Hansard, Wednesday, 4 October 2023

1 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) is aware of SingPost’s projected revenue as a result of the increase in postage rate for standard regular mails announced on 19 September 2023; (b) if so, what is the projected amount; (c) whether SingPost requires IMDA’s approval before postage rates are increased; and (d) whether the recent decision to increase postage rate for standard regular mails could have been considered earlier.

2 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Communications and Information whether IMDA will take into account the profit of S$38.8 million registered by SingPost in FY2022/23 when working with the company to review its decision to increase postal rates.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 1 and 2 on today's Order Paper together?

Please go ahead.

Sir, from 9 October 2023, the postage rate for standard letter mail will increase by 20 cents to 51 cents. The impact will be felt mostly by corporate entities rather than households, as they account for 80% of all letter mail sent in Singapore. In fact, the average consumer sends less than one letter a month. Nonetheless, all households will receive a booklet of 10 stamps of 51-cent each, which is enough to cover the increase in postage fees for the average household for about a year.

This is the first substantive increase in postage since 2014. In the 10 years since, the postal landscape has changed dramatically. For example, letter mail volumes have dropped by about half.

As a Public Postal Licensee, SingPost has an obligation to deliver letters to every addressable place in Singapore. It is also a publicly listed company that engages in non-regulated businesses, such as logistics services and properties, locally and overseas.

While the overall business of SingPost remains profitable in financial year (FY) 2022, more than 90% of these profits were attributable to its logistics business and largely contributed by its overseas investments. SingPost’s core business in Singapore is post and parcel, which incurred operating losses of $16 million. This is due to the global decline in letter mail, as well as intense competition from logistics companies and e-commerce players growing their own parcel delivery capabilities. As a result, per letter delivery costs have risen considerably.

The Infocomm Media Development Agency (IMDA) approved SingPost’s request to raise postage rates to better reflect the cost of delivering letters. After the increase, postage rates in Singapore remain comparable to countries like Japan, which is about 78 Singapore cents, and the United States (US), which is about 86 Singapore cents.

As noted by several analysts, there is no guarantee that the increase in postage rates will improve the financial position of SingPost. The boost to revenues may not compensate for the accelerated decline of letter volumes if customers opt for more e-substitution. As part of the postage rate increase, SingPost is also expected to invest in transforming its domestic post and parcel business so it remains efficient and provide high-quality service. Nonetheless, this is a move that could put SingPost on a more sustainable path to fulfil its obligations as a Public Postal Licensee.

Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his reply. I declare that I am working in an investment firm that has a stake in SingPost. I asked this Parliamentary Question (PQ) based on my residents' concerns and feedback on the issue.

Some of my residents work as property agents or in organisations like charitable organisations, small businesses, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that still depend on domestic postage as a primary mode of advertising and marketing. They have, therefore, expressed concerns that the postage hike will affect their livelihoods, especially when there are also price hikes in other areas. In addition to the 10 stamps that the Ministry will provide to each household to soften the impact of the increased postage rates, would the Ministry consider some form of targeted help for those who will be particularly affected, like those I mentioned earlier?

Sir, the average consumer sends less than one letter per month, so, the impact on consumers will be small, as I had shared earlier in my PQ reply. The bulk of the mail and letters, 80% domestic mail are by corporate entities, most of which are larger corporates like banks and financial institutions, but a significant portion is also by SMEs that the Member has mentioned.

To mitigate this, SingPost will continue to provide appropriate bulk discounts to businesses and provide other customised support for this group of consumers and businesses. SingPost will also continue to honour all first and second local stamp purchased before the rate increase. So, to give assurance to the Member's residents who are using these stamps, they will be honoured even after the postal rate increase.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Two follow-ups from me. Given how large corporations and, more pertinently, the Government, are the primary users of the postal mail, one is left to wonder whether this price hike does not amount to a tax of the Government on itself and, if so, is there actually a more efficient approach to pass through such cost increases? My second question has to do with the fact that cross-subsidisation, as the Senior Minister of State knows, occurs in all businesses. So, given overall net profits, is this the best time for the hike or would a delay be more optimal?

Sir, I thank the Member for his two supplementary questions. Allow me to be clear in the first instance. There are two reviews that are ongoing.

First, the Government is carrying out a fundamental review on the future of post and the longer-term considerations around this sector, as well as changes to the postal landscape in the coming years. As shared earlier, there is a global decline in mail volumes. In Singapore, the decline has been accelerating in the last few years with the advent of digital technologies and, certainly, over the COVID-19 period. We are doing a fundamental review on the future of the postal service. In doing so, we want to ensure that the postal service is sustainable for Singapore, sustainable for operators and sustainable for consumers. This may require us to relook existing assumptions, such as letter delivery standards. So, that is one review.

The second review is by SingPost – I just wanted this to be clear. SingPost has committed to reviewing its costs and operations as part of its business transformation. The Government will work closely with SingPost in its review to ensure that it continues to meet its public postal obligations, while safeguarding the interests of the public and postal workers.

So, there are two reviews.

To the Member's first question, there is a technical clarification. Most of the mail volume in Singapore is not by the Government. The Government contributes to a very small proportion of the total mail volume in Singapore.

Second, on the Member's question about cross-subsidisation, we have to understand that it is not sustainable for a publicly listed company to sustain a loss-making business, especially for SingPost where the bulk of its revenue is from outside of Singapore and more than 90% of its profits are from unregulated businesses. A shareholder of the company will justifiably ask whether this cross-subsidisation is both ways. When the business is doing well outside of Singapore, it is expected to support the not-so-profitable businesses in Singapore. But what happens if it is the other way round? What if its businesses in other countries are loss-making? Is there an expectation for us to backstop those losses?

So, we have to make clear that this is not the regulatory framework which we are operating under. The revenue, the profits, are ringfenced for the domestic regulated segment; they are not supposed to offset losses in its other businesses and vice versa.

To give some context to the Member, SingPost just celebrated its 165 years of service in Singapore. It is a century-old business and a century-old sector, but the changes to its business model have been quite dramatic in recent years with digital technologies and, certainly, mail volume saw a huge decline during the COVID-19 period.

So, we are reviewing the fundamental assumptions around the postal service for the long haul to make it more sustainable and fairer.

While I talked about e-substitution, there is important business correspondence that will still require the basic mail service, although volumes are getting smaller and smaller. Many Singaporeans have shared with me that it is heartwarming to receive a post card from loved ones overseas or even when a child sends a post card to Santa Claus. So, there is a need for the postal service. But how do we design a system that is fairer and sustainable for the long haul and where there is commercial incentive for the operator to continue to reinvest in infrastructure, in technology, in automation and, importantly, in jobs and the upgrading of its workers?

So, that is at the heart of the review that the Government is doing.

3 Ms Poh Li San asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) how will the recent recycling requirements on large water users affect business costs; and (b) whether the Government will be providing any additional support to help affected businesses amidst rising costs.

4 Mr Leong Mun Wai asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether there has been a change in the cost of producing NEWater and desalinated water since 2017; (b) what is the difference between the current marginal cost and long-run marginal cost of producing water in Singapore; and (c) whether the Government considers that there will be a need to increase water prices within the next five years.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I take Question Nos 3 and 4 on the Order Paper together?

You may. Go ahead.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. In Singapore, the water price is pegged to the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water. This includes the cost of building and upgrading water infrastructure. Pricing water on this basis allows the Public Utilities Board (PUB), Singapore's national water agency, to finance its long-term investments sustainably to meet future water demand and safeguard Singapore’s water security.

The cost of producing and supplying water has increased substantially since the last price revision in 2017. Average electricity tariffs have increased by 37%. Operating expenses for chemicals needed for water production have grown by 33% due to global supply chain disruption and higher transportation cost. Maintenance expenses have risen by 18% due to higher costs for contracted services. Construction costs have also gone up by 35%.

Together, these cost pressures have led to an increase in PUB’s operating expenditure by around 30% since the last water price revision in 2017.

PUB has undertaken various measures to moderate the impact of these cost drivers. These include leveraging energy-efficient technologies to reduce energy consumption, harnessing engineering solutions to offset higher construction costs and optimising and digitalising processes to reduce chemical and maintenance expenses.

PUB’s efforts have borne some fruit. For example, at the new Tuas Water Reclamation Plant (TWRP), PUB avoided the construction of a long deep-sea outfall costing $650 million by adopting membrane bio-reactor technology to treat used water to an adequate standard for near-shore discharge. TWRP will also generate 80% of the energy it requires for used water treatment, compared to only 25% for the conventional Ulu Pandan and Jurong WRPs it will replace, through enhanced primary treatment of used water and synergies from co-locating with the Integrated Waste Management Facility.

Despite such cost-saving measures, the cost of producing and supplying water, and collecting and treating our used water, remains significantly higher than the current water price. An increase in water price is thus necessary to catch up with rising costs. This is why the Government has announced the revision of water price by 50 cents per cubic metre in two phases, over 2024 and 2025, with a smaller increase in the first phase after due consideration for the current inflationary pressures.

The Government will continue to review the water price regularly to ensure that water is right-priced.

With the full increase in water price by 2025, three-quarters of households will see an increase of less than $10 per month in their water bill. As announced by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) last week, the Government will provide financial support to mitigate the impact of the water price increase and other cost of living concerns, especially for lower- and middle-income households. This includes additional U-Save rebates of $20 per quarter in 2024 and 2025 for all Singaporean HDB households. The additional rebates will, on average, fully offset the increase in utility bills for 1- to 2-room HDB households and offset about 80% of the increase in utility bills for 3- to 4-room HDB households during this period. With these rebates, 3- and 4-room households will see increases of only about $2 per month in their utility bills.

Besides right-pricing water to safeguard our water security, it is also important that we manage the growth in our water demand. This is especially so in the non-domestic sector, which will account for about two-thirds of our water demand by 2065.

Ms Poh Li San asked about water recycling requirements for companies which are large water users and Government support for them. From January next year, PUB will mandate minimum water efficiency requirements on new projects in water-intensive industries, with high potential for water recycling. By recycling water, companies can recover the cost of their investments over time and enjoy cost savings in the longer term through reduced water usage. Based on our estimates, the payback period for installing such recycling infrastructure ranges from two to four years for wafer fabrication companies and less than one year for the electronics and biomedical companies.

To better support businesses, PUB has also recently enhanced its Water Efficiency Fund, which businesses can tap on to implement water recycling, adopt innovative technologies for water conservation and conduct studies to identify water-saving opportunities in their operations. This includes an increased funding cap of up to $5 million to support large-scale recycling projects in water-intensive industries. PUB also works with businesses with high water consumption to identify ways to reduce consumption through their Water Efficiency Management Plans, or WEMP.

Everyone – individuals, households, community and businesses – has a part to play in conserving and using water wisely. With right pricing and sustainable growth in water demand, we can continue to ensure a sustainable water system and safeguard water security for Singapore.

Ms Poh Li San.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for her reply. Given that the subsidies are for new equipment, how can the Government further support businesses that have already invested in equipment and these equipment typically last 10 to 20 years, and also prevent these cost increases from being passed down to consumers?

I thank the Member for her supplementary question. First, let me also say that in addition to the fact that three-quarters of households will see a less than $10 per month increase in their utility bills without the U-Save rebate by 2025, actually 75% or three-quarters of businesses will also see a less than $25 per month increase in their utility bills as a result of the price revision. Obviously, it varies from business to business and it will impact the more water-intensive industries more. But in that sense, for the water-intensive users, companies that use more water, it is to their benefit and they are incentivised to look into water conservation projects and improve their water efficiency. Therefore, we have upped our Water Efficiency Fund in order for them to implement such water recycling projects.

In fact, from next year, there will be mandatory water recycling requirements, say, for wafer fabrication plants, a minimum 50% water recycling rate and, for the biomedical and electronics industries, specific waterwaste streams must be recycled.

In addition to that, as the Member has said, there will probably be some existing infrastructure. Indeed, the Water Efficiency Fund is also available for innovative technologies to be implemented, for instance, in order to conserve or save water usage as well as, of course, to audit and identify where else there are opportunities for water savings.

Sir, I have two questions for the Senior Minister of State.

First supplementary question: I agree with the Senior Minister of State that right pricing is important. So, is it possible to reduce the water price increase for households by introducing a progressive, multi-band pricing system to replace the current two-band system? This is fairer because, as the Senior Minister of State has said, most of the future increases in water consumption will come from the larger users in the non-household sector.

Second supplementary question: can the Senior Minister of State confirm that the current water pricing formula has already taken into account fully the cost of producing water from our local sources? If so, can Singaporeans expect that, barring unforeseen changes in ingredient costs, including energy, the water price will not shoot up drastically after the expiry of the Johor Water Supply Agreement in 2061?

With regard to right pricing, first, I am happy to note that the Member said that he agrees with us that we need to right price water. But perhaps the Member's concept would differ from what we mean by "right pricing". When we say "right pricing", we mean we want to reflect the scarcity value of water, that every drop of water is precious and, therefore, the price of water is pegged to the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water. And that will also take into account investments in additional facilities, additional water infrastructure, as well as renewing existing water infrastructure.

As to the Member's question about tiered pricing – I think that is what the Member is saying – beyond the threshold of 40 cubic metres and above, as I have said, when we say "right price" water, we want to reflect the scarcity value of water, that water is precious from the very first drop. So, in order to do that and encourage consumers to save water and use water wisely, we need to price it properly. And that is the price of the next drop, the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water. Therefore, everybody, whether it is individuals, households, businesses and communities, ought to pay the right price for water and that is why we do not have additional bands.

Having said that, an average household uses about 15 cubic metres of water monthly. For a four-person household, it is maybe about 18 cubic metres. We have a higher tariff for those who use above 40 cubic metres. The percentage of households that would be affected by this higher tariff is less than 4%. The higher tariff is in place to encourage and incentivise households to use water wisely and conserve water.

With regard to the Member's second question on whether the cost of producing water, say, from the local catchment has been fully priced, as I have said, the price of water is pegged to the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water. And to ensure water security, we have a blend of water, not just from local catchment, imported water, but also desalinated and NEWater. That has to be taken into account. When I say the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water, as I have said, we also take into account long-term investments to meet future water demand and that will take into account the fact that water demand will increase and we will have to invest in additional capacities.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Speaker, just two questions for the Senior Minister of State.

First, in 2018, water prices were raised by 30%. The latest announcement by the Government sees them go up by another 18%. Can I ask the Senior Minister of State why such a short interregnum, as compared to the pre-2018 increase, before which prices are going up again for water? Is there any scope, policy space, for the Government to delay this increase with a view towards the profits generated by the authorities vis-a-vis water and the supply of water?

My second question is with regard to the household water consumption patterns. I understand they have been on the down over the past few years, although it saw an uptick during the COVID-19 pandemic – and, understandably so, because most people were at home. With this as a backdrop, can I query the relevance of the water conservation tax as opposed to the Government's implementation of more water-efficient features for households, which is a more effective policy tool to encourage lower consumption of water and achieve the outcome that the Ministry is looking at with regard to ensuring that every Singaporean sees the first drop of water as a very scarce resource?

So, is there space for the Government to reconsider the utility of its water conservation tax? Is it achieving the policy purpose that is intended? Or are water-efficient features actually a more likely source of realising water savings from household consumers?

With regard to the first question about the earlier increase of 30% in 2017 and the current increase of 18%, as I have explained earlier in my reply, the latest revision in water price which would actually only take effect from 1 April 2024 and not now – is really due to external cost pressures. And I have listed the increase in costs: due to electricity cost, which increased by 37%, and construction cost which increased by 35%. The electricity cost increase is just from tariff increase. Actual increases could be higher, depending on when we contracted our energy contracts and so on. And then, there are maintenance cost increases due to increased manpower as well as chemical costs.

