of defending our way of life, with a strong sense of mission and commitment.

In addition, how will the Ministry ensure that the formation of the fourth service will not compromise the defence capabilities of our three existing services? Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] I would like to ask the Minister if he could elaborate on whether and how the DIS will build our capability in information warfare, like what an European country had conducted against Ukraine in early 2022?

Such information campaigns are conducted on various platforms online, capitalising, especially, on the wide-ranging effect of social media. The concoctions of mashed-up news and fake news using different channels are spread widely and instantaneously. They seek to influence national and global opinions, to shape policies and developments of political agendas.

Such information operations are becoming increasingly more complex and sophisticated. How will we ensure that the hearts and minds of our Singaporeans will be protected against such malicious and nebulous influences? We need communications talent as well to help build the immune system of our psychological defence and to conduct information warfare, when necessary, against hostile state and non-state actors.

(In English): Madam, we celebrate our 57th National Day next week. This will be the last year where we will see demonstrations of the capabilities of only three SAF services. I look forward to seeing how the DIS will share with Singaporeans some of its capabilities at our 58th National Day celebrations next year.

Mr Shawn Huang.

Mdm Deputy Speaker, the world is more connected today, an outcome of technological advancements, rapid digitalisation and the proliferation of mobile devices spurred by more affordable mobile devices.

We are experiencing an avalanche of innovation, opportunity and progress. For example, today's smartphones are a million times more powerful than the Apollo 11 guidance systems, and a thousand times faster than the Cray-2 supercomputers in the mid-1980s.

There were two billion people online in 2015. Today, over five billion people, or 63% of the world, are connected to the Internet.

The growing dependency on digital systems over the last 20 years has fundamentally changed how societies function, how communities interact and how individuals respond – everything from how we purchase our groceries, travel and play.

Last year, there were over 12 billion IoT active endpoints that manage many critical services and infrastructure, ranging from manufacturing and healthcare to e-commerce. The number of IOTs will double by 2025 to over 24 billion, of which 70% of IoTs contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

According to the World Economic Forum, cybersecurity measures in place by businesses, governments and individuals today are increasingly made obsolete by the growing sophistication of cyber capabilities. The global risk report states a 435% increase in ransomware in 2020.

A case in point would be the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, which impacted the computerised system managing the pipeline and forced the company to shut down operations to contain the attack. This pipeline carries gasoline, diesel and jet fuel from Texas to as far as New York and delivers about 45% of all energy consumed on the east coast.

Eventually, the company paid the ransom of 75 bitcoin, or US$4.4 million back then, after which, an IT tool was given to them to restore the system.

This event triggered an emergency declaration for 17 states, including Washington DC, to keep the fuel lines open.

This attack could have happened in Singapore, especially for our critical infrastructure, such as our oil refineries and port and air services.

May I ask the Minister for Defence, as part of the build-up of the fourth service, what are the priorities and areas of focus for the next three years, and how will this focus shift in the medium term? How differently will we safeguard our critical infrastructure with DIS?

As digitalisation continues to accelerate and remote working capabilities expand into homes due to the pandemic, companies have increased their digital reach and footprint in homes. Workers today have acquired more digital capabilities to work and operate remotely. With this, every organisation now has a greater variety of connected devices with little protection against a cyber attack.

When well-coordinated, other threats, such as deepfakes and disinformation for hire, can cause disruption and deepen the mistrust among societies, businesses and governments.

For example, deepfakes have been used to clone voices to authorise the transfer of monies to fraudulent accounts. In other scenarios, it can influence outcomes and views.

The digital and intelligence operating domain is vastly different from traditional domains. The spectrum of the intensity of the conflict, the target sets, which include private and public infrastructure, as well as its potential impact, it is dynamic and difficult to attribute. The notions of force and violence will also be less apparent in the digital domain.

This is a difficult operating landscape and will need a flexible, highly adaptable force that has strong partnerships and networks to be effective.

May I ask the Minister for Defence how will DIS define the state of war in the digital domain? How will the state of victory and defeat be defined in the digital domain? Similar to the other three services, how does DIS project deterrence in this domain?

As we look deep within the core of the mission of DIS, future capabilities, such as quantum computing, can cause disruptions and inflexions to the security landscape. Quantum computing is one of those threats that can break existing encryption keys and pose immense security risks to critical data. The public key encryption is still uncrackable when using very long key pairs with 2,048- or 4,096-bit keys. An advanced quantum computer could crack the code in over a few hours.

However, the development of advanced quantum computers today will still require 100,000 times more processing power, with a 100 times improved error rate to be viable. This may be over-the-horizon, but we must continue to invest and be ready to guard against these threats as they emerge.

Looking closer to our current state today, an attacker's pathway takes an average of two days to penetrate the company's internal computer systems. Check Point research reported that there were 50% more attack attempts per week on corporate networks in 2021 than 2020. These attempts were predominantly on education and research organisations, followed by Government, military and communications.

Today, it will take an average of 212 days to identify the breach and another 75 days to contain it.

The total cost? US$3.86 million for the attack.

This offensive threat landscape is coupled with an employment gap of over three million cybersecurity professionals worldwide. There is a dearth of talent with the requisite technical skills. As such, the job industry has a high turnover and retaining talent is increasingly difficult, as there are bountiful opportunities to progress.

I would like to ask the Minister for Defence how will the DIS plan to recruit, train and retain these talents and if the overall compensation of the skilled personnel will be competitive with the industry to ensure a favourable retention rate within the service.

There is much to reflect on as we think of the city of Troy and the Trojan horse, the 300 Spartans and the betrayal at the battle of Thermopylae, and the story of Dune between the Harkonnens and the Atreides.

The world has fundamentally changed. Hence, we must change and evolve how we fight and defend ourselves. Like how the US Air Force was formed from the US Army Air Corps, and the US Space Force from the US Air Force, we need a service that can protect our sovereignty in our digital domain. Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Sharael Taha.

Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker.

In a week's time, we will celebrate our National Day and we will also celebrate our 55th year of National Service. Mdm Deputy Speaker, before I begin, I would like to thank all our NSFs, NSMen and all our Servicemen and women, past and present, for protecting our country and safeguarding our sovereignty.

Our Singapore Armed Forces have always protected us from all threats – land, air and sea – and have always evolved to take on any new threats.

The security threat confronting Singapore today is multifaceted and ever-changing. This is increasingly evident when we consider countries and non-state entities capable of launching attacks across both physical and digital spheres.

The current war in Ukraine, for example, has shown that Ukraine had been under cyber attacks since 2014 and these intensified just prior to the war in February this year.

Cyber attacks targeting a country is nothing new. In 2007, a series of cyber attacks targeted Estonian organisations, including its parliament, ministries, banks and newspapers. The online services of Estonian banks and media outlets were taken down by unprecedented levels of internet traffic. Massive waves of spam were sent by botnets and huge amounts of automated online requests swamped servers.