Court of Appeal · Decided 19 November 2019
Independent State of Papua New Guinea v PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd
Feedback & support[2019] SGCA 72 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 78 of 2019 (Summons No 116 of 2019) · 18 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] I will, in these grounds, refer to the applicant in SUM 116 (ie, the respondent in CA 78) as “PNGSDP” and the respondent in SUM 116 (ie, the appellant in CA 78) as “the State”.
Background
- [7]
[7] Subsequently, on 15 August 2019, PNGSDP’s solicitors wrote to the State’s solicitors, demanding payment of the total sum of $2,522,356.07 (the “Outstanding Sum”) by 22 August 2019. The Outstanding Sum comprised the following:
(b) the portion of the costs of interlocutory applications in the consolidated proceedings fixed by the Judge which remained unpaid by the State totalling $186,300; and
(c) the disbursements agreed between the parties on 22 September 2017 and 24 October 2017 for the interlocutory applications in the consolidated proceedings amounting to $16,056.07.
- [9]
[9] Having received no further reply from the State’s solicitors, PNGSDP filed SUM 116 on 10 September 2019 for all further proceedings in CA 78 to be stayed until the State paid to PNGSDP:
(a) the Outstanding Sum; and
The basis of the application was this court’s inherent powers, as expressly preserved under O 92 r 4 of the Rules of Court.
- [12]
[12] In addition, as at the time of the hearing, the State’s case in the appeal had been filed (on 23 September 2019), while PNGSDP’s case in the appeal was due on 11 October 2019.
- [13]
[13] Having heard the parties’ submissions at the hearing for SUM 116, I dismissed the application. CA 78 is currently fixed for hearing before the Court of Appeal in January 2020.
Parties’ submissions
PNGSDP’s submissions
- [16]
[16] First, PNGSDP argued that the State was able but simply unwilling to pay the Outstanding Sum as it had not provided a convincing explanation for its continued non-payment of the sum. The fact that the State was acting in bad faith in not paying the Outstanding Sum was also allegedly evidenced by its past conduct in the consolidated proceedings. As the State was able but unwilling to pay the Outstanding Sum, the stay of the appeal would not stifle the State’s right of appeal and cause prejudice to it, since it would only delay the appeal pending payment of the Outstanding Sum plus interest.
The State’s submissions
- [19]
[19] The State denied PNGSDP’s allegations that it had acted in bad faith in the consolidated proceedings. It argued that such allegations were without merit and in any event, bore no connection to the present stay application. It also denied PNGSDP’s allegation that it was able but unwilling to pay the Outstanding Sum. It explained that it faced difficulties in paying the Outstanding Sum because of strict foreign exchange controls in place, which made it difficult for it to transfer large sums of foreign currency at short notice.
- [20]
[20] The State further highlighted the fact that PNGSDP had filed the present application without having made any prior attempt to enforce the Outstanding Sum. It argued that PNGSDP was seeking to stifle its right of appeal by bringing the stay application.
Legal authorities
Locus classicus: Roberto
On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the stay ought not to have been granted.
SOPA cases
- [27]
[27] In FT Plumbing, the defendant succeeded in adjudication proceedings against the plaintiff and sought to enforce the adjudication determination as a judgment debt. The plaintiff commenced a suit against the defendant, seeking a final determination of the dispute arising out of the construction contract between the parties. The defendant applied to stay the suit, alleging that the plaintiff’s commencement of the suit amounted to an abuse of process of the court given that the plaintiff had not paid the adjudicated amount to the defendant. The issue considered by the assistant registrar in FT Plumbing was whether it would be an abuse of process for the losing party in an adjudication to commence proceedings in court to obtain a final determination of the underlying dispute between the parties despite not having paid the adjudicated amount (FT Plumbing at [19]). Following the case of Lim Poh Yeoh, the assistant registrar granted the stay, rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that it genuinely did not have the ability to make payment (at [68]).
English cases
- [30]
[30] Under the English Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”), the appellate court has a discretion to “impose … conditions upon which an appeal may be brought” where there was a “compelling reason” for doing so (CPR 52.18(1)(c) read with 52.18(2)). Singapore does not have a similar provision.
- [34]
[34] In the recent case of Goldtrail Travel Ltd (in liquidation) v Onur Air Tasimacilik AS [2018] 1 All ER 721 (“Goldtrail Travel Ltd”), the UK Supreme Court approved of the Court of Appeal’s holdings in Hammond Suddard at [41(1)]–[41(3)], including the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the likely difficulties faced by the successful party in enforcement as a relevant factor in the consideration of whether there was a compelling reason for the stay to be granted (Goldtrail Travel Ltd at [21]). It cautioned, however, against the Court of Appeal’s phraseology at [41(4)] concerning the issue of when the appellant’s access to funds from a third party could be taken into account in assessing the likelihood that it could make payment of the judgment debt (see Goldtrail Travel Ltd at [22]). The UK Supreme Court also emphasised that a condition to the appellant’s continuation of the appeal should not be imposed where the effect of such a condition would be to stifle the appeal. The Supreme Court observed in particular (per Lord Wilson, with whom Lord Neuberger P and Lord Hodge agreed):
- [35]
[35] In my judgment, the following principles may be distilled from the above-cited three English cases:
(a) In an application by the respondent for a stay of appeal pending payment by the appellant of the judgment debt or costs below, the respondent has to show that there is a “compelling reason” for such a stay to be granted. A compelling reason is provided if the respondent would likely face difficulties in enforcing the judgment in the event the appellant loses the appeal, and the appellant’s non-payment of the judgment debt or costs is not due to financial difficulty but an illegitimate reason.