So, that is the reason why the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water has exceeded our current water price and there is a need to have a price revision in order to ensure that PUB can continue to sustainably cover its operating costs as well as continue to make investments in water infrastructure to ensure reliable water supply as well as water security. And we will continue to review our water price regularly, taking into account, of course, costs and other factors.

The Member was talking about profits. Let me clarify that, actually, if we look at the financial statements of PUB, in 2020, net operating income was positive, $10 million. But in FY2021, net operating income, before Government grants, was negative $109 million and it has actually widened to negative $264 million. After Government grants, it has become positive. But if we look at the revenue, the net income generated, whatever is generated, is actually ploughed back, reinvested, to fund the operating expenditure of the water system and, as I have said, in terms of ongoing investments, as well as additional investments. In fact, it is not enough.

By way of illustration, if you accrue the net income after Government grants for fiscal years 2018 to 2022, it is $1.5 billion. Some people talk about $2.4 billion and so on, of net surplus. Between 2018 and 2022, it is $1.5 billion, but that is really needed, as I have said, to fund the operating expenditure as well as investments. But it is not enough. In fact, the capital investments required then to meet future demand was $3 billion.

Therefore, PUB has had to, in addition, borrow from the market and issue bonds. For instance, last year, in 2022, we issued $800 million in green bonds. We borrowed from the market for long-term infrastructure projects. So, there is no profit; everything is actually reinvested or used.

With regard to whether it is better to use water efficiency features to incentivise water conservation efforts instead of the water conservation tax, first of all, the water conservation tax, is a tax, as the Member has rightly noted, to reflect the scarcity value as well as to incentivise consumers to use water wisely. But the water tariff, together with the water conservation tax, is actually part of the price of water, which reflects the cost of producing and supplying the next drop of water. So, it is actually part of the water price. Then, the waterborne tax is a tax contribution to the used water system.

Speaker, maybe I would just add, too – because I did not reply to water efficiency features – I would say that both are needed.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Sir, in the Senior Minister of State's reply, she mentioned that the non-domestic sector accounts for two-thirds of the overall water demand. And if we were to have further new demand, we are going to continue to tap on the more expensive sources of water, for example, desalination and recycled water.

I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State: should we really look at this non-domestic sector and do a review, or even if need be, rationalise, so that we will not continue to have this kind of demand, where we will consume more of our strategic resource, like water?

Perhaps, some industries are consuming too much that does not make sense for us. And for some of the new investments, when we look at them, do they make sense for us, from a water resource standpoint?

So, is the Government doing an exercise on that as well, to review the mix of our industry, whether it makes sense for us from a water resource standpoint?

First, let me say that water-intensive industries or large users or consumers of water do not necessarily use water inefficiently. It may be because of the nature of the industry and the processes needed, like our wafer fabrication factories for instance, where water is needed. But it does not mean that they are not using water efficiently.

Having said that, indeed, we continue to work with the industries. The mix of industries is something that the economic agencies, together with us, will have to continue to study. In addition to that, within each industry, PUB also works with them to look at how we can help them to improve their water efficiency, as well as, where it is possible, to recycle water as much as possible.

That is why for new projects in wafer fabrication, we are mandating 50% minimum water recycling requirements next year. And for the other industries, we will continue to work with them and see what we can do, in terms of technologies and projects. And that is also the reason why our Water Efficiency Fund funding cap has gone up to $5 million.

5 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked the Minister for Education (a) what is the expected impact of the recent announcement by the Ministry to allow an increase in the pricing cap of school bus fares of up to 13%; and (b) how can families of affected students, especially those with higher special education needs, be assisted.

Mr Speaker, school bus fares are determined through a competitive bidding process, with a fixed pricing cap during the contract period. However, the recent increases in operating costs and manpower shortage have made it more challenging for school bus operators to sustain their operations. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is, thus, allowing school bus operators to increase the pricing cap of school bus fares for mainstream schools under existing contracts by up to 13%, with effect from 1 January 2024. This is part of the larger effort to keep the school bus sector sustainable and minimise the risk of disruptions and inconvenience to parents and our students.

In January 2023, school bus subsidy under the MOE Financial Assistance Scheme was raised from 60% of monthly school bus fares to 65%, to take into account rising school bus fares. In situations where the low-income families need more help, schools have been and will continue to provide additional financial support. For special education (SPED) schools, eligible students taking school bus services can apply for the Enabling Transport Subsidy administered by SG Enable. The subsidy was increased from 1 July 2022 to help defray the cost of school bus fares. SPED schools also provide further support to students who may require additional help.

We will continue to regularly review our support schemes and make further adjustments if needed.

Ms Denise Phua.

I thank the Minister of State for her comprehensive reply. I am very heartened that financial assistance is being given to the students who need help. Some students, especially those in primary school and those throughout the school years in SPED schools, have little choice but to use the school bus services, and some bus operators, due to manpower shortages and business cost increases, have already exited the industry. That has created quite a lot of issues on the ground.

I wonder if there is any way that MOE, beyond the current measures, can provide additional studies and support to deeply understand these issues on the ground, and see if, creatively, we can co-create some solutions to further help the students, the school leaders and the families.

I thank the Member for her concern for our students. Indeed, we want to make sure that our students, who have no choice but to take the school bus, are able to afford the school bus fares. For those who require more assistance beyond what is in the baseline support, we welcome them to approach the schools and we will be very willing to provide them with the support.

MOE has also been in discussions with the school bus associations to better understand their operating models as well as their business challenges. Some of the measures that we have introduced in recent months will take time for the school bus sector to stabilise and consolidate. We will continue to work closely with the bus operators, so that there will be sufficient operators available to meet the needs of our schools.

6 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health (a) whether data is available since 2021 on how many cases have been raised to the authorities involving disputes on whether a hospital has provided inaccurate or outdated information at the material time on whether a patient qualifies for on-panel benefits when claiming for hospitalisation expenses under an Integrated Shield Plan; and (b) what avenues for redress and dispute resolution are available to affected individuals.

Mr Speaker, the Ministry of Health (MOH) does not track such data. However, we are aware of a few cases where medical providers have conveyed information that may have led patients into thinking that their medical bill would qualify for panel benefits or be fully covered by insurance.

Affected patients are encouraged to resolve their concerns directly with the medical provider first. Failing which, they may consider filing their dispute with the Clinical Claims Resolution Process (CCRP), which helps to resolve clinical matters pertaining to Integrated Shield Plan (IP) claims or seek mediation with the healthcare institutions facilitated by MOH Holdings' Healthcare Mediation Unit.

Dr Tan Wu Meng.

I thank MOH for the answer. I have got two supplementary questions. As illustration, I have a Clementi resident who sought treatment at a private hospital. The hospital website said at the material time that the doctor and the doctor's clinic were covered on their insurance company's panel. The doctor affirmed that it would be covered on the insurance company's panel.

After the treatment, the insurance company said it was not covered and it was not on the panel. Yet, six months later, my resident showed me, on my resident's handphone, that the private hospital still reflected that doctor and that clinic as being on the panel. When my resident appealed to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), they recommended that he contact the insurance company. When my resident appealed to MOH, he was referred back to the doctor and the insurance firm. In the meantime, the private hospital sent debt collectors after my resident.

Can I ask the Ministry who can consumers best seek help from in these situations? Is there a "no wrong door" policy to guide consumers, because consumers sometimes worry whether every door seems the wrong one in such situations?

Secondly, can I also ask what recourse is there if the hospital provided outdated information, the consumer acted on the outdated information and thereby suffered financial disadvantage? Are there lessons which can be learnt from the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 regime, the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) that could be applied to this as well?

I thank Dr Tan for sharing his resident's situation and for raising the supplementary questions. I can appreciate his concern in this case.

The Member had asked about the agency to refer to and the recourse available to the consumers. For disputes involving miscommunication between the patients and medical providers, the patients may consider writing in to MOH Holdings Healthcare Mediation Unit for mediation services, if they are not able to resolve the matter with the provider.

And if they are then still not able to resolve that through mediation, the other possible avenues include recourse through the Consumers Association of Singapore as well as the Small Claims Tribunals.

The case that Dr Tan has surfaced is, indeed, an unfortunate one. It is a situation where there was a misunderstanding on the doctor's part and also a miscommunication on the hospital's part. This is a good opportunity to remind all stakeholders to play their part in helping patients make informed decisions about their panel benefits.

The hospitals that wish to inform patients of the doctor's panel status should ensure that information that they have provided is updated and the doctors should also inform patients of any changes in their panel status as soon as possible. The insurance company and their agents should also remind policyholders to first check the panel status of the doctor before going for the treatment and explain the implications of the insurance coverage.

When everyone plays their part, situations like this could be avoided. So, I appreciate the Member's concerns. But in this case, it was really one of those few cases that we have seen where there was a misunderstanding and miscommunication. If everybody had followed according to what they were supposed to have done, this situation could, indeed, have been prevented.

7 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Transport (a) how many e-bike models have been approved to date and of these how many are additional new models that have been approved since January 2023; (b) in the past three years, how many e-bikes have been registered; (c) how many e-bikes are detected to be illegal; (d) how many riders are caught for not riding at approved places; and (e) how many accidents have been recorded.

As of 31 August 2023, 66 power-assisted bicycle (PAB) models have been approved, of which 17 were approved since January 2023. Between 2020 and 2022, about 26,300 PABs were registered with the Land Transport Authority (LTA).

In the same period, 3,000 non-compliant or unregistered PABs were detected; 10,900 riders were caught riding PABs on pedestrian-only paths, footpaths and expressways, on which PABs are disallowed; and there were 380 accidents involving PABs on roads and 50 off-road accidents recorded.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

Speaker, I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the comprehensive reply. With the Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) rising month after month and breaking records, more Singaporeans, understandably, will turn to e-bikes for their mobility solutions. So, would the Ministry of Transport (MOT) consider working with the e-bike suppliers to broaden the models available for Singaporeans to choose?

Two, what are MOT's plans to discourage and deter more illegal e-bikes to be used on the road? There are many e-bike fire incidents in different parts of Singapore, including in the Nanyang area.

Thirdly, what are MOT's plans to build more pathways and cycling paths to enable e-bike riders to ride safely on the pavement, rather than on the road? We understand that MOT has announced some plans to build cycling paths, but we are asking MOT whether it can intensify and accelerate the progress.

Sir, since 2016, we have already approved 66 PAB models. In fact, the numbers have been increasing, especially in recent years. Just this year, in the first eight months, we have approved 17 PAB models.

As the demand grows, the retailers would be incentivised to import more models – models that are certified to be safe for use on paths and roads.

As to ensuring that riders ride safely and properly on approved paths, public education and enforcement are carried out. For the offences that have been detected, the culprits were fined accordingly. We hope this will give the signal to riders to understand the law, abide by the law and, most importantly, look out for other users, whether on the path or on the road.

PABs are allowed on the roads, as well as on cycling paths. Yes, some riders would find it safer to be on cycling paths. That is why we are aggressively rolling out the islandwide cycling network. Currently, we are at over 500 kilometres. The plan is to build 1,300 kilometres by 2030.

We have just recently called a tender to construct cycling paths in the western region and that includes the Member's Nanyang area. The first phase of the cycling paths will be progressively completed from 2024 and there are plans to roll out subsequent phases in the coming years.

8 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) what is the average duration between the time a mosquito breeding site is found and a fine is issued; (b) whether there have been instances where fines were found to have been issued to the wrong households upon appeal; and (c) if so, how many of such cases were there in the past three years.

For the last three years, the National Environment Agency (NEA) took, on average, about five months to issue a fine after detection of the breeding site. More time is needed for cases that require further investigation and verification of the individual to be held accountable and issued with a fine. Surges in the number of cases over the past few years, especially years with large dengue outbreaks, have led to longer processing times. My Ministry is currently reviewing the enforcement process with a view to reducing the time taken to issue a fine.

From 2020 to date, NEA has issued fines to about 22,400 households for mosquito breeding offences. Of these, there were four instances, or 0.02% of the total, where fines were issued to the wrong household due to administrative errors. These cases were rectified immediately when they were made known to NEA through feedback or appeals. NEA will continue to monitor and improve its processes to avoid such errors.

Mr Saktiandi.

Mr Speaker, I would like to ask two supplementary questions, please. The reason why I am asking this Parliamentary Question (PQ) and these consequent supplementary questions is because I have been getting a number of residents complaining about letters coming in close to six months later, or a bit lengthier in some sense. One resident told me that it is their first offence as well and they would not get fined again, but then found out eventually, six months later, that they got a fine in the letter box. My Toa Payoh residents found this a bit worrying – six months after the fact. And also, the fines are substantial and can be quite significant for some of the low-income residents in my constituency.

The first supplementary question, Mr Speaker is: can the letters be sent earlier? I think the Senior Parliamentary Secretary has highlighted that the Ministry is trying to work to reduce the timeframe. If the Ministry can hasten that a bit, it will be very useful. It can help in some ways, especially when the offence is initiated earlier.

Can the Senior Parliamentary Secretary give some details on how first offenders are treated in such cases, especially the first offenders, because they are not familiar with this?

Second, can there be instances where the letters can be handed over physically? The Senior Parliamentary Secretary mentioned that there were four cases where wrong addresses were given to those who were fined. I think these are instances where the owner of the breeding sites is on the ground floor of a Housing and Development Board (HDB) block, for example, where the locations of the breeding sites could not be ascertained clearly. I think there were some instances of that and whether we can avoid that, by handing over the letters physically in such cases and to check the ownership of the breeding sites. I hope the Senior Parliamentary Secretary can share a bit on that.

NEA's key priority is to make sure that dengue transmission is stopped. So, resources are devoted to detect and destroy breeding habitats. The follow-through will be issuance of fines. In fact, residents should be "happier", if they receive the fines later, so they have more time to respond to that.

But nevertheless, during dengue outbreak periods, there will be a lot more inspections and potentially more breeding grounds detected and, therefore, more fines and more administrative work to be done. But we are committed to improving the processes so that residents do not have to wait too long to receive the fine.

The current practice is that when a breeding habitat is detected, a notification slip is given to the household. If the owner is not at home, the slip will be left at the household. The slip will inform them that enforcement may be taken if the sample is verified to contain a vector. This slip will be issued when there are larvae found within the premises. With this slip, it is very clear, in black and white, that there has been detection. There is no practice where first-time offenders will not be fined. There is no such practice. NEA will remind its officers not to give this wrong impression that first timers will be let off more easily because dengue can cause fatality and we need everyone to play their part to keep mosquitoes at bay and to remove any potential breeding grounds.

Mr Saktiandi's second question is on the wrong address. So, if the owner is at home, the slip will be given. But sometimes, there could be challenges or arguments as in, let us say, a pot along the common corridor. It may not necessarily belong to the unit closest to it. That is where the resident who receives the notice can appeal and NEA will investigate and ascertain who is the rightful owner and the rightful party to be responsible for upkeeping the area. NEA will review all appeals properly on a case-by-case basis, depending on the situation and to exercise leniency where it is necessary.

Mr Saktiandi.

Mr Speaker, I just want to seek clarification from the Senior Parliamentary Secretary. The reason why I asked is because, for first offenders, they get it six months later, thinking that they were not supposed to be fined. So, I think the long duration exacerbated the concerns of the resident.

So, my clarification is with regard to the notification slip. Can the Senior Parliamentary Secretary share if the notification slip will be placed into the letter box or under the HDB flat unit's door? So, in what ways will the notifications be delivered? I am wondering whether there would be instances where the notification slips would be sent to the wrong addresses or may have actually flown away or disappeared if it is hung on the door.

I need to confirm this, but I am quite sure it is not in the letter box, because NEA would not have access to the letter boxes. So, in cases where the household is not occupied at the point in time, I believe it is placed under the door.

There could be cases where a household member returns home, may not understand what the slip is about and ignores it or throws it away. That is possible. Hence, the rightful party may not know that inspection was conducted and some breeding was found.

But the slip will provide a contact number for the household to call, to ask for more details, verification or provide information that will help NEA in its investigations or to refute that the item where the breeding was found does not belong to them. So, there is a channel for members of the public to get in touch with NEA to assist in its investigations.

9 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Social and Family Development in view of the findings in the Minimum Income Standard Report 2023, whether the Ministry will consider (i) adjusting the financial assistance rendered to low-income families and (ii) conducting its own study to determine the level of living wage required to support a basic standard of living using various Government data beyond what is publicly available.

Sir, the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) regularly reviews the assistance coverage and payout quanta of ComCare schemes to ensure adequate assistance for lower-income families to meet their basic living needs. We last increased the assistance quantum for the ComCare Short-to-Medium Term Assistance and Long-Term Assistance in August 2022.

During these reviews, MSF references data and information from different sources. These include price data from the Department of Statistics (DOS), views from domain experts and community stakeholders, as well as academic studies and research commissioned by MSF.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the reply.

The Minimum Income Standard Report 2023 (MIS) stated that the minimum income standard budget for a household with two school-going children is $6,693 per month or about $1,600 per capita. According to the report, this means it is equivalent to the 30th percentile of all working households in Singapore.

Since MSF is giving ComCare assistance to the lowest 20th percentile of households, would MSF think that the $800 dollars per capita income, as a criterion to provide financial assistance, is too high or too low?

At the same time, I think the Ministry has also sent out a press release to say that according to Government analysis, the proposed monthly income stated in the MIS report is about $1,680 per capita and it is similar to the monthly expenditure of $1,650 per capita of all families and children. So, there is a big discrepancy. They are saying that in the MIS study, the income is based on the 30th percentile of household income, whereas MSF and other Ministries are saying that it is equivalent to about 50% of household income in Singapore.

So, if MSF disagrees with this report, which is internationally conducted in many countries, why would MSF not consider doing their own report, using the data that is available to MSF, to refute this or to convince Singaporeans better?

Sir, I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. I might want to, just perhaps, remind the Member of two points in my main reply. The first statement in my main reply reads, "We regularly review assistance coverage to ensure adequate assistance for lower-income families to meet their basic living needs."

The second point, in the last statement of my short reply, I mentioned that we reference different sources: price data from DOS, views from domain experts, community stakeholders as well as academic studies and research studies that have been commissioned by us in MSF.

I thank the Member for raising the spotlight on this MIS study. I just want to quote what the MIS study report stated, and I quote, "It is not just about basic needs like housing, food, clothing but also what it takes to enable a sense of belonging, respect, security, independence."

So, quite clearly, even the MIS report itself has defined what they have found as going beyond basic needs. Hence, what they are describing is really about what is aspirational, what perhaps one, or families, would like to have.

On this premise, now that we have set it clear, I would also like to raise a few points about the MIS study.

The study's methodology – 300 participants, small group discussions – is highly dependent on respondent profile and group dynamics. So, I understand that many respondents themselves in the study are not from lower-income households. And, when in a group, group dynamics is real and, oftentimes, minority participants may find it hard to articulate their views. I shall leave it at that.

Also, another assumption that has been made in the study is that lower-income households or lower-income families receive the same amount of financial help as median-income households. This is clearly not correct. Lower-income families qualify for and receive more financial help than median households. This is a fact that bears repeating, and I shall say it again. Lower-income households qualify for and receive more financial help than median households. This is not something that has been recognised by the MIS study.

The last point I will make: the Member mentioned $6,693 translated into per capita is $1,680 per person – quite a nice number. Under the MIS study, that is perhaps closer, as the Member rightly pointed out, to the average monthly expenditure of $1,650 per person for all families with children – rather than reflecting basic needs. So, this is in line with the spirit of the MIS study, because they are going beyond what are basic needs. They are measuring something that is aspirational, something that is perhaps more than basic.

As I mentioned in my main reply, what we cater for in ComCare, in our subsidies and in our financial assistance schemes cater for basic needs. We do need to look at the entirety of what is given or what is provided to the families – not just what the Government gives in terms of financial assistance but also what the community, the corporates give. As I mentioned in the earlier reply in yesterday's Sitting, how we take a "many helping hands" approach in making sure that those with less among us are well catered for.

Finally, the last point, I think the Member made reference to a press release. Indeed, a fuller exposition was set out in a joint press release by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and MSF. This was released on 14 September. I refer Members to this press release for a fuller exposition.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Speaker, I am not the author of the study, so I want to qualify that. But nevertheless, I think that I have read the study in some detail and some elements in which Senior Parliamentary Secretary Eric Chua has mentioned – about how they are aspirational – strike many Singaporeans as not entirely so.

For example, one of the things that was pointed out by the joint Ministry response was that perfume may seem like a bit of an aspirational good. But of course, many Singaporeans will understand as well that in a hot and humid climate like our own, being presentable, smelling normal, would be something that many jobseekers would require in order to have some dignity when they go for job interviews or when they go to work.

I am also somewhat puzzled because, yesterday, Senior Parliamentary Secretary Eric Chua mentioned how ComCare seems to have expanded their notion of needs to relative needs, such as mobile phone plans and the like.

So, my question is whether the Ministry will be able to explain some of these seemingly large discrepancies between that $6,000 or so for a four-family member household versus what ComCare currently has, which is significantly lower.

Sir, I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. I also thank him for making me go through an exercise to jog my memory about what I said yesterday. I remember saying in my reply to a Parliamentary Question (PQ) on ComCare that, actually, we assess our basket of products and services that are needed in a basic package for our ComCare families from time to time. And we have included mobile data plans because they provide for digital connectivity which, in turn, provides for human connection, which is a basic need we assessed. And that is consistent with what I have said today.

And I knew about this idea about discretionary items and perfumes, but I am also not aware of how perfumes would add to how we will present ourselves better in our climate which is hot and humid. My point really is, I agree with the Member that we do need to be presentable. But because I knew that I was going to be taking this PQ today, I made two calls this morning to two of my rental flat residents. Both are single mothers; both are in this category of residents that we are discussing about. And I do understand that this is not statistically significant. These are perhaps anecdotes, but these are anecdotes that I thought are instructive. I have sought their permission to share this with the House.

I asked them, perfume, jewellery, overseas holidays; what do these items mean to you? How would you describe them? Both of them told me in separate phone conversations without coordination, they tell me almost similar words, and I quote them, "Boss, these are good to have lah." I followed up and I asked, "So, ideally how would you like to be able to afford these items?" I provided some multiple-choice question (MCQ) options, "Is it through gainful employment or perhaps would you want that to be part of Government assistance?" Again, both of them told me, without coordinating their replies, "Boss, get a job. Earn money. Work hard for these things lor."

So, my takeaway earlier from these two conversations is this. Let us not underestimate the agency, the strength and the dignity of our lower-income families and the ability to turn things around and to break the cycle of poverty – with them clearly in the loop, with them clearly holding on to the levers of their own lives.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

I just want to clarify one point. Because the MIS report stated that an elderly person above 65 years old needs $1,500 a month to survive well. So, in MSF's view, what is the minimum amount to ensure basic needs for a 65-year-old elderly staying alone to survive? What is the amount?

Sir, I thank the Member for his supplementary question. I do not have an exact number with me right now but suffice to say we do review this. We do revisit the question of what is needed or what is sufficient for different archetypes, from time to time.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Just a follow-up to the Senior Parliamentary Secretary's replies. I refer to individuals in a family context, for example, full-time caregivers who have to look after family members who cannot work and their ability to go out and work in itself is limited. Does MSF look at assisting these families with a higher short-, medium- or long-term assistance payout?

I thank the Leader of Opposition for his supplementary question. I think the short answer is yes. MSF officers do look at the comprehensive situation of each family, each individual, each household, before rendering the appropriate assistance.

10 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Prime Minister what are the plans under consideration to (i) encourage locally incorporated tech companies to choose the Singapore Exchange (SGX) over foreign stock markets for their Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), especially if they have been backed by local agencies during the start-up phase and (ii) to attract more investors with risk appetite for investing in start-ups to invest in new IPOs or tech companies currently listed on the SGX.

Mr Speaker, I will address the questions by Ms He Ting Ru in today’s Order Paper as well as the written Parliamentary Question filed by Mr Desmond Choo for yesterday’s Sitting as they pertain to initiatives in progress to strengthen the attractiveness of Singapore’s equity markets.

The challenge of sustaining a vibrant and attractive cash equities market is not unique to Singapore. Globally, the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and proceeds raised has been declining since 2021. This was driven by the trend of companies staying private for longer and, more recently, against the backdrop of a challenging global macro-environment and interest rate environment. In the first half of 2023, global IPO proceeds fell by 36%, while Asia Pacific IPO proceeds were down by 40%.

Many stock exchanges are also dealing with the trend of local companies looking to list on large overseas markets like the United States (US). For instance, the United Kingdom (UK)’s largest chip design firm ARM Holdings recently listed in the US. Israel has a vibrant startup ecosystem. Yet, many of its companies list in the US due to its deep and liquid capital market and investor base. Nearer to home, Hong Kong is also looking to retain and attract more IPOs amidst the more challenging macro-economic environment.

Against this backdrop, we have shared in this House, most recently in November 2022, the initiatives that Government agencies and the Singapore Exchange (SGX) have established in recent years to support the attractiveness of our equities market. We have set up the S$1.5 billion Anchor Fund @ 65, which is a co-investment fund by the Government and Temasek, and the S$500 million EDBI Growth IPO Fund, to invest in high-growth enterprises at the late stage or at IPO. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has enhanced its grant scheme to defray listing costs and develop Singapore’s equity research ecosystem.

SGX has also been actively seeking cross-border partnerships with the regional exchanges to enhance its attractiveness as a gateway for Singapore companies and international investors to access regional capital markets and opportunities. In May this year, to expand access and connectivity to regional capital markets, SGX launched a Thailand-Singapore Depository Receipt or DR Connect, to broaden access to capital and to markets.

Overall, our initiatives aim to provide a more enabling environment for companies to consider listing on SGX.

At the same time, Mr Speaker, Sir, we recognise that there are limits to how these measures can directly influence listing decisions. Companies considering possible public listings have several commercial objectives in mind. In some cases, these considerations may prompt them to explore listing venues outside of Singapore. First, they may decide to list in jurisdictions where they can secure the best valuations for their shareholders. For quite a number of companies, a US listing is attractive due to the US’ deeper pool of investors and liquidity. Second, companies may list in jurisdictions that give them better exposure to their own target markets. For example, a company planning to expand its business in China may choose to list in either Hong Kong or China, or both.

If we take an overly prescriptive approach by making Government support to promising startups conditional on a local listing, we may end up imposing a rule that may be at odds with the growth plans of the company or the founder. Similarly, global investors who are in Singapore will ultimately determine how to allocate their capital based on their strategies and how they view the market. So, again, if we prescribe that they must invest certain amounts in only locally listed companies, we will effectively constrain their investment mandates and end up losing a larger pool of investors who adopt a regional or a global view.

Let me next respond to Mr Desmond Choo’s question on SGX’s role in helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs) raise capital from overseas markets. One way is to make sure we have good sources of SME financing available to meet our SMEs' needs. And apart from a well-developed banking system that provides a range of financing options for our SMEs, SGX has Catalist, a second board that caters to the fundraising needs of growth-stage companies or enterprises and currently has over 200 SMEs listed on it.

In addition, MAS has a grant scheme which defrays listing costs for issuers listing on Catalist. In 2021, MAS increased the grant cap under this scheme from S$200,000 to S$300,000, to further help SMEs who choose to list on Catalist, to alleviate their listing costs.

Apart from accessing public markets, private equity and venture capital, or PE/VC in short, have in recent years been an increasingly important source of growth capital for promising startups. More PE/VC managers have established their presence in Singapore and are coming in at earlier stages, which broadens the range of financing for our startups.

MAS recognises the value of an attractive equities market as part of our overall financial services ecosystem. That is why the Government and SGX have in place a range of initiatives to better position our equities market. We will continue to monitor the situation closely and review and update our measures, where necessary, to adapt to the shifts in global capital markets.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for the reply. I have a couple of supplementary questions.

First, I do not think the question was asking for the grants to be conditional upon making these firms list in Singapore on SGX or Catalist, as appropriate. Rather, it was just to get a sense of how many of these firms are receiving grants or support from the various agencies and how many of them eventually decide to exit via an IPO strategy and then, subsequently, decide upon careful consideration that they want to list elsewhere, as the Minister of State shared in his reply.

And does MAS then track the reasons why and what are the tensions between having a tech firm or just any startup decide to base themselves in Singapore, avail themselves of our grants and then, subsequently say, "Oh, actually, we rather have access to funds elsewhere" or "we rather try to access the capital markets elsewhere"?

So, I think having MAS to actually understand these tensions and the reasons why it is a good idea to be here but not a good idea to raise funds here and whether or not MAS does any studies to find out. Once you find out the reasons why, it will eventually become easier to amend or to support our regulatory environment and regime to address some of the concerns that these startups will have, with the ultimate aim of making our SGX and our equities and capital market regime here in Singapore more active and, of course, deepen that pool in the market here.

A related supplementary question is: does SGX and various agencies track the number of locally incorporated and home-grown tech startups which eventually, on a yearly basis, decide to list and go for an IPO here in Singapore? If so, can the Minister of State share the data?

I thank Ms He Ting Ru for her supplementary questions. I think her idea is to help and we are all aligned if we want to enhance our equities market.

To the first question, we do not collect that data. That is the simple answer to the question. As I mentioned earlier on in my reply, we are doing all that we can to help to boost the equities market, but there is also a limit. Because, ultimately, firms will have major commercial considerations, including valuations, including market, as well as including whether they can secure the best kinds of valuations elsewhere as well as whether they want to list in the market where they are closer to the particular target market.

So, I think that is the question. If you ask any of the companies or firms, they will tell you that it is primarily a commercial decision. Of course, we will do what we can. But, ultimately, it is a commercial decision.

On a broader perspective, I would like to share with the House also that in line with our Industry Transformation Map 2025, particularly on the financial sector, we are constantly looking at ways in which to enhance and deepen our financial sector. The financial sector is not focused on just having an equities market. We have a very vibrant foreign exchange market, we have a very vibrant wealth management market, we are into green finance, we are into fintech and others also. So, it is a dynamic, deep and also very diversified financial market.

Mr Louis Chua.

Mr Speaker, firstly, I would like to declare my interest as somebody working in a financial institution.

Just two supplementary questions for the Minister of State. I understand the Minister of State's point about it being a commercial decision for private companies to choose where they want to list. But I was just wondering: what is the Government's position, as to a ruling, such as that in Indonesia, whereby I believe the local companies can seek a dual listing, but they must also list on the local exchange?

The second supplementary question is: on top of listings, there is also the broader issue of delisting in the local market. And it is something which has been a challenge for the last couple of years, where the number of delistings has been more than the listings. As a result, there are concerns as to whether or not this issue of perceived weaker valuations and lower liquidity could continue to result in a bit of downward spiral. So, just wondering in terms of the delisting part, what is the Government's approach towards addressing some of these issues?