The court’s decision
Abuse of process
- [39]
[39] First, PNGSDP relied on the case of Lim Poh Yeoh to argue that a stay should be granted because the State was allegedly able but unwilling to pay the Outstanding Sum. As for the reason provided by the State for its continued non-payment of the Outstanding Sum, that is, the strict foreign exchange controls in place in Papua New Guinea, PNGSDP argued that the State failed to explain how the policies affected the payment due. Further, the State had only said that it was “difficult” and not impossible to transfer the Outstanding Sum. The logical conclusion, it argued, was that the State could afford to pay the Outstanding Sum but was deliberately and wilfully refusing to make payment.
- [40]
[40] I found that there was insufficient evidence in the present case establishing that the State was deliberately and wilfully refusing to pay the Outstanding Sum, and abusing the process of the court as a result, unlike the judgment debtor in Lim Poh Yeoh. As mentioned above, in Lim Poh Yeoh, the High Court made an express finding that the judgment debtor was cherry-picking which outstanding orders of court to comply with so that she would not weaken the legal position that she was adopting in the proceedings. This demonstrated her attempt to “game the system”, specifically to “use the power of [the] Court when it suit[ed] her and disregard it when it [did] not” (see above at [26]).
- [41]
[41] Turning to the present case, I accepted that there were some inadequacies in the evidence given by the State on the reasons for its continued non-payment of the Outstanding Sum. For instance, while the State’s position was that existing foreign exchange controls made it difficult to make payment at “short notice”, no detail was provided as to the estimated amount of time it needed to transfer the sums owed to PNGSDP. In addition, no explanation was provided as to why the State would have difficulty in meeting its own foreign exchange controls. That said, these were insufficient to lead to the conclusion that the State’s continued non-payment of the Outstanding Sum was deliberate and wilful, and clearly an abuse of process of the court. Unlike in Lim Poh Yeoh, there was no evidence that the State was able to make payment and in failing to pay the Outstanding Sum, attempting to “game the system”. This case was therefore not a “rare” one in which the justice of the case required that the stay be granted (see Roberto at [19]).
- [42]
[42] Second, PNGSDP submitted that the fact that the State was acting in bad faith in failing to pay the Outstanding Sum was evidenced by its past conduct in the consolidated proceedings, where the State allegedly made numerous attempts to re-characterise its claims against PNGSDP, resulting in a protracted litigation between the parties. PNGSDP also claimed that the State’s claims against it were “contrived” and that it had suffered prejudice as a result of having to defend the State’s claims in the consolidated proceedings. This was because of, amongst others, an interim injunction obtained by the State which prevented PNGSDP from effecting changes to its memorandum, articles of association and board of directors and which required it to regularly furnish information to the State on its assets and liabilities, pending the outcome of the litigation.
- [44]
[44] In the circumstances, I found that there was no evidence that the State was deliberately and wilfully refusing to pay the Outstanding Sum, and abusing the process of the court as a result.
Difficulties in enforcement
(a) Under s 5 of the Papua New Guinea Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1976 (Cap 50) (“REOJA”), a successful registration of a judgment may be set aside on grounds of public policy.
(b) If the registration of the judgment is not set aside under s 5 of the REOJA, pursuant to s 13(2) of the Papua New Guinea Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 (No 52 of 1996) (“CBAATSA”), to enforce the judgment, PNGSDP would have to serve a form on the Solicitor-General of Papua New Guinea. The Solicitor-General could endorse one of two options on the form. The first option was to allow the judgment to be satisfied. The second option was to certify that “the State proposes to take further action in this matter and satisfaction of judgment cannot take place”. While the legislation did not prescribe how the Solicitor-General’s discretion would be exercised “[p]resumably, it [would] be exercised in favour of the State and therefore to the detriment of PNGSDP”.
(c) Even if the Solicitor-General were to endorse that the judgment may be satisfied, the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters could only satisfy the judgment out of “moneys legally available”, pursuant to s 14(3) of the CBAATSA and it was unclear what that meant in practical terms.
(d) The Departmental Head responsible for finance matters also had the “absolute discretion” to make payment by instalments as long as the judgment was satisfied “within a reasonable time”, pursuant to s 14(4) of the CBAATSA.
(e) Under s 14(5) of the CBAATSA, no action for mandamus or contempt of court may lie against the Solicitor-General or Departmental Head responsible for finance matters in respect of satisfaction of a judgment under the CBAATSA, other than for failure to observe procedural requirements, or unless other exceptional circumstances could be shown.
- [47]
[47] In coming to my decision, I had regard to the principle established in Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and another appeal [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 (“Pacific Recreation”) that raw sources of foreign law, including foreign legal codes which are admissible under s 40 read in conjunction with s 86 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”), may be adduced as evidence of the foreign law (at [55]–[58]). However, in Pacific Recreation, the Court of Appeal explained that even if raw sources of foreign law were admissible under these sections of the Evidence Act, it did not mean that the courts were obliged to accord these sources any evidentiary weight, as it was preferable that solicitors provide expert opinions on foreign law whenever possible (at [60]).
Conclusion