I thank Mr Louis Chua for his supplementary questions. I will try to answer the second question first, which is regarding our delisting. Since 2014, there has been a trend where the number of delistings has surpassed the number of IPOs. As of April 2023, the total number of listed companies on SGX stood at 650.

As I mentioned in my main reply, there are a variety of different reasons why companies would list on a particular exchange, and also a variety of reasons why they would delist. That is based upon maybe how they view the market, whether they want to list overseas, or they look at prevailing options. It could be different funding sources. They might want to go back to private, for example. So, there is a whole different variety of why they would want to do so. As I mentioned earlier on also, I think it is important for us to try to play a part but there is also a limit to what we can do to encourage listings.

I do not have an answer, but I think the short answer to the Member's first question is that we just take a very different approach to Indonesia's.

11 Mr Pritam Singh asked the Minister for National Development (a) how many applicants were affected by the technical issues associated with the timely issuance of HDB Flat Eligibility letters since its implementation in May 2023; (b) what were the reasons for these issues; and (c) whether the problem has been fully resolved.

Mr Speaker, in the past, home buyers applied for their flat, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) housing grants, and the Housing and Development Board (HDB) housing loan at different stages of their flat buying journey. To bring more convenience and help home buyers make more informed decisions, HDB streamlined the flat buying process by integrating the different eligibility assessments into a single application called the HDB Flat Eligibility (HFE) letter. The HFE letter provides home buyers with upfront and holistic assessments of their eligibility to buy an HDB flat, receive CPF housing grants and take up an HDB housing loan, before they commence their flat buying journey.

Since the HFE letter was implemented on 9 May 2023, HDB has processed more than 50,000 HFE applications. For the May Build-To-Order (BTO) Sales launch, there were system errors and high application volume. HDB redeployed more officers to assist home buyers with flat applications that could not be completed successfully online. At the same time, the HFE system was not yet able to handle some complexities in integrating eligibility assessments with data from various agencies, resulting in a higher-than-expected proportion of cases requiring manual intervention. Hence, some home buyers experienced longer processing times for their HFE applications. HDB is working hard to process the outstanding applications as quickly as possible and we seek home buyers’ patience and understanding.

In the lead-up to the October 2023 BTO launch, HDB has carried out additional system enhancements to ensure a smoother flat buying process. We encourage prospective home buyers to apply for the HFE letter early, at least a month before HDB sales exercises. To facilitate expeditious processing, home buyers should submit the required information and supporting documents for their HFE letter application.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Some questions for the Senior Minister of State.

One, I do not think the question has been answered vis-a-vis how many applications were affected by the technical issues. I think the Minister of State replied to say there were 50,000 applications, but that does not answer the question.

The second supplementary question deals with the response to a press query by CNA on this matter and it was stated that the issue affecting the HFE matter has been resolved. Can I confirm that there would be no issues of that nature for the October exercise?

And with regard to those applications arising from the May 2023 exercise, how many people are still awaiting positive response to their HFE application? By "positive response", I mean a response to the HFE application.

In reply to Mr Pritam Singh's supplementary questions, in terms of determining how many people were affected, we do know that applicants experienced longer waiting times. But to measure how many people were affected, it is quite difficult to define it. So, we look at it in terms of the number of people who have reached out to HDB for assistance because they could not complete their applications.

So, let us look at them in terms of two categories.

Those who have applications for resale flats – those buyers who urgently require HFE applications to be completed in order to do their resale transactions but were not able to do so and have urgent needs, those that have reached out to HDB have been helped.

As for the May sales launch, to HDB's knowledge, because they have made transitional arrangements requiring only an indication and intention to buy as well as a preliminary HFE check, this transitional arrangement has not resulted in buyers missing out on the May sales launch.

For the upcoming, in fact, it is the current launch, which runs from 4 October to 10 October, HDB's commitment is to ensure that those who have submitted the HFE applications as well as the supporting documents prior to end of August would receive their HFE outcomes in time to take part in the launch.

Can I have the third question again, please?

In the main, my supplementary questions were really framed with regard to the clarification that HDB gave to the public via CNA.

The Senior Minister of State spoke of what it means by a delay.

According to the HDB statement, it said, "It takes up to 21 working days for HFE applications to be processed.

So, I think the gist of my supplementary question is: how many applications went beyond those 21 days? That should be a very simple criterion in terms of understanding what problems were faced by HDB because that is what has already occurred.

There is another deeper query: in terms of moving forward, are we going to see a repetition of this matter or has the problem been fully resolved, as stated by the HDB's press release?

I note the Senior Minister of State's qualification with regard to BTO sales launches and resale exercises. Can I just confirm, in so far as HFE applications for resale flats are concerned, is there actually no problem and there would be no issue in getting the HFE within 21 days of application?

Senior Minister of State Sim Ann. We are approaching the end of Question Time. So, try to keep your answer short.

Okay. Thank you, Speaker. The 21 days that Mr Pritam Singh has referred to is a service standard. So, for the applications that he is referring to, we have about 31% of our HFE applications that were processed within the service standard of 21 days.

I should add that there is the issue of whether it meets 21 days' service standard, but there is also the impact – whether or not the delay resulted in, for instance, applicant's not being able to take part in the launch. As I have mentioned, because HDB has also been expediting the processing and they have also made accommodations at their end, to HDB's knowledge, applicants were not made to miss out on the May BTO launch, even if they received their HFE outcomes after the 21 days.

So, I just wanted to clarify that. And for the resale applications, for those who have encountered difficulties and have reached out to HDB for help, they have all been helped.

Order. End of Question Time. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Orders of the Day.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), provided that Members had not asked for questions standing in their names to be postponed to a later Sitting day or withdrawn, written answers to questions not reached by the end of Question Time are reproduced in the Appendix.]

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, this Bill seeks to amend the Free Trade Zones Act to enhance the regulation and control of goods that flow through our Free Trade Zones (FTZs). Specifically, the Bill introduces three key areas of amendments to the FTZ Act.

The first is a new licensing regime on the operators of our FTZs. The second relates to new regulations on cargo handlers and other cargo agents. And the third involves amendments to the enforcement powers of the Director-General (DG) and officers of customs under the revised Act. Before I go into the specifics of each amendment, let me explain why we are making these changes.

Sir, trade is the lifeblood of Singapore's economy. We have thrived economically as a nation by situating ourselves as a trading hub and crucial node in global supply chains. Today, Singapore is the second busiest container port in the world and the largest transshipment hub, handling about a fifth of the world's container transshipment traffic.

In 2022, our port handled a container throughput of over 37 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs), mostly for transshipment. Our airport handled another two million tonnes of air cargo, a significant proportion of which is also transshipment cargo.

Our geographical location and connectivity give us a natural advantage as a trading hub. But what helps to further strengthen our attractiveness as a hub is our FTZs which facilitate transshipment activities and support more efficient and resilient global supply chains through a hub-and-spoke model.

There are, currently, 10 FTZs in Singapore, located mainly at our sea and air terminals. Businesses that operate within the FTZs enjoy exemption from customs duties and taxes on re-exports, simplified customs procedures, access to streamlined logistics and transportation services, as well as other services to facilitate their trade operations. These are pro-business elements we want to preserve when we amend the legislation.

There has been growing concerns of FTZs around the world being misused for illicit activities, such as weapons proliferation, environmental crimes and trade-based money laundering. Illegal actors will try to disguise their actions as legitimate trade, for example, by falsely declaring cargo manifest data, or by swapping out legitimate goods with contraband before re-exporting.

Singapore Customs has been taking proactive measures to combat and deter illicit activities within our FTZs.

For instance, Customs regularly conducts surprise inspections on businesses operating within the FTZs. Enforcement actions are taken against those found to be engaging in illicit trade.

To better target suspicious firms, Customs also works closely with our FTZ authorities, as well as local and international partners, to share actionable intelligence and operational support to strengthen our ability to detect illicit activities and enforce against illegal actors.

The aim of the legislative amendments is to update and strengthen our FTZ regime to keep pace with evolving threats and the increasing sophistication of illegal actors. We are proposing changes in this Bill to further enhance the regulation and control of goods that flow through our FTZs.

Mr Speaker, the first key amendment introduces a licensing regime for FTZ operators.

In the past, our FTZs were operated by public bodies that were appointed by the Minister for Finance. As these entities have since been privatised, a licensing regime is more fit-for-purpose. Through the licensing regime, we will be able to specify and enforce the necessary requirements to ensure the overall security of our FTZs and improve our regulation of the flow of goods and persons within the FTZ.

For example, FTZ operators will be required to put in place necessary security structures like CCTVs and fences and provide assistance to officers of customs in the performance of their official duties. Our FTZ authorities have already put many of these measures in place today and the proposed amendments will formalise these requirements in legislation. FTZ operators will also need to screen persons who intend to operate in the FTZ and manage the sub-leasing of premises in the FTZ. They will also need to report and disclose relevant information on suspicious or dangerous goods or persons within the FTZs to the DG of Customs.

The second key amendment of the Bill seeks to regulate the cargo handlers and cargo agents operating within the FTZ. While cargo handlers and agents will not be subject to a licensing regime, the proposed amendments seek to clearly lay out their responsibilities in terms of securing the goods under their charge and data provision.

Specifically, cargo handlers will be responsible for monitoring and managing the movement of goods handled at their premises within the FTZs and ensuring their premises are secure. They will need to report goods that may have contravened our laws. Cargo handlers and cargo agents will also need to provide specified information contained in a bill of lading or airway bill in advance of their entry or transshipment of their goods through Singapore.

Currently, only information relating to goods that are imported, exported or controlled goods that are transshipped, is required to be submitted as part of the permit application process. With this amendment, information on all transshipment goods will need to be submitted.

These amendments will give us better visibility of goods that are being transshipped through Singapore before arriving at their final destination. Customs can monitor the flows of goods for signs of illicit activity and take the necessary action, in close partnership with other international authorities.

The third set of amendments sets out the enforcement powers of the DG and officers of Customs and the regulatory actions they may undertake.

The DG of Customs will be allowed to grant, renew, suspend or revoke licences. He or she will also be empowered to impose or modify licensing conditions and order the removal of dangerous goods, as well as the detainment of goods for Customs' inspection.

The Bill will also introduce powers for officers of Customs to enter any area within the FTZ and inspect or remove goods within the FTZ. They will also be empowered to request for information for the purposes of investigation, witness examination, arrest of any person without warrant and search of any arrested person. These powers are necessary to allow Customs, as the FTZ regulator, to ensure the compliance of FTZ operators, cargo handlers, cargo agents and other entities and persons operating within the FTZs.

The remaining amendments to the Bill are operational and administrative in nature, such as amendments to the penalty framework to address non-compliance with the licensing framework and to allow for compoundable offences in lieu of prosecution.

The proposed amendments in this Bill have been carefully calibrated, in consultation with industry and relevant stakeholders, to improve Customs' ability to detect illicit activities, while keeping our regime efficient and pro-business for companies. They are also in line with international best practices, including those established by the World Customs Organization.

Sir, our status as a transshipment hub puts Singapore firmly on the world map. Our connectivity brings goods and people through Singapore, strengthens global supply chains, boosts our economy and creates good jobs for Singaporeans.

As the busiest transshipment hub in the world, a significant amount of cargo comes through us daily. The vast majority is legitimate, but there will be a small minority who seek to flout the rules. We will facilitate trade, but we do not want to be misused by bad actors for their illegal means.

The amendments in this Bill are targeted at these players, while keeping a business-friendly operating environment for genuine users.

Companies that do legitimate trade through Singapore will benefit from a sound, reputable and pro-business regime.

In turn, Singapore continues to remain competitive as the top port-of-call for transshipments and a trusted global trading hub. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

Mr Speaker, Sir, our 10 FTZs in Singapore are the lesser-known ingredients to our continued economic prosperity. They are governed by the Free Trade Zones Act 1966, which we enacted shortly after our Independence in order to facilitate the entrepot trade which we had become known for.

Since Singapore's early days as a British colony, its geographical location at the centre of major trade routes attracted traders to ship their goods here with the aim of re-exporting them elsewhere.

I note that the FTZs Act has not been substantially amended many times since it was first enacted in 1966. May I ask the Minister to provide further details on why we are suddenly looking at amending it now rather than doing it much earlier?

I note the Senior Minister of State's speech highlighting that it is meant to update and strengthen the FTZ regime. But could the Senior Minister of State provide further details as to why it was not done much earlier?

One of the main changes appears to be that the FTZs will no longer be managed by authorities that are answerable to the Minister but, instead, by FTZ operators who will be licensed by the DG of Customs.

However, I understand that the same three authorities – Jurong Port, PSA Corporation and Changi Airport Group – will continue to manage the 10 FTZs as FTZ operators. Is this amendment more of form than substance, or is it the case that, with this change, the Ministry will look to license other FTZ operators?

It is also unclear if this seemingly unnecessary change will bring about an increase in regulatory or compliance costs. For example, will the existing operators have to pay more to apply for and maintain their licence as FTZ operators? My concern is that they could seek to pass these cost increases on to the businesses and companies which operate in the FTZs, which may erode the more business-friendly conditions within these FTZs.

More importantly, how do our FTZs measure up in terms of competitiveness against the "free zones" operated by other major trading countries, especially those in the region? Based on a study by the World Customs Organization, it appears to be getting harder to differentiate between the regulation and operation of the "free zones" in various countries. What can we do to maintain our advantage as the transshipment hub of choice for traders and shippers?

The amended Act will also require FTZ cargo handlers to disclose certain cargo information to the licensed FTZ operator in a prescribed form, manner and timeline. In turn, the FTZ operator owes a duty to disclose the same information to the DG of Customs in order to facilitate enforcement of the Act.

While I understand that the form and manner of such reporting are to be prescribed in subsidiary legislation, will we be adopting the harmonised digital solutions and data standards which the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) has been working with other foreign ports to develop?

May I also ask what is the expected timeline for the enactment of such subsidiary legislation? Have any exercises been undertaken to consult the current industry practice on such data submissions and have they been completed? When will these reporting obligations be expected to come into force?

Finally, I note that the Bill introduces new sections 14Q to 14Z setting out the powers of enforcement of customs officers, among other things. For example, a customs officer may enter an FTZ to monitor compliance with the Act, search the FTZ, detain goods for inspection, require persons to provide information and documents, just to name a few.

Does this mean that the customs officers did not have these powers before this? How then have we ensured that our FTZs are free of money laundering, terrorist financing or any other illicit activities over the years? Mr Speaker, Sir, notwithstanding the clarifications sought, I support the Bill.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Mr Speaker, the amendments proposed to the FTZs Act are meant to provide better oversight for the flow of goods through our nation's FTZs, essentially, by devolving a number of functions away from authorities appointed by the Minister to licensed FTZ operators and cargo handlers may be seen as a devolution of operational responsibilities to a more decentralised regime, which could have the benefit of also simultaneously being more efficient.

These changes are also, according to the Ministry's public consultation documents, meant to enable better "detection, deterrence and prevention of money laundering" and associated terrorist financing.

To this end, these objectives to improve efficiency as well as safety are sound and should be supported.

My comments will briefly touch on some aspects of the Bill before moving on to discuss broader considerations about how FTZs operate in Singapore. I will then try to close with reflections on the evolving nature of FTZs in our global economy.

Section 10 confers powers to the DG to prohibit a person from entering or residing in an FTZ. This vests significant discretionary power to the DG and there is some ambiguity and uncertainty in terms of its scope and application. What conditions does the Ministry expect such prohibitions to be exercised? One could imagine cases where a fugitive or would-be fugitive seeks refuge in the zone, in which case, certainly, national laws and regulations would naturally apply. Would the Ministry consider requiring the DG to publish the underlying rationale for any prohibitions imposed when exercised? By doing so, the DG can provide greater transparency on when it uses its discretionary powers.

The new section 14N compels FTZ operators and cargo handlers to submit reports on suspicious goods. This is reasonable, but the process of submitting such reports appears to place the onus on the agents. There does not appear to be any routine reporting, for instance, unless specifically asked to do so by the DG. This provides incentive for operators and handlers that hope to avoid taking on additional regulatory burdens to remain somewhat conservative in their assessment of when goods may justify reporting.

As far as I can gather, the Bill does not provide guidance on, say, red flags or other thresholds associated with potentially suspicious goods. It may be, therefore, useful to include in a Schedule, in an annex, for instance, predetermined frameworks on what the Ministry believes to be appropriate thresholds or red flags. A sufficiently clear and comprehensive set of guidelines will allow operators to continue applying flexibility in determining what falls within or without the threshold, but ensure that all appropriate cases are flagged for possible investigation. Such an action also removes the possibility of excess discretion that the Ministry might not wish to confer.

Section 14P(6) stipulates that a decision by the DG to suspend or revoke an operational licence or to impose a regulatory action takes effect from the date on which the notice is served, or any other date as specified in the notice. While I appreciate that such snap suspensions can serve a purpose when seeking to arrest illegal or illicit activity without triggering suspicion, such actions could have detrimental effects on regular business operations. I have had residents meet with me, to be fair, in other contexts, where their operational licences were suspended with relatively limited buffer for them to rectify violations, or even while good faith negotiations over addressing highlighted problems appeared to be ongoing.

Will the Ministry confirm that, as a matter of course, the FTZ operators will be offered a brief but essential window of opportunity for compliance to written notices under section 14P(3)? For instance, the DG can specify the time for a notice under section 14P(6) to take effect, say, 14 days after the date of service of notice on the licensee, which would be consistent with section 14P(3)(c). Of course, this will only apply to section 14P1(a) through (c), since national security should supersede business disruptions. Nevertheless, this modification, I believe, would provide some grace period for otherwise legitimate business operations.

More generally, apart from the DG having the legal power to take measures or engage in necessary actions to ensure compliance by operators, it remains unclear how such compliance may be ascertained. Similarly, at the licensee level, the systems and procedures that licensees are required to implement to monitor the security and movement of goods within the FTZ are also not spelt out.

Sir, while I understand that legislation cannot be expected to detail all possible monitoring and enforcement procedures to ensure compliance with regulation as well as the law, it is worth noting that one major impetus for the proposed revisions is precisely to address the possibility of money laundering and terrorist financing. But it remains to be asked how will the Bill truly advance this goal?

This is my second point. After all, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and, as we have seen in recent times, in the context of real estate, for instance, a surfeit of laws will remain ineffectual so long as compliance is insufficiently observed. Even in the context of free zones, multiple reports have swirled around alleged illicit activities within "Le Freeport", which raises questions of how rigorous the process of due diligence and compliance with regulation truly is.

Some of these activities have included tax evasion, storage of looted goods, besides money laundering and terrorist financing.

One is left to wonder then how the Ministry believes that this devolution to licensed FTZ operators and cargo handlers will improve the practice of due diligence as well as regulatory compliance. For instance, in the past, how many contraventions of the Act have been raised to Customs over the past five years and have these instances been flagged by the operators themselves or was it because of tip-offs that were received by the authorities?

How many FTZ operators and agents operate within our FTZs and, if this is a large number, will this dilute the quality of monitoring and reporting since small operators, in particular, can hardly be expected to sustain the sort of compliance regime that larger ones are able to muster?

Relatedly, how many FTZ operators and handlers currently operate in our FTZs and how many are expected to be licensed by the Government under the new legislation?

Sir, my third point considers the role of FTZs in a 21st century economy. In principle, traditional FTZs offer a host of benefits. By exempting tariffs, they facilitate the unfettered flow of goods and services which are especially critical for transshipment activities. They also attract cross-border finance, since many typically offer an initial tax holiday, which can embed technological know-how and encourage the development of an otherwise infant industry. And their concentration of industries in one region often promotes the exchange of information and ideas which can promote economies of both scale and scope. Historically, our economic model has relied on entrepôt trade and foreign direct investment. And so, we have benefited as a country significantly from the presence of FTZs.

This is all well and good, but it is important for us to understand how the economic landscape is also shifting beneath us.

International trade in goods never quite recovered after the collapse in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, at least as a share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), prompting some to declare that globalisation has reached its peak and others to even pronounce that we are now in the new phase of "deglobalisation".

While I do not, to be clear, share this unvarnished, pessimistic view, it is undeniably true that world merchandise trade has essentially gone sideways since the mid-2000s and may have even declined as a share of output in some cases. Staking our future on the trend of continued international integration strikes me as risky at best, and foolhardy at worst.

Similarly, agreements on an international minimum corporate tax, base erosion profit shifting (BEPS), while progressing at a slower pace, nevertheless remain on track for roll-out over the next few years, which will similarly weaken some of the advantages that Singapore has enjoyed in terms of attracting global capital through crude tax competition. In any case, modern Singapore, as a major global wealth centre, is now seldom starved of investment financing, making the benefits of tax-free FTZs somewhat less compelling.

This, essentially, leaves the main advantage of FTZs, going forward, as being that of enhancing the benefits of agglomeration. But the exchange of knowledge and information occurs largely digitally these days and, even if we continue to believe in the merits of in-person exchanges, such spillovers are by no means bound by the artificial boundaries that constitute an FTZ. Indeed, we would surely want the entire nation to be a free-trade zone for ideas as well as active inquiry.

To this end, one may wonder whether the continued focus on FTZs as key engines of the economy – while unobjectionable on its face – may be missing the bigger picture, which would require our entire nation to be open to flows of data, information, knowledge and ideas – of course, within the boundaries of the law.

Importantly, it is insufficient to cater to such flows only from the perspective of quantitative metrics – ensuring that we have, for instance, a rapid and reliable digital infrastructure, a supportive environment for technology adoption, and adequate exposure for our companies and workers to modern innovations, all of which we do well, but also from a more subtle but just as important qualitative perspective. This means fostering and welcoming open debate over ideas, even uncomfortable ones. This means encouraging out-of-the-box thinking and training our workforce to be adaptable and flexible.

I understand that these all fall truly outside the scope of the FTZ Bill, but we should not forget the ultimate purpose of legislative efforts of this nature.

Mr Speaker, allow me to conclude. While I believe that the changes proposed in the Bill – meant to provide for safety and efficiency – remain important ones to pursue, it remains unclear how the provisions in the Bill will truly succeed in meeting them. Moreover, the changing nature of FTZs in the global economy may yet relegate our work here to a back seat, at least from the perspective of long-term economic performance.

Hence, while I support the Bill, nagging questions over whether it will truly make substantial headway in fulfilling the objectives it purports to achieve, nevertheless remain.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Speaker, Sir, as we all know, trade is the lifeblood of Singapore. As a critical trading hub, it is incumbent upon us to meet the highest international standards, whilst simultaneously reduce the impediments to trade. The amendments in this Bill are designed to fortify our FTZ regime, allowing for enhanced oversight of goods within these zones, while preserving the efficiency that characterises our trade networks. Notwithstanding, I would like to seek a few clarifications.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, with regard to the various entities designated to oversee the 10 FTZs, as they are private entities, what are the stipulated conditions and criteria for their appointment? What mechanisms are in place for potential revocation? Are there plans to establish more FTZs in the future?

Second, Mr Speaker, Sir, the delegation of greater powers to the DG by the Minister is a point of concern. In cases where the DG had acted ultra vires or unreasonably, will cases of appeal be reviewed by the Minister?

Third, the accuracy of data submission within the FTZs is of paramount importance. Can we get insights into the mechanisms that will be employed to ensure the accuracy of this data? Equally crucial is how this data will be safeguarded by customs authorities. Can the Ministry of Finance (MOF) share more information about this issue?

Fourth, will there be a provision allowing for appeals against penalties imposed in cases where licensing conditions are breached or where actions conflict with the Act?

Lastly, Mr Speaker, Sir, the matter of data confidentiality merits attention. Will data collected within FTZs be disclosed to foreign law enforcement agencies, such as INTERPOL, without the explicit consent of the individuals or entities involved? Notwithstanding, I support the Bill.

Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant.

Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to join this debate on the Free Trade Zones (Amendment) Bill.

Singapore's FTZs at our ports and airport are an important node of business and trade for the Singapore economy to thrive and prosper safely without any hindrance and threat. Singapore's Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Investment Guarantee Agreements and the Double Tax Avoidance Agreements also allow for smooth trade with many countries in the world.

In particular, this piece of legislation is of utmost importance for both small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as larger companies, as it is all about the ease of doing business in Singapore. It also gives a very clear and loud message to the investor community that Singapore means business in the proper operation of its ports of entry for goods and services.

In my speech, I would like to highlight three key items: importance of this legislation to global trade, the benefits that our businesses get from the legislative changes and, lastly, some concerns from an SME standpoint in their participation after the changes in these amendments are accepted.

FTZs in Singapore were first established in the 1960s to facilitate trade in dutiable goods. The FTZs Bill was last amended in Parliament in 2014. According to the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF, FTZs are vulnerable to trade-based money laundering through the misrepresentation of the price, quantity or quality of imports and exports, phantom shipments and falsification of invoices. Much has happened in the last nine years and it is timely to update this legislation, keeping in line with recent developments in global trade.

Sir, let me now turn to the key thrusts of the Bill.

In my view, this amendment removes legal uncertainty by creating security measures that ensure that goods passing through Singapore follow very stringent checks enforced by FTZ authorities. I believe this amendment also provides a stronger framework for preventing money laundering and financing for terrorism.

Three specific points.

First, licensing of FTZ operators. The amendment allows many administrative responsibilities to shift to licensed FTZ operators for more efficient movement of goods. The new tenets that allow operators and cargo holders to delegate authority are reflective of current industry practices. The amendment seeks to strike a balance, enabling both better oversight of goods flow and ensuring efficient movement of goods.

Second, the proposed amendment provides more powers to the officers of the Customs and Excise Department to investigate and arrest any parties suspected of illegal activity. In providing clear definition of criminal offences, it allows the DG and staff to enforce the law with increased penalties for offences.

Lastly, this amendment also allows for a smoother transmission of information and documents, while providing greater flexibility to staff.

I also want to highlight that the staff working in FTZs play a key role in the detection, deterrence and prevention of money laundering and financial crime. To help the staff to better appreciate the magnitude of the risks, we will need to, on a continuous basis, develop training roadmaps and programmes which would be conducted by the private operators for the staff performing various functions in the FTZs.

On to some concerns regarding the SME community.

SMEs will require a longer period to adjust to the main tenets of the new amendments. SMEs simply lack the capabilities and resources to take a more active role in enforcement and administration, which would make it difficult for them to take advantage of the new powers for FTZ licensed operators and cargo handlers.

SMEs will also need to understand the legal powers vested in FTZ authorities and their needs-based information-gathering procedures. As a vibrant trading hub, much of the work being done at the FTZs is round the clock, and SMEs may not have the scale to manage their lean workforce while balancing additional training needs.

Perhaps the Senior Minister of State can elaborate on the plans in place to assist our SMEs to help implement these changes.

The revised legislation also stands to benefit many businesses. The new amendment allows more delegation of authority by FTZ operators and cargo holders. This may benefit the SMEs as well as large businesses, as they can outsource certain tasks.

There is also a very clear list of what constitutes an offence under the Free Trade Zones (Amendment) Bill – what is permitted and prohibited, the gravity of each offence and also sentencing considerations.

The legislative changes also create a safer environment for new market players, as goods passing through Singapore’s FTZs will require stringent checks done by FTZ authorities.

Also, for SMEs aiming for a global presence, the free trade principles of this amendment will safeguard their operations and increase their brand presence internationally. This may also push them to adopt more digital technologies faster.

In conclusion, Sir, strong, well-managed FTZs are important to allow our country to remain competitive regionally and internationally. These amendments will reinforce the high standards of compliance that will not only maintain Singapore’s strong standing as a trade hub but also attract foreign investments that have confidence in our due diligence.

Sir, it is evident to me that these amendments will facilitate further development of our FTZs and, hence, I support this Bill.

Ms Mariam Jaafar.

Sir, FTZs are a core part of Singapore’s trade strategy, facilitating entrepot trade and transshipment and building on and reinforcing our international air and sea hub positioning.

FTZs have proliferated with speed in the past few decades and become an integral part of the global supply and value chains. Depending on your sources, there are now over 3,500 to over 5,000 FTZs in more than 135 countries around the world, boosting economic opportunities, foreign direct investments and job creation, in particular, by offering exemptions from duty and taxes and simplified administrative procedures and less regulations.

But the same characteristics that make FTZs attractive to legitimate businesses also attract abuse by illicit actors and there has been, for some time now, heightened concerns of FTZs being exploited for illicit trade, including weapons proliferation, as well as trade-based money laundering operations, tax evasion and terrorist financing.

Customs and the private sector have expressed the need for better Customs procedures and controls in FTZs, leading to the development of best practices, such as the Practical Guidance on Free Zones released by the World Customs Organization in 2020/2021.

As such, the update to the FTZ Act is timely. The proposed amendments have sought to align with international best practices, taking into account industry practices here and provide good clarity regarding regulations covering the control of the FTZs and the division of responsibilities of the various players, including Customs, the FTZ operators who will now be licensed, the FTZ cargo handlers and shipping agents.

This is key as the multiple actors involved in operating and governing the FTZ requires clarity about responsibilities and effective coordination, including information sharing. For instance, the requirement for advanced data submission by shipping agents to cargo handlers and, in turn, by cargo handlers and FTZ operators to Customs, will provide greater oversight of goods, persons and operations within the FTZs.

Licensed FTZ operators and cargo handlers are also obligated to report to Customs suspicious activities and goods in their possession, custody, charge or control that are brought or intended to be brought into Singapore or are manufactured in an FTZ and brought or intended to be brought into Singapore, in contravention of the Act or any other written law, akin to how the financial sector – as we spoke about a lot yesterday – is obligated to report suspicious transactions.

The amendments also establish the jurisdiction that the Government and Customs have to enforce controls and the penalty framework.

Lastly, better cooperation among all actors in and around the FTZ and internationally, including the provision for data sharing, will be a great help in combatting illicit activity. So, the amendments are all sound and I support them.

But I do have a few clarifications for the Senior Minister of State.

First, while there is a need to increase oversight and controls, there needs to be balance in ensuring that the controls do not create an overly onerous burden that affects the efficiency of our FTZs, which remain vital to our entrepot hub strategy.

Further, the best controls, if poorly implemented, will also affect the competitiveness of FTZs. This is especially true, given the diversity and volume of activities in our FTZs.

It is, therefore, important to take a risk-based approach and to leverage data, technology and IT integration.

I will say with conviction that FTZs will remain core to our overall trade and economic strategy, which will, for sure, change as globalisation changes – but trade is not going away.

I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether and how the revised FTZ regime increases our business costs and whether it will reduce the competitiveness of our FTZs, especially in the context of other countries raising their game. For example, China has recently moved to open its FTZs.

My second clarification has to do with the need for proportionate penalties and sanctions for anyone contravening the provisions of the Act. Is there an intent to review the provisions to see if the financial penalties, currently capped at $10,000, are adequate? Equally, it is important that any illicit actors caught are prosecuted to the fullest to deter others from exploiting our FTZs.

Thirdly, the root cause of poorly implemented controls and oversight is often the lack of awareness and understanding of FTZ-related risks and vulnerabilities at all levels, including on topics, such as trade-based money laundering. From the businesses in the FTZs to the relevant authorities and operators to financial institutions and banking regulators, this lack of understanding not only renders the zone vulnerable to illicit activity, but also impedes the ability to take a risk-based approach to management, enforcement and supervision efforts.

There is a need for a strong focus on adequate training programmes to ensure better understanding and identification of risks and an understanding of the requirements and processes under the new regime. What are the steps being taken to step up such training?

Finally, I would be also interested to hear the Senior Minister of State’s view on whether the proposed revisions to the FTZ regime will be sufficient to deal with the threats and vulnerabilities that we have identified. I am sure there are other measures being looked at that did not factor in these acts. What other preventive measures are being put in place to counter these threats? Notwithstanding the clarifications above, I support the Bill.

Mr Shawn Huang.

Mr Speaker, many countries have set up FTZs to boost business activity and reap the benefits of free trade. These zones have been instrumental in the evolution of trade for the integrated supply chains of the global economy.

According to an FIAS report, FTZs continue to benefit the country's economy. It has been proven that it is effective in generating employment, increasing the volume and diversity of exports, serving as an essential tool for attracting foreign direct investments and enhancing commercial linkages for export.

However, FTZs may also facilitate illegal and criminal activities, such as trade in counterfeit and pirated products.

FTZ is not a new concept. For centuries, governments have sought different ways to facilitate trade in their ports. One of the earliest was called free ports. These are designated areas open to commercial vessels where their cargo destined for re-export is exempt from customs duties.

Today, many FTZs are managed by private operators and regulated by Government authorities. A study concluded that the growth in private involvement in the FTZs has been beneficial, as privately-owned zones tend to offer better facilities and amenities and are more responsive to tenants' needs and provide a more comprehensive range of property management services.

However, we must be cognisant that lightly regulated zones are attractive to parties engaged in illegal and criminal activities. It is known that FTZs have facilitated trade in counterfeit and pirated products, as well as smuggling and money laundering. These areas have often provided bad actors with a relatively safe environment to carry out illicit activities.

As such, governments will need to control these zones adequately, especially those operated by private entities, as they are focused on expanding zone occupancy and providing profitable services to these businesses. There is also a need to establish a more direct interest, enhance law enforcement oversight and increase the capacity and authority in monitoring zone operations.

As most zones are operated via a hybrid and collaborative model between government and private parties, we need to further enhance and tighten the processes to ensure that it is strengthened against such exploitation.

FTZ cargo handlers play a critical role in the supply chain and FTZs. By regulating the FTZ cargo handlers to comply with the FTZ Act, we can further strengthen service standards, security and assist authorities in detaining goods for inspection and reporting goods that have contravened any written law. It is reasonable to screen any person who intends to operate in the FTZ, enhance the management of FTZ tenants and better manage sub-leasing premises in the FTZ.

As the volume of cargo that FTZ operators handle is immense, the authorities must be given accurate and timely cargo information. This is standard industry practice and will provide greater oversight of goods, persons and operations within the FTZ.

I have a few questions for the Senior Minister of State.

First, given the new FTZ requirements, how will this affect the overall business costs and competitiveness of our FTZs? What are the other areas that can be further improved to enhance the competitiveness of our FTZs?

Second, with the new data submission regime, what are the measures taken to ensure that the FTZ operators meet proper data management and cybersecurity requirements?

Third, given the evolving operating environment, how are the authorities updated on the latest threats?

In addition, given the collateral consequences of specific threats, what steps are taken to ensure that these threats do not enter Singapore in the first place? Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Edward Chia.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Free Trade Zones (Amendment) Bill seeks to refine and strengthen the operations and oversight of our FTZs. Our FTZs are the lifeblood of our entrepot trade.

The Bill's primary goal to enhance the security, transparency and efficiency of our FTZs resonates deeply. By striving to remain up-to-date with international best practices and increasing the level of oversight in our FTZs, this Bill reflects Singapore's unwavering commitment to trade with integrity and enhance global cooperation. This Bill proactively addresses potential vulnerabilities.

Having said that, I would like to highlight four concerns.

The first is regarding the potential economic implications. Singapore has always been renowned for its competitive edge in global trade, with our FTZs being a testament to our strategic prowess. While the enhanced regulations for FTZ operators may streamline processes in the long term, the immediate implication for businesses is a possible rise in costs.

Specifically, the need to construct and maintain dedicated structures, ensure heightened security measures and provide a steady stream of data to Customs can be daunting, both logistically and financially.

The new regime also emphasises the importance of FTZ operators disseminating information on the FTZ Bill's requirements. While essential, it demands a significant administrative apparatus. This is an operational dimension where efficiency is paramount. There is a potential risk that businesses might grapple with not just costs, but also operational delays. This could result in significant opportunity costs.

Additionally, the introduction of the advanced data submission requirement is undoubtedly poised to offer greater oversight. But the pertinent question is: how will it impact the velocity of trade? Efficient trade necessitates swift decisions and rapid movements. Any delays could render our FTZs less attractive, especially when time-sensitive goods are involved. It is crucial that as we endeavour to make our trade zones more secure and compliant with international standards, we must ensure that these changes do not place an undue burden on our businesses, which could inadvertently stymie our growth.

Hence, how do we anticipate businesses absorbing these costs? Will the revised FTZ regime inadvertently increase business and operational time costs and, by doing so, diminish the competitiveness of our FTZs? Will the Government introduce fiscal support measures to enable businesses to adhere to this amendment Bill and improve competitiveness?

Secondly, I acknowledge the highlighted threats and risks, such as illicit trade and potential money laundering, that this Bill aims to mitigate. However, these threats are not novel. They have loomed over international trade for quite some time. So, what are the considerations for amending the FTZ Act only now?

Thirdly, a point I would like to delve deeper into is the proposed penalty framework within the Bill. A robust and effective regulatory system is defined not just by its preventive measures, but also by its punitive ones. Will this penalty framework employ a structured, tiered approach, with penalties corresponding to the severity of non-compliance? It is crucial for our businesses to have a clear understanding of the repercussions, ensuring they can operate with certainty. The clarity, fairness and consistency of this framework will be paramount in securing the trust and cooperation of businesses within the FTZs, also aiming to guide entities towards compliant behaviour.

Lastly, while the proposed revisions are a commendable step towards bolstering the security and efficiency of our FTZs, are these revisions comprehensive and robust enough to truly thwart the threats cited? And beyond these amendments, what are other preventive measures that we, as a nation, are putting in place to counter such threats? It is not just about reactive measures, but about building a proactive shield that safeguards our trade reputation, ensuring that Singapore remains a beacon of trade integrity.

To conclude, the Free Trade Zones (Amendment) Bill stands as a testament to Singapore's approach to trade. These queries hope to strike the right balance between safeguarding our trade zones from potential challenges and ensuring a thriving, business-friendly environment. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill.

Senior Minister of State Chee Hong Tat.

Mr Speaker, I would like to thank Members for their support of the Bill and for their suggestions.

Indeed, as hon Members have pointed out, facilitating trade is critical to Singapore's survival as a small and open economy and our FTZs play an important role in supporting this. It is why we are making the amendments in this Bill. They will keep our regime updated and responsive to the evolving threats, so that we remain a trusted and competitive trading hub.

Members raised questions around four themes: one, whether the proposed amendments are necessary and adequate to deal with evolving threats faced by our FTZs; two, whether the revised FTZ regime will affect business costs, lead to operational delays in cargo flows and affect our overall competitiveness; three, the accuracy of and safeguards around the data collected; and four, how FTZ operators are licensed and regulated.

Sir, I will address them in turn.

First, on the adequacy of the legislative amendments to combat and prevent illegitimate trade, as raised by Mr Shawn Huang, Mr Edward Chia, Ms Mariam Jaafar and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Enhancing our FTZ regime is a constant endeavour. Even as we enhance the regulatory regime with this Bill, we must expect criminals to find new ways to circumvent the rules. We have to remain vigilant and continuously strengthen our regulatory framework to detect and deter illicit trade.

Customs will continue to review the adequacy of its regulations, take action to address gaps and ensure that we have a robust regime in place.

Not every enhancement to our regulatory regime requires legislative amendments. Some can be operational in nature, for instance, improving sense-making and detection capabilities and stepping up enforcement efforts, which are what Singapore Customs has been doing over the years.

For example, Singapore Customs develops and refines risk profiles and indicators on an ongoing basis to more accurately identify suspicious goods before they enter Singapore. Red flags are already made known to industry partners today, both through Singapore Customs' website and through direct engagements. We will continue to do this.

In recent years, Singapore Customs has also started using data analytics and artificial intelligence to improve its targeting and enforcement efforts.

In addition, Singapore Customs maintains strong partnerships with our other enforcement agencies and international counterparts and organisations, including the World Customs Organization, to share intelligence and best practices. Such capability-building and international partnerships supplement our legislation and enforcement framework, forming a multi-pronged approach to detecting and deterring illicit activities within our FTZs.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat and Mr Edward Chia asked why we are amending the Act now.

Sir, we need to keep our regulatory regime updated, as the risk of illicit trade grows and criminals become more sophisticated. Stronger levers will supplement Customs' broader efforts that I have just described, to build a trusted and competitive trade facilitation regime.

Let me now address the second theme that Members have raised: the impact of the revised regime on business costs, operational efficiency and our overall competitiveness.

The proposed amendments seek to strike the right balance between better governance and preserving our pro-business environment.

Most of the new requirements introduced in the Bill are practices currently performed by the FTZ authorities, such as ensuring the security of the FTZ and reporting any goods that contravene the law. The proposed amendments seek to consolidate, standardise and codify these requirements under the FTZ Act, to ensure consistent implementation across FTZs and a more robust regulatory regime.

We do not expect the new data submission requirements to be disruptive to trade. This is because the additional data that we are requesting from cargo agents are existing fields in the bill of lading and airway bill. They are standard information already provided today for the voyage and transport of goods. The submission timelines under the FTZ regime are also aligned with current industry norms. We will facilitate transmission of the data collected by the cargo agents to Customs via existing systems where possible.

In proposing these amendments, we have consulted key industry stakeholders to ensure that these changes are designed and implemented in such a way to minimise the cost and compliance burden for companies, including our SMEs. Implementation of the provisions under the revised Act will be phased in from early 2024. As part of this, clauses 25 and 27 of the Bill provide for a six-month transitional period to allow companies time to adjust.

Let me now move on to the third theme, which relates to the collection and safeguarding of cargo data.

The proposed amendments will empower Singapore Customs to collect specified cargo data in advance of vessel arrival in Singapore. This will strengthen the ability of Customs to detect suspicious goods prior to their entry into Singapore and facilitate the conduct of timely interventions by our public agencies.

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how we can ensure that the data provided is accurate. Indeed, criminals will not declare accurate data about their illegal goods. This is where Singapore Customs’ sense-making and intelligence capabilities come into play – to detect discrepancies in the data submitted to pick out suspicious shipments and perform additional checks.

Mr Yip and Mr Huang also asked how the data collected would be treated and managed, including cybersecurity requirements and other safeguards. The transmission of cargo data to Singapore Customs will need to abide by the data management and cybersecurity standards set by the Government, such as those under the Cybersecurity Act. All cargo data collected by Customs will be subject to the data confidentiality provisions in the new section 16A of the FTZ Act, which are consistent with our other laws pertaining to data protection and secrecy.

In short, data collected cannot be disclosed without prior written consent of the related parties. This also applies to requests by foreign law enforcement authorities. Exceptions pertain only for specific circumstances, for example, to enable officers of Customs to investigate suspected offences, or to enable our public agencies to collect, compile and analyse such data for the purposes of national security.

The fourth and final theme relates to the proposed licensing regime for the FTZ operators, the new powers granted to the DG and officers of Customs, and the Government’s approach to enforcement.

Mr Saktiandi asked if the powers granted to the officers of Customs are new and, if so, how Customs officers are empowered to carry out enforcement in the past. Currently, officers of Customs carry out inspections and enforcement within our FTZs by drawing on the powers granted to them under the Customs Act (CA) and the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act (RIEA). The proposed amendments will help to set out and clarify powers that relate specifically to FTZs and consolidate these under the FTZ Act.

Mr Yip and Mr Saktiandi sought clarifications about the proposed licensing regime and provisions for revocation or appeals where necessary. To qualify for an FTZ operator licence, the entity will need to demonstrate its ability to effectively operate an FTZ. Singapore Customs will also take other relevant considerations into account, such as whether the entity has obtained the necessary approvals from other Government agencies, for example, from the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore or the Maritime and Port Authority.

The FTZ operator licence will be valid for five years, after which, it can be renewed. This is a key lever for Singapore Customs, the FTZ regulator, to ensure that licence holders meet the required standards for the proper and efficient functioning of the FTZ. I wish to assure Mr Saktiandi that licence fees will be reasonable and will not impose a significant cost burden on the FTZ operators.

Licensees who wilfully and repeatedly fail to comply with the licensing conditions or provisions of the FTZ Act may have their licence suspended or revoked. Other instances of non-compliance may attract penalties, such as fines, imprisonment, or both. The penalty imposed will depend on the specific offence and will be tiered according to the severity of the offence.

To Mr Yip’s question on whether there will be an avenue of appeal, the short answer is yes. Appeals against any penalties imposed are provided for in section 18 of the FTZ Act. The appellant could appeal to the DG. If the appellant is aggrieved by the DG’s decision, he or she may appeal to the Minister.

Mr Speaker, I wish to address one point that Assoc Prof Jamus Lim raised during his speech, where he gave an academic description of globalisation and the impact on supply chains. Sir, I do not agree with the way he has characterised how global trade will change. We recognise that there is a change in global supply chains, the reconfiguration of the global supply chains and trade flows. That part is obvious and that part we agree. But what I do not fully agree with Assoc Prof Lim is that because of these changes, trade flows will no longer be important, global trade will no longer be important and, therefore, FTZs will no longer be important.

I think that is not quite in line with what we have seen, based on industry feedback, and also if we hear the speeches from the other Members in this House, including those with practical business experience, that is not what they are saying. They believe that FTZs continue to play an important role in supporting our position as a trade hub. And when we look at PSA's container volumes this year compared to last year, it is not going down. In fact, this year, our container volumes for PSA continues to grow.

That is why we need to invest for the future. We are putting in resources, building Tuas Port and expanding our container handling capacity. We are building T5 at Changi Airport and getting ready to be able to handle more passengers and more cargo.

All this is because we know that even though globalisation may affect global supply chains, the world still needs trade. If we position ourselves as a trusted competitive trade hub, we can still capture a slice of the pie.

I also wish to clarify one example that Assoc Prof Jamus Lim mentioned in his speech – Le Freeport. He gave this as an example of how lack of compliance would affect its status as an FTZ. Sir, I wish to clarify that Le Freeport, despite its name, is not an FTZ. It is a high-security warehouse facility located near Changi Airport that is modelled after similar institutions in Geneva and Luxembourg. Le Freeport Singapore offers climate-controlled storage solutions for both businesses and individuals, enabling storage of valuable assets, such as art, wine and precious metals. But it is not an FTZ.

Mr Speaker, let me conclude. Our trade facilitation regime today is highly competitive. The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (2023), which ranks countries’ performance on trade logistics, placed Singapore first in almost all categories, including customs and border management, trade-related infrastructure and timeliness of shipments. This is not a given. Maintaining our status as a trusted hub for global trade takes constant, proactive effort by our agencies, with support from our tripartite partners. Our industry, our unions, our workers, everyone has been working very hard to contribute to this outcome.

This Bill is part of that effort. The proposed amendments seek to enhance the regulation and control of goods that flow through our FTZs. They will strengthen Customs’ ability to detect and deter illegal actors from misusing our FTZs, while maintaining a business-friendly operating environment that minimises compliance cost and facilitates efficient transshipment of goods.

Today, we seek to formalise these amendments into law and, in doing so, put Singapore on a stronger footing to combat illicit trade and remain a critical node in global trade flows. This will help Singapore to safeguard our position as a global trade hub in the years ahead. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

Clarifications for the Senior Minister of State? Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Speaker. Sir, let me clarify two points. One has to do with Le Freeport. Just to be clear, and I am willing to stand corrected, but based on what I have checked, Le Freeport is located within a duty-free zone that is in the Changi Airport Logistics Hub. And I believe that the Changi Airport Logistics Hub is one of the nine free trade zones that are within Singapore. Again, I am willing to stand corrected on this.

On the second matter, the Senior Minister of State has stated that free trade remains an important part of our future economy and he cited a number that is based on the fact that our ports have, in fact, had a record volume of flows. This is heartening and I do not wish to convey the impression that I think that trade is unimportant. The point that I was trying to make was, firstly, unless the Senior Minister of State wishes to correct this point, unless he challenges the fact that trade, merchandise trade, as a share of global GDP has stagnated for about 15 years, the reality is that we have reached a kind of a peak in terms of the amount of trade relative to GDP. This does not mean that trade will not continue to grow as GDP grows. Trade will continue to grow.

But I think the point I was trying to make is that the future of free trade zones is not a growth industry, but rather one that is a mature industry and where we should focus on is much more on other areas, such as information flows.

Mr Speaker, I think, first, we have to get our facts correct. Le Freeport is not a free trade zone. It is not a free trade zone. I hope that clears up what is factually true and what is factually not true.

Second, this point about whether FTZs are going to be an area of growth or a mature sector, I think that is perhaps an area where we could agree to disagree. Assoc Prof Lim may have his opinion, I would have my opinion. We may not agree, but I respect that he has a different view.

I do not agree, Sir, with the characterisation that we no longer need FTZs or that trade is no longer going to be important to Singapore, for two reasons. First, as I explained in my earlier response, the world is going through a reconfiguration of supply chains. That part we agree. Globalisation is not going to proceed in the same way as what it has been in the past few decades.

However, the world still needs to trade. Cargo still needs to flow. There will still be supply chains. It is just that the supply chains will be configured differently.

The key for us is not whether trade is important or not important. The key for us is, if this is going to continue, how do we then adjust our strategy and prepare ourselves to be ready to tap on this new landscape so that if the trade flows reconfigure, can Singapore still remain a key node in global supply chains? This would then have an impact on whether in Singapore, this would be a growth area or this would be a stagnant area. That is how I view it.

So, how do we prepare ourselves, Sir? By investing for the future. I think the hardware part is clear: we need the capacity, T5, Tuas Port. I mentioned this. But even more important than the hardware, we need the operating systems, we need the workers to be ready, we need the workers to be trained. This is the part where Singapore is also able to, because of our strong tripartite partnership, build a strong, competitive ecosystem that will allow us to differentiate ourselves from the competitors.

So, if you look at COVID-19, where many airports and ports were disrupted, we kept our airport and ports open. We allowed supply chains to continue, we supported global supply chains to continue. In fact, Singapore was used as a catch-up port by many of the shipping lines. Now that COVID-19 is behind us, this trusted reputation that we have built up during the crisis is now paying some dividends. People are now looking at Singapore and saying that "this is a place that we can rely on, this is a trusted hub".

So, I see what we are doing here – the FTZ Bill – as an enhancement of that strategy because we are cautiously optimistic about the future of trade in Singapore and the importance of connectivity to our economy.

Any other clarifications for the Senior Minister of State? None.

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]

[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Chee Hong Tat]. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Minister for Home Affairs.

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

The Societies Act governs the registration of societies. It ensures that groups that may be used for unlawful purposes, pose a threat to safety and security, or whose activities are contrary to our national interests, are not allowed to establish themselves in Singapore.

To ensure that the Societies Act remains relevant and can continue to meet its intent, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has proposed a set of amendments to: (a) strengthen the regulation of societies to safeguard national interests and security; and (b) provide better clarity to the public on the registration requirements.

We had conducted engagement sessions with selected societies in 2022 and 2023, as well as a public consultation exercise in 2022 via the REACH platform. The feedback was supportive of the proposed amendments. Let me now go through the provisions of the Bill.

First, we aim to strengthen the registration process. Currently, applications to register societies can be processed via two routes.

The Normal Route is for applications that fall within the categories specified in the Schedule of the Societies Act. These societies are involved in issues which are more sensitive, such as politics, religion, race, language and nationality. Such applications go through vetting and assessment by the Registrar of Societies, which may involve several rounds of clarifications with the applicant. The Registrar has the authority to reject applications submitted via the Normal Route.

We also have the Automatic Route. This was introduced in 2004, for applications that do not fall within the categories specified in the Schedule of the Societies Act. It is meant for societies involved in issues which are less sensitive. For these applications, the Societies Act currently states that the Registrar shall, without making any further inquiry, register these societies on the date the Registrar receives the application, so long as the formal requirements for registration are met.

In the last five years, we received about 1,400 applications. About half of them were submitted via the Automatic Route. This differentiated approach in processing applications has allowed MHA to focus its attention on assessing the more sensitive applications. That said, there are two gaps.

First, there were instances when the Registrar needed information to ascertain whether applications under the Automatic Route indeed did not fall within the sensitive categories in the Schedule of the Societies Act. However, the current law does not allow the Registrar to seek clarifications of such applications.

Second, even if an application does not fall within the sensitive categories in the Schedule, it could still be of concern. However, the Registrar currently has no authority to reject such applications. Clause 4 of the Bill, therefore, amends section 4A of the Societies Act to: remove the obligation on the Registrar to register a society under the Automatic Route without making an inquiry. This will allow the Registrar to make inquiries of applications submitted via the Automatic Route; and empower the Registrar to reject an application submitted via the Automatic Route, if the Registrar is satisfied that the society, if registered: (a) is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore; or (b) would be contrary to Singapore’s national security or interest.

Let me give Members a hypothetical example of the current gaps and how these amendments will address the gaps.

Suppose a group of individuals, with antecedents of concern, wished to set up a society to advocate for the interest of a racial group. However, they know that if they were to set up a society promoting the interests of a particular race, they would have to do so via the Normal Route, where the Registrar would be able to scrutinise their application, such as asking questions to clarify the objectives of the society and queries on their leadership composition. To avoid being questioned, this group tries to set up a society with an innocuous aim, such as a history interest group. Such an application could then be submitted via the Automatic Route, which currently, will be approved immediately.

The proposed amendments in the Bill would allow the Registrar to make inquiries on all applications submitted, for both Automatic and Normal Routes.

Clause 4 of the Bill adds a new section to allow appeals to the Minister for Home Affairs for rejected applications via the Automatic Route, similar to the existing appeal mechanism for applications via the Normal Route. If an appeal is rejected by the Minister, the applicants can launch a judicial review, no different from today. We expect the majority of applications for registration of societies to still go through the Automatic Route without the need for any clarifications.

Our next set of amendments seeks to clarify the Registrar’s powers for applications submitted via the Normal Route. Currently, under the Normal Route, the Registrar may request an applicant to insert clauses into their constitution, prior to allowing the registration of the society. This practice is in accordance with section 29(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act, which provides that a power to grant a licence, permit, approval or exemption, also includes the power to impose reasonable conditions.

For instance, to preserve Singapore’s multi-religious and multiracial harmony, the Registrar may request an applicant of a society that is involved in issues of race and religion to insert a clause that the society "shall not engage in any activities that may undermine racial or religious harmony in Singapore", as a condition for registration.

Clause 3 of the Bill inserts a new section 4(3A) to make it explicit that the Registrar has powers to require the rules of specified societies to be amended as a condition for registration. The Registrar can refuse to register the society if the society does not comply. Section 4(3A) does not list the grounds for which the Registrar will direct a specified society to amend its rules. However, this does not mean that the Registrar can require a society to include unreasonable rules into its Constitution, failing which the Registrar will reject an application.

The Registrar’s decisions must still have a nexus to the purpose of the Societies Act, which is to ensure that groups which may be used for unlawful purposes, or poses a threat to public order, welfare or good order in Singapore or which will be contrary to our national interests will not be established in Singapore.

Mr Speaker, I will now touch on amendments affecting registered societies.

Currently, under section 11 of the Societies Act, societies need to seek the Registrar’s approval to change their name or amend the rules in their constitution. The Societies Act is silent on the grounds on which the Registrar can refuse to approve such applications. To provide clarity to societies, clause 8 of the Bill amends section 11 to include the grounds on which the Registrar may refuse to approve a change of name or an amendment of provisions in the societies’ constitution. For example, the Registrar can refuse to approve a change in name if the new name is likely to mislead members of the public as to the true character or purpose of the society.

The Registrar can refuse to approve a change in the constitution if it would be contrary to Singapore’s national interest or prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore. For avoidance of doubt, the Registrar will not be limited to the grounds stated in the Act.

Under section 12(1)(b) of the Societies Act, the Minister can currently declare a person to be unfit to be an officer of a society by reason of any conviction for a criminal offence, for example, where the officer is convicted for dishonesty, such as fraud, scam, cheating or misuse of monies, as well as offences under the Societies Act. An "officer" here refers to committee members and does not include members of the society.

For ease of administration, clause 10 of the Bill amends section 12(1)(b) of the Societies Act to allow the Registrar, instead of the Minister, to declare a person as unfit to be an officer of a society. The Minister will be the appellate authority. A person who is declared to be unfit by the Registrar can apply to the Minister for permission to act as an officer of a society.

Currently, section 2 of the Societies Act defines the place of business of a registered society as "the place where the records and books of account of a society is kept". This is too narrow in today’s context where virtual offices and storage of documents on the cloud are common. Instead of place of business, clause 2 of the Bill amends section 2 of the Societies Act to refer to "registered address" instead, defined as the address of the society that is kept and maintained with the Registrar. Consequential amendments will be made throughout the Societies Act.

The next set of amendments are on the offences.

The last review of the penalties in the Societies Act was done in 2004, 19 years ago. We are increasing the fine quantum for all the offences in the Societies Act to keep up with inflation and to ensure that the fine quantum continues to have a deterrent effect. In addition, we have updated the offences of providing false information to the Registrar.

Currently, sections 10 and 29 of the Societies Act penalise the failure to provide information and the provision of false information to the Registrar. Clauses 7 and 14 of the Bill update these provisions to align with the language used in newer Acts, such as the Debt Collection Act.

In particular, on the provision of false information to the Registrar, the fault element of the offender is presently not mentioned in sections 10 and 29. This means that even if a person provided false or inaccurate information by mistake, he would be in breach.

MHA's view is that only those who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly provide false or inaccurate information should be liable. Clauses 7 and 14 of the Bill, therefore, amend the fault element of these offences accordingly.

Clause 15 of the Bill introduces a new section 30A to allow the Registrar to compound offences in the Societies Act as an alternative to charging offenders in Court.

The Bill also includes amendments to facilitate the administration and regulation of societies.

First, we are proposing amendments to allow for electronic transmission of documents. These are in clauses 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 16 of the Bill.

Second, currently, application fees are to be paid upon approval of applications before the society is registered. MHA intends to charge the fee upon submission of an application, as costs will have to be incurred to assess the application, regardless of whether the registration is approved. Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill give effect to this.

Third, societies which are charities presently have to file their annual submissions to two separate authorities, the Registry of Societies and Charities Unit. To reduce the administrative burden on societies which are also charities, a one-stop service will be established which allows such societies to file their annual submissions only once. Clause 17 of the Bill introduces new sections to allow the Registrar to prescribe different forms for them. The details of the one-stop service will be worked out with Charities Unit later.

Mr Speaker, the amendments that MHA has proposed aim to strengthen and modernise the regulatory framework governing societies. I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to make just two short points in my speech.

I start by highlighting Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. Under Article 14(1)(c) of the Constitution, all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations.

However, this is not an untrammelled right. Article 14(2) specifically provides that Parliament may impose restrictions by law as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore, public order or morality. Further, Article 14(3) allows Parliament to impose, by law, restrictions relating to labour or education.

The Societies Act 1966 is a piece of legislation that Parliament passed to impose the restrictions contemplated in Article 14(2). We can appreciate, therefore, that the Act performs an important gatekeeping function.

Indeed, in 2004, when the Act was last amended, the hon Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs then, Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee, stated as follows in this House and I quote, "The Societies Act plays a gate-keeping role in ensuring that groups which may be used for unlawful purposes, or pose a threat to public order, welfare or good order in Singapore, or which will be contrary to our national interests are not allowed to establish themselves in Singapore."

The operative provision is section 4 of the Act which vests with the Registrar the power to refuse the registration of a specified society in enumerated circumstances. These include situations where, in the opinion of the Registrar, the specified society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace as contemplated in Article 14(2) of the Constitution.

Save for the enumerated circumstances, it is provided in section 4(1) of the Act that the Registrar shall register the society upon certain conditions being fulfilled.

The current arrangement makes good sense as it gives primacy to the constitutional right of Singaporeans to form associations, save in certain circumstances. At the same time, there is clarity on the basis upon which the Registrar can reject a society’s application. This was specifically acknowledged by Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee in this House in the same speech. He said and I quote, "In the first instance, the Registrar will have the discretion to look at applications. But his discretion is not an unfettered one… He bases his discretion on the Act itself. Section 4 of the Act sets out the premises upon which he can reject a society's application."

Under clause 3(a) of the Bill, it is proposed that the Registrar is vested with a discretion instead. The word "shall" is proposed to be replaced with "may".

On the face of it, it is proposed that the Registrar is to be given a certain measure of discretion to decide whether or not to register a specified society. On the face of it, the ambit of discretion is not specifically spelt out, save that it is subject to several circumstances set out in section 4 where the Registrar has the specific power to refuse registration of specified societies.

May I ask the hon Minister of State how would such a proposed amendment be aligned with Article 14 of the Constitution and the purpose behind section 4 of the Act as spelt out by Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee in this House in 2004?

In a similar vein, I seek the hon Minister of State's explanation on the proposal to vest in the Registrar the power to not register a specified society unless the rules of the society include or exclude provisions that the Registrar may direct. This is set out in clause 3(c) of the Bill.

Again, having regard to the constitutional provisions that I have highlighted earlier in my speech, may I ask what the ambit of this power will be? And I understand from the hon Minister of State's speech that it is meant to be used where national interests are engaged. But interestingly, unlike the power when you are dealing with amendments of rules, which is spelt out in clause 8(c) of the Bill, the grounds in respect of which the Registrar may invoke a direction to amend the rules is absent, when it comes to requiring the applicant to amend the rules at the point of application before the society is even registered. So, there is a dichotomy in the approach.

May I ask the hon Minister of State whether it is contemplated that the power would always be exercised in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution? Notwithstanding my comments, I support the Bill.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Speaker, the automatic registration regime was the main amendment introduced in the Societies (Amendment) Bill in 2004.

That was, in turn, derived from a recommendation by the Remaking Singapore Committee, chaired by then Minister of State for National Development, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, to adopt a differentiated approach by listing down explicitly the types of societies that would require prior approval. Those outside the list would be "automatically" approved and registered.

The Committee added a caveat that the registrations of such societies could still be revoked if they were subsequently found to use the society for unlawful purposes.

MHA then consulted the public on this and public feedback was generally supportive. MHA then finetuned the feedback received and finalised the scheme.

Under the 2004 Societies (Amendment) Bill, the "automatic regime" required the Registrar of Societies to register these societies on the date the application is received without making further inquiries, as long as the payment of the prescribed fee and other formalities are met.

During the Second Reading of the Bill in 2004, the then Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs, Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee, said that the amendments would "make it easier for many societies to be registered" and that "the changes are in line with the Government's move to loosen up restrictions to encourage greater social entrepreneurship." He called this automatic regime a "forward-looking approach".

The Bill before us today reverses some of the liberalisations to the Societies Act in 2004. It seeks to allow the Registrar to require further information to ascertain whether the society does, indeed, qualify for registration via the Automatic Route.

The Bill also allows the Registrar to reject an application submitted via the Automatic Route if the Registrar is satisfied that the society, if registered, is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore or would be contrary to Singapore's national interests or security. This effectively removes the automatic registration process in all but name, as every registration, even for societies that are not specified in the Schedule, will, henceforth, be subject to additional scrutiny. Thus, if the 2004 amendments were a "forward-looking approach", this Bill appears to be a backward-looking approach.

Why are the amendments to the automatic registration route now necessary? What has changed between 2004, when they were introduced, and now?

Section 24(1) of the Act already empowers the Minister to dissolve a society if it had secured automatic registration through false declaration or misrepresentation of its objects and activities at the point of registration. If there is need for an addition to the list of specified societies listed in the Schedule, the Minister is already empowered under section 33A to amend the Schedule by notification in the Gazette. If the society engages in illegal activities, it can be dealt with through a whole host of laws to safeguard national security and racial and religious harmony.

The Minister of State has cited hypothetical examples. Does she have real examples of society applications submitted since 2004 under the Automatic Route where one or both of the "two gaps" she mentioned were breached? What instances were there of registrations of non-specified societies that posed a national security threat and should not have been registered and how did the Registrar deal with those cases?

How many applications to form societies were rejected or refused registration by the Registrar in the past five years and what were the reasons for their rejection or refusal of registration?

Since 2004, we have seen a proliferation of access to the worldwide web, social media, smartphones and artificial intelligence. There is no shortage of data for the authorities to conduct background checks on applicants, even without asking them for more information.

Additionally, questionnaires can be built into the online application form and the applicants' answers to these questions could be used to flag out societies that are not eligible for the automatic registration route. The applicant can then be immediately notified to select the normal registration route before submitting their application.

If all these gates fail and the society gets registered through misrepresentation, the Minister can dissolve the society under section 24(1).

Groups nowadays can easily organise themselves over closed chatgroups and will likely avoid going through the hassle of registering a society if it is made more onerous. It will impose a greater burden on law-abiding groups who diligently register their societies.

By placing more hurdles for groups seeking to organise formally, the unintended effect could be to drive them and their activities underground. When this happens, the Registry of Societies will lose regulatory oversight of their financial conduct, which is one area where regulation is necessary in the public interest. Can the Minister of State assure the House that genuine applications under the Automatic Route will not face longer waiting periods for approval than under the current regime?

Finally, why do societies discussing issues related to civil or political rights, or the governance of Singapore society remain listed in the Schedule? The inclusion of these types of societies in the Schedule means that they cannot be registered under the Automatic Route.

Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee said in 2004 that "such groups, which aim to promote a particular cause, can potentially give rise to law and order problems if they engage actively in pushing their agenda, without due regard for those who may not agree with their cause." Is this still the Government's position and, more importantly, is that the only reason? I look forward to the Minister of State's answers to my questions.

Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.05 pm. Order. Order.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 3.45 pm until 4.05 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.05 pm

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]

[(proc text) Debate resumed. (proc text)]

Ms Ng Ling Ling.

Mr Deputy Speaker, social groups play a critical role in fostering social cohesion among Singaporeans. They serve as platforms for the development of strong bonds and community relations, uniting individuals from various social and cultural backgrounds. By forming a society, these groups establish a common identity among members who share a specific objective or purpose. Societies provide a setting for members to engage in discussions or activities related to particular interests or issues in Singapore.

I appreciate MHA's effort in simplifying the process for registration of societies in the past. However, despite existing regulations governing the registration of societies, the evolving societal dynamics and complex international environment have made it more challenging to manage the risks and threats associated with social groups.

Societies can be vulnerable to, and potentially engage in, unlawful activities or be subject to undue foreign influence. Hence, I support the proposed Societies (Amendment) Bill, aimed at strengthening safeguards against such threats.

I would like to focus my speech on three clarifications: one, the Automatic Route's comprehensive vetting process; two, the criteria for special appeals to the Minister for Home Affair; and three, strategies for safeguarding against undue foreign influence on societies that focus on sensitive issues like politics, race and religion.

Firstly, in the amendment Bill, clause 4 amends section 4A to empower the Registrar to refuse to register a society that is not specified in a Schedule, or a non‑specified society, if the Registrar is satisfied that the non‑specified society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace.

With the amendment, non-specified societies that apply via the Automatic Route are subject to inquiries by the Registrar to ascertain if they, indeed, qualify for registration via the Automatic Route. It is essential to strike a balance between enabling the formation of societies and ensuring that these groups do not pose risks to national security or public order. I believe that the proposed amendment aims to serve this very purpose. However, I seek to understand the methodology that the Registrar will employ to make these judgements. How comprehensive will the vetting process be and what measures will be put in place to ensure that societies with potential risks are effectively identified?

Additionally, I would like to clarify with MHA on the specific criteria that will be employed to assess whether societies are engaged in unlawful activities that will be prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore. This will offer greater clarity to the public, as well as existing and prospective societies, on the conditions that must be met to ensure compliance.

Secondly, clause 4 of the Bill also amends section 4A to provide the right of appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs from the decision of the Registrar not to register or to refuse a non-specified society. This provides a means for groups to be able to seek redress if they feel that they have a strong case for registration. This appeal process ensures opportunity for due process and serves as an important check-and-balance mechanism. On this issue, I would like to ask MHA how many appeals have been reviewed over the years by the Minister for both scheduled and non-specified societies, and on what grounds are the appeals granted by the Minister.

Lastly, it is worth noting the susceptibility of registered societies in Singapore to foreign influence interests through covert operations. We are reminded that in today's globalised world, the reach of foreign powers is not limited by borders and this makes the regulations of our societies even more imperative.

I hope to understand how MHA intends to combat that in this amendment Bill. While clause 9 of the amendment Bill, which modifies section 11A, clearly empowers the Registrar to mandate rule changes for specified societies as a condition for registration, I am concerned if this is sufficient to manage potential risks.

This formal compliance might appease the authorities on paper, but there remains the risk that the society in question could continue to pursue unlawful objectives. Therefore, I seek clarification from MHA on the mechanisms in place to ensure that undue foreign influence does not infiltrate specified societies discussing or promoting issues related to sensitive issues.

Additionally, will non-specified societies be directed or asked to modify their constitutions if they are identified as engaging in causes that seem to discuss or promote issues that are not aligned with a specific policy or the national interest of Singapore?

In closing, Mr Deputy Speaker, we cannot overlook the delicate balance that must be maintained between allowing societies and interest groups to grow and safeguarding national security. Internal security is of paramount importance to safeguard Singapore against social divisions that destabilise and tear apart any social fabric.

As I have raised earlier, we must ensure that our legal frameworks are robust enough to protect our community groups from being exploited for unlawful purposes. As such, the registration of our societies, whether specified under the Schedule of the Societies Act or not, should advance objectives in promoting communal harmony and the interest of all Singaporeans. Notwithstanding my clarifications raised, I support the Bill.

Dr Syed Harun Alhabsyi.

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I would like to first declare my interests as a past and current serving office-bearer of several societies. More relevant and presently, I am the President of Lembaga Biasiswa Kenangan Maulud and Honorary Secretary of Singapore Psychiatric Association. And I also have memberships in a few other registered societies.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I read the Societies (Amendment) Bill with much interest and, if I may, there is a certain duality that exists within the Bill.

The first of this duality is that it firmly entrenches our determination as a country to maintain public peace, welfare and good order, and protect what is in our national interest. It also suggests and reinforces that we make no apologies in protecting our Singapore society against undesirable and offensive influences that could fracture us along naturally occurring differences, such as religious and racial identities, or against ideas that are rooted in illegal activities or arising from foreign interference.

I am also heartened that the Bill's reach goes wide enough to be able to hold accountable persons who, directly or by proxy, allow any unlawful assembly, induce membership, publish materials and procure subscription and aid for the purposes of such unlawful societies.

I think these rules are necessary and the spirit of the amendments keeps pace with our desire to protect society against such detrimental activities.

The second of this duality, Mr Deputy Speaker, is that the Bill, notwithstanding the increase of maximum punishments and fines and clarifications on the powers of the Registrar of Societies, provides latitude for societies to flourish and for like-minded individuals to share their common perspectives and come together to advocate, to promote, to discuss and to deepen understanding of a wide set of issues and interests. These can range from issues relating to ethnicity, to religion, to nationality or language, to political inclinations, to civil liberties and rights, to the environment and even to animal welfare.

In this regard, the importance of societies within our society cannot be understated. Societies are like ingredients to the recipe of what Singapore is and could become. And beyond political affiliations in this House, I can say with a degree of confidence that many hon Members of the House are, or previously have been, members of societies and ground-up initiatives as well.

The nature of the establishment of any one society necessarily involves a group of people invested in a particular topic or issue enough to want to make formal a cause to call their collective own. It tells of a tale of a determined advocacy and of a meeting of intellectual minds and of a sense of belonging via a common thread, theme and identity.

By extension, this adds much richness and diversity to Singapore because societies, directly or indirectly, develop a rootedness to the local community, allow for outlets of philanthropy and groom the next generation of community leadership.

Mr Deputy Speaker, for youths especially, societies give opportunity to cultivate new ideas, address contemporary issues of interest and advocate for emerging concerns relevant to them and their future.

The thing about new ideas though, especially those without precedent and appearing as foreign and unfamiliar at the onset, is that they may well be seen as an affront initially to the current norm and equilibrium. New ideas could be viewed with much doubt, cynicism or even distrust by the establishment.

I hope that while the Ministry maintains its firm hand on the powers accorded by the Bill to be decisive when it comes to issues of national interest and security, that it also tempers the weight of this responsibility with an even-handed approach to some novelty, creativity, youthful exuberance and unusual ideas so that Singapore society can flourish from the diversity in our societies.

Beyond looking at the current laws and regulations, one must also recognise that the texture and grain of societies registered in any one era of our history tell us, to some extent, the matters of interest, influence and advocacy of the larger Singapore society then.

On 1 October 2023, via a simple search online on the Registry of Societies, I found that more than half, about 4,420 out of a total of 8,321 societies currently registered, are relatively new and were registered only at the turn of the century from 1 January 2001 onwards.

However, it is noteworthy that almost one in 10 registered societies today, or about 798 of them, had already existed pre-Independence more than 58 years ago.

Even as the Ministry is able to exercise its powers and authority, I would urge that the Ministry consider with some nuance, discernment and concern any dissolution of societies that have a long history, track record and legacy alongside Singapore's history.

It may well be that the cause remains as true, important and relevant today as it did pre-Independence, and it is just that the current prevailing interest, strength in leadership or continuity remain a temporary but periodic challenge for that particular society.

Rather than reinventing new organisations at every turn, I urge some discretion to give time and support for such societies, steeped in history and legacy, to recalibrate its identity and reinvigorate itself anew rather than be dissolved. Mr Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): The Societies (Amendment) Bill encompasses, among others, Malay/Muslim community organisations which have existed for a long time and did a lot of good for the community since the 1960s. Apart from LBKM, there are also other organisations like Alwehdah, Jamiyah, PERDAUS, PPIS and 4PM which have served for decades in community matters.

These organisations have their own emphasis and focus based on their areas of expertise and specialisation. Although their specific focus area may be different, just like the interdependent bamboo and riverbank, these organisations have shown a desire to work together to address the concerns of the community and the nation.

These organisations have a strong link to Singapore's history and have sculpted, shaped and influenced the lives of our community in Singapore together.

It is normal that many youths want to try out new interests and, sometimes, these interests seem to go against the cultural norms of the day. Although the sculpture may appear different, the style, nonetheless, remains the same: these youths have a deep desire and commitment to serve and uplift society.

At the same time, I also call on youths and professionals to contribute to prominent organisations, and it is not something that is old-fashioned or backward; far from it.

In fact, lately, the torch of leadership in some organisations have already been passed on to the next generation of leaders. They still value legacy and history and have gained confidence and benefited from the knowledge and experience of past leaders.

Some members of these organisations have stepped forward and seized the opportunity to participate in national conversations, such as the National Youth Council and the National Council of Social Services, as well as in the international arena, such as the ASEAN Youth Fellowship.

I hope the Government can balance the need to be firm when enforcing the regulations through this Societies (Amendment) Bill. I fully support the use of tough and expeditious methods to prevent organisations from being corrupt and unlawful or from having divisive elements.

At the same time, I also hope that the Government can recognise the tremendous legacy, history and contributions of organisations that have been working hard over the decades to do good for the people of Singapore.

New and contemporary ideas may sometimes cause misunderstanding initially due to differences in perspective, but if these ideas essentially stem from a desire to uplift society together, I think we should allow such ideas to be explored.

Sooner or later, changes and new ideas will become inevitable. In fact, a sign of a maturing society is when it gives due attention to renewal and recalibration after careful consideration.

(In English): Mr Deputy Speaker, to conclude, I am in firm support of our stance to protect fiercely our national security and interests. I am also of the view that civil society needs space to flourish and grow as well, because the nature of interests, texture of advocacy and the tenor of the times will certainly shift as the years go by.

And as these shift, tension will surely exist now and then between new, seemingly disruptive ideas and the prevailing social norm. These may be seen as presenting a challenge to the existing good order of things initially. My hope is that the Ministry considers these factors with perspective and discernment where they apply. Mr Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of this Bill.

Assoc Prof Razwana Begum.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of the Societies (Amendment) Bill.

This Bill strengthens the regulatory framework, expands the power of the regulator and provides clarity on the registration and administration of societies.

The proposed changes will enable societies to function effectively while remaining vigilant to the vulnerabilities and threats that may affect the society, its members and beneficiaries. These regulatory measures are necessary to ensure public safety and security.

It is important to note that the need for regulation and oversight of registered societies goes beyond enforcing laws and norms. They act as preventive measures, deterring potential wrongdoers from engaging in harmful activities. By providing clear guidelines and enforcing consequences, regulations create a culture of accountability, discouraging individuals from taking advantage of others or exploiting loopholes for personal gain.

Mr Deputy Speaker, at this juncture, I would like to declare my involvement in societies as a board member, office-bearer and an advisor.

Sir, societies are valuable partners in our social service sector. Societies complement the Government's service delivery, foster civic engagement and play a crucial role in addressing social and economic issues, such as poverty, healthcare, housing and education. Their programmes and services can assist, improve the quality of life for vulnerable populations, reduce inequality and discrimination and promote social inclusion. We need to recognise and celebrate their contribution.

It is, however, also important to remember the increasing threats connected with societies and it is reasonable that the Government provide some level of regulation and oversight of societies. This regulation and oversight must, however, be proportionate to the need.